result
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was acting to obtain a benefit on behalf of a charitable ... organization.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 8(B). As the district court saw it and as the government sees it, Webster deserves the enhancement. He pretended to “act[ ] on behalf of a charitable ... organization,” U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(A), when he solicited personal information from the victims on behalf of fake charities. As Webster sees it, the enhancement does not apply. In his view, the commentary limits the application of the charity enhancement, and he was not acting to obtain a benefit on behalf of a charitable organization (as the commentary seems to require). As a general matter, the text of a guideline trumps commentary about it. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (<HOLDING>). But we need not resolve whether the

    ### Response:
    holding that commentary is not authoritative if it is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of the guideline it interprets or explains
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a number of integers must be factored into the calculus— e.g., the nature of the information, the nature and characteristics of the supposed criminal activity, the nature and characteristics of the place to be searched, the nature of the items delineated in the warrant — and the likely endurance of the information must be gauged on that basis. See id.; see also United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 597 (1st Cir.1985), vacated on other grounds, 476 U.S. 1138, 106 S.Ct. 2241, 90 L.Ed.2d 688 (1986). The longer the expected duration of the criminal activity and the longer the expected life of the items attendant to it, the more likely that a datum from the seemingly distant past will be relevant to a current investigation. In this case, all signs point to ongoing an 10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Then, too, the troopers proposed to search

    ### Response:
    holding to like effect regarding laboratory equipment for the production of methamphetamine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Co., 947 S.W.2d 908, 913-14 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. denied), ovemiled on other grounds by Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 122-23 (Tex.2001), which held that, when policy gives absolute right to settle third-party claims, courts are not permitted to “engraft any consent requirement onto [the] policy”). The court recognized a separate issue was presented on whether the insurer owed extra-contractual duties to prudently investigate and settle claims. Id. However, because the policy gave the insurer the right to settle claims, its discretion in investigating and paying claims was not contractually limited. Id. Consequently, the court held the insured had no breach of contract action against the insurer as a matter of law. See id. at 89-90; see also Dear, 947 S.W.2d at 913-15 (<HOLDING>). Zurich contended that, likewise, Methodist’s

    ### Response:
    holding insured relinquished right to sue general liability insurer for breach of contract relative to insurers allegedly improper handling and payment of thirdparty claim by purchasing policy which gave insurer right to settle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a party from this litigation in the attached order. 7 . In the release, Smirman also took responsibility for the delay in the payment of the proceeds. After receiving the release, MetLife sent Smirman his account checkbook. 8 . As support for Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff submitted an expert opinion regarding standard insurance claims practices. We have read and considered the expert opinion, however we find that the expert opinion does not create a dispute of material fact in this matter. 9 . Section 8371 provides: In an action arising under an insurance policy, if tire court finds that the insurer has acted in bad faith toward the insured, the court may take all of the following actions: (1)Award inter 104 (E.D.Pa.1992) (<HOLDING>); Coyne v. Allstate Ins. Co., 771 F.Supp. 673

    ### Response:
    holding that courts may look to other statutes upon the same or similar subjects to define bad faith under section 8371
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because senior managers assign employees major responsibilities, performance standards, and CSFs at their discretion (id. at 15-17, 19). However, Dr. Banks concedes that evaluations and CSFs are not applied consistently between regions or between supervisors in the same regions, and that their assessments of employees are not comparable; “essentially their evaluations do not permit ‘apples to apples’ comparisons” (id. at 17-18, 27). This incomparability undermines plaintiffs claim of commonality: even if one supervisor used Allstate’s subjective employment practices “as a mask for discrimination,” that does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that any other supervisors did so. See, e.g., Morrison v. Panduit Corp., No. 03-3081, 2004 WL 3049816, at **2, 5 (7th Cir. Dec.21, 2004) (<HOLDING>). Dr. Banks’s opinion evidence does not

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence did not show that vice president discriminated against employee because vice president was not involved in many of the employment decisions at issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    38 S.Ct. 254, 257, 62 L.Ed. 664 (1918). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the phrase “arising under the instrument” in the declaratory judgment act to mean that the Texas courts could declare invalid only particular provisions of a will that has already been admitted to probate. Kausch, 470 F.2d at 1070. The court found that under the declaratory judgment act Texas courts “have no power to conduct an independent inquiry into the validity of the will as a testamentary instrument.” Id. Consequently, the federal court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim. Other courts have foúnd that actions to declare a will invalid under state declaratory judgment acts do not lie for various reasons. See Corron v. Corron, 40 Ohio St.3d 75, 79, 531 N.E.2d 708, 712 (1988) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Davidson v. Brate, 44 Ohio App.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an action challenging the validity of a will may not be brought under ohios declaratory judgment act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    GDHI took simultaneous title to both the Boat and its storage location— i.e., the Real Property. The parties therefore simply implied that delivery could occur at the same time as the execution of the Dation. Any additional physical delivery of the Boat was not necessary, and the Court concludes that Sharp conveyed the Boat to GDHI when it executed the Dation (on January 5, 2012). As a result, GDHI had no notice of the voidability of the transfer until after the conveyance of the Boat. Moreover, in the Final Order, the Texas Court never restrained Sharp from alienating the Boat; in fact, the TRO, the Temporary Injunction, and the Final Order never mention the Boat. Cf. Reliant Hosp. Partners, LLC v. Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holdings, Inc., 374 S.W.3d 488, 502 (Tex.App.2012) (<HOLDING>). Rather, these orders specifically describe

    ### Response:
    holding that under texr civ p 683 ejvery order granting an injunction must be specific in its terms and describe in reasonable detail the act or acts to be restrained
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with cases cited by plaintiffs finding that, in light of the California legislature’s decision to create statutory damages for each violation of CIPA, no separate showing of injury aside from a violation of the privacy rights protected'by CIPA is required. See, e.g., In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at *17-18, 2013 U.S. Dist.' LEXIS 172784, at *65-67 (N.D.Cal. Sep. 26, 2013) (rejecting an argument that § 632.7 requires independent injury aside from an invasion of statutory CIPA rights); Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 156, 167, 1 Cal. Rptr.3d 536 (2003) (“[A]n actionable violation of section 632 occurs the moment the surreptitious recording is made.”); Friddle v. Epstein, 16 Cal.App.4th 1649, 1661, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 85 (1993) (<HOLDING>). This finding is bolstered by the fact that §

    ### Response:
    holding that the right to recover statutory damages accrues at the moment the privacy act was violated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    involving the bribe, Muhammad maintains that the Government failed to prove that he acted with the specific intent to commit the offense and that it failed to demonstrate that he took a “substantial step” towards completing the crime. The federal bribery statute found at 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A) provides that a public official commits bribery when he “corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally ... in return for ... being influenced in the performance of any official act.” The language in the statute is disjunctive. In other words, a defendant violates § 201 by merely seeking or demanding a bribe, regardless of whether he accepts or even agrees to accept it. See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 863 F.2d 185, 189 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>) (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that  201b makes attempted bribery a crime and so long as a bribe is offered or promised with the requisite intent to influence any official act the crime is committed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). As such, it is well-established that generally a tort plaintiff is not required to proceed against all joint tortfeasors but may proceed against one, some or all of them. See Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 360 (2d Cir.2000) (citations omitted). Defendants do not articulate any interest of the Oneida Nation or the Casino which would be affected by the outcome of the claims against the other Defendants, nor is there anything in the record to suggest that any party would be prejudiced by permitting Plaintiffs to proceed against the other Defendants in the absence of the Oneida Nation and the Casino. Compare id. with Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Auth., 928 F.2d 542, 547 (2d Cir.1991) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court holds that the Oneida

    ### Response:
    holding that seneca nation is indispensable party to claims seeking to nullify agreement in which it has an interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Naturalization Act (“INA”), as amended by IIRIRA. Gonzalez-Oropeza v. United States Attorney Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1332 (11th Cir.2003). Petitioner contends that the IJ erred in finding that he was provided proper notice of his removal proceedings because the notice to appear was not sent to his current address. He cites Matter of G-Y-R, 2001 WL 1515819, 23 I & N Dec. 181 (BIA 2001), and its progeny for the proposition that a respondent cannot be ordered removed in absentia where the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) used an old address in serving the notice to appear and failed to warn the respondent of the consequences of failing to inform the government of a change of address. Petitioner also contends that Dominguez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 284 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), is distinguishable from his case, in that

    ### Response:
    holding that notice to an alien at the most recent address provided by the alien is legally sufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and waived, as indicated by his initials, reads, “I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.” Appellant also acknowledged waiver of these rights when questioned by the military judge at trial regarding the written waiver. Furthermore, Appellant acknowledged that his civilian attorney told him not to go into questioning without him and Appellant intentionally ignored that advice. Based on Appellant’s own testimony and actions in reviewing and signing the Article 31, UCMJ, rights form at the time of the interrogation, Appellant waived any right he may have had to have his counsel notified of and be present at the interrogation. See LeMasters, 39 M.J. at 493 (<HOLDING>). The current version of M.R.E. 305(e) does not

    ### Response:
    holding that notice to counsel may be waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980), cited in Envtl. Protection Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 257 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir.2001). An exception to this general rule permits the prevailing party to cross-appeal from a summary judgment if “the [collateral] adverse ruling can serve as the basis for collateral estoppel in subsequent litigation.” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 520 (9th Cir.1999). In this case, however, the determinations that Federal seeks to cross appeal will not have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent litigation because they were immaterial to the' judgment below. Envtl. Protection Info. Ctr., 257 F.3d at 1076. Moreover, Federal cannot appeal the judgment under Elec. Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241, 59 S.Ct. 860, 83 L.Ed. 1263 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The judgment in favor of Federal dismissed

    ### Response:
    holding that a party can seek reformation of a favorable decree that discusses issues immaterial to the final outcome
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proceedings under state statutes prohibiting sexual, racial, religious or similar discriminatory employment practices are preempted. Most of the pertinent state court decisions are in accord with the conclusion in Vaughn that the NLRA does not preempt proceedings under state statutes prohibiting employment discrimination on such bases. See, e.g., Bald v. RCA Alascom, 569 P2d 1328 (Alas 1977), and cases there cited; Walker Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 27 Wis 2d 669, 135 NW 2d 307 (1965). In Bald, the Alaska court indicated that the NLRA is not centrally concerned with those forms of discrimination. 569 P2d at 1334; see also McDonald v. West Branch, 466 US 284, 289, 104 S Ct 1799, 80 L Ed 2d 302 (1984); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company, 415 US 36, 94 S Ct 1011, 39 L Ed 2d 147 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue that Vaughn is

    ### Response:
    holding that discharged black employe had right of action under title vii of civil rights act of 1964 42 usc  2000e et seq to assert discrimination claim notwithstanding arbitrators finding pursuant to collective bargaining agreement that employe was discharged for cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for unlawfully possessing a firearm, an explosive, and materials for creating fraudulent identifications. Pauckert contends that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We vacate the sentence and remand to the district court for further action. 1. The district court properly imposed a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1:1. Pauckert’s instruction to Dodge to destroy the printers that were used to create the fraudulent identification materials may be subject to more than one interpretation, but the district court did not clearly err in concluding that the instruction was given with the purpose of destroying material evidence. See United States v. Garro, 517 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Under § 3C1.1, Application Note 4(D),

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts factual findings for purposes of obstruction enhancement are reviewed for clear error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment’s protection. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U.S. 573, 577, 66 S.Ct. 745, 747, 90 L.Ed. 862 (1946); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2574-75, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976)). Here, neither the State of Alabama nor Congress has waived Eleventh Amendment immunity under §§ 1981, 1983 or 1985, and therefore, the aforementioned exceptions do not apply. Carr, 916 F.2d at 1524-25 (Exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity did not apply in § 1983 action, inasmuch as Congress had not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 cases and State of Alabama had not waived its immunity.); Sessions v. Rusk State Hosp., 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Fincher v. Florida Dep’t of Labor &

    ### Response:
    holding that the eleventh amendment applies in  1981 litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Dodd-Frank delayed the effective date of Title XIV of the Act. Dodd-Frank, Pub. Law No. 111-203, § 1400(c); 124 Stat. 1376, 2136. Thus, the Dodd-Frank changes and resulting regulations are not relevant to this case. 6 . As discussed above, Dodd-Frank made changes to RESPA, including reducing this period to 30 days. Dodd-Frank, Pub. Law No. 111-203, § 1463; 124 Stat. 1376, 2184. As the QWR in this case was sent in January of 2011 and Dodd-Frank was enacted in July of 2010, one might think that Chase should have responded within 30, rather than 60, days. However, § 1400(c) of Dodd-Frank delayed the effective date of Title XIV of the Act and with it, this 60-day to 30-day change. Dodd-Frank, cv-13622, 2011 WL 5375375, *2-3, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128455, *8 (E.D.Mich. Nov. 7, 2011) (<HOLDING>). In any case, decisions from other district

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to respond in accord with  2605e2a b or c is a single respa violation because the statute provides a servicer with disjunctive response options not that a servicer has unfettered discretion in how to respond
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CIT Group/Factoring Mfr. Hanover, Inc. v. Srour (In re Srour), 138 B.R. 413 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1992)). Moreover, the debtor must have more than a mere derivative interest in the property in question because the term “property of the debtor,” as expressed in 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A), has reference to property in which the debtor has a direct proprietary interest. In re Colodner, 147 B.R. at 93 (citing MCorp. Management Solutions, Inc., 901 F.2d at 841) (Congress intended to limit the reach of § 727(a)(2)(A) only to those transfers of property in which the debtor has a direct proprietary interest). In this case, the property transferred was not property of the debtor, but rather property of the LLC. See BPS Guard Serv., Inc. v. Myrick (In re Myrick), 172 B.R. 633, 638 (Bankr.D.Neb.1994) (<HOLDING>); In re Srour, 138 B.R. at 419 (stating it does

    ### Response:
    holding that  727a2a does not apply to the transfer of the assets of a corporation in which the debtor is a shareholder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (sanctions imposed upon revocation are to be “served consecutively to any other term of imprisonment imposed for any criminal conduct that is the basis of the revocation”); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(e) (p.s.) (recognizing that a sentence for an instant offense should “run consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to the extent necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense”). Thus, the policy favoring imposition of consecutive sentences in cases of violation of release, as expressed in Chapters 5 and 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines, governs. A contrary result illogically would rest the priority of consecutive sentences upon the order in which the sentences were imposed. Accord United States v. Glasener, 981 F.2d 973, 975-76 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. 1 . The district court added three

    ### Response:
    holding in nearly identical situation that the mere order in which the sentences were imposed does not alter the result that is required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jet airplanes, and from the period of steam and gas powered energy to that of atom propulsion, we should keep pace with the times and apply new and modern principles, better suited for our changed and changing world. We answer the argument by pointing out that we are not convinced that the rule we are urged to adopt would better serve the legal needs of this new day, and even if we were we would be most hesitant to promulgate such rules to replace doctrine long established. This would seem to be more properly for the [Legislature. Id. at 334, 378 P.2d at 373-74. This is a classic example of a policy discussion, global and general in nature directed at a legal duty, rather than a proximate cause discussion of the specific facts of the case. See Leyba, 120 N.M. at 771, 907 P.2d at 175 (<HOLDING>); Torres, 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389

    ### Response:
    recognizing that policy determines duty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 2752, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987). Since the Court could not dismiss Count I on the grounds that the government had failed to allege means necessary to state a violation of § 371 there are no grounds to dismiss because the listed “means and methods” are laid out vaguely. The indictment does state the essential elements of the offense, does allege at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and therefore serves to apprise defendants of what they must be prepared to defend. See United States v. Treadwell, 760 F.2d 327, 337 (D.C.Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064, 106 S.Ct. 814, 88 L.Ed.2d 788 (1986). No further allegations are required in a § 371 indictment. United States v. Tarvers, 833 F.2d 1068, 1075 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The indictment puts defendants on notice that

    ### Response:
    holding that the essential elements of a  371 indict ment are an agreement to pursue an unlawful object accompanied by an overt act in furtherance of the agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    explicit requirements — the “necessity ... of private enforcement” of the public interest. Awarding attorney fees for litigation when those rights could have been vindicated by reasonable efforts short of litigation does not advance that objective and encourages lawsuits that are more opportunistic than authentically for the public good. Lengthy prelitigation negotiations are not required ... but a plaintiff must at least notify the defendant of its grievances and proposed remedies and give the defendant the opportunity to meet its demands within a reasonable time. What constitutes a “reasonable” time will depend on the context. Id. at 577, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 331, 101 P.3d 140; see also Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.4th 604, 608, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 371, 101 P.3d 174 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Grimsley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 169

    ### Response:
    holding that to recover private attorney general fees a plaintiff must reasonably attempt to settle before litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    those seven products of the snap action claims. First, we note that proof of infringement by collateral estoppel is only appropriate in limited circumstances, where it is shown that a close identity exists between the relevant features of the accused device and the device previously determined to be infringing. See Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 525 F.3d 1319, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2008) (noting that claim preclusion does not apply with respect to infringement unless the accused device and the device previously held infringing are “essentially the same,” meaning that the differences between them are merely “col-orable” or “unrelated to the limitations in the claim of the patent” (citations omitted)); see also Del Mar Avionics, Inc., v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1324 (Fed.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Young Engineers, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,

    ### Response:
    holding that claim preclusion did not apply because a device not previously before the court and shown to differ from those structures previously litigated requires a determination on its own facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 5 . We note the trial court found it significant that the jury’s verdict did not include any award for past medical expenses. Seiwell argues that the jury verdict’s failure to specify an award for past medical bills should not be dispositive. Appellant’s Brief at 12. Seiwell contends that ”[t]he fact a plaintiff decides not to include a specific request for an award of damages for these conditional [Medicare] payments does not change the nature of their obligation or ultimately the obligation of the defendant (or their liability insurance carrier).” Id. at 12-13. We recognize that the allocation of the verdict award may serve as an adequate basis for denying Seiwell's motion. See Fanning v. Davne, 795 A.2d 388, 397 (Pa.Super.2002) (<HOLDING>), appeal denied, 573 Pa. 697, 825 A.2d 1261

    ### Response:
    holding that to offset a jurys damage award a separate thirdparty insurance award must cover the same loss which served as the basis for the jury award
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    individual litigation.” Id. To ensure that (b)(2) classes are cohesive in nature, the Third Circuit has explicitly “committed to the district court the discretion to deny certification in Rule 23(b)(2) cases in the presence of ‘disparate factual circumstances.’ ” Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission, 719 F.2d 1199, 1205 (3d Cir.1983) (citing Carter v. Butz, 479 F.2d 1084, 1089 (3d Cir.1973)). In Santiago, the court held that “court[s] should be more hesitant in accepting a (b)(2) suit which contains significant individual issues than it would under subsection 23(b)(3).” Santiago, 72 F.R.D. at 628; see also Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 905, 906, aff'd in part, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975); Rice v. City of Philadelphia, 66 F.R.D. 17, 20 (E.D.Pa.1974) (<HOLDING>). The Santiago court identified two reasons as

    ### Response:
    holding that a case should not proceed as a b2 action where virtually all of the issues would have to be litigated individually in order to determine whether a particular alleged class member was entitled to any damages at all
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to demonstrate that she is a resident of Alabama. One must be a resident of Alabama in order to serve as an administrator of an estate here; § 43-2-22, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in part: “(a) No person must be deemed a fit person to serve as executor who is under the age of 19 years, or who has been convicted of an infamous crime, or who, from intemperance, improvidence or ■ want of understanding, is incompetent to discharge the duties of the trust. Nor shall any nonresident of the state be appointed as administrator unless he is at the time executor or administrator of the same estate in some other state or territory or jurisdiction, duly qualified under the laws of that jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.) But see § 43-2-191, Ala.Code 1975, and Ex parte Adams, 168 So.3d 40, 45 (Ala.2014) (<HOLDING>). On June 3, 2014, the same day on which the

    ### Response:
    holding that an executor named in a will is not subject to the nonresident restriction set forth in  43222
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the results of the investigation conducted by the Conference, into the factual findings that formed the basis for .the resolution, and into the Conference’s decision to remove [the pastor and his son] from [the church]. ... For these reasons, the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over [the pastor’s] claims against [the lay member] by virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” 103 So.3d at 72 (emphasis added). In the present case, the plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claims are intertwined with the petitioners’ investigations and decisions concerning Reverend Greer’s employment and discipline. As set out above, the basis for the plaintiffs’ claims deriv Omaha, 244 Neb. 715, 508 N.W.2d 907, 911-13 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Wisconsin: L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis.2d 674,

    ### Response:
    holding that first amendment barred adult parishioner who engaged in sexual relationship with priest during the course of pastoral counseling from bringing intentional infliction of emotional distress negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    excepted from discharge any debts ""created by ... fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer, or in any fiduciary capacity.” Ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550-51 (repealed 1978). 3 . See also In re Barton, 465 F.Supp. 918, 923 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (""The cases under section 17(a)(4) [of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898] regarding attorneys as fiduciaries are united in their prohibition of attorney conduct that affects funds or other property [entrusted to the attorney, under a retained claim of equitable title by the client.”); In re Schulman, 196 B.R. 688, 698 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996) (noting that debtor-attorney’s conversion of client’s money is fiduciary fraud (citing In re Kane, 48 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.1931))); In re McDowell, 162 B.R. 136, 139 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1993) (<HOLDING>); Kwiat v. Doucette, 81 B.R. 184, 188-89

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorney is a fiduciary under section 523a4
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a final judgment that U.S. D.I.D. is liable on the injunction bond (absent future proceedings between the parties), the Court will and hereby does grant Plaintiffs request and stays any release of funds for fourteen days. Accordingly, on January 22, 2013, the Clerk of the Court shall issue a check payable to Windstream Communications, Inc., in the amount of $227,271.92, which is to be drawn from the $314,672.80 deposited by U.S. D.I.D. in the Court’s registry, and shall mail that check to Windstream’s counsel, Brian J. Butler, Esq., at Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, One Lincoln Center, Syracuse, N.Y. 13202. On that same date, the Clerk of the Court shall issue a check payable to U.S. D.I.D. Corporation for the remaining $87,400.88 deposited by U.S. D.I.D. in the C 80 n. 5 (3d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Pace v. Ross, No. 78 Civ. 2515, 1981 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court possessed ancillary jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the disposition of an injunction bond
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Arkansas Supreme Court Rule l-2(a)(6). The Commission’s Rule of Procedure 12 addresses the procedure by which the Arkansas Supreme Court reviews Commission decisions. Specifically, Rule 12(F) provides that “The Supreme Court may bring up for review any action taken upon any complaint filed with the Commission, and may also bring up for review a case in which the Commission has failed to act.” Rules of Procedure of the Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm’n 12(F) (emphasis supplied). Under Arkansas law, the Arkansas Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to a disciplinary matter so long as these issues were raised before the Commission. See Huffman v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm’n, 344 Ark. 274, 42 S.W.3d 386, 390 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Commission held a probable cause

    ### Response:
    holding that a judges constitutional challenges to commissions admonition would have been considered by the arkansas supreme court had such matters been on the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    benefit. Hartbarger argues that nothing he did is encompassed by any of the categories in that list. We see no reason why the list should be deemed inclusive of all reasons for which an employee might be disciplined or terminated, or indeed, why the list should preclude discharge for no reason at all. There is no statement in the yellow handbook to the effect that the handbook reflects “established procedure regarding suspension of problem employees and termination for those who cannot conform to Company Policy,” as there was in the handbook at issue in Lukoski, 106 N.M. at 666, 748 P.2d at 509. Neither is there anything suggesting “that the enumerated conduct was the only basis for dismissal, and the rules were consistent with a termination-at-will policy.” Rowe, 473 N.W.2d at 275 (<HOLDING>). We find that there is no language in the

    ### Response:
    holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in a limited fashion); Takacs v. Engle, 768 F.2d 122, 124 (6th Cir.1985) (“Coleman’s harmless error analysis remains good law”). Because we cannot conclude that the denial of counsel at the preliminary hearing necessarily undermined the entire criminal proceeding, we will apply a harmless error analysis in this case. 4. We now turn to the salient question of whether the denial of Ditch’s right to counsel at his preliminary hearing was harmless error. To determine whether constitutional error in a habeas case was harmless, we must decide whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); see also Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 953 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In making the harmless error determination,

    ### Response:
    holding that a federal habeas court performing a harmless error inquiry on collateral review must employ the standard for harmless error articulated in brecht even if the state courts have never reviewed the error on direct appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the parties, the plain, clear meaning of its terms must be given effect, and ‘the parties must be legally presumed to have intended what is plainly and clearly set out.’ Camp v. Milam, 201 Ala. 12, 16, 277 So.2d 95, 98 (1973). Accord, Financial Investment Corp. v. Tukabatchee Area Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America, 353 So.2d 1389 (Ala.1977). The court cannot look beyond the ‘four corners of the grant to construe its terms unless the court determines that the language or its meaning is ambiguous.’ Camp, supra.’ ” Kerrigan v. Sherrer, 535 So.2d 74, 75 (Ala.1988). We conclude that the document creating the easement in this case unambiguously created a nonexclusive easement and that the extrinsic evidence regarding the intent of the grantor and the grantee was not admissible. Id. at 75 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court erred in considering the intent of the parties when the document creating the easement was unambiguous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a prisoner must surmount on 7 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 124 S.Ct. 496, 157 L.Ed.2d 395 (2003) (""We emphasize that we do not require that all Rule 60(b) motions be treated as successive applications; instead, the proper treatment of the motion depends on the nature of the claims presented.”); Dunlap v. Litscher, 301 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir.2002) (allowing the use of Rule 60(b) to reopen previous habeas cases as long as the substance of the using a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the denial of habeas, but has expressly declined to decide whether such Rule 60(b) motions are always successive habeas petitions. Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir.2002). The position of the Third Circuit is not clear. See United States v. Edwards, 309 F.3d 110, 113 (3d Cir.2002) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Harris concedes in his brief that he had

    ### Response:
    holding that motion for reconsideration would be construed not as a rule 60b motion but rather as an unauthorized successive motion under  2255 which the district court may have been without jurisdiction to consider
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    preempted and could not be removed from state court); Shafii 83 F.3d at 568-70 (similar). Second, Hernandez also alleges that Conriv promised that if he left the union, he “would continue to receive all of the benefits that he had been receiving as a union member,” and that Conriv breached the contract by “failing to pay [him] according to the agreement.” As with Hernandez’s other breach of contract claims, this is a state law breach of contract claim, indicating that it is not preempted and not removable. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123-24, 114 S.Ct. at 2078 (“it is the legal character of a claim, as independent of rights created under the collective-bargaining agreement, that decides whether a state cause of action may go forward”);' Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 388-89, 107 S.Ct. at 2427-28 (<HOLDING>); Derrico v. Sheehan Emergency Hospital, 844

    ### Response:
    holding that union members suit based on contract that was independent of a collective bargaining agreement was not preempted and not removable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    actions are not discretionary and even define what a ministerial action is, the key to whether official immunity is applicable is whether the defendant has proven that they are a public employee and that the allegedly tortious acts were discretionary. 5 . The Plaintiffs assert that Aumua failed to follow Grain Valley Policies and the ""Emergency Guidelines for Schools and Childcare Facilities” promulgated by the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. 6 . We also note that a wealth of case law has established that government employees providing medical treatment in non-emergency situations are not entitled to official immunity regardless of whether any rules, policies, orders, or regulations were violated. See Thomas v. Brandt, 325 S.W.3d 481, 484 (Mo.App. E.D.2010) (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gaertner,

    ### Response:
    holding that emergency medical technicians and paramedics were not entitled to official immunity for their actions related to the treatment of patients in nonemergency situations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    imprisonment, below the 24-month sentence recommended by Probation. II Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 prohibits “[t]he court” from participating in plea discussions. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). The Federal Rules broadly define “[c]ourt” to “mean[ ] a federal judge performing functions authorized by law,” Fed.R.Crim.P. 1(b)(2), a definition which expressly includes “a magistrate judge” executing' his or her legal duty, Fed. R.Crim.P. 1(b)(3)(B). While Rule 11(c)(1) appears to prohibit any form of judicial participation in the plea bargaining process, our “court previously approved the participation by a settlement judge in plea negotiations.” United States v. Scolari, 72 F.3d 751, 753 (9th Cir.1995); see United States v. Torres, 999 F.2d 376, 377-78 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Torres and Scolari did not address, much less

    ### Response:
    holding that no rule 11 violation occurred when the parties  hammered out their agreement with the assistance of a settlement judge in accordance with the thenexisting criminal case settlement procedures for the southern district of california
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. We found that the child’s credibility “became increasingly unimpeachable as each adult added his or her personal eloquence, maturity, emotion, and professionalism to [the child’s] out-of-court statements,” so that the “presumption of innocence was overcome long before [Stone] got to the stand.” Id. at 540. Stone is distinguishable from this case. Here, C.S.’s statements were repeated by Douglas, Callen, and Renz, and the videotaped interview with Detective McClain was played. However, C.S. was the first witness to testify and was subject to cross examination. Moreover, Douglas, Callen, and Renz’s testimony was brief, consistent with, and did not elaborate upon C.S.’s testimony. We conclude that any error was harmless. See, e.g., Craig v. State, 630 N.E.2d 207, 211-212 (Ind.1994) (<HOLDING>); McGrew v. State, 673 N.E.2d 787, 796

    ### Response:
    holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony of two witnesses that confirmed but did not elaborate upon the victims testimony would have had only minor impact on the jury because there was little to undermine the victims credibility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Washington state prisoner Craig F. Weighall appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.2004). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Weighall did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants’ chosen course of treatment of his amputation site was medically unacceptable. See id. at 1058 (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not

    ### Response:
    holding that a difference of opinion about the best course of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    failed to request a jury shuffle thereafter, the court of criminal appeals reversed, holding appellant had waived any “claim that his shuffle improperly included persons who did not ultimately sit on the jury panel.” Sanders v. State, 942 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (hereinafter “Sanders II”). Accordingly, the court remanded the case to this Court to address appellant’s remaining points of error. In his original brief to this Court, appellant raised thirteen points of error. On remand, he filed a brief containing four points of error — two from the original brief and two new points of error. The State contends that neither the rules of appellate procedure nor case law permit the raising of new points of error on remand. See Theus v. State, 863 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Theus v. State, 874 S.W.2d 121, 126

    ### Response:
    holding that remand from texas court of criminal appeals was equivalent to filing transcript and statement of facts thereby giving parties thirty days to file a brief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the possibility that the appointed attorney may appear in court before the judge who appointed him.” Id. at 677 n. 14, 108 S.Ct. 2597. This history is directly relevant to our analysis. In context, the appointment of defense counsel for indigent criminal defendants would seem to be a necessary step for judges to take in order to provide for fair process. That rationale applies to the appointment of interim United States Attorneys with equal force. It is in keeping with preserving the institutional integrity of the judiciary that judges, faced with an indefinite vacancy in the office of United States Attorney, seek out a competent lawyer to represent the government. Cf. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 800-01, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Like judges’ participation in the Sentencing

    ### Response:
    holding that when the executive branch defaults a district court has the authority to appoint a prosecutor for contempt proceedings in order to preserve respect for the judicial system itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    courts have uniformly held that state agencies are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See Cronen v. Texas Dep’t of Human Serv., 977 F.2d 934, 936 (5th Cir.1992); Kroll v. Board of Trustees, 934 F.2d 904, 910 n.. 7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 377, 116 L.Ed.2d 329 (1991); Manning v. South Carolina Dep’t of Highway and Pub. Transp., 914 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1990); Norfleet ex rel. Norfleet v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Serv., 796 F.Supp. 1194, 1197 (E.D.Ark.1992); Chrissy F. ex rel. Medley v. Mississippi Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 780 F.Supp. 1104, 1116 (S.D.Miss.1991); Reiger v. Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 755 F.Supp. 360, 361 (D.Kan.1990); Croft v. Harder, 730 F.Supp. 342, 348 (D.Kan.1989); cf. Kaimowitz v. Board of Trustees, 951 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Barket, Levy & Fine, 948 F.2d at 1086

    ### Response:
    holding state university is not a person under  1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Litig., 503 F.Supp.2d 666, 678 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (""In each of the cases in which the Second Circuit has employed a materialization of the risk analysis, it has considered a particular risk that was allegedly concealed by the defendant’s actions and which then materialized to cause a market loss.”) (citing cases). 85 . Catton, 2006 WL 27470, at *5 (quoting In re IPO, 2005 WL 1529659, at *6). Accord Lentell, 396 F.3d at 175 n. 4 (noting that corrective disclosures ""reveal to the market the falsity of the prior [statements]”). 86 . In re eSpeed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 457 F.Supp.2d 266, 297 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (citations omitted). 87 . In re Winstar Commc'ns, Nos. 01 Civ. 3014, 01 Civ. 11522, 2006 WL 473885, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.27, 2006). 88 . 544 U.S. at 342-43, 125 S.Ct. 1627 (emphasis in original) (<HOLDING>). 89 . Miles I, 471 F.3d at 43 (quoting DeMaria

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs failed to plead loss causation where their only allegation was the payment of artificially inflated prices for defendants securities and their complaint failed to provide defendants with notice of what plaintiffs relevant economic loss might be or of what the causal connection might be between that loss and the alleged misrepresentation at issue 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hamlet, 312 N.C. 162, 175, 321 S.E.2d 837, 846 (1984). A third type exists where “the killing demonstrates an unusual depravity of mind on the part of the defen t the murder was conscienceless and pitiless, leaving the victim in his last moments aware of but helpless to prevent impending death. Defendant’s kicking, pistol-whipping, and taunting his felled victim showed a complete lack of conscience and pity. Moreover, a juror could reasonably infer that the victim knew that death was imminent and that he was helpless to prevent it during the “silent moment” between defendant’s pointing the gun at the victim’s face and the first shot. The length of time during which the victim fears for his life may qualify despite any brevity. See State v. Sexton, 336 N.C. 321, 374, 444 S.E.2d 879, 909 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1006, 130 L. Ed. 2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a reasonable juror could infer that the victim feared for her life in the ten seconds it took her to lose consciousness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    893.80(4), which limits immunity to ""acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions."" Beginning with the injury that Showers has alleged, we note that Showers' allegations are different in kind from the allegations underlying the Lyons test for governmental contractor immunity. The substance of Showers' claim is not that Musson was negligent in its implementation of a decision made in the exercise of a governmental entity's legislative, quasi-le , 253 N.W.2d 240 (1977) (same). ¶ 54. In contrast, Showers alleges that Musson's performance of its construction duties, such as maintaining drainage at the worksite, did not meet the standard of due care for construction work. Cf. Brooks v. Hayes, 133 Wis. 2d 228, 234-35, 395 N.W.2d 167 (1986) (<HOLDING>). An allegation such as Showers makes does not

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a construction contract implicitly imposes a duty on contractors to perform work according to the standard of due care
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the drug taxing and trafficking conspiracies charged in counts three and four. Even if Appellants had raised an accurate multiple conspiracies challenge to count two, it would be unavailing. The several conspiracies that were predicate acts for the substantive RICO violations of § 1962(c) were also evidence of the overall § 1962(d) conspiracy to violate RICO. What matters for a sufficiency of the evidence inquiry is that there was adequate proof of an overall conspiracy to participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the Erne’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. In this case, the pattern included predicate acts that were themselves constitutive conspiracies. 19 . But cf. Oki Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 298 F.3d 768, 774-75 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Although not explicitly labeled as such, the

    ### Response:
    holding it is the mere agreement to violate rico that  1962d forbids it is not necessary to prove any substantive rico violations ever occurred as a result of the conspiracy without mentioning neibels limitations on who may be held liable for rico conspiracy which posit that conspiracy liability is dependent on potential substantive liability if the scheme were successfully completed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contentions by Kimler both ignore and misconstrue the evidence in this case. As set out above, there was sufficient direct evidence, even in the abbreviated record before us, that, using his computer, Kimler received and transmitted proscribed images over the internet across state lines via telephone wires, and that those computer images were the ones stored on his computer’s hard drive. As we have emphasized, Kimler does not address his argument to a single one of the dozens of exhibits introduced in this case, along with testimony, showing actual interstate trafficking in the proscribed images over the internet. Kimler also does not argue that such actual interstate activity is not in interstate commerce, nor could he. See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 888, 123 S.Ct. 137,

    ### Response:
    holding that transmission of photographs by means of the internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be read his Miranda rights before the school police questioned him and, given their failure to do so, we find that Appellant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination was violated. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. Former Chief Justice FLAHERTY did not participate in the decision of this case. CAPPY, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. CASTILLE, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. NEWMAN, Justice, files a concurring opinion. SAYLOR, Justice, files a concurring opinion. EAKIN, Justice, did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Although Justice Castille's dissent goes

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “imputed income from the distribution is a relevant factor if the parent chooses to deal with the distribution other than as an investment vehicle.” Id. (citing Croak, supra note 4, 856 N.E.2d at 906). “The trial court retains that discretion in part because ‘[a] parent cannot insulate an inheritance from consideration for child support by transforming it into a non-income producing asset.’ ” Lasché I, supra, 977 A.2d at 372 (quoting Cody, supra note 4, 291 A.D.2d 27, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 185). Where a parent does so, it may be reasonable to impute income to all or a portion of an inheritance where there is an adequate foundation for doing so. See, e.g., Connell v. Connell, 313 N.J.Super. 426, 712 A.2d 1266, 1270 (1998); see also Gainey v. Gainey, 89 Wash.App. 269, 948 P.2d 865, 869 (1997) (<HOLDING>) If appellant had invested the funds, the

    ### Response:
    holding that the corpus of an inheritance is not included in a parents gross income but that the interest generated by an inheritance is
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    transfers by assignment made to May after the Amendment, including the assignment of income to Berghini Consulting, were ignored by the Bankruptcy Court. A reading of the Bankruptcy Court’s final judgment indicates that the United States’ allegation is well founded; the Bankruptcy Court did focus solely on the transfers made pursuant to the Amendment. This was error. The transfers by assignment were made at a time when the debtor knew about his federal tax liability and these transfers by assignment could have been made in an attempt to evade payment of taxes. After these transfers were made, Sternberg’s assets were beyond the reach of the IRS. All of Sternberg’s asset transfers should have been considered for section 523(a)(1)(C) purposes. See In re Zuhone, 88 F.3d 469 (7th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>); In re Wright, 191 B.R. 291

    ### Response:
    holding that intentional reduction of taxpayers salary to avoid garnishment is indicative of intent to evade or defeat tax
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of treatment. It only requires that the distinction have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made, and that the different treatments be not so disparate as to be wholly arbitrary.” State v. Andersen, 208 So.2d 814, 820 (Fla.1968). “Where an equal protection challenge is brought before a court of law, that court must, from the outset, determine the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to be applied to the state regulation under attack.” Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass’n v. Thomas By & Through Thomas, 434 So.2d 306, 308 (Fla.1983). If the challenged government action “abridge[s] some fundamental right or affect[s] adversely upon some suspect class of persons,” it must withstand strict scrutiny. Id. “To withstand strict scrutiny, a 81, 984 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1979) (<HOLDING>). We are persuaded by this authority,

    ### Response:
    holding that youthful offender treatment is not a fundamental right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to limit the jurisdiction of this court or the Commission to inquire into wrongful judicial conduct. In re Fadeley, supra, 310 Or at 558. 8 In context, the term “should” is used in the canon in order to allow for the fact that Canon 3D provides for certain cases in which disqualification will not be required under Canon 3C(1)(c) (financial interest) or Canon 3C(1)(d) (relational interest), based on adequate disclosure by a judge and the written consent of the parties. 9 The range of constitutional challenges based on “vagueness” is discussed in Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or 293, 296-303, 605 P2d 273 (1980). We will assume, arguendo, that the challenge in this case may be cognizable generally as a federal due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 300-03 (<HOLDING>). 10 The Judge argues that the blanket

    ### Response:
    recognizing the uncertain state of federal law in this area
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which applied the ordinance — not any state-court judgment. Similarly, in Count II, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he City” may not deprive Get Back Up due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Compl. II56.) Therefore, neither count stems from any judgment of a state court. The fact that the Wayne County Circuit Court affirmed the BZA’s decision does not change the result. See McCormick, 451 F.3d at 394 (“The fact that the state court chose not to remedy the injury does not transform the subsequent federal suit on the same matter into an appeal, forbidden by Rooker-Feldman, of the state-court judgment.” (quoting Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87-88 (2d Cir.2005))); Camp v. City of Charlevoix, 1:07-CV-980, 2008 WL 4185954, at *4 (W.D.Mich. Sept. 8, 2008) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, this Court has subject-matter

    ### Response:
    holding that although the state court affirmed the zoning board of appeals dismissal of plaintiffs appeal the statecourt judgment did not trigger rookerfeldman where the complaint did not allege that the judgment itself violated federal law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for his conclusion that Mrs. Kyle developed blood clots and pulmonary emboli that were the cause of her respiratory arrest as a result of failure [t]o provide appropriate post operative drugs. Because Hillery objected only on the grounds that the report was conclusory concerning the element of causation, and did not mention the elements of standard of care or breach, we do not address that portion of Hillery’s issue concerning standard of care and breach. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a); Hawkins v. Herrera, 296 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (refusing to address objections by defendant physician who did not raise objections in trial court); see also Plemons v. Harris, No. 02-08-00326-CV, 2009 WL 51290, *3 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Jan. 8, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Mora, 264 S.W.3d 888,

    ### Response:
    holding objection to expert report made in trial court must comport with complaint asserted on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it may award full attorney’s fees; we will set such an award aside only if it is “manifestly unreasonable and amounts to a clear abuse of discretion.” Given Mr. Song’s failure to argue this issue, we find no reason to disturb the award of full fees to Ms. Song for defending against Mr. Song’s motion to set aska 1972) (same, regarding a Rule 60(b)(1) motion). 8 . O'Link v. O'Link, 632 P.2d 225, 230 (Alaska 1981). 9 . See Carvalho v. Carvalho, 838 P.2d 259, 261 n. 4 (Alaska 1992). 10 . Cf. Cushing v. Painter, 666.P.2d 1044, 1045-46 (Alaska 1983) (finding that the court violated basic fairness by issuing final custody order with^out notice after expedited, interim hearing). 11 . AS 25.24.220(g). 12 . See Aarvig v. Aarvig, 248 N.J.Super. 181, 590 A.2d 704, 706-07 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1991) (<HOLDING>); Bond v. Bond, 69 Ohio App.3d 225, 590 N.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court is without authority to modify a settlement agreement but may enforce and interpret it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defend, despite controlling authority that the duty to defend is determined by allegations of the underlying complaint, because further factual development was warranted to determine whether damage, as alleged in the complaint, occurred while the premises were being used as contemplated by the policy); American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 587 F.Supp. 1549, 1553 (E.D.Mich.1984) (declaratory judgment action by insurer where, despite state authority that the duty to defend is determined based on allegations of the complaint, court looked to “subsequent discovery and testimony at trial” to discern the “continuous nature of the insured’s dumping” and held that the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify); Kepner v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 109 Ariz. 329, 509 P.2d 222 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Barmet of Indiana v. Security Ins. Group, 425

    ### Response:
    holding despite authority for the general proposition that the duty to defend is determined based on the allegations of the complaint that an insurer had no duty to defend where the underlying claim was covered by the policy based on the facts pleaded in complaint but other facts not appearing in the complaint excluded coverage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While the additional facts added to the evidence are relevant to an analysis of Colvin's credibility, ""the very persuasive pieces of physical corroboration"" cited by Judge Andrews still remain. Based on our analysis of the evidence presented to Judge Andrews and the additional facts that must be added pursuant to Judge Wolverton's findings, we conclude that the additional facts do not preclude a finding of probable cause. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court's order suppressing the taped conversations obtained when the police executed the (Hlass warrants. Conclusion The order of the superior court suppressing the taped conversations obtained when the Glass warrants were executed is REVERSED. 1 . See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978), on reh'g, 596 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1979) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). 5 . See Lewis v. State, 9

    ### Response:
    holding that the alaska constitution requires police to obtain judicial authorization before secretly recording a persons private conversations2 722 p2d 943 alaska 19863 862 p2d 181 alaska app199344 lewis 862 p2d at 186 quoting malkin 722 p2d at 946  n 6
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    criminal convictions and, thus, support the conclusion that the prosecution of the resisting arrest charge ended in plaintiffs favor. Under similar circumstances, other courts have found no bar to a malicious prosecution claim. See, e.g., Ahern v. City of Syracuse, 411 F.Supp.2d 132, 151 (N.D.N.Y.2006) (permitting malicious prosecution claim for resisting arrest charge to proceed despite finding of probable cause as to skateboarding and unlawful possession of marijuana charges); Kavazanjian v. Rice, No. 03-CV-1923 (FB), 2005 WL 1377946, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2005) (finding malicious prosecution claim for criminal mischief charge not barred by conviction for, inter alia, assault, resisting arrest, and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle); Pichardo, 1998 WL 812049, at *4 (<HOLDING>); Sassower v. City of White Plains, No.

    ### Response:
    holding that conviction on misdemeanor assault charge did not bar malicious prosecution claim for misdemeanor resisting arrest charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bent are highly relevant. A third situation involves a claim of accidental death, where, for ex ample, defendant’s version of the facts is that the victim picked up defendant’s gun and was accidentally killed while toying with it. In such cases the deceased’s statements of fear as to guns or of defendant himself (showing he would never go near defendant under any circumstances) are relevant in that they tend to rebut this defense. Of course, even in these cases, where the evidence is of a highly prejudicial nature, it has been held that it must be excluded in spite of a significant degree of relevance. (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 767. After analyzing numerous court opinions on the issue, many being incapable of reconciliation, Judge MacKinnon determined as follows: The rule then t ) (<HOLDING>); State v. Magruder, Mont.Supr., 234 Mont. 492,

    ### Response:
    holding admissible testimony from 2 witnesses that within days immediately preceding the victims departure from kansas city with the defendant the victim stated that she feared that the defendant was going to kill her where the defendant claimed accident
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    grant the relief R2 seeks without requiring a significant revision of Charter’s reorganization. R2’s argument is, in effect, an attack on the bankruptcy court’s determination that it was appropriate for the Plan to consider all the Charter entities together, even though the bankruptcies were never substantively consolidated. In order to grant a separate valuation of CCI, the district court would have had to overturn the bankruptcy court’s determination that a joint Plan was appropriate. That legal conclusion would require not just that CCI be separately valued, but that all the Charter subsidiaries be revalued and the proceeds of the bankruptcy distributed accordingly. See Compania Internacional Financiera S.A. v. Calpine Corp. (In re Calpine Corp.), 390 B.R. 508, 519-20 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (<HOLDING>), aff'd 354 Fed.Appx. 479 (2d Cir.2009). This

    ### Response:
    holding that the debtors valuation was a  key issue  in a reorganization and therefore even if a remand resulted in a higher valuation the plan would need to be substantially changed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    serious crime and should be deterred by the imposition of a separate penalty through a consecutive sentence. See United States v. Packer, 70 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir.1995) (interpreting the statute’s intent), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 75, 136 L.Ed.2d 34 (1996). Contrary to the suggested treatment of a sentence in Commentary 3 to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.6, the statute does not suggest that a sentencing court might determine a total sentence for the underlying offense or offenses and the failure to appear and then divide the sentence among the convictions. The consecutive sentencing requirement of the statute is in conflict with Commentary 3 to U.S.S.G § 2J1.6. The statute’s requirement of a consecutive sentence, therefore, prevails over the Sentencing Guidelines. See Packer, 70 F.3d at 360 (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1214

    ### Response:
    holding that 18 usc  3146b2 prevails over commentary 3 to ussg  2j16 because the commentary defeats the statutes intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    failed to notify the Union before granting higher rates of pay to less senior members and did not mention the issue of obtaining the Union’s consent. Meanwhile, the Union argues that the grievance more broadly claimed a violation of Article 14 and that the issue of consent came up both during the arbitration hearing and in the parties’ post-hearing briefs. An arbitrator’s authority to decide issues extends only to the issues actually submitted. Matteson v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir.1996). We have cautioned against “attaching] too great significance to documents drafted early in the dispute,” such as the initial grievance, and observed that the issues to be decided are those reflected in the evidence and arguments of the parties at the arbitration hearing. Id. at 115 (<HOLDING>). In keeping with our standard of review, we

    ### Response:
    holding that an arbitrator stepped outside his authority when he decided an issue that had been focused on earlier in a grievance process but not in the final hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    misconduct depend on factual determinations that were resolved against him, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing committee on questions of fact. See Bristol, 2006-NMSC-041, ¶ 15, 140 N.M. 317, 142 P.3d 905 (“Because the hearing committee directly observes witness testimony, it is in the best position to weigh the evidence, resolve matters of credibility, and choose between the conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.”). Moreover, other than general assertions of prejudice, Respondent failed to specifically demonstrate how any of disciplinary counsel’s purported misconduct prejudiced Respondent’s defense or would result in a different outcome if rectified. See In re Castellano, 119 N.M. 140, 144, 889 P.2d 175, 179 (1995) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). For all of the foregoing reasons, we reject

    ### Response:
    holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    desire to speak does not negate Fautenberry’s pri- or, unambiguous initiation of further communication. To be sure, had Fautenberry reinvoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel after initiating communication with Agent Ott, he would have been protected from further questioning, but Fau-tenberry does not assert that he did so and the alleged Brady evidence does not demonstrate that he did so. In order to invoke one’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the “suspect must unambiguously request counsel,” meaning that “he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The alleged Brady evidence does not indicate

    ### Response:
    holding that an ambiguous mention of an attorney is not a request for counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a court to examine the circumstances surrounding an assertion of lawful authority to search to determine whether the consent was sufficiently independent of the assertion to remove its taint. If not, the consent was not freely and voluntarily given. ¶ 18 Although it might be difficult to prove that consent given after an assertion of lawful authority to search was nevertheless freely given, we should not preclude the possibility that it could happen. For example, consent conceivably could be voluntary if, after an officer asserts lawful authority to search, the officer retracts that assertion or an attorney advises that the search is not lawfully required before the subject of the search consents. See Kunzler v. Pima Cty. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 568, 570, 744 P.2d 669, 671 (1987) (<HOLDING>); State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 571

    ### Response:
    holding that a person arrested for dui has the right to consult an attorney before taking a breath test when such consultation would not delay or interfere with the investigation or test taking
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    permitted to participate.” Id. at 229-30, 74 S.Ct. 450 (emphasis added); cf. Maj. Op. 347-48 (omitting italicized language). Remmer thus imposes on a district court two distinct obligations: a duty to investigate allegations of a juror’s exposure to an unauthorized communication and a duty to determine whether the exposure violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. See United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 535-36 (6th Cir.2000) (stating that “ ‘when there is a credible allegation of extraneous influences, the court must investigate sufficiently to assure itself that constitutional rights of the criminal defendant have not been violated’” (quoting United States v. Rigsby, 45 F.3d 120, 124-25 (6th Cir.1995))); United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141, 1145 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932,

    ### Response:
    holding that where possible juror misconduct is brought to the trial judges attention he or she has a duty to investigate and to determine whether there may have been a violation of the sixth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    held in Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co-op. of Florida, findings satisfying both prongs of our standard are essential before dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. 864 F.2d 101, 102-03 (11th Cir.1989). And, although “we occasionally have found implicit in an order the [findings necessary to support dismissal], we have never suggested that the district court need not make that finding.” World Thrust Films, Inc., 41 F.3d at 1456 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We rigidly require the district courts to make these findings precisely “[b]ecause the sanction of dismissal with prejudice is so unsparing,” Mingo, 864 F.2d at 103, and we strive to afford a litigant his or her day in court, if possible. Flaksa v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in Mingo, where the district court

    ### Response:
    recognizing the importance except in the most flagrant circumstances of resorting to sanctions that do not deprive a litigant of his day in court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be awarded only to compensate actual injury or, in the case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights. Carey, 435 U.S. at 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042. The FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is limited to damages “for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). In situations where Congress has limited the ability of plaintiffs to collect damages due to governmental wrongs—such as the FTCA—courts have recognized that such a statutory limitation does not preclude the award of nominal damages for a violation of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Bush v. St. Tammany Par., 754 F.2d 1132, 1133 (5th Cir.1984) (affirming award of nominal damages for FTCA violation); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d

    ### Response:
    recognizing availability of nominal damages for violations of constitutional rights notwithstanding statutory bar in prison litigation  reform act 42 usc  1997ee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1 . 29 U.S.C. § 106. 2 . The district court set aside the verdict against Gilmartin for intentional infliction of emotional distress, indicating that it believed the evidence was insufficient. Whether or not the court was correct to do so is an issue we do not reach since the Johnsons' cross-appeal was untimely, infra. We are nonetheless free to take account of the evidence against Gilmartin in deciding whether the evidence as a whole suffices for us to affirm the district court's approval of the jury verdict against the Union. 3 . The legal issue as to whether some of the harassing conduct amounted to assaults turned on whether the conduct embodied a sufficiently imminent threat of bodily harm. See Comrie v. Hinds, No. CV 930521854S, 1996 WL 240419 at *2 (Conn.Super. April 18, 1996) (<HOLDING>); 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery § 4 (1975)

    ### Response:
    holding that an assault cannot be accomplished by words alone there must be an overt act evidencing some corporeal threat
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    officer, in violation of 26 [U.S.C. § 7214], for making and signing fraudulent entries, and failing] to perform their duties, making them personally liable for damages.” Id. Any fraud, therefore, “is not one perpetrated by [Plaintiffs], but one by color of law, absent the requirements of law.” Id. at 2-3. In addition, Plaintiffs challenge the Government’s contention that res judicata bars Plaintiffs’ claims, because “[l]ack of jurisdiction either of the person or of the subject matter precludes an administrative determination from being res judicata.” Id. at 3. Since the Notice of Deficiency and certificates of assessment are not valid, “all determination[s] based upon that ignorance is void due to lack of validity.” Id. Finally, Plaintiffs reassert that their Promissory Note (2006) (<HOLDING>). The United States Court of Federal Claims has

    ### Response:
    holding that the united states court of federal claims does not have jurisdiction to enter declaratory judgment that taxpayers were not liable for any type of federal income tax or to issue injunction permanently removing the tax liens on property and levies on wages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Underwriting Association ... NJ.Stat.Ann. 17:29A-35b(2). The plain language of the statute makes clear that at least 10% of the surcharge bill or the actual collection fees incurred in recovering unpaid surcharges are to be paid to the DMV for its costs of administering the collection of surcharges and the cancellation notification system. The remainder are to be remitted to the JUA as part of the scheme of assuring market rate insurance to all motorists. Because Code § 523(a)(7) excludes from its coverage debts payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit as compensation for actual pecuniary loss, the debtor’s obligation to pay that portion of costs and fees retained by the DMV to cover administrative expenses is dischargeable. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7); Kent, 190 B.R. at 206 (<HOLDING>); Curtin, Ch. 7 Case No. 95-28844, Adv. No.

    ### Response:
    holding that debtors obligation to pay portion of debt representing administrative expenses of collection was dischargeable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    payment amounts that Durham must follow in connection with the court-ordered restitution. The essence of this claim is that decisions such as the amount and timing of IFRP payments constitute core judicial functions under Article III, and therefore a district court cannot delegate those functions without violating separation of powers. The IFRP, set forth in 28 C.F.R. §§ 545.10 and 545.11, requires participating inmates to commit a percentage of their prison employment earnings toward the payment of court-ordered restitution. Its constitutionality has been considered and upheld by other circuits. See McGhee v. Clark, 166 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir.1999) (noting that the IFRP “has been uniformly upheld against constitutional attack”); Dorman v. Thornburgh, 955 F.2d 57, 58-59 (D.C.Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Johnpoll v. Thornburgh, 898 F.2d 849, 851 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding ifrp does not deprive inmates of constitutional rights to due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1983. The second theory is the so-called “public function” theory: that the State of Illinois has allowed hotel proprietors to perform a governmental function in enforcing their lien, and therefore that their actions must be governed by constitutional limitations. A. Entwinement The proper focus for determining whether state action exists under this theory was recently stated by the Supreme Court as follows: [T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 453, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974) (<HOLDING>). The test is whether the state has

    ### Response:
    holding that the termination of electric service by a public utility for nonpayment of bills was not state action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that she had been shot; in August 2001, a woman reported an assault (without injury); in February 2002, a woman reported that her car was stolen from her in the parking lot; in April 2002, one customer intentionally hit another customer’s vehicle in the drive-through lane (with property damage but not injury); and, in February 2003, police arrested a person who refused to leave the premises. In contrast, no evidence exists that the Whataburger was the scene of any aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, sexual assault, or murder in the three years prior to Dean’s murder. No crime similar to this one had ever occurred: no one had ever robbed the restauran of bus was not foreseeable because plaintiff produced no evidence of similar robberies on same bus line), and Allen, 158 S.W.3d at 67 (<HOLDING>), with Trammell Crow Cent. Tex., Ltd. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that sexual assault was not foreseeable because plaintiff produced no evidence of similar criminal acts on or near defendants premises
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petitioner Gustavo Escobedo-Fernandez (Escobedo) seeks review of the reinstatement by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of his 1997 order of deportation. He also challenges the dismissal by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) of his two motions to reopen and his motion to reconsider. 1. This court lacks jurisdiction to review the DHS’s reinstatement of Escobe-do’s 1997 order of deportation because he did not appeal that order to the BIA. See Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring

    ### Response:
    recognizing that other jurisdictional limitations within 8 usc  1252 remain applicable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Statute of Elizabeth Ross has also argued that PCS may not set aside conveyances under the Statute of Elizabeth where PCS has not established the precise amount of the underlying debt. See, e.g., ECF No. 343 at 12-13 (“PCS has not established its ability to set aside the conveyance in any amount because it didn’t prove at trial that it’s owed monies from Ross in any particular amount.”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(b) and South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 18(b) allow actions for recovery of a debt and fraudulent conveyance to proceed contemporaneously, rather than previously where a creditor was required to obtain a return nulla bona before commencing an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. See also Lebovitz v. Mudd, 293 S.C. 49, 358 S.E.2d 698, 700-01 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Ross argues that, nonetheless, PCS is

    ### Response:
    holding that once rule 18b went into effect no creditor suing under the statute of elizabeth needs to reduce debt to a judgment and obtain a return nulla bona before bringing suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    'only expressly in a state statute or constitution' or by overwhelming implication from the text of that state statute or constitution). Thus, KSU argues that-in this case a waiver may only be found if the text of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 76-723 overwhelmingly implies no other reasonable construction. On the other hand, the debtors urge us to follow the approach taken by the bankruptcy and district courts-reading the legislation in concert with the contract and the federal regulation to determine wh ida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981) (stating that state agency’s explicit agreement “to obey federal law in administering federal program can hardly be deemed an express waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity”); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673-74, 94 S.Ct. 1347 (<HOLDING>); accord Duke v. Department of Agric., 131 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that neither mere participation in a federal program nor provision requiring compliance with federal law is sufficient to establish that the state consented to be sued in federal court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 2254’s exhaustion requirement, but, more importantly for our purposes, also constitutes an adjudication on the merits that is ripe for federal habeas review. See Comer v. Schriro, 463 F.3d 934, 956 (9th Cir.2006) (concluding, for purposes of federal habeas review, that a claim is exhausted and ripe for review on the merits if, under ""Arizona’s fundamental error review ... the state appellate court ... mentions it is considering the claim sua sponte ”), withdrawn on other grounds, Comer v. Stewart, 471 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir.2006) (granting rehearing en banc to consider whether to grant state habeas petitioner’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the federal habeas proceedings); Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1057 (9th Cir.2005); Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Cooper v. Wainwright, 807 F.2d 881, 887 (11th

    ### Response:
    holding that a state appellate courts decision to raise and answer a constitutional question sua sponte permits subsequent federal habeas review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had resided at the same residence for the past fifteen years: 1712 26th Street in Orlando, Florida. This address matched the address listed for Coleman on the State’s witness list. Nevertheless, Corporal Payne testified that she was unable to locate Coleman at the address Richards gave her. Buttressing Payne’s 3 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987); Monfiston v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 559 Fed.Appx. 863, 868 (11th Cir.2014) (concluding that for the petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiency to investigate the witness, he had to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the state postconviction court’s finding that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial); Gideon v. Dep’t of Corr., 295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579, 583

    ### Response:
    holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the challenged conduct did not violate a constitutional right (the objective element) and the official undertook the challenged conduct in a good-faith belief that the conduct was valid (the subjective element). However, on further consideration, the Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald stated, “[t]he subjective element of the good-faith defense frequently has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial.” 457 U.S. 800, 815-16, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Therefore, the modern qualified immunity doctrine is viewed only through the lens of objective reasonableness. Id., at 815-16, 102 S.Ct. 2727. Title VI Claims Plaintiff appears to bring his Title VII claims against both the individual Defendants — in t 084 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Chavez v. McDonald’s Carp., 1999 WL 814527,

    ### Response:
    holding that a supervisor who implemented a maternity leave policy that violated the terms of title vii could not be held individually liable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of counsel that occurred around November 15, 2002, when the State allegedly withdrew the 20-year plea-bargain offer that appellant had purportedly accepted. Waiver of Right to Appeal In its reply brief, the State contends that any alleged errors concerning the “plea bargain process” have been waived by appellant’s pleas of guilty because the complaints of ineffective assistance of counsel have no nexus with appellant’s pleas of guilty. Whether entered with or without an agreed recommendation of punishment by the State, a valid plea of guilty or nolo contendere waives, or forfeits, the right to appeal a claim of error only when the judgment of guilt was rendered independently of, and is not supported by, the alleged error. Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656, 666-67 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). There must usually be a nexus— temporal or

    ### Response:
    holding that because judgment of youngs guilt was not rendered independently of trial courts ruling on motion to suppress evidence of offense and judgment would not be supported without that evidence error not waived by plea of guilty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is a reasonable deduction from facts in evidence; it was not “speculation.” Detective Reynolds saw the ligatures tied to Jeff Wright’s wrists and leg, at the death scene, at the morgue, and in photographs. Although Detective Reynolds admittedly did not know where on the headboard of the bed the ligatures were tied, it was reasonable for him to infer that appellant secured the ligatures to the bed in some fashion. See Valdez, 776 S.W.2d at 169. Moreover, the precise location where the ligatures were tied is an insignificant fact; the more important question is when appellant tied Jeff Wright’s arms and legs. As we have noted, it is not necessary that the demonstration be identical to the event in every respect. See id. at 168; Cantu, 738 S.W.2d at 266; see also Key, 192 S.W.2d at 566 (<HOLDING>). Appellant has not cited any cases, and we

    ### Response:
    holding minor differences in details of demonstration and actual event did not render reenactment substantially dissimilar
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    10 . In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent' all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. 11 . Courts have construed this phrase and similar phrases to include both state and federal courts. See Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 227 F.3d 414, 421 (6th Cir.2000) (concluding actions under the TCA may be filed in state or federal court); Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 694 (4th Cir.2000) (indicating same); see also Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181—82, 74 S.Ct. 442, 445, 98 L.Ed. 608 (1954) (reasoning ""any court” included state courts); Freeman Brown Co. v. Harris, 139 F. 105, 108 (4th Cir.1905) (<HOLDING>). 12 . See Brehmer v. Planning Bd., 238 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding court of competent jurisdiction includes federal courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testimony of the government’s witnesses. Unless the district court is given an opportunity to correct the error, an appellate court cannot review evidence presented at trial which casts doubt upon a pre-trial suppression motion. See United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411, 420-21 (7th Cir.1985). Thomas next contends that the prosecutor misrepresented the testimony of two government witnesses and, in his closing statement, the prosecutor said that Thomas ran a ""satellite office"" for the E & Lite conspiracy. Because five witnesses, including one police officer, testified that Thomas sold E & Lite heroin at the Travelers' Motel as a subordinate of E. Gaston, the prosecutor did not misrepresent the trial record as a whole. See United States v. Sterling, 742 F.2d 521, 527 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099, 105 S.Ct. 2322,

    ### Response:
    holding that prosecutorial error does not warrant reversal unless substantial prejudice results
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    may be “used” in violation of § 924(c), not only as instruments of intimidation or enforcement, but also as tender in a barter transaction, in exchange for drugs. In Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), the Court held that simply possessing a firearm, without active employment, did not constitute “use” under § 924(c). Following Smith and Bailey, courts of appeals had also held that trading drugs for a firearm constituted “use” under § 924(c)(1)(A). See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 39 F.3d 1262, 1269 (4th Cir.1994) (finding defendant “used” a firearm for purposes of § 924(c) where he gave cocaine base to a compatriot in exchange for assistance in obtaining a gun); United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103 F.3d 1501, 1506 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ulloa, 94 F.3d 949, 955 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that trading drugs for a firearm constituted use under  924c1a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the trial court and will be sustained’ on review absent' an abuse of discretion. Id. The State is correct that Johnson’s cooperation with the police is an insufficient statutory ground to justify the downward departure sentence. The statutory mitigating factor of cooperation is found in section 921.0026(i), Florida Statutes (2011). Cooperation requires more than a confession to .the authorities after arrest and guilty, plea. See State v. Knox, 990 So.2d 665, 668 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). “A departure sentence is not warranted where a defendant merely “cooperated after [the] offense was discovered because that cooperation did not solve a crime.”” Id. Johnson’s cooperation did not resolve the current offenses or any other offense. See State v. White, 894 So.2d 293, 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 2Q05)(<HOLDING>). See also State v. Collins, 482 So.2d 388

    ### Response:
    holding that cooperation was insufficient where the defendants cooperation was based on his confession to the charged crimes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    very approach our court adopted in Pro-Snax, concluding that it departed from the statute by imposing a “heightened standard” and requiring evaluation “by hindsight.” In re Top Grade Sausage, Inc., 227 F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir.2000) abrogated on other grounds by Lamie, 540 U.S. 526, 124 S.Ct. 1023. Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that § 330(a)(4)(A) superseded its past precedent, which had “requir[ed] that the services actually provide an ‘identifiable, tangible and material benefit to the [debt- or’s] estate.” ’ In re Smith, 317 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting In re Xebec, 147 B.R. 518, 523 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.1992)). In addition, the Seventh Circuit has applied a similar rule, without specifically relying on the post-1994 guidelines. See In re Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d at 314-16 (<HOLDING>). While Pro-Snax purported to consider the

    ### Response:
    holding that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in granting a fee award to an attorney whose preference action did not have a reasonable likelihood of benefiting the estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the application of Blakely in Foster [therefore] di appellate counsel performed deficiently by failing to raise a Blakely claim, he could not prevail without also showing that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him. In this context, a showing of prejudice would require demonstrating “a reasonable probability that inclusion of the [Blakely ] issue would have changed the result of the appeal.” Benning, 345 Fed.Appx. at 158 (quoting Wilson v. Parker, 515 F.3d 682, 707 (6th Cir.2008)) (alteration in original). This requires only “a reasonable probability that the appeal would have resulted in a remand,” and does not necessarily require that “the remand would have resulted in a shorter sentence.” Ibid.; see also Carter v. Timmerman-Cooper, 380 Fed.Appx. 470, 473 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Under this standard, it is clear that Baker

    ### Response:
    holding failure to assert blakely claim in analogous context did not result in prejudice because under ohio law at the time it is unlikely the fifth district would have remanded petitioners case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a file, URL, IP address, telephone number, television channel, radio station, application, or service.” '002 Patent, col. 10, lines 8-10. Although the term pointer is used in the field of computing, it is analogous to any tag that directs a person to an object or data located elsewhere. As the Special Master observed, “[a]n index (such as the card catalog at a library) contains pointers to information (the books stored in a systematic manner).” R & R on '081 and '002 Patents 31 (emphasis added). Thus, at its core, this patent is directed to the abstract idea of retrieving data located in another place by using a device with information that pinpoints the data’s location to facilitate its retrieval. See Bascom Research, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 77 F.Supp.3d 940, 949-50 (N.D.Cal.2015) (<HOLDING>). This is the same idea at play when someone

    ### Response:
    holding that the concept of establishing and using relationships between documents is a common ageold practice that is not meaningfully different from classifying and organizing data
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were screen captures of the chat, including an image of an adult male masturbating. Moreover, the application explained that records obtained from the Internet provider identified Gentles as the Internet service account holder. From this information, the issuing judge could reasonably infer that the federal agent subpoenaed information related to the suspect’s IP address and that Gentles, as the account holder, probably was the adult male engaged in the unlawful online activity described in the application. Because the items listed in the search warrant— computers, webcams, and other electronic media and storage devices—generally are kept in one’s home, it follows that probable cause existed to search Gentles’s home. See United States v. Cowling, 648 F.3d 690, 696 (8th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McArthur, 573 F.3d 608,

    ### Response:
    holding that probable cause existed to search the defendants residence because the warrant affidavit established probable cause that the defendant possessed stolen firearms and because people generally keep firearms at home or on their persons
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any felony defined by Illinois law. 96 Ill.App.3d at 724, 52 Ill.Dec. at 327, 422 N.E.2d at 8 (quoting Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, para. 33A-2 (1978)). The court held that “where the commission of an underlying offense is a requisite for the commission of a second offense, the information must also contain the elements of the underlying offense.” Id. at 725, 52 Ill.Dec. at 328, 422 N.E.2d at 9. Some jurisdictions that require that the specific underlying offense be identified in the charge, however, do not require that all the elements of the underlying felony itself be alleged, as mandated in Miles. The courts instead require only that the specific underlying felony be identified by name or statutory reference. See, e.g., State v. Hartz, 65 Wash.App. 351, 354-55, 828 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488, 490

    ### Response:
    holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of felonymurder the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    methamphetamine and five counts of distribution of methamphetamine. Herrera now appeals his conviction and sentence. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (appeal of a final decision of a district court); and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (appeal of a final decision regarding a sentence). For the following reasons the conviction is affirmed. Familiarity with the facts is assumed. I. Entrapment Instruction Herrera claims that the district court did not adequately instruct the jury on his theory of the case, namely sentencing entrapment. Sentencing entrapment “occurs when ‘a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped in committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment.’ ” United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) (quoting United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that sentencing entrapment was a valid reason to downwardly depart under the guidelines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    costs because it used the contract’s incorrect prevailing wage schedules, which the City’s bid documents designated, in calculating its bid for the project and determining its lump sum contract price for the project. According to SES, the City’s breach — i.e., specifying the incorrect rate in the bid documents — caused these damages. SES offered evidence that its representatives relied on the incorrect rate in formulating SES’s bid on the project. It also offered damage models showing the difference between its actual costs and the costs it would have incurred had the rate been capped by the allegedly correct ot make the City a guarantor that an employer hires employees at that rate. See United States v. Binghamton Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 171, 178, 74 S.Ct. 438, 442, 98 L.Ed. 594 (1954) (<HOLDING>). According to section 1.2.2 of the contract,

    ### Response:
    holding that federal prevailing wage rate statutes requirement that contractor pay not less specified minima presupposes possibility that successful bidder may have to pay higher rate to workers and that bidders reliance on governments representation of prevailing rate in computing its bid cannot be said to have been justified
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Here, Appellant did not request a limiting instruction concerning Appellant’s assault of Ms. Kurt until the State had completed its direct examination of Randy. And it was during the State’s direct examination of Randy that he testified that Appellant hit Ms. Kurt twice in the convenience store parking lot. Thus, Randy’s testimony that Appellant twice hit Ms. Kurt had already been admitted as part of the general evidence and was usable for all purposes. See id. Appellant failed to request a limiting instruction at the time the evidence of the assault was first admitted, and therefore failed to preserve this point for appellate review. See id.; see also Prescott v. State, 123 S.W.3d 506, 515-16 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We overrule Appellant’s third point. VII.

    ### Response:
    holding defendant who failed to request limiting instruction concerning use of extraneous offenses at the moment the evidence was admitted was not entitled to limiting instructions in jury charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in determining whether the false light tort had been committed; their interest hi the subject matter was determinative. Here, the report was not distributed to the public. The report was only distributed to those individuals with a professional interest in the value of the Resort. Order filed December 22, 1995, 4-7. The report was distributed by defendants to the Bank, which forwarded copies to certain individuals working for other participating lenders. One copy was left in a hotel room, but retrieved two hours later. Benchmark’s decision to copy and distribute this report cannot be charged to defendants — plaintiffs cannot complain of unwanted publicity for which they alone are responsible. Cf. Live Oak Pub. Co. v. Cohagan, 234 Cal.App.3d 1277, 286 Cal.Rptr. 198, 201-03 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Since plaintiffs have no proof that the

    ### Response:
    holding that libel defendant is not liable for plaintiffs reasonable republication where republication was not coerced
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    before he filed his EEOC complaint, and Count I is dismissed as time-barred. B. Title III of the ADA Claims Defendants move to dismiss Counts II and III, both of which allege ADA Title III violations. Count II alleges that Prudential discriminated against Wilson based on his mental disability by maintaining a long-term disability policy that treats mental and physical disabilities differently. Count III states that Prudential violated Title III by refusing to pay Wilson’s rehabilitation expenses based on the Plan’s mbntal-disability limit. Defendants’ motions to dismiss both counts turn on an issue not yet decided by the First Circuit: whether the ADA requires a private employer-sponsored disability plan to provide equal benefits for mental and physical disabili 4, 148-58 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092,

    ### Response:
    holding ada does not require parity between mental and physical disabilities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has been “convicted of any prior or subsequent crime.” This language contrasts with the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 that bars expungement of disorderly persons offenses only for those “convicted of any prior or subsequent crime * *, or of another three disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses.” By making its disqualifier for another “crime” both retrospective and prospective, the Legislature has frozen the rights of the two-time criminal. The act must be read to disapprove of the language of State v. Chelson, supra, 104 N.J.Super. at 510, that suggested that an offender could expunge the record of a last criminal conviction, although not able to use that to leapfrog backwards to wipe out an entire record. Cf. State v. D’Angerio, 124 N.J.Super. 240 (Law Div.1973) (<HOLDING>). Implicit in this view is that the Legislature

    ### Response:
    holding that the multiple offender could not expunge all of his convictions by simply removing them from his record one at a time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of movement; their initial contact was not a stop. Nor was Officer Robinson’s observation of the inside of defendant’s pickup a search for constitutional purposes. In State v. Orlovski, 146 Or App 632, 933 P2d 976 (1997), we explained, “It is well settled that a police officer’s unaided observation, purposive or not, from a lawful vantage point is not a search under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that “ ‘[a]n officer who has lawfully stopped a vehicle does not violate any occupant’s rights in walking around the vehicle and looking through the windows of the vehicle to observe that which can be plainly seen.’ State v. Jackson, 296 Or 430, 438, 677 P2d 21 (1984); see also State v. Wacker, 317 Or 419, 426-27, 856 P2d 1029 (1993) (<HOLDING>).” Id. at 636-37 (internal quotation marks and

    ### Response:
    holding that no privacy interest was invaded when the officers saw the defendants activities while he was parked in a tavern parking lot and seated in a vehicle with the console light on
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    punishment. The court’s instruction is designed to prevent a jury from committing jury misconduct by speculating on the amount of time that a convict may serve, or by considering what the Parole Board may do relative to the accused’s sentence. A juror’s ability to follow the court’s instruction on this matter must and can be tested during voir dire when the accused may challenge each venire member, both concerning his position on or understanding of the law as well as on the accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial and to fair and impartial punishment. Implicit within the statute is appellant’s duty to make inquiry and to challenge each ve-nire member on his willingness to follow the court’s instruction. See House of Tobacco, Inc. v. Calvert, 394 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex.1965) (<HOLDING>). While it may very well be difficult for a

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute that does not provide for notice and a hearing is not unconstitutional because those provisions may be incorporated by implication to prevent a holding of unconstitutionality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    focus on conduct, which almost doomed the defendants’ constitutional Challenge from the outset, has returned to extinguish their argument based on R.AV. Because R.AV. does not apply to statutes that are “directed at conduct,” it does not apply to FACE, which is primarily, or 'even entirely, “directed at conduct.” This assumes, however, that our definition of “conduct” has not changed. With respect to the use of force, this seems to be a safe assumption. See, e.g., Mitchell, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2201. Moreover, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute that selectively proscribes threats of force is similarly “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297,

    ### Response:
    holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within separate exception to rav
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lopez v. State, 25 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Moore v. State, 4 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Minix v. State, 990 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1999, pet. ref'd); Price v. State, 989 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1999, pet. ref'd); Hernandez v. State, 986 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex.App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref'd); Vidaurri v. State, 981 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. granted); Johnson v. State, 978 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1998, no pet.); Session v. State, 978 S.W.2d 289, 291-92 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.); Rigsby v. State, 976 S.W.2d 368, 369 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1998, no pet.). 4 . But see Johnson v. State, 32 S.W.3d 444, 445-46 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. filed) (<HOLDING>); Lopez, 25 S.W.3d at 928 (same); Martinez v.

    ### Response:
    holding that notwithstanding rule 252b3 requirements appellate court could address jurisdictional defects
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. We suspect Knight’s multiple attempts to obtain relief on this claim stem from a mistaken belief that such an error is, or was at one time, per se reversible. The supreme court, however, has never held that it is. In the absence of such a declaration by the supreme court, all judgments are subject to a harmless error analysis. See § 924.33, Fla. Stat. (1993); State v. Schopp, 653 So.2d 1016, 1020 (Fla.1995); State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1134 (Fla.1986). Knight likely was misled because until recently the supreme court had not discussed the harmless error test in any of its decisions reversing an improper firearm enhancement. See, e.g., Tripp, 642 So.2d at 728; State v. Overfelt, 457 So.2d 1385 (Fla.1984). A reversal without a discussion of wh ) (<HOLDING>); State v. Overfelt, 457 So.2d 1385, 1387

    ### Response:
    holding that even where evidence regarding the use of a firearm is unrebutted to impose mandatory minimum sentence a jury must make that finding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Therefore, on the face of the Amended Complaint, it is certainly at least ambiguous and not readily discernible that the minimum amount in controversy could be met at the time of removal of the case from state court in order to support diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court must move to the second step of the analysis, wherein Defendant, “the party invoking federal jurisdiction^] must prove the requisite amount by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bell, 557 F.3d at 956. 2. Legally Recoverable Damages As discussed above, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint alleges only a single claim of breach of contract. In Minnesota, the measure of damages for a breach of contract claim is those damages flowing from the alleged breach. Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 440, 234 N.W.2d 775, 789 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Defendant first argues that, when determining

    ### Response:
    holding that absent an independent tort a plaintiff alleging a breach of contract may only seek to recover the damages flowing from the breach
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it.” J & R Ice Cream Corp. v. California Smoothie Licensing Corp., 31 F.3d 1259, 1272 (3d Cir.1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, New Jersey courts have opined that the “the entire thrust of the Act is pointed to products and services sold to consumers in the popular sense.” E. Coast Office Sys. v. Citicorp Vendor Fin., Inc., No. 06-24-GEB, 2006 WL 3257091, at *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82044, at *6-7 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Thus, the [NJ]CFA is not intended to cover every transaction that occurs in the marketplace, but, rather, its applicability is limited to consumer transactions which are defined both by the status of the parties and the nature of the transaction itself.” I 79-80, 597 A.2d 1109 (N.J.Super.Ct. Law Div. 1990) (<HOLDING>); Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Bergen Brunswig

    ### Response:
    holding that a corporation that purchased certain technology and support services through a services and licensing agreement was not protected by the njcfa because the technology and services were not 1 available to the public in large quantities or mass produced and 2 had no similarity to the comprehensive definitions of goods and services promulgated by the nj division of consumer affairs under the njcfa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    immunity from civil suit based on their testimony because without such immunity, ""the truth-seeking process at trial would be impaired.” Id. at 1505. The Court reasoned in Rehberg that ""[t]he factors that justify absolute immunity for trial witnesses apply with equal force to grand jury witnesses.” Id. Although here we deal with a different form of speech protection, we similarly hold that the factors justifying First Amendment protection against retaliation for trial witnesses apply with equal force to subpoenaed deposition witnesses. 4 . We note that, unlike the plaintiff in Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009), Karl is not a police officer whose duty under state law is to testify truthfully as part of her professional responsibilities. See 574 F.3d at 707-08 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and brackets

    ### Response:
    holding that under california law tjestifying before a grand jury charged with investigating corruption is one part of an officers job and therefore any speech huppert gave during his grand jury testimony was pursuant to his duties as a police officer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consistent with the ruling of this Court., As only the City or the Commonwealth may appeal from an adverse ruling by this Court pursuant to Va. Code § 16.1-131.1 and the Court has ruled in their favor, endorsements are dispensed with in accordance with Rule 1:13 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Clerk is directed to remand this matter to the Chesapeake General District Court and to forward copies of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to all counsel of record and to The Honorable Michael R. Katchmark, Presiding Judge of the Chesapeake General District Court. Entry of this memorandum opinion shall constitute an order of the Court consistent with its directives. It is so ordered. 1 See Parker v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 681, 686-90, 485 S.E.2d 150, 153 — 54 (1997) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1071. 2 See

    ### Response:
    holding that va code  182603 is not void for vagueness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Transfers that the Debtor made to the Bank because the Defendant received, either directly or indirectly, the benefit of these transfers. However, the Mortgage Payment Transfers reduced a secured debt — the mortgage owed- on the Lake Property, The Debtor owed the-mortgage to the'Bank, in the same amount and with the same payment schedule,'whether or not the Defendant was living in the Lake Property. The benefit received by the Defendant on account of the Mortgage Payment Transfers is merely incidental. The Mortgage Payment Transfers reduced the mortgage such that the.Bank’s claim in the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate is significantly less than it would have been had the Debtor not made the Mortgage Payments. See Meister v. Jamison (In re Jamison), 21 B.R. 380, 381 (Bankr.D.Conn.1982) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, allowing the Trustee to recover the

    ### Response:
    holding that even though a transfer of property eg money incidentally benefits another it cannot be said as a matter of law or logic that the transaction was a fraudulent transfer as to the party benefited
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Association’s dismissal from the foreclosure action did not preclude PNC Bank’s entitlement to section 718.116’s safe harbor protection and, therefore, dismissal of PNC Bank’s action based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not appropriate. First, the involuntary dismissal of the Association from the foreclosure action did not render the assessment lien superior to the mortgage lien. The Association was involuntarily dismissed from PNC Bank’s 2012 foreclosure action because it was involuntary dismissed from the 2008 foreclosure action as a sanction against the previous bank. This sanction could not, as a matter of law, render the Association’s assessment lien superior to the first mortgage lien. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Farhood, 153 So.3d 955, 957-58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (<HOLDING>); see also Holly Lake Ass’n v. Fed. Nat’l

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court exceeded its authority in declaring the associations lien superior to the foreclosing banks mortgage lien as a sanction for delay tactics because the courts declaration of lien priority as a sanction impermissibly overlooked the common law and encroached on the legislatures codification of wellestablished property rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was no manifest necessity to declare the mistrial, and no express or implied consent to the mistrial by the defendant, we perceive no exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause’s requirement that an individual may not be subjected “to hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.” Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). We have considered all arguments presented by the parties and conclude that no further discussion is necessary. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 1 . New Jersey relies on ""manifest necessity” because the phrase ""ends of public justice” is not applicable to the facts of this case. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 468-471, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072-1074, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The district court, without discussion,

    ### Response:
    holding that the ends of public justice justify a mistrial where the trial contains a defect such that a conviction if obtained could be upset at will on appeal or in collateral proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fifth Amendment. Gray, 796 A.2d at 717. In response to the State’s contention that Appellant fully presented his theory of the case to the jury, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s refusal to permit Appellant to call Ms. Day to the stand was harmless. See Jenkins, 195 W.Va. at 628, 466 S.E.2d at 479. Simply put, we cannot be certain that the jury would not have viewed Appellant’s theory of the case in a different light had Ms. Day taken the stand and either responded to questions posed by defense counsel or refused to testify in the jury’s presence. Based on the specific circumstances present in this case, an acquitted co-defendant who refused to testify despite a grant of immunity combined with sufficient evidence suggesting that the co-defendant may have been the sole per t 150 (<HOLDING>). Based on the specific facts presented by this

    ### Response:
    recognizing that exclusion of testimony that provides a direct link to someone other than the defen dant committing the crime  constitutes reversible error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Friendly, J., and dissenting opinion of Lombard, J.) 4 . A recent case in which the same situation prevailed is LaMade v. Wilson (1975) 168 U.S.App.D.C. 108, 512 F.2d 1348. There the trial court had ruled such evidence admissible. The issue of a curative instruction was not raised and the only issue was one of admissibility. 5 . 375 U.S. at 255, 84 S.Ct. at 317. 6 . 58 Am.Jur. § 530, p. 124. For an instance in which an appropriate instruction cured an impermissible reference to collateral benefits, see Edwards v. Steinns (4th Cir. 1953) 207 F.2d 734, 735. To the same effect, are Mixon v. Lovett (1970) 122 Ga.App. 517, 177 S.E.2d 826, 827, and Finley P. Smith, Inc. v. Schectman (Fla.App.) 132 So.2d 460, 466; cf. Franklin v. Sandersville Railroad Company (5th Cir. 1971) 445 F.2d 270, 271 (<HOLDING>) The point, however, has been most often

    ### Response:
    holding that a verdict of no liability made any reference to collateral benefits harmless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    , at any time upon a showing of good cause. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3). This court follows the vast majority of courts that have considered this issue and finds that the FCA does not run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine. See United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032, 1041 (6th Cir.1994); Kelly, 9 F.3d at 755 (“[T]he FCA gives the Attorney General sufficient means of controlling or supervising relators to satisfy separation of powers concerns.”); Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1155 (“[T]he FCA qui tam provisions do not usurp the executive branch’s litigating funct d qui tam rela-tors do not wield so much governmental power that their appointments must conform to the requirements of the Appointments Clause); Robinson, 824 F.Supp. 830, 836 (<HOLDING>). Hektoen argues that qui tam relators are

    ### Response:
    holding that relators are not officers because they seek to vindicate not only public rights but their own private rights as well
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Mangan, 575 F.2d at 45. The Bondholders argue that evidence regarding the hedging activities of Non-Consequential Damages Parties is not relevant as it does not shed light on the conduct of the Consequential Damages Parties and, ev ion v. Raroc, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 3078, 2000 WL 204537, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2000) (citing, in the context of a labor case, 26 C.F.R. § 639.99(b)(2) for the proposition that an “employer must exercise such commercially reasonable business judgment as would a similarly situated employer in predicting the demands of its particular market”). Reasonableness cannot be judged solely by looking at the subjective actions of the Consequential Damages Parties. See Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 417, 419-20 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (<HOLDING>). Here, where “there is no clear, established

    ### Response:
    holding that beeause the actions an employee takes to find work themselves cannot be evidence of their own reasonableness looking solely at the employee plaintiffs efforts to find work would convert the mitigation test into a subjective one
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this issue. Kinman states in her affidavit that initially she did not welcome McDougall’ F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.1996) (refusing to hold school district Hable for student-on-student harassment unless the school itself directly discriminated based on sex). The divergence of views on this issue stems in part from the factual disparity in the cases. Title IX cases vary in both the type of discrimination alleged (hostile environment, quid pro quo, sexual abuse, discriminatory hiring/firing, or some combination) and in the identity of the perpetrators and victims (teacher/student harassment, stu dent/student harassment, or school official/teacher harassment). But even those courts which have addressed similar fact patterns have varied in their holdings. Compare Bosley, 904 F.Supp. at 1022 (<HOLDING>) with Rowinsky, 80 F.3d 1006 (refusing to hold

    ### Response:
    holding school board liable for studentonstudent harassment if school officials knew of harassment and intentionally failed to take proper remedial action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    III, concurs. 1 . The Fourth Circuit is one of two federal circuits that does not currently require a showing that the government intentionally delayed the indictment so as to gain a tactical advantage. See U.S. v. Automated Med. Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399 (4th Cir.1985); Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889 (4th Cir.1990). Chief Justice TOAL dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In accordance with the majority of the federal circuits that have addressed the issue, I would hold that pre-indictment delay does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause unless a defendant can show both actual prejudice and that the State has intentionally delayed the issuance of an indictment in order to gain an unfair tactical advantage. See Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). But leaving this aside, I disagree with the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that this test applies in every federal circuit save the fourth and the ninth
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also provides that “[t]he burden of proof in hearings held under this section is on the appropriate county agency.” In Zawacki v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 745 A.2d 701 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), the Department argued that the trial court had discretion to dismiss the statutory appeal for the sake of judicial efficiency when the licensee failed to appear at the scheduled hearing to prosecute his appeal. Finding no controlling authority on the issue, the Court relied on the “practice rule” under Rule 218(b)(1) and (c) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, Pa. R.C.P. No. 218(b)(1) and (c), while recognizing that the rules of civil procedure do not apply to a statutory appeal. See Knopsnider v. Derry Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 725 A.2d 245 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (<HOLDING>). Rule 218(b)(1) and (c) permits a plaintiff to

    ### Response:
    holding that under pa rcp no 1007 the rules of civil procedure apply only to actions brought by a praecipe for a writ of summons or a complaint not to a statutory appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ventures § 12 (1969)).” Flowers v. Pope, 937 So.2d 61, 65-66 (Ala.2006). The record does not contain substantial evidence to create a jury question with regard to the existence of a joint venture involving Hyundai. Nothing in the evidence supports a finding of a community of interest. Hyundai never had a joint ownership interest with any of the alleged joint venturers in the property of the Rus-sells or the McLemore group upon the closings on the property. Additionally, Hyundai did not provide financing for the purchase of the property, and it had no risk or expenses with regard to the purchase. Thus, nothing supports a finding of a community of interest involving Hyundai with regard to the acquisition of the property to constitute the project site. Cf. Flowers v. Pope, 937 So.2d at 68 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the record indicates that Hyundai

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no community of interest because the alleged joint venturers did not have an equal proprietary interest and only one of the alleged joint venturers bore the risks and paid the expenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the trial court’s denial of the university’s plea to the jurisdiction in part, but concluded that the bank’s claim for inverse condemnation was properly dismissed because the university took the property under color of contract, as conceded by the parties in their pleadings. Id. at 911. In contrast to Texas Southern, in which the parties conceded the existence of a contract by which the university took possession of the equipment, here, the Porrettos’ claim of ownership in the land is unchallenged in the pleadings and the evidence. Id. Instead, the facts in this case resemble those in State v. Riemer and Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Mauro, cases in which takings claims survived a plea to the jurisdiction. See State v. Riemer, 94 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); see also Kenedy Mem’l Found., 921 S.W.2d at

    ### Response:
    holding that allegations that states lease and actions that resulted in taking of oil and gas were sufficient to state claim for inverse condemnation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    light of the statute’s language, structure, and legislative history. If such inferences of intent are not present, we must conclude that “ ‘the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy’” does not exist. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179, 108 S.Ct. at 516 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 94, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1582, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981)). “Courts seldom imply a private right of action where none appears in the statute, for ‘a strong presumption exists against [their] creation....’” Statland v. American Airlines, Inc., 998 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting West Allis Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251, 254 (7th Cir.1988)); see also Louisiana Landmarks Soc’y, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 85 F.3d 1119, 1123 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Stowell v. Ives, 976 F.2d 65, 70 n. 5 (1st

    ### Response:
    recognizing this presumption
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    some state-law claims nonactionable through the class-action device”). 2. In connection with prong Plaintiffs assert that even if their complaints allege deceit, their claims are not SLUSA-barred because the challenged conduct did not occur “in connection with the purchase or sale of’ a security. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(l). But, the Supreme Court has read SLUSA’s “in connection with” requirement broadly, finding it satisfied if misrepresentations simply “coincide with a securities transaction.” Dabit, 547 U.S. at 77-78, 85, 126 S.Ct. 1503 (internal quotation marks omitted). The misrepresentation need only “have more than some tangential relation to the securities transaction.” Freeman, 704 F.3d at 1116 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Chadbourne, 134 S.Ct. at 1066 (<HOLDING>). That test is satisfied here. As the district

    ### Response:
    holding that slusas in connection with prong extends to misrepresentations that are material to the purchase or sale of a covered security
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the plea-agreement-disclosure requirement. Although Wilder did not testify pursuant to a plea agreement, the Court finds that the prosecutor’s repeated reference to the “minimal” benefit afforded Wilder for his testimony was improper. The Court also finds that the prosecutor’s statements tended to mislead the jury, prejudiced Petitioner by hamstringing his efforts to explore fully Wilder’s motives for testifying, and were deliberately placed before the jury by the prosecutor. In addition, considered in the context of the relative weakness of the prosecution’s case, which relied heavily on Wilder’s testimony and the testimony of admitted drug dealers, the prosecutor’s misconduct rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Scott v. Foltz, 612 F.Supp. 50, 58 (E.D.Mich.1985) (Cohn, J.) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that the state court’s

    ### Response:
    holding witnesss false testimony regarding plea agreement was reasonably likely to have impacted the jurys judgment where case essentially amounted to a credibility contest between the witness who testified falsely regarding a plea agreement and the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether or not a certificate has been filed. TOLLING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS The hearing officer found that even if the limitations period began to run before the certificate was filed, the period should be tolled during the time the city was attempting to obtain worker’s signature on the certificate. Worker’s refusal to execute the certificate, according to the hearing officer, provided good cause for the city’s failure to file its claim against the fund within the limitations period. Tolling of a limitations period is normally accomplished by statute. See NMSA 1978, §§ 37-1-9 to 37-1-12 (tolling for absence or concealment of a debtor, minority, incapacity, death of claimant, and stay of action pursuant to injunction); cf. Hardin v. Farris, 87 N.M. 143, 530 P.2d 407 (Ct.App.1974) (<HOLDING>). As the Hardin case illustrates, some fault on

    ### Response:
    holding that tolling may occur even in absence of statute if defendant prevented plaintiff from knowing of claim by fraudulently concealing it or failing to disclose it when its existence is hidden from plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (emphasis added.) As a matter of industry terminology, “not to exceed” or “guaranteed not to exceed” refers to an estimate by which the customer pays the lower of the estimated cost or the actual cost based upon the actual weight and services provided on the estimate. (Id. ¶ 15.) Had Mr. Harrison been disclosed pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2), there might have been an argument as to whether his expert opinion on the “industry” meaning of the terms “not to exceed” or “guaranteed not to exceed” would be admissible (especially in light of the fact that Chen is not a member of the moving industry). But there is no doubt that such testimony falls under Rule 702’s category of “specialized knowledge.” See, e.g., WH Smith Hotel Sens., Inc. v. Wendy’s Intl., Inc., 25 F.3d 422, 428-29 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); but see Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank

    ### Response:
    holding that court did not err in interpreting lease using testimony of expert in real estate leases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is sought.’ ” Sample v. Keystone Mercy Health Plan, Civ. A. No. 12-3188, 2012 WL 5401015, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 5, 2012). We are bound by the Court of Appeals’ holding in Marra and agree with the numerous district courts deciding that the Seventh Amendment confers a right to a jury trial on PHRA claims seeking compensatory damages brought in federal court. See Id.; Weaver v. Cnty. of McKean, No. 11-254, 2012 WL 1564661, at *7 (W.D.Pa. Apr. 9, 2012) (“[T]he Court finds that Plaintiff has a right to a jury trial on her PHRA retaliation claim.”); Heater v. Kispeace, No. Civ. A. 05-4545, 2005 WL 2456008, at *5-6 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 5, 2005) (“Plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on her PHRA claim for compensatory damages.”); Cortes v. R.I. Enterps., Inc., 95 F.Supp.2d 255, 260-62 (M.D.Pa.2000) (<HOLDING>). F. Compensatory and Punitive Damages pursuant

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiff established entitlement to jury trial of legal claims brought under the phra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the defendants knew of, and disregarded, an excessive risk to his health or safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (“[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”). The district court properly granted summary judgment on Windham’s due process claims challenging his transfer to administrative segregation at CSP-Solano because prisoners generally have no protected liberty interest in being incarcerated at a particular prison or against placement in administrative segregation. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225-27, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (<HOLDING>); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding prisoners have no due process interest protecting against transfer from one insti tution to another
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not qualify as an excited utterance because the State failed to show the amount of time that elapsed between the shooting and Anderson’s purported statement. Appellant further maintains that Anderson’s statement is not reliable because the State was unable to show Anderson’s actions during the time between the shooting and the statement, and therefore, Anderson may have had the opportunity to reflect on, or fabricate, the details of the shooting. The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is founded on the belief that a statement made as a result of a startling event or condition is involuntary and does not allow the declarant an adequate opportunity to fabricate, thereby ensuring the trustworthiness of the statement. Couchman, 3 S.W.3d at p.-San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd.) (<HOLDING>); Gay v. State, 981 S.W.2d 864, 867

    ### Response:
    holding no excited utterance because declarant had time to fabricate during oneyear lapse
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    but not cocaine. The court entered a revocation of probation and imposed a two-year sentence for battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting arrest with violence, with credit for time served on probation. However, the court’s written order of revocation of probation does not give defendant any credit for time served on probation, and finds that defendant committed each of the probation violations charged. We affirm the revocation of probation because defendant admitted several violations of his conditions of probation. However, the State properly concedes that the sentence must be reversed because the trial court erred in failing to enter a written order that conformed to its oral pronouncements at the sentencing hearing. See Whitehead v. State, 654 So.2d 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>); Nodal v. State, 650 So.2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA

    ### Response:
    holding that courts written sentence must conform to oral pronouncement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and a third party who supplied necessaries to the husband’s wife and children, providing the third party with a means of holding the husband liable for the support of his family. Id. As early as 1867, this Court expressly recognized a father’s liability for necessaries furnished to his child. Fowlkes v. Baker, 29 Tex. 135, 137 (1867); see also Cunningham v. Cunningham, 120 Tex. 491, 40 S.W.2d 46, 48 (1931) (noting that a father’s liability for necessaries furnished to his minor child “is generally enforced in England, ... the United States, and always in Texas”). Not long after, this Court recognized attorney’s fees incurred as a result of services rendered for the benefit of a minor may be treated as necessaries. See, e.g., Searcy v. Hunter, 81 Tex. 644, 17 S.W. 372, 373 (1891) (<HOLDING>); Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294, 11 S.W. 1101,

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys fees are necessaries in a civil suit to recover money or property for the minor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    police observed that the radiator and motor were still hot. Id. The trial court also admitted evidence that Rawls was intoxicated at the time. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Rawls’ conviction, even though “[t]he only direct evidence that [Rawls] had driven a motor vehicle upon a public street was his statement or confession,” stating, The fact that appellant failed to challenge the statement of the driver of the wrecker or in any other manner failed to challenge the implication that it was his automobile which the officer trailed and which was found at the site is deemed sufficient circumstance to corroborate his extrajudicial confession that he was the driver of the automobile. Id. (relying on Fancher v. State, 167 Tex.Crim. 269, 319 S.W.2d 707, 708 (Tex.Crim.App.1958) (<HOLDING>)). Likewise, here, appellant described running

    ### Response:
    holding that ownership of vehicle and presence at scene of crash sufficiently corroborated appellants statement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Export Clause does not contain that affirmative requirement, the court cannot construe the clause as the full and express waiver of sovereign immunity necessary to allow prejudgment interest. C. Fifth Amendment Taking Plaintiffs argue that the imposition of the HMT on exports was a taking under the Fifth Amendment and, therefore, the traditional rule against interest does not apply. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. See U.S. Const, amend. V. A Fifth Amendment takings claim requires a two-step analysis. First, Plaintiff must establish that it possesses a compensable property interest. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); , 876 (9th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>); Coleman v. C.I.R., 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir.

    ### Response:
    holding that a purely financial exaction does not constitute a taking
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requirements of-Daubert, see Williams v. Mast Biosurgery USA, Inc., 644 F.3d 1312, 1317-18 (11th Cir.2011), or to expert, disclosure requirements under rules of court. See Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 320 F.3d at 1217-23; United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1119 (11th Cir.2002). .This is so because “[l]ay opinion testimony is admissible only to help the jury or the court to understand the facts about which the witness is testifying and not to provide specialized explanations or interpretations that an untrained layman could not make if perceiving the same acts or events.” United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641 (8th Cir.2001)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 701, Advisory Committee Note to 2000 Amendments (<HOLDING>). However, courts must be vigilant to ensure

    ### Response:
    recognizing that rule 701 as amended incorporates the distinction set forth in state v brown 836 sw2d 530 549 tenn1992 in which the court stated that lay testimony results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life whereas expert testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the NLRB, the state’s jurisdiction is preempted. Id. at 197, 201, 98 S.Ct. 1745; see also Belknap, 463 U.S. at 511, 103 S.Ct. 3172 (applying primary jurisdiction test to state regulation of arguably prohibited conduct). As to whether the picketing was arguably protected by the NLRA, the Court went beyond the primary jurisdiction test to address additional federal supremacy concerns — whether, despite the lack of identi-cality between issues the state court and NLRB might consider, preemption was warranted to protect against the risk of “misinterpretation of [the NLRA] and the consequent prohibition of protected conduct.” Sears, 436 U.S. at 203, 98 S.Ct. 1745. We employed this “primary jurisdiction plus” approach in Radcliffe v. Rainbow Const. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 786 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). a. Primary Jurisdiction The parties do not

    ### Response:
    holding that state jurisdiction over claims by union members against employer for false arrest false imprisonment and malicious prosecution were not preempted under garmon
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only unjust, but also inconsistent with the underlying policies of the patent law, now to base a determination that A & E infringed the patent on information that was not part of the public record at the time A & E designed the 735 Model, regardless of whether that information substantively altered the claims of the original patent. To do so would expose any subsequent inventor who seeks to improve the art to the risk of paying substantial damages by the simple expedient of allowing a patent holder to obtain a reissued patent and then use the changes in that patent in a pending infringement suit in order to prevail with its interpretation of a disputed term. See Stairmaster Sports/Medical Prod. Inc. v. Groupe Procycle, Inc., No. Civ. 97-396(MMS), 1998 WL 290296 (D.Del. May 20, 1998) (<HOLDING>). This potential risk is balanced to a certain

    ### Response:
    recognizing risk of allowing patent holder to selfservingly make a reissue declaration that broadens the scope of the claims beyond what was intended by the inventor when the initial patent was first filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    determination.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir.2009). Maldonado-Reyes challenges the denial of his request for a continuance. “We review the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of petitioner’s motion for continuance under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Ilic-Lee v. Mukasey, 507 F.3d 1044, 1047 (6th Cir.2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if ‘the denial ... was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination.’ ” Id. (omission in original) (quoting Abu-Khaliel v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 627, 634 (6th Cir.2006)). The IJ “may grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. “Finding ‘good cause’ is crucial since a continuance, in effe .2008) (<HOLDING>). Maldonado-Reyes additionally argues that the

    ### Response:
    holding that where the ij had previously granted continuance requests this reason alone is a sufficient basis to affirm the ij
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hart points to two remarks, one from the prosecutor’s closing argument, the other from the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing. In his brief, Hart quotes the first challenged remark: This whole thing about the Defendant intending to kill himself has been a false issue that’s just been kind of floating around out there throughout. What the Defendant’s actions were all about weren’t about suicide. * ⅜ ⅞ ⅜ But the bottom line is it doesn’t really matter what his intention was, whether he was intending at that time to kill himself. What matters is that he committed an aggravated assault. [¶ 12] Appellant contends the prosecutor’s remark was a gross misstatement of the law because intent does matter, even if the crime is a general intent crime. See Cox v. State, 829 P.2d 1183, 1185-86 (Wyo.1992) (<HOLDING>); accord Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921,

    ### Response:
    holding that wyo stat ann  62502aiii defines a general intent crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether the appeal is taken in good faith or is frivolous. Regardless of whether a defendant’s counsel or the district court determines that an appeal is frivolous, if the appellate court agrees, then no counsel is required to represent the client on the frivolous appeal. Rather, the obligation is upon counsel to withdraw from an appeal that is frivolous. Counsel may even be subject to sanctions for bringing a frivolous appeal. Fed. R.App. P. 38 (""If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may ... award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.""). See also U.S. v. Spitzer, Case No. 06-CV00479,-Fed.Appx.-, 2007 WL 2376783 (11th Cir. 2007) (granting sanctions under Rule 38 when appeal was frivolous); U.S. v. Cooper, 170 F.3d 691 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Defendant, in her motion, relies on very

    ### Response:
    holding rule 38 applies to frivolous criminal appeals as well as civil appeals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statutes] and 625 ILCS 5/2 — 123(h) [section 2 — 123(h) of the Illinois Vehicle Code]). Now saying that they do “not directly rely on the [federal statutes],” Claimants contend that count III asserts “an implied statutory tort based on the federal statutes and State nondisclosure policy.” Petition for Rehearing, paragraph 20, at 7. Raising an issue of first impression in this Court, Claimants ask us to recognize an implied statutory tort— i.e., a private civil action implied from a statute that does not expressly create a private cause of action — emanating from a mix of federal and state statutes. Claimants invoke the “5-factor” standard for implied statutory torts established in Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp. (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 378, 432 N.E.2d 849, 59 Ill. Dec. 905 (<HOLDING>). We must reject this creative but wildly

    ### Response:
    recognizing implied private action for violation of the real estate brokers and salesmen license act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his deposition and go over his testimony. They were under no obligation to do so. See Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d at 191 (contrasting subpoenaed grand jury testimony with voluntary disclosure). This “deliberate, affirmative, and selective” use of work product waives the SEC’s ability to now assert the privilege against the defendants. See also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated June 5, 2008, 329 Fed.Appx. 302, 303-04 (2d Cir.2009) (summary order) (“Disclosure to Roe waived the privilege because Roe had firsthand and independent knowledge of the facts at the center of the grand jury’s investigation, she had separate representation from Doe, and her interests in the litigation were divergent from those of Doe.”); Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Aeroflex, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 66, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>); Medinol, Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 214

    ### Response:
    holding defendants waived work product protection over emails that defense counsel sent to independent thirdparty witness with whom defendants did not share common interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    night, and thus they tried to use the DWI unit whenever possible so that patrol cars would be available for their primary responsibility of responding to service calls and emergencies. He also stated that the DWI unit officers were more experienced in DWI investigations, were usually able to conduct a DWI investigation more quickly than patrol officers, and had primary responsibility for conducting DWI investigations. We conclude that the delay in Bullock’s detention furthered legitimate law enforcement purposes — specifically, ensuring that an adequate number of patrol cars are available to respond to emergency calls and utilizing a DWI unit that has greater experience in investigating DWIs and can perform such investigations with greater expediency. See Belcher, 244 S.W.3d at 539-41 (<HOLDING>); Hartman, 144 S.W.3d at 573-74 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that delay while awaiting arrival of dwi enforcement officer was for legitimate law enforcement purposes because dwi officer was more experienced and could complete dwi investigation faster
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fact-dependent inquiry that will vary depending on individual circumstances”). Consideration of these factors leads the Court to conclude that Johnson’s due process rights have not been offended by his detention. Johnson was detained for eleven months before an IJ ruled on his removal, an extended period of detention. On December 17, 2012, an IJ ordered Johnson removed. The sole reason that Johnson continues to be in ICE custody is the fact that Johnson chose to appeal the IJ’s removal order. Although Johnson indisputably “has every right to seek any relief from deportation for which he may be eligible, delay caused by his actions does not make continued detention unreasonable or unjustified.” Andreenko, 2010 WL 2900363 at *4; see Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 211 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Diaz, 2011 WL 3422856, at *4

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioneralien could not rely on the extra time resulting from his pursuit of available legal remedies to claim that his prolonged detention violates substantive due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from disposition of collateral, our analysis is based on a calculation of McCormac’s intended “pecuniary harm.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1, cmt. n. 2(A)(ii). The 2001 amendments to the sentencing guidelines for fraud make clear that intended loss should not be an inquiry into intent to repay, as suggested by case law interpreting the prior sentencing guideline, but rather should focus on the intended financial harm. See id. Thus, even though in many instances this will simply be an inquiry into whether a defendant intended to repay, when collateral is involved courts must also consider whether a defendant planned to return the collateral or anticipated that such collateral would be repossessed or foreclosed on by the lending institution. See Williams, 292 F.3d at 686 (<HOLDING>). Applying that standard here, we find that

    ### Response:
    holding that a court should consider pledged collateral when determining the amount of the intended loss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” Carter, supra, 566 A.2d at 717. Any doubts in this regard are to be “resolved in favor of coverage.” Id. As it is clear that Article II, Section 12 can be interpreted rationally to include the underlying dispute between the parties here, we hold, as a matter of law, that the parties’ dispute falls within the scope of their agreement to arbitrate. Our decision to enforce the Beth Din provision in Ohev Sholom’s bylaws is consistent with every other decision of which we are aware in which an appellate court in a jurisdiction, like ours, that has adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act has addressed the enforceability of an agreement to refer a dispute to a Beth Din. See In re Marriage of Popack, 998 P.2d 464, 465-68 (Colo.2000) (<HOLDING>); Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation,

    ### Response:
    holding that an agreement to arbitrate before a beth din is enforceable under the colorado uniform arbitration act as long it is not unconscionable and did not result from duress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    order that there is no just reason for delay, it may direct in the order the entry of a final judgment: (1) as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties[.] 6 . Assuming, arguendo, that the circuit court intended.to — and did— dismiss the entire action, that ruling would have been erroneous. Md. Rule 2-213 provides: Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. So long as one of the original plaintiffs and one of the original defendants remain as parties to the action, parties may be dropped ... by order of the court on motion of any party.... Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately. Severance rather than dismissal is the appropriate remedy for misjoinder when, as here, the appellants and the Asbestos Defe .Y.1993) (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Rudolph, 515 So.2d 704 (Ala. 1987)

    ### Response:
    holding joinder of a hospital medical malpractice claim and a drug manufacturer products liability theory was proper in claim alleging injury from administering a drug
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    17 U.S.C. § 102). It then noted that ""[elffort expended to create the Tentative Map and supporting documents is effort expended to create tangible: works of authorship,"" and ""[als such, ... [was] within the scope of copyright protection."" Id. (citing Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F.Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y.1985)). Turning to the second prong-the extra-element test-the court noted that the development company's allegation that its former employee had breached her fiduciary duty by giving the map to its competitor did not ""change[] the nature of [its] action'"" but rather simply restated a copyright claim. Id. at 977. Accordingly the ""unfair competition claim for misappropriation of ... time and effort expended in producing t *1, *5 (Mich.App. Sept. 22, 2005) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Editorial Photocolor Archives, Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding in suit between sellers of historic photographs copyright act preempted state law claim based on right to exclusive reproduction of photographs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    third parties. In re Farmland Indus., Inc., 378 B.R. 829 (8th Cir. BAP 2007). The BAP remanded the case to the bankruptcy court, instructing the court to dismiss GAF’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The defendants appealed the BAP’s decision, and this Court reversed. In re Farmland Indus., Inc., 567 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir.2009). We held that the bankruptcy court had subject-matter jurisdiction because GAF’s claims are “related to” the bankruptcy of Farmland under 28 U.S.C. § 157(e)(1). Id. at 1020. We thus remanded the case to the BAP for a ruling on whether the bankruptcy court properly dismissed GAF’s complaint. Id. at 1021. On remand, the BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of GAF’s complaint. In re Farmland Indus., Inc., 408 B.R. 497 (8th Cir. BAP 2009) (<HOLDING>). II. In an appeal from a decision of the BAP,

    ### Response:
    holding that gaf lacked standing to sue and that gafs complaint failed to state a claim was barred by collateral estoppel and was precluded by 11 usc  363m
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    most favorable to the plaintiff. See Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir.1989). Dismissal of a complaint is improper “unless ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir.1986)). 1. Application of the statute of limitations to the § 1983 claims. DeGrassi contends that the district court erred when it dismissed those of her § 1983 claims based on acts occurring more than one year before the fifing of the action on September 23, 1997, as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. We apply California’s personal injury statute of limitations to § 1983 actions. See Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Federal law determines when a civil rights

    ### Response:
    holding that in california the oneyear statute applies to a  1983 action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    each element of this offense. Witness testimony and wire-transfer receipts confirm that the defendant made wire transfers of $93,650 in drug proceeds. Further, the defendant’s claim of innocence is incredible. Over a span of three years Ronald Jenkins received thousands of dollars in cash from Hart, Smith, House, and Coleman, all young men ranging in age from 15 to 19. He also was aware that his brother lived a lavish lifestyle—he owned multiple homes, limousines, a Rolls Royce—yet had no visible source of income. On at least one occasion, the defendant had over $100,000 in cash stored in a garbage bag in his home. A jury certainly could have concluded from this evidence that the defendant was aware that the money in question had resulted from drug activity. Lopez, 42 F.3d 463, 467 (<HOLDING>). III. Next, the defendant argues that his

    ### Response:
    recognizing that jury may infer from the evidence that defendants money came from drug sales
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ch. 290, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 548, 548-51 (repealed and recodified 2003) (current version at Tex Ins.Code Ann. §§ 541.051-.061). 8 . This subsection defines as unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance [m)isrepresenting an insurance policy by: (a) making an untrue statement of material fact; (b) failing to state a material fact that is necessary to make other statements made not misleading, considering the circumstances under which the statements were made; (c) making a statement in such manner as to mislead a reasonably prudent person to a false conclusion of a material fact; (d) making a material misstatement of law; or (e) failing to disclose any matter required by law to be disclosed, including a failure to make disclo .-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Significantly, both Durbin and Alaniz relied

    ### Response:
    holding that affidavit filed separately from the reply was untimely because it was offered in support of the motion for summary judgment but evidence attached to the reply was properly part of the summaryjudgment evidence because the evidence was offered in reply to nonmovants response
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to Young, falls short of the required showing necessary to establish that his claim reasonably grew out of the EEOC charge. For a charge to grow out of an ensuing investigation, the plaintiffs EEOC charge must, at a minimum, relate facts that would prompt the EEOC to consider or investigate other forms of discrimination. See Haithcock v. Frank, 958 F.2d 671 (6th Cir.1992) (noting that plaintiffs complaint contained factual predicates that supported court review of allegations of race and disability discrimination). The facts set forth in Young’s charge explicitly limit his allegation to that of age discrimination and there is no evidence to conclude that the EEOC uncovered facts that would suggest otherwise. See Abeita v. Trans-America Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Viewing the determination letter as a whole,

    ### Response:
    holding court did not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs retaliation claim where plaintiff did not check the retaliation box or describe anything that indicates such a claim in the eeoc complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    governmental interest or if it is an unreasonable means of advancing a legitimáte governmental interest.” In Curto, the plaintiff, a gas station owner, claimed that a local ordinance violated his substantive due process rights by limiting the number of vehicles that were allowed to wait for service at his station. Id. at 1240. Pearson, Curto, Lakewood, and Harris are all consistent with the Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence. Oddly, the Sixth Circuit also has a line of recent cases in which it holds that substantive due process protects only fundamental rights, and affords no protection to state action that arbitrarily or capriciously deprives persons of their economic interests or contractual rights. See Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1352-56 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Sutton v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 958 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff state employees contractual right to promotion was not protected by constitutional guarantee of substantive due process because right was not fundamental
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reciprocal admission rules are more generous, Mr. Spencer was required to establish that he had been actively practicing for three of the previous five years preceding his application. See Idaho Bar Comm'n R. 204A(a)(2) (2010); see also supra ¶ 1 n. 1. 24 . Rule 14-705 now requires that an applicant seeking admission on motion establish that he has actively practiced law in a reciprocal jurisdiction for five of the seven years preceding his application. Sur. Ct. R. Practice 14-705(a)(7). 25 . 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 26 . Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495 (10th Cir.2000) (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 LEd.2d 540 (1998). 27 . Id. (citations omitted). 28 . See Kourianos v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 65 Fed.Appx. 238, 241 (10th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 29 . 42 U.S.C. § 12189. 30 . 28 C.F.R.§

    ### Response:
    holding that the appellant failed to establish that she was entitled to an accommodation under the ada because there was nothing in the record to demonstrate that she could not perform the functions and activities of daily life or that her impairment and symptoms substantially limited her functions and activities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    understood that “revisions to the Increment Rule,” which might have obviated the need for its petition, “would take time.” Pet’r’s Br. 29. But the Clean Air Act does not toll filing deadlines for such niceties. The Increment Rule was in full effect and applicable to North Carolina when we handed down our decision in NRDC. See, e.g., 75 Fed.Reg. at 64,898 (noting that the Increment Rule set “final PM2.6 increments ... for all State [prevention of significant deterioration] programs” (emphasis added)). The State thus had no more than sixty days from when we issued that decision on January 4, 2013, to avail itself of the after-arising grounds exception and file its petition. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b); cf. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v.

    ### Response:
    holding that a suit is ripe if the legal issue is fit for judicial resolution and the party challenging an administrative action has felt its effects in a concrete way
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have recognized inherent powers in the following instances: to change, set aside or otherwise control their judgments; to summon and compel the attendance of witnesses; to regulate the admission and practice of law; and to provide personnel to aid the court in the exercise of its judicial function. Id. at n. 1 (and cases cited therein). The judicial branch of government possesses inherent power to require the legislative and judicial branches to provide staffing and facilities for it to properly perform its judicial functions. Distvict Judges of 188th Judicial District v. County Judge and Commissioners’ Court for Gregg County, Texas, 657 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1983, writ refd n.r.e.); see also Vondy v. Commissioners Court of Uvalde County, 620 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Tex.1981) (<HOLDING>). Without this power, the judiciary, a separate

    ### Response:
    holding that courts have inherent power to hire and require salaries be paid to secretaries clerks probation officers and assistants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    should be warned that his statements during sentencing could be used against him in his pending case. See Whitehead, 21 So.3d at 159 (noting that the trial judge “told the defendant that he could say anything he wished, but warned him that his statements could be used in the [pending] case”). If the defendant decides not to offer an explanation, the court should respect his decision and not consider his silence in imposing sentence. For the above reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence. We recede from prior case law to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion. Affirmed. DAMOORGIAN, C.J., WARNER, STEVENSON, GROSS, MAY, CIKLIN, GERBER, LEVINE, CONNER, FORST and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur. 1 . See Yisrael v. State, 65 So.3d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>); Mirutil v. State, 30 So.3d 588, 590 (Fla. 3d

    ### Response:
    holding that consideration of pending or dismissed charges during sentencing results in a denial of the defendants due process rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    overcompensates the defendant, at the expense of the deterrence force of the criminal law. Another consequence is that there will be fewer motions of any kind. If filing a motion under § 5K1.1 permits the judge to cut the sentence by three-quarters (as happened here), the prosecutor will insist on a great deal of assistance. Many defendants are unlucky enough to have little of value to offer.... They are now condemned to serve the full authorized sentence, even though a prosecutor possessed of power to differentiate might reward slight aid with a slight reduction. ' We hold that a motion under USSG § 5K1.1 unaccompanied by a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) does not authorize a sentencing court to impose a se d.2d 169 (1993); United States v. Valente, 961 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). V. Finally, Melendez argues that the district

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants aberrant behavior will not justify a departure below a statutory minimum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has met “the burden of showing that ‘such an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee.’” Dague, 505 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. at 2641 (emphasis added) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 898, 104 S.Ct. at 1548). Moreover, we disagree with the dissent that the unavailability of willing local counsel is not a proper factor justifying an enhancement of the lodestar. Such an enhancement is clearly necessary to a reasonable fee where the district court finds that the case is of the type that attorneys are unwilling to take for fear of ostracization and out of concern for their personal safety. Such a consideration is hot ordinarily reflected in the lodestar, and we find that it was clearly not reflected in the lodestar in this particular instance. See Stewart, 987 F.2d at 1454 (<HOLDING>). In the alternative, the dissent contests the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that after dague enhancement is still appropriate in limited circumstances on the basis of factors not fully reflected in the basie fee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any difficulties were created by the State. In support of his contention, Defendant merely asserts that the manufacturer of a particular machine, the Intoxilyzer, does not sell the machine to private persons. Moreover, the record fails to show that Defendant even attempted to obtain independent testing of his breath. Defendant did not offer any evidence that the State created the difficulty he identifies in obtaining a breath sample. Instead, the record shows that Defendant was informed of his right to seek an independent chemical test, but did not seek one. He could have obtained a blood test. Thus, the practical difficulty that Defendant identifies in obtaining an independent breath sample fails to create a due process violation. See Bolan, 187 Ariz. at 161-62, 927 P.2d at 821-22 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm

    ### Response:
    holding that practical difficulties in securing transportation and finding and hiring experts for blood testing and analysis do not present due process violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sent the notices to his last known address and to the prison where he was incarcerated, that the prison received the notice and had a policy and procedure in place for distribution of mail to inmates, and that the Government published notice in USA Today. Rather, Tidwell argues for the first time on appeal that the notice the Government provided was insufficient because the Government could have assured that the Notice of Seizure was directly handed to him or sent to his attorney, but it failed to do so. The argument that the Government must provide a prisoner with actual notice was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in Dusenbery. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 171, 122 S.Ct. 694 (“[O]ur cases have never required actual notice.”); see One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d at 155 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Tidwell’s argument that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fall within one of the limited grounds for vacation of an arbitration award. See § 16-4423(a)(3) (identifying as ground for vacatur arbitrator’s “re-fus[al] to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducting] the hearing contrary to § 16-4415,” which provides for “a right to be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy, and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing,” D.C.Code § 16-4415). Ap-pellee’s brief, however, paints a different picture. He contends that appellant agreed to the arbitrators, that she testified at the hearing, and responded to questions. In short, appellant’s bare allegations are contested and, without support, are insufficient to prove a statutory basis for vacating the arbitration award. See Dolton, 935 A.2d at 299-300 (<HOLDING>). Appellant argues that because there is no

    ### Response:
    holding that a transcript is necessary if the asserted grounds for vacatur of arbitration award are grounded in the conduct of the proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have previously rejected similar arguments and recently addressed this same issue in Marek v. State, where we explained: With regard to the claim about the length of time Marek has spent on death row, we have previously rejected similar arguments. In Tompkins [v. State], 994 So.2d [1072, 1085 (Fla.2008)], we held that twenty-three years on death row did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. We explained that 0 L.Ed.2d 89 (2008); Elledge v. State, 911 So.2d 57, 76 (Fla.2005) (finding no merit in constitutional claim predicated on the cruel and unusual nature of prolonged stay on death row); Lucas v. State, 841 So.2d 380, 389 (Fla.2003) (concluding that twenty-five years on death row does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Foster v. State, 810 So.2d 910, 916 (Fla.2002) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Johnston’s claim that execution

    ### Response:
    holding that twentythree years on death row is not cruel and unusual punishment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration ... [and opining that] as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability”) (citations omitted). Neither of the FDIC’s other arguments undermines this conclusion. First, the court is unpersuaded by the FDIC’s claim that a broad interpretation of the arbitration clause would render the forum selection clause superfluous. As TACG points out, the forum selection clause could apply to suits to compel arbitration or enforce an arbitration award. See Kvaerner ASA v. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., N.Y. Branch, 210 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, a broad construction of the arbitration

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no conflict between a contracts arbitration clause and its venue clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc., 120 F.3d 50, 52 (5th Cir.1997), we held that an individual who was permanently blind in one eye was not substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing because he could see well enough with the other eye to engage in most typical activities.. And in Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996), we held that an individual who suffered from asbestosis, which impairment had reduced his lung capacity to 50% of normal and had caused him to experience shortness of breath and difficulty climbing stairs, was not substantially limited in the major life activity of breathing. See also Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 & n. 11 (5th Cir.1995), and Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, we note that Deas' claim is

    ### Response:
    holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in seeking a lower sentence, the record must both reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it.” United States v. Vonner, 452 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir.2006). This Court will only uphold a sentence if it is reasonable. Reasonableness contains two facets: substantive and procedural. See United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Jones, 445 F.3d 865 (6th Cir.2006) (Moore, J., dissenting on the ground that the majority opinion conflicted with prior Circuit precedent). In reviewing for reasonableness, this Court employs a presumption of substantive reasonableness. United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (2006) (<HOLDING>). That is, this Court presumes that the

    ### Response:
    holding presumption of reasonableness exists but still noting that a district court must consider the  3553 factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 3. As we have discussed, Stewart decided whether a worker on a floating dredge was a seaman. Steivart did not decide whether a ship taken out of the water for extensive repairs was a vessel. Stewart’s holding, thus, does not decide the issue before us. Rather, we must decide this case by looking at its distinct factual circumstances and their legal implications. Nehring v. S.S. M/V Point Vail, 901 F.2d 1044, 1050 (11th Cir.1990). Stewart simply reinforces our precedent, directing our focus to the BETTY LYN II’s practical capability to serve as a means of maritime transportation. D. The BETTY LYN II is a Vessel A “case-by-case approach” is often necessary to determine whether admiralty jurisdiction applies to “novel or unusual situations.” Id. This case w 45, 850-51 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Colonna’s Shipyard, 584 F.Supp.2d at 864,

    ### Response:
    holding that a ship with inoperable engines and no ability to selfpropel was a vessel because it had residual navigational capacity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    citing Letson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F.Supp. 1221, 1230 (N.D.Ga.1981). Camfield, 719 F.2d at 1364. 14 . There is nothing in the record which would indicate that Wesley would be unable to receive the quantities of grain covered by the HTAs. 15 . As Judge Easterbrook has astutely observed, ‘'[ejrroneous business judgments many months after a contract was formed do not, however, change the nature of the contract from a forward to a future.” Nagel v. ADM Investor Servs., 65 F.Supp.2d 740, 750 (N.D.Ill.1999), affirmed, 217 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir.2000). 16 . Because FAC-MARC was not a signatory to the guarantee agreement entered into by ADM and Agri-Plan, the guaranteed IB relationship between ADM and Agri-Plan would not render FAC-MARC an agent of ADM. See Cunningham, 65 F.3d at 1358

    ### Response:
    holding that nonsignatory to ib guarantee agreement possessed no authority from fcm  express implied or apparent  to conduct business relating to commodity pools nonsignatory to ib guarantee agreement was never an agent of any kind for fcm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judge. Felix Moultrie appeals from a final judgment adjudicating him guilty of aggravated battery in which he was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Out of the five issues raised on appeal, only one merits discussion and requires reversal. Moultrie claims and the State agrees that the trial court erred in imposing discretionary costs without orally announcing same and without making the required statutory finding that he had the ability to pay the additional assessment. See § 939.18, Fla. Stat. (1999); Patterson v. State, 796 So.2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Tolbert v. State, 698 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). Because these requirements were not followed,

    ### Response:
    holding trial court must comply with procedures in imposing discretionary costs pursuant to section 93901
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the remedy provided to Simmons when Missouri held his death sentence to be unconstitutional was life without possibility of parole. 112 S.W.3d at 413. This case, of course, does not involve the death penalty. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Supreme Court of Florida has held that a sentence of life without possibility of parole is unconstitutional when applied to a person under the age of eighteen. Without such a ruling, Mr. Culpepper does not have an issue raising a “fundamental constitutional right” that can be raised at this time. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b)(2); Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 930 (Fla.1980); Margarejo v. State, No. 2D07-700, — So.2d -, 2007 WL 4404602 (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 19, 2007); see also Sims v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W.3d 731, 733 (Ky.App.2007) (<HOLDING>). We note that Mr. Culpepper’s motion for

    ### Response:
    holding that roper did not support a similar postconviction claim and noting that roper contained obiter dictum to the effect that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole remains a permissible sentence for such offenders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    insolvent, the directors are thereafter considered as trustees for the corporate creditors.” 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations § 849 (1945 ed.). It appears, then, that the directors of a Chapter 11 debtor are not fiduciaries of the corporation; rather, they are fiduciaries of the estate, which the debtor in possession holds as trustee for the creditors, 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). Given that, it is difficult to accept debtors’ position that, in effect, there is no difference in the relationship between the debtors and their directors pre- and post-petition, since the nature of the directors’ duties has changed from helmsman to guardian. 43 B.R. at 459-60 n. 22. See also Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. Wharton, (In re Continental Vending Machine Corp.) 358 F.2d 587, 590 (2d Cir.1966) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629, 633 (4th

    ### Response:
    holding that directors of an insolvent corporation are trustees for the creditors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the plaintiff suffer an adverse employment action.” Id. In this case, the central dispute over Spees’s ADA claim revolves around whether she meets the definition of a “disabled” person. A “disability” is defined as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). This section of the Act was amended in 2009, subsequent to the events giving rise to Spees’s lawsuit. But we must analyze Spees’s claims pursuant to the earlier version (provided above) because the amendments to the ADA do not apply retroactively. See Milholland v. Sumner County Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562, 567 (6th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Spees does not argue that her pregnancy

    ### Response:
    holding that the ada amendments act does not apply to preamendment conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sovereignty interest, and lawsuit seeking recertification of state property tax assessment was fully as intrusive as retroactive money judgment). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has likewise declined to extend Coeur d'Alene. See Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 567-68 (6th Cir.2002)(Coeur dAlene does not extend to every case involving state property interest, and state’s interest in regulation of riparian rights does not implicate Coeur dAlene where the suit does not seek to quiet title); Hamilton v. Myers, 281 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir.2002)(same). The Sixth Circuit specifically has determined that Coeur d’Alene does not apply to claims for prospective relief brought under federal anti-discrimination laws. Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391, 397 (6th Cir.2002)(<HOLDING>). In two other decisions, however, the Sixth

    ### Response:
    holding that coeur dalene does not bar claim for prospective relief under ada title ii citing garrett 121 sct at 968 n 9
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The clear intent of this provision is to permit the staff judge advocate or legal officer (not the chief of staff or some other officer in the chain of command) to supplement the staff judge advocate’s recommendation. See generally Article 6(b), UCMJ, 10 USC § 806(b) (“Convening authorities shall at all times communicate directly with their staff judge advocates or legal officers in matters relating to the administration of military justice. . . .”); Cooke v. Orser, 12 MJ 335, 344 (CMA 1982) (noting that Congress intended special relationship between commander and staff judge advocate). The attachment of these comments to the post-trial recommendation without the knowledge or approval of the staff judge advocate was legal error. See United States v. Hensley, 52 MJ 391, 393 (2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Finster, 51 MJ 185, 188-89

    ### Response:
    holding that it was error for someone other than ships legal officer to prepare posttrial recommendation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 523(a)(8) and whether the Debtor may attempt to discharge the amount through the plan confirmation process. Initially, the parties dispute whether the amount at issue represents a default penalty or collection costs incurred in USAFI’s attempt to collect upon the student loan debt. The Debtor argues that the amount is a default penalty that may either be discharged or cured through payment of the student loan principal and interest. The Debtor is correct that default penalty provisions, meant to penalize a debtor rather than repay the loan or reimburse a creditor for costs, have been held to be outside the discharge exception for student loans found in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). See Rural Kentucky Medical Scholarship Fund, Inc. v. Lipps (In re Lipps), 79 B.R. 67, 70 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1987) (<HOLDING>). However, USAFI’s “Statement of Purchased

    ### Response:
    holding that the principal and interest of a student loan was nondischargeable but that the default penalty arising from the debtors failure to practice medicine in the contractually agreed upon area was dischargeable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had the authority to consent to a search of the [woman’s] purse.” Id. Guided by Glenn, we reach a similar result here. In the appellant’s case, it was unreasonable for Investigator Sapp to conclude that the appellant’s girlfriend had the authority to consent to the search of the bag because she specifically told Sapp that the bag belonged to the appellant. Sapp was not required to speculate about who owned it. See also, e.g., United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir.1987) (recognizing that consent to search provided by the owner of premises “is generally invalid when it is ‘obvious’ that the searched item belongs to a guest” (quoting United States v. Isom, 588 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir.1978))). Compare United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 863-65 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Ruiz, 428 F.3d 877,

    ### Response:
    holding that girlfriend lacked actual or apparent authority to consent to the search of her boyfriends bag which he stored in her apartment because she identified the bag as his and no evidence indicated that she exercised mutual use or possessed  joint interest and control over it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a default provision similar to that applicable in the instant case. The Lamberth Court recognized an equitable interest in a vendee under an executory agreement for the sale of land, stating: It has been held repeatedly that “the relation between vendor and vendee in an executory agreement for the sale and purchase of land is substantially that subsisting between mortgagee and mortgagor, and governed by the same general rules.” Lamberth, 506 S.E.2d at 296. In expanding on this view, the court found in the event of default, a vendor-mortgagee may choose a variety of remedies, including forfeiture if the contract allows, while a vendee-mortgagor has the right to redeem his interest under the contract to prevent forfeiture. See also Boyd v. Watts, 316 N.C. 622, 342 S.E.2d 840 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The court further held a vendee’s right to

    ### Response:
    recognizing among a vendors options in the case of a default the right to initiate a quiet title action accept noncompliance as a forfeiture or initiate an action to declare the contract at an end
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Code where the General Assembly has prohibited conduct with statutes that rely on individualized assessments by those enforcing the laws, including: (1) Va. Code § 18.2-60.3 (stalking); (2) Va. Code § 18.2-153 (obstructing canal or ther states have held that their respective “following too closely” statutes, with almost identical language to the Virginia statute, are not unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., State v. Maga, 2008-Ohio-423, P48-P55, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 375, at *13-16 (Ct. App. Ohio 2008) (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4511.34); Tennessee v. Harton, 108 S.W.3d 253, 258-60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-124(a)); State v. Shapiro, 751 So. 2d 337, 341-42 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999) (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:81). 2 See Wilson v. State, 262 S.E.2d 810, 812-13 (Ga. 1980)

    ### Response:
    holding that georgias reckless driving statute now ga code ann  406390 which is similar in substance to the virginia statute is not unconstitutionally vague
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    extinct by mutual agreement between the parties” (citation omitted)). Moreover, Settlement Agreement I also stated that “[b]y copy of this agreement, the USPS is formally providing notification to [Plaintiff] that it is moving out of the Detroit, Michigan property on November 30, 2000.” Id. Ex. B H2 (emphasis added). Finally, the USPS’s decision to move out of the facility as of September 1999, and not using the facility thereafter, further evidences the intention of the parties to surrender the lease tenancy on November 30, 2000, not some unknown date in the future. See Gov’t Resp. To PFF H 4; see also Gov’t Resp. To PFF App. at 1-2. Third, Plaintiff argues that by retaining the keys subsequent t ank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (<HOLDING>); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251,

    ### Response:
    holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant despite retaining keys because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 210 (2d Cir.2005) (error harmless unless evidentiary ruling had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict) (quoting United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 62 (2d Cir.2003)). We also reject Williams’ claims that the district court impermissibly precluded him from arguing to the jury during summation that the government failed to meet its burden of proving alienage insofar as it failed to definitively rule out the possibility that Williams had derived citizenship. Given that the evidence before the jury was insufficient to support any claim of derivative citizenship, the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding this line of argument. See United States v. Bautista, 252 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In any event, any error was, again, harmless.

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court properly prohibited an argument at closing that was not based on facts in the record and could have effect of confusing the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    held that any challenge to counsel’s performance must be reviewed on direct appeal. Id. at 187. Petitioner’s reliance on Geist misses at least two marks. First, unlike a proceeding for termination of parental rights, in which the state brings the direct weight of its power to bear on parents who risk losing the fundamental right of parenthood, id. at 186, petitioner has been convicted of a crime in an underlying proceeding. In contrast to the challenge of the defending parent in Geist, petitioner’s motion did not address the performance of counsel in the underlying proceeding that resulted in a deprivation of his liberty interests. Here, unlike in the criminal proceeding, petitioner is the party who is ultimately responsible for prosecuting the action. See McClure, 110 Or App at 123-24 (<HOLDING>). In sum, this is a collateral civil

    ### Response:
    holding that a postconviction petitioner is responsible for filing the petition and selecting the issues for litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fully accept this principle but find it inapplicable here. Where the indictment includes, as here, specific, narrowing language “descriptive of the offense charged,” we cannot treat it as immaterial “surplusage.” Commonwealth v. Nuckles, 266 Va. 519, 523, 587 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2003); see also Etheridge, 210 Va. at 330, 171 S.E.2d at 192. In short, we hold a fatal variance existed between the indictments against Purvy and the proof offered by the prosecution at trial. For this reason, his convictions cannot stand. II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Purvy also contends the evidence was insufficient to prove the unindicted variant offenses for which he was convicted—specifically, violating Code § 18.2-472.1(B) by “knowingly providing] materially false information” i at 435-36 (15th ed.1993) (<HOLDING>), with Farr, 536 F.3d at 1186-87 (recognizing

    ### Response:
    recognizing double jeopardy bar is inapplicable where a variance between indictment and proof necessitated prosecution under a new indictment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. United States, 899 F.2d 1495, 1501 (6th Cir.1990). Vaught based his motion to disqualify on the fact that John Hollins, Sr., husband of Vaught’s sister Carol, was a prominent attorney in the Nashville area, past president of the Nashville Bar Association, and a member of various other professional organizations. In United States v. Dandy, we held that a judge who was acquainted with a government witness did not err by denying a motion for recusal. 998 F.2d 1344, 1349 (6th Cir.1993). Similarly, there is no evidence in this case that the judge’s acquaintance with John Hollins, no matter how long-standing, extended beyond that level in any way that requires recusal (i.e., that their relationship was personal or fiduciary). See also United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811 (2nd Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cole, 293 F.3d 153, 164 (4th

    ### Response:
    holding recusal not required where case involved a family whom district judge had known personally seven or eight years earlier
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    $1,350,-000, the court is concerned about Prudential serving as its own surety. Prudential is very much an interested stakeholder in the instant suit. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that the claimant’s rights would be as fully protected as if the bond carried a surety .other than Prudential. Notwithstanding that Prudential is on a fist of sureties approved in the District of Kansas, we believe that a separate surety is necessary to more adequately protect the rights of the claimants by giving them two independent parties from whom to collect. See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Gillespie, 397 F.Supp. 1337 (D.Del.1975) (requiring bond in Rule 22 interpleader even where stakeholder was disinterested); but cf, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Schmitt, 441 F.Supp. 440 (N.D.Cal.1977) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that we lack jurisdiction over

    ### Response:
    holding that a wholly owned subsidiary of the plaintiff could serve as surety
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    693, 142 L.Ed.2d 728 (1999) (Lopez II). Moreover, “[a] State, whether partially or fully covered, has authority to submit any voting change on behalf of its covered jurisdictions and political subunits.” 28 C.F.R. § 51.23. At least one district court has recognized that “Congress intended that either the legislative body that enacted the legislation or the executive body that was responsible for administering the legislation would be responsible for obtaining preclearance.” Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 200 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1156 (D.S.D.2002) Under the facts alleged in this case, Secretary Detzner is an appropriate defendant for a Section 5 enforcement action because his office adopted and is responsible for administrating the Database Matching Program. See Bone Shirt, 200 F.Supp.2d at 1156 (<HOLDING>); see also Haith v. Martin, 618 F.Supp. 410

    ### Response:
    holding that ujnder the plain meaning of the voting rights act the state of south dakota is an entity that must secure preclearance from the attorney general or bring a declaratory judgment action for review of a law passed by the state legislature that impacts voting in covered counties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    drug offenders, and not non-violent property offenders, to mandatory sentencing treats these two similarly situated groups differently. This, appellant argues, violates the equal protection clause. We disagree. Appellant has failed to show that non-violent drug offenders are subjected to a level of scrutiny higher than that stated above. See Appellant’s brief at 11-16. “Consequently, only a minimum level of scrutiny need be applied to determine whether the statute bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective.” Eicher, 605 A.2d at 352 (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 374 Pa.Super. 431, 543 A.2d 548 (1988)). This Court has repeatedly held that mandatory sentencing provisions pass constitutional muster. See Eicher, 605 A.2d at 352; see also Plass, 636 A.2d at 641 (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Jones, 374 Pa.Super. 431, 543

    ### Response:
    holding 18 pacsa  7508 effectuates the legislative purpose of reducing drug crimes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Davidson v. State, 701 So.2d 123 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). SAWAYA, PALMER and ORFINGER, JJ.,

    ### Response:
    holding that orders denying motions to mitigate sentence under florida rule of criminal procedure 3800c are not appealable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    circumstances” excusing his late filing of an asylum application. The BIA also affirmed the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) adverse credibility determination. Because the BIA generally adopted the IJ’s conclusions and added its own comments, we review both decisions. Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir.2005). For the reasons stated below, we grant the petition and remand for further proceedings on an open record. 1. As the government now concedes, we have jurisdiction over the BIA’s “extraordinary circumstances” determination on undisputed underlying facts. Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1177-81 (9th Cir.2008). Petitioner argued that he established “extraordinary circumstances,” because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(iii) (<HOLDING>); see also Toj-Culpatan v. Holder, 588 F.3d

    ### Response:
    recognizing ineffective assistance of counsel as one extraordinary circumstance and setting forth the requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had no statutory duty to bargain. The unions were nevertheless able to enforce interest arbitration clauses in expiring contracts. We also conclude that Local 666’s situation did not bar it from invoking interest arbitration. Specifically, we hold that although Stokes had no statutory duty to bargain because of its good faith doubt about the Union’s majority, it was not for that reason relieved of its contractual obligation to submit to interest arbitration. C. Stokes next argues that the Regional Director’s dismissal of its election petition was tantamount to a formal decertification by election, an event that would have ended the Union’s rights under the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 316 F.2d 754, 757 (7th Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>). According to the Regional Director, he

    ### Response:
    holding that unions were not entitled to specific performance of collective bargaining agreements after employees voted in boardsupervised elections to decertify the unions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    courts and state courts have found judges to be judicially immune from criminal charges relating to the performance of judicial duties. See Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. at 934-35 (sustaining a judge’s plea at bar that he should be immune from indictment and prosecution for depriving a citizen of civil rights “under the color of any law” in judicial proceedings in his court); In re Petition of Dwyer, 486 Pa. 585, 406 A.2d 1355, 1360 (Pa. 1979) (finding “that the petitioners are quasi-judicial and/or quasi-prosecutorial officers . .. [and] in the absence of allegations of bad faith or corruption, the petitioners, in granting the extensions and variance, are insulated from criminal prosecution for the consequences of their actions”); Commonwealth v. Tartar, 239 S.W.2d 265, 266-67 (Ky. App. 1951) (<HOLDING>); In re McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498, 502

    ### Response:
    holding that the circuit court properly sustained a demurrer to the indictment of a judge for misfeasance in office because judges acting in their official capacities should be protected from harassment by either civil suits or criminal prosecutions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Board in making the decision whether to grant or deny the parole” — not to limit it, id. at 1360 (emphasis added). Where the Board exercises its discretion to depart from this numerical system, it may do so as long as it “specif[ies] in writing those factors which it used. Departures must be explained, but they are not proscribed.” Id. (emphasis added). As the McRae Court concluded, the Board need not render a decision based on a strict application of the system set forth in the 1987 Regulations. Rather, it must simply adhere to “the words of the governing statute, § 24-204(a), [and determine whether a prisoner is able to] live and remain at liberty without violating the law such that release would be compatible with the welfare of society.” Id. at 1361; see also id. at 1360-61 (<HOLDING>). The holding in McRae does not stand alone. In

    ### Response:
    holding the board is not required to either grant or deny parole based upon the score attained and it may ignore the results of the scoring system and either grant or deny parole in the individual case so long as it specifies the reasons in writing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bar, 59 So.3d 29, 39 (Ala.2010). We further stated: ‘When the Board issues its new order, Cooner will have an opportunity to challenge the judgment” through a postjudgment motion. 59 So.3d at 41. The Board issued a new order of disbarment, but Cooner did not file a post-judgment motion. We twice more remanded the Board’s order for the entry of a more specific order and ultimately affirmed, without an opinion, the Board’s order of disbarment. Cooner v. Alabama State Bar, 145 So.3d 1 (Ala.2013) (on return to second remand). After this Court had affirmed the Board’s order, Cooner filed with the Board a “Motion for New Trial, to Alter, Amend or Vacate, or Alternatively to Open the Disciplinary Board’s Order.” The Board, citing this Court’s affirmance of Cooner’s disbarment .Civ.App.2003) (<HOLDING>); and Superior Sec. Serv., Inc. v. Azalea City

    ### Response:
    holding that absent a timely postjudgment motion the trial court has no jurisdiction to alter amend or vacate a final judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we have focused on whether the members of the district attorney's office would stand to receive personal benefit or detriment from the outcome of a case in order to determine whether the office was ""interested"" in the case in such a way as to require disqualification. Id. at 711. Examples of such a level of ""interest"" would be a case in which attorneys in the office were material witnesses in a case, Pease v. Dist. Court, 708 P.2d 800, 802 (Colo.1985), or a case in which an attorney in the office had an attorney-client relationship with the defendant prior to the attorney's employment as a prosecutor. People v. Stevens, 642 P.2d 39, 40 (Colo. App. 1981). An ""appearance of impropriety"" can also be the basis for disqualification. People v. Garcia, 698 P.2d 801, 806 (Colo. 1985) (<HOLDING>); People v. County Court, 854 P.2d 1341, 1344

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial court may disqualify the district attorney where a member of his staffs testimony in a criminal case created an appearance of impropriety
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    began to run at the filing of the Chapter 11 petition and expired on January 24, 1994, five months before the filing of this action. This court recently held that the two-year statute of limitations in Section 546(a) begins to run against a debtor-in-possession upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition in a Chapter 11 case. In re Harstad, 170 B.R. 666, 669 (D.Minn.1994). Although a question of first impression in this circuit, the decision is in accord with four courts of appeals. See In re Century Brass Products, Inc., 22 F.3d 37 (2d Cir.1994); In re Coastal Group, Inc., 13 F.3d 81 (3d Cir.1994); In re Softwaire Centre Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 682 (9th Cir.1993); Zilkha Energy Co. v. Leighton, 920 F.2d 1520 (10th Cir.1990); but see In re Maxway Corp., 27 F.3d 980 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 580, 130

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute of limitations does not run on a debtorinpossession
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Sixth Circuit has since narrowed its holding in Benes. See United States v. Del Percio, 870 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that the statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional bar, but rather a waivable affirmative defense that does not affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, but not reaching whether the failure to assert the defense in the trial court constitutes a waiver). The issue (at least in the federal arena) has now largely been put to rest by the United States Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement in Musacchio, 136 S.Ct. at 717: [T]he statute-of-limitations defense becomes a part of a case only if the defendant puts the defense in issue. When a defendant presses a limitations defense, the Government then bears the burden of establishing complia 011) (<HOLDING>); Adams v. Hawai’i, 103 Hawai’i 214, 81 P.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute of limitations in a criminal case is a nonjurisdictional affirmative defense that is waived if not raised in the trial court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to establish personal jurisdiction” on the basis of Wendt. In Acquadro, a defamation claim was brought against the nonresident defendant based upon a telephone call from Massachusetts to the plaintiff, the plaintiffs sister, and another third party in Florida in which the defendant stated that the plaintiff “had AIDS.” Id. at 668. The Court noted in a footnote that although the record was not completely clear, it appeared that the telephone call was a conference call in which the third party called the defendant in Massachusetts, and they proceeded to call the defendant in Florida. Id. at 668 n. 7. Other courts, both state and federal, applying Florida law have also held that communications made during a telephone call between a person in Florida and an 65 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). In a case on a similar topic but with

    ### Response:
    holding that a nonresident defendant who called plaintiff in florida and allegedly made misrepresentations during the conversation satisfied 481931b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a continuation of the welfare check. Cf. Parsons, 825 So.2d at 409 (noting that nothing suggested deputy still believed appellant was intoxicated at the time he learned appellant was a sex offender); Danielewicz, 730 So.2d at 364 (noting that although officer testified he suspected appellant was intoxicated, he did not testify that he was concerned for appellant’s safety and he acknowledged that people sleep in their cars without criminal implication). Indeed, the fact that Dermio continued to be incoherent and “out of it” despite the deputy’s repeated attempts to communicate with him suggested he might have been in need of assistance, thereby permitting the deputy to enter Dermio’s car under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408 (<HOLDING>); Vitale v. State, 946 So.2d 1220, 1221 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    recognizing emergency exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “excruciating pain in his fingers, face and neck; a swollen face, knee and fingers; black eyes; and a bloody ear”), adopted by, 2010 WL 3636132 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2010). Likewise, the subjective prong is fulfilled because, by knowing — whether from seeing his injuries, hearing about the beating, speaking with Nugent, or anything else— about Plaintiffs need to go to an outside medical facility but yet leaving him to suffer in a van for hours, these Defendants were “aware of a substantial risk [of] serious inmate harm” and yet “fail[ed] to act.” Nielsen, 746 (2d Cir.2012) (same), and includes actions for monetary damages despite the fact that monetary damages are not available as an administrative remedy, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the PLRA mandates “ ‘proper

    ### Response:
    holding exhaustion is required regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    left to the sound discretion of the trial justice.”); Aponte, 649 A.2d at 223 (“The ultimate determination of the effect of evidence lies in the discretion of the trial justice.”). Accordingly, we will not disturb such a determination on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. In the present case, defendant argues that the clothing worn by Mr. Lima and the testimony of Mr. Bessette were irrelevant because it was undisputed that he had fatally stabbed Mr. Lima. It is well settled, however, that “[w]hen the state prosecutes a defendant, it carries the burden of proving every element necessary to the charge beyond a reasonable, doubt, even if some of those elements may not be disputed.” State v. Mora, 618 A.2d 1275, 1280 (R.I.1993); see also State v. Barnes, 777 A.2d 140, 143-44 (R.I.2001) (<HOLDING>); State v. Carter, 744 A.2d 839, 847 (R.I.2000)

    ### Response:
    holding in the context of a sexual assault charge that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the first basic and essential element of the offense namely that an act of intercourse involving the victim had occurred and further stating that that fact had to be proved even if the defendant was not disputing that particular element of the offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    use, site plan, and subdivision plat met the existing zoning requirements, as acknowledged by the City in the May 16, 2007 letter quoted herein, then the City possessed no discretion to deny the permit without a legally valid reason. The circuit court failed to review whether any legally valid reason existed to deny approval of the site plan or subdivision plat. This Court in Vineyard Investments, LLC, 999 So.2d at 441-42 (¶ 10), acknowledged that an applicant’s right to erect a building, which met current zoning requirements, was absolute, and this Court reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court. ¶ 49. Based upon the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. RUSSELL, J., JOINS THIS OPINION. 2 . See McKee v. City of Starkville, 2010 WL 3547993 *4 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (<HOLDING>); Childs v. Hancock County Bd. of Supervisors,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that zoning and rezoning are legislative matters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (and because, in addition, the circuit court intended for her to be able to pursue her statutory claims), the circuit court abused its discretion in denying her motion. That issue was not addressed in Gas-kins. Moreover, the Bank’s assumption that any amendment to Ms. Walls’s complaint would have been either a futile attempt to revive a non-viable wrongful discharge claim or the bringing of a new cause of action that would not have related back begs the central question whether the relation back doctrine would have applied. We note, because it bears on the Bank’s second non-preservation argument, that whether a claim stated in an amended complaint relates back to the original complaint is a question of law. See Chambers v. Seghetti, 107 Md.App. 536, 540-41, 668 A.2d 1006 (1995) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the order denying the motion to

    ### Response:
    holding that as a matter of law claim stated in amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    enough to overcome the far more fundamental principles involving the sanctity of certification/recognition and exclusive representation. We are likewise aware of no case in which a union has been permitted to bargain over the conditions of employment of excluded supervisory personnel. The absence of any such case is easily explained. Under the FSLMRS (and the NLRA), supervisors are members of management and are legally disabled from belonging to any bargaining unit, see 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(1); as such, the same policies that prevent a union from purporting to regulate the conditions of employment of persons in other units apply with equal force to supervisory personnel. Indeed, the Authority itself has recognized as much. See National Council of Field Labor Locals, 3 F.L.R.A. at 292 (<HOLDING>). With regard to non-employees and employees

    ### Response:
    holding nonnegotiable proposal specifying procedure for filling management and supervisory positions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    line acknowledging receipt of the notice of right to rescind and the signature line certifying her decision not to rescind. Id. at 95. The Wiggins court found the form “both objectively false and internally inconsistent,” because it purported to notify the borrower of her three-day right to rescind, while simultaneously requiring her to certify the rescission period had expired. Id. at 96. A prospective borrower signing the document at closing is bound to be confused about whether her right of rescission has actually passed. [T]he very language of the election not to rescind tells the average borrower that her “cooling off’ period “has expired” and that she may no longer rescind the transaction. Id.) see also Rodrigues v. Members Mortgage Co., 323 F.Supp.2d 202, 209 (D.Mass.2004) (<HOLDING>); Adams v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 351

    ### Response:
    holding the practice of requiring borrower to certify at closing the threeday period had expired and the transaction had not been rescinded has the serious potential for actual harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The relevant question at the motion-to-dismiss stage is not whether Plaintiffs have alleged an exact sum of money in their complaint. Indeed, the case primarily relied upon by Defendants shows that alleging an exact sum of money is not itself enough to support a conversion claim. See, e.g., High View Fund, L.P. v. Hall, 27 F.Supp.2d 420, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (dismissing conversion claim seeking $1 million because “plaintiffs do not claim ownership of a specifically identifiable, segregated $1 million” (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted)). Rather, the question is whether the money alleged to have been converted is specifically “identifiable” or, put another way, whether it is capable of “being desc l & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Brennan’s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107

    ### Response:
    holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an identifiable fund and thus a proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    strike defendant's arguments in this regard. Plaintiff's motion to strike is denied. 5 . The asserted independent claims are 30, 102, 317, 414 and the asserted dependent claims are 31, 34, 106, 122, 324, 343, 416, and 422. 6 . Defendant provides similar comparisons for independent claims 102, 317, and 414. (D.I. 139 at 16-21) 7 . Plaintiff advances the same argument, i.e., that the claims use- ""special purpose computers,” to assert that the claims are ""tied to a particular machine or apparatus,” and satisfy the first prong of the machine-or-transformation test. Using the same analysis, the court disagrees. 8 . The preemption inquiry focuses on whether the patent “would risk disproportionately ty ing up the use of the underlying ideas.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2354; Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294 (<HOLDING>); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No.

    ### Response:
    holding that patents that would  disproportionately tie up the use of the underlying natural laws are invalid for lacking patentable subject matter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    agent” that has been designated by the plaintiffs to appoint licensees of their merchandise, and receives a royalty for the licensing fees that are generated. The only exceptions to CLC’s exclusive agency designations are for certain non-retail sales such as “university purchases for internal consumption” or “student organization use.” Section 1125(a)(1) of the Lanham Act specifically provides that a cause of action may be asserted by “any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged” by infringing conduct, and the Fifth Circuit has held on several occasions that this provision permits the assertion of unfair competition claims by exclusive trademark licensees. See Martin’s Herend Imports v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, 112 F.3d 1296, 1301 n. 10 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that exclusive importer had standing to sue for unfair competition under  1125a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    basis, but displayed poor focus, grandiosity and religiosity, id. at 448, and appeared to display disorganized thought pattern and loose associations, id. at 449. The ALJ explained that he gave very little weight to Dr. Johnson-Miller’s evidence because it was quite conclusory and provided very little explanation of the evidence relied upon, and because her opinions departed substantially from the rest of the evidence. Mr. Akers argues on appeal that Dr. Johnson-Miller’s report was not conclusory. We disagree. Dr. Johnson-Miller expressly relied quite heavily on Mr. Akers’ subjective complaints and provided little or no explanation of the basis of her conclusions, thus, the ALJ was entitled to give her report little weight. See Bernal v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 297, 301 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). We find no merit in Mr. Akers’ claim that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a treating physicians opinion may be rejected if it is brief conclusory and unsupported by medical evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a witness to answer questions must be obeyed, and a failure to obey such order subjects the witness to a contempt citation, even if the order was erroneous or improvident.” Minnesota State Bar Ass’n v. Divorce Assistance Ass’n, Inc., 311 Minn. 276, 283, 248 N.W.2d 733, 740 (1976) (emphasis added). The doctrine of absolute privilege may apply if a person voluntarily makes a statement that later is the basis of a civil action, Mahoney & Hagberg, 729 N.W.2d at 306, albeit within “narrow limits,” Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219,' 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1954). And there are even stronger reasons to apply the doctrine of absolute privilege if a person involuntarily makes a statement that later is the basis of a civil action. See Johnson v. Dirkswager, 315 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Minn. 1982) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Mattson is entitled to the protections

    ### Response:
    holding that state official was entitled to absolute privilege because he was required by law ie data privacy act to disclose reason for termination of plaintiffs employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Commission. 6 James v. Jane was decided June 6, 1980. The trial court announced its decision in the present case on June 9, 1980. It does not appear that our decision was called to the trial court’s attention. 7 On the same day we decided James v. Jane, we also decided Freeman v. City of Norfolk, 221 Va. 57, 266 S.E.2d 885 (1980) (upholding city’s immunity from liability for alleged negligence in providing or failing to provide traffic lights and other traffic controls). Since then, we have decided Banks v. Sellers, 224 Va. 168, 294 S.E.2d 862 (1982) (upholding immunity of division superintendent of schools and high school principal from liability for alleged negligence in failing to provide a safe school environment), and First Virginia Bank v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 301 S.E.2d 9 (1983) (<HOLDING>). None of these decisions affects the outcome

    ### Response:
    holding clerk of court not immune from liability for negligent misindexing by deputy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of unconscionability based upon the UCC is preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the policies underlying § 301 “require that the relationships created by a collective bargaining agreement be defined by application of an evolving federal common law grounded in national labor policy,” so that “questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and wha l Union of North America, 2 Fed.Appx. 157, 160 (2d Cir.2001) (“Section 301 of the [LMRA] confers jurisdiction in the federal courts for ‘[s]uits] for violation of contracts between ... labor organizations.’ Such suits based upon the terms of union constitutions fall within the sweep of § 301.”) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). While “[t]he principles for deciding when a

    ### Response:
    holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of his codefendants, we conclude that Pedraza’s sufficiency challenge is also without merit. Gonzalez identified Pedraza as one of the men who converged at Shorty Pedraza’s home and helped unload the marijuana from Garcia’s trailer. Gonzalez also testified that Pedraza was part owner of the truck used during the first conspiracy and that Pedraza and Garcia argued on one occasion when Pedraza wanted Garcia to finish paying Pedraza for the truck. Thus, Gonzalez’s testimony, if believed, established more than Pedraza’s mere presence at the scene of conspiratorial activity. Pedraza’s complaint that the jury could not have rationally convicted him and at the same'time acquitted Shorty Pedraza is without merit. See United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876, 877 (5th Cir.1992) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Because a rational jury could have found that

    ### Response:
    holding that a verdict convicting one alleged conspirator can stand even if the jury acquits the sole alleged eoconspirator
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    most likely would have found no structural error. 4 . Of course, in an absence of counsel case, to determine that structural error has occurred it may be necessary for a court to find facts related to whether counsel was absent and whether inculpatory evidence was presented during the absence. But once a court answers “yes"" to these preliminary questions, no case-by-case determination is permitted. 5 . I agree with the majority that the presence of lawyers for co-defendantS' — even when a co-defendant’s lawyer agrees to cover for an absent defense lawyer — is irrelevant to the structural error inquiry unless the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to the presence of his own lawyer. See Maj. Op. at 1158-59; Olden v. United States, 224 F.3d 561, 568-69 (6th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant was denied counsel even though his lawyer asked another defendants lawyer to take notes or whatever in the defendants lawyers temporary absence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allowing other claimants to potentially receive a distribution from the overpayment refund. The court therefore concludes that the Applicant’s request for an administrative expense was timely. C. The Right to Payment Although the Applicant has been awarded compensation entitled to be paid as an administrative expense, the Applicant is not necessarily entitled to be paid by the Trustee, the Debtor, or any other person. As the Applicant notes in its supplemental brief, the allowance of an administrative expense is one thing, while payment of an administrative expense is another. In re Sweports, Ltd., 777 F.3d at 366-67 (bankruptcy court could approve fees and expenses even though no funds were available for distribution after dismissal); In re Fox, 140 B.R. 761, 765 (Bankr.D.S.D.1992) (<HOLDING>). The same holds true for compensation which,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that no guarantee of payment exists even if administrative expense allowed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Affirmed. See Almond v. State, 89 So.3d 1056, 1058 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (<HOLDING>); Moore v. State, 880 So.2d 826, 828-29 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding that when a criminal court still has jurisdiction over a defendant whose criminal record mandates the court to classify him as a sexual predator the criminal court may designate the defendant as a sexual predator even though the designation was overlooked at sentencing many years earlier
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    6 . The appellant raises the following AOEs: 1) The guilty findings for all child pornography offenses are legally insufficient because the Government failed to introduce evidence that 18 U.S.C. § 2252A existed at the time of the appellant’s offenses; 2) The specification alleging an attempt to entice a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity fails to state an offense by not expressly alleging an underlying state statute criminalizing the activity; 3) The military judge erred when he admitted over defense objection evidence of uncharged misconduct from the appellant's statements to Naval Criminal Investigative Service; 4) The military judge erred where he admitted over defense objection at *10-12, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11429, at *32-38 (E.D.Wis. Feb. 16, 2007) (<HOLDING>). 15 . Although we decline to accept the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a 2422b indictment that merely tracks the language of the statute without identifying an underlying statute may be insufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and eviden-tiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply . .. and nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on them.""). 14 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 8.2(1) at 164-65 (5th ed. 2012). 15 The Supreme Court of Georgia has explained: ""To hold that the legislature could nonetheless pass laws stating that a person 'impliedly' consents to searches under certain circumstances where a search would otherwise be unlawful would be to condone an unconstitutional bypassing of the Fourth Amendment."" Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605, 612 (Ga. 2003) (quoting Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977, 987 (Ind. App. 2003)). 16 Aviles v. State, 443 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) (<HOLDING>). 17 The Birchfield Court noted that ""[t]here

    ### Response:
    holding that implied consent and blood draw statutes are not permissible exceptions to the warrant requirement and stating that to hold otherwise flies in the face of mcneelys repeated mandate that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances of each case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also raised usury as a defense, arguing that requiring the Borschows to promise to pay Eureka’s ac count with BI in order to get the new terms to retire the January 2007 note constituted usury. However, this defense was not raised in Defendants’ Answer to the Complaint or in the Defendants’ Pre-trial Order; thus the Court finds that the Defendants waived their right to assert a defense based on usury. See Cadles Grassy Meadows II, L.L.C. v. Gervin (In re Gervin), 300 Fed.Appx. 293 (5th Cir.2008) citing Harris v. Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 343 (D.C.Cir.1997) (""[A] party’s failure to plead an affirmative defense ... generally results in waiver of that defense and its exclusion from the case.”); Najarro v. SASI Intern., Ltd., 904 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 3 . On re-direct examination at trial, Omar

    ### Response:
    recognizing the affirmative defense of usury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a specific duty to cooperate with BRA’s investigation, intentionally and without sufficient excuse. “Given that [BRA] bore the burden of proving misconduct of either kind, we see no need to reopen the hearing, thereby giving the employer a second bite at the proverbial apple; rather, the agency on remand shall make the necessary finding[s] based on the existing record.” So ordered. 1 . Neither witness identified any written documentation referring to the five-day requirement or otherwise describing investigation procedure uard's taking of unauthorized break, during which he placed his gun in a desk drawer at his security post (after removing the bullets), took off his shoes, and prayed briefly at his desk, constituted simple, not gross, misconduct); Doyle, 991 A.2d at 1182, 1184 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted); Odeniran,

    ### Response:
    holding that employees failure to comply with employers rule requiring employees to notify employer when a temporary job placement ended did not constitute gross misconduct because the violation was an isolated incident and employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious  or indeed any consequences as a result of employees unavailability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the debtor” to “an interest of the debtor in property,” but the Supreme Court stated that, because this alteration was a “clarifying change,” the older language and the newer language are “coextensive.” Id. at 59 n. 3, 110 S.Ct. at 2263 n. 3. In Nordberg v. Sanchez (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 813 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir.1987), which involved fraudulent transfers, we discussed “[t]he rules established in the avoidable preference cases” and explained that “any funds under the control of the debtor, regardless of the source, are properly deemed to be the debtor’s property, and any transfers that diminish that property are subject to avoidance.” See Andreini & Co. v. Pony Express Delivery Services, Inc. (In re Pony Express Delivery Servs., Inc.), 440 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 F. 850, 852 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that a transferee is an initial transferee under the bankruptcy code if they exercise legal control over the assets received
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any time, including within one year of the purchase. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, there is no evidence that Father and the Company agreed that he would hold legal title ""indefinitely.” Rather, all evidence suggests that this issue simply fell through the proverbial cracks until it surfaced in preparation for the merger with Darling in 2010. 16 . Inasmuch as plaintiffs' substantive allegations against Robert relate solely to his role in the 2010 merger and the Cold Spring title transfer, the Court also finds that Robert should be dismissed as a defendant as a matter of law. 17 . Further, the Court rejects defendants’ argument that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the probate exception to federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See Wisecarver v. Moore, 489 F.3d 747, 750 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Although Keating argues that Griffin

    ### Response:
    holding that probate exception does not apply where plaintiffs assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty seek in personam jurisdiction over defendants and do not seek to probate or annul a will
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purposes of setting alimony award); Steiner v. Steiner, 788 So 2d 771, 778 (Miss 2001) (same); Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va App 472, 485, 375 SE2d 387, 395 (1988) (same); Weberg v. Weberg, 158 Wis 2d 540, 544-45,463 NW2d 382, 384 (Ct App 1990) (same); see also Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P2d 1257, 1263 n 9 (Alaska 1992) (stating in dicta that a “state court is clearly free to consider post-divorce disability income and order a disabled veteran to pay spousal support even where disability benefits will be used to make such payments’’); Davis v. Davis, 777 SW2d 230, 232 (Ky 1989) (noting that, although VA disability benefits were not divisible as property, courts could resolve an inequitable property division with a spousal support award); but see Ex parte Billeck, 777 So 2d 105, 109 (Ala 2000) (<HOLDING>). Based on our reading of Mansell — and our

    ### Response:
    holding that federal law precludes courts from considering va disability payments in awarding alimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plaintiffs’ expert report was deficient as to Agrawal, the court ultimately held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the claims against the association. Id. at 843. Thus, although the Kettle court appears to conclude that an expert report is required whenever a professional association is sued, it also recognizes that the liability of the professional association depends on the conduct of the association’s physician, and its holding is based on the inadequacy of the expert report as to that physician. Therefore, Kettle is not persuasive on the question before us. McCoy’s petitions alleged, under a section entitled “Vicarious Liability,” that OGA was “vicariously liable for the conduct 2671863, at *1 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Nov.23, 2004, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, McCoy seeks to hold OGA liable under a

    ### Response:
    holding that expert report addressing hospitals conduct was not required when plaintiffs sole theory against hospital was vicarious liability based on ostensible agency and explaining that the conduct by the hospital on which the agency relationship depends is not measured by a medical standard of care these are principles of agency law on which no expert report is required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    — and that he once agreed to store some cocaine. Because Landrau was charged with conspiracy to knowingly possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it, and because he defended by claiming ignorance of the cocaine, Landrau’s reading of the Rule 404(b) exceptions is too restrictive. See United, States v. Flores Perez, 849 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1988) (“[W]here ... the other bad act evidence is introduced to show knowledge, motive, or intent, the Rule 404(b) exceptions to the prohibition against character evidence have been construed broadly.”). The other bad act need not be identical to the crime charged so long as it is sufficiently similar to allow a juror to draw a reasonable inference probative of knowledge or intent. See United States v. Spinosa, 982 F.2d 620, 628 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112,

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of prior drug sales was sufficiently similar to the crimes charged  to be probative of the fact that the defendant was not merely an innocent driver who was involved in the drug transaction by accident
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    immunity insulates the State and its agencies from liability based on vague or principled notions [of government responsibility].” Id. at 574, 746 S.E.2d at 565. 34 . Respondent urges that J.H. v. West Virginia Div. of Rehabilitation Svcs., 224 W.Va. 147, 680 S.E.2d 392 (2009) stands for the proposition that the special duty doctrine creates a separate cause of action. J.H. involved a patient at a rehab center who was sexually molested by another resident. First, we note that J.H. is a per curiam decision which does, in fact, cite to the special duty doctrine as a basis to reverse the circuit court's 12(b)(6) dismissal of the case. However, it is clear that J.H. is contrary to the well-established and predominant application of the special duty doctrine. See also Lavender, supra (<HOLDING>). The overwhelming bulk of our jurisprudence

    ### Response:
    holding that the special duty doctrine as an exception to the public duty doctrine was a concept distinct from immunity and did not serve to resurrect an otherwise immune claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States, 781 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir.1986), we affirmed dismissal of a suit alleging negligent inspection of a cargo compartment in the aircraft certification process. We emphasized that “[although Varig involved an alleged negligent failure to inspect, the Supreme Court wrote broadly in concluding that ‘the discretionary function exception precludes a tort action based on the conduct of the FAA in certificating ... aircraft for use in commercial aviation.’ ” Id. at 753 (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 815-16, 104 S.Ct. 2755). Finally, in West v. FAA, 830 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (9th Cir.1987), we held that the FAA’s adoption of airport d e FAA’s actions are not susceptible to policy analysis because they were based on objective scientific standards. See Glacier Bay, 71 F.3d at 1453-54 (<HOLDING>); Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States,

    ### Response:
    holding that scientific hydrographic judgment and purely scientific considerations do not involve policy considerations and are not protected by the discretionary function exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    193 (1942) (permanent or indefinite employment); Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1974) (indefinite employment); Cooper v. Vitraco, Inc., 320 F.Supp. 239 (D.V.I. 1970) (Virgin Islands law) (lifetime employment); Silverman v. Bemot, 218 Va. 650, 239 S.E.2d 118 (1977) (lifetime employment); Rua v. Bowyer Smokeless Coal Co., 84 W.Va. 47, 99 S.E. 213 (1919); Dow v. Shoe Corp. of America, F.2d 165 (7th Cir.1960) (Wisconsin law) (lifetime employment). 3 . In Easter v. Kass-Berger, Inc., 121 A.2d 868, 870 (D.C.Mun.App.1956), for example, a local trial court held that an employment contract for an express term of two years fell within the statute. This holding is entirely consistent with the conventional interpretation accepted by local courts. See Cooper, 365 A.2d at 629 (<HOLDING>); see also Farrow, 663 F.2d at 207 n. 29

    ### Response:
    holding that contracts for an indefinite period are excluded from the statutes coverage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Before trial, defendant objected to the state’s proposed use of Wilcox’s testimony to demonstrate that defendant’s physical condition corroborated the BAC test result. The trial court ruled before trial that the testimony was admissible. At trial, the prosecutor asked Wilcox in the state’s case in chief: “Q. The .081 blood alcohol content, was that consistent with the defendant’s behavior that you observed personally? “A. Yes, it was.” On appeal, defendant assigns Wilcox’s trial testimony as error. His argument under his assignment presents two issues: (1) whether the evidence is admissible under ORS 813.010(1)(a); and (2) whether Wilcox was qualified to express the opinion that defendant’s behavior was consistent with his BAC. See State v. Jacobs, 109 Or App 444, 819 P2d 766 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Arguably, the case law is in conflict in

    ### Response:
    holding that an arresting officers participation in numerous duii investigations was insufficient to qualify him as an expert to give an opinion based on observable signs of intoxication as to the defendants bac
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the zipper missing at the crotch.” Docket # 65 at 17. At the end of the day, the Court commented to defense counsel, ‘You will deal with the clothing issue, so I won’t have to hear about that tomorrow morning?” T.217. Counsel replied that he would do so. Thus, Van Gorder apparently registered a complaint about his clothing that day, but it was not placed on the record. During the rest of the trial, there were no further objections from Van Gorder or defense counsel regarding Van Gorder’s attire. Van Gorder was not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s omission of this issue on direct appeal. First of all, the state appellate court would have dismissed the claim as unpreserved due to the defendant’s failure to object. E.g., People v. Brown, 259 A.D.2d 985, 688 N.Y.S.2d 861 (4th Dep’t 1999) (<HOLDING>) (citing N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law §§ 470.05(2),

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant did not preserve for review his contention that he was compelled to wear prison clothing and handcuffs during trial and declining to address claim as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the manner described, it shall set forth its reasons in a supporting memorandum by March 21, 2008, to which the Bank and/or IRS may respond by April 4, 2008. If — given the particular facts of this case — DOR is content to abide by the court’s ruling, it shall so notify the other parties and, with the consent of those parties, provide to the court the figures to be distributed out of the fund as of March 28, 2008. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . It should be noted that DOR asserts no claim of sovereign immunity, thereby conceding the power of the court to resolve the parties' dispute in this forum. Compare Hudson Sav. Bank v. Austin, 479 F.3d 102, 108-09 (1st Cir.2007). 2 . See also Bridgewater Sav. Bank v. United States, 42 A.F.T.R.2d. 78-5133, 1978 WL 4507, at *3, (D.Mass. May 11, 1978) (<HOLDING>). The court’s ruling, however, did not, as a

    ### Response:
    holding that two federal tax liens had priority as a matter of law over the competing claims for fees and costs of a stakeholderbank
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ... the school’s administration refused to take action”; (4) “[h]e continued to experience discrimination following his graduation from college”; and (5) “he was denied employment on account of his religious affiliation.” Based on these incidents, the BIA found that Soccer failed to demonstrate past persecution because the “discrimination” he faced “in his school, neighborhood, and employment opportunities concerned harassment from private individuals” and because it did not “rise to the level of persecution.” Admittedly, the BIA did not attempt to reconcile its conclusion that the school-related conduct was carried out by “private individuals” with the uncertainty about whether Soccer attended private or government schools. Cf. Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 17 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). But regardless of whether Soccer’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the immigration and nationality act protects against persecution not only by government forces but also by nongovernmental groups that the government cannot control
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    training on the use of force demonstrate that at the time of Sample’s shooting, there was a clearly established constitutional right for a suspect to be free from deadly force except where the suspect poses an imminent or immediate threat either to officers or others. One of the first articulations of this right came in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Under Gamer, the police may not use deadly force against a citizen unless “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Id. at 3, 105 S.Ct. 1694. This same standard has been repeatedly followed by the Sixth Circuit in deadly force cases. Whitlow, 39 Fed.Appx. 297, 302-03, 2002 WL 1455317, at *5 (<HOLDING>); Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898

    ### Response:
    recognizing that deadly force is only justified where a suspect poses an immediate threat
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    original; citation and internal quotation marks omitted). All reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial must be drawn in favor of the Government. Id. First, Wagner argues that the Government failed to prove the existence of a RICO enterprise because, he maintains, it presented no evidence of an enterprise distinct from the alleged predicate acts, and, further, the predicate acts alleged were nothing more than a discontinuous series of individual crimes. Neither of these arguments has merit. Contrary to Wagner’s first argument, neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has required that the Government’s proof of the alleged enterprise be distinct from the racketeering conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370,

    ### Response:
    holding that while both the enterprise and pattern of racketeering elements must each be proven the proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robideau intended D.C. to find his mother’s dead body. II. Was there sufficient notice of this reason for departure? The prosecution is required to notify the defendant of its intent to seek an upward departure. Minn.Stat. § 244.10, subd. 4 (2010); Minn. R.Crim. P. 7.03. Because the construction of procedural rules is reviewed de novo, we review de novo whether the notice in this case fulfills that required in the rules. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 923. Robideau argues that this departure basis was not included in the original notice of intent to seek an aggravated sentence. As a result, Robideau argues that it is an impermissible basis for departure and that he did not waive his jury trial right on this issue. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (<HOLDING>); State v. Shattuck, 689 N.W.2d 785, 786

    ### Response:
    holding that criminal defendants have a right to a jury trial as to the facts on which a court bases an upward departure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    366 F.3d at 150; see also Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 147 (2d Cir.2003). Although the Second Circuit has held that there is no “magic” threshold number of harassing incidents that are required, as a matter of law, to state a claim, see Richardson, 180 F.3d at 439, “[isolated instances of harassment ordinarily do not rise to this level.” Cruz, 202 F.3d at 570. Generally, however, a hostile work environment is determined by “all the circumstances,” including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; [and] whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance .... ” Howley, 217 F.3d at 154 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367); see Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Edüd 662, (1998) (<HOLDING>); Brennan v. Met. Opera Ass’n, Inc., 192 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that simple teasing  offhand comments isolated incidents unless extremely serious are not discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    J. Appellants, Eric Russell Lewis and Mary Loughran Lewis (the Lewises) were injured when the car in which they were riding was struck by a vehicle which was being chased by appellee, Officer Robert Epstein (Epstein). Epstein was employed by appellee, The Seminole Department of Law Enforcement (SDLE). The Lewises’ filed suit against Epstein and SDLE; the complaint was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We affirm the dismissal of the complaint against SDLE. See Houghtaling v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 611 So.2d 1235 (Fla.1993)(<HOLDING>); see also Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg.

    ### Response:
    holding that florida does not have jurisdiction in a suit by other persons against an indian tribe absent express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of limitations and granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. See Bi-beau, 980 F.Supp. at 358. II Bibeau claims he was the victim of a conspiracy to fraudulently induce him to participate in the experiments, and that he was lied to about the possible side effects of the radiation and about the nature and purpose of the experiments. He also brings related state-law claims for fraud, battery, breach of fiduciary duty, strict liability for ultrahazardous activity and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims have their roots in the events of over three decades ago, and the parties agree that the statute of limitations applicable to both the federal and the state claims is two years. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110 (1997). The question

    ### Response:
    holding that the appropriate state statute of limitations to borrow for section 1983 actions is that for recovery of damages for personal injuries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to alter its decision denying the petition for rehearing or substituting the opinion. This Court granted Shirley’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. II. Standard of Review Declaratory judgments are neither legal nor equitable. Felts v. Richland Cnty., 303 S.C. 354, 400 S.E.2d 781 (1991); Wiedemann v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 344 S.C. 233, 542 S.E.2d 752 (Ct.App.2001). The standard of review for a declaratory judgment action is, therefore, determined by the nature of the underlying issue. Doe v. S.C. Med. Malpractice Liab. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 347 S.C. 642, 557 S.E.2d 670 (2001); Wiedemann, 344 S.C. at 236, 542 S.E.2d at 753; see Travelers Indem. Co. v. Auto World of Orangeburg, Inc., 334 S.C. 137, 511 S.E.2d 692 (Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). The determination of the existence of an

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a suit for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable but is determined by the nature of underlying issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236, 240 (Utah 1992). In addition, the plaintiff must experience either physical or mental symptoms as a result of the incident. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 974-75 (Utah 1993). The undisputed facts demonstrate that James and Cheryl Lawson did not actually witness the event in which their daughter was hit. Because they did not even see the foul ball, they cannot claim that the accident caused emotional distress from fear of injury; the speed of the accident actually prevented any apprehension or anticipation of harm. Furthermore, even if James and Cheryl Lawson had anticipated the harm, they do not proffer any evidence indicating that they experienced severe mental illness as a result of the incident. See Hansen, 858 P.2d at 975 (<HOLDING>). Thus, as a matter of law, the Lawsons do not

    ### Response:
    holding emotional distress suffered must be severe and not trivial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inference of fraud or it will not satisfy even a relaxed pleading standard’ and it must also ‘allege that the necessary information lies within the defendant’s control, and then allegations must be accompanied by a statement of facts upon which allegations are based.’ ” United States ex rel. Sanders, 953 F.Supp. at 1413 (quoting United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., 755 F.Supp. 1040, 1052 (S.D.Ga.1990)). Such “specific facts supporting a strong inference of fraud” are absent in Morrow’s complaint. Nonetheless, the complaint’s lack of particularity with respect to the allegation of fraudulent concealment need not necessitate the dismissal of that claim. It is true that a “district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave 409 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Alexander v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., 147

    ### Response:
    holding that flsa which provides an exemption from the acts wage and overtime provisions for fishermen preempts claims under alaskas minimumwage and overtime statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of damage ... is satisfied by ... proof of some damage flowing from the unlawful conspiracy; inquiry beyond this minimum point goes only to the amount and not the fact of damage” (emphasis added)). In sum, Dr. Beyer’s declaration provides a reasonable basis and a feasible means for plaintiffs to prove impact on a class-wide basis. At the class certification stage, the court’s task is not to determine whether his opinion will ultimately be persuasive, but rather to evaluate whether his declaration is sufficient to demonstrate common questions of fact warranting class certification. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Lit., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir.2001). The court is satisfied that his declaration satisfies this criteria. See, e.g., Linerboard Antitrust Lit., 203 F.R.D. at 220 (<HOLDING>); In re Vitamins Antitrust Lit., 209 F.R.D.

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiffs demonstrated a means of proving impact on a classwide basis despite defendants arguments regarding variations in products and pricing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also Wis. Stat. § 273.06 (1935). ¶ 36. The language that remained after the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 273.06 (1933) is identical to the language contained in § 816.06 (2007-08). See Wis. Stat. § 273.06 (1935). Therefore, since 1935, Wisconsin's supplemental proceeding law has been bereft of any language that would grant a judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding. 3. THE RESULT OF THE 1935 REVISIONS ¶ 37. We conclude that the legislature has deliberately removed the statutory right of judgment creditors to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding. As a general matter, courts may not find a statutory right in legislative silence alone. See Harvot, 320 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 50, (<HOLDING>). This is so because statutory rights ""are

    ### Response:
    holding that the courts should not undertake ad hoc judicial discovery of implied statutory rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    invoked to artificially limit a trial court’s examination of the factors necessary to a reasoned determination of whether a plaintiff has met her burden of establishing each of the Rule 23 class action requirements.” Castano, 84 F.3d at 744 n. 17 (quoting Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir.1984)). Appellants contend that the Supreme Court’s June 6, 2011 decision in Halliburton, 131 S.Ct. 2179, precludes district courts from rendering merits-based conclusions at the class stage. We disagree. In Halliburton, the Supreme Court does not state that merits inquiries or conclusions cannot occur, or must be ignored, in the fact-intensive Rule 23 analysis. Instead, the Supreme Court’s holding was specific to the securities fraud context in Halliburton. 131 S.Ct. at 2183 (<HOLDING>). This distinction, in fact, was expressly

    ### Response:
    holding that we erred by requiring securities fraud plaintiffs to prove loss causation in order to obtain class certification
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regulations”); Marotta, 214 So.3d at 599, 2017 WL 1282111, at *7 (“Thus, Congress clearly intended to ‘protect the national economy from the burden imposed by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations,’ but did not clearly intend to extend broad immunity from common law liability to cigarette manufacturers.” (citation omitted)). Nothing in these six statutes reflects a federal objective to permit the sale or manufacture of cigarettes. As a result, we cannot say that Congress created a regulatory scheme that does not tolerate tort liability based on the dangerousness of all cigarettes manufactured by the tobacco companies but tolerates tort actions based on theories with a more limited scope. Cf. Altria Grp., 555 U.S. at 90, 129 S.Ct. 538 (<HOLDING>); Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that federal law did not preempt commonlaw fraud claim against cigarette manufacturer based on advertising of light cigarettes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the defendant did not know the nature of the act; (2) even if the defendant did, the defendant did not understand that the act was wrong; and (3) the defendant’s failure to know the nature of the act or that it was wrong was the result of a defect of reason caused by mental illness or mental deficiency. See State v. Persitz, 518 N.W.2d 843 (Minn.1994). The law presumes sanity and the defendant has the burden of proving each element of the defense of mental illness or mental deficiency by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Bouwman, 354 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.1984). Regarding defenses relying upon a defendant’s use of alcohol or drugs, we have consistently held that mental illness caused by voluntary intoxication is not a defense. See State v. Patch, 329 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Minn.1983) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. darken, 260 N.W.2d 463, 463

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Szpunar next argues that Indiana Code section 23-2-1-3 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not specifically define the term security. He contends that application of the statute in this case is void for vagueness because it "" 'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,"" "" and ""because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions."" Br. of Appellant at 21 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954)). Initially we note that this claim is waived because it was not properly raised in the trial court. See Vaillancourt v. State, 695 N.E.2d 606, 610 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied (citing Regan v. State, 590 N.E.2d 640, 645-46 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>)). However, we choose to address this claim on

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute waives the issue on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the right to tell a Labor Ready employee not to return to the shipyard if they were unsatisfied with the employee’s job performance. Although Lomeli speculated that he would follow Labor Ready’s instructions if they conflicted with Southwest’s instructions, he presented no evidence beyond this speculation that Labor Ready ever gave him any specific instructions on what to do at Southwest and how to do the work that Southwest employees assigned to him, let alone any instructions that conflicted with South west’s instructions. Instead, the only instructions Labor Ready gave to Lomeli were to be at Southwest at 3:30 on November 13, 2007, and to perform the work assigned to him by the Southwest supervisors. See Melancon, 834 F.2d at 1245; Capps, 784 F.2d at 617; cf. Brown, 984 F.2d at 677 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Southwest “clearly had

    ### Response:
    holding that fact issue raised when brown presented evidence that he was supervised by employee of his original employer and received instructions from that employee while working at union oil
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the extent they have been named in their individual capacities. With regard to that claim, the Court will proceed to consider the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike. II. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # s 19 and 28) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Affidavit of Samuel D. Faulkner (Doc. # 87) Although Johnson cannot proceed against the ODNR, nor the individual De fendants to the extent they have been sued in their official capacities and to the extent they have been sued under the common law of Ohio, he may proceed against Weaver and Wolgemuth in his § 1983 action (Fourth Cause of Action), to the extent they have been named in their individual capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-27, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (<HOLDING>). After setting forth the facts and the

    ### Response:
    holding that a state official can be held individually hable under  1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court is without jurisdiction to hear the claim until administrative review is complete. See Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 1084, 1089, 146 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000); Thunder Basin Coal Co., 510 U.S. at 202, 207, 218, 114 S.Ct. 771. Section 925(c) explicitly limits the scope of district court jurisdiction to the “judicial review of [a] denial” by the Secretary of the Treasury of an application for relief. The statutory scheme set forth in Section 925(c) makes it not only “fairly discernible” but abundantly clear that Congress intended to confine the initial adjudication of § 925(c) applications to the Secretary of the Treasury. First, § 925(c) is not written so as to create a freestanding opportunity for relief fr 120 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McGill, 74 F.3d 64, 66 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that there must first be a denial by atf for the district court to review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We will affirm summary judgment if it is correct for any reason. City of Tempe v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., 201 Ariz. 106, 111, ¶ 14, 32 P.3d 31, 36 (App.2001). ¶4 Newman asserts that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment for Cornerstone. She argues that to comply with AR.S. § 20-259.01 the insurer must “make available” and “offer” UIM coverage, which she argues must necessarily include providing definite terms such as a premium quote in the blank space provided on the form approved by the Arizona Department of Insurance. To this end, Newman cites, generally, to Tallent v. National Gen. Ins. Co., 185 Ariz. 266, 915 P.2d 665 (1996) and Ballesteros, 226 Ariz. 345, 248 P.3d 193, and, more specifically, to Melendez v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 232 Ariz. 327, 305 P.3d 392 (App. 2013) (<HOLDING>) (depublished by order of the Arizona Supreme

    ### Response:
    holding insurers uim offer was ineffectual when it offered no premium price and was on a form that failed to comply with department of insurance guidelines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it because Grilauskaite failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if—(1) the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”); Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir.2004) (“failure to raise an issue in an appeal to the BIA constitutes failure to exhaust remedies with respect to that question and deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter” (citation omitted)). Grilauskaite argues here, as she did before the BIA, that she was denied due process because the IJ did not act as a neutral fact-finder. However, we do not have jurisdiction over this claim because it is not a colorable due process claim. Torres-Aguilar v. I.N.S., 246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we AFFIRM. ** This disposition

    ### Response:
    holding that to invoke our jurisdiction a petitioner must allege at least a colorable constitutional violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indicated that he was pressured into pleading guilty. Movant stated to the plea court that he had spoken with his counsel enough to know whether he wanted to plead guilty, his decision to plead guilty was of his own free will, and nobody threatened him to do so. After he was sentenced, Movant was again given the opportunity to indicate whether his pleas of guilty were coerced. Instead, he specifically stated that his pleas were not a result of threats or promises. He further stated that his lawyer answered all his questions, he was afforded enough time to discuss his charges with his lawyer, and aside from a delay in paperwork granting him access to the prison law library, his lawyer “fulfilled everything else” asked of him. See Nesbitt v. State, 335 S.W.3d 67, 69 (Mo.App.E.D.2011) (<HOLDING>). Because the record here clearly refutes

    ### Response:
    holding no coercion where counsel told movant his conviction was likely because movant stated he understood full range of punishment and no one threatened him to plead guilty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for COA purposes, Gutierrez has not adequately shown pursuant t ns, Gutierrez claimed Harrell made a material misrepresentation when she stated: in the jury questionnaire, that she had never been charged, or arrested, with theft or shoplifting; and, during voir dire, that, although she had been charged with theft in 1979, the charges had been dismissed, and she had not been arrested. Gutierrez asserted Harrell had been arrested, charged, and convicted of theft, making her ineligible for jury service under Texas law. Furthermore, under McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, Gutierrez claimed his due-process rights were violated, because his trial counsel did not make a for-cause challenge based on Harrell’s voir-dire answers. 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The state-habeas court held Gutierrez had

    ### Response:
    holding due process violated where a potential jurors failure to answer a material question on voir dire deprived the defendant of information permitting a valid forcause challenge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    specific content of Karl’s testimony independently exposed potential government wrongdoing or even “whether it had an impact on the result” of Wender’s litigation. Robinson, 566 F.3d at 823. Finally, we see no material distinction between subpoenaed deposition testimony and testimony in open court, where both are offered in the context of a judicial or administrative proceeding alleging government misconduct. Caw argues that testimony given during a deposition, which is often conducted in the private confines of a law firm, differs from testimony elicited in court, which is open to the public. We have recognized that the public has a lesser First Amendment interest in accessing pretrial discovery materials. See Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467

    ### Response:
    holding parties to a lower standard when they seek to file under seal documents attached to nondispositive rather than dispositive motions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (noting that SLUSA “does not itself displace state law with federal law but mak urt observed, the complaints alleged that “the false promise of best execution .,. induce[d] [Plaintiffs] to purchase or sell securities through Schwab for a fee, and [] caused losses directly resulting from what clients believed . to be legitimate securities transactions.” The net price obtained when purchasing or selling a security is plainly material to a buyer or seller, and the alleged breach here coincided with-securities transactions. See Kurz, 556 F.3d at 641 (finding that an argument “that the duty of best execution is not in connection with the purchase or sale of securities ... is frivolous, given Dabit ”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Newton, 135 F.3d at 270 (<HOLDING>); Rayner, 248 F.Supp.3d at 504 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding breach of best execution duty is a material misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of the securities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    used in practice”). Further, the district court’s reliance on the testimony of MEEI’s patent law expert to support its conclusion that Dr. Levy made a significant contribution is misplaced. The patent law expert testified that a proposed experiment to test 200 mW/cm2, 250 mW/cm2, 300 mW/cm2, and 600 mW/cm2 could not serve as the basis for conception of a range of 300 mW/cm2 to 900 mW/cm2 because the experiments did not test beyond 600 mW/ cm2. Based on this testimony, the district court improperly concluded that an inventor must actually test at 900 mW/cm2 to conceive a range of 300 mW/cm2 to 900 mW/cm2. Testing at exactly the end points of a range is not necessarily required for a conception of that range. See Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Because a trier of fact could conclude that

    ### Response:
    holding that ranges found in an applicants claims need not correspond exactly to those disclosed in a parent application
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    husband for wrongful death and also asserted causes of action against the insurance company for bad faith and misrepresentation based on its refusal to properly settle her claim. Id. at ¶ 5. ¶ 13 In Speiry, we determined that the plaintiffs “wrongful death claim [submitted to the insurer] was not based upon her own coverage but on [her husband’s] liability coverage for negligence.” Id. at ¶ 10. Thus, we concluded that the plaintiff could not be considered a party to the insurance contract for purposes of her bad faith action against the insurer since the insurer, in its capacity as the liability insurer of her husband, owed her no contractual good faith duties to settle her claim. Id. at ¶ 11; see also Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 749-50 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14 Allstate argues that, like the plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding that an insurer which insures a tortfeasor under a liability policy has no obligation of good faith and fair dealing to an injured third party even where the injured third party also carries a separate policy with the insurer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Supreme Court cases narrowing general jurisdiction’s scope. See Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846. But Gorman’s reasoning remains valid as applied to specific jurisdiction, so long as that the cause of action ""arises out of” District residents’ internet transactions with the defendant. 6 . The Supreme Court reversed Shute v, Carnival Cruise Lines on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585, 111 S,Ct. 1522, 113 L,Ed.2d 622 (1991), but the Ninth Circuit held that its ""but for test” was unaffected, Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995). 7 . It is unclear whether. Shoppers held that ""discernable relationship” is the appropriate standard for the nexus requirement under the D.C. long-arm statute,' the Due Process Clause, or both. See 746 A.2d at 335 (<HOLDING>). In any event, because the Court’s opinion

    ### Response:
    holding that the nexus requirement in the longarm statute should be interpreted in the same way as the supreme courts due process nexus requirement and that that way is the discernable relationship test
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was 14 days, but that she advised 59, at 93,858, 1985 WL 17668 (finding breach was not material where contractor did not pursue payment or assert any urgency). 2. Retainages and Withholdings a. Retainages for Lack of Progress The court also finds that the FBOP’s practice of retaining money from progress payments did not amount to a material breach. The parties agree that beginning in May 1995, the FBOP began to retain “portions of Morganti’s progress payments under F.A.R. 52.232-5(e), based on Morganti’s failure to make progress. Under F.A.R. 52.232-5(e), the contracting officer “may retain a maximum of 10 percent of the amount of the [progress] payment until satisfactory progress is achieved.” Nexus Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 31070, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,303, at 121,461, 1991 WL 179322(1991) (<HOLDING>). The evidence presented at trial established

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the government may suspend or withhold progress payments under certain circumstances depending on the contracts provisions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    59.27(4). Again, in an effort to ascertain the scope of Sheriff Clarke's constitutional authority, our inquiry focuses on the nature of the task involved, as opposed to Sheriff Clarke's general power of appointment or his ability to assign a task. See Kocken, 301 Wis. 2d 266, ¶ 54 n.37 (discussing the inquiry to be made, pursuant to WPPA I); see also id., ¶ 67 (""Adhering to case law, we focus on the nature of the job assigned, that is, providing food, rather than the general power of job assignment.""). ¶ 24. DSA casts a wide net in its effort to liken this case to Kocken by contending that ""as was the case in Kocken, the real issue is whether Sheriff Clarke has constitutional authority to hire and fire personnel to transport prisoners under § 59.27(4)."" See Kocken, 301 Wis. 2d 266, ¶ 4 (<HOLDING>). We are not convinced that this case can

    ### Response:
    holding that the sheriffs hiring and firing of personnel to provide food service to the county jail is not a time immemorial principal and important duty that characterizes and distinguishes the office of sheriff and as such is not within the sheriffs constitutional powers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Twenty-first Amendment, which concerns alcoholic beverages, provides: “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2. 4 . The Eighth Circuit’s consideration of a First Amendment challenge to an across-the-board prohibition of ""adult uses” at establishments holding liquor licenses also suggests that such prohibitions implicate the First Amendment, since the court rejected the challenged based on LaRue. See BZAPS, Inc. v. City of Mankato, 268 F.3d 603, 607-08 (8th Cir.2001). 5 . The State does not argue that rational basis scrutiny, as used in LaRue, applies. See LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118, 93 S.Ct. 390 (<HOLDING>). Even if it had, we agree'with the Third,

    ### Response:
    holding that californias conclusion that sexual performances should not be offered where liquor is sold was not an irrational one
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testimony of various witnesses. We have examined those portions of the record, and we have determined that Culver failed to object to the testimony that adult magazines were found in the attic and placed on K.W.’s bed for the photographs (R. 932, 1173-74) and that he failed to object to the testimony about the recovery of a canvas bag that contained adult material. (R. 1184-85). Furthermore, the photographic exhibits about which the witnesses testified, and that we understand to be those to which Culver now objects, were admitted into evidence without objection at trial. (R. 1135, 1185.) By failing to object to the photographs when they were offered and admitted, Culver has waived appellate review of this argument. See, e.g., Shouldis v. State, 953 So.2d 1275, 1284 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we note that, during his closing

    ### Response:
    holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    450 (Ala.Civ.App.2006), this court issued a writ of mandamus instructing the trial court to vacate its order granting leave for Envision to amend its pleadings in the case to add a new counterclaim, reasoning that “[t]he philosophy favoring finality of judgments dictates that Envision should not be allowed to amend its pleadings on remand to assert a counterclaim.” See also Eskridge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 855 So.2d 469, 473 (Ala.2003) (quoting Karagan v. Bryant, 537 So.2d 10, 11 (Ala.1988), quoting in turn other authorities) (emphasizing that “““the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] [is not] to be employed in a way that is contrary to the philosophy favoring finality of judgments and the expeditious termination of litigation’ ” ’ ”); Karagan v. Bryant, supra (<HOLDING>); and Costellos v. Jebeles, 406 So.2d 393

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant in an action to redeem property from a tax sale was barred from asserting on remand a counterclaim for the value of improvements made to the property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Supreme Court determined that the ""no set of facts"" language set forth in Conley, 355 U.S. at 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, ""has earned its retirement,” Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1969. 23 . The decision in Bannum was based upon RCFC 56.1, which was abrogated and replaced by RCFC 52.1. RCFC 52.1, however, was designed to incorporate the decision in Bannum. See RCFC 52.1, Rules Committee Note (June 20, 2006). 24 . As defendant notes, plaintiff does not cite 37 U.S.C. § 204 in his complaint. See Def.’s Mot. 6 n. 2. However, because 37 U.S.C. § 204 is the only money-mandating statute that could provide the basis for the relief sought by plaintiff, the court presumes that plaintiff's claim for back pay is premised on 37 U.S.C. § 204. See Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1315 (Fed.Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991,

    ### Response:
    holding that 37 usc  204 is moneymandating
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any event, the Government’s failures occurred after plaintiff failed to act with reasonable diligence to preserve her rights. This is an important distinction. Had plaintiff acted within a reasonable time period to exhaust her administrative remedies, the Government’s failure to respond might have caused a different outcome here. However, that is not the case at bar and I need not decide that question. I am sympathetic to the fact that plaintiff here acted (or failed to act, as it were) based on the representations of her former employers and her current counsel. Nevertheless, I cannot dispense freely with the 45-day time limit, which the Supreme Court has held must be strictly construed. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I hold as a matter of law that

    ### Response:
    holding that courts must strictly adhere to title viis procedural requirements and stating that these requirements are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ” Id. (quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983)). Reasonable diligence does not require a debtor to conduct “ ‘impracticable and extended searches ... in the name of due process.’ ” Id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317, 70 S.Ct. 652). To that end, “[a] debtor does not have a ‘duty to search out each conceivable or possible creditor and urge that person or entity to make a claim against it.’ ” Id. (quoting Charter, 125 B.R. at 654). Efforts beyond a careful examination of a debtor’s own books and records are generally not required. Id. at 347. For unknown claimants or creditors, it is well established that “constructive notice of the bar claims date by publication satisfies the requirements of due process.” Id. at 348 (<HOLDING>); see Brown v. Seaman Furniture Co., 171 B.R.

    ### Response:
    holding that notice published in the new york times and the wall street journal was sufficient to satisfy due process owed to unknown creditors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court record indicate not only that the district court considered the defendant’s argument but it must also explain why the district court decided to reject that argument. We do not require district courts to be automatons in their discussion of the Section 3553(a) factors. Rather, the focus is on substance rather than form and no “ritual incantation” of the factors is required. Instead, the record must simply be sufficiently clear to allow us to be assured that the district court considered all the arguments before it and to understand how those arguments factored into the district court’s ultimate sentencing determination. This is required even where the district court’s sentence of a defendant is presumptively reasonable under Williams. See e.g., Moms, 448 F.3d at 931 (<HOLDING>). Applying our past jurisprudence to this case,

    ### Response:
    holding that the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness does not relieve the district court of the obligation to consider other relevant statutory factors or sufficiently articulate its reasoning so as to permit reasonable appellate review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have many statutory duties, the performance of which are mandatory to the administration of a bankruptcy estate, but whieh nevertheless may not yield a specific monetary recovery. Debtors’ counsel in Chapter 11 cases are not insurers of a successful reorganization and may be entitled to reasonable compensation even in a failed case. See Matters of Coastal Nursing Center, Inc., and Tybee Island Nursing Center, Inc., Ch. 11 Cases No. 93-40898 & 93-40899, slip op. at 5-9 (Bankr.S.D.Ga., Oct. 10, 1993) (Davis, J.). Nevertheless, where a debtor litigates distinct and separate claims within a Chapter 11 case, compensation is still dependent on whether the services were reasonable and necessary, which includes the factor of results obtained. See Resolution Trust Corporation, 996 F.2d at 1150 (<HOLDING>). Thus, while good faith, unsuccessful

    ### Response:
    holding that a court first should determined the reasonable hours and rate and then it may adjust the lodestar if the prevailing party was not completely successful in its efforts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    writ denied). An appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider the merits of an appeal from a void judgment. Eubanks, 578 S.W.2d at 517. In such an instance the appellate court must set aside the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the appeal. Id. Mellon’s affidavits relate the factual circumstances surrounding the summary judgment hearing and entry of judgment. Under rule 19(d), motions, dependent on facts not apparent in the record, must be supported by affidavits or other satisfactory evidence. O’Connor v. Sam Houston Medical Hosp., Inc., 802 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 807 S.W.2d 574 (Tex.1991); Tex.R.App.Proc. 19(d). Other courts are in accord. See, e.g., Aycock v. Pannill, 853 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1993, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). It is axiomatic that an appellate court has

    ### Response:
    holding appellate court by virtue of rule 19d can consider materials not in the record that are filed in support of a motion to dismiss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provision is unambiguous in setting forth, “We do not cover loss caused by mold”); Lundstrom v. United Services Auto. Ass’n-CIC, 192 S.W.3d 78, 91 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (presuming without deciding that even if the mold were a covered loss under the policy, the mold is not negligence claims can sometimes be asserted in the claims-handling context. See St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Dai-Worth Tank Co., Inc., 917 S.W.2d 29, 53-54 (Tex.App.Amarillo 1995); aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 974 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam). 19 .See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h) (""The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”); San Saba Energy, L.P., 171 S.W.3d at 338 (<HOLDING>); Wright v. Greenberg, 2 S.W.3d 666, 673

    ### Response:
    holding that parties asserting error on appeal must put forth some specific argument and analysis citing the record and authorities in support of the parties argument
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Blackmon-Malloy, 575 F.3d at 713 (quoting President, 627 F.2d at 362). 14 . To the extent that Hyson argues that the application score or interview should have played a larger role in the hiring decision, the Court ""defer[s] to the Government's decision of what nondiscriminatory qualities it ... seek[s] in filling the ... position.” Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 429 (D.C.Cir.2003). 15 . This is especially true in the context of the prima facie burden-shifting scheme and the direct-versus-indirect evidence inquiry. See Wicks, 701 F.Supp.2d at 44 ("" '[DJirect evidence does not include stray remarks in the workplace' "" (quoting Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 96 (1st Cir.1996))); Prater v. FedEx Corp. Servs., Inc., 2009 WL 1725978, at *6-7 (D.D.C. June 18, 2009) (<HOLDING>). Once the focus shifts to the ultimate inquiry

    ### Response:
    holding that without a link to the challenged decision stray remarks did not constitute indirect evidence of discrimination sufficient to satisfy the final prong of the mcdonnell douglas framework
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issued several non-precedential opinions granting motions to reopen that were filed with the BIA before Dada but not adjudicated by the BIA until after Dada that provide apt comparison to Patel’s situation. In these cases, the BIA has construed the motion to reopen as an “implicit” request for withdrawal of voluntary departure because the alien was unaware of his/her right to request withdrawal at the time of filing the motion to reopen and because the motion coupled with the alien’s “decision to remain in the United States, clearly reflect that [the alien] was more interested in pursuing the underlying application for relief than in pursuing voluntary departure.” In re Surujpaul Persaud, 2009 WL 3335993 (BIA Oct. 7, 2009); see also In re Mahmood, 2009 WL 5252795 (BIA Dec. 10, 2009) (<HOLDING>); In re Rodenau, 2009 WL 2171614 (BIA July 9,

    ### Response:
    holding motion to reopen seeking adjustment of status constituted a withdrawal of the request for voluntary departure and the adjustment motion was therefore not barred based on failure to depart within the voluntary departure time allowed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.... When the government targets not subject matter but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction. Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 2516 (citations omitted). 12 . The district court and the Building Authority rely on Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.1990), as relevant authority. This reliance is misplaced; the legal d.2d 897 (1992); Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926, 110 S.Ct. 2619,

    ### Response:
    holding that display of solitary semipermanent menorah in city hall park closely associated with seat of city government violates the establishment clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appeal that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and if need be thereafter, to an appropriate federal Court of Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5); see also Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir.2004) (noting that the purpose of the I.N.A.’s exhaustion requirement is to “allow the BIA to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review” (citation omitted)). This review process, not surprisingly, is exclusive. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) and (d)(1). Thus, other courts who have confronted this issue have reached the same conclusion. See Howell v. INS, 72 F.3d 288, 293 (2d Cir.1995) (finding jurisdiction lacking where removal proceedings had begun because denials of status adjustment may be reviewed by immigration judges); cf. Pinho, 432 F.3d at 200-201 (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION Thus, having failed to exhaust her

    ### Response:
    holding that an aao eligibility determination is final and ripe for district court review if removal proceedings have not been initiated but noting that judicial review is barred in cases where removal proceedings have begun
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Criminal Procedure — Part III: Right to Jury Trial, Peremptory Challenges: Equal Protection Issues, 85 Geo. L.J. 1240, 1257 n. 1734 (1997). In addition, United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir.1987), provides that if “the Government used its peremptory challenges to strike the last remaining juror of defendant’s race” (two were challenged for cause and one could have been challenged for cause — id. at 1312) it “raise[s] an inference” that that “juror was excluded” because of his race (Native American). Id. at 1314. In addition, United States v. Wills, 88 F.3 lding uncounseled Article 15s and summaty courts-martial may not be used as sentence enhancers). Counsel's conflict of interest. Compare Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3120, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987)(<HOLDING>) with United States v. Smith, 36 MJ 455, 457

    ### Response:
    holding defendant must demonstrate an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stolen the money, and that he was acting in his private (vice duty) capacity in going to the appellant’s room. Record at 101-02. His primary motive was to be reimbursed for the money he had given LCpl Woods. The appellant was gone, but his roommate invited Cpl Cervantes into the room. Cpl Cervantes told the roommate he was looking for an envelope LCpl Woods’s wife had left, and asked if he could look in appellant’s “cammies” to see if perhaps it was there. The roommate agreed. Cpl Cervantes found the envelope — torn open — in the appellant’s cammies. The money was missing. Record at 102. We review the military judge’s decision on a suppression motion for an abuse of discretion, applying a clearly erroneous standard to his essential findings of fact, and we conduct a de novo re 1996)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Portt, 21 M.J. 333, 334

    ### Response:
    holding that the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rules are not implicated by a private search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a news show as such. The fact remains, however, that it depicted, in Best’s case, an arrest on criminal charges and facts concerning prior arrests or citations. These are legitimate matters of public concern, even if Best’s encounters with the police involved conduct that was arguably toward the lower end of the spectrum of criminality. With these principles in mind, the Court turns to defendants’ argument regarding the construction of IRPA. Federal courts generally “interpret laws consistent with their meaning, but with an eye towards avoiding exposing any constitutional infirmities.” Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir.1999). Illinois adheres to this canon as well. See, e.g., In re Estate of Poole, 207 Ill.2d 393, 409, 278 Ill.Dec. 532, 799 N.E.2d 250, 259 (2003) (<HOLDING>) (citing People v. Fisher, 184 Ill.2d 441, 448,

    ### Response:
    recognizing the courts duty to construe a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality if it can reasonably do so
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    delayed opening of the restaurant when the subcontractor misread the building plans and constructed the building foundation in the wrong location. See id. at 1302. The court cited the economic loss rule as the basis for its holding: As a general rule, no cause of action lies in tort when purely economic damage is caused by negligent breach of a contractual duty. This economic loss rule prevents recovery for negligence when the duty breached is a contractual duty and the harm incurred is the result of failure of the purpose of the contract. Id. at 1303. A number of courts of appeals cases have applied the economic loss rule in varying contexts since the decision in Jardel. See, e.g., Town of Alma, 985 P.2d at 57 (this appeal); Grynberg v. Agri Tech, Inc., 985 P.2d 59, 63 (Colo.App.1999) (<HOLDING>); Terrones v. Tapia, 967 P.2d 216, 220

    ### Response:
    holding that the economic loss rule bars negligence claim for failure to receive a particular return on cattle investment program
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jurisdiction over the industry.” Connecticut Light, 324 U.S. at 531, 65 S.Ct. 749. Additionally, the Court was especially cognizant of the legislative history of the FPA in which Congress communicated its belief that the FPA did not give the FPC “jurisdiction over local rates.” Id. at 525-28, 65 S.Ct. 749. The Court also cited a House of Representatives report which stated that “no jurisdiction is given over local distribution of electric energy, and the authority of States to fix local rates is not disturbed even in those cases where the energy is brought in from another state.” Id. at 527, 65 S.Ct. 749 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 8, 27 (1935)); cf. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ind., 332 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 190, 92 L.Ed. 128 (1947) (<HOLDING>). With this background in mind, we believe that

    ### Response:
    holding nga extended federal regulation only to area which supreme court had held state could not reach and did not usurp state authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Greaves met the requirements of effective service by having an alias summons issued before they made their second attempt at process, an action Miller & Custom failed to take. Thus, Miller & Custom’s first attempt at service failed because notice was not sent to the Debtor’s attorney. Their second effort by personal service was not attempted until long after the 10 day period after the summons was issued, in violation of the mandate of the last sentence of Bankruptcy Rule 7004(f). Thus, at best, Miller & Custom contend that proper in person-am jurisdiction over the Debtor is deriv ervice of process is defective, any default judgment is void because the court had no jurisdiction over the parties. Kaczmarczik v. Van Meter (In re Van Meter), 175 B.R. 64, 67 (9th Cir. BAP 1994) (<HOLDING>); Cossio v. Cate (In re Cossio), 163 B.R. 150,

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to serve debtors with filed complaint and issued summons rendered default judgment void
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it. Because we find that H.B. 1544 attempts to regulate the use of the information legally obtained, we turn to Anderson Courier’s second issue involving commercial free speech. In determining whether a regulation of commercial speech survives First Amendment scrutiny, we look to the factors set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). Under the Central Hudson test, if a state wishes to regulate truthful, non-deceptive speech relating to a commercial transaction, the state bears the burden of showing that: (1) the state has a substantial interest in supporting the regulation; (2) the regulation directly and materially advances that interest; and (3) the regulatio 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Despite its substantial interests, the State

    ### Response:
    holding that preventing fraud maintaining ethical standards and privacy were substantial interests
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    officers’ comments were not particularly “evocative.” Id. As such, the defendant “was not subjected/by the police to words or actions that the police should have known were likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id. Innis clearly establishes that interrogation includes express questioning or its functional equivalent — any words or actions that police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id. at 300-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682. The Supreme Court has provided little additional guidance on what constitutes the functional equivalent of express questioning, although it has suggested that interrogation may be limited to “compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct questioning.” Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Innis thus provides a very general rule, and

    ### Response:
    holding that allowing suspect to speak with his wife in the presence of a police officer was not interrogation as it did not fall into any of these categories
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    basis of injuries to third parties, unless the plaintiff additionally demonstrates “a close relation to the injured third party and a hindrance to that party’s ability to protect its own interests.” Mid-Hudson Catskill Rural Migrant Ministry, Inc. v. Fine Host Corp., 418 F.3d 168, 174 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, however, Salim is not suing on his parents’ behalf; instead, he seeks to assert his rights under a contract he allegedly formed with the Trustee. And while Sal-im’s parents may have been beneficiaries of this alleged agreement, insofar as it purported to shield them from suit, Salim brings this action as the contract’s principal. Moreover, Salim seeks to recover damages for his own injuries, not for any injuries his parents may have sustained. See, e.g., Leibovitz, 252 F.3d at 188 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the doctrine of third-party

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiffs psychological distress was not vicarious in a hostile work environment case where she experienced her workplace as hostile by reason of the alleged harassment of other women out of her presence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2. Thus, the RLCWA has satisfied the pipes-in-the-ground test. The parties disagree, however, over whether the RLCWA has the legal right to serve Fox Run. Ohio law gives water districts plenary authority “[t]o supply water to users within and without the district.” Le-Ax, 346 F.3d at 707 (quoting O.R.C. § 6119.01(A)). Because the RLCWA is a regional water district in the State of Ohio, and because Fox Run is located within the RLCWA’s service district, the Court concludes that the RLCWA has the legal right to serve Fox Run. Id. While Grafton admits that “Fox Run was an area within the water district served by RLCWA and was included in the or exation of land within area served by water district did not act to remove that land from water district’s service area). Cf. Wayne, 36 F.3d 517 (<HOLDING>); Lexington-South Elkhom, 93 F.3d 230 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with its NEPA obligations when implementing a land-use program.” Id. We have recently confirmed that these holdings apply at least to areas of greater than 5,000 acres, even if they have not previously been inventoried for wilderness consideration, and also to inventoried areas of under 5,000 acres. Lands Council v. Martin, 479 F.3d 636, 640 (9th Cir.2007). Because “[r]oadless areas ... also help conserve some of the last unspoiled wilderness in our country,” Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1121 (9th Cir.2002), there is no reason to suppose that such characteristics, when they appear on BLM land, rather than on Forest Service land, do not implicate the planning process. They therefore also implicate NEPA. An ater, 173 F.3d 1033, , 174 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 631 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that the designation of the rod as final agency action under the apa is generally recognized
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the arbitrator. Arbitrators have wide latitude in how they conduct proceedings. See Association of Flight Attendants v. USAir, Inc., 960 F.2d 345, 349 (3d Cir.1992) (“Once the parties are obligated to submit a dispute to arbitration, then ‘procedural questions’ growing out of the dispute and bearing on its final disposition are to be left to the arbitrator.”); Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 420 v. Kinney Air Conditioning Co., 756 F.2d 742, 744 (9th Cir.1985) (noting that procedural questions are “part of the bundle of issues committed to decision by the arbitrator”). The institutional role of the judiciary with respect to the conduct of the arbitral process is a limited one. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964) (<HOLDING>); Association of Flight Attendants, 960 F.2d at

    ### Response:
    holding that questions of procedure are for the arbitrator not the courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a final order for purposes of the Gaming Act, 4 Pa.C.S. § 1506, by reference to the Judicial Code’s definitions, 42 Pa.C.S. § 102); Bray v. McKeesport Housing Auth., 114 A.3d 442, 446 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (defining housing authority as a local agency for purposes of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 752, by turning to the definition of ""Commonwealth government” in the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 102); Frazier v. Phila. Cnty. Office of Prothonotary, 58 A.3d 858, 859 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (defining ""unified judicial system” in Section 102 of the Right to Know Law, 65 P.S, § 67.102, by relying upon the definitions provided in the Rules of Judicial Administration, Pa.R.J. A. 102); Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna Cnty. v. Pennsylvania Office of Open Records, 2 A.3d 810 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (<HOLDING>). This is a reasonable and intuitive approach,

    ### Response:
    holding that the director of the office of domestic relations was a judicial agency pursuant to the rtkl because the director was administrative staff of the unified judicial system as defined in the judicial code 42 pacs  102
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    control inquiry would be focused on the performance of the work and the condition of the premises. Unless specific facts (e.g., a contract which required the Space Needle to provide for the safety of the workers) pointed to retained right of control, the principal would have no liability. Here the alleged dangerous condition relates to a condition of the work site and the failure to provide protective barriers, so our scope of retained control inquiry must focus on the elevators. Within the scope of that limited control, the Space Needle had a duty of care. Accord Phillips, 74 Wn. App. at 751; Greenleaf v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 58 Wn.2d 647, 652, 364 P.2d 796 (1961) (finding the common law duty was breached by failing to provide proper lighting); Doss, 60 Wn. App. at 130 (<HOLDING>). The Space Needle retained sufficient control

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment was improper because the common law duty might have been breached by failing to provide a safety net above the worker to guard against falling slag
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an injury to her leg (a scheduled member) so that § 42-9-10 controls her compensation. We agree, and join those courts which have held that the hip socket is part of the pelvis and not part of the leg for workers’ compensation purposes. See e.g. Blackburn v. Allied Chemical Corp., 616 S.W. (2d) 600 (Tenn. 1981) (finding the hip socket itself is part of the pelvis); Scamperino v. Federal Envelope Co., 205 Neb. 508, 288 N.W. (2d) 477 (1980) (stating that the hip is neither a part of the leg nor a scheduled member); Milburn v. Concrete Fabricators, Inc., 18 Ark. App. 23, 709 S.W. (2d) 822 (1986) (stating that medically speaking the hip may be considered part of the leg, but from a legal view it is part of the body as a whole); Lauhoff Grain Co. v. McIntosh, 395 N.W. (2d) 834 (Iowa 1986) (<HOLDING>); Altus House Nursing v. Roberts, 646 P. (2d) 9

    ### Response:
    holding that the hip is part of the body as opposed to part of the leg and where the effects of the loss of a member extend to other parts of the body and interfere with their efficiency the scheduled allowance for the lost member is not exclusive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.2001)). Therefore, any potential contacts by DSM Dyneema, B.V. with South Carolina or Virginia are irrelevant to this Court’s analysis of whether a federal court in North Carolina has personal jurisdiction over these claims. As to the availability of goods in North Carolina, the Supreme Court noted in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro that “[t]he defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.” Nicastro, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 2788, 180 L.Ed.2d 765 (2011); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2852, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Absent any indication that DSM Dyneema B.V.

    ### Response:
    holding that a foreign subsidiary that is not registered to do business in north carolina has no place of business employees or bank accounts in north carolina does not design manufacture or advertise its products in north carolina and does not solicit business in north carolina cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction in north carolina even if some of the companys products do enter north carolina through the stream of commerce
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    impossible to ascertain the precise economic consequences of intangible harms, such as damage to reputation and loss of goodwill, caused by such violations. Abbott Laboratories, 971 F.2d at 16. The Tenth Circuit has limited this presumption to the following circumstances: In any event, the presumption is properly limited to circumstances in which injury would indeed likely flow from the defendant’s objectionable statements, i.e., when the defendant has explicitly compared its product to the plaintiffs or the plaintiff is an obvious competitor with respect to the misrepresented product. See Ortho, 32 F.3d at 694; Porous, 110 F.3d at 1335. Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 211 F.3d 515, 522 (10th Cir.2000); See Western Chemical Pumps, Inc. v. Superior Mfg., Inc., 989 F.Supp. 1112, 1130 (D.Kan.1997) (<HOLDING>) Here, defendant’s # 1 burst does not refer

    ### Response:
    holding that irreparable harm may be presumed if the challenged advertisement directly but falsely proclaims the superiority of defendants product over plaintiffs product
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the court. See Thomas v. Bracey, 940 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.); see also Russell v. Clark, 620 S.W.2d 865, 870 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1981, writ refd n.r.e.). All doubt should be resolved in favor of the communication’s relation to the proceeding. See id. “It is a verity of life that all things human, including lawsuits, have a beginning and end. These two aspects define the thing involved, and in defining it, they are inextricably related to and become a part of it.” Bennett v. Computer Associates Intern., Inc., 932 S.W.2d 197, 201 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied). Courts have deemed conduct related to the initiation of a suit as sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding and, therefore, absolutely privileged. See Thomas, 940 S.W.2d at 343 (<HOLDING>); see also Russell, 620 S.W.2d at 868 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding demand letter written prior to and during litigation absolutely privileged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is not an element weighing against allowing summary judgment. Rather, it is an issue with respect to the amount of damages to which TKO is entitled that still must be assessed by a finder of fact. Although TKO anticipates it, Reilly does not raise the issue of duress. Therefore, I do not address it. However, given the fact that Reilly held the agreement for a period of one to six months before signing it, and that Reilly had the assistance of counsel during that time period, I note that it would be difficult for Reilly to maintain that he was under such pressure as to have been deprived of his free will or free agency in signing the agreement. See Mills v. Swords Lumber Co., 63 Conn. 103, 105 (1893). See also Zebedeo v. Martin E. Segal Co., Inc., 582 F.Sup. 1394, 1417 (D. Conn. 1984)

    ### Response:
    holding that alleged wrongful conduct must induce a fearful state of mind in the person signing which makes it impossible for him to exercise his own free will 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.”). Even assuming that Tate was not on notice about the fact that he had no competent summary judgment evidence to support his claims eight months after he filed his complaint, he had about a month after the magistrate judge’s report to sign his complaint, but did not do so, and, as will be discussed, it was his own fault that the district court granted summary judgment. 4 . See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge. ... ”); Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Lindquist, 592 F.3d 838, 845-46 (8th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Brainard v. Am. Skandia Life Assur. Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that district court properly ignored attorneys affidavit because he did not assert personal knowledge of the transaction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    weigh the evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact.’ ” United States v. Branham, 515 F.3d 1268, 1273 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Dykes, 406 F.3d 717, 721 (D.C.Cir.2005)). To prove that a defendant entered into a narcotics conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must prove that he did so knowingly. See, e.g., United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 708-09 (D.C.Cir.1995). Knowledge alone, however, is not enough. Id. The government must also prove that the defendant had the “specific intent to further the conspiracy’s objective.” Id. at 708; see United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d 732, 737 (D.C.Cir.1998); United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1392 (D.C.Cir.1988); see also Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678, 79 S.Ct. 1314, 3 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, to sustain Gaskins’ conviction,

    ### Response:
    holding that conspiracy to commit a particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and (5) violated section 546.001 of the transportation code, which permits proceeding past a red light “after slowing as necessary for safe operation.” See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 546.001. In his deposition testimony, Price was asked the basis for his conclusion that Hallett violated section 546.001. Price responded, “[sjolely the fact that another car hit him.” Price stated that Hallett failed to properly clear the intersection before entering, but declined to characterize such conduct as “reckless.” Price agreed that an officer has a responsibility to refrain from entering an intersection against t states that Hallett failed to exercise due caution by disregarding the red light and that he should not have entered the intersection until he was certain t .App. LEXIS 2286, at **12-14 (<HOLDING>). We hold that Garrett’s statements are

    ### Response:
    holding written reprimand stating that officer failed to exercise due care and failed to comply with transportation code did not raise fact issue on reckless disregard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the facility. Thus, we find that the agreement was a contract of adhesion. B. Unconscionability A contract of adhesion is not ipso facto unenforceable. It is unenforceable only to the extent that it is found to be unconscionable. Lytle v. Citifinancial Services Inc., 810 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. 2002). “Once a contract is deemed to be one of adhesion, its terms must be analyzed to determine whether the contract as a whole, or specific provisions of it, are unconscionable.” Denlinger Inc. v. Dendler, 415 Pa. Super. 164, 176, 608 A.2d 1061, 1067 (1992). A contract term is unconscionable if (1) the party challenging it had no reasonable choice in accepting it, as in the case of a contract of adhesion, and (2) the provision unreasonably favors the other party. Huegel, 796 A.2d at 357 (<HOLDING>). Although we have found the agreement to be a

    ### Response:
    holding that an arbitration clause was not unconscionable because it did not unreasonably favor the defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 43 F.3d 1471, 1994 WL 705073, *2 (6th Cir.1994) (Table) (applying Webster’s Third International Dictionary’s definition of contamination as “unfit for use by the introduction of unwholesome or undesirable elements” to find that insured’s home was “contaminated” where it had been negligently treated for termites with chlordane, resulting in adverse health effects and forced insureds to move from home); Hartory v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 50 Ohio App.3d 1, 552 N.E.2d 223 (1988) (applying Webster’s definition and holding that contamination exclusion precluded coverage for damages resulting when methane gas from a neighboring landfill penetrated the plaintiffs’ home forcing them to evacuate); Auten v. Employers Nat. Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 468 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986) (<HOLDING>); St. Mary’s Area Water Auth. v. St. Paul Fire

    ### Response:
    holding that insureds loss resulting from exterminators misapplication of pesticides which rendered their home uninhabitable was caused as matter of law by contamination and thus was excluded under terms of allrisks homeowners policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the policy against restraints on alienation, even where the mortgage explicitly states there is no right to prepay the note, if the mortgagor can provide the mortgagee with the benefit of his bargain under the terms of the note, he will be allowed to have a release of his land following the substitution of security or other arrangement. Id. at 66 n. 1, 468 A.2d at 461 n. 1. In arguing that the restraint is unreasonable, Warrington relies in part on California case law that holds due-on-sale and due-on-encumbrance clauses, though not per se unreasonable, to be unreasonable where enforcement is unnecessary to protect the lender’s security interest. E.g., Tucker v. Lassen Savings and Loan Ass’n, 12 Cal.3d 629, 635-36, 526 P.2d 1169, 1173-74, 116 Cal.Rptr. 633, 637-38 (1974) (<HOLDING>); La Sala v. American Savings & Loan Ass’n, 5

    ### Response:
    holding as an unreasonable restraint on alienation the automatic enforcement of a dueonsale clause where the borrower has entered into an installment land contract to sell the secured property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the adjacent channel, “making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.” Id. at 742,126 S.Ct. 2208. The plurality explained that “[a]n intermittent, physically remote hydro-logic connection” would be inadequate to meet this prong of its test. See id. 2. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence Justice Kennedy set forth a different test for analyzing whether the wetlands at issue in Rapanos fell under the jurisdiction of the CWA. Seizing upon language contained in SWANCC, he stated that “the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in a traditional sense.” Id. at 779, 126 S.Ct. 2208. He fur r.2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 948, 128 S.Ct. 375, 169 L.Ed.2d 260 (2007) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, it is unnecessary for us

    ### Response:
    holding that jurisdiction exists if either the pluralitys test or kennedys test is met
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). In the context of a guilty plea, an error affects substantial rights when, considering the record as a whole, we do not have a fair assurance that the defendant’s decision to plead guilty would not have changed had the trial court properly admonished him. Anderson v. State, 182 S.W.3d 914, 919 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). 2. Analysis Prior to accepting his plea, the trial court admonished appellant, but failed to admonish him on the range of punishment. Appellant contends the trial court’s error in failing to admonish him on the applicable range of punishment requires reversal without a harm analysis. In support of his position, appellant relies on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Boykin. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the appellant that the trial

    ### Response:
    holding that for a trial judge to accept a defendants guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary violates the defendants constitutional rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A state court’s decision whether to recognize and enforce an employer’s cause of action for reimbursement, which is ere- ated by statute in another state, is an issue of conflict of laws rather than subject matter jurisdiction. See Hoffman v. Henderson, 355 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Minn.Ct.App.), pet. for review denied, (Minn. Dec. 20, 1984), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2326, 85 L.Ed.2d 844 (1985) (applying Alaska law to govern attorney-client fee agreement pertaining to an Alaska worker’s compensation action); Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. Girard Steel Supply Co., 224 F.Supp. 690, 695 (D.Minn.1963) (declining to enforce in Minnesota a Wisconsin employer’s right to reimbursement under Wisconsin law); cf. Barry v. Baker Electric Cooperative, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 666, 668-73 (N.D.1984) (<HOLDING>). See also Hile v. Liberty Mutual Insurance

    ### Response:
    holding north dakota law which precludes a negligent employer from being liable for contribution applicable as against minnesota law which permits limited contribution liability even thought the injure employee received benefits under the minnesota workers compensation act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    said that it was not asking for a competency trial, and defense counsel said he was not sure that a competency hearing or trial was necessary. 2 . The parties also agreed that they would need to have a competency trial. Arid the trial court reiterated that it was suggesting the issue of competency sua sponte, ""not after any kind of error or caused by the State or by' the Defense, for that matter."" 3 . See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.29(a) (providing the general rule that ""after the trial of any felony case begins and a juror dies or, as determined by the judge, becomes disabled from sitting at any time before the charge of the court is read to the jury, the remainder of the jury shall have the power to render the verdict”); Hill v. State, 90 S.W.3d 308, 315-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Defense counsel later told the trial

    ### Response:
    holding that double jeopardy barred the second prosecution when one of the jurors in the first trial became disabled and the trial court declared a mistrial instead of proceeding with eleven jurors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “there is evidence upon which the jury could rationally sustain the defense.” United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1984) (per curiam). On the other hand, a trial court may preclude a defense theory where “the evidence, as described in the defendant’s offer of proof, is insufficient as a matter of law to support the proffered defense.” United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 430 (9th Cir.1985). Counsel must also “articulate every ground on which the evidence is admissible, since a ground not identified at trial will not provide a basis for reversal on appeal.” Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, § 130.20[5], p. 103-39 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d. ed.2008); see also Hudspeth v. Comm’r, 914 F.2d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In support of his assertion of the return of

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to identify ground of admissibility limited appellate review to plain error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remedy under state law for employment discrimination claims. Hunt v. Wyle Lab., 997 F.Supp. 84, 91 (D.Mass.1997). Fortucci responds that her claim is not precluded because M.G.L. c. 151B, § 9 states that a claim can be brought in a civil action 90 days after the claim was filed with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Even if, for the moment, the Court assumes that Section 9 authorized her to bring a claim, it would be time barred. Under that section, an aggrieved party may bring a civil action “not later than three years af benefit when she is deprived of compensation for services rendered or when the intended purpose of the termination was to benefit the employer at the employee’s expense. Siles v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 13 Mass.App.Ct. 354, 433 N.E.2d 103, 106 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Fortucci contends that she was deprived of a

    ### Response:
    holding employee not terminated in bad faith because no evidence suggested that employer discharged employee in order to retain em ployees previously earned sales commissions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    caused Nova to stop offering abortions to minors without parental involvement. Therefore, it is at best merely speculative whether these defendants caused Nova’s decision to require parental consent, with a concomitant prospective loss of patients that flowed from that decision. The plaintiffs burden of demonstrating causation is not satisfied when “[speculative inferences are necessary to connect [its] injury to the challenged actions.” See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45-46, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). In other words, Nova has “confus[ed] the statute’s immediate coercive effect on the plaintiff! ] with any coercive effect that might be applied by the defendants.” See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 426 (5th Cir.2001) (en banc) (emphasis in original) (<HOLDING>). Nothing in the record distinguishes these

    ### Response:
    holding that a states governor and attorney general were not proper defendants when they had no power to enforce the challenged statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pays the costs of the condemnation as required by 21 U.S.C. § 334(e). For example, in United States v. Articles of Drug. . .Penapar VK, 458 F.Supp. 687 (D.Md.1978), the court found that because there was “no longer any dispute [between the government and claimant] concerning condemnation and destruction of the drugs,” the claimant’s motion to withdraw should be granted. Id. at 689. The only remaining dispute in that case was over costs, and the court found that § 334(e) required the claimant to pay them. Id. See also United States v. 302 Cases, of Frozen Shrimp, 25 F.Supp.2d 1352, 1357 (M.D.Fla.1998) (stating that a claimant may withdraw from a case, but withdrawal does not waive liability for costs); United States v. 374/100 Pound Burlap Bags, 1989 WL 36948 (E.D. Pa. April 13, 1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Court finds that although

    ### Response:
    holding that an intervening claimant in a civil forfeiture case may withdraw its claim but is still liable for costs of condemnation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    DWI effectuated and detention should have ended when officer determined driver was merely tired). 31 . See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 64; Valadez, 267 F.3d at 398 (continued questioning on unrelated matter and computer check on warrants and criminal history impermissible where officer’s suspicions on which stop was based had already been dispelled); Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d at 432 (once reason for stop has been satisfied, detained individual must be free to leave). 32 . Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243 (quoting Robinette, 519 U.S. at 41, 117 S.Ct. at 422 (Ginsberg, J., concurring)). 33 . See id. at 244; Perales v. State, 117 S.W.3d 434, 439 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. ref'd); see also United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 241 (5t 286-87 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (passenger reeked of marijuana sm (<HOLDING>). 45 . Gearing, 685 S.W.2d at 329 (citing

    ### Response:
    holding asking passenger for identification not improper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Board’s decision. She states that the text of Section 402(b) of the Law does not mention marital status of a claimant, and Section 1704 of the Marriage Law does not apply because Procito and her partner are not seeking recognition of a marriage. After restating equal protection and due process arguments, she contends that the Board made no alternate holding, when in fact the Board did determine that Procito failed to prove that she quit due to a necessitous and compelling cause. She asserts, as well, that the Court should conclude that any arguments concerning the adequacy of the reasons for Procito’s partner's relocation were waived by virtue of the employer’s failure to raise the issue. She cites Wing v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 496 Pa. 113, 436 A.2d 179 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Procito’s argument lacks merit as it is her

    ### Response:
    holding that an employers theory of termination for willful misconduct rather than voluntary quit raised for the first time before the commonwealth court was waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Alleged Error in Computing Criminal History Appellant argues that the district court erred in determining that his New Hampshire conviction for selling cocaine on October 30, 1992, was a “prior sentence” resulting in an additional two points being added to his criminal history computation pursuant to section 4A1.2(a)(l) of the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(l). Appellant argues that his conduct in violation of section 1326(b)(2) came to light only through his arrest for selling cocaine. Since “he was found in this country in the process of committing that [state] offense”, Appellant argues that the offense conduct of selling cocaine should be viewed as part of the instant offense and not counted as a prior sentence. See Trial Transcript (Aug. 30, 1993) at 29-30. T 1) (<HOLDING>). Whether or not the “prior sentence” and the

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants state court conviction for possessing a stolen car was severable from federal offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm even though firearm was found in cars trunk at time of defendants arrest for state stolen vehicle charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the policy’s termination. The premium adjustment endorsement does not affect coverage, as Continental argues, and its adjustment process is not applicable for the losses here, which were reported long after the policy terms expired. See id. at 222, 133 N.W.2d at 36 (construing premium adjustment endorsement to avoid consequences that would have been drastic to the insured). b. Primary liability under missing policies. Canadian General was Domtar’s primary insurer from October 1956 to, February 1965. The actual Canadian General policies were lost for periods during that time. Although Lloyd’s did not otherwise dispute the existence or language of the lost policies, it was Lloyds’ position that the policies could have contained additional endorsements. See id. at 219, 133 N.W.2d at 35 (<HOLDING>). Lloyd’s argues that if Domtar has not

    ### Response:
    recognizing that endorsement would prevail if inconsistent with policy provisions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other evidence the effect upon the jury would be the same as if no redaction had occurred at all.”). As the Government pointed out, the Supreme Court in Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206-07, 107 S.Ct. at 1706-07, explained that Bruton was a “narrow exception” to the assumption that juries can and generally do follow limiting instructions. Government Brief at 29-30 & n. 9. The Richardson Court explained: The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process. On th 8 L.Ed.2d 432 (1992); United States v. Donahue, 948 F.2d 438, 444 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 698, 701

    ### Response:
    holding that two or three references to everyone and they in testimony about confession did not violate bruton because testimony did not implicate the defendant expressly nor was it incriminating on its face
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM: Roderick L 8, 285-86 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Lattimore did not challenge any

    ### Response:
    holding that prior convictions could not be severed from their essential components such as separateness location and dates of of fenses and that therefore no finding of fact is made with respect to these inherent facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Proxy Statement and more than two years before the enactment of the statute. Thus, the extended statute of limitations under Sarbanes-Oxley does not revive Plaintiffs’ time-barred claims. In support of their retroactivity argument, Plaintiffs cite to an SEC amicus brief, filed in connection with a non-prece-dential case, AIG Asian Infrastructure v. Chase Manhattan, 122 Fed.Appx. 541, 2005 WL 435406 (2d Cir.2005), which urged the Second Circuit to retroactively apply the new limitations period under Sarbanes-Oxley based on the plain meaning of Section 804(b). See Pls.App. G; Pls. Opp. at 15. However, not only did the AIG Asian court refuse to adopt the SEC’s position, but the retroactivity argument was explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit in Enterprise Mortgage, 391 F.3d at 406 (<HOLDING>). The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have also

    ### Response:
    holding that sarbanesoxley is not retroactive and that neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of section 804 indicate that congress clearly favored retroactive application 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs have not specifically alleged which representations they saw, heard, or read, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled which affirmations or promises formed the “basis of their bargain.” Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to Plaintiffs’ express warranty claim. 2. Breach of Warranty Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Defendants breached any express or implied warranty. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to allege that the Products did not work for them or that they suffered any injury arising from use of the products. The Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument. Although Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts regarding the express promises and affirmations of fact made by Defendants, the gist of their , at *14 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited by Defendants are

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of express warranty where plaintiff alleged that align did not have proven digestive health benefits as advertised by procter  gamble and was nothing but sugarfilled capsules injected with a small amount of unremarkable bacteria
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The judgment is affirmed. All concur. 1 . RSMo Cum.Supp.2004. All other statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise noted. 2 . RSMo Cum.Supp.2004. 3 . Citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Hoffa, 242 F.Supp. 246, 253 (D.D.C.1965) (""New York allows a corporation to expend funds in defense of a derivative action presumptively brought in its behalf when some interest of the corporation is threatened.""); Fuller v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 91 F.Supp. 710, 711 (S.D.N.Y.1950) (""The corporation can actively defend where the interests of the corporation are threatened with injury by the relief sought in the complaint.”); Leven v. Birrell, 92 F.Supp. 436, 444 (S.D.N.Y.1949); Otis & Co. v. Penn. R.R. Co., 57 F.Supp. 680, 682 (E.D.Penn.1944) (<HOLDING>); Esposito v. Riverside Sand & Gravel Co., 287

    ### Response:
    holding that corporation can file an answer when the plaintiffs cause of action is such as to endanger rather than advance corporate interests but not where the cause of action is fraud against the corporate directors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial is mandatory only when: (1) it is requested; (2) the matters raised in the motion and accompanying affidavit are not determinable from the record; and (3) the motion and affidavit establish reasonable grounds showing that the defendant could potentially be entitled to relief. Id. (citing Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339; Martinez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 19, 21-22 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Reyes v. State, 849 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Edwards v. State, 37 S.W.3d 511 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd)). Even if the defendant meets the requirements for obtaining a hearing, however, the trial court is not required to allow live testimony at the hearing. Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). Instead, that decision lies within the discretion of the trial court. See id. (<HOLDING>). We review a trial court’s denial of a hearing

    ### Response:
    holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Corp., 97 B.R. at 180. 31. The retention of jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court after confirmation is particularly appropriate where, as here, the bankruptcy court expressly retains jurisdiction under the plan. Hospital and Univ. Property Damage Claimants v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 7 F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir.1993) (“The bankruptcy court’s post-confirmation jurisdiction ... defined by reference to the Plan”); Mueller Indus., Inc. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 1992 WL 116314, *2 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“[T]he bankruptcy court as a branch of .the district court is empowered to oversee the reorganization and issue orders necessary to ensure that it proceeds in' compliance with the terms of the approved plan”); In re Hardwicke Cos., Inc., 64 B.R. 113, 117-18 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (<HOLDING>). 32. Thus, this Court expressly retained

    ### Response:
    holding that postconfirmation jurisdiction was proper in light of plan provision retaining such jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a default final judgment, the moving party must show three things: (1) the failure to file a responsive pleading was the result of excusable neglect; (2) the moving party has a meritorious defense; and (3) the moving party acted with due diligence in seeking relief from the default.”), review denied, 969 So.2d 1011 (Fla.2007); Geer v. Jacobsen, 880 So.2d 717, 721 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (A meritorious defense “must be asserted either by a pleading or in an affidavit, and a general denial is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense.”); Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. v. Ronco Inventions, LLC, 890 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (finding that a seven-week delay in seeking relief from default judgment was unreasonable); Herrick v. Se. Bank, 512 So.2d 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>); see also Fischer v. Barnett Bank of S. Fla.,

    ### Response:
    holding that excusable neglect cannot arise from negligence of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    out of the Commonwealth’s coffers. Consequently, we need not address the more nuanced issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Greenless v. Almond, 277 F.3d 601, 606-08 (1st Cir.2002) (explaining that Eleventh Amendment issues, like other constitutional issues, should be avoided whenever a case can be disposed of on other grounds); Parella v. Retirement Bd., 173 F.3d 46, 56-57 (1st Cir.1999) (similar). Thus, partial judgment will be entered DISMISSING the § 1983 claims against movants in their official capacities. However, we note that plaintiffs’ parallel action against them in their individual capacities is not barred by either the definition of “person” contained in § 1983 or the Eleventh Amendment. Cf. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Movants next argue that plaintiffs have

    ### Response:
    holding that a state officer sued in his individual capacity may be held personally liable for damages under 42 usc  1983 based upon actions taken in his official capacity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in domestic law. Although a dismissal of the family court action certainly may have an effect on whether Stone pursues the circuit court action against Thompson, the two actions are completely separate. Therefore, the family court’s order, which retains subject matter jurisdiction over this case, does not deprive Thompson of a mode of trial to which she may speculatively be entitled to as a matter of right in another case. See Flagstar Corp., 341 S.C. at 72, 533 S.E.2d at 333 (stating the traditional analysis of subsection (2) is whether “a party is erroneously denied a trial by jury in a law case, or is erroneously required to proceed before a jury in an equity case”); see also, e.g., Woodard v. Westvaco Corp., 319 S.C. 240, 242-43, 243 n.2, 460 S.E.2d 392, 393-94, 394 n.2 (1995) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Sabb v. S.C.

    ### Response:
    holding an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not immediately appealable because it does not fall into one of the enumerated categories of section 143330 and such order does not finally determine anything
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service .... 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1998) (bold emphasis added). In the leading case on Section 230 immunity, the federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir.1997), noted that: By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service. Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exerci 206 F.3d 980, 984-86 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). And even those courts which have not

    ### Response:
    holding that online service provider was immune from defamation claim based on inaccurate stock information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to prison term of twenty-five-years to life under California’s “three strikes law” for a recidivist who was convicted of stealing golf clubs worth $1,200). While it was previously unclear to lower courts whether the proportionality requirements of the Eight portionality review is one of several respects in which we have held that ‘death is different,’ and have imposed protections that the Constitution nowhere else provides.”) (citations omitted). For non-capital cases, it is only an “extraordinary case” where “the gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 68, 77, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003); see also Solem, 463 U.S. at 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (<HOLDING>); Weems, 217 U.S. at 349, 30 S.Ct. 544

    ### Response:
    holding unconstitutional a sentence of life imprisonment for passing a bad check by a convicted felon
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    attorney fees given absence of prejudice to opposing party resulting from extension of time limit). Nor did the court abuse its discretion by failing to specify its reasons for extending the time for filing the motion. Cf. Nat’l Broker Assocs., Inc. v. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc., 211 Ariz. 210, ¶ 38, 119 P.3d 477, 485 (App.2005) (trial court does not abuse discretion “by summarily overruling objections to an untimely statement of costs”). ¶ 14 Bingham further argues the trial court committed reversible error in awarding-attorney fees in the quiet title action pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1103 because Cain did not tender five dollars along with a request for the execution of a quit claim deed as required by § 12-1103(B). See Lange v. Lotzer, 151 Ariz. 260, 262, 727 P.2d 38, 40 (App.1986) (<HOLDING>). We review a fee award under this statute for

    ### Response:
    holding payment of five dollars to other party prerequisite for recovering attorney fees pursuant to  121103b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 1544 — is equally applicable whether the reversal occurs in the defendant’s own appeal or in someone else’s appeal, so long as it occurs before the decision in the defendant’s appeal is rendered. If the appellate court’s opinion determines the law and finds error, the error by definition is plain “at the time of appellate consideration,” id., and clear “under current law.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. (Emphases added.) It would be anomalous and arbitrary to hold otherwise, for as soon as the opinion were to issue, it would be precedent that would establish both “error” and “plainness” in all other pending direct appeals by similarly situated appellants raising the same plain error claim. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the Crawford error in this

    ### Response:
    holding that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases  pending on direct review  with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a clear break with the past
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Waeranty. The plaintiffs claim against Ser-vinsky for breach of .implied warranty does not survive the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. A claim for breach of implied warranty is not distinct from a claim for breach of contract, because any implied warranties arise out of the contract. See, e.g., Cent. Park Drive, LLC v. Rinker Design Assocs., No. CL-2008-4207, 2008 WL 4376203 (Va.Cir.Ct. Aug. 19, 2008) (“Because RDA’s implied warranty of care arises out of its contract with the Plaintiff, any breach of the implied warranty would also constitute a breach of the contract itself.”). The impediment to the plaintiffs claim for breach of implied warranty is that he cannot establish privity of contract 'with Servinsky. See Gravely v. Providence P’ship, 549 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). C. Claim foe Breach of Implied Contract. The

    ### Response:
    holding that under virginia law an implied warranty claim was not actionable against the plaintiff because there was no privity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    absence of an element of fraudulent conduct from the definition of the crime has been sufficient to find that the crime was not one involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353, 81 S.Ct. 147, 149-50, 5 L.Ed.2d 120 (1960) (breach of peace not a crime involving moral turpitude, because no “fraudulent conduct” was involved). Courts have consistently held that statutory rape is a crime involving moral turpitude, even though it has no intent element, because such a crime is “usually classed as rape,” which “manifestly involves moral turpitude.” See, e.g., Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1025 (citing cases so holding). So, too, courts have expressed similar certainty that theft crimes involve moral turpitude. See, e.g., Dashto v. INS, 59 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434,

    ### Response:
    recognizing prior decision holding that  theft has always been held to involve moral turpitude regardless of the sentence imposed or the amount stolen  quoting soetarto v ins 516 f2d 778 780 7th cir1975
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    then think that the Mobile Desk may be produced by the same company (or a company affiliated with the company) that makes the Lap .Traveler. To answer this question, it is helpful to review “the basic objectives of trademark law,” which the United States Supreme Court has described as follows: In principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, “reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,” for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item — the item with this mark — is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitat ntertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). But these courts have all relied on the fact

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants use of the domain name moviebuffcom violated plaintiffs trademark rights in the mark moviebufp
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    admissible in evidence”). 29 . Admittedly, this inference is weak in light of the fact that the Mejias have provided no explanation of why Airborne’s Bezmen would vouch for the existence of such a call on behalf of the other defendants. (See, e.g., Luis Mejia Dep. at 351 (""I don’t know what was going on between them and Brenda Tipton. For all I know, they were having an affair. Who, God knows what was going on.”).) Still, the weakness of the inference that there was no call from ""Luis” to Airborne is ultimately immaterial, for, as detailed below, a reasonable juror could conclude that probable cause was lacking at the time of the arrest even if there was such a call. 30 . See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 31 . Airborne's characteriza d 397, 405-06 (7th Cir.1993) (pre-Richardson) (<HOLDING>); Rodrigues v. Furtado, 950 F.2d 805, 815 (1st

    ### Response:
    holding that private psychiatric facility that had been involved in emergency involuntary detention and treatment of arrestee pursuant to state court order was entitled to assert qualified immunity in light of policy considerations that underlie doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    test to determine substantial and sustained contacts pursuant to FRE 701). Further, Van Meter’s testimony’s probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect resulting in no violation of FRE 403. See United States v. Henderson, 68 F.3d 323, 327-28 (9th Cir.1995). Third, the district court did not err in denying appellant’s request to represent himself, finding that such requests were delaying tactics. See United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669, 675 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that if the “request [to proceed pro se] is part of a pattern of dilatory activity, the court has the discretion to deny the continuance and require the defendant to proceed to trial on the scheduled date either with the counsel designated or pro se”); see also Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Fourth, we reject appellant’s request for a

    ### Response:
    holding the request to represent oneself to be untimely because it was made only after a motion for substitute counsel and new trial was denied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (10th Cir.1993)). “[T]he application of an enhancement ... does not implicate the Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey.” United States v. Reyes-Vencomo, No. CR 11-2563 JB, 2012 WL 2574810, at *3 (D.N.M. June 26,. 2012) (Browning, J.). • The Tenth Circuit applies Apprendi v. New Jersey’s requirement that a fact be submitted to a jury only where the fact would increase a defendant’s sentence “above the statutory maximum permitted by the statute of conviction.” United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 847 (10th Cir.2005). Accord United States v. Ray, 704 F.3d at 1314. A-defendant may. assert an error under Apprendi v. New Jersey only where the fact at issue increased his sentence beyond the statutory maximum. See United States v. O’Flanagan, 339 F.3d 1229, 1232 (10th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hendrickson, 592 Fed.Appx.

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant could not assert an error under apprendi v new jersey because his sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    passion of the community.” Id. Most of the newspaper articles about the case did not mention Mills, but rather reported the progress of the search for Les Lawhon. Moreover, the articles that mentioned Mills did so in the context of reporting on an unfolding case. No editorials sounded the call for justice, nor did any county officials make public, blatantly prejudicial comments. See Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1538-40 (finding presumed prejudice partially based on the widespread reporting of the county sheriffs statement that he would like to “pre-cook” the defendants in an oven before they were executed). Finally, the disclosure that Mills was in jail for a parole violation did not suggest that juror prejudice should have been presumed. See Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1543 (11th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983, 109 S.Ct. 534,

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioner had failed to establish presumed prejudice despite a substantial number of jurors exposure to newspaper articles disclosing inadmissable evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    officer. See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) (""The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs"") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the current speedy trial figure may be

    ### Response:
    holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    28 at 9. 12 . 18 U.S.C. § 4013; Doc. 17 at 6. 13 . See 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (setting forth offense of ""escape from the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative"") (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (setting forth offense of sexual assault against a person in a ""prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any Federal department or agency”) (emphasis added). 14 .Doc. 28 at 7-9. 15 . 18 U.S.C. § 4013. 16 . 565 U.S. 118, 132 S.Ct. 617, 181 L.Ed.2d 606 (2012). 17 . Id. at 626. 18 . Id. at 623-26. 19 . Id.; see Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70-74, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001); Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1103 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); but see DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas

    ### Response:
    holding that court would not imply a bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private prison facility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be impounded during the pendency of the action, upon such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe, all articles alleged to infringe a copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970) (amended 1976). The words “such person” were interpreted to permit the impoundment of an infringing work only when it was possessed by a defendant who had himself infringed the plaintiffs copyright. See Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627, 629 (2nd Cir.1952) (finding impoundment improper when sought against a purchaser of copyrighted material because the “remedy of forfeiture and destruction is given only against an infringer” and “one does not infringe a copyright by buying an infringing copy” of a work); Jewelers’ Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 F. 932, 936 (S.D.N.Y.1921) (<HOLDING>); Matenciot, Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 422

    ### Response:
    holding that impoundment could not interrupt a bailees possession because under the 1909 act the remedy was expressly limited to infringers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    157 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1354-55 (S.D.Fla.2001). Although the Sinaltrainal court interpreted a claim of failure to exhaust as a chal lenge to subject matter jurisdiction, 256 F.Supp.2d at 1357, other district courts have treated the same claim as non-jurisdictional. See Abiola, 267 F.Supp.2d at 910 (finding that the TVPA “is not a jurisdictional statute, such that failure to comply with its requirements strips the Court of jurisdiction” and that the TVPA’s exhaustion requirement did not apply to claims raised under the ATCA); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1347 n. 30 (N.D.Ga.2002) (noting that the burden is on defendant to raise non-exhaustion and defendant in that case had not met the burden); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., et al., 2002 WL 319887, at *17 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F.Supp. 1189,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant raising exhaustion defense did not meet initial burden of demonstrating that plaintiffs had not exhausted alternative and adequate remedies in nigeria
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CWOF entered for that first offense was vacated and replaced with a conviction as of the date that the admission to sufficient facts and CWOF was entered (May 1, 2000). A CWOF is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. “Failure to comply with the conditions does not require the matter to be relitigated, because the defendant has already admitted to facts sufficient to prove guilt. A guilty verdict enters upon proof of failing to comply with the conditions, and the defendant is sentenced as if a guilty verdict had originally entered.” Commonwealth v. Berrios, 84 Mass.App.Ct. 521, 526 (2013). See also, Paquette v. Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds, Hampden Superior Court (Moriarty, J.), CA No. 10-909 (2011) (found at p. 127 of the Administrative Record) (<HOLDING>)(c)(4)). Finally, Burke’s argument flies in the

    ### Response:
    holding that violation of probation imposed on a cwof caused a replacement of the cwof with a conviction that qualified as a prior conviction for purposes of glc 90 24l
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remand the case and direct the FCC to supplement the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c) (the court of appeals may “order ... additional evidence ... to be taken by the agency’’ where requested to do so by one of the parties). 3) The court may transfer the case to the district court for a full hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b)(3). 4) The court may appoint a special master pursuant to F.R.A.P. 48 to hold hearings and gather any additional information the court needs to decide the just compensation issue. 5) The court may fashion any other “appropriate modes of procedure” to gather the evidence it needs to conduct its factual inquiry pursuant to its authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C § 1651. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1090-91, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Depending on the particular facts of a case,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that courts may rely on them authority under the all writs act in issuing orders appropriate to assist them in conducting factual inquiries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    3583(e)(2).” Id; at 712, 120 S.Ct. 1795 (emphasis added). In short, by thus recognizing the possibility for both extension and revocation, the Supreme Court did not construe the numbered subsections of § 3583(e) as mutually exclusive. Harris characterizes this part of Johnson as dictum and emphasizes that Justices Kennedy and Thomas objected to this language in brief concurrences. See id. at 713-15, 120 S.Ct. 1795 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 715, 120 S.Ct. 1795 (Thomas, J., concurring). The observation, however, only underscores that a six-justice majority (excluding Justice Scalia, who dissented from this aspect of the decision, see id. at 715-27, 120 S.Ct. 1795 (Scalia, J., dissenting)) deliberately chose to retain it. Thus, even if the statement is fairly charact 2d Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>); see also id. at 624 n.6 (rejecting double

    ### Response:
    holding that even in the absence of a new violation district court may extend supervised release after prior revocation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in part by the court’s observation that the Legislature had delegated “considerable deference and broad discretion” to the Tennessee DOC, from which it concluded that “[t]his broad grant of discretion also envisions that those persons intimately involved with the intricacies of the prison system and not the voting public are best equipped to establish policies and procedures for inmate discipline.” Mandela, supra, 978 S.W.2d at 534. With due respect to the Tennessee court, that is not the issue. Clearly, control over prison management is vested in DOC, subject to the Secretary’s overall supervision, and not the “voting public” or, indeed, the Judiciary. See State v. McCray, 267 Md. 111, 134, 297 A.2d 265, 277 (1972); see also Lumumba v. Morton, 280 N.J.Super. 400, 655 A.2d 487 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The question is simply whether inmate

    ### Response:
    holding that prison rule prohibiting inmates from wearing shirts that could show military rank or group membership was not subject to formal apa rulemaking requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1979). In Texas West Oil and Gas Corp. v. First Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857 (1987), reconfirmed, 749 P.2d 278 (Wyo.1988), we answered the narrower question of whether res judicata or collateral estoppel defenses can be sustained on a motion to dismiss. We concluded: This court follows the modern trend * * *, that if the information necessary for decision is available to the court by judicial notice, defendant can raise res judicata or collateral estoppel for consideration by a motion to dismiss. Id. at 858. These principles control the disposition of this case. Despite the fact that motions to dismiss are generally not favored, we hold that the district court properly decided that appellant’s petition to disestablish paternity was barre 2 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972) (<HOLDING>); and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that penalizing the illegitimate child for the acts of the parent is an unconstitutional and ineffective deterrent and does not serve any state interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this assertion and appellant has failed to offer other relevant authority concerning his point of error. See Tex.R.App.Proc. 38.1(f)-(h) (formerly Tex.R.App.Proc. 74(f)). MEYERS, Judge, concurring. The majority either assumes the trial court had the foresight to consider factors this Court would, more than two years later, recognize as important in assessing admissibility of victim related evidence at punishment in a capital murder case or undertakes the appropriate consideration of such factors itself in a kind of silent de novo review to which no one is privy. In either case, I decline to join them. At the time of appellant’s trial admissibility of victim related evidence at punishment was, at the very most, questionable. Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d at 262 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)(<HOLDING>). A majority of the Court in Mosley rendered

    ### Response:
    recognizing our jurisprudence in this area has been somewhat inconsistent and confusing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spir uestion: whether the Plaintiff-Appellant could argue the (undisputedly) correct legal standard to the jury, when it appeared that the shift would be a matter of law and jury instruction rather than a re-opening of discovery, and when the relevant facts underpinning the correct legal standard were already in the record. It was therefore essential in this case that the court give a specific account of its decisionmaking, and to clearly set forth its account of what harm would result from the shift in the legal standard. This it failed to do. A district court that gives “insufficient reasons” for its equitable decision abuses its discretion. See Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 792-93 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Equities that may be considered include

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to amend when the opposing partys case for prejudice is stated  only in the most conclusory of terms and no particular witnesses or documents are identified to support the argument that a delay would prejudice a party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    652-53, 75 S.E. 930 (1912); In re Hart, 8 Pa. 32, 37 (1848); Cupp v. Frazier’s Heirs, 239 Ark. 77, 81-83, 387 S.W.2d 328 (1965). 18 Annot., Rights of Inheritance in Ancestral Property as Between Kindred of Whole and Half Blood, 141 A.L.R. 976, 982 (1942). See 23 Am. Jur. 2d Descent and Distribution § 84, at 820; 26A C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 11, at 543; and Comment, Statutory Treatment of Ancestral Estate and the Half Blood in Intestate Succession, 42 Yale L.J. 101, 103 (1932). 19 See, e.g., Gardner v. Collins, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 58, 94, 7 L. Ed. 347 (1829); Dale v. Connolly, 10 N.J. Misc. ); In re Estate of Edwards, 273 N.W.2d 118 (S.D. 1978); McDonnall v. Drawz, 212 Minn. 283, 3 N.W.2d 419, 141 A.L.R. 970 (1942); In re Estate of Belshaw, 190 Cal. 278, 212 P. 13 (1923). But see (<HOLDING>) Rotenbach v. Young, 119 Misc. 267, 196 N.Y.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that halfblood claimants may not inherit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An employer, however, is not an insurer of its employees’ safety. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d at 794; Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex.1996); Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1993). Whataburger does not dispute that it owed a duty to Dean, as its employee, but observes that its duty is to protect its employees from foreseeable harms. The issue in this case, whether analyzed' as a part of the duty element of negligence or the causation element, is the foreseeability of the criminal conduct that led to Dean’s murder. As the Texas cases that discuss the foreseeability of intervening criminal conduct do so, in the main, in the context of the element of duty, we do so as well. See, e.g., Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377

    ### Response:
    holding no legal duty exists to prevent unforeseeable criminal acts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Seligmann, A Diller A Dollar: Section 1983 Claims in Special Education Lawsuits, 36 Ga. L.Rev. 465, 525-26 (2002) ] (noting that measuring available relief at the time when the injury occurred ensures that ""the IDEA process is not ... ignored, with the potential consequence of more educational harm being done to the child until no remedy but damages remain”). Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1067. 5 . ""Hurting him” here refers to the general emotional trauma the Muskrats reported to the school, not the medical consequences they now attribute to the timeouts. Cf. App. 1063-65 (deposition of Mrs. Muskrat in which she admits the Muskrats never told school officials that timeouts were producing severe stress symptoms in J.M.). 6 . See Doe v. Hawaii Dept. of Educ., 334 F.3d 906, 908-09 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272

    ### Response:
    holding that excessive force by a school official should be analyzed under the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    third issue, which faults trial counsel for failing to ensure a complete record was made of the voir dire. The present record includes only part of the voir dire proceedings, that is, the individual voir dire strikes and final jury selection. During the motion for new trial hearing, counsel said it was his typical practice to have the voir dire recorded and that there was no trial strategy associated with the failure to ensure that a full record was made of voir dire. Mere failure of counsel to request recordation of the voir dire examination is not ineffective assistance of counsel per se. Ybarra v. State, 890 S.W.2d 98, 112 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, pet. ref'd); Wills v. State, 867 S.W.2d 852, 857 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd); see also Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 (<HOLDING>). “Some injury resulting from the failure to

    ### Response:
    recognizing reluctance to designate any error as per se ineffective assistance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    three-year sentences on the two armed criminal action counts to be served concurrent with each murder sentence, and a ten-year sentence on the robbery count to be served concurrent with the first murder sentence. Id. On April 11, 2001, after serving over seventeen years in prison, Dixon’s convictions for the two counts of murder and two counts of armed criminal action “were set aside by a Jackson County, Missouri, Circuit Judge, on grounds that the Jackson County Prosecutor violated the due process clause which forbids a state from using inconsistent irreconcilable theories to secure convictions against two or more defendants in prosecution for the same offense arising out of the same event.” Presentence Report (PSR) at ¶ 31. See also Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The only conviction left intact- was Dixon’s

    ### Response:
    holding the prosecutor also violated the due process rights of one of dixons accomplices jon smith by using inherently contradictory theories to obtain the convictions of smith and another of dixons accomplices anthony lytle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and was not addressed by the Supreme Court in Auer, that being whether an employer’s policy of requiring deductions from a salaried employee’s vacation, personal leave or other paid benefits accounts when he or she works less than the required forty hours per week violates the “salary basis” test for exempt executive employees. Again there is a split in the circuits on this issue. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test. Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419,

    ### Response:
    holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits the salary basis concept is not violated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or whether it indicates that compliance with the request for information might be compelled; (7) whether the officer physically touches the person of the citizen; (8) whether an officer's show of authority or exercise of control over an individual impedes that individual's ability to terminate the encounter; (9) the duration of the encounter; and (10) whether the officer retains the citizen's identification or travel documents. Id. (citing People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68, 73-75 (Colo.1998)). In addition to these factors, we have considered whether, and under what cireum-stances, a police officer's request for a citizen's identification and subsequent check for outstanding warrants transforms a consensual encounter into an investigatory stop. See Martinez, 200 P.3d at 1058-59 (<HOLDING>); Padgett, 932 P.2d at 814 (holding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the police subjected the defendant to an investigatory stop when they directed the de fendant to come out of the bathroom and into a separate room and then ran a clearance check to determine whether the defendant had any outstanding warrants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of discussion of discriminatory intent based upon race. The provision of 1968 did more than reflect mere “cosmetic” changes but contained substantially revisions to the 1885 law. The framers and ratifiers of the 1968 Constitution deliberately chose to change the prohibition on voting by felons in order to achieve a different and new result in terms of the persons who would be disqualified. The 1968 Constitution altered Article VI, Section 4, of the 1885 Constitution to categorically disqualify felons not only from voting but also from holding office. Additionally, it changed Article VI, Section 5, of the 1885 Constitution by deleting specific crimes that would have triggered disqualification included some misdemeanors. See, e.g., State ex rel. Jordan v. Buckman, 18 Fla. 267 (1881) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the legislature in 1986 disqualified a

    ### Response:
    holding misdemeanor conviction for petty larceny triggered disenfranchisement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    respect of NRDC’s challenge to the 2009-10 specifications. The Fifth Amended Complaint challenged specifications for the first time in this case as to the 2009-10 specifications and quotas, rather than in a separate action as NRDC had done before without exception. Indeed, because NRDC did not file a separate action to challenge the 2009-10 specifications, the Fifth Amended Complaint challenged those specifications for the first time ever, in this case or any other. The magistrate judge therefore had not engaged — much less substantially engaged — the 2009-10 specifications in any prior proceeding in this case. At the time WCSPA moved to intervene, this case was not “at issue;” NMFS had not even filed a responsive pleading to the Fifth Amended Complaint. See LULAC, 131 F.3d at 1303 (<HOLDING>). Thus, this case entered a new stage with the

    ### Response:
    holding the stage of the proceedings supported a finding of untimeliness of the proposed intervention where the defendant had filed an answer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    review de novo questions of law, Ahir v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir.2008). We dismiss in part, deny in part and grant in part the petition for review, and we remand. We lack jurisdiction to consider Liang’s contention that his former attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel because he did not exhaust this claim before the BIA. See Ontiveros-Lopez v. INS, 213 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir.2000). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination because Liang’s inconsistency regarding whether or not he lived in Venezuela for three years before coming to the United States was not a minor discrepancy, see Chebchoub, 257 F.3d at 1043, and he failed to provide corroborating evidence of his identity, see Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1090-92 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that in his brief to the BIA,

    ### Response:
    holding that when the ij has reason to question an aliens credibility material and easily available corroboration may be required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prescription drug use and Keating’s positive urine test that day. Moreover, once inside 90 Market Street, Lombardo’s flight and Keating’s presence in the upstairs bathroom provided additional justification for the search of the residence. We find the search reasonable. C. The Strip Search of Keating Was Reasonable. We also agree with the District Court that the strip search of Keating was reasonable under the circumstances. The reasonableness of a strip search or visual cavity search is assessed by considering the totality of the circumstances, including “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 620, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed,2d 447 (1979) (<HOLDING>). We reiterate that Keating, as a parolee, had

    ### Response:
    holding that prison officials may conduct visual body cavity searches in a reasonable manner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    negligence action is a question of law air traffic control had been notified that a flight was going to involve a group of parachutists jumping at high altitude, the air traffic controller knew or should have known that any mistake pertaining to the plane’s position could be disastrous. Freeman, 509 F.2d at 629. Thus, the court held that the controller owed a duty to the jumpers to exercise due care under Ohio law. Id. FAA air traffic controllers’ duties include giving “all the information and warnings specified in [their] manuals, and in certain situations [they] must give warnings beyond the manuals.” Davis, 824 F.2d at 550. These duties include reporting certain weather conditions, as specified in the ATC manual. See Worthington v. United States, 21 F.3d 399, 406-07 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Ingham, 373 F.2d at 234 (“The issue

    ### Response:
    holding that faa controllers failure to provide accurate and timely information about foggy weather conditions when an airplane pilot approached the landing strip caused the spatial disorientation of the pilot which was the type of harm the controllers should have expected
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (unpublished) (affirming the district court’s decision that the lawsuit was barred by the AIA, but remanding the case “for the district court to revise the- judgment to clarify that the petition was dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”). While the minority’s analysis in Hobby Lobby on the jurisdictional nature of the AIA may be compelling, it does not change the fact that this Court is bound by U.S. Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit case law holding the opposite. Therefore, the Court concludes the AIA applies in this case and operates to strip the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the Tribe’s lawsuit. The same conclusion applies with respect to the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). See Wyo. Trucking Ass’n v. Bentsen, 82 F.3d 930, 935 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The DJA does not provide this Court with

    ### Response:
    holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the djas federal tax exception over an action seeking a declaration as to the rights of litigating parties with respect to federal taxes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    invocation of his right to counsel was certainly unfortunate, it does not merit habe-as relief. I will deny Pursell’s claims under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and deny him a certificate of appealability on these claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). (b) Testimony About Pursell’s Prior Criminal Record and Counsel’s Withdrawal of Motion for Mistrial Pursell’s second claim concerning Krahe’s testimony focuses on Krahe’s statement that Pursell had a prior criminal record. When asked by the court for the name of Pursell’s lawyer, Krahe said the following: “He said Gary Skiba. ‘He got me out of jail before.’ ” (Tr. 1/21/82, at 121). Pursell’s counsel objected to this statement and moved for mistrial. He later withdrew that motion when the governmen .Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The Commonwealth concedes the inadmissibility

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants statements not admissible once he had invoked right to counsel without proof of waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (2d Cir.2006) (upholding administrator’s determination that plaintiff was not a participating employee under the plan where “ample evidence” suggested that he had been terminated, though there was “also evidence that [he] was not terminated”), and Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 89-90 (2d Cir.2009) (rejecting argument that administrator erred in concluding that the claimant was not disabled based on its weighing of competing medical evaluations), with McCauley v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 551 F.3d 126, 138 (2d Cir.2008) (concluding that administrator’s “reliance on one medical report ... to the detriment of a more detailed contrary report without further investigation was unreasonable”), and Durakovic v. Bldg. Serv. 32 BJ Pension Fund, 609 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Put differently, if the administrator has

    ### Response:
    holding that funds reasoning was inappropriately onesided where funds summarily dismissed a report by the claimants vocational expert which was vastly more detailed and particularized than the report on which the funds relied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Charles, 213 F.3d 10, 24 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Martinez, 144 F.3d 189, 190 (1st Cir.1998). In this Circuit, the types of evidence relied upon by district courts to determine that a particular substance is crack cocaine under the Guidelines include: (1) a chemist’s testimony that the substance was cocaine base, combined with an investigator’s testimony that the substance was crack, and the defendant’s own admission that he sold “rock,” see Robinson, 144 F.3d at 109; (2) a chemist’s testimony that the substance was cocaine base and that sodium bicarbonate (usually used in processing crack cocaine) was present, together with the testimony of three different law enforcement agents that the substance was crack, see Richardson, 225 F.3d at 50. Accord Martinez, 144 F.3d at 190 (<HOLDING>) id.; see also Charles, 213 F.3d at 24-25

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in question required no ‘distinctive knowledge’ or ‘specialized skill.’ ” Thangaraja, 428 F.3d at 876. Ramon-Sepulveda, the sole case on which the government relies, noted that plaintiffs “legal claim against the INS involved established principles of res judicata-principles with which the majority of attorneys are, or should be, familiar. Additionally, there is no shortage of attorneys in Los Angeles qualified to assist aliens in deportation proceedings.” Ramon-Sepulveda, 863 F.2d at 1463. See Thangaraja, 428 F.3d at 876 (declining to apply an upward adjustment for representation of an alien in connection with the review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision regarding applications for asylum and withholding of removal); Ruedar-Menicucci v. I.N.S., 132 F.3d 493, 496 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Johnson v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205,

    ### Response:
    holding that no specialized skill or distinctive knowledge was needed to represent an alien at asylum and withholding of deportation hearings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to defraud the banks of the full face amount of the worthless checks.” Id. at 188. The fraudulent check amount that Dul-lum argues should not be included in the total loss for purposes of determining his enhancement was the $10,000 rental check he cashed, which served as the basis for the bank fraud count. He admitted, however, that he intended the money to “help out some of [his] financial burdens,” including a withdrawal of $7,000 to pay back his home equity line and his intention to use the money to cover any outstanding payments on the rental property if necessary. He only repaid to the bank the fraudulent check amount after a Secret Service investigation had begun and his accounts were frozen. Dullum did not pre-vide any evidence to the contrary at sentencing. See id. at 194 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Strozier, 981 F.2d 281, 285

    ### Response:
    holding that a sentencing judge may consider the face value of deposited checks as sufficient evidence that it was the intended loss although it cannot mechanically be assumed and the defendant can then produce evidence of his or her own in an attempt to convince the court that another figure was intended
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and resources it expended in 2013.” Applying the well-known principle of “the time value of money” means that spending money on other priorities in 2013 — and reaping the benefits of those investments between 2013 and 2015 — would financially benefit Kawa even if it eventually expends money in 2015 to comply with the mandate. Construing Kawa’s complaint liberally, I understand Kawa to have easily alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate Article III standing in its complaint. Of course, my view on the issue of standing has nothing to do with the merits of Kawa’s complaint challenging the employer mandate’s delayed enforcement under the APA. In fact, any discussion of the merits here would be inappropriate. See, e.g., Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 855, 618 F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). However, I would hold that Kawa has alleged

    ### Response:
    holding after we found standing following a district courts dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction that the merits will be for the district court to decide on remand
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for all the world like there’s not much of a future for the Debtors’ case because they can’t even pay their own way, normal on-going operating expenses, to keep their heads above water. They’re falling further in the hole. Given this, I find that the Debtors’ .failure to pay their post-petition income taxes as and when due constitutes cause for the conversion or the dismissal of this case.... (December 14, 1994, Hearing Transcript, pp. 7-8.) On December 20, 1994, the Debtors filed a notice of appeal with the Bankruptcy Court. The appellants/Debtors filed their brief on February 8,1995, and the United States filed its brief on March 10, 1995. This court heard oral arguments on May 25, 1995, and, after considering both the briefs and the arguments advanced by the parties, affirms the (<HOLDING>), affd, 949 F.2d 401 (10th Cir.). Also,

    ### Response:
    holding that a bankruptcy courts decision to convert or dismiss a chapter 11 case is a matter within its discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    both the legal issues and the facts involved in this action are extraordinarily complex. Because the court finds that the Tofel Firm is not prepared to continue the Porzio Firm's representation, any counsel replacing the Porzio Firm would face insurmountable obstacles in attempting to prepare for the January 8, 1996 trial of the common law claims in this action. On the one hand, failure by this court to grant such replacement counsel a continuance of that trial would result in prejudice to the Laga Defendants. On the other hand, any further delay of that trial would result in prejudice to the other litigants in this matter. Such prejudice weighs heavily in the court's determination of whether to deny the Porzio Firm's motion. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 V.I. 466, 477 (D.V.I. 1977) (<HOLDING>); Jacobs, 236 A.2d at 890 (attorney requesting

    ### Response:
    holding that it was inappropriate to allow petitioner to withdraw while motions were pending before the court and ready to be argued
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it was received by the government, which filed a response, Rl-330, prior to Garrison’s sentencing and that it was reviewed by the district court because it is referenced in the sentencing transcript, R4-4. Accordingly, we have considered Garrison's sentencing memorandum and the representations therein. We reiterate, however, that it is the responsibility of the parties to see that the appellate record is complete and that documents from which they quote on appeal were docketed in the district court and are part of the record on appeal. 30 . The lack-of-notice cases relied upon by Garrison are inapposite because either the PSR did not indicate the possibility of an upward departure or did not specify the reason for an upward departure. See Burns, 501 U.S. at 131-32, 111 S.Ct. at 2184 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Valentine, 21 F.3d 395,

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court violated fedrcrimp 32 by departing upward in sentence without notice and the psr identified no grounds for departure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it was so out of whack, it was repaid in conformance with the business that conducts — I mean, it’s not something you see every day, but it was paid in conformance with the business that conducts a massive fraud and has lots and lots of victims, including Apple Fund. Transcript 2 at 163-165. This court notes that the exception to preference liability applies to payments made by a legitimate business, not payments made by a fraudulent business. The measure of business conduct for purposes of this defense should be limited to the legitimate practices of legitimate businesses. This court declines to apply the Defendants’ reasoning; ordinary businesses do not pay fictitious profits or systematically defraud their customers or their lenders. See, e.g., M & L Bus. Mach. Co., 84 F.3d at 1340 (<HOLDING>). This court finds that Apple Fund’s collection

    ### Response:
    holding that ordinary businesses do not pay fictitious profits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it is executed for the uses and purposes it expresses.” Hawaiian Trust & Inv. Co. v. Barton, 16 Haw. 294, 300 (1904) It has also been held that even without recordation, “ ‘[a] deed apparently valid upon its face carries with it a presumption of validity’” as between the parties to a deed. Chun Chew Pang v. Chun Chew Kee, 49 Haw. 62, 71, 412 P.2d 326, 332 (1966) (quoting McElroy v. Calhoun, 177 Okla. 38, 57 P.2d 827, 828 (1936)). “Even if the deed had no acknowledgment, or its equivalent, at all, it would still be good between the parties. As between the parties acknowledgment of a deed is not necessary.” Meheula v. Pioneer Mill Co., 17 Haw. 56, 58 (1905) (citing Laanui v. Puohu, 2 Haw. 161 (1859)). See also In re Nelson, 26 Haw. 809, 820 (1923); Aiau v. Kupau, 4 Haw. 384, 385 (1881) (<HOLDING>). Id. at 281-82, 909 P.2d at 609-10 (some

    ### Response:
    holding that recording is notice to one bound to search the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    119 S.Ct. 1307). Because Jimarez refused to testify at Defendant Rivas-Macias’ trial, the proceeding at issue here, Defendant cannot establish that Jimarez engaged in a testimonial waiver of the privilege. Defendant’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive. The privilege against self-incrimination protects against a party forcing an individual to adopt, at trial, “his unsworn out-of-court confession.” Silverstein, 732 F.2d at 1347; see also United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36, 45 (2d Cir.1979) (ruling that an individual “had not waived his privilege” by making “previous statements to the FBI and the grand jury” because a “waiver of the privilege in one proceeding does not affect a witness’ rights in another proceeding”); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 552 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). That is exactly what Defendant Rivas-Macias

    ### Response:
    holding an individuals admission to a government agent prior to trial that he had previously committed perjury did not waive his privilege to invoke the fifth amendment as to that matter at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    punishing those who give false information in order to obtain drivers’ licenses or identification cards from the. office of motor vehicles of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, to limit the issuance of such documentation to correspond to the time limits placed by the federal Immigration and Naturalization Service on documentation, and to make operating a motor vehicle in this state when not lawfully present in the United States a crime. Congress has exercised its power over immigration in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. (the “INA”). The INA is a comprehensive regulatory scheme which regulates the authorized entry, length of stay, residence status, and deportation of aliens. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474-75 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). The INA delegates enforcement duties to the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the regulatory scheme created by the ina is so pervasive as to be consistent with the exclusive federal power over immigration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    venue as to a nonresident co-defendant would vanish and the court would lose personal jurisdiction over the remaining nonresident co-defendant. Ross v. Battle, 117 Ga. 877, 880, 45 S.E. 252, 254 (1903). Defendant argues that the Final Judgment cannot be enforced against him, and that plaintiff should be required to reassert her now eighteen-year-old claim, although defendant argues that the reasserted claims would be barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant’s argument is without merit. The defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction and venue are waived as a matter of law if not raised “at the earliest opportunity.” See Euler-Siac S.P.A. v. Drama Marble Co., 274 Ga.App. 252, 254-55, 617 S.E.2d 203, 206 (2005); Maalouf v. Knight, 237 Ga.App. 509, 510, 515 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1999) (<HOLDING>); McDonough Contractors, Inc. v. Martin &

    ### Response:
    holding that the defense of lack of venue must be made at the earliest opportunity to plead or it is waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is well settled that representations are construed to be fraudulent when made by one who either knows the assurances to be false or else not knowing the verity asserts them to be true.... Neither actual dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an element of constructive fraud. Lane v. Rachel, 239 Ark. 400, 389 S.W.2d 621, 624 (1965) (emphasis in original); see also South County, Inc. v. First West. Loan Co., 315 Ark. 722, 871 S.W.2d 325, 327 (1994) (describing constructive fraud as the “making of misrepresentations by one who, not knowing whether they are true or not, asserts them to be true without knowledge of their falsity and without moral guilt or evil intent”); Cardiac Thoracic & Vascular Surgery, P.A. Profit Sharing Trust v. Bond, 310 Ark. 798, 840 S.W.2d 188, 191 (1992) (<HOLDING>). To establish constructive fraud under

    ### Response:
    holding that a cause of action for constructive fraud will lie even when the misrepresentations were made innocently and their false nature is not discovered until well after the representations are made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Tex. Pen.Code § 1.07(a)(46). The plain language of the statute therefore defines serious bodily injury in terms of bodily injury; though some forms of bodily injury are not “serious bodily injury,” all forms of “serious bodily injury” include bodily injury. Moreover, death is also bodily injury under the plain meaning of the Penal Code because it is an “impairment of physical condition.” See Tex. Pen.Code § 1.07(a)(8). In proving appellant caused the complainant’s death, the State necessarily had to prove that appellant caused bodily injury to the complainant. See Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Almanza v.

    ### Response:
    holding that death necessarily involves bodily injury as defined in the penal code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ ” Kraus v. County of Pierce, 793 F.2d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1571, 94 L.Ed.2d 763 (1987). If the investigatory stops of motorcyclists continued for an extended period of time, probable cause that the motorcyclists knew about the helmet’s non-compliance could be required. “Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop. But [Supreme Court] cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685, 105 S.Ct. at 1575. See also Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). However, the possibility

    ### Response:
    holding that an initially lawful terry stop can be converted into a fullfledged arrest for which probable cause is required but noting that there is no bright line rule for determining when an investigatory stop crosses the line and becomes an arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appellate precedent.” Id. at 201. Specifically, at the time of the GPS tracking in Fisher, “the Supreme Court had strongly indicated, and the Sixth Circuit and three other circuits had held, that the warrantless use of electronic tracking devices was permissible.” Id. at 203. Also, as the Seventh Circuit has recognized, “circuits that did not have their own GPS precedent prior to Jones have uniformly concluded that [the Supreme Court’s decision in] Knotts is binding appellate precedent for the purpose of Davis’s good-faith exception, even when police officers’ GPS monitoring lasted for a longer period of time.” United States v. Taylor, 776 F.3d 513, 518 n.2 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing cases); see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Here, the GPS tracking took place during

    ### Response:
    holding that monitoring of a signal from a beeper was not a search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be made as to whether death was a probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 541. In other words, the Court apparently looked beyond the requirements of the underlying offense, ordinary negligence, to determine if the death was “a probable consequence” of this particular defendant’s action. As we note later, this view has been expressed by a few other jurisdictions, and it represents a minority view that has merit— as long as the jury is properly instructed that the probable consequences of the defendant’s actions were obvious. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Heck, 517 Pa. 192, 535 A.2d 575, 579 (1987), decided after Jumper, held the contrary view that a showing of criminal negligence is required for vehicular homicide. 11. —The misdemeanor -29 (1992) (<HOLDING>); but see United States v. Walker, 380 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a careless driving statute could not be used as a predicate for vehicular homicide because careless driving can occur without criminal negligence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Claim Constr. Reply 2. Thus Aspex’s own reasoning acknowledges that, if the magnetic members of claim 18 of the '545 patent are limited to horizontal orientation, as the court held that they are, Aspex IV, 2007 WL 2984673, at *23, the scope of claim 18 of the '545 patent is not the same as that of claim 2 of the '207 patent, because the former’s magnetic members are limited to horizontal orientation while the latter’s do not contain this limitation. Because claim 18 of the '545 reissue patent contains a limitation not present in claim 2 of the original '207 patent — that the magnetic members possess horizontal orientation and thus engage vertically— and this limitation affects the scope of the claims, these two claims are not substantially identical. See Laitram Corp., 163 F.3d at 1348 (<HOLDING>); Bloom Eng’g, 129 F.3d at 1251 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that original claim was not substantially identical to reissue claim because original claim covered printer that generated any quality of alphanumeric characters while reissue claim covered printer that generated a particular kind of alphanumeric characters type quality alphanumeric characters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arguments advanced for the first time on appeal applies to sentencing proceedings.... [If] a party is silent or fails to state the grounds for objections, the objections are waived.” (citations, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted)); id. (“On this appeal Maurice makes three arguments in support of his objection; .... [Maurice] waived [two of] these arguments by not presenting them at the sentencing hearing and we will only consider them under a plain error standard.”); cf. United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir.2009) (“At trial, Emmanuel made a hearsay objection to the evidence, but did not mention the Confrontation Clause. A hearsay objection to testimony at trial, standing alone, does not preserve a constitutional challenge under the (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); cf. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 4 (“In

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer leader manager or supervisor under  3bllc in part because the defendant actively recruited two individuals to transport drugs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assess whether the goals are indeed worth the risks. (Id. at 386). “[T]o be confident in its Solicitor’s advice on matters ‘intimately related’ to Authority policy,” the Court explained, “the Board must have the right to demand that his loyalties lie with it and its agenda.... Given the political ramifications of any attendant legal advice, confidence sometimes may come only with the assurance that the Solicitor shares the same political ideology as the Board.” (Id.), quoting Ness, 660 F.2d at 522). The Court of Appeals concluded: “These situations are exactly the types for which the Supreme Court created the Elrod/Bmnti exception.” {Id.; see also, Battaglia v. Union County Welfare Board, 88 N.J. 48, 438 A.2d 530 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965, 102 S.Ct. 2045, 72 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982) (<HOLDING>) The position of assistant county counsel is

    ### Response:
    holding termination of legal assistant to county welfare board based on political party affiliation was permissible under first amendment to the united states constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court’s judgment as a matter of law for Monroe County on the state law negligence claim. Mississippi waives sovereign immunity for itself and its political subdivisions in § 11-46-5 of the Mississippi Code, but subjects this blanket waiver to numerous exceptions, including those listed in § 11-46-9. In pertinent part, § 11-46-9 provides: (l) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim: (m) Of any claimant who at the time the claim arises is an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such institution, regardless of whether such claimant is or is not an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, pena d 1325, 1332 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we find that the district

    ### Response:
    holding that it is inappropriate to reach constitutional issues when a case can be decided on other grounds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have failed to make a showing of exceptional circumstances. Neither the parties nor the issues are identical or substantially similar. The Swiss action identifies Pablo as the lone Defendant; by contrast, Ms. Madanes names ten Defendants in this action. See id. In addition, this action concerns activity that is not part of the Swiss action. Consider, for instance, the allegations concerning $7.5 million worth of fraudulent transfers from the New York Account, which are not part of the Swiss complaint The mere fact that “a number of similar issues need to be resolved” in both actions does not mandate dismissal; indeed, this is so even where “the circumstances out of which the two actions arise are identical.” Eskofot A/S v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 872 F.Supp. 81, 90 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (<HOLDING>). The Court further notes that any

    ### Response:
    holding that although underlying circumstances of two actions were identical dismissal was not warranted where american company was not party to english action and plaintiff has stated claims relating to american antitrust law that would not be resolved in english action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Admission Agreement would be equally vulnerable. {39} Additionally, we disagree with the district court’s comments in the present case that a written power of attorney or an enumerated list authorizing Ms. Chapman to take each specific step was required to indicate the scope of her agency. Rather, Ms. Barron, as the principal, was in a position to limit her agent’s authority if she so chose. Cf. Comstock, 110 N.M. at 132, 793 P.2d at 262 (stating that “[i]t is always competent for a principal to limit the authority of his agent, and if such limitations have been brought to the attention of the party with whom the agent is dealing, the power to bind the principal is defined thereby”); Morris Oil Co. v. Rainbow Oilfield Trucking, Inc., 106 N.M. 237, 240, 741 P.2d 840, 844 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the law in New Mexico is that an

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a principal may limit the authority of its agent and such limitation will be binding on a third party who is aware of the limitation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Town then invoked the Williamson County state-litigation requirement and asserted that the Owners’ taking claim was unripe. Although “[r]ipeness reflects constitutional considerations that implicate ‘Article III limitations on judicial power,’ as well as ‘prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction,’ ” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1767 n. 2, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010) (quoting Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57, n. 18, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993)), the Williamson County state-litigation requirement involves only prudential considerations, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734, 117 S.Ct. 1659, 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997); see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S.Ct. at 2610 (<HOLDING>). Because Williamson County is a prudential

    ### Response:
    holding that williamson county is not jurisdictional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to buck when the first shot was fired, Appellant continued firing his pistol from atop an uncontrolled horse. Indeed, it was under the circumstances just described that Samantha, seated only a few feet from Jonathan and Gabe, was shot. It is therefore easily seen that if the horse had bucked in a slightly different way as Appellant continued to fire his gun, any of the shots could have hit Jonathan or Gabe as surely as the one that hit Samantha. Appellant’s conduct, as indicated by the Commonwealth’s evidence, exhibited an extreme indifference to the value of human life and created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to Jonathan and Gabe. Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict on these two charges. See Port v. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 327, 334 (Ky.1995) (<HOLDING>); Combs v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 859, 860-61

    ### Response:
    holding that there was sufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where defendant pointed a gun and fired two shots while in a crowded restaurant thereby creating dangerous atmosphere for other diners
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to § 164(a), they must first qualify as real property taxes, which are defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.164r-3(b) (as amended in 1964) as “taxes imposed on interests in real property and levied for the general public welfare. ...” Treas. Reg. § 1.164—3(b); Black v. Comm’r, 60 T.C. 108, 113 (U.S.Tax Ct.1973). Thus under Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3(b), deductions pursuant to § 164(a)(1) may only be taken on taxes actually imposed on interests in real property. Furthermore, Treas. Reg. § 1.164-1 (as amended in 1978), which states that generally, “taxes are deductible only by the person upon whom they are imposed,” reinforces the notion that real property taxes must first be imposed before they may be deducted for federal income tax purposes. See Hynes v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1266, 1289 (U.S.Tax Ct.1980) (<HOLDING>). In order to determine upon whom local

    ### Response:
    holding petitioner could not deduct real estate taxes imposed on property he did not own because these taxes were not imposed on him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    providing rights to “persons within the jurisdiction of the United States,” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), only protects persons within the United States’ territorial jurisdiction. See Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 556 (7th Cir.1985) (applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to the ADEA prior to the 1991 amendments, see ante at 302-303, because “[t]he normal basis of national sovereignty is territorial”). Second, the mere decision by a defendant in the United States to discriminate against employees abroad cannot serve as the basis for a claim pursuant to Section 1981. The statute prohibits acts of discrimination committed against “persons who are within the jurisdiction of United States,” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (emphasis added). See Ortiz-Bou, 382 F.Supp.2d at 296-97 (<HOLDING>); Theus, 738 F.Supp. at 1253 (“A decision to

    ### Response:
    holding that discriminatory acts that manifested themselves in a foreign country are not covered by section 1981
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    utility which here provides both regulated (interLATA service) and deregulated (PBX and software) services. Sprint’s regulated service is not at issue in this case. Hence, the PUC has no jurisdiction here over the DOC, and its jurisdiction over Sprint is not implicated. A. Jurisdiction Over the DOC We begin by noting that the Safebloek system was provided as a privilege to inmates for the purpose of making personal telephone calls. Powell does not argue, and this court has never held, that inmates have a constitutional right to use the phone for personal and social purposes. Although prisoners do have a right of access to the courts, which can include telephonic access upon occasion, such access is not at issue in this case. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 582-85 (10th Cir,1980)(<HOLDING>). The record in this case indicates that a

    ### Response:
    holding that prisoners have a constitutional right to meaningful access to courts and examining the facility as a whole to determine whether such access was sufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Golden Pacific). The Federal Circuit held in Golden Pacific that bank seizures do not constitute regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment, because investors in banks do not have a reasonable investment-backed expectation that regulators will not seize banks that are deemed to be in trouble. Id. at 1074 (“Given the highly regulated nature of the banking industry, ... the [federal regulators’ seizure of the bank] could not possibly have interfered with a reasonable investment-backed expectation on the part of Golden Pacific.”). The principle that a bank seizure does not provide the basis for a valid takings claim in this court is set forth in numerous eases in this circuit, and remains good law. See, e.g., Cal. Hous. Sec., Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 958 (Fed.Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Castle v. United States, 48 Fed.Cl. 187, 220

    ### Response:
    holding that the seizure and subsequent liquidation of the bank in question cannot constitute a physical fifth amendment taking because neither the bank nor its owner could have developed a historically rooted expectation of compensation for such a seizure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cocaine doses. The investigators further searched Defendant’s car and found neither drugs nor paraphernalia. The State’s meager evidence of intent to sell cannot be considered “substantial evidence” supporting the charge of possession of cocaine with intent to sell. See State v. Wiggins, 33 N.C. App. 291, 294-95, 235 S.E.2d 265, 268, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 592, 241 S.E.2d 513 (1977) (A relatively small drug quantity alone, “without some additional evidence, is not sufficient to raise an inference that the [drug] was for the purpose of distribution.”). We therefore reverse Defendant’s conviction and remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing on the lesser-included offense of possession of cocaine. See State v. Simmons, 165 N.C. App. 685, 689, 599 S.E.2d 109, 112 (2004) (<HOLDING>); State v. Robinson, 160 N.C. App. 564, 565,

    ### Response:
    recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the circuit court agreed with Corcoran’s due process argument related to BTO Betham and further concluded that the issue was disposi-tive of the entire proceeding. The circuit court concluded in pertinent part: A driver is entitled to request subpoenas for witnesses identified in the documents pertaining to the license suspension and has the right to present evidence relevant to the issues, to cross-examine opposing witnesses, to impeach any witness, and to rebut the evidence presented against the driver. §§ 822.2615(2) and 322.2615(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2012); Rules 15A-6.012(1) and 15A-6.013(5), Fla. Admin. Code. Also, in support of his argument, Cor-coran cites cases, Auzenne v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1056a (Fla. 9th Cir.Ct.2010) (<HOLDING>) and Amodeo v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor

    ### Response:
    holding that it was error for the hearing officer to refuse to issue a subpoena for the breath test operator who was a relevant witness as he had contact with the driver at or near the time of arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Jan. 9, 1985), 1st Dist. No. C-840263. 59 . State v. Key (Feb. 2, 1994), 1st Dist. Nos. C-930205 and C-930206, 1994 WL 25313. 60 . See, e.g., State v. Ford, 9th Dist. No. 24286, 2009-Ohio-3864, 2009 WL 2383002 (unauthorized suspended sentence); State v. Kendrick, 180 Ohio App.3d 662, 2009-Ohio-380, 906 N.E.2d 1174 (unauthorized lifetime suspension of hunting and fishing license); State v. Lisboa, 8th Dist. No. 89283, 2008-Ohio-571, 2008 WL 384141 (unauthorized term of community control); State v. Ehlert, 11th Dist. No. 2007-P-0032, 2008-Ohio-529, 2008 WL 351661 (unauthorized sanctions for minor misdemeanor). 61 . (Citation omitted.) State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 20; accord State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422 (<HOLDING>). 62 . State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76,

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion to withdraw a guilty or nocontest plea is a presenlence motion if the sentence was void for lack of postreleasecontrol notification
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    eligibility for benefits and to construe and interpret all terms and provisions of this Policy.” (Ad min. Record at 29; see also id. at 31.) Next, the Policy elsewhere states that the proof of loss submitted in support of a claim for benefits “must be satisfactory” to Defendant. (Id. at 16.) As Defendant observes, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that plan language of this sort confers sufficient discretionary authority to warrant judicial review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. See Frazier v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 725 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir.2013) (“This Court has found ‘satisfactory proof,’ and similar phrases, sufficiently clear to grant discretion to administrators and fiduciaries.”); Calvert v. Firstar Finance, Inc., 409 F.3d 286, 292 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). In response, Plaintiff does not dispute that

    ### Response:
    holding that plan language granting the plan administrator the sole discretion to construe the terms of a long term disability policy and to determine eligibility under the policy triggered arbitrary and capricious review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of this statute was to require the federal courts to fashion a uniform body of federal law for the enforcement of national labor laws. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 923, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95, 103-06, 82 S.Ct. 571, 576-78, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962). 3 . See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 1288 (West 1982). This statute of limitations is not applicable except to the extent that it may be applicable in state court to other than section 301 claims. See Del Costello v. Teamsters Union,-U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The second cause of action for

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute of limitations applicable to a section 301 suit was the same as that which applies to suits against an employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    existence of state created liberty interests compare such evidence on summary judgment or at trial, rather than at the, pleading stage, as in the instant case. See Sandin, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418; Wilkinson, 545 U.S. 209, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174; Wolff, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935; Bass, 170 F.3d 1312; Rodgers, 142 F.3d 1252; Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 Fed.Appx. 733 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam). In contrast, in close cases courts are less willing to dismiss claims for failure to allege a state-created liberty interest at the motion to dismiss stage of the proceedings. See Spaulding, 551 Fed.Appx. 984; Wallace, 229 Fed.Appx. at 830; Magluta, 375 F.3d at 1282-83; but see Morales v. Chertoff, 212 Fed.Appx. 888, 889-90 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Regional Dir. of Fla. Dep’t of

    ### Response:
    holding that neither the due process clause nor florida statutes bestowed a liberty interest in prisoners position as a law clerk
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to proceed. On these facts, we hold, first, that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s request for a second evaluation. A defendant is not automatically entitled to a second evaluation simply because, after the first evaluation, he raises the defense of mental defect or mental incapacity or contests the first evaluation. Whether a second mental evaluation is necessary is within the trial court’s discretion to determine. Barnes v. State, 346 Ark. 91, 55 S.W.3d 271 (2001); Dirickson v. State, 329 Ark. 572, 953 S.W.2d 55 (1997). Moreover, it is not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to deny a second examination to a defendant who fails to act diligently to secure the necessary information on which to establish the defense of mental disease or defect. Dirickson, supra (<HOLDING>). Appellant here did not act with diligence to

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant who did not raise the issue of incompetency at the first opportunity and who waited over one month after receiving notice of the mental evaluation to request supporting documents was not entitled to a second mental evaluation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “[a] person may not discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee because the employee has ... filed a workers’ compensation claim in good faith.” Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 451.001(1). Several Texas courts have held that, where employees both suffered an actual injury and reported the injury to the employer, this is sufficient to invoke the statutory protection against retaliatory discharge. See Munoz v. H & M Wholesale, Inc., 926 F.Supp. 596, 603 (S.D.Tex.1996) (noting before company terminated employee, employee sustained an on-the-job back injury for which company sent him to doctor and chiropractor and company filed its first report of injury regarding incident); Duhon v. Bone & Joint Physical Therapy Clinics, 947 S.W.2d 316, 317-18 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1997, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d 81,

    ### Response:
    holding employee invoked protection of statute when she sustained an onthejob injury and reported it to her employer the next day
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    withdraw guilty pleas. See Rules 4.1-4.4 of the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. 19 . King v. State, 553 P.2d 529, 532 (Okla.Crim.App.1976) (""We have, in the past, repeatedly emphasized the serious remifications [sic] of an accused’s plea of guilty and the necessity of an adequate record reflecting compliance with procedures articulated by this Court to insure an accused’s plea of guilty is voluntarily and intelligently entered as mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 20 . Although Crofford filed his petition pro se, yet another new attorney (his fourth by our calculation) entered his appearance and filed a brief in support of Crofford’s original § 2254 petition. 21 . Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (<HOLDING>). 22 . In addition, Crofford contends the first

    ### Response:
    holding defendant must have a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Miranda warnings was coercive. Notably, Sturdivant does not claim that the officers failed to advise him of the Miranda warnings before any of the interviews, nor does he claim that he did not understand his rights or that his waivers were not knowingly and voluntarily made. Rather, he takes issue with the fact that Sandoval gave him his Miranda warnings orally during the unrecorded interviews, using a written Miranda waiver only after he confessed. Sturdivant does not direct our attention to any case law, from this court or any other court, in support of his position. At any rate, the absence of a written Miranda waiver did not render Sturdi-vant’s oral waivers or subsequent confessions involuntary products of coercion. See United States v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Sturdivant next claims that Sandoval promised

    ### Response:
    holding officers failure to obtain a written waiver from defendant did not render his oral waiver or subsequent confession involuntary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    98 & n.17, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 2959 & n. 17, 82 L.Ed.2d 70 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-44, 102 S.Ct. 2466, 2472-73, 73 L.Ed.2d 48 (1982). The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, grants a private right of action to, inter alia, a person “injured in his business or property” by a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Smith misconstrues the law in arguing that the Supreme Court has refused to limit antitrust remedies to commercial interests. The cases she cites address whether the plaintiffs alleged injuries within the meaning of the Clayton Act; in that context, the Court held that the statute was not limited to redressing injuries to commercial interests. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,

    ### Response:
    holding that injury to business or property was not limited to commercial interests
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had been repealed for aliens placed in removal proceedings on or after April 1, 1997. See IIRIRA § 309(c)(1). At the hearing, the IJ informed Walker and the Huieoeheas that in light of the statutory amendments, the only relief even potentially available to them was a discretionary procedure known as “cancellation of removal.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). An alien must demonstrate ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States prior to applying for this new form of relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(A). Furthermore, according to the “stop-time rule,” an alien’s continual presence in the United States is deemed to end once the INS begins removal proceedings by serving a Notice to Appear. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(l); Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Unaware of Huicochea-Gomez’s eleven-month

    ### Response:
    holding that the new stoptime rule applies to all aliens applying for either suspension of deportation under the old law or cancellation of removal under the iirira amendments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    without implicating the First Amendment, even if newspapers themselves were not banned. First Amendment Reply at 4. First Amendment scrutiny is triggered because the statute bans the sale of something that at some level contains protected expression. See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227-28, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987) (invalidating tax on magazines, with exceptions b L.Ed.2d 118 (2000). While there is some disagreement over whether object code, as opposed to source code, is deserving of First Amendment protection, the better reasoned approach is that it is protected. Object code is merely one additional translation of speech into a new, and different, language. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445-49 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d at 326-27; Bernstein

    ### Response:
    recognizing that code is speech
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in two stages. “First, we determine whether the statements were improper.” Boyd, 640 F.3d at 669. Second, we determine whether the prosecutor’s remarks were “flagrant.” Id. Poandl contends that the prosecutor made two types of improper arguments. First, Poandl argues that the government made inflammatory appeals to sympathy for David Harper and played on jurors’ fears that Poandl would hurt other children. Appellant Br. at 52. Second, Poandl argues that the government minimized the burden of proof. Id. at 58-62. I agree with my colleagues that the second category of comments was not improper or flagrant. I. IMPROPRIETY A. Inflaming the Passions and Prejudices of Jurors It is well established that prosecutors “must obey the cardinal rule that a prosecutor cannot m th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). And it is improper for the government to

    ### Response:
    holding that it was improper for the prosecutor to tell the jury that if they acquit the defendant of bank robbery that is like opening all the banks and saying come on and get the money boys because well never be able to convict them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remand, it should first be determined whether the actions the [plaintiffs] allege Anderson to have taken are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful. If they are, then Anderson is entitled to dismissal prior to discovery. ... If they are not, and if the actions Anderson claims he took are different from those the [plaintiffs] allege (and are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful), then discovery may be necessary before Anderson’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds can be resolved. Of course, any such discovery should be tailored specifically to the question of Anderson’s qualified immunity. 483 U.S. at 641, 646-47, n. 6, 107 S.Ct. at 3039, 3042, n. 6. See also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 n. 11 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 929

    ### Response:
    recognizing the availability of summary judgment based on absolute prosecutorial immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to strike are pending. In such circumstances, the trial court is given the limited jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the motion in order to decide if it should award attorney fees and costs to the defendants.”). The reasoning for this retention of limited jurisdiction makes intuitive sense.’As the court in Col-train v. Shewalter explained, a voluntary dismissal should not automatically preclude an award of attorneys’ fees to a defendant because [ojtherwise, SLAPP plaintiffs could achieve most of their objective with little risk — by filing a SLAPP suit, forcing the defendant to incur the effort and expense of preparing a special motion to strike, then dismissing the action without prejudice. The specter of the action being refiled (at ptr.2d 807 (1999), as modified (Feb. 5, 1999) (<HOLDING>); eCash Techs., Inc. v. Guagliardo, 127

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant who is voluntarily dismissed with or without prejudice after filing a section 42516 motion to strike is nevertheless entitled to have the merits of such motion heard as a predicate to a determination of the defendants motion for attorneys fees and costs under subdivision c of that section
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the magistrate judge’s finding. Instead, the Millers argue that they are entitled to a less stringent standard because they are not attacking the validity of the foreclosure sale but, rather, are seeking only compensatory damages arising from the sale. The Millers are correct that the above three-part standard — in particular the requirement to show a grossly inadequate selling price — does not apply to all wrongful foreclosure claims* under Texas law. However, the cases on which the Millers rely establish only a particularized exception whereby the plaintiff-mortgagor may avoid showing a grossly inadequate selling price if he or she alleges that the defendant-mortgagee (lender) deliberately “chilled” the bidding at the foreclosure sale. See, e.g., Charter Nat’l Bank, 781 S.W.2d at 371 (<HOLDING>). The cases do not stand for the Millers’

    ### Response:
    holding that a mortgagor is not required to prove a grossly inadequate selling price in a situation where the bidding at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale was deliberately chilled by the affirmative acts of a mortgagee and the injured mortgagor seeks a recovery of damages rather than a setting aside of the sale itself emphasis omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by a private landowner in a proceeding to condemn land); Bonaparte v. Baltimore, H & L. R.R. Co., 75 Md. 340, 23 A. 784 (1892) (the existence of a de facto corporation may not be challenged in a collateral way but must be brought quo warranto ); Reisner v. Strong, 24 Kan. 410 (1880) (a de facto railroad may exercise the right of eminent domain and the legal existence of a de facto corporation can only be questioned by the state in a proceeding for that purpose); The National Docks Railway Co. v. The Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, 32 N.J.Eq. 755 (1880) (when corporation is de facto, private party cannot challenge, but action, instead, must be instituted by the state); The Aurora and Cincinnati R.R. Co., v. Miller, 56 Ind. 88 (1877) (<HOLDING>); McAuley v. Columbus, Chicago and Indian

    ### Response:
    recognizing that proceeding in the nature guo warranto was pending to challenge organization of railroad rather than through condemnation proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. State ex rel. Baxley, 340 So.2d 1121 (Ala.Civ.App.1976)). A forfeiture proceeding that is not instituted promptly is ineffectual. Id. “The term ‘promptly’ has been construed to mean within a reasonable time in light of all the circumstances.” State v. $17,636.00 in United States Currency, 650 So.2d 900, 901 (Ala.Civ.App.1994). Whether a forfeiture action is “prompt” is governed by the facts and circumstances of that particular case. Lightfoot v. Floyd, 667 So.2d 56, 66 (Ala.1995); Adams v. State ex rel. Whetstone, 598 So.2d 967, 970 (Ala.Civ.App.1992). However, it is evident from cases addressing the issue of promptness in forfeiture actions that a short period of time between the seizure of property and the institution of forfeiture proceedings is favored. See Reach v. State, supra (<HOLDING>); State v. Chesson, 948 So.2d 566

    ### Response:
    holding that forfeiture proceedings instituted eight months after the seizure of property failed to meet the promptness requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court’s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor’s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435,

    ### Response:
    holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsels eligibility and all connections with debtor including counsels retainer agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    .Id. at 266. 24 . Id. 25 . Id. 26 . Id. at 267. 27 . Int’l Paper Co., 788 S.W.2d at 305. 28 . Id. 29 . Id. at 306. 30 . See Webcon Group, Inc., 1 S.W.3d at 542-43. 31 . Smith, 17 S.W.3d at 597. 32 . RSMo 1994. 33 . McCormack v. Stewart Enter., Inc., 956 S.W.2d 310, 314 (Mo.App. W.D.1997). 34 . See id. 35 . Id. (citing Komosa v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 317 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Mo. banc 1958)). 36 . 421 S.W.2d 229 (Mo.1967). 37 . Id. at 234 (quoting Laughlin v. Boatmen's Nat’l Bank of St. Louis, 354 Mo. 467, 189 S.W.2d 974, 979 (1945)). 38 . Kinetic Energy Dev. Corp. v. Trigen Energy Corp., 22 S.W.3d 691, 697 (Mo.App. W.D. 1999) (quoting Baker v. Brown’s Estate, 365 Mo. 1159, 294 S.W.2d 22, 27 (1956)). 39 .Id. at 698. 40 . Baraba v. Stuart, 780 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Mo.App. E.D.1989). 41 . See id. (<HOLDING>). 42 . See Burger v. Wood, 446 S.W.2d 436, 444

    ### Response:
    holding that a contractors experience in his profession qualifies him to testify as an expert to reasonable rates
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on Bailey’s current net income, of $970.51 per month, an amount lower than his former monthly net income of $1,200 per month. We remand this issue to the trial court with instructions to calculate and award retroactive child support to the date Bardin filed her counter-petition for support, based upon the child’s needs and Bailey’s ability to pay. III. Change of the Child’s Surname. The trial court changed the child’s legal surname from Bardin to Bailey despite the fact that Bailey offered no evidence that the change was in the best interests of the child. This court, in Collinsworth v. O’Connell, 508 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), held that the change of a child’s surname to that of the father, based only on a finding of paternity, is error. The Collinsworth court explained CA 1997)(<HOLDING>); Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So.2d 12, 14 (Fla. 3d DCA

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court abused its discretion in changing the surname of the child and explaining that the mere fact that paternity has been established does not automatically entitle the father to insist the child be given his surname
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    aff'd, 912 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1990). Rather, "" 'actual intent’ to defraud must be shown.” Id. See also In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23, 32 (1st Cir. 1975) (noting that ""[although every preferential payment to a creditor has the effect of hindering or delaying other creditors from collecting their judgments, ... granting a security interest to secure funds with which the debtor intends to pay a preexisting debt does not necessarily imply an intent to 'hinder, delay or defraud creditors’[.]”); Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823, 831 (1959) (""Although a transfer may have the effect of hindering or delaying or defrauding creditors, incidental effect is not enough to satisfy the requirements of actual intent to defraud.”); In re Decker, 295 F.Supp. 501, 515 (W.D.Va.1969) (<HOLDING>), aff’d, 420 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1980). 10 .

    ### Response:
    recognizing wellsettled law that a conveyance made in good faith whether for an antecedent debt or a present consideration is not forbidden even though it may have the effect of hindering or delaying creditors by removing from their reach assets of the debtor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to that fact, it should have been dispelled by Breshears’s unequivocal declaration that he lived there. Further, when Wyles arrived, Deputy Cameron perceived that Wyles and Breshears were acquainted with each other. Under these circumstances, we believe that it was unreasonable for Deputy Cameron to rely on Wyles’s consent to enter Breshears’s residence without further inquiry and further evidence that Breshears had been lawfully evicted. Deputy Cameron’s reliance on the fact that Wyles was the owner of the property- and his claim that Breshears was trespassing as his sole basis for entry into a dwelling known by the officer to be a rental unit was the type of consent that was of course long ago found not to pass constitutional muster. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the Fourth Amendment required

    ### Response:
    holding that a landlord could not validly consent to the search of a house he had rented to another
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for documents until after the suit was initiated. Until then it did not even attempt to search its files for the requested documents or review them at all. OL & S was therefore reasonable in believing that the filing of a lawsuit was necessary in order to induce government compliance. b. OL & S Vigorously Pursued Administrative Avenues Before Filing Suit. OL & S took full advantage of the administrative process to resolve its claim prior to filing a lawsuit, and had exhausted the process and reached an impasse before the suit was filed. A number of eases have held that a lawsuit was premature, and therefore unnecessary, when the plaintiff was aware that the agency was attempting to comply with the request. Weisberg v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 848 F.2d 1265, 1271 (D.C.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Ginter v. Internal Revenue Serv., 648 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding not necessary a suit filed while the government was still searching for the files and the plaintiffs requests were unduly broad
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discharge. Ill The trial court determined by summary judgment that even if MacDougall were an employee, he did not demonstrate that he was wrongfully discharged. The Appellate Division sustained that determination. If on the retrial of this matter, the trial court determines that the working relationship was one of employment, then it must consider whether plaintiff was ""wrongfully discharged. That issue, we note, has been fully briefed and argued on the appeal before us. Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to explain the standards that should inform and guide the trial court in the event it reaches the issue of wrongful discharge. A In Pierce, we recognized that “an employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is c 157-59, 443 A.2d 728 (App.Div. 1982) (<HOLDING>); O’Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J.Super. 416,

    ### Response:
    holding that discharge of pharmacist for refusing to violate state administrative regulation requiring pharmacist to be present at all times pharmacy operates for business and for reporting his employers intended violation pursuant to statutory provision and his professional code of ethics would violate clear mandate of public policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in part is reversed and the complaints are dismissed. Judge Barry dissents. 1 The two complaints, which were heard separately by the administrative law judge, were consolidated on appeal to the PUO. 2 Stray voltage is neutral voltage which cannot return to the utility’s substation through the distribution lines. Stray voltage is grounded by the utility, and travels through the earth as it returns along the distribution circuit. When the stray voltage , runs through any electrical equipment, such as milking machines, it can produce low voltage electrical shock if the equipment is not properly grounded. Stray voltage may also pass through the body of a cow as part of the return circuit, depending in part on the levels of soil moisture. T 34 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 516, 383 A.2d 997 (1978) (<HOLDING>). 6 Because of our disposition of the case on

    ### Response:
    holding that the puc may not allocate the amount of a disputed water bill between the utility and the customer where the complainants had not met their burden of proof
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allegedly false statements to the press because statements to the media “have no functional tie to the judicial process.” Id. at -, 113 mation that is subject to disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), is advocatory. In Imbler, the prosecutor was alleged to have knowingly used false testimony and suppressed material exculpatory evidence at trial. The Court upheld the lower courts’ rulings that the prosecutor was absolutely immune from potential liability for the alleged misconduct. As other courts have recognized, it follows from Imbler that the failure, be it knowing or inadvertent, to disclose material exculpatory evidence before trial also' falls within the protection afforded by absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Hill, 45 F.3d at 662 (<HOLDING>); Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 262 (4th

    ### Response:
    holding failure to turn over brady material after prosecutorial phase of case had begun was covered by absolute prosecutorial immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or employee, (2) perform a federal function, and (3) be subject to supervision by a federal officer or employee. 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (1988). See Hedman v. United States, 15 Cl.Ct. 304, 313 (1988); Lambert v. United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 303, 305, aff'd, 746 F.2d 1490 (Fed.Cir.1984). 5 . Thus, for example, a plaintiff with a contract claim for an amount greater than $10,000 could not sue in the District Court under section 702 for specific performance of her contract; she may only sue in the Claims Court for appropriate relief. See H.R.Rep. No. 1656 at 12-13. In addition to the limitation on section 702, section 704 of the APA bars District Court jurisdiction over claims for which an adequate remedy in another court exists. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988). See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 904, 108 S.Ct. at 2737 (<HOLDING>). In Mitchell v. United States, 930 F.2d 893

    ### Response:
    holding that section 704 does not bar district court jurisdiction when the claims court does not provide a special and adequate review procedure for that claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a contention that the panel held that the Convention created rights enforceable by individuals. While we conclude that Faulder has not decided the question, we do not reach its merits because at best Flores’s assertion is Teague barred. The Supreme Court in Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1355, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998), noted that “[t]he Vienna [Convention ... arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest.” Thus, even the Court admits the possibility that the Vienna Convention does not confer such rights, and therefore, such a finding would create a new exclusionary rule, which is prohibited in a collateral habeas attack because of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). See Breard, 118 S.Ct. at 1354-55 (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. 1 . The petition was filed in the

    ### Response:
    holding that the vienna convention must be applied in conformity with the laws and regulations of the united states including the rules for federal habeas relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of agency apply); 4 White & Summers, Uniform, Commercial Code § 31-8 (6th ed. 2012) (“We are left, therefore, with several hundred years of cases and with the policy of Article 9 to help us define the word possession.”). The main focus of possession is whether the evi rts have stated that for per er. 447, 453-54, 370 A.2d 41, 45 (N.J.App.Div.1977) (finding that the secured party had possession of the hotel’s personalty when the debtor handed the hotel’s keys to the secured party). The Fourth Circuit has held that a “pledgee must either have actual exclusive possession of the property, or if it remains on the pledgor’s premises he must so separate and mark it as to give notice of his possession to the public.” In re Spanish-American Cork Prods. Co., 2 F.2d 203, 204 (4th Cir.1924) (<HOLDING>). The Fourth Circuit has further held that it

    ### Response:
    holding that signs placed on the inside of a leased space were not alone sufficient to provide notice of control of any part of the premises by anyone other than the debtor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fraction would entitle plaintiff to 25.22 percent of defendant’s military pension if defendant retired at,his earliest retirement date, 11 July 2003. In addition, the trial court properly attempted, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20.1(b) (3), to award plaintiff a prorated portion of defendant’s military pension, one-half of the marital portion of each of defendant’s pension payments, to be paid by defendant at the time he began receiving benefits. However, the trial court failed to determine that defendant’s military pension was a defined benefit retirement plan and failed to value it. We further note the record contained evidence regarding the value of defendant’s military pension as of the date of separation. Cf. Albritton v. Albritton, 109 N.C. App. 36, 426 S.E.2d 80 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse and remand the trial

    ### Response:
    holding the trial courts error in not valuing a retirement account was not prejudicial because plaintiff failed to provide evidence regarding the date of separation value
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    became very confused about the timing of her alleged abortion. An independent review of the record confirms that the petitioner’s awkward attempts to make sense out of a story that did not hang together cannot be lightly dismissed. A third basis for the IJ’s adverse credibility finding involves the high price that the petitioner paid to be smuggled into the United States. The IJ had difficulty believing that someone who complained so bitterly about a 5,000 yuan penalty could meet the $50,000 price tag set by the smugglers. The IJ also noted that this steep price, once paid, gave the petitioner a tremendous incentive to lie, if necessary, so as to remain in the United States. The petitioner attempts to debunk this reasoning as mere conjecture. See Cordero-Tre-jo, 40 F.3d at 487 (<HOLDING>). We regard it, however, as the drawing of a

    ### Response:
    holding that no deference is due when findings are based on inferences not grounded in the record or merely personal views of the immigration judge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from seeking to accelerate the rent, despite being in possession of the leased property. The same is not true regarding the annual maintenance fee. First, the acceleration clause does not mention the annual maintenance fee, only stating that “the Minimum Rent for the unexpired portion of the Term shall be accelerated... and shall become due and be paid upon the demand of [IMAX].” (Doc. 1, Ex. A at p. 11 of 26.) Thus, Plaintiff has no contractual claim to acceleration of the annual maintenance fee. Second, Plaintiff would be unjustly enriched if it were allowed to accelerate the annual maintenance fee where it is in possession of the IMAX system and cannot possibly have any future maintenance obligations to Defendant. See Mitchell v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff would essentially be paid for

    ### Response:
    holding that a party is unjustly enriched where under the circumstances it would be inequitable for the party to retain a benefit for which it has not provided value
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and fair evidentiary hearing are without merit. With regard to the questioning by the trial court, which Overton contends functioned as action from a “second prosecutor,” there was not any bias displayed by the trial court in favor of either the State or Overton. Instead, the court questioned witnesses to clarify certain points after both parties asked initial questions and also to gain further knowledge into background information with regard to the witnesses. As evidenced by the length of the evidentiary hearing, we conclude that the trial court’s refusal to rush through the evidentiary hearing and the decision to ask questions to ensure that all pertinent information was on the record helped facilitate a full and fair hearing here. See Sims v. State, 754 So.2d 657, 666 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the trial court elicited

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant was not deprived of a full and fair hearing on his postconviction motion by reasoning in part that the trial court set aside several days for the hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the circumstances attending claimant's departure from his job as bank teller, and the reference to his drinking on the job, what evidence there is on this issue suggests that claimant did occasionally decompensate in the work setting. 8 . These are: Organic mental disorders (§ 12.-02); Depressive syndrome (§ 12.04); Anxiety disorders (§ 12.06); Personality disorders (§ 12.08); Peripheral neuropathies (§ 11.14); Liver damage (§ 5.05); Pancreatitis (§ 5.08); and Seizures (§ 11.02 or 11.03). Proof that alcoholism, or any substance addiction disorder, has resulted in conditions that meet or equal any of these listings will establish that the substance addiction disorder is disabling at step three of the sequential evaluation process. But see In re Petition of Sullivan, 904 F.2d at 844-846 (<HOLDING>). 9 . In response to questioning by the AU, Dr.

    ### Response:
    holding that only the severity requirements of the crossreferenced mental impairments must be met while all of the requirements for the crossreferenced physical impairments must be met to prove alcoholism disabling at step three
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Basler, 239 S.W.3d 687, 690 (Mo.App. E.D.2007) (citing Beery v. Shinkle, 193 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Mo.App. W.D.2006)). This principle simply restates, of course, the criteria described in the first sentence of section 228.342. For this purpose, Mis souri courts have defined “strict necessity” as “ ‘the lack of a legally enforceable right to use a practicable way to and from a person’s land, either private or public.’” Id. (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Webb, 58 S.W.3d 903, 907 (Mo.App. S.D.2001)). Under this definition, if property has no physical access to a public road and no other legally enforceable right to use a practicable way to a public road (such as an express easement, for example), then strict necessity for a private road has been established. See, e.g., Beery, 193 S.W.3d at 441-42 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the parties stipulated that

    ### Response:
    holding that where an express easement created by agreement afforded a property owner a legally enforceable right of ingress and egress strict necessity under section 228342 is not established
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    challenge the results by showing errors in the machine or in the operator, or extraneous conditions affecting the results. Id. at 354, 857 P.2d at 406. Our decision in Guthrie did not undermine this rationale. See Guthrie, 202 Ariz. at 275, 43 P.3d at 603. ¶ 14 In any event, the practical difficulty that Defendant has identified in obtaining an independent breath sample is not sufficient to create a due process violation. A DUI suspect has a due process right to gather exculpatory evidence. See Smith v. Coda, 114 Ariz. 510, 512-13, 562 P.2d 390, 392-93 (App.1977). Due process, however, requires only that a defendant be given a “reasonable opportunity” to obtain exculpatory evidence. Van Herreweghe v. Burke ex rel. County of La Paz, 201 Ariz. 387, 390, ¶ 11, 36 P.3d 65, 68 (App.2001) (<HOLDING>). “Police officers are not required to take the

    ### Response:
    holding that dui defendants constitutional and statutory right to a reasonable opportunity to obtain exculpatory evidence does not require his immediate release from jail
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his complaint for declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of the term “disorderly conduct” contained in Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-601.314, § 9-17. We affirm the trial court’s ruling because the term is not vague or overbroad. See Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 799 So.2d 319, 319 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>); D.L.B. v. State, 707 So.2d 844, 845 (Fla. 2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the prohibition against fighting in fla admin code r 33601314  24 was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the business judgment rule. In view of the case law and the record we are unable to say that the district court abused its discretion. B. MONDSCHEIN’S CLAIM OF DEMAND FUTILITY Unlike Stepak; Mondschein did not make a demand upon the Board. Instead, Mondschein alleged that demand was futile and therefore excused. The district court rejected this argument and held that under Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767 (Del.1990), and Stotland v. GAF Corp., 469 A.2d 421 (Del.1983), Stepak’s demand precluded any Southern stockholder from prosecuting a demand other excused derivative suit based on the claims covered by the Stepak demand letter. The district court is not alone in its analysis. See Boeing Co. v. Shrontz, Del.Ch. (Civ. A. No. 11,278, April 20, 1992), 18 Del. J.Corp.L. 225, 237 (1993) (<HOLDING>). On appeal, Mondschein does not address the

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs cannot cover all the bases by having one shareholder make a demand and another allege demand futility spiegel requires shareholders to choose either to make demand or attempt to establish demand futility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    such a restrictive application could be given the case, the impact would likely be substantial. The range of time and offenses involved, and the size of our military forces underscore the effect of ret-roactivity on the administration of justice. The difficulties and dangers in reopening large numbers of such cases obviously argue with great force for prospective application of O’Callahan. In sum we are persuaded that the criteria under Supreme Court decisions justify and strongly call for limiting to prospective application the ruling in O’Callahan v. Parker. We agree with the view of the District Judges in these proceedings and those of the several courts that have reached a like conclusion. See Gosa v. Mayden, supra; Mercer and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269 (<HOLDING>). 9 . Alaska does provide for indictment by

    ### Response:
    holding that indigents have a right to a transcript on appeal as announced in griffin v illinois 351 us 12 76 sct 585 100 led 891 to be retroactive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    money or property utilized in the illegal sale of controlled substances. That section provides, in pertinent part: “(a) The following are subject to forfeiture: “(1) All controlled substances ... acquired in violation of any law of this state; “(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used or intended for use for the manufacturing, ... processing, delivering, importing or exporting any controlled substance in violation of any law of this state; “(4) All moneys ... furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of any law of this state; all proceeds traceable to such an exchange; and all moneys ... used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of any law of this st So.2d 151 (Ala.Civ.App.1992) (<HOLDING>); Adams v. State ex rel. Whetstone, supra

    ### Response:
    holding that forfeiture proceeding instituted more than seven months after property was seized did not meet the promptness requirement of  202  93c
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    permitted Williams's convictions despite a lack of sufficient evidence, the result of the trial is fundamentally unfair. Garner v. State, 550 N.E.2d 1309, 1312 (Ind. Ct.App.1990). The crux of Williams's allegation of ineffective assistance is identical to his allegation of fundamental error, that is, his convictions lacked sufficient evidentiary support. Generally, allegations of errors not raised on direct appeal are considered waived for purposes of post-conviction relief. Green v. State, 525 NE.2d 1260, 1261 (Ind.Ct.App.1988). However, conviction without sufficient evidence constitutes fundamental error, and fundamental error may be raised in a post-conviction proceeding, within the rules of post-conviction procedure. Id. See also Smith v. State, 559 N.E.2d 888 (Ind. Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). We therefore will examine, on the merits, the

    ### Response:
    holding that insufficiency of evidence is reviewable even in a postconviction setting
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and thus, on that basis, cannot be said to be within the scope of the assets transferred by the Asset Agreement. The majority recognizes this problem and states that “[a] possible reply” is that ICI “didn’t need the copyright itself, but just the right that [17 U.S.C. § 117] gave it — the right to modify the program for its own use.” Op. at 931. I agree that the right to modify the program is the only right “necessary” to its freight forwarding service and thus the only right necessarily conveyed by an asset transfer agreement that only transfers assets “necessary” to the business. 2. Although there is a strict requirement that the transfer of a copyright interest be in writing, the majority is correct when it states that “it does not follow as ITOFCA believes t 80, 285 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (<HOLDING>); Relational Design & Tech., Inc. v. Brock,

    ### Response:
    holding that agreement transferring  all right title and interest to all of its computer programs and software conveyed the copyright
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from the time of the damaged shipment until the time of the insurance payment. Because National Insurance, as subrogee, is only entitled to indemnity for its payment to Tabacalera, we believe that the district court did not err in computing prejudgment interest from the date that National Insurance paid Tabacalera’s claim. D. Simple Prejudgment Interest On cross-appeal, National Insurance also submits that the district court erred in awarding simple rather than compound prejudgment interest. As a general rule, the decision whether to award compound or simple prejudgment interest is left to the discretion of the trial court. See Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 437 (7th Cir.1989); EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dep’t, 80 F.3d 1086, 1098 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538,

    ### Response:
    holding in adea action that district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding compound rather than simple prejudgment interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    diversity jurisdiction over cases between aliens. More specifically, “diversity is lacking ... where the only parties are foreign entities, or where on one side there are citizens and aliens and on the opposite side there are only aliens.” Universal Licensing, 293 F.3d at 581. For corporate citizenship, the version of section 1332(c) that was in effect at the time this action was commenced read: “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006). State, with a capital “S,” clearly refers only to the States of the United States. The diversity statute repeatedly dis f Syria & Leb., No. 04 Civ. 5434(RJH), 2005 WL 39917, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2005) (<HOLDING>); Willems v. Barclays Bank D.C.O., 263 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    holding  1332c does not apply to a domestically incorporated corporation with its principal place of business abroad
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recovery under that section. We note that pre-SARA, Conrail could make a viable claim for contribution under § 107(a)(4)(B). As originally enacted, CERCLA lacked any express mechanism by which one party could recover from another for paying more than its pro rata share of the costs of a clean-up. See United Technologies v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir.1994). Courts filled this gap by interpreting § 107(a)(4)(B) as providing a private right of action by which a party, who had expended resources on cleanup efforts, could obtain contribution from others. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 n. 7, 114 S.Ct. at 1965 n. 7, 128 L.Ed.2d 797 (1994) (noting interpretation); United States v. New Castle County, 642 F.Supp. 1258, 1269 (D.Del.1986) (<HOLDING>). Until the passage of SARA in 1986, the

    ### Response:
    recognizing cause of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Leasing Corp., 699 F.2d 58, 61 (1st Cir.1983) (”[I]n case of doubt, an instrument is to be taken against the party that drew it”); ER Holdings, Inc. v. Norton Co., 735 F.Supp. 1094, 1100 (D.Mass.1990) (""Massachusetts law construes ambiguous contractual language against the drafter”)). This Court need not reach the issue before Judge Hillman. Even if the language were ambiguous as capable of the two meanings offered in Cromwell, the Gizas cannot rely on either as a rebuttal to the presumption of delivery where they did not testify with any assurance or consistency as to what they received, where they put it or what happened to it thereafter. 20 .The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling that Appellants had violated the MCCCDA by failing to provi 008, 1012 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>), with Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 762

    ### Response:
    holding that mere assertion of nonreceipt is not enough to raise a genuine issue of fact as to compliance with the regula tion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ramiro Camacho, Jr., a Nevada state pris acho failed to produce any evidence creating an issue of fact pertaining to the alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Jacobson, 50 F.3d at 1496 (affirming

    ### Response:
    holding that prisoner must show prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions to establish an eighth amendment violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issue. SCRA 1986, 12-216 (Cum.Supp.1995); see also State v. Casteneda, 97 N.M. 670, 674, 642 P.2d 1129, 1133 (Ct.App.1982). The trial court asked during closing argument whether the sole issue was the exigent circumstances question, and neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel corrected the court’s impression. After the trial court orally ruled in favor of the State on the exigent circumstances question, defense counsel asked to clarify several points. None of the matters sought to be clarified involved the pretext issue sought to be argued here, and counsel did not request that the trial court rule on this issue. Under these circumstances we hold that Defendants failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. Cf. State v. Montoya, 116 N.M. 297, 304, 861 P.2d 978, 985 (Ct.App.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 116 N.M. 364, 862 P.2d 1228

    ### Response:
    holding claim of pretextual purpose necessitates finding on factual issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contains a lengthy discussion — located in the section following Kendall’s discussion of recusal — explaining why Kendall had sua sponte concluded that Ford and Paris could not obtain a fair trial due to pre-trial publicity, despite the holding of this Court’s May 13, 2009 Opinion. Ford, 52 V.I. at 53-59. Thus, the July 7, 2009 Opinion itself provides strong evidence that Kendall’s stated reason for recusal was a pretext, in that Kendall continued to issue rulings in the matter — including in the same document in which he announced his recusal — despite claiming to have been biased against one of the parties. Under these circumstances, we find Kendall guilty of indirect criminal contempt through failure to comply with the May 13, 2009 Opinion and Order. See Palmer, 418 N.E.2d at 532 (<HOLDING>). D. Misbehaving in Official Transactions

    ### Response:
    holding trial judge in indirect criminal contempt for recusing himself to avoid applying decision he disagreed with
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the period required to replace it. Damages in Tort, supra § 37.54[1], at 166—67; McCormick, supra § 124. The general rule regarding damages occasioned by the total destruction of one’s motor vehicle has long been limited to recovery simply for the vehicle’s value at the time of destruction. The reason for this rule is not clear. It may be based upon the historical limitation contained in an action for trover at common law; or because plaintiff has the presumed ability to enter the marketplace with the sum awarded and purchase another product; or perhaps upon the theory that in recovering the full value of the vehicle as of the date of destruction, the owner has been made whole. Allanson v. Cummings, 81 A.D.2d 16, 439 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546-47 (1981) (citations and internal quotat 1962) (<HOLDING>). The rationale supporting this proposition is

    ### Response:
    holding that the court could not condone conditioning recovery on ones financial ability to hire another automobile because plaintiff would be denied compensation for his inconvenience resulting from the wrongful act of the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    683, 684-85 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ). Section 230 of the Texas Probate Code codifies the common law concept that the executor has a fiduciary duty to exercise reasonable care in the administration of the estate property. Tex. PROb.Code Ann. § 230 (“The executor or administrator shall take care of the property of the estate of his testator or intestate as a prudent man would take of his own property.”); see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 77 (2007) (stating that trustee has duty to administer the trust as a prudent person would). An independent executor’s fiduciary duty runs to the estate’s beneficiaries, and it arises from his status as trustee of the estate’s property. Human Soc’y of Austin, 531 S.W.2d at 577; see also Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 922-23 (Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the independent executor owes a legal

    ### Response:
    holding that relationship between executor and estates beneficiaries is one that gives rise to fiduciary duty as matter of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    700 F.2d 427, 429 (1st Cir.1983). In this case, the specificity of the indictment’s allegations “fairly [apprised] the defendant of the crimes with which he was charged,” Kimberlin, 18 F.3d at 1159, quoting Land v. United States, 177 F.2d 346, 348 (4th Cir.1949), and the date of the conspiracy was not a substantive element of the crime of conspiracy. Even if an improper variance had existed, it would not have impinged on Queen’s substantial rights. Furthermore, the district court’s decision not to give the defendant’s- offered limiting instructions to the jury was a reasonable exercise of its discretion. “A district court’s refusal to provide an th Cir.1993) (admitting testimony of defendant's prior extortionate acts to show motive, intent, and plan); Russell, 971 F.2d at 1106-07 (<HOLDING>). 4 . The archetype of this practice appears at

    ### Response:
    holding evidence of defendants extramarital affairs and discharge from the marine corps admissible to show motive in the murder of defendants wife
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 715 (5th Cir.1971) (same). In the section 3006A(e) context, we have remanded to the district court for adherence to the statute. Hamlet, 456 F.2d at 1285; Theriault, 440 F.2d at 715. However, the guarantees of section 3006A(e) are distinct in at least one important respect: the statute provides a defendant expert assistance for preparation for his trial, and provision of those statutory guarantees therefore takes on a constitutional dimension not present in collateral habeas corpus proceedings. Compare Theriault, 440 F.2d at 716-717 (Wisdom, J., concurring) (invoking indigent criminal defendant’s constitutional right to court-appointed experts to assist with defense) with Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2770, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The fact that there is no constitutional

    ### Response:
    holding that even capital prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel in habeas cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proposition that the imposition of principles of comparative negligence is an appropriate method for apportioning liability when the misrepresentation is only negligent. See Aztlan Lodge No. 1 v. Ruffner, 155 Ariz. 163, 745 P.2d 611 (1987) (court held jury should have been instructed on contributory-negligence theory in negligent-misrepresentation action by sellers against real estate broker and its agent); Darner Motor Sales Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388 (1984) (court held that question of contributory negligence is for the trier of fact and turns on the reasonableness of an insured’s failure to read the policy and his reliance on statements made by the agent); Robinson v. Poudre Valley Federal Credit Union, 654 P.2d 861 (Colo.Ct.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); McElroy v. Boise Cascade Corp., 632 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that contributorynegligence principles apply to recipient of a negligent misrepresentation and to negligence that results in pecuniary loss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    review by the municipality’s authorized policymakers,"" Id. at 127 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Rather, it refers to the plurality's earlier observation that ""[ajssuming applicable law” does not make the mayor's decisions reviewable by municipality's civil service commission, ""one would have to conclude that policy decisions made [] by the mayor ... would be attributable to the city itself.” Id. at 126 (plurality opinion). This is merely a common sense understanding of the word ""final.” 25 . A different way of stating the same point is to the extent an official is not monitored for compliance with ""merit and fitness” policies, the official is not actually ""constrained” by such polices for purposes of Praprotnik. See Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 448-49 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 26 . If

    ### Response:
    holding that in determining final policymaking authority the pertinent issue is not whether the official is hypothetically constrained by policies not of that officials making but whether such constraints are actually meaningful and citing melton to note that a city charters merit and fitness policy did not preclude an officials final policymaking authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opinion on remand that the superior court may have implicitly adjusted upward the valuation of the marital estate by the amount of the post-trial appreciation in the Snowy Owl property. (The superior court there stated that, “one solution is to re-divide the marital assets and give Kevin more of those assets, which primarily is the [Snowy Owl] house."") There is no indication that the superior court adjusted the valuation of any of the other assets comprising the marital estate to account for any post-trial appreciation. To the extent that the appreciation of the Snowy Owl property is attributable to Wendy’s post-trial expenditures of effort or money, it would be error to increase the valuation of the marital estate. See, e.g., Bousquet v. Bousquet, 731 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Alaska 1987) (<HOLDING>); Foster v. Foster 883 P.2d 397, 399 (Alaska

    ### Response:
    holding that assets acquired subsequent to separation are not considered marital property absent evidence that spouse used marital property to obtain them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    both the Code and the relevant regulations that allowed the double deduction at issue. In fact, Ilfeld itself suggests that it would give way to permissive regulations. See 292 U.S. at 68, 54 S.Ct. 596 (“There is nothing in the Act that purports to authorize double deduction of losses or in the regulations to suggest that the [IRS] construed any of its provisions to empower [the IRS] to prescribe a regulation that would 'permit consolidated returns to be made on the basis now claimed by [the parent].” (emphases added)). The deductions in Ilfeld violated the existing regulations, which was the basis of the decision. Id. at 67, 54 S.Ct. 596. Nor do any other Supreme Court cases make such a leap. See McLaughlin v. Pac. Lumber Co., 293 U.S. 351, 355-56, 55 S.Ct. 219, 79 L.Ed. 423 (1934) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that the claimed deductions were inconsistent with the governing statute where no onpoint regulations permitted the duplicative deductions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. The result of this balancing test, the Seventh Circuit concluded, is that an order damaging only an attorney’s professional reputation, while potentially a significant enough injury to satisfy the case or controversy requirements of Article III, is not a “final decision” for the purposes of § 1291 and, therefore, not appealable. Id.; Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 572, 573 (7th Cir.1984). The Seventh Circuit did, however, leave open the possibility that an attorney damaged by an order finding misconduct alone could seek relief by a writ of mandamus. Clark, 972 F.2d at 820. The Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits fall into the second category and both allow attorneys to appeal orders that find misconduct alone. Walker v. City of Mesquite, 129 F.3d 831, 832-33 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Sullivan v. Committee on Admissions and

    ### Response:
    holding that the importance of an attorneys professional reputation and the imperative to defend it when necessary obviates the need for a finding of monetary liability or other punishment as a requisite for the appeal of a court order finding professional misconduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1439 & n. 11 (1995) (""It is well known that some of the most insuperable barriers in the great race of competition are the result of government regulation.” (quoting United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 673 (9th Cir.1990) (quotation marks omitted))). 11 . See also Wash. Admin. Code §§ 246-310-010(58), -715(2). If a planning area's net need is negative, the Department may revoke existing certificates of need. See Wash. Admin. Code §§ 246-310-715(2), -755(a). 12 . At worst, capacity expansion, if motivated by a specific intent to monopolize with a dangerous probability of success, might be attempted monopolization under Sherman Act § 2, but that could not be decided on a facial challenge and thus could not warrant preemption. See Fisher, 475 U.S. at 270 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 1045 (<HOLDING>); Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 774-75, 104 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that an allegation of monopolization or attempted monopolization would go beyond the scope of the facial preemption challenge presented here
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    modification suit, does a trial court have jurisdiction and authority to order payment of attorney’s fees as additional child support? Under his first issue, Ross argues that in a modification suit in which the trial court does not order a party to pay a past-due child-support obligation, the trial court has no authority to order payment of attorney’s fees to a parent or amicus attorney as additional child support. The reasoning of the First Court of Appeals in In re Moers supports Ross’s argument. See 104 S.W.3d 609, 611-12 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Though he relies upon the In re Moers case, Ross acknowledges that this court declined to follow In re Moers and held to the contrary in Hardin v. Hardin. See 161 S.W.3d 14, 24-27 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) (<HOLDING>), judgm’t vacated, op. not withdrawn, No.

    ### Response:
    holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction may order one parent to pay the reasonable attorneys fees of the other parent as additional child support if the fees are necessaries for the benefit of the children
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 264 (D.C.Cir.1987) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. f(1982)). Therefore, the defendants could have included the affirmative defenses in their answer. But delay alone is not sufficient reason to deny a motion for leave to amend a pleading, and although the delay here is substantial, it must be weighed against the “time and judi ndants’ dispositive motions, taken alone, should fail because they incorporate affirmative defenses not set forth in their answer. See Harris, 126 F.3d at 345; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). But the fact that the defendants erred in filing their dispositive motion before seeking leave to amend their answer does not persuade the court to deny their motion for leave to file an amended answer. See Harris, 126 F.3d at 345 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, allowing the defendants to amend

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant could not raise affirmative defenses initially in its dispositive motion but remanding the case to the trial court to determine if leave to amend answer to incorporate affirmative defenses was appropriate so that the defendant could then properly raise those defenses in its dispositive motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because Shushan applies the analysis used for class actions brought under Rule 23, and because the Fifth Cir cuit has described Rule 23’s “opt out” procedure as fundamentally and irreconcilably different from § 216 (b)’s “opt in” proee-dure, see LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir.1975) (per curiam), most courts in this district follow the Lusardi approach. See Sandoz, 553 F.3d at 915 n. 2. See also Tolentino v. C & J Spec-Rent Services Inc., 716 F.Supp.2d 642, 646 (S.D.Tex.2010) (collecting cases). This court, therefore, will analyze plaintiffs motion using the Lusardi approach. At this initial state of the Lusardi approach, a plaintiff need only make a minimum showing to persuade the court to issue notice to potential class members. Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214 (<HOLDING>). In the absence of Fifth Circuit guidance on

    ### Response:
    recognizing that courts apply a fairly lenient standard at the initial stage of the analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been committed before Agent Faria intervened, Valencia-Vergara had the opportunity to proceed to trial, but chose to plead guilty, and he was represented during his plea and sentencing hearings by his attorney. Based on these considerations, Agent Faria’s conduct, though reprehensible, did not rise to the level of fundamental unfairness and outrageousness contemplated by this Court’s precedent. See id. at 868-69. Moreover, as the magistrate judge noted, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has reversed a conviction because of a failure to dismiss a case based on government misconduct, and this case is not one of the rare instances in which government conduct was so outrageous that it violated due process. See United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 385-87 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov.1981) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if Valencia-Vergara had shown

    ### Response:
    holding where 1 the government provided the defendant with all the necessary drugmaking materials 2 the government provided instructions on how to make the drugs and 3 the defendant sought out the materials and help from the undercover government agents the case set the outer limits to which the government may go in the quest to ferret out and prosecute crimes but the governments conduct did not rise to the level of a due process violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    considered the claim of the mother to be more analogous to a direct claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. As explained by the Court in Giardina, “the medical malpractice causing an infant stillbirth constitutes a tort against the parents, entailing the direct infliction of injury, their emotional distress and mental suffering, for which they are entitled to recover compensatory damages.” 111 N.J. at 413, 545 A.2d 139. In reaching that conclusion the Court drew on cases involving so-called wrongful-birth and wrongful-life causes of action, which recognize direct claims by parents for the infliction of emotional distress from negligent advice or genetic counselling in anticipation of or during pregnancy, see, e.g., Procanik v. Cilio, 97 N.J. 339, 352, 478 A.2d 755 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 63-64, 432

    ### Response:
    holding that family could assert claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against doctor who negligently interpreted a german measles test thereby depriving parents of opportunity to consider terminating pregnancy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in order to increase the attendance and contributions of out-of-state parishioners, it drew members from three states, it paid salaries, it hosted gospel concerts featuring out-of-state talent for which it requested donations, and it owned several vehicles. Id. at 234-35. On this basis, we concluded that “[t]he church’s interstate connections were direct, regular, and substantial.” Id. at 234. Other courts have similarly found churches to affect interstate commerce where the church has some active commercial connection. See United States v. Terry, 257 F.3d 366, 369-70 (4th Cir.2001) (finding that a church daycare center “was actively engaged in commercial activity” because it provided childcare services for payment); United States v. Grassie, 237 F.3d 1199, 1209 n. 7 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Churches are not the-only buildings that we

    ### Response:
    holding that a mormon church in rural new mexico affected interstate commerce because the revenues of the church and the tithed incomes goods and services of church members flowed across state lines for distribution by the churchs headquarters in salt lake city
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Bell, 833 F.2d 272, 277 (11th Cir.1987) (finding that although federal authorities were highly involved in the defendant’s initial arrest, “it was only after the federal indictment ... that the clock under the Speedy Trial Act began running”). Mr. Bocanegra argues that because the agents that led the investigation and arrested him were federal officials, his arrest was in effect a federal arrest. This circuit’s precedent, however, is contrary to Mr. Bocanegra’s argument given the factual findings of the district court. “[I]f one is held by state officers on a state charge and subsequently turned over to federal authorities for federal prosecution, the starting date for purposes of the Act is the date that the defendant is delivered into federal custody.” Shahryar, 719 F.2d at 1525 (<HOLDING>). That a defendant’s arrest is effected by

    ### Response:
    holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (V.I. 2008)). Having reviewed the magistrate’s order and the record, we agree with the Superior Court that the magistrate did not commit clear error in his determination of actual notice. To show that the opposing party received actual notice, a party is not required to prove that any particular form, such as personal service by a process server or service by mail, was used. See Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 491 (permitting actual notice to be given by “ ‘mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice.’ ”) (quoting Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800). In the present context, the critical issue under Tulsa is whether or not the claimants had actual knowledge of the creation and pendency of the estate, not the form the notice took. See In re Estate of Sheridan, 117 P.3d 39, 41 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (<HOLDING>). The magistrate rested his determination that

    ### Response:
    holding that despite a lack of any formal notice tulsa requirement was satisfied by a showing that because the creditor was also the executor of the estate the creditor had actual notice of the pendency of the estate proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we affirm the trial court’s decision, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 . The trial court noted that the detective asked Arroya whether or not she needed a kleenex, something to drink, and even whether she wanted an opportunity to smoke. Additionally, the court found, based its on review of the entire interrogation, that the detective had not used “unscrupulous techniques.” 2 . The law has developed differently in the area of a request for counsel. Building on a distinction first articulated in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602, the Supreme Court provides greater procedural safeguards for the right to counsel than for the right to remain silent. Compare Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>) with Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 & n. 10, 96 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that once the right to counsel is invoked custodial interrogation must cease until the suspects attorney is present
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    'genuine' means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party [and] 'material' means that the fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law""). 13 . Leonard v. General Motors Corp. (In re Headquarters Dodge), 13 F.3d 674, 679 (3d Cir.1993) (""A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder [sic] could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant.”). See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (""Where the record taken as a whole co pital), 213 B.R. 509, 516 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1997), aff'd, 181 F.3d 103, 1999 WL 313768 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). 49 . Notably, before the March and April 2007

    ### Response:
    holding that payments made 25 days after the average were within the ordinary course of dealings but payments made 50 days after the average were not
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    she was qualified for the positions which became available in March and no circumstantial evidence indicating that Kelly Services’s failure to offer these positions to her was related to her jury service. Because three months passed between Boutwell’s jury service in December and the alleged failure to offer her an available position in March, the two events are not “proximate” and there is, therefore, no inference that the two events are connected. See Hatch, - So.3d at -, 2009 WL 1716967 at *5. Furthermore, although the evidence indicates that Kelly Services was aware of Boutwell’s service on a jury, this evidence alone is not sufficient to demonstrate that her service was the sole motivating factor in the decision to not offer one of the Yutaka positions to her. Id. at -, *6 (<HOLDING>). Evidence indicating that three months after

    ### Response:
    holding that the fact that employer had knowledge of the employees protected activity was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation where the timing of the discharge was not proximate to the protected activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    idea’ of the ‘characteristics’ of the product.” Black & Decker, 944 F.Supp. at 225 (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir.1976)). No exercise of the imagination is necessary to perceive that PowerCheck enables a consumer to check, or verify, the power in the battery. See Thompson Med. Co., 753 F.2d at 216. Indeed, as noted above, in 1981, Anderson registered POW-R-CHEK as a mark, and four other companies are presently marketing products with a power verification feature called “power check.” The use of the identical term by several companies to describe diverse products with a power-verification feature supports the Court’s conclusion that the term PowerCheck is descriptive and thus not particularly distinctive. See Estee Lauder, 108 F.3d at 1511 (<HOLDING>). As the Second Circuit has noted, “[t]he

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts finding of distinctiveness of mark 100 used in respect to facial moisturizer was undermined by the trial evidence that there were approximately 70 trademark registrations and pending applications for registration or renewal that incorporated the term 100 some of which were for cosmetic products
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that permits us to review the constitutionality of the provision in question. Accordingly, even though Ohms did not challenge the constitutionality of seetion 78-3-31 below, we nonetheless address this argument on appeal. Our analysis of the constitutionality of section 78-3-31 begins with the premise that “statutes stitutionality of a given statute is made, the said statute must be examined to determine if it is unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied. See, e.g., In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Court No. CS-1, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988); Wells v. Children’s Aid Soc’y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984); Ellis v. Social Servs. Dep’t of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Utah 1980). The statute at issue in th 116 (Utah 1970) (<HOLDING>); accord State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 916

    ### Response:
    holding that utah supreme court cannot delegate its duty to discipline an erring attorney to others
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that “[d]is-missal of the underlying bankruptcy proceeding may indicate that no case or controversy remains with respect to issues directly involving the reorganization of the estate....” Dahlquist v. First Nat’l Bank (In re Dahlquist), 751 F.2d 295 (8th Cir.1985); see also Spacek v. Thomen (In re Universal Farming Indus.), 873 F.2d 1334, 1335 (9th Cir.1989) (“When the issue being litigated directly involves the debt- or’s reorganization, the case is mooted by the dismissal of the bankruptcy.”). We believe that the issue before-this court is directly related to OSI’s reorganization. The purpose of this appeal is to obtain a ruling that allows OSI to challenge the propriety of the bankruptcy court’s order lifting the automatic stay. In Chapter 11 bankruptci 100 (Bankr. 9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Let an appropriate order of dismissal be

    ### Response:
    holding that an appeal challenging a bankruptcy court order approving a foreclosure sale became moot upon dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or motion is made for a rehearing of such decision, the decision of the appeals examiner shall become final. 9 . 078. WORK, NATURE OF. Every claimant has the right to restrict his availability to suitable work. I.D.A.P.A. 09.01.30 (1994). 02. Suitable Work. A claimant who customarily works either inside or outside may restrict his availability for a reasonable time to that type of work for which he is best suited and shall not be denied benefits. 073.01. Prospects for Work. A claimant unemployed for a long period of time shall be expected to lower his expectations for employment and become available for work which may not have been previously considered suitable. I.D.A.P.A. 09.01.30 (1994). See also, Guillard v. Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 647, 652, 603 P.2d 981, 986 (1979) (<HOLDING>). (Citing Bayly Mfg. Co. v. Department of

    ### Response:
    holding that work which may be deemed unsuitable at the inception of claimants unemployment and for a reasonable time thereafter may thereafter become suitable work when consideration is given to the length of unemployment and the prospects of obtaining customary work at claimants prior earning capacity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ‘the crime charged [in the indictment] was substantially altered at trial, so that it was impossible to know whether the grand jury would have indicted for the crime actually proved.’ ” United States v. Adamson, 291 F.3d 606, 615 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Von Stoll, 726 F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir.1984)). Here, there was no constructive amendment of the indictment. Swaid’s conviction for ITSP was not substantially altered from the charged crime. Nor did the facts, as alleged in the indictment, materially vary from the evidence adduced at trial. The government evidence concerning “Mark Hansen,” another source of stolen merchandise, constituted nothing more than a single divergence and did not result in any material change in the complex of facts. Cf. Von Stoll, 726 F.2d at 587 (<HOLDING>). Thus, there was no constructive amendment of

    ### Response:
    holding that the identity of a defrauded person under 18 usc  2814 is irrelevant and did not materially alter the complex of facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the defendants here, but rather it applies through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). 4 . For example, Fox's brief opposing summary judgment in the district court stated that ""Plaintiff has never based his [42 U.S.C. § 1983] claim on the original, August 17, 1993, seizure of his license.” A 21, 1991 WL 268661, *3 (N.D.Ill.Dec.4, 1991) (rejecting such a Fourth Amendment claim), aff'd without reaching this issue, 980 F.2d 733, 1992 WL 348883 (7th Cir.1992) (unpublished order). In addition, the district court found that two unpublished opinions of this circuit suggest that claims similar to the one made by Fox here are cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. See Bush v. Banks, Nos. 95-6370, 96-5015, 1996 WL 668551 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Eaton v. Farmer, No. 93-6305, 1994 WL 151336

    ### Response:
    holding that allegations that a seized vehicle was improperly retained and damaged state claims of a denial of due process and right to be free from unreasonable seizure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requests for leave to amend. In deciding whether to permit an amendment, a district court may consider factors such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously! allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). We conclude that the district court gave Rogers sufficient prior opportunity to plead his best case and amend his complaint, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Rogers’s case without permitting Rogers to file a third complaint. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Adrian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 363 F.3d 398, 403-04 (5th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to file a third amended complaint where the plaintiff had already been given opportunities to amend and did not indicate what additional facts he could plead to correct the deficiencies in his complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    318-19 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1991) (awarding $250,000.00 in punitive damages where petitioners acted willfully and maliciously); In re Camelot, Inc., 25 B.R. at 869 (assessing $1,000.00 in punitive damages where petitioners “vindictively” filed their petition). Also, the court should attempt to further overriding bankruptcy policies while ensuring that the penalty is not “unduly harsh.” In re Atlas Mach, and Iron Works, Inc., 190 B.R. at 805 (quoting In re Fox Island Square, 106 B.R. 962, 968 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1989)). The court should take into account the petitioner’s financial situation in determining what amount of sanctions will further the purposes served by punitive damage awards. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In these cases, Petitioners chose not to

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants wealth is a traditional and acceptable factor where calculating punitive damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed” under the FCA. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (amended 2009). The Sixth Circuit has held that “protected activity” should be interpreted broadly. United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 944 (6th Cir.1997) (McKenzie I) (citation omitted). Indeed, Plaintiff need not have actually filed suit under the FCA to receive whistleblower protection accorded by Section 3730(h). Rather, in accordance with other circuits, the Sixth Circuit has interpreted “in furtherance of’ to require that Plaintiff be “investigating matters that reasonably could lead to a viable False Claims Act case.” Id.; see also Dookeran v. Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 281 F.3d 105, 108 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) Here, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff “in

    ### Response:
    holding there must at least be a distinct possibility that a viable fca action could be filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was maritime in nature. Id. at 738, 81 S.Ct. 886. This was true even though the right the seaman gave up may have been “erroneousf ].” Id. In this case, Great Eastern’s right to refuse delivery of the cargo without presentation of the bills of lading is not contested. It is clear from the language of the LOI itself that its purpose was to induce Great Eastern into discharging the cargo without the presentation of the bills of lading. Binani’s “consideration” (Compl. Ex. 2 at 1) on the contract was a promise to pay indemnity; Great Eastern’s consideration was the prompt discharge of the cargo, a quintessentially maritime service, in forbearance of its right to demand the bills of lading on discharge, a quintessentially maritime right. Cf. Norfolk S. Ry., 543 U.S. at 27, 125 S.Ct. 385 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the LOI was maritime in nature.

    ### Response:
    holding that bills of lading are maritime contracts so long as they require substantial carriage of goods by sea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because Thompson’s car was within the protected curtilage of his home — parked in his attached garage. (See R.189, at 10-12.) “The decision to impound an automobile, unless it is supported by probable cause of criminal activity, is only valid if the arrestee is otherwise unable to provide for the speedy and efficient removal of the car from public thoroughfares or parking lots.” Duguay, 93 F.3d at 351. 1. The Officers Had Probable Cause to Believe Thompson’s Car Was Subject to Seizure and Forfeiture Defendants claim they are entitled to summary judgment because Thompson’s vehicle was used in commission of an offense — aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer — that subjected his vehicle to forfeiture. See United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1241-42 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Police may seize vehicles without a warrant

    ### Response:
    holding that a vehicle may be seized without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that it is subject to forfeiture
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 406, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 52. NCAIG raises a separate issue, barely addressed by Maxum, as to whether Max-um breached its duty to defend Mulberry in the underlying litigation. The Policy states: We will have the right and duty to defend any “insured” against any “suit” seeking those “damages”. However, we will have no duty to defend an “insured” against any “suit” seeking “damages” for a “wrongful act” to which this insurance does not apply. In NCAIG’s view, because the Maxum failed to show that Mulberry subjectively believed that the issuance of the fraudulent insurance would result in a claim, it also breached its duty to defend the litigation, and is therefore liable for the default judgment. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal.2d 263, 279, 54 Cal.Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (1966) (<HOLDING>). The next inquiry is whether the knowledge of

    ### Response:
    holding that insurance companies that breach the duty to defend to be liable on any subsequent judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (W.D.Mo. Sept. 14, 1999) (same); Greer v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 97-1138 (W.D.Mo. Sept. 14, 1999) (same); McClain v. Shelter General Ins. Co., No. 97-1139 (W.D.Mo. Sept. 14, 1999) (same); McClain v. American Economy Ins. Co., No. 97-1019 (W.D.Mo. Sept. 14, 1999) (same); Canady v. Federal Ins. Co., No. 97-1141 (W.D.Mo. Sept. 14, 1999) (same); Canady v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co., No. 97-1121 (W.D.Mo. Sept. 14, 1999) (same); Hammonds v. Prudential Property & Cas. Co., No. 97-1016 (W.D.Mo. Sept. 14, 1999) (same). 6 . Appellants contend that the All Writs Act does not provide an independent basis for removal to federal court, relying primarily on precedent from other circuits to support their argument. See, e.g., Pacheco de Perez v. AT & T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1379 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). However, those cases do not deal with the

    ### Response:
    holding that the all writs act does not provide an independent basis for supplemental federal jurisdiction in situations where federal jurisdiction is otherwise wholly lacking
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recanted his testimony to some extent, stating that it was hard to tell whether the riders and/or the truck had remained on their respective sides of the road. Another rider testified at his deposition that he was certain that Mr. Konitshek’s SUV extended beyond the center line. Still another testified that the SUV certainly remained on its side of the road the entire time. For purposes of this appeal, we will assume the facts most favorable to Plaintiffs’ argument. 4 . Admittedly, there is no indication in Keller v. Albright, 1 F.Supp.2d 1279, that the plaintiff there argued that the Utah standard for granting summary judgment in a negligence claim should apply. 5 . Even if the defendants have some burden to establish that the race was run in accorda 570, 574-75 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>), with Macintosh v. Stoker Paving and Const.

    ### Response:
    holding that expert testimony was not necessary in a case involving allegations that a senior living center was negligent for failing to install a fire sprinkler system
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its consent to be bound by [an international agreement].). Secondarily, a treaty may be self-executing upon ratification. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314, 7 L.Ed. 415 (1829) (“Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land ... [it is regarded as] equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.”). When this is the case, the treaty acts in the same manner as an Act of Congress. See, e.g., Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 125 S.Ct. 2088, 2103, 161 L.Ed.2d 982 (2005) (O’Connor, J. dissenting) (noting that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was self-executing); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699, 108 S.Ct. 2104, 100 L.Ed.2d 722 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint

    ### Response:
    holding that the hague service convention is selfexecuting
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    repaid. Burnett also purchased a large quantity of drugs from Jer-abek that turned out to be of very low quality. Burnett severed his relationship with Jerabek after this. Rutland sold drugs and collected debts for Burnett. Although there was no evidence any of the coconspirators specifically stated they were targeting Jerabek to damage his business, Burnett did say while planning the robbery that he wanted what Jerabek owed him. The district court could have inferred from this evidence that one purpose of the robbery was to collect drug debts Jerabek owed Burnett. Rutland’s sole response to this evidence is to argue the robbery was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the drug conspiracy. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 188, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987) (<HOLDING>). He maintains that the drug conspirators

    ### Response:
    holding an individual who acts outside the scope of a conspiracy cannot bind his coconspirators
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Swansea (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 759, 763-65, 371 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (sewer rate classifications). We conclude that the trial court did not apply an incorrect standard in reviewing Chicago’s ordinance in the first instance. Because it is plaintiffs’ “heavy burden” to overcome the presumptive validity of the ordinance, it follows that they must also demonstrate that the rates charged them are discriminatory, unreasonable, or arbitrary, by a clear and affirmative showing. If it were Chicago’s burden to prove the reasonableness of its rates in the first instance, the presumptive validity of the ordinance would be nullified. Nevertheless, Chicago did produce affirmative evidence of the reasonableness of its rates. Cf. Bobrowicz v. City of Chicago (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 227, 522 N.E.2d 663 (<HOLDING>), appeal denied (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 570, 530

    ### Response:
    holding that chicagos 50 surcharge on water sales to nonresident consumers violated its common law duty not to charge unreasonable or discriminatory rates to those customers to whom the city had undertaken to provide water
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for a full evidentiary hearing in which extensive findings of fact would be made. Moreover, the court’s judgment on whether the reinitiation procedures in question are contumacious turns on legal analysis not on disputed issues of material facts. This conclusion is based on two realities. First, the facts that underlie the specific practice alleged to be contumacious are not controverted. The plaintiffs agree with the defendant that the union’s policy of charging fees and back dues for reinitiation is race neutral on its face. (Pl.’s Motion at 2). The absence of a dispute over the nature of the policy makes a full evidentiary hearing in which the court would conduct extensive findings of fact unnecessary. See Sassower v. Sheriff of Westchester Cnty., 824 F.2d 184, 190 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Agur v. Wilson, 498 F.2d 961, 965 (2d Cir.)

    ### Response:
    holding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing when parties submissions in contempt proceedings raise disputed issue of material fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Davis, 203 F.3d 627, 636 (9th Cir.2000). The pertinent part of § 2255 reads: “A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of(l) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” Id. The phrase “becomes final” is capable of at least two meanings. In this case, the district court interpreted “final” to mean the date the court of appeals affirms the judgment of conviction. Both parties contend on appeal, however, that a judgment is final only when the time for seeking certio-rari review has expired. This date is 90 days after entry of the court of appeals’ judgment. See Sup.Ct. R. 13. Our sister circuit courts have split over this issue. Compare Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) with Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565 (3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the oneyear period begins to run when the mandate of the court of appeals issues
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    That legislative inaction, in and of itself, is entitled to little weight is evident from a review of several decisions of this court in which we have overruled our own earlier statutory interpretations despite legislative inaction. See, e.g., Magoon, 75 Haw. at 185-86, 858 P.2d at 722-23 (explicitly overruling In re Application of Kaimuki Land Co., 35 Haw. 254 (1939), because it failed to correctly review and analyze the statutory estoppel language of Revised Laws of Hawai'i (RLH) 1935 § 5032); State v. Dow, 72 Haw. 56, 59-61, 806 P.2d 402, 404-05 (1991) (overruling in part State v. Wacker, 70 Haw. 332, 770 P.2d 420 (1989), because “the statutory analysis employed in Wacker [was] no longer applicable”); State v. Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 559-63, 799 P.2d 48, 52-54 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Association of Owners of Kukui Plaza v.

    ### Response:
    holding that rules 702 and 704 of the hawaii rules of evidence do not allow expert witnesses to opine as to the credibility of alleged child sex abuse victims and overruling state v kim 64 haw 598 645 p2d 1330 1982 to the extent that it held otherwise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    insurance contract [does] not impose a duty on the insurer to pay attorney’s fees in connection with the insured’s pursuit of the coverage issues.Generally, if the insured hires an attorney to represent him in coverage disputes, he will have to bear those costs himself.” Steptore v. Masco Constr. Co., 643 So.2d 1213, 1218 (La.1994); see Dowden v. Leebo’s Stores, Inc., 877 So.2d 353, 356 (La.Ct.App.2004) (“Generally, an insured can recover attorney fees associated with its defense of the underlying action, but not with its litigation of the coverage issue.”). Some Louisiana courts have, however, allowed for the imposition of attorney’s fees and penalties pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute §§ 22:658 and 22:1220. See, e.g., Credeur v. McCullough, 702 So.2d 985, 987 (La.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). But see, e.g., Howell v. Am. Cas. Co. of

    ### Response:
    holding that a thirdparty claimant could be awarded attorneys fees and penalties pursuant to  221220 because the insurers failure to defend was arbitrary and capricious
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Truck Lines, Inc., 314 S.C. 303, 304, 443 S.E.2d 906, 907 (1994). When the language of a court rule is clear and unambiguous, the court is obligated to follow its plain and ordinary meaning. Unless an extension is granted, a defendant must serve his answer within thirty days “after the service of the complaint upon him.” Rule 12(a), SCRCP. If a party has failed to “plead or otherwise defend as provided by [the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure] and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise,” the clerk of court will enter default. Rule 55(a), SCRCP. Entry of default is a ministerial act which a clerk is required to perform once default is made to appear by the affidavit of the moving party. See Thynes v. Lloyd, 294 S.C. 152, 153-54, 363 S.E.2d 122, 123 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Appellants initially argue the circuit court

    ### Response:
    holding that whether default was actually entered is of no consequence since the entry of default is a purely ministerial act which the clerk was required to perform once the default was made to appear by the affidavit of the moving party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    lacks the integrity and judgment to resist getting revenge in an immature and vicious manner. All of these implications go to Cody’s personal, rather than professional, traits. The alleged misconduct did not even occur while Cody was on the job, as it did in Sangston; Harris accused Cody of retaliating against the station not while he was an employee, but after (and apparently because of) his termination. This situation is not like the Illinois cases that have found defamation per se when a plaintiffs work or conduct while carrying out his employment-duties has been impugned. In some cases, personal integrity is so intertwined with job skills, that an attack upon it could constitute defamation per se. Kumaran v. Brotman, 247 Ill.App.3d 216, 186 Ill.Dec. 952, 617 N.E.2d 191, 199 (1993) (<HOLDING>). We do not believe, nor does Cody argue, that

    ### Response:
    holding that a newspaper article accusing a schoolteacher of filing scam lawsuits was defamatory per se because part of a teachers job is to set a good example and serve as a role model for students
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judicata because a court of competent jurisdiction previously signed an order denying expunction. The Department has assigned error only in these two respects. Notably, on appeal, the Department has not challenged any of the following: (1) the sufficiency of the notice the Department received of the hearing on Pinnock’s expunction petition, (2) the trial court’s action in granting the expunction petition without receiving any evidence at the expunction hearing, (3) any alleged failure by Pinnock to prove his entitlement to the expunction relief the trial court granted, or (4) the trial court’s signing of an “Agreed Order of Expunction,” despite the lack of any apparent indication that the Department had agreed to the order. See Texas Nat’l Bank v. Karnes, 717 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex.1986) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Patterson, No. 14-10-00943-CV, 2011

    ### Response:
    holding that the court of appeals may not reverse a trial courts judgment in the absence of properly assigned error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cited by defendants, but we highlight it more for its insightful language than its precedential value. The district court in Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F.Supp. 440 (S.D.Ga.1976), observed that “[d]efining public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.” When the case went up on appeal, the circuit court looked to the words of Justice Potter Stewart in remarking that “[although the public figure concept has eluded a truly working definition (footnote omitted), it falls within that class of legal abstractions where ‘I know it when I see it.’ ” Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir.1978) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1683, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurr n. 3 (10th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Of course it is absurd for Stephan to allege

    ### Response:
    recognizing that kansas supreme court would accept the final draft of the restatement second of torts  652e adopted in 1977
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hum. Res.Code Ann. § 36.113(b); Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-216.8. 121 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). 122 . United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F.Supp.2d 39, 46 (D.Mass.2001) (quoting United States ex rel. Walsh v. Eas e of an actual false claim is 'the sin qua non of a False Claims Act violation.’ "" (quoting Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1311)). 129 . Id. at 232. 130 . See id. 131 . Id.; see also Walsh, 98 F.Supp.2d at 147 (""Relator’s First Amended Complaint, in essence, sets out a methodology by which the vendors might have produced false invoices, which in turn could have led to false claims. Without citing a single false claim arising from an allegedly false invoice, Relator has not met even a bare-bones Rule 9(b) test.”). 132 . Karvelas, 360 d. 148 . See id. at 235; Walsh, 98 F.Supp.2d at 147 (<HOLDING>). 149 . See Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 235

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy rule 9b when his complaint did not cite one single false claim arising out of the defendants alleged methodology that may have produced false claim invoices
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    404 U.S. at 323, 92 S.Ct. 455). Referencing its preference for resolving issues of delay by relying upon statutes of limitations the United States Supreme Court stated: “ ‘The law has provided other mechanisms to guard against possible as distinguished from actual prejudice resulting from the passage of time between crime and arrest or charge.’ ” Jones, 94 F.3d at 906 (quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 455) (emphasis in original). Critically, as the Fourth Circuit recounted, “the courts of appeals have uniformly held that to obtain a dismissal under the Due Process Clause a defendant must establish that a pre-indictment delay actually prejudiced his defense .... ” Jones, 94 F.3d at 907 (emphasis in original); accord Wilson v. McCaughtry, 994 F.2d 1228, 1234 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). After reviewing the rulings of the various

    ### Response:
    holding that despite sixteenyear delay between crime and indictment defendant must demonstrate that he suffered actual and substantial prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Having determined that the district court’s sentencing calculations were based oh a proper interpretation of § 2F1.1(b)(1), we turn to the district court’s assessment of the amount of the intended loss. We find that the district court’s determination that Kipta intended to defraud First Chicago out of the entire $171,355.46 was not clearly erroneous. The fraudulent letter that Kipta used to back her deposits stated that she had -reserves of $800,000.00, an amount more than sufficient to cover the deposits into the First Chicago account. There was nothing to limit the amount of funds available for withdrawal, and the corresponding potential for loss by First Chicago, to less than the total amount deposited into the account. See United States v. Yusufu, 63 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Bonanno, 146 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the amount that a defendant made available to himself by way of fraudulent deposits demonstrated the amount of loss intended
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contract). Jolicoeur contemplates that an insurance administrator could, under appropriate circumstances, illicitly interfere with the contract of its principal. Like any other agent, an administrator could accomplish this feat by acting beyond the scope of its authority. See Kennett v. Marquis, 798 A.2d 416, 419 (R.I.2002) (per curiam) (“An agent, however, may be personally liable for unauthorized acts outside the scope of the agency[.]”); Brown v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217, 223 (Okla.Civ.App.2002) (remarking that an independent insurance adjuster could be liable for tortiously interfering with an insurance contract by acting beyond the scope of its authority from the insurer); see also Michelson v. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co., 808 F.2d 1005,1007-08 (3d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 225 (7th Cir.1983)

    ### Response:
    holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Engstrom pushed Hoffman away from the toilet. He reached into the toilet and retrieved a baggie. It was later determined the baggie contained crack cocaine. Corporal Engstrom testified he had participated in the execution of numerous search warrants where drugs were retrieved from toilets. He further testified that after seeing Hoffman standing over the toilet and flushing it, he entered the room because he feared she was destroying evidence. Investigator Geske also testified he thought Hoffman was destroying evidence and stated it was uncommon for a person to see him with a motel manager and then “immediately run into the room and flush the toilet.” The trial court ultimat L.Ed.2d 573 (1988); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 122, 124-5, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The circumstances may also include attempts

    ### Response:
    holding defendants unprovoked flight from area of heavy narcotic trafficking after noticing uniformed officers provided reasonable suspicion to detain and stating headlong flight wherever it occurs  is the consummate act of evasion it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sources on safety regarding the ventilation of an HC binder; review of Fuller’s MSDS; interviews with McCullock concerning her work area and the glue pot; background industrial experience with ventilation; and practical experience with fumes. Thus, his analysis went far beyond that of a layman. Woolley had both the practical experience and necessary academic training to testify whether McCullock was in the breathing zone of the glue fumes. The district court therefore did not err, let alone manifestly err, by admitting Woolley’s expert testimony. B. Dr. Fagelson As to Dr. Fagelson, Fuller cites Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1113 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912, 112 S.Ct. 1280, 117 L.Ed.2d 506 (1992), for the proposition that hol 5 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 734, 130

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court properly admitted expert testimony under daubert that was based on inter alia the doctors clinical experience and review of the medical records
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1993-NMSC-033, ¶ 4, 115 N.M. 573, 855 P.2d 562. We also look to the common law and to equity in determining public policy. {39} Other relevant statutes include the Small Loan Act, Sections 58-15-31 to -39, which regulates the small loan industry; the unconscionability clause of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Section 55-2-302; and the Money, Interest and Usury Act (Money Act), NMSA 1978, Sections 56-8-1 to -21 (1851, as amended through 2004), which sets a default interest rate of 15 percent for contracts where no interest rate is stated. Section 56-8-3. Because these statutes were enacted prior to the UPA, we can infer that the Legislature enacted the UPA with full knowledge of and in harmony with the public policy expressed by those statutes. See Schnedar, 1993-NMSC-033, ¶ 4 (<HOLDING>). {40} The Legislature enacted the Small Loan

    ### Response:
    holding that similar statutes should be harmonized and construed together when possible in a way that facilitates their operation and the achievement of their goals internal citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ROBERT M. DOW, JR., District Judge. I. Background In May 2011, KZF Development (KZF) and/or Dundee Partners (Dundee) removed approximately 180 trees from a 6.8 acre residential parcel in Northbrook, Illinois (the Site). Plaintiffs Robert and Sheryl Long allege that the tree removal c ycling Corp., 629 F.3d 387, 399-400 (4th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Plaintiff may only allege ongoing

    ### Response:
    holding that adequate notice is a mandatory precondition of a clean water act citizen suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    first part of claim two, Mr. Goodwin alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at a hearing on a motion to suppress a pretrial confession and at the trial on the charges. In the portion of claim two addressing the motion to suppress, Mr. Goodwin alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to research the effects of heroin withdrawal on an addict. This allegation is concluso-ry, and we need not address it further. As part of this portion of his second claim, Mr. Goodwin also asserted that his trial counsel failed to present the testimony of medical experts who had been subpoenaed and were waiting to testify. The postconviction court denied this part of claim two as facially insufficient, citing Leftwich v. State, 954 So.2d 714, 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Goodwin alleged that the potential

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the juvenile court. Although we find instructive the Supreme Court’s holding in Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962), cited by appellant, we conclude that holding does not require a different result. In Gallegos, the Court said that a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible only to the police. [Such a person] is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and ... is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefit of his constitutional rights. 370 U.S. at 54, 82 S.Ct. at 1212; see also Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601, 68 S.Ct. 302, 304, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948) (<HOLDING>). Gallegos is distinguishable from appellant’s

    ### Response:
    holding interrogation of fifteen year old without parent or attorney violated due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    forward an alternative theory that the rules stem from unlawful ""hub-and-spoke” conspiracies. See Stoumbos Prop. Compl. ¶ 53. Because we conclude that the proposed amended complaints allege a horizontal conspiracy, we do not reach the question of whether Plaintiffs’ alternative theories are tenable. 4 . As futility was the sole ground articulated by the District Court for denying the Plaintiffs’ motions to amend the judgment and to file amended complaints, we see no reason that the motions should not be granted on remand. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 181-82, 83 S.Ct. 227 (explaining that if ""the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits”); Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 672-73 (<HOLDING>). But we leave this discretionary decision to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that it may be appropriate to convert a judgment that dismisses a case into an order dismissing a complaint for statute of limitations purpose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    harm is unavailing—because the harm respondents seek to avoid is not certainly impending” and holding that “respondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending”); see also Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir.2011) (“[The plaintiffs’] alleged time and money expenditures to monitor their financial information do not establish standing, because costs incurred to watch for a speculative chain of future events based on hypothetical future criminal acts are no more ‘actual’ injuries than the alleged ‘increased risk of injury* which forms the basis for [the plaintiffs’] claims.”); Crisafulli v. Amertias Life Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-5937, 2015 WL 1969176 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2015) (<HOLDING>); In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff may not rely on expenses for identity theft protection as a basis for standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court’s use of the disjunctive in defining the relationship requirement in H.J. Inc. “suggests that the Court meant to craft a broad test of relatedness”). Applying the test set forth in H.J. Inc., the court concludes that the first indictment clearly contains sufficient facts to satisfy the relationship requirement. The indictment alleges that the defendant committed all of the predicate acts of criminal activity charged in the indictment, and that he misused his position as Sheriff to engage in each of the predicate acts. Thus, the predicate acts shared a common “participant” (the defendant) and a common “method[] of commission” (abuse of the defendant’s power as Sheriff). H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240, 109 S.Ct. 2893; see also United States v. Hively, 437 F.3d 752, 762 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lovin, 2007 WL 167454, at

    ### Response:
    holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish a pattern of racketeering where inter alia the predicate acts of mail fraud shared a common participant the defendant an elected state prosecutor and a common method of commission abuse of the defendants power as prosecuting attorney
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    There was nothing particularly horrific about the admitted evidence to indicate that the jury would have based its verdict on such emotional considerations. See Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984. Moreover, any prejudicial effect the evidence may have had was outweighed by its highly probative value concerning the very elements of the crime charged which Downs disputed-knowledge and intent. See State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, ¶ 35, 61 P.3d 1019. The fact that she was living in a house where police had observed activity consistent with drug trafficking and executed a search warrant that yielded controlled substances and drug paraphernalia provided context and made her claim of ignorance about the pink baggie in her pocket considerably less believable. See State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ¶ 24, 25 P.3d 985 (<HOLDING>); cf. Johnson, 784 P.2d at 1141 (""The

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion under rule 403 by allowing evidence that provided background for the crime charged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hindered, delayed, or defrauded) to be clearly and utterly void, frustrate and of no effect, any pretense, color, feigned consideration, expressing of use, or any other matter or thing to the contrary notwithstanding. S.C.Code Ann. § 27-23-10(A). 1. Cash Transfers May Be Voided under The Statute of Elizabeth Ross contends that cash transfers are not covered by the Statute of Elizabeth and, therefore, that the transfers to the Ross Shareholders and Directors are not voidable. Conveyances of cash are, admittedly, not expressly referenced in the Statute of Elizabeth. S.C.Code Ann. § 27-23-10(A). However, the South Carolina Supreme Court does not view the listing of various specific types of property in the statute as prohibitive. See Avery v. Wilson, 47 S.C. 78, 25 S.E. 286, 294 (1896) (<HOLDING>). In Fabrica la Estrella S.A. de C.V. v. Banda,

    ### Response:
    holding that the omission from the statute of elizabeth as then written of the words goods and chattels did not enable debtors to practice frauds as to goods and chattels any more than they could as to any other property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    omitted). However, there must be “some but not precise factual correspondence” between the relevant precedents and the conduct at issue. Id. (citations omitted). Officials are expected to “apply general, well-developed legal principles.” Id. (citation omitted). The acts complained of in this case which relate to the diet issue occurred between July 18, 1992 and February 24, 1994. Case law prior to July 18, 1992 reveals that courts had found that inmates have a right, in general, to sufficient food to sustain them in satisfactory health consistent with their religious beliefs. See, e.g., Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46 (7th Cir.1990) (reversing summary judgment for defendants where Muslim in disciplinary segregation denied non-pork diet); Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Prior to July 1992, however, courts had also

    ### Response:
    holding orthodox jewish inmates are entitled to a kosher diet
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be a conviction or impose any civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from a conviction for a crime.” (Emphasis added.) Additionally, recognizing that juvenile adjudications are “quasi-criminal in nature” necessarily demonstrates that juvenile adjudications are, in fact, not criminal. Indeed, Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “quasi” as: “Seemingly but not actually; in some sense or degree; resembling; nearly.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1363 (9th ed.2Q09) (emphasis added). Thus, although it. is correct to characterize juvenile-delinquency proceedings as “quasi-criminal in nature,”- such a characterization does not mandate a finding that a juvenile adjudication is the functional equivalent of a criminal conviction. See also Jennings v. State, 384 So.2d 104, 105 (Ala.1980) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, under Rule 32.1, I cannot

    ### Response:
    recognizing that our juvenile statute removes juveniles who have committed a crime from the jurisdiction of the criminaljustice system and establishes an entirely separate system to minister to them a system whose aim is rehabilitative rather than retributive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the absence of such relationships or when the circumstances of a particular case do not suggest a duty of protection or a duty to control, then “the evidentiary hurdle is higher” and the risk of the criminal act must be precisely shown. Workman, 320 F.3d at 264. The rationale for lessening the requirement of heightened foreseeability in cases involving a special relationship between the parties is that “the ability of one of the parties to provide for his own protection has been limited in some way by his submission to the control of the other,” and, therefore, “a duty should be imposed upon the one possessing control (and thus the power to act) to take reasonable precautions to protect the other one from assaults by third parties which, at least l conduct of servant); id. § 318 (<HOLDING>); id. § 319 (recognizing duty of those in

    ### Response:
    recognizing duty of possessor of land or chattels to control conduct of licensee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the purposes of section 607A.6 were accomplished despite the fact the judge delegated to the court attendant the judge’s statutory responsibility to excuse potential jurors. See Coble, 301 N.W.2d at 237 (concluding that procedure allowing jury commissioners to excuse potential jurors, rather than judge as required by statute, did not frustrate legislative goals). -For this reason, Chidester is unable to shoyv that he has been prejudiced and therefore, the State’s violation of section 607A.6 was . not material as required by rule 17(3). See State v. Clift, 202 Kan. 512, 449 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1969) (refusing to reverse defendant’s conviction where he showed no prejudice from fact that bailiff excused potential jurors rather than the judge, as required by statute); Martel, 689 A.2d at 1330 (<HOLDING>). The trial court did not err in denying

    ### Response:
    holding statutory challenge to juryselection procedure failed in absence of showing of prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sovereign immunity. C. The Public Vessels Act, Suits in Admiralty Act, and Federal Tort Claims Act Each of these three Acts provides an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. The PVA waives sovereign immunity for suits for “damages caused by a public vessel of the United States.” 46 U.S.C. § 31102(a)(1). But the PVA contains a reciprocity requirement: A national of a foreign country may sue under the PVA only if the government of that foreign country would permit a United States national to bring the same suit in its courts. Id. § 31111. The SAA waives sovereign immunity, subject to some exceptions, in admiralty cases when a civil action could otherwise be brought if the United States were not a party. Id. § 30903(a); see Earles v. United States, 935 F.2d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the FTCA waives sovereign immunity

    ### Response:
    recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and misconduct on the part of the DEA, which falls under Rule 60(b)(3). Reed did not file his motion within one year after the 1992 order was entered, and accordingly, the motion was untimely. Moreover, Reed presented no new facts, arguments, or evidence to explain why he was unable to directly appeal the 1992 order or to justify the 13-year delay between the 1992 order and the 2005 Rule 60(b) motion. On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. AFFIRMED. 1 . Given our resolution of the Rule 60(b) issue, we discern no abuse of the district court’s discretion in its denial of Reed's Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend the order denying his Rule 60(b) motion. Cf. Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). 2 . In construing Reed's arguments, we have

    ### Response:
    holding that we will not overturn a denial of a rule 59 motion absent an abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Terry’s and Silverman’s hostile environment harassment of Faragher. IV.Standards of Review We review the district court’s finding of fact under the clearly erroneous standard of review. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). We review the district court’s conclusions of law and its application of law to facts de novo. Massaro v. Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass’n, Inc., 3 F.3d 1472, 1475 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 808, 115 S.Ct. 56, 130 L.Ed.2d 15 (1994). V.Contentions of the Parties Faragher contends that Terry’s and Silver-man’s positions as top lifeguard commanders make them prototypical agents of the City. Faragher argues that this status, combined with Terry’s and Silverman’s conduct, makes the -16 (9th Cir.1989)(<HOLDING>). This Circuit has concluded that in a pure

    ### Response:
    holding that employers are liable for failing to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which managementlevel employees knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    law. Central Wharf, 57 S.W. at 983. We believe this principle applies equally to Article 3, sec. 56. See JC-0101. Our conclusion that this constitutional provision does not limit the legislature’s inherent power to repeal laws is further supported by decisions from other states construing similar constitutional provisions. See People ex rel. Williamson v. Rinner, 52 Cal.App. 747, 199 P. 1066 (3 Dist.1921)(citing Central Wharf and numerous other cases with approval, Court held act which repealed special act creating school district did not violate constitutional provision against creation of local or special laws because the legislature’s inherent power to repeal is not expressly limited by the state constitution); People ex rel. Rogerson v. Crawley, 274 Ill. 139, 113 N.E. 119 (1916)(<HOLDING>); State v. Prather, 84 Kan. 169, 112 P. 829

    ### Response:
    holding that legislation which repealed the charter of the city of jacksonville did not violate constitutional provision prohibiting local or special laws which change the charter of a city
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nos. A97 484 984, A97 484 985, A97 849 320 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 14, 2002). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. Even assuming that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, to the extent that it was affirmed by the BIA, was marred by serious error and that the IJ abused her discretion by denying Huang a continuance, remand would be futile because Huang has not submitted any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that she suffered past persecution, had a well-founded fear of future persecution, or has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that her life or freedom would be threatened if she were returned to China. See Xiao Ji Chen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 161-62 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178

    ### Response:
    holding that a remand need not be ordered despite legal errors if remand would be futile
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rights Practices in Sri Lanka indicates that repercussions of the war continue to impact human rights in Sri Lanka, particularly for Tamils such as Sabaratnam. U.S. Dep’t of State, Sri Lanka, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2010 (2011), available at http://www. state.gov/g/dr]/rls/hrrpt/2010/sca/154486. htm; see also Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 179, 186 n. 5 (2d Cir.2006) (providing that the Court “may always exercise independent discretion to take judicial notice of any further changes in a country’s politics that occurred between the time of the BIA’s determination decision and [the Court’s] review”). Furthermore, on remand, the agency may decide that Sabaratnam is entitled to nunc pro tunc relief. See Xue Yong Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 665 & n. 13 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an award of nunc pro tunc may in an appropriate circumstance be granted as a means of rectifying error in immigration proceedings and that when a matter is adjudicated nunc pro tunc it is as if it were done as of the time that it should have been done
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ""above and beyond what is required by Tennessee law.” Turner, 2009 WL 426260, at *8. This statement of the Court of Criminal Appeals is only accurate in the post-waiver context. 11 . The court went on to state that ""[a]ssum-ing arguendo that [Tidwell]'s request in the case sub judice was equivocal, the interrogation following the equivocal request should have been strictly limited to a clarification of whether the defendant was in fact invoking his right to have counsel present during interrogation.” Id. at 387. This was the standard for all custodial interrogations in Tennessee prior to Davis and Saylor. It remains the standard for interactions between police and the accused prior to waiver of the Miranda rights. 12 . See, e.g., Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216, 1220-21 (7th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Braboy v. State, 130 Md.App. 220, 745 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding in light of davis that defendants statement i cant afford a lawyer but is there anyway i can get one lacked the clear implication of a present desire to consult with counsel and was ambiguous at best
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reduces the likelihood of confusion.” Sally Beauty Co., 304 F.3d at 975. Buyers typically exercise little care in selecting inexpensive items and making impulse purchases. Id. Conversely, expensive items are typically chosen more carefully. Id. “The relevant inquiry focuses on the consumer’s degree of care exercised at the time of purchase.” Id. The court envisions that a rational trier of fact might weigh this factor in favor of finding that consumers are likely to exercise a high degree of care under all of the circumstances here. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1230-31 (7th Cir.1993) (trademark infringement case involving apparel in which the court rejected the argument that the degree of care depends solely upon price); Jordache Enters., 828 F.2d at 1487 (<HOLDING>).' But, at this procedural juncture the court

    ### Response:
    holding the district courts finding following a bench trial that customers are likely to exercise a high degree of care in purchasing clothing that costs between fifteen and sixty dollars was not clearly erroneous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in a concrete factual circumstance. United States v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 1991) (Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. West, 748 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir.1984) and Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336, 1342 (D.C.Cir.1984) (assertion of privilege in general). 2 . Gillock advises that Florida law is relevant to the inquiry. But since the privilege asserted is a federal one which should be uniform in all of the states, Florida law cannot be dispositive of the issue. 3 . The circuit declined to extend the reasoning of this case, providing immunity to state legislators, to the legislative acts of a municipality. Berkley v. Common Council of City of Charleston, 63 F.3d 295 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The analogy to the law clerks in the

    ### Response:
    holding that schlitz was overruled to that extent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recounting Mr. Ruiz’s evidence that police “might or might not” help a person, like Mr. Ruiz, who has gang-related tattoos and who has been removed from the United States. R. at 215. Thus, the agency did not utilize a flawed willful-blindness standard. Finally, we turn to this court’s jurisdiction over Mr. Ruiz’s second and third CAT arguments. We conclude that those arguments are not reviewable as they attempt to raise issues of fact. Specifically, to determine the likelihood of governmental acquiescence to torture (Mr. Ruiz’s second argument), and whether the evidence as a whole shows Mr. Ruiz’s eligibility for CAT relief (his third argument), we would have to weigh the evidence in this case. The criminal-alien bar prevents that. See Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>); Gallimore, 715 F.3d at 690 (observing that

    ### Response:
    holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien established that he will more likely than not be tortured if  removed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not waive personal jurisdiction because service had never been effectuated. Here, Myers was validly served, and to the extent valid service on Myers confers personal jurisdiction, Fisher is inapposite. More importantly, the issue of whether there is an invalid retroactive application of personal jurisdiction may involve other issues; for example, whether valid service by publication confers personal jurisdiction on the district court in the way that personal service might confer personal jurisdiction such that there is no retroactivity issue but instead, only a waiver issue. Myers did not cite Fisher or raise the issue of retroactive waiver of personal jurisdiction in either the district court or in its briefing, instead presenting the argument and authori 1138, 1140 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Because Myers’ general appearance did not

    ### Response:
    holding the notice of appearance was not a motion under rule 12b2 4 or 5 and therefore the filing of the notice constituted a voluntary appearance by the defendants in this action which was the equivalent of the service of the summons upon them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rendition of the services by the other party to the contract, constitutes a breach of contract, importing damages”) (citations omitted). Moreover, a determination as to whether activities were undertaken in good faith depends partly on an analysis of motive and should generally be made by a trier of fact. See, e.g., Carvel Corp. v. Diversified Mgmt. Group, Inc., 930 F.2d 228, 230 (2d Cir.1991) (party to contract claiming that other party to contract “unjustifiably frustrated” its efforts to perform under agreement in breach of implied duty of good faith “is entitled to have the jury instructed as to his claims and theories of law if supported by the evidence and brought to the attention of the court”); Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 493, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122, 128, 335 N.E.2d 334 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Here, defendants refused to certify a

    ### Response:
    holding that it is appropriate for determinations as to whether the activities of defendants were undertaken in good faith for a legitimate corporate purpose to go to the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    For each of those factors, plaintiffs rely on the survey evidence presented by their expert William Neal. For the reasons set forth above and below, the Court finds Mr. Neal’s testimony is not persuasive on this critical issue. 2. Plaintiffs’ Survey Evidence is Unpersuasive a. The Legal Standard Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the Court must ensure that expert testimony “is not only relevant, but reliable.” See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Daubert and Kumho are codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The Daubert standard applies to survey evidence. See, e.g., The Sports Authority, Inc. v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 965 F.Supp. 925, 933 (E.D.Mich.1997) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Defendant’s expert, Dr.

    ### Response:
    holding that tjhe proponent of a consumer survey has the burden of establishing that it was conducted in accordance with accepted principles of survey research
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have transpired differently had the proper defendants been named. In these circumstances, and particularly where the party seeking to avoid claim preclusion was the plaintiff in the prior action and the sole source of the error in naming the incorrect party, res judicata should bar the plaintiff from gaining a second opportunity to litigate the very same claims, even where complete identity between the parties is lacking. See Cahill, 659 F.Supp. at 1123. To find otherwise would be to elevate form over substance in a manner inconsistent with the underlying goals of res judicata. See Amalgamated Sugar Co., 825 F.2d at 640 (“The doctrine of privity [in the res judicata context] ... is to be applied with flexibility.”); Expert Electric, Inc. v. Levine, 554 F.2d 1227, 1233 (2d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Although the Second Circuit has not, to the

    ### Response:
    holding that identity of parties for res judicata purposes is a determination of substance not mere form
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). Garces, of course, is not controlling precedent in this circuit. In any event, Garces itself recognizes no categorical prohibition on the consideration of a vacated Alford plea. See 611 F.3d at 1347 (observing that neither case law nor Fed. R.Evid. 410 “categorically bars the BIA from considering [defendant’s] withdrawn plea for any purpose”). Indeed, our court has summarily observed that § 1182(a)(2)(C) “places no qualification upon the basis of knowledge or belief that an alien has engaged in drug trafficking.” Neptune v. Holder, 346 Fed.Appx. 671, 673 (2d Cir.2009) (emphasis in original). The focus of concern in Garces was how much evidentiary weight the guilty plea could bear under the circumstances. See 611 F.3d at 1347; see also id. at 1347-49 (<HOLDING>). Although the BIA here noted the IJ’s

    ### Response:
    holding that plea carried little or no probative weight where record lacked indication that defendant made any admissions and florida law permitted defen dants to plead guilty without swearing to underlying facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ins. Co., Ltd., 512 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1975) (contract between seamen and vessel owner); T.N.T. Marine Serv., Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d 585, 587-88 (5th Cir.) (contract for repairs at shipyard), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847, 104 S.Ct. 151, 78 L.Ed.2d 141 (1983). Panek’s negligence claim that Concordia’s lax security caused the fire or that its failure to prevent the PROWLER from sinking is also maritime in nature. See Butler v. American Trawler Co., Inc., 887 F.2d 20, 21 (1st Cir.1989) (“[Tjhere is admiralty jurisdiction if the tort at issue 1) occurred on navigable waters and 2) bore a significant relation to traditional maritime activities.”); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268, 93 S.Ct. 493, 504, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the district court could have

    ### Response:
    holding that for the purposes of admiralty jurisdiction a tort occurs where the negligence takes effect not where the negligent act occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    battery claim where the jury failed to award any compensatory or nominal damages. (Dkt. 91 at 12 n.4) If the court’s ruling was error, it was invited error. Invited error precludes a court from “invoking the plain error rule and reversing.” United States v. Davis, 448 F.2d 560, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1971). Second, she contends that the district court plainly erred by instructing the jury that nominal damages are awarded in an amount that “you ... decide [is appropriate] under all of the facts and circumstances of the case.” (Dkt. 96 at 312.) Smith contends that Georgia law requires a jury to award, at a minimum, nominal damages for an intentional tort. See, e.g., Norton v. Holcomb, 285 Ga.App. 78, 646 S.E.2d 94, 101 (2007); see also Jeter v. Davis, 33 Ga.App. 733, 127 S.E. 898, 901 (1925) (<HOLDING>). Under Georgia law, compensatory or nominal

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a plaintiff would at least be entitled to nominal damages by proving the elements of an intentional tort
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this Court is required to directly review Clark’s sentence of death, though we believe that, if he is competent, he may knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to any further review of his case. {92} IT IS SO ORDERED. MINZNER, C.J., BACA, and MAES, JJ., concur. FRANCHINI, Justice (specially concurring). 1 . The State notes that Rosales, Scullion, and Redford did not deliberate Clark’s sentence: Rosales’ name was not reached during the selection process, Scullion was peremptorily stricken by Clark, and Redford was chosen as an alternate after Clark exhausted his peremptory challenges. However, the State also notes that this Court held that prejudice is presumed when a defendant uses a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause, and ) (<HOLDING>); Klokoc v. State, 589 So.2d 219, 221-22 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding that california has an important interest in accuracy and fairness in its criminal proceed ings that outweighs the defendants right to selfrepresentation where the defendant challenged the validity of californias statutory automatic appeal for death sentences by habeas petition contending that his incarceration on death row pending determination of the forced and unwanted appeal constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and violates his right to refuse counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    due process guarantees. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597; id. at 831, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (O’Connor, J., concurring). We hold that victim impact evidence, brief and narrowly presented, is admissible during the penalty phase of death penalty cases. {38} Further, we hold that victim impact testimony is consistent with the Capital Felony Sentencing Act following Payne because it constitutes additional evidence as to the circumstances of the crime under Section 31-20A-1(C) and NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2(B) (1979). Through Section 31-2CA-1(C), the Legislature requires the jury to consider evidence of the circumstance of the crime, and many other courts have also held that victim impact testimony is relevant for this purpose. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1219 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1007, 119 S.Ct. 1148,

    ### Response:
    holding that the effects of the victims deaths upon the families is part of the circumstances of the crime and is properly presented to the jury at the penalty phase
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Commission also seeks a declaratory judgment that Nebraska has violated its fiduciary and contractual obligations under the Compact, an accounting, the removal of Nebraska from further supervision of the licensing process and appointment of a third party to exercise supervision of the licensing process. 5 . ""No State shall, without the consent of Congress, ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power....” 6 . Entergy Arkansas, Inc., v. State of Nebraska, 68 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1097-98 (D.Neb.1999) (Commission’s suit was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment), aff'd, 241 F.3d 979, 987-88 (8th Cir.2001). 7 . The early history of the Compact Clause is also described in Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 597-602, 38 S.Ct. 400, 59 L.Ed. 1272 (1918) (<HOLDING>). See also United States Steel Corp. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the court had the power to enforce a 12 million judgment recommended by a special master and adopted by the court in favor of virginia and against west virginia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    much a part of the term as the antecedent fixed term,” Shackelford, 138 Ga. at 162, and that “the mere expiration of the term of the incumbent does not create a vacancy,” id. at 163. Appellant contends that, because the end of his four-year term did not create a vacancy and because his holdover term was an extension of his original term, he was entitled to the protection of the removal-for-cause provision of the City Charter. Appellant, however, overlooks the fundamental character of a holdover term, which is that the holdover official has the right to the position only until a successor is appointed. See OCGA § 45-2-4 (saying that holdover officers hold the office only “until [their] successors are commissioned and qualified”); Garcia v. Miller, 261 Ga. 531, 532 (408 SE2d 97) (1991) (<HOLDING>); Shackelford, 138 Ga. at 161-162 (saying that

    ### Response:
    holding that a holdover superior court judge could exercise the power of that office until his successor was qualified
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ongoing paid administrative leave, which deprives him of the ability to go to his workplace and advance his career, constitutes an adverse employment action. B. Timing of Attempted Return to Work Defendants next argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for retaliation under the FMLA because he did not attempt to return to work until five 569, 577 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (stating that “[a]n employer may not terminate an employee because he or she has taken the leave permitted by the statute. If the employee is not able to return to work after twelve weeks, however, the employer may terminate the employee.”) (quoting Katekovich v. Team Rent A Car, Inc., 36 Fed.Appx. 688, 690 (3d Cir. 2002)) (alteration in original); Dogmanits v. Capital Blue Cross, 413 F.Supp.2d 452, 462 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (<HOLDING>). In arguing that he was still protected by the

    ### Response:
    holding that employees who exceed the twelve weeks of fmla leave stand to lose their entitlement to job restoration even if their employers provide additional nonfmla leave
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a bank lo t know about his damages, his testimony is no evidence of damages. See Tate v. Goins, Underkofler, Crawford & Langdon, 24 S.W.3d 627, 635 (Tex.App.Dallas 2000, pet. denied) (“Damages must be ascertainable in some manner other than by mere speculation or conjecture, and by reference to some fairly definite standard, established experience, or direct inference from known facts.”). Further, even if we disregarded Dr. Cravens’s reb-anee upon Dr. Ruhter’s opinions and his “I don’t know” statements, his testimony would still be no evidence because it was entirely conclusory. See Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Justiss, 397 S.W.3d 150, 156-57 (Tex.2012) (confirming that conclu-sory or speculative testimony will not support a judgment); Holt Atherton Indus., Inc., 835 S.W.2d at 84 (<HOLDING>). We hold that Dr. Cravens’s testimony was no

    ### Response:
    holding that testimony of owner that he lost approximately 200000 in income was legally insufficient because it did not provide any indication of how the damages were determined
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when its owner has received a specific amount of money. See id. § 422.3, at 385. If article 5.2 is a production payment clause, it would not prevent NL from recovering additional damages if GHR breached the workover agreement. The owner or operator of a gas well must protect the interest of the owner of a production payment or an overriding royalty, particularly in a case such as this, in which the entire reimbursement for NL’s services was to come from the production payment. See id. § 420.1, at 356.1-356.2. If the owner or operator of the gas well does something to diminish the value of the mineral interest, the owner of a production payment or an overriding royalty can sue for damages. See, e.g., Whitson Co. v. Bluff Creek Oil Co., 156 Tex. 139, 146-47, 293 S.W.2d 488, 492 (1956) (<HOLDING>); Natural Gas Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 355

    ### Response:
    holding that the operator of an oil well was liable for damages to the owner of an overriding royalty after the operator negligently destroyed the well when it attempted to eliminate excess water that the well was producing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 10 . Neither Lindsey nor the State argues that Officer Kruse's actions do not constitute a search. The State's brief states, ""Arguably, this was not even a search,"" Appellee's Br. p. 19, but includes no further discussion on the point. Any such argument is thus waived for failure to present a cogent argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (""'The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning."") Lyles v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1035, 1050 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>), reh'g denied, trans. denied. 11 . Article 1,

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to develop a cogent argument waives the issue for appellate review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    May 1, 1995, so that deduction would only be available for systems certified for the 1993 assessment year or earlier, and phased out the deduction entirely after the 1997 assessment year. P.L. 25-1995, SEC. 15. One effect of this amendment was that an RRS first certified in 1994 would no longer receive any deduction. Winski first argues that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over its complaint because to exhaust its administrative remedies would be futile. The general rule is that a party is not entitled to judicial relief for an alleged or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. Austin Lakes Joint Venture v. Avon Util., Inc., 648 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Ind.1995). Well recognized exceptions to the general rule requiring exhaust .1996)(<HOLDING>). But see Bielski v. Zorn, 627 N.E.2d 880

    ### Response:
    holding that constitutional challenge to controlled substance excise tax must pursue administrative routes followed by appeal in tax court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . ""The Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico apply except as otherwise provided by local rule or by Court order. See, e.g., D.N.M.LR-Civ. 83.4(c). Lawyers appearing in this District must comply with the section for lawyers of ‘A Creed of Professionalism of the New Mexico Bench and Bar.’"" D.N.M.LR-Civ. 83.9. 2 . Mr. Bello asserts in his statement of issues that an attorney's ""respectful disagreement” with a district court cannot be a proper basis for discipline. Aplt. Br. at XVI. His brief, however, does not develop this particular argument, and in fact, makes no further reference to this contention. We therefore deem the argument waived. See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1202 n. 4 (10th Cir.2003)

    ### Response:
    recognizing that failure to develop claim on appeal constitutes waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    outstanding capias warrant for Plaintiff and the law prohibiting a search in such circumstances was not “clearly established” as required in Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269. For their argument that the law on this issue was unsettled at the time of the search, Defendants cite Malek v. Knightly, No. 94-2113, 56 F.3d 59, 1995 WL 338178, 1995 U.S.App. LEXIS 13924 (1st Cir.1995). In Malek, the First Circuit declined to determine “whether a bench warrant for civil contempt authorizes entry into the arrestee’s home to effect the arrest.” Id. at *2, 1995 U.S.App. LEXIS 13924 at *2. From this, Defendants argue that Defendant Bartels was conducting himself in an uncertain area of the law defining whether the capias entitled him to enter and search the P 172, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (U.S.1974) (<HOLDING>)). See also U.S. v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 69, n.

    ### Response:
    holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    law, a municipality may be held vicariously liable on state law claims asserted against individual officers under a theory of respondeat superior.” Marcano, 38 F.Supp.3d at 267; see also Bektic Marrero v. Goldberg, 850 F.Supp.2d 418, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The doctrine of respon-deat superior renders a master vicariously liable for a tort committed by his servant while acting within the scope of his employment.”). Thus, “an employer may be held liable when the employee acts negligently or intentionally, so long as the tortious conduct is generally foreseeable and a natural incident of the employment.” Judith M. v. Sisters of Charity Hosp., 93 N.Y.2d 932, 933, 693 N.Y.S.2d 67, 715 N.E.2d 95 (N.Y. 1999); see also Ramos v. Jake Realty Co., 21 A.D.3d 744, 801 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (N.Y. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, “New York courts have held

    ### Response:
    recognizing the doctrine reaches even intentional torts such as an employees alleged assault provided the tortious conduct at issue occurred within the scope of employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Workers Union of New Jersey, Local 827 v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 584 F.2d 31, 33-34 (3d Cir.1978); Burmah Oil Tankers v. Trisun Tankers, 687 F.Supp. 897, 899 (S.D.N.Y.1988); Hudson-Berlind Corp. v. Local 807, Affiliated with the Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 597 F.Supp. 1282, 1285-86 (E.D.N.Y.1984). Cases which have refused to apply issue preclusion to arbitrators have done so because the requirements for issue preclusion were not met. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union No. 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 765, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 2183, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983) (refusing to apply res judicata where arbitrator’s earlier award had exceeded his authority); McGraw Edison, Wagner Div. v. Local 1104, Int’l Union of Elec. Workers, 767 F.2d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that the arbitrator had the

    ### Response:
    holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Murphy’s reasoning was “cursory, meandering, and generally unclear.” Furthermore, Arbitrator Murphy, by failing to afford the Vana Award preclusive effect, created an anomaly, to the benefit of Smucker and the employee Rose would have bumped. However, the threshold for vacating an arbitration award is extremely high. Lat-timer-Stevens, 913 F.2d at 1169. “[Alb-sent a contractual provision to the contrary, the preclusive effect of an earlier arbitration award is to be determined by the arbitrator.” UAW v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548, 557 (6th Cir.2002). In our case law, we have consistently showed considerable reluctance to allow district courts to vacate arbitration awards. In light of Arbitrator Murphy’s explicit examination of the Vana A thyl Corp., 644 F.2d 1044, 1050 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). However, we have explicitly declined to adopt

    ### Response:
    holding that arbitrations may be subject to preclusion if their facts are substantially similar or not materially different
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    action.”); ORS 652.200 (providing for attorney fees for prosecution of an action for the collection of wages). As we understand plaintiff’s contention, it is that, because attorney fees were available and awarded in the underlying wage claim, under ORCP 68 A(l) fees are also available in the UFTA action, as an action to enforce the judgment on the wage claim and, therefore, as “services related to the prosecution or defense of’ the underlying wage claim. Plaintiff is correct that we have previously said that fees incurred in the collection of a judgment on a claim for which attorney fees are available are encompassed within “attorney fees,” as defined in ORCP 68 A(l) as fees “related to the prosecution or defense of an action.” See Holder v. Elg, 151 Or App 329, 332, 948 P2d 763 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. Jeppe, 77 Or App 685, 688, 713 P2d

    ### Response:
    recognizing a partys right to receive postjudgment fees for collection when the original judgment awarded that party attorney fees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 1512 — the criminal statute prohibiting tampering with a witness — and a criminal conspiracy in violation 18 U.S.C. § 371. Section 1512(b) specifically provides: Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to — (1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding; .... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. An “official proceeding,” as referred to in § 1512(b), is explicitly defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1515 to include a federal grand jury proceeding. Indeed, § 1512(b) applies to attempts to influence testimony in a broader range of proceedings than does t d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Plainly, by stating a claim under § 1985(2),

    ### Response:
    holding that witnesss testimony that he lied to investigators because his friend the defendant had asked him to do so was sufficient to sustain the defendants conviction under  1512b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding; (8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record: And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the circumstances r n any event. But cf. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 783, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Since we determine that Fairman did not

    ### Response:
    holding that an error pertaining to a mixed question of law and fact under state law is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if any of them believed that the Creditor Group was legally barred from ... bringing the Claims, (Answering Br. at 21.) We agree. To hold otherwise would allow a “claw back” of the sale itself because the value of the claims, without the ability to prosecute them, would be completely eliminated and a central feature of the transaction would thus be frustrated, through no apparent fault of the Creditor Group. See, e.g., Pieper, Inc. v. Land O’Lakes Farmland Feed, LLC, 390 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that defendant’s expressed principal purpose for entering an agreement was substantially frustrated by the failure of basic assumption of the agreement, defeating the commercial reason for contract); Unihealth v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 14 F.Supp.2d 623, 635 (D.N.J. 1998) (<HOLDING>); 30 Williston on Contracts § 77:95 (4th ed.

    ### Response:
    recognizing frustration of purpose where an unexpected regulatory change substantially frustrated the principal purpose of the agreement to the unfair advantage of one party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Attorney General chose to remove the case from state court, where it originated. In contrast, the elements required to show clear and voluntary action constituting a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity by a State defendant are absent here. Regarding MDOC, AmerenUE has not demonstrated that MDOC has the power to bring suit in federal court. Having this power is, under Lapides, a prerequisite for a state actor to have the ability to waive the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Even if MDOC has this power, it is clear that MDOC, which is a defendant in this lawsuit, has not voluntarily invoked federal jurisdiction by entering a general appearance and defending against AmerenUE’s suit. See, e.g., Fromm v. Comm’n of Veterans Affairs, 220 F.3d 887, 888-90 (8th Cir.2000) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, MDOC did assert the State’s

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no waiver where attorney general appeared in federal court answered a complaint responded to discovery and later moved to amend its answer to the complaint in order to raise states eleventh amendment immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that it evidences not the exercise of will but the perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but the defiance of judgment, not the exercise of reason but instead passion or bias.” Nakoff v. Fairview Gen. Hosp. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 254, 256, 662 N.E.2d 1, quoting State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 222, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, quoting Spalding v. Spalding (1959), 355 Mich. 382, 384-385, 94 N.W.2d 810. {¶ 11} This court has previously been split as to the standard of review for the granting or denial of a motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings pending arbitration. GB AZ 1, L.L.C. v. Arizona Motors, L.L.C., Cuyahoga App. No. 95502, 2011-Ohio-1808, 2011 WL 1419636. See Vanyo v. Clear Channel Worldwide, 156 Ohio App.3d 706, 2004-Ohio-1793, 808 N.E.2d 482 (<HOLDING>). Cf. Bevan v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., Cuyahoga

    ### Response:
    holding that the question whether a party has agreed to submit an issue to arbitration is a question of law requiring de novo review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    required merger where the “evidence presented at a particular trial” showed that one offense was coextensive with another, “does not suffice to overcome the presumption.” Id. Byrd’s presumption applies here because kidnaping and child sexual abuse each “requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” 598 A.2d at 389. Kid-naping, unlike child sexual abuse, requires “asportation or confinement.” Parker, 692 A.2d at 916; see also D.C.Code § 22-2001. Child sexual abuse, on the other hand, requires proof of an actual or attempted “sexual act” (in the case of first-degree child sexual abuse, see D.C.Code §§ 22-3008, 3018) or “sexual contact” (in the case of second-degree child sexual abuse, see D.C.Code §§ 22-3009, 3018), whereas kid-naping does not. See also Bryant, 859 A.2d at 1108 (<HOLDING>). Since D.W. “has not presented any evidence,

    ### Response:
    holding that under byrd kidnaping and sexualabuse convictions do not merge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rent-a-Car is not a proper defendant to this case.” (Garnishee Defs.’ Resp. PL’s Verified Mot. Remand, Ex. J at 1.) In response, Mr. Johnson’s lawyer wrote on January 25, 2001: “I concur that my theories of possible negligence against Enterprise have not developed. Thus, regarding the underlying tort action it does not appear that Enterprise was negligent or that Wilson was your agent.” (Id., Ex. L at 1.) What remained was a dispute between Mr. Johnson and Enterprise with respect to whether Enterprise could have some secondary liability rather than some independent liability to Mr. Johnson. Under Indiana law, Mr. Johnson could not bring a direct action against Enterprise as a part of the underlying negligence action. See Rausch v. Reinhold, 716 N.E.2d 993, 1002 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>); Araiza v. Chrysler Ins. Co., 703 N.E.2d 661,

    ### Response:
    holding that an injured third party does not have the right to bring a direct action against a tortfeasors liability insurer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    barred party from raising issue in second arbitration proceeding that could have been raised in first arbitration); Waterfront Marine Construction, Inc. v. North End 49ers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups A, B and C, 251 Va. 417, 434, 468 S.E.2d 894 (1996) (doctrine of claim preclusion barred second arbitration action because “even though the first demand described only specific defects, the doctrine of res judicata applies to all claims which could have been brought”); and, more specifically, have distinguished between issue preclusion and claim preclusion in requiring a subsequent arbitral panel to apply the doctrine of claim preclusion based upon a prior panel’s determination. See, e.g., Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 815, 824 and n.2, 982 P.2d 229, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366 (1999) (<HOLDING>); but see, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Ortho

    ### Response:
    holding that prior arbitration has no collateral estoppel effect absent agreement of parties on subsequent arbitration but noting that california precedent accords res judicata effect to serial arbitration proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is required to prove; otherwise, there would be too great a risk that a jury, by placing undue emphasis on the affirmative defense, might presume that the government had already met its burden of proof’). Because the sentencing process, even after Apprendi is “no more exacting than the process of establishing guilt,” Patterson’s reasoning applies with full force to Snype’s challenge to the burden of proof assignment in § 3559(c)(3)(A). United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d at 295 (relying on Patterson in holding that “a paradigm that allows the defendant to raise an affirmative defense during the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings, but then shifts the burden of proof to him to establish the defense, does not violate due process”); see also United States v. Brown, 276 F.3d at 932 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Wicks, 132 F.3d 383, 389

    ### Response:
    holding that apprendi leaves undisturbed the principle that while the prosecution must indeed prove all the elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt the legislation creating the offense can place the burden of proving affirmative defenses on the defendant internal citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for discrimination or retaliation purposes between “termination” and other adverse actions such as “failure to promote” or “denial of transfer.” See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061. Nor does — or could— the majority ultimately hinge its decision on the absence of any formal “reinstatement process.” The denial of reinstatement can give rise to a claim if grounded in discriminatory or retaliatory bias, regardless of whether any formal process attends the denial. Indeed, one of the cases cited by the majority in setting out when reinstatement claims might be made, EEOC v. City of Norfolk Police Department, 45 F.3d 80 (4th Cir.1995) (cited ante, at 529-30), establishes that refusal of reinstatement through informal means can be actionable. See Norfolk Police, 45 F.3d at 84-85 (<HOLDING>). The majority ultimately rests its decision on

    ### Response:
    holding that where white police officers were customarily reinstated imme diately after criminal charges against them were dropped while an africanamerican officer was required to complete a formal administrative appeal process eeoc can pursue a discrimination claim against the police department for failing to reinstate the africanamerican officer through informal procedures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [the court] why the district court erred” and, indeed, could not. “respond to the district court’s decision, since each section [was] directly copied and pasted, essentially word for word from”'the underlying filings). Lanier also asserts that the question violated the Confrontation Clause because it assumed facts not in,evidence thus transforming the prosecutor into an unconfronted fact witness. When combined with a witness’s testimony, the questions of a prosecutor designed to introduce testimony about out-of-court testimony that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay, can violate the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Kizzee, No. 16-20397, 877 F.3d 650, 655-56, 2017 WL 6398243, at *3 (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 2017). But see United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 442 (5th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). Here, the prosecutor’s questioning was not

    ### Response:
    holding that because closing arguments do not constitute evidence a prosecutors statement did not implicate the confrontation clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Standard Concrete Pipe Sales Co., 366 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1963, no writ), the court of appeals held it to be error for the trial court to include in a summary judgment an order severing an attorney’s-fee issue in a suit on an account when the defendant, in controverting affidavits, raised an issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees demanded in the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Id. at 105. The crux of the court’s holding was that the defendant was entitled to rely on its affidavits as raising a fact issue to defeat the summary-judgment motion. Id. The outcome may well have been different if the severance had come after a ruling on the motion for summary judgment. See Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex.1982) (<HOLDING>). Bradford directs this Court to several eases

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in severing defendants counterclaim after summary judgment was granted as to plaintiffs claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 3156(a)(4)(B) which has a definition similar to that in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)). On its face, the plain language of 16(b) encompasses Tex. Penal Code § 30.04, which proscribes breaking into, or entering, a vehicle with the intent to commit a theft or felony. Breaking into a vehicle, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used against the property of another. See 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Alfaro-Gramajo’s argument that the Texas courts have construed the statute too broadly for it to be considered a crime of violence is unpersuasive. The cases cited by Alfaro-Gramajo show that Texas courts have interpreted the statute within the plain meaning of its terms. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 919 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tex.Ct. App.1996) (<HOLDING>). However, to qualify under § 16(b), the

    ### Response:
    holding a car was broken into or entered when defendant reached in through the open window of a car
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    finds this argument unconvincing for two reasons. First, as presented above, Karaeff relied on factors in addition to the apparent wealth of the Harts, such as the close personal relationship and trust between her and Toby, as well as her perception of Toby as a savvy real estate developer. Although Karaeff may not have had as close of a relationship with Toby as she did with Debra Hart, her testimony indicates she trusted Toby as a family member. Trial Tr. 10:5-10. Second, the language under 523(a)(2)(A) “other than a statement respecting the debtor’s ... financial condition,” should be interpreted narrowly to include formal written accounting documents, and not broad oral or written statements concerning financial wealth. See In re Belice, 461 B.R. 564, 577-78 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700, 714 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding that the phrase statement respecting the debtors  financial condition should be narrowly interpreted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the jury that Bailey was of bad character and was willing to engage in criminal pursuits. As was the case with the evidence about the four-wheeler and the tractor, this evidence was not admissible, and it did not come within any exception to the exclusionary rule. The trial court erred when it allowed evidence of the collateral acts. Even if we had determined that evidence about the four-wheeler, the tractor, and the conversations recorded at Reeves’ residence fit within an exception to the exclusionary rule, we would nonetheless hold that the collateral-act evidence was inadmissible because it was not reasonably necessary to the State’s case and because its probative value was far outweighed by its prejudicial value. See, e.g., Ex parte Jackson, 33 So.3d 1279, 1286 (Ala.2009) (<HOLDING>). None of the collateral-act evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that to admit evidence of prior bad acts under rule 404b ala r evid the state must demonstrate that the evidence was reasonably necessary to its case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Reardon’s independent investigation yielded only minimal corroborative evidence relating to appellant, Officer Rear-don lacked probable cause to arrest appellant at the time he seized and searched the bag of socks. For these reasons, I would hold the trial court erroneously denied the motion to suppress, and I would reverse and dismiss appellant’s conviction. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 2 . The Commonwealth made this argument in the trial court and on brief on appeal. The fact that the trial court concluded appellant consented to the search and, thus, did not reach the probable cause issue does not prevent us from considering that issue on appeal where no further factual findings are necessary. See Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 449, 451-52, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Hancock v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App.

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate court may affirm ruling where trial court reached right result for wrong reason as long as alternate basis for affirmance was presented to trial court and no further factual findings are necessary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and Skelly relied on their design expert, Sicher, who testified about the important role testing plays (or should play) in the design process: “[T]he basic design principles are set your goals, determine how you’re going to test or evaluate them, and then start testing them.” If the test results are unsatisfactory, then the company should “go back and either do a redesign or evaluate whether that was a true indicative method of evaluating [the goal] properly.” That is, in Sicher’s opinion, rollover testing is vital to producing a careful design because it allows a company like GM to discover how a vehicle performs during a rollover and what alternatives, if any, can improve that performance—to him, failure to test means failure to exercise reasonable care. Cf. McKnight, 36 F.3d at 1411 (<HOLDING>); Zesch v. Abrasive Co. of Phila., 353 Mo. 558,

    ### Response:
    recognizing failure to test is a viable theory of recovery under missouri law in a manufacturing defect case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (op. on reh’g). In the Windsor suit, the trial court specifically found that venue was proper in Tarrant County. We reviewed the venue ruling and affirmed it. Windsor, 923 S.W.2d at 93-95. Thus, we need to determine whether this final judgment on venue in the Windsor suit irrevocably fixes venue in Tarrant County for Miller II. A final judgment on venue is conclusive on the parties as to the issue of venue and irrevocably fixes venue of any suit involving the same subject matter and parties. See Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Orozco, 681 S.W.2d 245, 245 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1984, no writ); Pinney v. Cook, 558 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Tex. l Co., 510 U.S. 820, 114 S.Ct. 76, 126 L.Ed.2d 45 (1993); Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Gibson, 372 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1963, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Further, the underlying facts giving rise to

    ### Response:
    holding additional parties in second suit do not prevent the application of res judicata based on the first suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to any relief in this suit.” Id. at 620, 58 S.Ct. 385; see also Mobil-Teria Catering Co. v. Spradling, 576 S.W.2d 282 (Mo.1978), overruled on other grounds, Alumax Foils, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 939 S.W.2d 907 (Mo.1997) (finding that a municipality may not impose a tax on gross receipts derived from places of business lying outside its geographical boundaries). ¶ 12 The Arizona Supreme Court applied these principles in Gorman v. City of Phoenix, concluding that portions of the property to be annexed “were not contiguous to the City of Phoenix and that therefore the city commission is without jurisdiction to annex the territory involved.” 70 Ariz. 59, 65, 216 P.2d 400, 404 (1950). The court held that unless a sufficient petition l, 98 Ariz. 382, 385-88, 405 P.2d 871, 873-75 (1965) (<HOLDING>); Cornman Tweedy 560, L.L.C. v. City of Casa

    ### Response:
    holding that the signature requirement was an indispensable condition precedent and the failure to comply with it deprived the town of jurisdiction to annex
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is based in large part on the Court’s determination that the decisions of the Second and Eleventh Circuits hew more closely to the Supreme Court’s instruction that the jurisdictional provision of § 1001 should not be construed in a narrow or technical manner. See Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 480, 104 S.Ct. 1942. In addition, the Court also notes as persuasive the Government’s argument that this somewhat broader interpretation of § 1001’s jurisdictional scope is consistent with that taken by the Fourth Circuit in its interpretation of the jurisdictional scope of 18 U.S.C. § 111, which imposes criminal liability on, inter alia, persons who assault federal marshals or “person[s] employed to assist” federal marshals. 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 1114; see United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Although § 111 differs from § 1001 in that §

    ### Response:
    holding that the scope of 18 usc  111 is broad enough to include assaults on local law enforcement officials responsible for housing federal prisoners pursuant to a contract with the marshals service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as an intentional relinquishment of a known right,” but which is often construed as “an equitable principle used by courts to avoid harsh results when a party has conducted itself in such a way as to make those results unfair.” Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir.1978). Neither the district court nor the Kramer states that Plaintiff-Appellant intentionally relinquished her Fourth Amendment claim, nor are we dealing with a hard, judicially recognized bright line for waiver, like the principle that a party waives on appeal any argument that it does not present to the district court. This bright-line principle backs the numerous waiver cases cited by Defendant-Appellee Kramer in her brief. See, e.g., Teumer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 34 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Colburn v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 973 F.2d 581,

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to draw the district courts attention to an applicable legal theory waives pursuit of that theory in this court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that because the nylon mask and other items that were later subjected to DNA testing were stored in the same place as items that were taken from his home, there was a possibility that the DNA analysis was conducted on a mixed sample and, therefore, the DNA evidence should be excluded. The trial court rejected the defendant’s argument and pointed out that there was “no evidence” that the items taken from the defendant’s home were “somehow commingled” with the nylon mask. We agree with the defendant that if the DNA results presented to the jury were based on the analysis of a known mixed sample, the State would be required to explain how the presence of DNA from another individual would affect the statistical analysis. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 3 P.3d 999, 1003-04 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (<HOLDING>); State v. Ayers, 68 P.3d 768, 775 (Mont. 2003)

    ### Response:
    holding that frye test for admissibility was satisfied because expert used likelihood ratios to explain results of dna tests conducted on known mixed samples
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    witness’s testimony adversely. We have stated that “[i]n determining the intent with which a defendant acted, a district court is entitled to rely on ... all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from all of the evidence,” Khedr, 343 F.3d at 102, and that “[w]e generally defer to a sentencing court’s findings as to what a speaker meant by his words, and how a listener would reasonably interpret those words.” United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 466 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). These considerations fully support the district court’s conclusion that the totality of the timing and circumstances of Yarbrough’s phone call to the witness demonstrated a clear intent to threaten the witness. Cf United States v. Shoulberg, 895 F.2d 882, 884-86 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the witness stated that he did

    ### Response:
    holding that ussg  3c11 reaches attempts to obstruct whether direct or indirect in affirming obstruction of justice enhancement for incarcerated defendant who wrote a note stating that he did not trust at all a codefendant asking for location of codefendants residence and implying possibility of rough sexual altercation with codefendant upon defendants release from detention even though codefendant never received note because totality of circumstances surrounding note indicated an indirect attempt to obstruct justice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    abuse of discretion standard, I concur in the result. 1. Standard of Review As the majority notes, the parties on appeal disagree as to which standard of review is applicable to the trial court’s sentencing. There is inconsistency amongst jurisdictions concerning which standard of review applies to those alleged sentencing errors not preserved at trial. There are at least three categories in which standards of review are applied to sentencing. Some jurisdictions apply the abuse of discretion standard when addressing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, whereas procedural errors not raised at trial are reviewed for plain error. See United States. v. Judge, 649 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[sentences are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but wher 160 (Neb. 2011) (<HOLDING>); State v. Georgius, 225 W. Va. 716, 696 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    equitable relief as may be appropriate, including ... reinstatement,” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B). Defendants .also argue that Dr. Coulibaly cannot rely on the Federal Tort Claims Act (""FTCA”) for any waiver of sovereign immunity. See Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 6-7. But the Court does not discern an FTCA claim from the complaint, and because Dr. Coulibaly disclaims any reliance on the. FTC A in his filings, the Court will not consider this issue, See Mem. Supp. PL’s Mot. Summ. J, 19 (""FTCA‘and FMLA are two different cases and there is no issue of sovereign immunity for FMLA lawsuit.""). 10 . The question of whether the FMLA permits actions against individuals as1 opposed to only employer^ is the subject of a circuit split. Compare Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 829 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 687 (11th

    ### Response:
    holding that fmla does not impose individual liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New York law, false arrest is considered to be a species of false unlawful arrest, the determination of whether probable cause existed must be made on the basis of the information possessed or reasonably available to the defendant at the time of the arrest. See Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 570 (2d Cir.1996), It is, therefore, axiomatic that subsequently discovered evidence cannot be used to cure an arrest that was made without probable cause. Cf. People v. Gomcin, 265 A.D.2d 493, 495, 697 N.Y.S.2d 93, 95 (2d Dep’t 1999) (search incident to arrest) (“[I]t is beyond cavil that the fruit of a search incident to an arrest cannot be used to establish probable cause to arrest.”); cf. also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17, 68 S.Ct. 367, 370, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) (<HOLDING>). B. Malicious Prosecution under § 1983 and New

    ### Response:
    holding that reasoning which would justify the arrest by the search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest  will not do
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Notably, the rule prohibiting interlocutory appeals prevents the “delay and expense from fragmentary appeals” and “expedite^] the administration of justice.” See Berger v. Berger, 67 N.C. App. 591, 595, 313 S.E.2d 825, 828, (citing Shaver, 54 N.C. App. at 486, 283 S.E.2d at 526), disc. review denied, 311 N.C. 303, 317 S.E.2d 678 (1984). Here, the Commission reserved both the issue of the extent of Mr. Thomas’s temporary disability, if any, after 13 November 2008 and the issue of his permanent partial disability for future resolution. Its Opinion and Award with respect to causation and temporary total disability compensation from October 2007 until November 2008 was clearly interlocutory. See Watts v. Hemlock Homes of Highlands, Inc., 160 N.C. App. 81, 84, 584 S.E.2d 97, 99 (2003) (<HOLDING>). While we certainly agree with the parties’

    ### Response:
    holding that where the commissions opinion and award had yet to determine the total amount of compensation and there was nothing in the record to indicate that the parties had resolved this issue independently since the commission entered its opinion and award that the appeal was clearly interlocutory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a criminal defendant had obtained independent DNA testing of physical evidence, but decided not to present the evidently unfavorable results at trial. When the prosecution subpoenaed the person who had conducted the tests to testify, the defendant moved to quash the subpoena, but the trial court denied the motion. On appeal to this Court, we determined that the work-product privilege barred the prosecution from presenting the testimony. We refused to allow the prosecution to present the expert’s testimony because the defense had reasonably expected discussions with, and investigations by, the expert to remain confidential, and the public interest behind the privilege would be undermined by overriding the privilege. See also Commonwealth v. Noll, 443 Pa.Super. 602, 662 A.2d 1123 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with Kennedy, we conclude here

    ### Response:
    holding that the prosecution could not retain as a testifying expert for trial a nontestifying expert the defendant had previously retained
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    available exemptions as measured by the dollar amount of the exemption claim. Thus, “§ 522(f) entitles [the debtor] to avoid [the judgment] lien only to the extent of the ... homestead exemption” irrespective of the debtor’s equity interest in the property. Wrenn, 40 F.3d at 1166-67. Applying Wrenn to the ease before us, the Holloways can avoid John Hancock’s lien on their residence only to the extent of their homestead exemption. Because the Holloways’ claimed exemption was worth $0.00, they are not entitled to any lien avoidance. The Holloways contend that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 effectively overrules Wrenn, and that a judgment lien can be avoided to the extent that it impairs an exemption or exceeds the amount of equity in the property. See Thomsen, 181 B.R. at 1016-1017 (<HOLDING>). Although the 1994 amendments to the

    ### Response:
    holding that the bankruptcy reform act effectively overruled wrenn
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    waive” the alleged error). We discern no plain error. Viewed in context of the entire trial, see United States v. Christians, 200 F.3d 1124, 1128 (8th Cir.1999), it is not clear or obvious that the prosecutor was commenting indi rectly on Kieffer’s failure to testify. Kieffer was attempting to convince the jury that the Ninth Circuit’s decision to admit Kieffer to practice somehow relieved Kieffer of responsibility for his own deceitful conduct. In stating Kieffer was “not accepting ... responsibility,” the prosecutor apparently was rebutting Kieffer’s defense. The prosecutor probably was deflecting Kieffer’s attempt to shift blame, emphasizing the District of North Dakota’s attorney admission system was based on trust and the jury should not “lose sight of who is on trial.” Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence Kieffer argues

    ### Response:
    holding the prosecutors statement there was no contradictory evidence to those facts was only a general observation about the strength and clarity of the governments evidence presented at trial and not grounds for plain error relief for alleged prosecutorial misconduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Ameritech Pub., Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1128, 1129 (Ind.1998). ""[Ilt is in the best interest of the public not to restrict unnecessarily persons' freedom of contract."" Id. (quoting Fresh Cut, Inc. v. Fazli, 650 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (Ind.1995)). Burkhart freely entered into this lease with Providence's predecessor. In fact, the lease is clearly Burkhart's own form lease. We conclude that the termination of a lease according to the parties' own provisions is not a taking of property. Given the termination of the lease pursuant to Provi-denece's proposed development of the property and our supreme court's opinion in Heslar, we conclude that Burkhart had no interest in the property compensable by the City. See also P.C. Management, Inc. v. Page Two, Inc., 573 N.E.2d 484, 439 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). We acknowledge another clause in the lease,

    ### Response:
    holding that a sublessee had no property interest taken by the city
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only be used sparingly in employment discrimination eases,” citing Haglof v. Northwest Rehabilitation, Inc., 910 F.2d 492, 495 (8th Cir.1990); Hillebrand, 827 F.2d at 364). Summary judgment is appropriate in such cases only in “those rare instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion.” Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244; see also Webb v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 51 F.3d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244); Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244). The court reasoned that “[bjecause discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant.” Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (<HOLDING>); Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244. The Eighth Circuit

    ### Response:
    holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    custody affected a liberty interest because they constituted an “atypical and significant hardship [upon him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). As a result, Mr. Rios maintains, he could not be placed in maximum custody without some procedural protections. Mr. Rios also argues that prison officials violated his due process rights by reviewing his placement in maximum custody only once a year. Finally, Mr. Rios asserts that “administrative sentence credit” constitutes an appropriate request for relief in this § 2241 proceeding because he is barred from seeking monetary relief under the Feres doctrine. See generally Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (<HOLDING>); Walden v. Bartlett, 840 F.2d 771, 774 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding that the united states is immune from monetary damages for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    course of law.’ ” Hintz, 305 S.W.3d at 772 (quoting Tex. Const, art. I, § 13). “This provision, among other things, prohibits the Legislature from unreasonably restricting common law causes of action.” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 357 (Tex.1995)). When challenging a statute as unconstitutional under the open courts provision, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that the statute restricts a well-recognized common law cause of action. Id. (citing Flores v. Law, 8 S.W.3d 785, 787 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet.denied)); see also Thomas, 895 S.W.2d at 357. Because the open courts provision affects common law claims and not statutory claims, the provision does not apply to claims under the TTCA. Villasan, 166 S.W.3d at 766; see also Thomas, 895 S.W.2d at 357-58 (<HOLDING>); Hintz, 305 S.W.3d at 772-73 (holding current

    ### Response:
    holding predecessor to section 101106 did not violate open courts provision because ttca broadened rather than restricted an injured partys remedies because municipalities performing governmental functions were completely immune from liability under common law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has jurisdiction to sua sponte impose a pre-filing injunction, and we believe that the rationale of that decision is equally applicable to a modification. Although Martin-Trigona and Brown imply that a district court may sua sponte modify an existing injunction to deter vexatious filings, they do not explicitly adopt this holding. Based on our precedent, we conclude that the exercise of this power is permitted by Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b)(5) states the following: “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment [or] order [when] ... it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The one-year limitation period applicable to

    ### Response:
    holding that a party may obtain relief from a district courts permanent injunction pursuant to rule 60b5
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appellate counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, we give special weight to the PCR court’s decision. Finally, the State’s case against Pfau did not hinge upon the Cyco evidence. As found by the trial court, Pfau’s appellate counsel, the PCR court, and the district court below, the State presented overwhelming evidence that Pfau planned and participated in the robbery. Although we conclude the Iowa Supreme Court decided the trial court did not erroneously admit the Cyco evidence, we also conclude, even if the trial court did erroneously admit this evidence, it constituted harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, which means Pfau suffered no prejudice from his appellate counsel’s failure to cite Nance. See, e.g., Odem v. Hopkins, 382 F.3d 846, 851-52 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d 777,

    ### Response:
    holding stricklands prejudice prong was not met because of overwhelming evidence of guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bring his or her Tucker Act action in the Court of Federal Claims within six years of the date of discharge or retirement.”); Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1313 (“The cause of action in [the plaintiffs] Tucker Act suit was for the denial of money; that cause of action therefore accrued when he was separated from active duty and his monetary injury began.”); Adkins v. United States, 68 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed.Cir.1995) (noting that the plaintiff, a retired Army officer, was entitled to basic pay under 37 U.S.C. § 204 prior to his retirement, and holding that if the plaintiffs “discharge was voluntary and improper, [his] statutory right to pay was not extinguished, and thus serves as a basis for Tucker Act jurisdiction”); see also Brownfield v. United States, 589 F.2d 1035, 1038-40 (Ct.Cl.1978) (<HOLDING>); Coon v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 531, 540

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs claim that he was wrongfully denied a promotion prior to his retirement accrued on the date that he was finally denied that promotion  the date of his retirement at the lower rank
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a duty to avoid negligent infliction of emotional distress, as the law recognizes and imposes a duty of care on many different types of relationships, not all of which necessarily implicate the emotional well-being of the parties. See Undertakings and Special Relationships, supra, at 49 & n. 1. (referring to relationships involving “(1) carrier-passenger, (2) innkeeper-guest, (3) invitor-invitee or possessor of land open to the public and one lawfully upon the premises; (4) employer-employee, (5) school-student, (6) landlord-tenant, and (7) custodian-ward”); Vassiliades, 492 A.2d at 591-92 (noting that fiduciaries have a duty to “scrupulously hon- or the trust and confidence reposed in them because” of fiduciary relationship); District of Columbia v. Royal, 465 A.2d 367, 369 (D.C.1983) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 298 A.2d 214,

    ### Response:
    recognizing the districts duty of care for the protection of school children in its schools
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “actual conflict” exists between the laws of jurisdictions with ties to a case, New Jersey applies the “most significant relationship” test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See Lebegern v. Forman, 471 F.3d 424, 428 (3d Cir.2006); P.V. ex rel. T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 197 N.J. 132, 962 A.2d 453, 459-60 (2008). As the District Court found, an actual conflict exists here: Michigan bars all variations of the claims asserted by the Grossbaums, see Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2971, whereas the New Jersey and New York statutes of limitations for medical malpractice claims differ in both length and the date on which they begin to run, compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2 (two-year statute of limitations), and Caravaggio v. D’Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 765 A.2d 182, 189 (2001) (<HOLDING>), with N.Y.C.P.L.R. 214-a (30-month statute of

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the City in this case are not legally cognizable unless they are clearly waived by the TTCA See York, 871 S.W.2d at 177; Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex.1980). Plaintiff alleges assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress—both intentional torts under Texas law. The TTCA provides that a municipality cannot be liable for any claims “arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, or any intentional tort_” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.057(2). A review of the summary judgment evidence submitted by Plaintiff reveals that his intentional tort allegations are not waived by the TTCA. Therefore, these claims are absolutely barred by sovereign immunity. See City of San Antonio v. Dunn, 796 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied)(<HOLDING>); Townsend v. Memorial Medical Center, 529

    ### Response:
    holding that no waiver of municipal liability existed under the ttca where plaintiffs claims arose out of allegations of intentional torts including false arrest and excessive force
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discretion.’ ” (Citation omitted.)). The Teamsters court recognized that a particularized showing of bad faith is required to justify the use of the court’s inherent power, and stated that we have declined to uphold awards under the bad-faith exception absent both clear evidence that the challenged actions are entirely without color, and are taken for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes and a high degree of specificity in the factual findings of the lower courts. Id. (quoting Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir.1986) (citations, internal brackets, and internal quotations marks omitted)); see also Kukui Nuts, 6 Haw.App. at 436, 726 P.2d at 272 (<HOLDING>). Although it is well-settled that “[a]n

    ### Response:
    holding that a necessary precedent to any sanction of attorneys fees under the courts inherent powers was the finding that the attorneys conduct constituted or was tantamount to bad faith citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the government to release to Stichting Mayflower and Olson-Neihart the deposit of just compensation that the government deposited into an escrow account. Mayflower, however, has failed to submit an application for fees With this court or the district court as required by the statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (“A party seeking an award of fees ... shall within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party ... the amount sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness ... stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed.”) (emphasis added); see also Myers v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 666 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, we do not address Mayflower's

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the statutory requirement that a claimant under eaja file timely application for fees is jurisdictional in nature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259, 261 (1969) (finding woman who, while in a department store dressing room, heard a noise like an explosion and witnessed the collapse of a wall, although she herself merely got dusty, to be within a zone of danger); Quill v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438, 440 (Minn.Ct.App.1985) (determining that man who experienced a sudden 34,000-foot drop in elevation due to the out-of-control tailspin of the commercial aircraft in which he was a passenger was within a zone of danger). Masepohl has not alleged a single incident that could even remotely be construed as placing him in a zone of danger. The doctrine of negligent infliction of emotional distress simply does not cover the type of conduct that Masepohl asserts. Cf. K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 558 (<HOLDING>). As for Masepohl’s negligence claim, Masepohl

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant must have placed plaintiff in a situation where it was abundantly clear that plaintiff was in grave personal peril for some specifically defined period of time for negligent infliction claim to be actionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we must then decide if that improper factor was significant enough to remand the cause for resentencing. Matters considered by the legislature in determining the authorized range of sentences which are inherent in the offense are not proper aggravating factors to be considered in a sentencing hearing. (People v. Conover (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 400, 419 N.E.2d 906.) In Conover, the Illinois Supreme Court held that it was improper for a trial court to consider receipt of proceeds from a burglary or theft as an aggravating factor in determining the length of a sentence. Proceeds were an inherent part of the crime of burglary or theft and had already been considered by the legislature when it determined the range of penalties. (See also People v. Martin (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 453, 519 N.E.2d 884 (<HOLDING>); People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256,

    ### Response:
    holding that the death of a victim may not be considered an aggravating factor in a homicide sentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a determination that Plaintiffs are actually innocent of the charges for which they were convicted. Against this need, Ryan claims an “executive communications privilege.” The court finds no federal authority for extending to a state governor the presidential communications privilege. Furthermore, Ryan has disclaimed reliance on the deliberative process privilege and has not followed the established procedures for asserting that privilege. Additionally, if there is some privilege Ryan might have asserted to maintain the confidentiality of his deliberations in exercising his state constitutional authority to issue pardons, he has waived that privilege. Privileges relating to governmental decisionmaking may be waived. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. IRS, 772 F.Supp. 202, 209 (D.Del.1991) (<HOLDING>). However, such a waiver “should not be lightly

    ### Response:
    holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    period. Piggly Wiggly Clarksville, Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp., 215 F.R.D. 523, 528 (E.D.Tex.2003). Rule 23(b)(3) provides that a class may be certified if, among other requirements, “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” The district court applied the correct legal standards, and we cannot say that it abused its discretion in denying class certification. A. Calculation of Damages The necessity of calculating damages on an individual basis, by itself, can be grounds for not certifying a class. Bell Atlantic, 339 F.3d at 308 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); O’Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that class certification is not appropriate because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the calculation of individualized actual economic damages if any suffered by the class members can be performed in accordance with the predominance requirement of rule 23b3
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    where no promise to reeonvey). Under these authorities, the facts asserted by Clara would give rise to a constructive trust in the C.D. to her benefit. She makes a prima facie showing that ""within the confidential relationship of husband and wife, she transferred property (the loan proceeds) in reliance on her husband’s agreement that the property acquired with the loan proceeds (the C.D.) was hers and his promise that the property would be reconveyed to her upon the maturity of the C.D. The government’s forfeiture forced a breach of that promise that may result in a potentially unjust enrichment of the government (and commensurate unjust impoverishment of Clara) if Clara is denied standing to contest the forfeiture. See United States v. Marx, 844 F.2d 1303, 1306-08 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Clara’s status as the apparent beneficiary of

    ### Response:
    holding in forfeiture case that circumstances surrounding mothers conveyance of stock to her soninlaw were sufficient under wisconsin law to create constructive trust in stock in daughters favor where testimony showed such was intent of conveyance despite facts that stock registered in husbands name and that no documentation supported testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ala. R.App. P. Slack v. Stream, 988 So.2d 516, 533-34 (Ala.2008). This court cannot cure that deficiency by creating legal arguments for the appellant, see Spradlin v. Spradlin, 601 So.2d 76, 78-79 (Ala.1992), because it is not the function of this court to perform an appellant’s legal research. City of Birmingham v. Business Realty Inv. Co., 722 So.2d 747, 752 (Ala.1998). Disregarding those arguments the State fails to appropriately supp d in concluding that the agreement between the grandmother and the grandson regarding payment for the truck satisfied § 8-9-2, Ala.Code 1975, the Statute of Frauds. However, the State did not raise that argument before the trial court, and it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See Simmons v. Simmons, 99 So.3d 316, 323 (Ala.Civ.App.2011) (<HOLDING>). Based on the foregoing analysis, I would

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to file a postjudgment motion on alleged error of law relating to ruling on exception to the statute of frauds that was committed for first time in the judgment waives any objection to that ruling and that in the absence of any other formal objection the issue is not preserved for appellate review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    money is incapable of being ‘described or identified in the same manner as a specific chattel’ ..., it is not the proper subject of a conversion action.” Id. (internal citation omitted). In its conversion cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s “intentional unauthorized use of coins ... resulted in loss and damage to the City of Syracuse[.]” See Dkt. No. 22 at ¶ 182. Plaintiff does not specifically allege how much money was allegedly converted by Defendant and, in its prayer for relief, simply requests a “[j]udgment against defendant!] for compensatory [damages], in an amount to be determined at trial.” This conclusory allegation is insufficient to support a claim for conversion. See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Securities LLC, 458 B.R. 87, 133 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.2011) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege that

    ### Response:
    holding that because the complaint does not seek a specific amount of money converted from a particular account but rather an award of compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial it fails to state a claim for conversion under new york law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allow [the Court] to depart downward.” The court then went on to consider the government’s motion for an upward departure, a motion the court granted. In the final analysis, despite the government’s attempts to paint them as innocuous, the district court’s comments are pointed and reflect a belief that the court lacked discretion to depart downward. This, however, is error. In effect, the district court inverted the rule. The district court appeared to assume that, absent the Guidelines’ express reference to a particular factor, the court lacked authority to depart downward on that basis; the rule, however, is the opposite — unless the Guidelines specifically proscribe consideration of the factor, then the factor is to be considered. This rule was articulated plainly and (9th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>). Clearly, then, because previous incarceration

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants status as a deportable alien could be considered by the district court at sentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the employees that day. Under the circumstances, we do not view the agents’ interviewing of employees who had been detained during the execution of a search warrant as acts taken in “flagrant disregard” of the terms of the search warrant. Therefore, the extreme remedy of blanket suppression of the documentary evidence covered by the terms of the warrant was not required and the distinct court properly denied Appellants’ motion to suppress on this basis. 3. For similar reasons, we reject Appellants’ alternative contention that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress because there was a factual dispute as to whether the employees were forcibly detained and coercively questioned. Cf. United States v. Taylor, 13 F.3d 786, 789 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Appellants assert that they created a

    ### Response:
    holding that when material facts that affect the resolution of a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search are in conflict the appropriate way to resolve the conflict is by holding an evidentiary hearing after which the district court will be in a position to make findings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    period at issue.” 5 So.3d at 1198. Cutler’s complaint, on the other hand, alleges that the tumor/lesion culminated in a legal injury on February 11, 2015, despite “an adverse beginning of the growth process within the four years following June 28, 2005.” (Emphasis added.) Based on this averment, the trial court concluded that, regardless of the date of the discovery of any injury, the statute of repose would have begun to run at the latest by June 28, 2009, and would have expired at the latest by June 28,2013. We agree. It is well settled that in medical-malpractice actions the legal injury occurs at the time of the negligent act or omission, regardless of whether the injury is or could be discovered within the statutory period. See, e.g., Ex parte Hodge, 153 So.3d 734 (Ala.2014)(<HOLDING>); Ex parte Sonnier, 707 So.2d 635

    ### Response:
    holding that patient suffered actionable legal injury and period of repose began to run when physician left hemostat clamp in patients body regardless of when or to what extent the complications from the negligent act would be discovered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Arbitration Agreement Under issue one, Mohamed argues the Auto Nation parties could not enforce the arbitration agreement because they were not signatories to the agreement and did not prove they were in privity with a signatory. The initial burden of the party seeking to compel arbitration-to establish the arbitration agreement’s existence-includes proving the entity seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement was a party to it or had the right to enforce the agreement notwithstanding. See Pepe Int’l Dev. Co. v. Pub Brewing Co., 915 S.W.2d 925, 931 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (combined appeal & orig. proceeding); Texas Private Employment Ass’n v. Lyrir-Jay Int’l, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 529, 531, 532 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (op. & op. on reh’g) (<HOLDING>). The burden of showing one’s status as a party

    ### Response:
    holding association itself was not party to arbitration agreement set out in associations bylaws that required associations members to arbitration disputes among themselves
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in a contract that did not define the term). By its terms, section XVI prohibits an award of “attorney fees” or “costs and disbursements” to either party in an action for dissolution of their marriage. Husband does not contend that the expert witness fee was an “attorney fee.” Rather, husband argues that the fee was a “cost.” We turn to the meaning of that word as the parties used it in the broader term “costs and disbursements.” The parties do not suggest that the term “costs and disbursements” is ambiguous, nor did they adduce any evidence at trial regarding its intended meaning. However, the term has a well-established legal meaning in the context of the subject matter of section XVI, that is, dissolution actions. See O’Neal and O’Neal, 158 Or App 431, 433-35, 974 P2d 785 (1999) (<HOLDING>). ORCP 68 A(2) defines “costs and

    ### Response:
    holding that orcp 68 defines costs and disbursements for purposes of dissolution actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    official charged with detaining a federal prisoner in order to fraudulently obtain access to that prisoner. Simply stated, Hussein Addine Selmen is a federal prisoner regardless of whether he is detained directly by the Marshals Service or by a local official to whom the Marshals Service has properly delegated this responsibility. Access to him is therefore a federal issue within the jurisdiction of the Marshals Service. Accordingly, any false statement made in order to gain access to him falls within the scope of § 1001, which, as the Government correctly notes, hinges not on the person to whom the statement is made, but rather on whether the statement falls within the jurisdiction of a branch of the federal government. See Davis, 8 F.3d at 929; see also Gibson, 881 F.2d at 322 (<HOLDING>). Here, the statement clearly falls within the

    ### Response:
    holding that tjhere is no implicit requirement that the statements be made directly to or even be received by the federal department or agency in question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered by district courts in appeals to them from bankruptcy courts. The bankruptcy court held that the interests of the permanent investors were not part of the bankrupt estate and that the notes, deeds of trust and their proceeds should be delivered to Fireman’s Fund; it reserved judgment, however, on the nature of the interests of revolving investors. As the interests of the revolving investors and other issues remain to be decided, we must determine whether the decision of the lower court is final within the meaning of § 158(d). The Supreme Court has adopted a practical rather than a technical construction of the requirement of “finality”. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152, 85 S.Ct. 308, 311, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964), (<HOLDING>). That a pragmatic approach to finality is

    ### Response:
    holding that the practical effects of marginally final orders must be taken into account in determining appealability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    initial ability to determine its jurisdiction}.]”). Once the determination is made that a public employer and its labor relations system has grandfather status and that its collective bargaining system has not substantially changed after January 1, 2003, no other provision of the PEBA applies to that employer. Id. ¶ 6 (explaining that if the grandfather clause applies, “the PEBA does not apply”). And, if the public employer is not subject to the terms of the PEBA, then the PELRB has no jurisdiction to hear its complaints because the PELRB can only enforce the PEBA— it cannot enforce the LMRO. See § 10-7E-9(F) (noting that the PELRB “has the power to enforce provisions of the [PEBA]”); Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed'n of Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, ¶ 4, 125 N.M. 401, 962 P.2d 1236 (<HOLDING>); Deming Firefighters Local 4521,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the peba created the pelrb whose function is the administration of the peba
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    given that applying the Establishment Clause to all government actions that impede religion would render the Free Exercise Clause superflous, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim as it pertains to Defendants’ alleged attempts to impede Plaintiffs’ religion. However, Plaintiffs also allege the Defendants attempted to advance their own religious beliefs and to impose those beliefs on the Plaintiffs and their children by sharing their religious views with Plaintiffs’ children and forcing them to listen to “Christian music.” Complaint, ¶¶ 59, 66. These alleged actions have no apparent secular purpose and would have a primary effect of advancing Defendants’ religion. As such, these alleged actions would constitute violations of the Establishment Clause. Lemon, supra (<HOLDING>) Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding that governmental actions violate the establishment clause if they have no secular purpose have a primary effect of advancing religion or foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this case. It states in part, “[w]hen property is damaged, the loss is the cost of repairs, not to exceed the loss had the property been destroyed.” The district court calculated the cost of repairs based upon the bank’s standard hourly rate for its employees’ time, computer time, and administrative overhead-the same rate that the bank uses in charging paying customers. Sabían complains that this was improper because of the profit margin and administrative overhead that is built into these charges. However, had the bank hired an outside contractor to make the repairs these factors would have been built into the charges. Similarly, had it not been necessary for the bank to devote its employees’ time and computer time to making these repairs, the administrative overhead (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). However, we need not consider this matter in

    ### Response:
    holding that consequential damages are not to be considered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court to reverse a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). We “must consider the probable effect the prosecutor’s [comments] would have on the jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly,” “within the context of the trial.” Id. at 12, 105 S.Ct. 1038. a. Barragan, Franco, and Gutierrez An “important factor contributing to the prejudicial effect of improper statements is the strength of the case against a defendant.” Sanchez, 659 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Weather spoon, 410 F.3d at 1151). The evidence against Barragan, Franco, and Gutierrez was overwhelming, and they do not argue otherwise. Thus, we conclude that the prosecutor’s remarks did not prejudice them. See Nobari, 574 F.3d at 1082 (<HOLDING>). b. Fernandez The evidence against Fernandez

    ### Response:
    holding that prosecutors remarks were harmless in light of overwhelming evidence against defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (same). If the direct evidence approach can ever supplant the market definition approach in a § 2 context, it can only do so where a reasonable juror could find the evidence conclusive as to why Defendants’ prices were higher. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 386 F.3d 485, 500 (“where direct evidence is unavailable or inconclusive, as here, monopoly power may be inferred from” the market definition approach); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1411-12 (7th Cir.1995) (“a reasonable finder of fact cannot infer monopoly power just from higher prices — the difference may reflect a higher quality more costly to provide — and it is always treacherous to try to infer monopoly power from a high rate of return”); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The Plaintiffs’ one-track focus on the price

    ### Response:
    holding that high prices with no showing of restricted output failed to establish monopoly power
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a double discipline issue. Am. Nat’l Can Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 120 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir.1997). The court finds no valid basis to distinguish this case from the Rice matter. Although Henderson purported to rely on factual differences between Rice and this case, he did not explain how those differences would justify a different result. Nor did Henderson explain why the well-recognized bar against retroactivity did not apply to Peterson. Even leaving the Rice decision aside, it is not seriously contested that the Commissioner understood he was constrained to apply the New Policy prospectively. See NFLPA Ex. 119, at 7; id. Ex. 35, at 101:12-13, 99:21-100:15; see also United Transp. Union, Local Lodge No. 31 v. St. Paul, Union Depot Co., 434 F.2d 220, 222 (8th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>). Henderson simply disregarded the law of the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the law of the shop includes the understanding of the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Thus, class action treatment is warranted under Rule 23(b)(2). Moreover, the class is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(3) because “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” and that the class action vehicle is the “superior” method to adjudicate this dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The factual and legal issues involved are identical because each member of the proposed class received substantially similar letters from the defendant. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997)(“predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws”); Fry v. Hayt, 198 F.R.D. 461, 470 (E.D.Pa.2000)(Robreno, J.)(<HOLDING>). While individual questions may arise in the

    ### Response:
    holding common questions of fact and law predominated where defendant sent nearly the exact same debt collection letter to all the plaintiffs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sporck, since that decision “has been widely adopted.” Id. at 4. Sporck was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in a securities fraud class action. See Sporck, 759 F.2d at 313. The relevant facts follow. In preparation for a deposition, defendant’s counsel reviewed with the client “an unknown quantity of the numerous documents produced by defendants in response to plaintiffs discovery requests.” Id. During the deposition, defendant’s counsel declined to produce all documents reviewed by the defendant, because “the selected documents represented, as a group, counsel’s legal opinion as to the evidence relevant both to the allegations in the case and possible legal defenses.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 314 (<HOLDING>). The trial court initially granted plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding that the select grouping of the documents was attorney workproduct protected from discovery by federal rule of civil procedure 26b3
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 475, 226 A.2d 186. To the contrary, the Kern court noted, the Legislature in enacting the Survivor’s Act broadly intended to afford “executors or administrators an action for any trespass done to the person or property of their testator or intestate.” Id. at 472, 226 A.2d 186. Further, the court observed, prior reported cases involving survival actions appeared to recognize, without expressly so holding, that punitive damages were in fact a permissible form of recovery under the Survivor’s Act. Id. at 474-75, 226 A.2d 186 (citing Meehan, supra, 181 F.Supp. 594 (upholding punitive damages of $1000 for reckless and wanton conduct that brought about conscious pain and suffering of decedent as well as death), and Messina v. Petroli, 11 N.J. Misc. 583, 587, 167 A. 767 (Cir.Ct.1933) (<HOLDING>)). Thus, in Kern, supra, the plaintiffs claims

    ### Response:
    holding pain and suffering compensable under survival statute and impliedly recognizing availability of punitive damages in action under executors and administrators act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did so, adopting the magistrate’s short opinion. I Illinois law requires that a criminal complaint be sworn. Ill.Rev.Stat. 38 § lll-3(b). Vaughn’s complaint was not properly sworn. Vaughn signed the complaint, but not in the presence of the attesting officer, Sgt. Heatley. Gramenos believes that on this account Vaughn and the police must pay him damages. We will assume that the procedure of attesting the signature out of the presence of the witness violates state law. It does not matter. In a suit under § 1983 the plaintiff must show a violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, not just a violation of state law. The two are not the same. E.g., Carson v. Block, 790 F.2d 562, 565 (7th Cir.1986) (collecting cases); McKinney v. George, 726 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (7th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). No principle of federal law makes a properly

    ### Response:
    holding that a warrantless arrest on probable cause does not violate the fourth amendment even if state law required the police to have prior authorization
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consent when settling or investigating the merits of a claim and the court was not permitted to write such a clause into the policy. Id. (citing Dear v. Scottsdale I eaeh-of-contract action was precluded because the policy gave Zurich the right to investigate and settle the claims at issue. 2. Negligence In its live petition, Methodist alleged Zurich, McKenney, and Vu breached a purported duty to exercise ordinary care when handling the Riegert and Fulton-Perez claims. Appellees moved for summary judgment on the ground that Texas law has not recognized a cause of action by an insured for its insurer’s negligent handling of an insurance claim in any context other than Stowers. See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Comm’n App.1929, holding approved) (<HOLDING>). Appellees again relied on Duddlesten, in

    ### Response:
    recognizing generally a liability insurer may be liable in tort for failing to accept a reasonable settlement demand within policy limits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    298 Minn. at 454, 215 N.W.2d at 610. “[E]aeh case must be decided upon its own facts.” Id. Although the United States Supreme Court has avoided establishing clear-cut guidelines as to what constitutes manifest necessity, federal case law has set forth certain criteria upon which a court’s discretion can be measured. The manifest necessity standard “is a flexible standard which seeks fairness to the defendant, the government, and the public interest alike.” United States v. Givens, 88 F.3d 608, 613 (8th Cir.1996). In reviewing a trial court’s exercise of discretion and in determining whether the mistrial was manifestly necessary, one thing we consider is whether the court adequately assessed less drastic alternatives. See United States v. Dixon, 913 F.2d 1305, 1311 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). We also look to see whether the court gave

    ### Response:
    holding that consultation with counsel and consideration of available alternatives are consistent with exercise of sound discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We owe deference to In re Ruiz-Lopez under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The BIA reasonably relied on In re Ruiz-Lopez because there is no material difference between the Washington and California statutes. Section 2800.2(a) defines the elements of the crime. To violate the California statute, the defendant must “deliberately flout[] lawful authority” by fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing officer, In re Ruiz-Lopez, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 556, just as the Washington statute requires; and the defendant must also “recklessly endanger! ] the officer, other drivers, passengers, pedestrians, or property,” id., again as is true in Washington. See Penuliar v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 603, 609-10 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>), ovemled in part on other grounds by Sykes v.

    ### Response:
    holding that under california law section 28002 requires a reckless mens rea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    clearly erroneous and, thus, will not be disturbed on appeal. Judgment affirmed. Smith, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. Decided September 8, 2011. Clegg & Petrey, John H. Petrey, for appellant. Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Stephen A. Fern, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 See, e.g., Goolsby v. State, 299 Ga. App. 330, 330-31 (682 SE2d 671) (2009); 98) (2009). 20 261 Ga. 640 (409 SE2d 649) (1991). 21 Payne, 285 Ga. at 138; see Williams, 261 Ga. at 642 (2) (b). 22 Id. 23 See Davis v. State, 279 Ga. 786, 787-88 (3) (621 SE2d 446) (2005) (finding that evidence of defendant’s murder of witnesses to the murder for which he was being tried was admissible to show defendant’s course of conduct and bent of mind); Rainey v. State, 179 Ga. App. 584, 586 (4) (347 SE2d 341) (1986) (<HOLDING>); see also McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 571 (5)

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of assault on victim that was subsequent to the arson for which defendant was tried was admissible to show defendants bent of mind toward violence directed at the victim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    distribution. See id. at 997 (“[T]he more similar the prior act is (in terms of physical similarity or mental state) to the act being proved, the more relevant it becomes.”). Thus, the evidence was relevant to Day’s intent and the absence of a mistake. In addition, the evidence was necessary to corroborate other testimony that had been challenged on credibility grounds, and to provide additional objective evidence that Day intended to join the charged conspiracy with the intent to distribute cocaine. Moreover, the admission of the conviction was not excessively prejudicial because the conviction involved the same type of drug and the conduct occurred in relatively the same time period as the offenses charged in the indictment. See United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Further, the Government gave advance notice

    ### Response:
    holding there is no unfair prejudice when the prior act is no more sensational or disturbing than the evidence admitted directly supporting the crimes with which the defendant was charged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doctrine of ejectment, entry is not a prerequisite to the action, and if the lessee has such interest in the property as gives a present right of possession, it is immaterial whether he has entered into possession before bringing the action. The right of entry, not the entry itself — the right of possession, not actual possession — are the essentials of an action in ejectment.” Ewert v. Robinson, 289 F. 740, 750-51 (8th Cir. 1923). The notion that prior possession by a lessee is necessary to trigger the right of possession is a legal fiction unrelated to our more modern view of a lessee’s contractual rights. See Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979) (opinion by Larsen, J.); id., 486 Pa. at 298-299, 405 A.2d at 910 (Roberts, J., joined by Nix and Manderino, JJ., concurring) (<HOLDING>); see also Albert M. Greenfield & Co., Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding landlord and tenants obligations mutually dependent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Silverdale, Washington, and did remain so absent until 18 June 1999. Charge Sheet. The Article 92 offense alleged that the appellant: having knowledge of a lawful order issued by CDR Steven L. Syzska, to report to the Correctional Custody Unit, an order which it was his duty to obey, did, at Naval Submarine Base Bangor, Silverdale, Washington, on or about 28 May 1999, fail to obey the same by wrongfully failing to report to the Correctional Custody Unit. Charge Sheet. Since the appellant entered unconditional guilty pleas to these two offenses at trial the issue of multiplicity is waived unless we find that the charges are facially duplicative. Lloyd, 46 M.J. at 23. When considering whether charges are facially duplicative—“that is, factually the same, 552 (N.M.Ct.Crim.App.1997)(<HOLDING>). But see, United States v. Granger, 9 USCMA

    ### Response:
    holding that an unauthorized absence of several months and missing movement were not multiplicious
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argument, the Maryland and New Jersey courts here did not delegate the setting of payment schedules to probation or the Bureau of Prisons. Rather, both courts held that payment was due immediately. Thus, there was no improper delegation by the courts of their exclusive authority to determine a payment schedule. The Bureau of Prisons was merely using the IFRP to collect Bramson’s court-ordered payments. See, e.g., Matheny v. Morrison, 307 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); McGhee v. Clark, 166 F.3d 884, 886 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that bureau of prisons may administer collection of payments through ifrp where sentencing court orders immediate payment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’ ” (quoting U.S. Const, art. II, § 3)). The Executive has a unique need to access the federal courts in order to fulfill this constitutional responsibility for ensuring that public rights are enforced, and such an executive enforcement action is a “Case” or “Controversy” that satisfies Article III. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 n. 4, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (confirming that the Court’s standing jurisprudence “derives from Article III and not Article II,” even when it has “an impact on Presidential powers”). Therefore, federal courts have jurisdiction over such executive actions under Article III. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 586, 15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895) (<HOLDING>). There is only one way for a plaintiff to

    ### Response:
    holding that when the government acts to enforce public rights the mere fact that the government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    continued the May 9, 2005, trial setting. The statute of limitations has expired. Estrada does not object to allowing Martinez to amend her pleading to substitute the appropriate party. Cornell and Estrada have indicated that they intend to assert the statute of limitation defense should Martinez seek to add the proper party in Estrada’s stead. LAW REGARDING ADMISSIONS AND MOTIONS TO AMEND Rule 8(d)’s purpose is to “apprise the plaintiff of the allegations in the complaint that stand admitted and will not be in issue at trial and those that are contested and will require proof to be established to enable plaintiff to prevail.” Yamell v. Roberts, 66 F.R.D. 417, 423 (E.D.Pa.1975)(citing 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fe citing Meschino v. N. Am. Drager, Inc., 841 F.2d at 435-36)(<HOLDING>). Federal pleading is not a game of skill and

    ### Response:
    holding that parties are bound by admissions in pleadings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    duress, is voidable, not void, and the person claiming duress must act promptly to repudiate the contract or release or he will be deemed to have waived his right to do so.”), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 915, 103 S.Ct. 1896, 77 L.Ed.2d 285 (1983). The burden of proving ratification of an invalid release rests upon Leslie Fay. Leslie Fay also argues that Kishbaugh must be deemed to have ratified the release because he did not tender back the $10,200 he received as a result of signing it. Whether the OWBPA was intended to supplant the common law doctrine of ratification is the subject of intense debate. See Reid v. IBM Corp., No. 95 Civ. 1755, 1997 WL 357969, *14 (S.D.N.Y. June 26,1997) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)); compare Blistein v. St. John’s College, 74 F.3d 1459, 1466 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Fleming v. U.S. Postal Serv., 27 F.3d 259,

    ### Response:
    holding adea release enforceable notwithstanding employers failure to conform the release to the owbpa because upon learning that the agreement is voidable the employee like the party who acted under duress can either avoid performance of the contract or accept its benefits and thereby ratify the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    146-16-146-25). 362 . Rec. Doc. 146-7 at 5-6. 363 . Rec. Doc. 172 at 3. 364 . Rec. Doc. 118-1 at 19. 365 . Id. (citing Rec. Doc. 22), 366 . Rec. Doc. 118-21 at 1; Rec. Doc. 118-22 at 1-2. 367 . Rec, Doc. 118-37; Rec. Doc. 118-38. 368 . Rec. Doc. 118-21 at 2. 369 . Rec. Doc. 11 at 19. 370 . Rec. Doc. 146-1 at 2. 371 . Rec. Doc. 11 at 21. 372 . Id. 373 . Rec. Doc. 146 at 20. 374 . Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 2007-2441 (La. 4/8/08), 988 So.2d 186, 201, on reh’g in part (July 7, 2008) (“Louisiana courts have long held that attorney's fees are not allowed except where authorized by statute or contract.”). 375 . Rec. Doc. 146 at 20. 376 . Id. at 23, 377 . La. Rev. Stat. § 22:1973(C). 378 . Katie Realty, Ltd. v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2012-0588, (La. 10/16/12), 100 So.3d 324, 330 (<HOLDING>). 379 . Batson v. S. La. Med. Ctr., 734 So.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a violation of  221973 may subject the insurer to penalties in an amount not to exceed two times the damages sustained or five thousand dollars whichever is greater attorney fees though are not recoverable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of customs violations. These officials did not need ‘to have particularized suspicions about any person or place before searching, nor were they required to justify their actions to any authority after the search.’ The Framers found these unchecked governmental actions by the British unacceptable. To ensure that their new government would not have this type of arbitrary power, and to protect against the recurrence of these unchecked governmental actions, the Framers included the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights, granting the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” See Denise Robinson, Kaupp v. Texas: Breathing Life into the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 761 (Spring 2004). This protection was, 2 S.Ct. 587, 592, 151 L.Ed.2d 497, 506-507 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In still others, the Court has dispensed with

    ### Response:
    holding that when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer who is already subject to a search condition pursuant to his probation agreement is engaged in criminal activity then there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationers  privacy interests is reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    can shift the entire loss to a particular insurer notwithstanding the existence of other insurance clauses. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. American International Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2004) (interpreting Virginia law and holding that the general rule is that an indemnity agreement between the insureds shifts the entire loss to a particular insurer notwithstanding the existence of other insurance clauses). Indeed, a majority of jurisdictions to have addressed priority of insurance coverage disputes involving additional insureds have held that the downstream/subcontractor’s insurance, including its excess insurance, should pay first and before the contractor’s own primary insurance. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., 292 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Am. Indem. Lloyds v. Travelers Prop. & Cas.

    ### Response:
    holding that excess policy issued to downstream contractor and covering upstream contractor as additional insured was liable before upstream contractors own insurance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an employer’s agent and thus a statutory “employer” for purposes of liability, are not personally liable under Title VII and similar state laws. Wathen, 115 F.3d at 405-06. Principal Rybak and Superintendent Schlachter admittedly were Pittman’s “superiors,” but they do not qualify as statutory “employers” for purposes of federal civil rights laws. There is also a limitation on what federal civil rights claims Pittman can bring against CVCC. As an arm of the State, CVCC is immune from claims brought by Pittman pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. CVCC’s immunity stems from the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. A plaintiff is precluded from directly suing a State in federal court on these claims. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 350, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)(<HOLDING>); see also Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506,

    ### Response:
    holding that  1983 does not override a states eleventh amendment immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    THE LANDLORD from any and all liability for loss, injury (including death), or damages to person or property sustained while in or on the facilities of LANDLORD, including fire .... ” (App. of Exs., tab 2.) The boat owners argue that it is not enough that the clause released the marina from all liability, it must do more by specifically referring to liability caused by the marina’s own fault. The boat owners made clear during oral argument that they do not suggest that the clause is deficient for not using the magic term “negligence,” but argue that it must refer to liability arising from the marina’s fault in some manner. We recognize that the Supreme Court of Missouri requires something more, see Alack v. Vic Tanny Int’l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 337 (Mo.1996) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), but we are applying federal maritime law,

    ### Response:
    holding that exculpatory clause in health club membership did not exculpate the facility from liability for a personal injury stemming from the facilitys negligence because the clause did not use the term negligence fault or equivalents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    facility in accordance with subsection (c) of this section. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(l). The EMTALA extends to anyone who seeks emergency room assistance, without distinction between persons with and without insurance. Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C.Cir.1991). 6 . Advantage argues in the alternative that the court “lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear any claim based on rights that P.G. Flospital may have by subrogation” because the patients did not exha (6th Cir.2002) (finding that professional medical organizations had standing to assert a § 1983 claim against state officials for violation of the Medicaid statute provisions requiring early and periodic screening; diagnosis, and treatment for Medicaid-eligible children); Mallo, 88 F.Supp.2d at 1391

    ### Response:
    holding that patient could sue state agency under  1983 for breaching its obligation under the balance billing provision of the medicaid statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by a state employee. As PWR has demonstrated, Defendant was neither subjectively ignorant nor acting in reliance upon any misleading communications from the state. We elaborate below: First, Defendant did nothing to investigate Ms. Nelson’s work status, despite the fact that the accident took place at mid-day on a work day and Ms. Nelson’s declaration that she used the vehicle to drive to and from work. See PWR Resp. 7 (citing Tucker Dep. 132:24-133:2). A claim by Defendant that it “lacked knowledge or the means of knowledge of the matter in question” here would be unpersuasive, given that even the most rudimentary inquiry into the matter would likely have disclosed Ms. Nelson’s status as a state agency employee. Cf. City of Crown Point v. Lake Cnty., 510 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Evansville v. Follis, 161

    ### Response:
    holding that estoppel cannot be applied if the facts are equally known by or accessible to both parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cargo consolidator might, as here, fail to forward the freight payment to the carrier. Under the semi-strict “assumption of risk” view — the view taken by the district court — a shipper remains liable to a carrier, regardless of the shipper’s payment to a cargo consolidator like ICTS, unless the carrier intentionally released the shipper from its duty to pay under the bill of lading. See Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Omni Lines, 106 F.3d 1544, 1546-47 (11th Cir.1997) (adopting rule of “semi-strict liability for shippers,” such that “unless the carrier intends to release the shipper from its duty to pay under the bill of lading, the shipper remains liable to the carrier, irrespective of the shipper’s payment to a [cargo consolidator]”); Strachan Shipping Co., 701 F.2d at 489-90 (<HOLDING>); Sectr-Land Serv. v. Amstar Corp., 690 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    holding that shipper is relieved of liability only if it can demonstrate that carrier actually released it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Credit Union Services. These services include, but are not limited to, the use of a share or share draft account, check cashing privileges, ATM transactions, payroll deductions, online banking, and the opening of a new account will not be permitted until the deficiency has been rectified. There will be a 10 day notice of termination sent to the member. If it is a bankruptcy, it can be sent to the attorney. 4 .Assuming the Jaspers complete their plan, BFCU will be paid a dividend of $766.83 on its $15,336.65 unsecured claim. See Order Allowing & Disallowing Claims, doc. # 44, dated December 13, 2004. 5 . BFCU does not dispute that it is a “governmental unit” within the meaning of § 525(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27); T I Federal Credit Union v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921, 930-38 (1st Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). For this case, the aptness of DelBonis’s

    ### Response:
    holding that federal credit unions are governmental units within the meaning  523a8
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1206-07 — we are also unpersuaded. As the record shows, the advisory guidelines range that is applicable in the instant case was the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence, not the range of 57 to 71 months that would have applied without the mandatory minimum sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.l(b) (providing that when a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guidelines range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guidelines sentence). Thus, the government would have requested an improper sentence had it requested a sentence within the range of 57 to 71 months because the district court was not permitted to enter a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum. See United States v. Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d 1358, 1360 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Further, although the government did not

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court is not authorized to sentence a defendant below the statutory minimum unless the government filed a substantial assistance motion pursuant to 18 usc  3553e and ussg  5k11 or the defendant falls within the safetyvalve of 18 usc  3553f
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the first element of the mere instrumentality rule articulated in Glenn, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege that Novar exercised “complete domination and control” over Indalex so that Indalex “had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own.” Thus, while Plaintiff may have alleged that Novar exercised control over Indalex, such allegations are insufficient to show that Novar exercised “complete domination and control” over Indalex as that language is defined in Glenn v. Wagner. Further, Plaintiffs Complaint contains no allegations that Indalex was a sham corporation. See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 349 (4th Cir.1998) (citing B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Spencer, 268 N.C. 1, 8, 149 S.E.2d 570, 575 (N.C.1966)) (<HOLDING>); Austin v. Granite Quarries, USA, Inc., No.

    ### Response:
    holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    law enforcement efforts. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc); see also United States v. Brooks, 367 F.3d 1128, 1133 n. 5 (9th Cir.2004) (same). “Exigent circumstances alone, however, are insufficient as the government must also show that a warrant could not have been obtained in time.” United States v. Good, 780 F.2d at 775; see also United States v. Lai, 944 F.2d 1434, 1442 (9th Cir.1991) (“Exigency necessarily implies insufficient time to obtain a warrant; therefore the Government must show that a warrant could not have been obtained in time.”); United States v. Howard, 828 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir.1986) (same); United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 522 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Our definition of exigent circumstances is

    ### Response:
    holding that as part of showing that a warrantless entry was imperative the government must demonstrate that a warrant could not have been obtained in time even by telephone under the procedure authorized by fedrcrimp 41c2
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the record neither compels, nor supports, a reversal of the IJ and BIA’s decisions. Thus, we deny the petitioners’ petition for review. PETITION DENIED. 1 . Repizo also argues that the lack of corroborative evidence to support his allegations of persecution was due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and indicates that he recendy filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings with the BIA on said grounds. Since the BIA has yet to make a determination with regard to his motion to reopen, we lack jurisdiction to review Repizo's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he has not yet exhausted his administrative remedies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir.2006)

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate jurisdiction over final orders of removal are limited to claims that have been exhausted before the bia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the trial court for an in camera inspection to determine whether they are to be disclosed. CONCURRING: G. MURRAY SNOW, Presiding Judge and PATRICK IRVINE, Judge. 1 . A Ponzi scheme is ""[a] fraudulent investment scheme in which money contributed by later investors generates artificially high dividends for the original investors, whose example attracts even larger investments."" Black’s Law Dictionary 1180 (7th ed.1999). It is named for Charles Ponzi, who in the 1920s was convicted of fraudulent schemes conducted in Boston. Id. 2 . The parties agree that the Commission waived its work-product immunity with its consulting expert, the accountant, when it designated him as an expert witness. See Emergency Care Dynamics, Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 188 Ariz. 32, 33, 932 P.2d 297, 298 (App.1997) (<HOLDING>). 3 . These are only some, but not all, of the

    ### Response:
    holding that a lawyer forgoes workproduct protection for communications with an expert witness concerning the subject of the experts testimony even if the expert also plays a consulting role
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the merits of whether the resolution in question authorized METRO to construct a light rail line along Richmond Avenue. She argues, “This is precisely the type of situation that the Texas Supreme Court had in mind when it decided the Miranda case: ‘[i]f the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder.’ ” See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227-28. We disagree. The alleged contract with the voters upon which Scarbrough bases her claims consists of Resolution 2003-93, i.e., the bond proposition itself, together with its exhibits, which the 2003 referendum approved, not extraneous documents. See Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 676 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the ripe issues raised in Scarbrough’s

    ### Response:
    holding that extraneous documents were not part of contract with voters created by voter approval of bond proposition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Florida homestead for the sole purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding her creditors. Key Bank appeals the district court’s order. II. DISCUSSION The following legal issue was the primary focus of the parties’ briefs on appeal: whether a claimed Florida homestead exemption can be successfully challenged if the home is purchased with non-exempt assets with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors in violation of Fla. Stat. § 726.105. In Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Lang, 898 F.Supp. 883 (S.D.Fla.1995), the district court answered that question in the negative. Our research leads us to believe that this question is a significant issue of Florida law with respect to which the Florida precedent is not clear. See Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So.2d 56, 60 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>); Palm Beach Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Fishbein,

    ### Response:
    holding that a homestead was exempt from civil or criminal forfeiture under floridas rico act because forfeitures are not mentioned either expressly or by reasonable implication in the three enumerated exceptions to floridas homestead exemption
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to recover obligations owed by SBMC. [Id. at p. 8]. In connection with these lawsuits, Plaintiffs incurred defense costs and had judgments entered against them personally after SBMC failed to pay the debts through its bankruptcy. [Adv. Doc. No. 17-1, p. 13]. The harm that Plaintiffs allegedly sustained in connection with lawsuits filed against them in their individual capacities is personal and entirely distinct from any harm suffered by SBMC. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ causes of action against Defendants for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation óf the DTPA that are based on suits filed against them by SBMC creditors are Plaintiffs’ direct causes of action that should not be dismissed. In re Skyport Global Commc’ns, Inc., 2011 WL 111427 (Bankr.S.D.Tex. Jan. 13, 2011) (<HOLDING>). c. Derivative Causes of Action The Complaint

    ### Response:
    holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The second (categorical) classification traditionally “comprises cases in which the Court implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical restrictions on the death penalty,” but was recently expanded by the Supreme Court to include term-of-years sentences in narrow instances. See id. Walker asserts that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment both categorically and as-applied. A. Walker argues that his 180-month sentence categorically violates the Eighth Amendment under Graham. However, this court has concluded that Graham does not apply in cases where the defendant receives a sentence that is “less severe” than a life sentence. See United States v. Jones, 476 Fed.Appx. 651, 652 (6th Cir.2012) (unpublished); United States v. Moore, 643 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Further, this circuit’s holdings emphasize

    ### Response:
    holding sentences of life without parole unique in their severity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Verdell Harvey challenges the trial court’s summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Harvey’s motion contained five claims. We affirm the trial court’s rulings without discussion on four of the claims, but we reverse and remand with directions to the trial court on the fifth claim. Harvey was convicted of second-degree murder. In his motion, Harvey alleges that the trial court erred by not reclassifying this conviction from a first-degree felony to a life felony. In other words, Harvey alleges that the trial court erred by imposing a habitual offender sentence because the conviction was a life felony based on the use of a weapon. See, e.g., Nathan v. State, 689 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). In order to enhance a conviction based on the

    ### Response:
    holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    changes in the terms and conditions of employment”); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 783 (1st Cir.1990) (“[A]n isolated sexual advance, without more, does not satisfy the requirement that an employee asserting a cause of action for hostile environment discrimination demonstrate an abusive workplace environment.”). There was no proof that Peter Rodriguez touched or physically threatened Pomales. While we do not preclude the possibility of a single-incident hostile work environment claim based on exclusively verbal conduct, successful single-incident claims typically have involved unwanted physical contact. See Barbara Lindemann & Paul Gross-man, Employment Discrimination Law at 795 n. 240 (3d ed.1996) (collecting cases). Finally, Pomales presented no h Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of a single battery and two offensive remarks over six months did not establish a hostile environment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Although the BIA noted that the ability of Padilla’s mother to remain in Honduras unharmed undermined Padilla’s CAT claim, that finding does not equate to “changed circumstances” sufficient for rebuttal. Compare Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir.1999) (well-founded fear diminished where family members continued to live in her native country), with Islami v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 391, 397 (2d Cir.2005) (requiring government to show that “country conditions have changed radically” to establish a fundamental change in circumstances sufficient to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution (emphasis added)), overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. D.O.J., 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir.2007), and Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Because this presumption applies equally to

    ### Response:
    holding that aliens return trip did not rebut the presumption because the government cannot satisfy its burden  simply by showing that applicant enjoyed periods with no new persecution or that applicant will not perpetually be persecuted in her native country
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    state actor deprived him of a pro tected property interest without due process of law. See Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 322 (7th Cir.1996). The District argues that (1) Kiser did not have a property interest in his continued employment and, (2) even if he had such an interest, his own allegations establish that his due process rights were not violated. As to the first argument, the critical question is whether Kiser had a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to continued employment. Thornton v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 1380, 1386 (7th Cir.1989) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). Every contract that limits the reasons an employee may be terminated creates such an entitlement. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (<HOLDING>). Kiser’s contract was to last through June 30,

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff had an employment interest until the date his appointment terminated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    summary judgment: (1) the action was barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the action was barred by the plaintiff’s laches; (3) the plaintiff failed to exhaust his remedies under the grievance procedure of the collective bargaining agreement; (4) the Union is a necessary and indispensable party. The trial court’s ruling was based solely on the first ground, and that is our primary concern here. However, since defendant also relies on the other grounds on this appeal, we will also deal with them. Whether jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship or § 301 of the LMRA, the law of Nebraska relative to the appropriate statute of limitations applies. See International Union, United Automobile, etc. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L. Ed.2d 192 (1966) (<HOLDING>). Nebraska has a statute of limitations of four

    ### Response:
    holding that absent an applicable federal statute of limitations state statutes of limitations should be applied in  301 cases if they are not in conflict with federal policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Court construes each count as if it were alleged against both Siemens and Dandekar. 3 . The Court construes Count IV as a state law claim because neither Title VII nor Section 1981 is mentioned as a basis for this count, and Plaintiff's response only proffers state law arguments. (R. 27, Pl.’s Resp. at 12.) 4 . Were the Court to consider these additional documents, the Court would need to exercise its discretion and convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 12(d). Because the Court finds that consideration of such documents would not change its analysis, however, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgement. See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 583 (7th Cir.2009)

    ### Response:
    holding that district court has discretion when deciding to convert a defendants motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    commitments, the City has remained determined to implement the Lodi Environmental Remediation Program without imposing the burden of Site response costs on the City's innocent taxpayers or ratepayers. Accordingly, the City has sought to borrow from the capital markets additional funds on terms that would not impact the general or special funds of the City of Lodi. To that end, the City of Lodi identified a lender that was willing to provide funds to the City of Lodi for implementation of the Lodi Environmental Remediation Program on terms acceptable to the City Council. 33 . To date, we have declined to decide whether a municipality is a ""private party” or the ""State,” i.e., the government, for purposes of CERCLA § 107(a)(4). See Washington State Dep’t of Transp., 59 F.3d at 800 & n. 5 (<HOLDING>). Thus, it is not clear whether Lodi would

    ### Response:
    holding that state administrative departments and agencies are within cerclas definition of state under  107a4 and declining to reach the question whether a municipality is the state under that provision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    construe the channels of public disclosure specified in § 3730(e)(4)(A). See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, — U.S.-,-, 131 S.Ct. 1885, 1891, 179 L.Ed.2d 825 (2011) (noting that the “sources of public disclosure in § 3730(e)(4)(A), especially ‘news media,’ suggest that the public disclosure bar provides ‘a broa[d] sweep’ ”). Courts in our Circuit, for example, have construed the term “news media” to include readily accessible websites. See United States ex rel Green v. Serv. Contract Educ. & Training Trust Fund, 843 F.Supp.2d 20, 32 (D.D.C.2012). Courts have also broadly construed the term “administrative reports” to include publiely-searchable databases. See United States ex rel. Rosner v. WB/Stellar IP Owner, L.L.C., 739 F.Supp.2d 396, 407 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (<HOLDING>). Here, the defendants argue that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a public database on a city agencys website was an administrative report subject to public disclosure bar
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    negligent failure-to-warn cause of action. See Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 842 F.Supp.2d 791, 796-97 (E.D.Pa.2012) (Robreno, J.) (""Products-liability theories, including strict products liability, are well within maritime law” and include ""three distinct theories of liability: manufacturing defects, design defects, and defects based on inadequate warnings”) (citing East River Steamship Corp., 476 U.S. at 865, 106 S.Ct. 2295; Ocean Barge Transport Co. v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 726 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir.1984); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998) (previously Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (esp. comments h and j))); Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir.2005). 13 . See, e.g., Russo v. Abex Corp., 670 F.Supp. 206, 207 (E.D.Mich.1987) (<HOLDING>); Menna v. JohnsManville Corp., 585 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    our review of the summary-judgment evidence. See Science Spectrum, Inc., 941 S.W.2d at 911. These issues are encompassed by our disposition of the three specific issues that we address below, all of which Orion has supported with argument and authorities, as required by rule 38.1(h). See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h) (requiring that appellant’s brief contain arguments to support contentions). Because Orion has not supported its first and fifth issues with additional arguments that are independent of and distinct from its second, third, and fourth issues, we deem the first and fifth issues addressed by and disposed of by our analysis of Orion’s second, third, and fourth issues. See id,.; Henriquez v. Cemex Mgmt., Inc., 177 S.W.3d 241, 255 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Breach of Contract As part of its fourth

    ### Response:
    holding broad malooly  point sufficient to support contention challenging all possible grounds on which summary judgment rendered if supported by argument distinguishing malooly bros inc 461 sw2d at 121
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    adequately to explain the distinction it has drawn proves fatal to its regulation as applied in this case. II. Beads ISKCON also wants to go on selling two types of beads at its stand on the Mall. One type apparently serves as an instrument of prayer and meditation while the other serves to identify the wearer as a devotee of Krishna. ISKCON’s sale of the former is of no moment to the First Amendment; those beads may be an aid to spiritual activity, but they are not in themselves communicative. I presume that the Park Service could not prohibit the use of a rosary or perhaps of a prayer mat on the Mall, but that does not mean that it must also allow vendors to sell them there. See There to Care, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana Department of Revenue, 19 F.3d 1165, 1167 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The so-called identification beads, on the

    ### Response:
    holding words used in bingo game not protected because they did not convey ideas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from cross-industry salary surveys, the court found that this expert opinion failed to ""address the main question confronting the Court — whether members of the Proposed Class are sufficiently cohesive with respect to the employment opportunities available to them.” Id. at *10. 10 . To be sure, the court in Fleischman adhered to its decision to deny class certification as to the issues of antitrust impact and damages, even after the plaintiffs in that case retained Dr. Ashenfelter as an additional expert whose benchmark analysis offered a means by which the plaintiffs could potentially establish antitrust impact and damages through common proof. This ruling, however, was based in part on procedural considerations that are not pertinent here. See Fleischman, 2010 WL 681992 at *3 (<HOLDING>). To the extent that the court further

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs were not permitted to present a new benchmark analysis from dr ashenfelter that rested upon previously discoverable data
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that [section 301] creates federal jurisdiction only over parties to the contract being sued upon.” Id. at 583. Plaintiff also cites Service, Hospital, Nursing Home, and Public Employees Union v. Commercial Property Services, Inc., 755 F.2d 499, 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850, 106 S.Ct. 147, 88 L.Ed.2d 122 (1985), in which the Sixth Circuit held that “a district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a non-signatory to a collective bargaining agreement, where no rights or duties are stated in the terms and conditions of the agreement.” 755 F.2d at 506. However, in each of those cases, the plaintiff filed suit directly under § 301, seeking to recover against a non-signatory to the collective bargaining agreement, and the courts w . 1054, 1056-57 (E.D.Mich.1995) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff has cited to no authority to the

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a composite frequency for defendant’s six-loci genotype. At the Rule 104 hearing, the defense’s expert, Dr. Shaler, did not contest the accuracy of Cellmark’s databases. Instead, he relied on them in his own statistical calculations. Although the defense still does not criticize the databases, it contends that the State’s population databases were not large enough to be an accurate sampling of the population. Post at 291, 699 A.2d at 682. In addition, the defense never sought to introduce evidence disputing the general acceptance or the mathematical soundness of the product rule. Even on this appeal, the defense does not challenge the use of the product rule. Indeed, the defense states that “everyone agrees that the product rule is absolutely valid.” The dissent, how 2d 799, 803 (1995) (<HOLDING>); State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 317

    ### Response:
    holding that product rule method of dna statistical evidence is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    required to decide whether they had subject matter jurisdiction over those federal claims. In contrast, in the instant case, this Court’s jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff has not asserted any claims under § 301. She has asserted only state law claims. The question before this Court is whether non-signatories to a CBA can invoke § 301 preemption as a defense to a plaintiffs state law claims. Several courts have held that they can. See Covenant Coal, 977 F.2d at 899-900; Dashields v. Robertson, No. 99-1124, 2000 WL 564024, at *2 n. 8 (4th Cir. May 10, 2000) (“section 301 can preempt claims against non-signatories to a collective bargaining agreement”); Mullins v. International Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 77, 214 F.Supp.2d 655, 668 (E.D.Va.2002)(<HOLDING>). See also Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 878

    ### Response:
    holding that  301 preempts state claims against nonsignatories where interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is required for resolution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the plaintiffs emotional distress; and (4) the distress suffered was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc., 111 N.J. 355, 366, 544 A.2d 857 (1988). Defendants submit that Kounelis’s IIED claim must fail because his distress cannot be characterized as severe. Defendants assert that, despite Kounelis’s allegations of emotional distress, he has never been treated for his alleged anxiety, nor has he presented any objective medical evidence suggesting that his emotional distress was the proximate result of Defendants’ conduct. Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, neither medical treatment, nor expert testimony is necessary in order for a plaintiff to prevail on an IIED claim. Bolden v. SEPTA, 21 F.3d 29, 34 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, in New Jersey, there is generally no

    ### Response:
    holding that expert testimony is not required to corroborate a claim for emotional distress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a tax return). Le Doux also challenges her liability for frivolous return penalties because she contends that she did not receive a proper Form 17 Notice and Demand. This argument is without merit. The IRS may send notice and demand on any form so long as it includes the information that 26 U.S.C. § 6303 requires. See Long v. United States, 972 F.2d 1174, 1181(10th Cir.1992)(“Not only does the IRS Manual not confer on the taxpayer a substantive right to receive a particular form, but also ‘the form on which a notice of assessment and demand for payment is made is irrelevant as long as it provides the taxpayer with all the information required under 26 U.S.C. 6303(a).’ ’’)(quoting Elias v. Connett, 908 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir.1990)); Jones v. Commissioner, 338 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir.2003)(<HOLDING>); Hoffman v. United States, 209 F.Supp.2d 1089,

    ### Response:
    holding notice of balance due satisfies notice and demand requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are different because the obligations of the insurance company are different depending upon whether the claim is based upon a “first-party” contract or a “third-party” relationship. That is, “the theory underlying the tort of bad faith settlement of a first-party claim is that there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” and this “covenant is dependent upon a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the insurer.” Id. at 776. In contrast, the “theory underlying the liability” in a third-party case is predicated upon “a fiduciary relationship between the insured and insurer[.]” Id. at 772-773. The second case which convinces me that Nebraska would adopt the general rule is American Driver Svc., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 10 Neb.App. 318, 631 N.W.2d 140 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In arriving at this decision, the Nebraska

    ### Response:
    holding that no fiduciary relationship existed between insured and insurance company providing workers compensation coverage where insured sued for overpayment of premiums thus there was no basis for tolling the statute of limitations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Referring to the Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 9-03 (2002 ed. rev.), which had been provided to the jurors. 7 . At the outset, we reject Ms. Blackwell’s argument that because this was a complex medical malpractice case with no fewer than four breaches of the applicable standard of care alleged, the jury was obligated to reach unanimity on each theory of breach before determining whether a particular breach proximately caused Ms. Bowman’s death. The trial court correctly noted that, by consenting to a verdict form that simply asked one single question about breach instead of requesting a special verdict form specifically addressing each of the alleged breaches, appellants forfeited this argument. See Burke v. Scaggs, 867 A.2d 213, 221 (D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>); Nimetz v. Cappadona, 596 A.2d 603, 606-08

    ### Response:
    holding in a medical malpractice case involving several theories of liability that the appellant by not requesting a special verdict form has forfeited his right to complain on appeal that the jury might not have been unanimous in its views
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018; see also Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (citing Monell). Counties, like municipalities, cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382. The county must be the “moving force” behind the injury. See id. át 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382. The district court properly found that Fox has neither alleged nor presented any evidence that Hartrum and Van Oosterum acted pursuant to county policy or custom when they refused to return Fox’s driver’s license. No evidence indicates that this was anything more than a one-time, isolated event for which the county is not responsible. Cf. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (<HOLDING>). Fox also claims that Stewart failed to

    ### Response:
    holding that absent a formal policy a section 1983 plaintiff must establish that the deprivation was  caused by a governmental custom
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 731 (5th Cir.1999). The evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 n. 2 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc). Due deference is given to the credibility determinations of the district court. United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 437 (5th Cir.2002). 3. Walker alleges that the search of her car was improper. The initial encounter with Walker was a valid stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), because the officers had information from a reliable Cl; they knew Walker had been involved in drug trafficking in the past; and they knew that she was located in a high drug-trafficking area. See United States v. Gonzalez, 190 F.3d 668, 672-73 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We must also consider whether the officers’

    ### Response:
    holding that a tip may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the capacity of the proposed ward. Section 684(a)(1) of the Probate Code states as much. Furthermore, given the plain wording of section 643, an applicant for guardianship is entitled to have the jury address that fact, assuming its provisions are satisfied. So, if Green was correct in his reading of section 692, then the applicant would be obligated to prove to the trial court that the proposed ward was an incapacitated person in order to win the right to prove the same thing to a jury. In short, two trials would be required; one to a trial court in order to secure one to a jury. Yet, such an inefficient and wasteful result would be absurd and hardly that intended by the legislature. See Cooper v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 985 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Next, and again assuming the accuracy of

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute cannot be construed in a manner that would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    440 (1981); Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 669-70, 93 S.Ct. 1197, 35 L.Ed.2d 618 (1973) (per curiam). Restrictions on student speech do not violate the First Amendment when educators exercise “editorial control over the style and content of student speech” that is “school-sponsored,” provided “their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988). Here, Keefe’s speech was off-campus, was not school-sponsored, and cannot be reasonably attributed to the school. Hazelwood’s “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” test is therefore inapplicable in this case. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 882

    ### Response:
    holding that hazelwood does not control this case because no one would reasonably believe that a students banner bore the schools imprimatur
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Rolling v. Emrich, 122 Wis. 134, 99 N.W. 464, 465 (1904). See also Simon v. Pettit, 687 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Colo.1984) (""evidence that the city had maintained the footpaths or included them on a map of the city’s street system would be a strong indication that the paths had acquired a status as public highways”); Hatch Bros. Co. v. Black, 25 Wyo. 109, 165 P. 518, 520 (1917) (noting that “those using the road had done considerable work thereon by making dugways, constructing bridges, etc.; one witness testifying that he had spent about $500 on it about 1891”) superseded by statute as noted in Yeager v. Forbes, 78 P.3d 241, 255 (Wyo.2003). 34 . The same is true of the construction of railroads. See Jamestown & N. R.R. Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 125, 132, 20 S.Ct. 568, 44 L.Ed. 698 (1900) (<HOLDING>). 35 . SUWA quotes this Court’s Hodel decision

    ### Response:
    holding that railroad right of way under the act of march 3 1875 ch 152 18 stat 482 vested upon actual construction of the road
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    way, generally somewhat raised, especially intended for pedestrians, and adapted to their use, usually constructed in this country as a part of the street at or along the side of the part thereof especially designed and constructed for the passage of vehicles and animals, there being often, if not generally, a gutter, also constituting a portion of the street, between such parts; and when the sidewalk is spoken of as being on a specific side of a designated street, it is to be understood to be a part so reserved of that street at or along the specific side of the roadway.” Central Life Assurance Soc’y v. City of Des Moines, 185 Iowa 573, 577, 171 N.W. 31, 32 (1919) (quoting Wabash R.R. v. DeHart, 32 Ind.App. 62, 64, 65 N.E. 192, 193 (1902)) (citations omitted). This def , 561 (1936) (<HOLDING>); City of Elmhurst v. Buettgen, 394 Ill. 248,

    ### Response:
    holding that in a city or town a sidewalk is that part of a street or highway that is intended or used by pedestrians
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    North Carolina is commonly called an “absolute” jurisdiction, but its holdings that refusal cannot be reconsidered involve consent given outside the thirty-minute period. See Etheridge v. Peters, 269 S.E.2d 133, 136 (N.C. 1980) (finding willful refusal to submit to test after statutory thirty-minute period had expired); Seders v. Powell, 259 S.E.2d 544, 548-50 (N.C. 1979) (same). These cases do not make clear whether an operator may reconsider a refusal within the thirty-minute period. ¶ 18. The many courts that allow operators to reconsider a refusal coalesce around two rationales: (1) fairness to the operator, and (2) furthering the purpose of implied-consent statutes by encouraging the administration of chemical tests in as many cases as possible. See, e.g., Gaunt, 666 P.2d at 527 (<HOLDING>); Moore, 614 P.2d at 935 (“We . . . decline to

    ### Response:
    recognizing clarity afforded by absolute rule but concluding that it could lead to unnecessarily harsh and selfdefeating results
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it did not, Connecticut law abolished the doctrine of assumption of risk when the state adopted its comparative negligence regime in 1973. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-572h(i) (“The legal doctrines of last clear chance and assumption of risk to which this section is applicable are abolished.”); Wendland v. Ridgefield Constr. Servs., Inc., 190 Conn. 791, 797, 462 A.2d 1043 (1983); Gomeau v. Forrest, 176 Conn. 523, 525-26, 409 A.2d 1006 (1979); Sabella v. Fritz, No. CV116007373S, 2012 WL 1870979, at *2 (Conn.Super. May 2, 2012) (barring assumption of risk claims “couched in negligence language”); Cahill v. Carella, 43 Conn.Supp. 168, 173, 648 A.2d 169 (Conn.Super.1994) (doctrine of assumption of risk abolished); see also Eichelberg v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 57 F.3d 1179, 1188 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). To date, the Connecticut Supreme Court has

    ### Response:
    recognizing connecticut general statute  52572hi and state case law had eliminated doctrine of assumption of risk
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    show that 1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; 2) DOCCS is an entity subject to the acts; and 3) he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from DOCCS’s services, programs, or activities or DOCCS otherwise discriminated against him by reason of his disability. Id. Wright undoubtedly satisfies the first two elements: DOCCS does not dispute that Wright is a qualified individual because he suffers from cerebral palsy and scoliosis or that DOCCS is an entity that is subject to the statutes. Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that DOCCS is subject to the ADA and RA). Both the ADA and the RA undoubtedly apply to state prisons and their prisoners. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (<HOLDING>). The parties, however, dispute the third

    ### Response:
    holding the ada unmistakably includes state prisons and prisoners within its coverage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    property “is not an exact science and, therefore, all that is required is that the distribution be equitable.” Kasser v. Kasser, 2006 VT 2, ¶ 30, 179 Vt. 259, 895 A.2d 134 (citation omitted). An equitable award does not, however, mean an equal one. Goodrich v. Goodrich, 158 Vt. 587, 593, 613 A.2d 203, 206 (1992). “A disparate property division is not ‘facially inequitable,’ and will not be reversed as long as the family court makes adequate findings that are supported by the evidence.” MacCormack, 2015 VT 64, ¶ 17 (quoting Wade v. Wade, 2005 VT 72, ¶ 20, 178 Vt. 189, 878 A.2d 303). Furthermore, we note that where the court finds that one party is primarily responsible for the debt, it acts within its discretion when it assigns all the debt to that party. See Wade, 2005 VT 72, ¶ 17 (<HOLDING>). We will thus uphold the family court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that it was within family courts discretion to assign all debt to one party when court found that party to be at fault for debt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    5 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See Pa. Const, sched. art. 5, § 16(f), (i). As a result, this Court concludes that regardless of how plaintiff was appointed to the position of President Judge, the holding in Blake is still applicable to the instant case. With regard to the liberty interest asserted by plaintiff, plaintiff argues that the actions of defendant constitute a liberty interest; defamation must be combined with a more tangible interest under state law, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has already held that a President Judge has no legal interest under state law in his administrative duties and responsibilities. See Petition of Blake, 593 A.2d at 1269 n. 2; see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1165, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Clark v. Township of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 620

    ### Response:
    holding that defamation by a state official alone does not violate a liberty interest of a plaintiff absent the alteration or extinguishment of a right or status previously recognized by state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    precisely assert a paramount title to Tracts A and A2. In fact, they conceded Mother held legal title to these tracts. Rather, they asserted they held equitable title to the tracts and sought specific performance as a remedy for Mother’s alleged breach of the contracts to sell the tracts. Further, our appellate courts have traditionally viewed the main purpose of a cause of action seeking specific performance as the pursuit of equitable relief and thus have found such a claim to be equitable in nature. See Ingram v. Kasey’s Assocs., 340 S.C. 98, 105, 531 S.E.2d 287, 290-91 (2000) (applying the equitable standard of review to the findings of fact in a specific performance action); Lowcountry Open Land Trust v. Charleston S. Univ., 376 S.C. 399, 406, 656 S.E.2d 775, 779 (Ct. App. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Based on the foregoing, we view the two

    ### Response:
    holding that an action for specific performance lies in equity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court cases noted above, did not attempt to define the word “race” nor did it provide a distinction between race and national origin. In the years following the Agnew decision the Ninth Circuit has been presented with a number of cases in which plaintiffs alleging membership in distinctive groups of the population brought suit pursuant to section 1981. In each of these cases the district court had either dismissed the complaint or entered judgment in favor of the defendants. In each instance the circuit court reversed and allowed the plaintiff to sue under section 1981 without any discussion of whether the claims involved discrimination on the basis of race or national origin or of whether such distinction could be made. See Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1975) (<HOLDING>); Sethy v. Alameda County Water District, 545

    ### Response:
    holding that american indian plaintiffs had appropriately pled a claim under section 1981
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    presented to the courts of last resort — state and federal— will be resolved on other grounds and not by answering this debatable question about the net impact of different rules of law on freedom of expression by performing artists. A more compelling ground for resolving the issue is that legal constraints protecting freedom of expression are primarily designed as a shield, not a sword. They may be invoked generally in defense of freedom and only rarely to sustain an action for damages. The legal system stands ready to shield freedom against unlawful governmental intrusion, but reluctant to use the sword of damages to vindicate one claim of freedom by striking down another. Cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920-32, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3430-36, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982) (<HOLDING>). In a system of equal justice, a conception of

    ### Response:
    holding that first amendment principles preclude recovery under state law for damages caused by speech or other protected conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (quoting United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir.1984)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923, 107 S.Ct. 329, 93 L.Ed.2d 302 (1986). The authority for this proposition derives from the opinion in Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893), where, in interpret t have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. We see an obvious and overwhelming nexus in time, causation, and logic between Novak's willful and repeated violations of the lawful conditions of his supervised release and the sentencing proceeding imposing those conditions in the first place. Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the pre-Aguilar analysis of our sister circuit in Haiti v. United States, 260 F.2d 744, 746 (9th Cir.1958) (<HOLDING>), and its progeny. 12 . Indeed, the government

    ### Response:
    holding that interference with terms of anothers probation was not interference with due administration of justice under  1503 reading omnibus clause of  1503 narrowly ejusdem generis to relate to conduct designed to interfere with the process of arriving at an appropriate judgment in a pending case and which disturb the ordinary and proper functions of the court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prior litigation. See Response to Motion, dkt. no. 22, P-2 However, the Defendant contends that the issues decided by the state court are not identical to the issues concerning the nondischargeability claim because the April 4 Order did not establish the existence of an express trust. In support, the Defendant asserts, without any supporting authority, that a fiduciary relationship under § 523(a)(4) is limited to express and technical trusts. The Defendant is mistaken. The Seventh Circuit has made clear that a fiduciary duty for purposes of § 523(a)(4) also applies in circumstances which, “while not involving trusts in a formal sense, seemed to call for the imposition of the same high standard.” In re Marchiando, at 1115; see also In re McDade, 282 B.R. 650, 658 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2002) (<HOLDING>); In re Odeh, 431 B.R. 807, 816

    ### Response:
    recognizing that fiduciary relationships may arise for nondischargeability purposes outside of express trusts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to collect attorney’s fees, and the condo association was not “bound to accept something less than the full sum to which it was entitled.” Id. at 471. We further held that the expenditure of $46,548.64 in attorneys fees was not unreasonable to recover $1,200 in outstanding condo association fees because of the nature of the litigation. Id. However, we have also held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding a homeowners’ association only a portion of its fees where the association did not prevail on all of its claims and where the trial court conducted a thorough review of the record, which included a detailed worksheet on litigation expenses. The Ridings at Whitpain, 811 A.2d at 1116; accord Township of South Whitehall v. Karoly, 891 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, we concluded that a trial court

    ### Response:
    holding that the ridings at whitpain does not require a reduction in an attorney fee award for an unsuccessful complaint but simply concluded that a trial court was justified in reducing the award if the record supported such a decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890, 101 S.Ct. 247, 66 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), rejected the Board’s conclusion that it was an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge union officials who disobeyed a contract term requiring union officials to take positive steps to terminate contractually forbidden strikes. As the same court later noted, in a summary of the Gould decision, “where a collective bargaining agreement explicitly requires union officers and representatives to use every reasonable effort to terminate an unauthorized ‘work stoppage,’ an employer may single out for disciplinary discharge a union steward who fails to take affirmative steps to terminate that work stoppage.” Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>). The Seventh Circuit has reached the same

    ### Response:
    holding that where contract does not authorize employers selective discharge of union officials discharge violates section 8a3
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    manufacture a controlled substance. The order of the Superi- or Court affirming the judgment of sentence is vacated. This case is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County for resentencing in accordance with the terms of this Opinion. Justice TODD did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. Chief Justice CASTILLE, and Justices SAYLOR, EAKIN and BAER, and Justice GREENSPAN join the opinion. 1 . 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32) 2 . 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) 3 . 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3302 4 . 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903 5 . Additional sentences on the offenses relating to possessing drug paraphernalia and risking a catastrophe either merged with or were to run concurrently with Appellant's other sentences, and are not at issue on this appeal. 6 . Cf. Dickson, supra at 109 (<HOLDING>). 7 . The 1972 Official Comment to 18 Pa.C.S. §

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on a person convicted of a crime of violence if the person visibly possessed a firearm or replica of a firearm cannot be applied to a coconspirator who did not visibly possess a firearm or replica
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    concluded that plaintiffs’ claims generally meet the preliminary standard set by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the SRA, the Court must determine whether plaintiffs have pled with particularity all facts on which their beliefs about the falsity of defendants statements are formed. At this point in the analysis, the line between pleading falsity and pleading fraud becomes blurred. As defendants note, in the Second Circuit, the information and belief pleading requirement appears to be an integral part of the strong inference standard for pleading scienter. See Philip Morris, 75 F.3d at 812-813 (finding that plaintiffs’ allegations of negative internal reports failed to support claims of falsity and scienter); Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172-73 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Crystal v. Foy, 562 F.Supp. 422, 424-25

    ### Response:
    holding that conclusory allegation of leak of confidential information without more failed to create inference of fraudulent intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    except as otherwise provided, be brought in the county wherein such place is situated.” Both parties agree the contract did not specify a location in which it was to be performed. Nonetheless, Abernethy claims, because the payments were to be made to him in Johnson County, the contract was assumed to be performed in Johnson County. The district court agreed with this conclusion. However, “a contract to pay at a particular place arising from implication of law is not sufficient” such that section 616.7 would apply. Bechtel v. Dist. Ct., 215 Iowa 295, 245 N.W. 299, 300 (1932). Due to the lack of specification with regard to the locality of performance, Iowa Code section 616.7 is not a vehicle through which the suit may be brought outside of Schmitt’s resident county. See id, at 300 — 01 (<HOLDING>). In addition, the district court also relied

    ### Response:
    holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not the Columbia County Probation and Parole Office — as a defendant, and avers that “Defendant Columbia County is a municipality within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that, at all times relevant hereto, operated the Columbia County Probation Department.” .App. 1220. However, Columbia County denied this claim in its answer, stating that “it is specifically denied that Columbia County operated the County Probation Department with respect to the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint,” and asserting that “Defendant Panetta was acting as an officer of the court, which is a branch of the state for purposes of the alleged claims.” App. 1288. This assertion'is sup ported by the rule this Court articulated in Benn v. First Judicial District of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>), which we underscored in Haybarger, 551 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that pennsylvanias judicial districts are entitled to immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evaluated as a whole, [it] is in substantial compliance with the applicable requirements [of the NCP] and results in a CERCLA-quality cleanup.” 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i). See 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(4) (a party that “substantially complies” with the requirements of the NCP may pursue a cost-recovery action); Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. v. East Bay Regional Park District, 135 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1100 (N.D.Cal.2001) (stating that the EPA shifted to this flexible “case-by-case” standard “to avoid discouraging private parties from cleaning up hazardous wastes for fear that recovery of their costs would later be precluded by less than perfect compliance with the NCP,” citing 55 Fed.Reg. 8792-94). See also Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 24 F.3d 1565, 1576 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Actions are not consid ered inconsistent with

    ### Response:
    holding that strict compliance is not required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2003) (emphasis added). Thus, in three different statutory provisions, Congress has provided that a court shall dismiss a prisoner’s complaint if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. In Black’s Law Dictionary, the word “shall” is defined as follows: As used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is generally imperative or mandatory. In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term “ 07 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (<HOLDING>); and Hughes v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 1301, 1302,

    ### Response:
    holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    actually charged “were bargain rates”). Rather, the bankruptcy court considered the quality and efficiency of counsel’s services. The court’s conclusion that $200 per hour was a reasonable rate is not an abuse of discretion. In short, the bankruptcy court and district court permissibly calculated fees and costs. As the district court noted, a recalculation may be required as a result of the remand to the bankruptcy court, but no error in the award of fees and costs appears to date. AFFIRMED. 1 . The Bank filed no cross-appeal. Therefore, the Bank's argument that we should reverse the district court’s holding that Plaintiffs held equitable title to the Property is not properly before us. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 479, 119 S.Ct. 1430, 143 L.Ed.2d 635 (1999) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The Bank relies on Stanley v. Crossland,

    ### Response:
    holding that in the absence of a crossappeal an appellee may urge affirmance of the lower courts ruling on any basis appearing in the record but may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    membership in a prison gang. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir.2005) (res judicata); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir.2003) (failure to exhaust). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed the due process claims because they have already been litigated by the parties or their privies in state court. See Acuna v. Kirkland, No. HC-PB-05-0005242, slip op. at 1 (Cal.Super.Ct. Oct. 6, 2006); In re Arcadio Acuna, No. HCPB06-5235, slip op. at 3 (Cal.Super.Ct. Apr. 6, 2007); see also Kay v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 504 F.3d 803, 808 (9th Cir.2007) (setting forth elements of res judicata under California law); Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The district court properly dismissed the

    ### Response:
    holding that because of the nature of a state habeas proceeding a decision actually rendered should preclude an identical issue from being relitigated in a subsequent  1983 action if the state habeas court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the issue to be heard and determined under federal standards
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    California, Sacramento Division. In this action, plaintiffs sought to compel the BIA to issue a decision on the pending appeals. Because the BIA indicated that it would issue its decision, that case was dismissed as moot. 4 . Plaintiffs erroneously argue that this Court may apply a lesser standard than that set forth in Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., -U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 365, 375, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). In considering preliminary injunctions after Winter, Ninth Circuit cases have unanimously rejected this notion. See e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns. Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir.2009) (""To the extent that our cases have suggested a lesser standard, they are no longer controlling, or even viable.”); Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 571 F.3d 960, 977 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the winter court rejected the ninth circuit sliding scale test because it was too lenient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    so severe as to alter plaintiffs working conditions. Plaintiffs deposition testimony and other evidence in the record indicates that his working environment prior to this incident was generally amicable. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. A, Jones Dep. at 52 (stating that the emp ances, including the plaintiffs and Mr. Wallace’s working relationship over the prior two years, plaintiffs failure to ever voice any complaints to management that Mr. Wallace’s behavior allegedly made plaintiff uncomfortable, and the fact that the conditions of plaintiffs working environment were not altered, there being nothing in the record indicating that prior to or after this incident plaintiff was unable to perform efficiently in his work environment due to Mr. Wallace’s conduct, see Lee-Crespo, 354 F.3d 34, 45-46 (<HOLDING>), the Court grants summary judgment to the

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff did not establish a severe or pervasive hostile work environment where the complained of conduct was episodic but not so frequent as to become pervasive was never severe was never physically threatening though occasionally discomforting or mildly humiliating and significantly was never according to the record an impediment to the plaintiffs work performance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    specific securities.” 241 F.Supp.2d at 220; see also id. at 221-22. In fact, the complaint specifically alleges that defendants’ misrepresentations about the source of their investment advice were intended to and did cause plaintiffs and the putative class members to pay premium brokerage commissions — commissions which accrued only upon the purchase or sale of securities. We held in Dabit that such claims are preempted by SLUSA because they allege misstatements “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities as that term was interpreted by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 122 S.Ct. 1899, 153 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). See Dabit, 395 F.3d at 48-49 (citing Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820, 825); accord Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 299-300 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The contract and negligence claims fare no

    ### Response:
    holding that slusa preempts claims which allege a material misrepresentation or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of securities whether or not that allegation is an element of or otherwise necessary to the putative state claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    notes that pimp can be used as an insult, but can also mean “cool.” See The Online Slang Dictionary, at http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/ wrader/slang/p.html# top (visited July 29, 2002). See also http://www.slang-site.eom/slang/P.html (visited July 29, 2002) (defining “pimp” variously as “when complimenting a person on their mastery of the subject matter;” “a headhunter, recruiter, or account executive;” “a cigarette filled with tobacco or anything else you can smoke;” and to “plug, promote”). While Plaintiffs are correct that their prescribed meaning is not unreasonable, this assertion misses the point. In First Amendment jurisprudence, it is not the meaning prescribed by or the effect on the listener that controls. See e.g. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (<HOLDING>); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding first amendment does not permit emotional distress claim for ad parody
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to others. Summary judgment dismissing Nunes’s ADA claim was therefore inappropriate. That judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 . The ADA mentions only threats to others, whereas the EEOC regulations expand the term ""direct threat” to include threats to the disabled person herself. We have not yet ruled on whether the direct threat defense includes threats to one’s self and decline to do so in the present case because the issue was not addressed in the district court and has not been properly presented in this appeal. We note, however, that two courts in other circuits have considered this issue and have reached different results. Compare Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, 932 F.Supp. 1110, 1111 (N.D.Ill.1996) (<HOLDING>), with Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97

    ### Response:
    holding that expansion of the ada to encompass threats to self is untenable because the ada mentions only threats to others
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    — CDC—to a third party — the Commonwealth — through mechanisms of depletion and nonpayment in order to evade the judgment. State postjudgment enforcement procedures, incorporated into federal procedure by Rule 69(a), classically encompass such fact patterns. And in colloquial terms, it could be thought that exercise of enforcement jurisdiction here simply protects the MD judgment. Futura draws an analogy to a situation where a judgment is entered against a corporate subsidiary and the judgment is unenforcable because the corporate parent has looted the subsidiary. In such instance, suits or enforcement proceedings against the corporate parent to enforce the judgment have been permitted. See, e.g., Explosives Corp. of America v. Garlam Enterprises Corp., 817 F.2d 894 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Pan America Match Inc. v. Sears, Robuck and

    ### Response:
    holding parent corporation which controlled litigation on behalf of subsidiary bound by judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    following birth, even though the initial ingestion by the pregnant woman occurred pre-birth. [¶ 15] “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, fully renewable on appeal.” State v. Geiser, 2009 ND 36, ¶ 6, 763 N.W.2d 469. “When interpreting statutes, this Court has a duty to ascertain the Legislature’s intent.” Id. at ¶ 8. “Words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense, unless a contrary intention plainly appears, but any words explained in this code are to be understood as thus explained.” N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. “Technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or as are defined by statute, must be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.” N.D.C.C. § (Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); State v. Gray, 62 Ohio St.3d 514, 584 N.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding an unborn viable fetus is not a human being under the new mexico child abuse statute and the mothers use of cocaine during pregnancy was not child abuse
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 1 . Plaintiff Toyee, while declining to concur in the relief sought by this motion pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(a) (E.D.Mich. November 7, 1994), has not submitted a response to Reno’s motion to dismiss. 2 . In his brief in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, presently pending before this court, Toyee argues that ""the arrogance and intentional political posturing that defendant attributed to plaintiff on the basis of this event [the T-shirt incident] clearly contributed to the alleged ""unprofessional attitude” that admittedly was the primary factor in the decision to discharge [Toyee]. (emphasis in the original) 3 . Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)

    ### Response:
    holding that a federal cause of action for damages arises upon a federal agents unconstitutional conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    guerillas. Review of the record, however, shows that claim was sufficiently presented to the BIA. Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 321-22 (5th Cir.2009). The BIA’s decision is reviewed for substantial evidence. See Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 302 (5th Cir.1997); Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006). Under this standard, the IA 2007) (finding proposed group of wealthy Guatemalans “not so readily ‘identifiable’ or sufficiently defined as to meet the requirements of a particular social group within the meaning of the refugee definition”) (emphasis in original). Insofar as Segovia asserts he is entitled to relief because political unrest makes it unsafe for him to return to El Salvador, his claim is similarly unavailing. Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 190 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). DENIED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the

    ### Response:
    holding applicants fear of persecution cannot be based solely on general violence and civil disorder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to make public or “available” those portions of the prior art that anticipated Smarts’ patents. In other words, Smarts would have this Court foreclose Delphi as prior art based on the inadequacy of a demonstration when it is not at all clear — by Smarts’ own design — what could or should have been demonstrated, or what aspect of the Delphi software was, in fact, anticipatory. Triable issues thus exist with respect to the application of Sections 102(a), 102(b), and 102(g). It may of course be the case that, given both the nature of the prior art and the extent of Morgan Stanley’s demonstration to third parties, Delphi may not ultimately qualify as prior art under those statutory provisions. However, such issues must be left for another day. C.f Articulate Sys., 53 F.Supp.2d at 63, 75-76 (<HOLDING>). At the present time, the Defendants have

    ### Response:
    holding that issue of whether inventions prior demonstration constituted clear and convincing evidence of patent invalidity was close question properly put to jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    restores the contract to its original condition and places the parties in the same legal position as before the repudiation. See Restatement, supra, § 256 cmt. a (if a repudiation is nullified it eliminates all consequences of a repudiation). Thus, a retraction reinstates the obligations of the other party, including any conditions precedent, so that the performance of such conditions is once again necessary before the repudiating party can be charged with breach. Corbin, supra, § 980, at 933. However, a retraction, to be effective, must be clear and unequivocal; it may not impose new conditions not in accord with the original contract. See Pichignau v. City of Paris, 264 Cal.App.2d 138, 70 Cal.Rptr. 147, 149 (1968); Vahabzadeh v.. Mooney, 241 Va. 47, 399 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1991) (<HOLDING>). {20} Based on the evidence presented at

    ### Response:
    holding that to be effective a retraction must meet the same standard as repudiation and therefore must be clear definite absolute and unequivocal in evincing the repudiators intention to honor his obligations under the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.2012) (“Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”). Sadeeq next contends that the ALJ erred by discounting his testimony and the written testimony of his wife regarding the debilitating effect of his heart condition and leg pain. The ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons to discount Sadeeq’s testimony and the written statements of Sadeeq’s wife regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of Sadeeq’s symptoms. First, the ALJ properly found that Sa-deeq’s assertion of debilitating limitations was undermined by the medical evidence. See Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 670-71 (9th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Second, the ALJ was permitted to consider

    ### Response:
    holding that the alj properly relied on medical evidence undermining claimants subjective assessment of limitations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Circuit Court of Appeals which concern precisely this issue. See Lebrón-Torres v. Whitehall Laboratories, 251 F.3d 236 (1st Cir.2001) and Gelabert-Ladenheim v. American Airlines, Inc., 252 F.3d 54 (1st Cir.2001). After considering Defendant’s request, at the conclusion of the August 22, 2001 Settlement Conference, the Court ordered Defendant to file its motion and legal memorandum by September 6, 2001. Plaintiffs’ response was due on September 21, 2001. Having received the parties’ submissions, the Court will now decide, in light of Lebrón and Gelabert, whether Plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of “working” for the purposes of the ADA. Defendant has proceeded pursuant to Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (<HOLDING>) to discuss the undisputed facts of the case at

    ### Response:
    holding that whether a person has a disability under the ada is an individualized inquiry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on Mr. Stanley’s behavior, which was also a concern of the district court, see id. Vol. 4 at 72, so this delay does not weigh against the government. In addition, the two-month delay required for the later competency evaluation that was requested by defense counsel weighs against Mr. Stanley. Mr. Stanley alleges that the substitution of district judges on October 31, 2008, caused delay, but he has not explained how the change of judge delayed his case. Consequently, this claim does not weigh against the government. Cf. Gomez, 67 F.3d at 1522 (“[D]elay attributable to an overburdened judg cooperate with his attorneys and the necessity of substituting lead counsel twice — once a month before trial — resulted in considerable delay to be weighed against him. See Britton, 129 S.Ct. at 1292 (<HOLDING>). Under these circumstances, we conclude that

    ### Response:
    holding delays caused by defendants role in necessitating substitution of defense counsel once on the eve of trial are attributed to defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issue of liability as to their due process claim. See Order of June 6, 2002 (Docket No. 67). The plaintiffs’ second claim of political discrimination was tried before a jury from December 2-23, 2002, along with the damages phase of their due process claim. Ultimately, the jury rendered a verdict against plaintiffs, finding that defendants had not dismissed plaintiffs based on political grounds, and also awarding zero damages for the defendants’ violation of plaintiffs’ due process rights. See Verdict Forms (Docket Nos. 119-150). Notwithstanding, the Court upon entering judgment, awarded each plaintiff one dollar ($1.00) as nominal compensation for their due process claim. See Judgment of January 7, 2003 (Docket No. 152). See also Campos-Orrego v. Rivera, 175 F.3d 89, 98 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). In their “Motion for New Trial ... ” (Docket

    ### Response:
    holding that when a jury finds section 1988 liability but fails to award damages nominal damages are available to plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    340, 108 S.Ct. 2413. But there are actually two types of prejudice relevant to this factor: (1) trial prejudice, i.e., prejudice in the defendant’s ability to mount a defense at trial; and (2) non-trial prejudice. The Supreme Court has described the latter type of prejudice as follows: Inordinate delay between public charge and trial, wholly aside from possible prejudice to a defense on the merits, may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. Taylor, 487 U.S. at 340-41, 108 S.Ct. 2413 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Moss, 217 F.3d at 431-32 (<HOLDING>). It is well established that a criminal

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court erred when it neglected to address any nontrial prejudice suffered by the defendant including the impact of his incarceration on his life circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if it were a search, I would find it here supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion and would therefore admit the evidence obtained from the search. Because the majority concludes that under Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, a dog sniff of a person's automobile intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy and constitutes a search, and because the majority discerns no reasonable suspicion, I respectfully dissent. I The purpose of both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is to protect a person's legitimate expectation of privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusion. People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 139 (Colo.1983). In determining whether an expectation of privacy is legitimat ) (<HOLDING>). Hence, the United States Supreme Court and

    ### Response:
    holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could not have been sexually assaulted, even though defendant planned to, and had taken substantial steps to, carry out the act. The State contends that because it was impossible for defendant to have completed the crime he had attempted, the instruction was correct. We disagree. “[C]lear and correct jury instructions are essential for a fair trial.” State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 522, 651 A.2d 19 (1994). Jury instructions constitute “a road map to guide the jury, and without an appropriate charge a jury can take a wrong turn in its deliberations.” State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15, 573 A.2d 1359 (1990). “So critical is the need for accuracy that erroneous instructions on material points are presumed to be reversible error.” Ibid. Accord, State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3, 7, 601 A.2d 689 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Prior to the enactment of the New Jersey Code

    ### Response:
    holding that incorrect charges on substantive elements of a crime constitute reversible error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by Dixon, Todd Rounds (“Rounds”), and Camacho)); (Id. Ex. 49, ECF No. 191^2 (Declaration and Power of Attorney for Patent Application '855 signed by Camacho, Dale Johnson, and Mark Sasaki)) Those signed declarations recite that the signing parties are the only joint inventors on the '629 and '855 Patents; Lindquist is not listed as a joint inventor. Subsequently, however, Camacho and Rounds testified that Lindquist too had a role in the design of the patented invention. (Kneafsey Decl. Ex. 19, at 392-93, ECF No. 175-25); (Id. Ex. 24, at 9, ECF No. 175-30 (deposition transcript of Rounds)) “Thus, there is flatly contradictory evidence relating to the matter critical for determining whether the ['629 and '855 Patents are] invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).” Checkpoint, 412 F.3d at 1338 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court finds there is a

    ### Response:
    holding that the original pto declarations create a genuine issue of material fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exists a “longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.” Id. Because Congress failed to articulate a “clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas,” the Court concluded that the IIRIRA did not eliminate habeas jurisdiction. Id. at 314, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The petitioner notes that as in St. Cyr, several circuit courts have held that because 28 U.S.C. § 2242(d) does not contain a sufficiently clear and unambiguous expression of congressional intent to limit judicial review of habeas petitions brought under the FARR Act, that provision does not strip district courts of habeas jurisdiction over FARR Act claims. See Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1182-83 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Singh v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435, 441 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that because the farr act does not expressly mention habeas corpus or 28 usc  2241 it does not eliminate habeas jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    406 (1994). “To satisfy the prejudice inquiry, the evidence suppressed must have been material to guilt or punishment.” Gibson, 951 A.2d at 1126-1127 (Pa.2008). As noted by Appellant, materiality extends to evidence affecting the credibility of witnesses, rather than merely to purely exculpatory evidence. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (“When the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule.”). Moreover, we have held that the protection of Brady extends to the defendant’s ability to investigate alternate defense theories and to formulate trial strategy. See Commonwealth v. Green, 536 Pa. 599, 640 A.2d 1242, 1245 (1994) (<HOLDING>). “[F]avorable evidence is material, and

    ### Response:
    holding that courts must consider any adverse effect that the prosecutors failure to disclose might have had on not only the presentation of the defense at trial but the preparation of the defense as well
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    JJ., who dissent. 1 . The Trust had entered into a management agreement with Wolford under which Wol-ford was responsible for the contract, including its recording. LARSON, Justice (dissenting). I dissent because section 558.46 does not clearly provide for criminal, as opposed to civil, punishment. In such a case, doubts must be resolved in favor of the defendant. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L.Ed.2d 493, 497 (1971) (“[Ajmbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”). The majority holds that section 558.46(2) i whether a statute imposes civil or criminal sanctions, “we must seek out and give effect to the intention of the legislature.... ” Lenertz v. Mun. Ct., 219 N.W.2d 513, 515-16 (Iowa 1974) (<HOLDING>); see 36A C.J.S. Fines § 2, at 206 (“The true

    ### Response:
    holdingafter considering the statutes whole text legislative history and purpose  that a consumer fraud provision did not impose criminal sanctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    AND As.”). After examining the relevant regulations, we find that the status of an ANDA holder’s product as the RLD for a given prescription drug product does not alter the ANDA holder’s obligations. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s rejection of the Plaintiffs RLD theory against Mylan. 3. Remaining State Law Claims Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing their remaining state law claims including breach of express and implied warranty, misrepresentation, fraud, consumer protection, and statutory negligence. A prior panel of this Court rejected similar claims, including breach of warranty, fraud, and misrepresentation under Tennessee law in Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 391-96 (6th Cir.2013), finding t 9 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008) (<HOLDING>), where the Supreme Court found express

    ### Response:
    holding that the federal cigarette labeling and advertising act did not preempt plaintiffs state law claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.12, 1997) (reviewing arbitration panel’s “interim order” requiring defendant to post security pending a final award); Atlas Assurance Co. of Am. v. American Centennial Ins. Co., No. 90 Civ. 5474, 1991 WL 4741, at *2-*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.16, 1991) (confirming interim award directing defendant to fund an escrow account for the benefit of the successful party as determined in the final award); Konkar Maritime Enterprises v. Compagnie Belge D’Affretement, 668 F.Supp. 267, 272 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (confirming arbitrators’ interim order to establish jointly-held escrow account that was intended to establish “security for enforcement of an award in the event that respondent was found liable”); Southern Seas Navigation Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 606 F.Supp. 692, 694 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>); Sperry Int’l Trade v. Government of Israel,

    ### Response:
    holding that order reducing the notice of a claim of lien was not interim in the sense of being an intermediate step toward a further end rather it is an end in itself for its very purpose is to clarify the parties rights in the interim period pending a final decision on the merits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the trial court granted leave to file a late response, we presume that the trial court did not consider it. Envtl. Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 612 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). 3 . Arnold, v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas, 279 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (explaining that allegations of harm caused by overly-large implants were allegations of an error in medical judgment, not an allegation of the negligent use of tangible personal property). 4 . Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1994) (concluding that immunity is not waived for harm resulting from errors or lapses in medical documentation or failure to follow recommendations). 5 . Kertville v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>); Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch v. Thompson, 2006

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to administer an injectable drug is a nonuse of tangible property and does not fall under the waiver provisions of the texas tort claims act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    110, 58 S.Ct. 803, 811, 82 L.Ed. 1202 (1938) (""[W]hether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either state can be conclusive.”). Federal common law also operates in areas “in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law.” Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640, 101 S.Ct. at 2067. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110, 109 S.Ct. 948, 954, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989) (""[C]ourts are to develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA plans.” (citation and internal quotation omitted)); Nat’l Soc’y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 1363, 55 L.Ed.2d 637 (1978) (<HOLDING>). 13 . See Peter Westen and Jeffrey S. Lehman,

    ### Response:
    holding that congress expected the courts to give shape to the sherman acts broad mandate by drawing on commonlaw tradition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the class. Although it is not necessary for the putative class representatives’ claims to be identical to those of absent class members, due process precludes certification if the named plaintiffs possess potentially conflicting interests that may impair the vigorous prosecution of the class claims. In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 122 F.R.D. at 428. Where class members have conflicting interests, each group must receive its own representation; it is n onably well represent the class. The named policyholders who were defrauded share the same incentive as absent policyholders who were defrauded to establish the alleged fraud and to maximize the overall recovery. Weiss Aff. at ¶252; see also Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d at 811; New York Life, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 652, at *29 (<HOLDING>). And, there are no disparate interests to

    ### Response:
    holding representation adequate where policyholders represented mix of characteristics representative of the mix found in the class itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    QDRO. 2004 ND 58, ¶ 9, 676 N.W.2d 794. We explained the trial court correctly found the former husband in contempt for willfully violating the divorce judgment by receiving and 0 (stating trial court should take all reasonable measures to ensure that QDROs are drafted and entered as soon as possible after entry of the divorce decree). Thus, the trial court erred by shifting the responsibility for obtaining a QDRO from the trial court that entered the 1993 divorce decree to Mary Blomdahl, a party to the decree. Further, under ERISA, there is no statute of limitations for the entry of a QDRO. See Jordan, 147 S.W.3d at 260 (noting the intentional absence of a statute of limitations for the entry of a QDRO under ERISA); see also Marshall v. Priess, 99 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>); Ochoa v. Ochoa, 71 S.W.3d 593, 596-97

    ### Response:
    holding the entry of qdro is not subject to statute of limitations on enforcement of judgments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the black leather jacket, which the court viewed as merely cumulative physical evidence. We conclude that in the circumstances of this case the denial of the right to present what would have been exculpatory evidence had consequences far more serious than the erroneous receipt of inculpatory evidence of only marginal probative force. Newman’s claimed lack of a Hispanic accent was apparently the only defense he had to offer. There may be cases in which the wrongful exclusion of such evidence might be considered harmless, but we conclude that this is not one of them. Although on retrial Newman will be entitled to offer a voice exemplar without waiving his privilege against self-incrimination, he will of course be required to establish its reliability. See Esdaille, 769 F.2d at 107 (<HOLDING>). Whether he is able to do so will be a matter

    ### Response:
    holding that proposed voice exemplar was properly excluded as unreliable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    presents procedural due process complaints. B. Has appellant preserved error as to his procedural due process complaints? In the argument under his fourth issue, appellant also asserts that the trial court violated his procedural due process rights because it did not conduct a hearing or give any reasons for its decision to impose Amended Conditions 18 and 19. Although appellant complains in part that the trial court did not give him a hearing or a statement of reasons, the record reflects that the trial court did' give appellant a hear x.Crim.App.1980) (explaining that appellant must request findings before failure to make them constitutes reversible error). Appellant also has waived any error to the extent that he complains the tria .W.3d 376, 379 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s fourth

    ### Response:
    holding that party can waive procedural due process rights under ordinary preservationoferror rules
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    112 F.Supp.2d 681, 687 (N.D.Ohio 2000) (citing Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 83 Ohio St.3d 507, 700 N.E.2d 1247 (1998)). In making such a determination, O.R.C. § 2307.75(B) sets forth a number of factors to consider in determining the foreseeable risks associated with the design of a product, and O.R.C. § 2307.75(C) sets forth a number of factors to consider in determining the benefits of a particular design. Here, in support of the design defect claim, Plaintiff alleges that the risks of the reservoir design outweighed its benefits, especially considering the availability of alternative, safer designs. (Doc. 1). The Court finds that such allegations sufficiently assert a defective design claim under O.R.C. § 2307.75. See Boroff v. Alza Carp., 685 F.Supp.2d 704 (N.D.Ohio 2010) (<HOLDING>). Defendants’ contention that the claim in this

    ### Response:
    holding that allegations that duragesic has been recalled for causing death to users due to an excessive leak of fentanyl a dangerous narcotic medication into the skin and that this sort of leakage caused the death at issue  is enough to give rise to a plausible inference that the foreseeable risks associated with duragesics design or formulation outweighed its benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    service. Process Opp’n 19. Fujitsu requests that the Court order service on Defendants’ U.S. counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). Id. Both D-Link Corp. and ZyXEL Corp. oppose this request. Process Reply 6-7. “[Sjervice of process under Rule 4(f)(3) is neither a last resort’ nor extraordinary relief.’ It is merely one means among several which enables service of process on an international defendant.” Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir.2002) (internal citation omitted). “‘Under Rule 4(f)(3), federal courts have discretionary authority to direct service by other means not prohibited by international agreements.’ ” Nuance Commc’ns, 626 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3)); see also Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1016 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, “The choice between dismissal

    ### Response:
    holding the task of determining when the particularities and necessities of a given case require alternate service of process under rule 4f3 is committed to the sound discretion of the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“courts presume that ‘or’ is used in a statute disjunctively unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary”); see also American Heritage Dictionary Of The English Language 873 (4th ed.2000) (defining “or” as “[ujsed to indicate ... [a]n alternative ...” (emphasis added)); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 817 (10th ed.1996) (defining “or” as “a function word [used] to indicate an alternative ” (emphasis added)); VII Oxford English Dictionary 166 (1933) (defining “or” as “[a] particle co-ordinating two (or more) words, phrases, or clauses, between which there is an alternative ” (emphasis added)). Congress plainly framed § 1002(21)(A)(i) in the alternative, and it further bifurcated the subsection with the parallel inclusion of the verb “exerc 15, 1421 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). While it is not necessary to our holding, we

    ### Response:
    holding a plan administrator is a fiduciary under the disposition clause where it wrongfully disbursed the plans funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ind. Admin. Code 1-4.” 405 Ind. Admin. Code l-l-3(a). Those provisions offer the Providers a right to request an administrative hearing on the denial before an administrative law judge (ALJ). 470 Ind. Admin. Code 1-4-3 to 1-4-5. Subsequently, they may seek an agency review of the ALJ’s decision. 470 Ind. Admin. Code 1-4-6. Finally, if still dissatisfied, the Providers may seek judicial review. 470 Ind. Admin. Code 1-4-7. Tellingly, the Providers have not challenged the adequacy of these appellate remedies, nor even acknowledged FSSA’s argument that these remedies exist. Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1405 (assuming that the state’s offered remedies were adequate because the parties gave little attention to the issue); Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Ill., 852 F.2d 951, 955-56 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Further, there is no evidence that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff has not raised a colorable claim that he was denied procedural due process because he did not allege that the available state remedies are constitutionally inadequate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    infants. Id. 5 . There was no such pending allegation at the time of the incident. See Def's. Mot. to Dismiss or Summary Judgment, 5. 6 . Although not styled as a Motion for Spoliation Sanctions, the Court interprets Strand’s allegations of spoliation in her Response in Opposition (ECF No. 52) as such. 7 . Initially, Strand also asserted that the Government breached its duties by failing to hire enough personnel to adequately supervise the pool field trip and failing to properly train its counselors. While it seems that Strand may have abandoned both of these theories, even if she has not, they are barred by the discretionary function exception. Staffing decisions are indisputably discretionary functions. See S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. at 820, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (<HOLDING>). With regard to the first step of

    ### Response:
    holding that faa implementation of safety regulations was discretionary because in part such decisions required the agency to establish priorities for the accomplishment of its policy objectives by balancing the objectives sought against such practical considerations as staffing and funding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (9th Cir.2004) (affirming district court’s ruling that arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable even when plaintiffs contended that they never received or saw a copy of the incorporated arbitration agreement because the arbitration agreement was easily available to the plaintiffs). According to Mr. Calderon, it is standard policy and procedure for employees of the Costa Rican Hertz licensee to give the folder jacket to the customer at the time a vehicle is rented. Calderon Declaration, ECF No. 31 at 2, ¶ 6. Thus, even if Mr. Martin did not receive it, it appears that the folder jacket was easily available to him, and he does not declare facts to suggest otherwise. Courts have enforced incorporated arbitration agreements in similar situations. See Koffler, 2011 WL 1086035, at *4 (<HOLDING>); Wolschlager, 111 Cal.App.4th at 789-91, 4

    ### Response:
    holding under california law that a set of general terms and conditions that included an arbitration agreement and that were not provided to plaintiff but were available upon request were properly incorporated by reference into a purchase agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CAÍ has presented evidence that Mr. Long and HughGM used the stolen proprietary information to steal significantly-valued contracts with Boeing, Microsoft, and other “Fortune 100 clients”. If proven, the injury to CAI in Indiana is unquestionably substantial. Moreover, Mr. Long’s contacts with CAI in Indiana, as CAI’s employee, is precisely what made his alleged scheme of fraud possible. Accordingly, Mr. Long must be held to have purposefully directed his tortious activities at Indiana. (Filing No, 56 at 25-26.) Thus, the Court affords CAI’s choice of its home forum considerable deference. In addition, when considering the convenience of the parties, courts also consider the parties’ abilities to bear the expense of trial in a particular forum. Dee Eng’g, Inc., 2003 WL 1089515, at *2-3 (<HOLDING>); Bussell, 939 F.Supp. at 651. In this case,

    ### Response:
    holding that the larger of the two parties was in a better position to bear the cost of litigating outside of its home forum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we know of no basis for crafting a theory of estoppel based upon sworn statements in a tax return and will not explore such a theory sua sponte. 3 . The Court stated: It may hardly be disputed that each of the strikers resisted the captain and other officers in the free and lawful exercise of their authority and command, within the meaning of § 293, or that they combined and conspired to that end, within the meaning of § 292. Deliberately and persistently they defied direct commands to perform their duties in making ready for the departure from port. Id. at 40. 4 . Backpay awards for violations of the Act would appear to be the type of non-tort recovery that is taxable. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 337, 115 S.Ct. 2159, 132 L.Ed.2d 294 (1995) (<HOLDING>) 5 . We acknowledge that, as we discuss below,

    ### Response:
    holding that settlement for backpay in age discrimination case was not excludable from taxpayers reported gross income because recovery for back wages does not satisfy the critical requirement of the irs tax code of being on account of any personal injury nor is it based upon tort or tort type rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Fifth Circuit in Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n. 2 (5th Cir.1957) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S.Ct. 563, 2 L.Ed.2d 579 (1958)). However, “[cjertain possible consequences of a guilty plea are ‘collateral’ rather than direct and need not be explained to the defendant in order to ensure that the plea is voluntary.” United States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 915 (2d Cir. 1990) (listing examples of collateral consequences, such as parole revocation, the likelihood of an unfavorable military discharge, and the potential for civil commitment proceedings). Thus, district courts need not inform a defendant of collateral consequences during the plea colloquy. See United States v. Salerno, 66 F.3d 544, 550-51 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The requirements of Rule 11 are consistent

    ### Response:
    holding that an enhancement in a future sentence based on the present conviction is a collateral consequence and need not be advised of by the district court in its plea colloquy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    want to do anything that would distort the financials of General Reinsurance.”). Regardless of whether the final structure of the deal took shape in mid-November 2000, this evidence provides an adequate basis for a rational jury to conclude that the conspiracy to artificially inflate AIG’s loss reserves and deceive the company’s investors started with Greenberg’s call to Ferguson on October 31, 2000. Lastly, Ferguson argues that the government presented insufficient evidence that a secret side agreement ensured that the LPT was a no-risk deal, and that Ferguson knew of it and agreed to it as part of the overall deal. This argument, however, is also unavailing, in light of the evidence at trial supporting both inferences. See United States v. Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). The government presented sufficient evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to avoid creating a protected liberty interest: ""Good conduct time is a privilege and not a right.” Tex. Govt.Code § 498.003. On the other hand, the causa] relationship between a disciplinary infraction and loss of goodtime credits appears to make Texas law indistinguishable from the law at issue in Wolff. See Tex. Govt.Code § 498.004 (""If ... the inmate commits an offense or violates a rule of the division, the department may forfeit all or any part of the inmate’s accrued good conduct time.”). The Fifth Circuit has addressed the issue from a variety of angles, but no case directly addresses the issue of whether Texas prisoners have a constitutional interest in their accrued good-time credits under current Texas law. See Hallmark v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073, 1079-1080 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Allison v. Kyle, 66 F.3d 71, 74 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no protected liberty interest in the restoration of goodtime credits forfeited for disciplinary infractions under an older statutory scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    134 S.Ct. 2175, 2183, 189 L.Ed.2d 62 (2014) (distinguishing between statutes of limitations, which are subject to equitable tolling, and statutes of repose, which are not). In determining whether a time period set by federal law is a statute of limitations, the Court considers the “functional characteristics” of the statute, that is, whether the time period at issue serves the policies of a statute of limitations. Lozano, 134 S.Ct. at 1234-35 & n.6. A statute of limitations is generally “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specifically, a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered).” Black’s Law Dictionary 1636 (10th ed. 2014); see also CTS Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2182 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed.

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute of limitations creates a time limit fpr suing in a civil case based on the date when the claim accrued
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requirements to discuss the relevant socioeconomic impacts of the RBTI. In addition, the Fifth Circuit has long held that the “[djetermination of economic benefits and costs that are tangential to environmental consequences are within th[e] wide area of agency discretion.” S. La. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir.1980). NEPA requires, at most, “a narrowly focused, indirect review of the economic assumptions underlying a federal project described in an impact statement.” Id. See also Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 974-75 (5th Cir.1983) (finding that an agency need only consider “important” information relevant to a “significant” effect not based on “unreasonable speculation”); Town of Norfolk v. United States EPA, 761 F.Supp. 867, 887-88 (D.Mass.1991) (<HOLDING>); Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to place a dollar value on a possible decrease in property value was not unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    duties of the Financial Aid Office. He too was not an at-will employee. Wallace State’s reasons for placing Hammons on administrative leave with full pay through her contract term and failure to renew her employment contract extended beyond issues in the Financial Aid Office, and neither Allen nor Bowie were responsible for, or in any way involved in, those other problems. Simply put, neither of these proposed comparators was “similarly situated in all relevant respects” or “nearly identical” to Hammons. See Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1091. Accordingly, the district court did not err by finding Hammons failed to meet the fourth prong of her prima facie disparate-treatment claim. IV. We likewise affirm the district court’s entry of summary 1 (S.D.Ala.1997), aff’d 140 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Hammons wrote the letter of grievance to the

    ### Response:
    holding that more than a year between the protected activity and the discharge is not close enough to support the causal connection requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was not appropriately incorporated by reference into the '889 patent for this point and even if it had been, that Dickinson effectively teaches away from claim 13 because in deactivating those genes responsible for expressing the pathway, isobutanol production was “virtually abolished.” Id. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the foregoing, Butamax has identified sufficient evidence that at least creates a genuine dispute of material fact. Gevo makes much of the fact that Dickinson, though cited in the '889 patent, was not cited in connection with the deactivation of this pathway and was not incorporated by reference into the patent. Nonetheless, Dickinson’s teachings still reflect what was known in the art. See Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Dickinson does show that persons of ordinary

    ### Response:
    holding that where accessible literature sources clearly provided a description of the teachings at issue the written description requirement does not require their incorporation by reference
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    public against the commission of other offenses during the term, and which have as their objective the deterrence of future misconduct” (citation omitted)); Baca, 90 N.M. at 281-82, 562 P.2d at 842^13 (“The broad general purposes to be served by probation are education and rehabilitation.”). {37} Our probation-related search cases are consistent with the federal law allowing warrantless searches as developed in Knights and Griffin. See Marquart, 1997-NMCA-090, ¶ 19, 123 N.M. 809, 945 P.2d 1027 (“Our ruling, however, does not prevent a court from imposing as a condition of probation that the probationer give his or her consent to reasonable warrantless searches by a probation officer to ensure compliance with the conditions of probation.”); Gallagher, 100 N.M. at 699, 675 P.2d at 431 (<HOLDING>); Gardner, 95 N.M. at 174, 619 P.2d at 850

    ### Response:
    holding a warrantless probation search condition that is reasonably related to a probationers rehabilitation is a valid limitation to a defendants fourth amendment rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that “evidence showing a murder ‘to have been deliberate, premeditated and wilful could be so clear and uncontroverted that a trial court could properly refuse to instruct on the lesser included offenses.’ ” Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 409, 384 S.E.2d 757, 769 (1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990) (quoting Painter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 360, 366, 171 S.E.2d 166, 171 (1969)). The evidence in the present case does not support the defendant’s proffered instructions. An instruction on first degree murder was not warranted because the video tape clearly established that Burnett was shot in the chest during the commission of armed robbery at the convenience store. See Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 470, 374 S.E.2d 303, 317 (1988), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the sole issue was whether the

    ### Response:
    holding first degree murder instruction not warranted because defendant adduced no evidence that victim was not murdered during commission of robbery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (3) the purpose of applying the Eptam was to control weeds; (4) Dillman made an inspection of the field in question; (5) the Cobbs “relied on the expertise of... Dillman... to determine if the Eptam would or would not, in fact, control the visible weeds in said field”; (6) “it is part of... Dillman’s duty ... to make an inspection of the type of weeds and to determine what pesticide would be effec tive on them and to so advise the customer”; and (7) “[t]hat, without the consent or knowledge of [the Cobbs], [Sure Crop] applied Treflan EC to [the Cobbs’] land in question .. . Pursuant to § 2-315, implied warranties are imposed upon goods when and only when they become the subject of a contract for their sale. See, e.g., Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir. 1980) (<HOLDING>); Dunham-Bush, Inc. v. Thermo-Air Service,

    ### Response:
    holding trial court erred when it permitted jury to consider ucc impliedwarranty theories where evidence was insufficient to prove defective product at issue was sold
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that entire colleges should be designated as voter registration agencies. Rather, it said that disability services offices in colleges were “offices” under the Act. These smaller offices had to be designated as voter registration agencies, according to NCSD, because they were offering “programs primarily engaged in providing services” to disabled students. Second, it argued that the ADA requires colleges to provide convenient and accessible voter registration sites for disabled students. Third, NCSD went beyond its complaint and argued that the ADA requires Virginia to provide braille and large print voter registration applications for persons who are visually impaired., This third argument was apparently based on Lightbourn v. El Paso, 904 F.Supp. 1429, 1433-34 (W.D.Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>), a decision that was reversed .on appeal to

    ### Response:
    holding that texas secretary of state had duty to make sure local election authorities complied with ada in providing accommodations to allow visually impaired persons to vote in secret
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the Second District may have considered rule 3.170(g)(2)(A) jurisdictional. Rule 3.170(g)(2)(A) specifically states: (2) Unless otherwise stated at the time the plea is entered: (A) The state may move to vacate a pleá and sentence within 60 days of the defendant’s noncompliance with the specific terms of a plea agreement. The Fifth District held that rule 3.170(g)(2)(A) is not jurisdictional because it permits the time for filing to be altered. A jurisdictional rule cannot be altered by the court or by agreement of the parties. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So.2d 179, 181 (Fla.1994) (“We acknowledge that the parties cannot stipulate to jurisdiction over the subject matter where none exists.... ”); Harrell v. State, 721 So.2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). Because this particular provision allows the

    ### Response:
    holding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1 . State v. Jones, Order No. 00903020716, 2009 WL 3338100 (Del.Super.Sept. 11, 2009). 2 . Williams v. State, 962 A.2d 210, 214 (Del.2008) (citing Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Del.2008)). 3 . Id. 4 . Id. 5 . 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). 6 . Id. at 625-26, 111 S.Ct. 1547. 7 . Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 869 (Del.1999). See also Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1173-74 (Del.2010); Moore v. State, 997 A.2d 656, 663-64 (Del.2010); Williams, 962 A.2d at 215-16; Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d at 1286 n. 6; Ross v. State, 925 A.2d 489, 493-94 (Del.2007); Harris v. State, 806 A.2d 119, 124 (Del.2002); Flonnory v. State, 805 A.2d 854, 858 (Del.2001); Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1264 (Del.2001). 8 . Williams, 962 A.2d at 215-16. See also Ross, 925 A.2d at 494 (<HOLDING>). 9 . Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101, 125

    ### Response:
    holding that the presence of uniformed police officers following a walking pedestrian and requesting to speak with him without doing anything more does not constitute a seizure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the “Special Investigations Unit” and HUB Enterprises, Inc., another company with whom Defendant had strong financial ties, to conduct an investigation. While the Court recognizes that “there is nothing procedurally improper about the úse of surveillance,” an IME or FCE would have yielded to a more complete assessment of Plaintiffs capacity and limitations. See Salomaa, 642 F.3d at 676 (“An insurance company may choose to avoid an independent medical examination because of the risk that the physicians it employs may conclude that the claimant is entitled to benefits.”) Here, the fact that a video surveillance was conducted in lieu of an IME raises legitimate questions concerning the thoroughness of the investigation. Calvert v. Firstar Fin., Inc., 409 F.3d 286, 295 (6th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). In -view of Defendant’s conflict of interest,

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to conduct a physical examination may in some cases raise questions about the thoroughness and accuracy of the benefits determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim as ""too creative for the law as it stands”); United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 745-46 (10th Cir.2008) (rejecting as-applied Sixth Amendment challenge). 9 . Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50, 128 S.Ct. 586. The district court need not, however, issue a ""robotic incantation[ ] that each statutory factor has been considered.” Key, 599 F.3d at 474 (quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir.2006)). 10 . See United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (""[The district court’s] individualized assess- men! 'necessarily means that [it] is free to conclude that the applicable [guidelines range gives too much or too little weight to one or more factors, either as applied in a particular case or as a matter of policy.’ ” (quotin h Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). 17 . See Gutierrez, 359 Fed.Appx. at 541

    ### Response:
    holding that the departure from the guidelines was procedurally reasonable where based on 1 the vulnerability of elderly victims to fraud and 2 the likelihood that the victims modest means and advanced age produced greater psychological trauma without suggesting that an explanation of the weight of each factor was required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interest in distributing information and stimulating debate on scientific issues allegedly resulting from the AEC's refusal to assess the environmental effects of its liquid metal breeder reactor program sufficed for NEPA standing purposes. See 481 F.2d at 1087 n. 29. This dicta in SIPI has subsequently been cited to support recognition of similar informational injuries arising from an agency’s failure to prepare an EIS. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation, 839 F.2d at 712 (involving individual plaintiffs, not organizations). Nevertheless, a right to specific information under NEPA has so far been recognized for standing purposes only when the information sought relates to environmental inierests that NEPA was intended to protect. See National Wildlife Federation, 839 F.2d at 712 (<HOLDING>) (citing SIPI); Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that for affiants voicing environmental concerns  the elimination of an opportunity to see and use an eis  does constitute a constitutionally sufficient injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (noting the general rule that a final judgment from a lower court carries res judicata effect even though it is still subject to review by an appellate court). As to the other district court orders that Mr. Leo purports to appeal, he does little more than reprise the unfounded theme that Garmin’s lawyer is a fraud artist who fabricated evidence (an argument we rejected in Leo, 431 Fed.Appx. at 705) and question the impartiality and abilities of the district court judge who ruled against him. Ad hominem attacks on counsel and the district court do not count as legal argument, and Mr. Leo’s scant references to any legal issues fall short of his obligation to adequately frame and develop his arguments. See Exum v. United States Olympic Comm., 389 F.3d 1130, 1133-34 n. 4 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux &

    ### Response:
    holding that scattered statements in the appellants briefs are not enough to preserve an issue for appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    upon the independent justification. Contrary to the majority’s position, there is no body of law under article I, section 7 directing that any pretextual motive on the part of the officer invalidates a traffic stop based upon probable cause that a traffic infraction has been committed. Turning first, however, to other flaws in the majority opinion, the majority misstates the issue before the court, claiming that the State asks this court to approve the use of pretext to justify a warrantless seizure. Majority at 352. The State without question has not asked this court to do any such thing. The State briefed this case under the Fourth Amendment and particularly relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996) (<HOLDING>). The State did not ask for a holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that under the fourth amendment the motive of the officer when stopping a vehicle for a minor traffic infraction whether subjective or objective is completely irrelevant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “‘An issue raised for the first time on appeal is not subject to appellate review because it has not been properly preserved and presented.’ ” Id. at 794 (citing Pate v. State, 601 So.2d 210, 213 (Ala.Crim.App.1992)). “[T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, it must be presented to the trial court by a timely and specific motion setting out the specific grounds in support thereof.” McKinney v. State, 654 So.2d 95, 99 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (citation omitted). Snow’s challenges to defects in the circuit court’s consideration of the presumptive sentencing standards are waivable and were, in fact, waived when Snow failed to object to those defects in the circuit court and thereby preserve his arguments for review on appeal. Compare Clark v. State, 166 So.3d 147 (Ala.Crim.App.2014) (<HOLDING>); Hyde v. State, 185 So.3d 501

    ### Response:
    holding presumptive sentencing standards applied retroactively where defendant objected at sentencing hearing on the basis that the presumptive sentencing standards applied to his case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). In this case, plaintiff claims that prison officials filed misconduct charges against him to retaliate for filing a lawsuit forcing the DOC to recognize the NOI as a religious group as well as filing grievances alleging violations of his First Amendment free exercise rights. Because both filing a lawsuit and filing grievances are protected activities, see Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir.1997) (finding that the filing of a lawsuit is protected activity); Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Rivera v. Chesney, 1998 WL 639255, *1

    ### Response:
    holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    903 n. 6 (8th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 1106, 47 L.Ed.2d 314 (1976); Henderson v. United States, 425 F.2d 134, 138 n. 4 (5th Cir.1970), we have no occasion to engage the rule of lenity. 7 . Appellant’s claim that his self-professed indi-gency affects the validity of the special assessment is not properly before us and we express no opinion on it. Absent an indication ""that the government has attempted or will attempt to collect the special assessment while [the defendant] lacks the ability to pay,” United States v. Rivera-Velez, 839 F.2d 8, 8 (1st Cir.1988) (per curiam) — and there is no such indication in this record — appellant's challenge is prematurely posed. See id.; accord Pagan, 785 F.2d at 381; cf. United States v. Levy, 897 F.2d 596, 598 (1st Cir.1990)

    ### Response:
    holding to like effect with respect to a standcommitted fine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    before commencement of the trial. [15] The omnibus date in this case was ultimately set for November 6, 2013. Thus, under the statute, Zamani was required to file his notice of an insanity defense by October 17, 2013. The court held a final pretrial hearing on April 16, 2014, at which it heard argument on the State’s motion in limine, and at the hearing Zamani’s counsel verbally indicated that Zamani stated that he believes he is insane. [16] As Zamani attempted a late filing of the required notice, the trial court had discretion whether to accept it. See Ankney v. State, 825 N.E.2d 965, 970 (Ind.Ct. App.2005) (“Ankney attempted a late filing of the required notice, and, thus, the trial court had discretion whether to accept it.”) (citing Eveler v. State, 524 N.E.2d 9, 11 (Ind.1988) (<HOLDING>)), trans. denied. [17] The State’s motion in

    ### Response:
    holding that after the omnibus date the trial courts discretion controlled and such discretion is exercisable upon a showing of good cause by a defendant who has missed the deadline
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in part; dismissed in part by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: In these consolidated appeals, the parties appeal from the district court’s order affirming in part and reversing in part the bankruptcy courts’ orders finding that a portion of GMAC’s claims in the underlying bankruptcy proceedings are unsecured. In light of our decision in In re Price, 562 F.3d 618 (4th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because the parties have settled the

    ### Response:
    holding debtors negative equity in a tradein vehicle included in amount financed created a purchase money obligation within the meaning of 11 usc  1325a 2006 we summarily affirm the portion of the district courts order at issue in no 081850
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    necessary — for Congress to stipulate time frames in which amnesty-like provisions, such as the exception for family-smugglers, apply. See generally Mathews, 426 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478. It is also not wholly irrational for Congress to distinguish between aliens based on their family connection to legalized United States residents, in furtherance of a general amnesty scheme. B. International Law Claims Mr. Ayala-Caballero also asserts that, in making its determination the BIA failed sufficiently to consider the best interest of his citizen children. Citing a district court case for support, Ayala-Caballero asserts that this failure contravenes customary international law principles as incorporated in federal law. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F.Supp.2d 584 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). This court’s recent decision in

    ### Response:
    holding that article 3 of the united nations convention on the rights of the child has attained the status of customary international law and is therefore incorporated in federal law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law. Nor has it mattered whether the States have acted through laws of broad general application rather than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial relations. Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow the States to control conduct which is the subject of national regulation would create potential frustration of national purposes. However, it is clear that preemption under Garmon is not “complete.” Every court to address the issue directly has reached this conclusion. See Lontz v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435, 442-43 (4th Cir.2005) (“[Sjections 7 and 8 do not work to completely preempt the kind of state law claims that plaintiffs are pressing.”); Felix v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1165-66 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that garmon preemption provides no basis for removal jurisdiction in federal court and observing that the lower courts are uniform in finding that garmon preemption under the nlra does not completely preempt state laws so as to provide removal jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States, 250 U.S. 273, 279, 39 S.Ct. 468, 470, 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919)), we note that in this unusual circumstance we need not find a violation of section 441b before addressing the separation of powers claim. The Supreme Court in similar situations — when plaintiffs challenged the constitutional composition or character of a tribunal — determined the constitutional status issue without reaching the merits. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 859, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3261, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of CFTC’s authority to adjudicate common law counterclaims without passing on the merits of the counterclaim); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 56, 87, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2864, 2880, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Appellants claim that the composition of the

    ### Response:
    holding that the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to adjudicate common law claims violated article iii without deciding the claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because there is no substantial question presented by these appeals, we grant Wipro’s motions to summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. Gupta’s motions for summary action are denied, as is his motion to strike Wipro’s motion for summary action in C.A. No. 15-3194. * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 . Gupta initially filed the complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, which, upon Wipro’s motion (which was joined by the Secretary of Labor), transferred the matter to the District of New Jersey. To the extent that Gupta seeks review of that transfer order, we lack jurisdiction. See Posnanski v. Gibney, 421 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Furthermore, the ARB properly concluded

    ### Response:
    holding that a transfer order issued by a district court in another circuit is reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    property area does not have business or pedestrian activity after 6:00 p.m. M.C. was also seen walking along the complex’s back alley while looking up at the roof for any surveillance equipment. Further, Officer Quintero saw M.C. hide behind a dumpster after he approached in his marked police K-9 vehicle and then begin to quickly walk away from Officer Quintero when he got out of the vehicle. M.C.’s actions, as observed by Officer Quintero, plus any rational inferences to be drawn from them, establish that M.C. was acting in an unusual way at the time and place the police officer encountered him, suggesting a breach of the peace was imminent. Thus, M.C.’s actions were “aberrant and suspicious criminal conduct” that law-abiding individuals do not engage in. See B.J., 951 So.2d at 103 (<HOLDING>); G.G., 903 So.2d at 1033 (holding the first

    ### Response:
    holding the first element was proven because defendant was hiding at 130 am in the back of a pickup truck near a closed business that was the subject of a burglary call
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    & Son (an unincorporated division of Federal) is party to the agreements at issue in this case, the parties entered into a tolling agreement, in December 2005, dismissing without prejudice all claims against them. 4 . Captives typically buy reinsurance as a risk-spreading mechanism. See In re Petition of the Bd. of Dirs. of Hopewell Int’l Ins., Ltd., 272 B.R. 396, 400 & n. 1 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2002). Here, FFG purchased reinsurance from (or, in proper parlance, ceded it to) Federal on the Policy. Under this particular type of reinsurance (known as quota-share reinsurance), Federal agreed to cover 30% of FFG’s losses under the Policy in exchange for the same percentage of Fleet's premium. 5 . RSI's principal place of business is not entirely cl 145 Ariz. 1, 699 P.2d 376, 386 (Ct.App.1984) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The opinion does not specify whether the

    ### Response:
    holding that an administrator was involved in a joint venture with the insurer and thereby exposed to bad faith liability based on evidence that the administrator collected premiums handled claims and took a commission on the premiums collected and a percentage of the renewal commissions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    section 725.9 only preempted the city from enacting an ordinance regulating the dissemination of obscene materials to minors. Id. After looking at the legislative history of section 725.9, we determined section 725.9 was not limited to the dissemination of obscene materials to minors and instead restricted governmental subdivisions from enacting any local ordinances regulating conduct covered in chapter 725, now chapter 728. Id. at 374. The United States Supreme Court had come to the same conclusion when reviewing a conviction from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa for a violation of a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of obscene materials. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 293-95, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 1760-61, 52 L.Ed.2d 324, 331-32 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, in Chelsea Theater, we held the

    ### Response:
    holding section 72811s predecessor section 7259 preempted all local regulation of obscene materials and was not restricted in application to the dissemination of obscene materials to minors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    written judgment controlled over oral pronouncement of sentence). This is particularly true when the written order is included in the appellate record and. no issue is raised as to its accuracy. Ablon, 537 S.W.2d at 267. Oral cumulation orders entered pursuant to article 42.08 are void unless they are reflected in the written judgment. Dutton v. State, 836 S.W.2d 221, 228-29 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Tex. Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 42.08 (Vernon Supp.1997). Thus, the written order in this case controls. Appellant directs this court to the portion of the reporter’s record at which the trial court orally pronounced the sentences would run consecutively. However, the written judgment provides as follows: IT IS ORDERED by the -Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). In any event, even if appellant had preserved

    ### Response:
    holding the constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment may be waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conflation of state procedural requirements and the 48-hour period during which a probable cause determination should be made for warrantless arrests, with the entirely independent substantive due process right to an initial appearance. Moreover, even assuming the City maintained a policy that resulted in individuals not being afforded initial appearances in a manner compliant with the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, plaintiff concedes that all new detainees who were not released on bond would be brought to Municipal Court, held on most Thursdays. All reported cases finding liability for violation of the substantive due process right to which plaintiff points have involved significantly longer periods of detention without an initial appearance. E.g., Hayes, 388 F.3d at 674-75 (<HOLDING>); Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 577-79 (fifty-seven

    ### Response:
    holding thirtyeight day preappearance detention violated due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the sales-tax exemption in § 40-23-4(a)(ll) facially discriminated against interstate commerce, and was thus “‘“virtually per se invalid,” ’ ” and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to “the Department’s justification for any discriminatory treatment in assessing sales taxes.” Hoover, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 833 So.2d at 35, 36 (quoting Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996)). The supreme court specifically stated that the Department had “completely ignore[d]” the United States Supreme Court cases relied on by Hoover for the proposition that the tax-exemption statute discriminated against interstate commerce and had, instead, relied on State v. Leary & Owens Equipment Co., 54 Ala.App. 49, 304 So.2d 604 (Civ.1974) (<HOLDING>), for its contention that taxing out-of-state

    ### Response:
    holding that alabama could tax the sales of repair parts to county governments in florida when the transactions were conducted entirely within alabama
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to pursue legal action.” The last letter preceded this statement with the declaration that “it is our intent to close our files and inform our client that you have refused to cooperate.” Id. at *2. The letter went on to describe possible consequences of litigation and suggested that the client obtain legal assistance. Id. The court held, however, that the letters’ references to legal action were not threats to pursue it; the letters merely communicated that litigation was one possible course of action. “Far from threatening legal action, the statement ... indicates that legal action is an option available to the creditor, who may indeed choose to take advantage of it.” Id. at *7; see Knowles v. Credit Bureau of Rochester, No. 91-CV-14S, 1992 WL 131107, at **1-2 (W.D.N.Y. May 28, 1992) (<HOLDING>). After reviewing the applicable precedent,

    ### Response:
    holding that the statement failure to pay will leave our client with no choice but to consider legal action did not violate  1692e5 by threatening legal action because at most the language  threatened that the creditor will have to consider legal action and therefore no action of any kind is threatened by defendant collection agency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir.2003) (citing United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983)). The acts that allegedly “deprived the plaintiff of equal protection must be the result of class-based discrimination.” Id. (citing Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 886 (6th Cir.1992)). A plaintiff fails to state an adequate claim if his allegations are premised upon mere conclusions and opinions. Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987). A plaintiff must make sufficient factual allegations to link two alleged conspirators in the conspiracy and to establish the requisite “meeting of the minds” essential to the existence of the conspiracy. McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Coker has failed to properly allege a

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for conspiracy pursuant to  1985 for failure to allege a meeting of the minds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (quoting Smith, 461 U.S. at 55 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. 1625). Finally, Mendez clearly rejects ASARCO’s argument that $9 in punitive damages should be the constitutional limit on an award of $1 in nominal damages, instead recognizing that a higher ratio may be warranted by the need to deter future misconduct. See id. (noting that the district court held that such a small award would not be “sufficient to deter other [defendants] from engaging in similar conduct in the future,” and agreeing that the second Gore guidepost may have reduced relevance in § 1983 suits involving only nominal damages, and expressly rejecting the defendants’ contention that $18 in punitive damages was the constitutional maximum on the award of $1 in nominal damages on two claims); and compare Murray, 55 F.3d at 1453 (<HOLDING>); Bains, 405 F.3d at 775 (post-BMW case

    ### Response:
    holding prebmw that deterrence is relevant to the determination of constitutionally permissible punitive damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decision included an unfavorable opinion in the form of the opinion of the Medical Doctor on the November 1983 Board panel.” R. at 8. The Board explained that “[t]he November 1983 Board panel was free to use its own medical judgment in deciding the claim, and whether the articulation of its reasons or bases for applying that judgment may not meet present standards, it is not a basis for a CUE finding in the November 1983 Board decision.” R. at 9. Although the Secretary now argues that the Board correctly found that the November 1983 Board decision “constituted a medical opinion” that weighed against the appellant’s claim, Secretary’s Br. at 10, the Court does not agree. The Court has held in other contexts that VA decisions are not evidence. See Wages v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 233, 239 (<HOLDING>). “Evidence” is “[s]omething (including

    ### Response:
    holding that the director of compensations determination as to whether an extraschedular rating was warranted is not evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1) bear the obligation “to manage and supervise the process by which signatures for the initiative petition are obtained”; (2) “control the arguments in favor of an initiative measure,” including by serving as gatekeeper for all ballot arguments, providing arguments afforded priority status on the ballot, controlling all rebuttal ballot arguments, and retaining the ability to withdraw ballot arguments at any time; and (3) are allowed to intervene, both before and after the initiative is passed, in litigation affecting the initiated statute, and to appeal state court rulings adverse to the initiative’s validity. Perry v. Brown, 52 Cal.4th 1116, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 499, 265 P.3d 1002, 1017-18 (2011). But see Hollingsworth v. Perry, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2662, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (<HOLDING>). In addition to having special duties beyond

    ### Response:
    holding that the authority of the official proponent to intervene in court proceedings pertaining to an initiative is insufficient without more to create article iii standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a. Blackwell Has Alleged a Disability Within the Meaning of the ADA Blackwell must first allege that he has a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA. Swanks, 179 F.3d at 934. The ADA defines a disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). “The operation of a major bodily function, including ... circulatory ... functions,” is a “major life activity.” Id. § 12102(2)(B). And according to EEOC regulations, the term “substantially limits” is to be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(B)-(E) (generally defining a broad scope for the term “substantially limits”); Green v. American Univ., 647 F.Supp.2d 21, 29 (D.D.C.2009) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. District of Columbia, 572

    ### Response:
    holding that an individual with a condition similar to irritable bowel syndrome pleaded a disability because the functioning of the bowels is a major life activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [Adv. Doc. No. 87-1, p. 4-5J. 14 . Meter’s billing entries include: (1) .2 hours on April 7, 2010 for “[cjonference with H. Ray III regarding telephone conference and review of pleadings”; (2) 1.8 hours on April 7, 2010 for the following tasks: ""[rjeview and analyze motion to dismiss; review and analyze petition”; (3) 1.2 hours on April 12, 2010 for “[cjonference with I. Wang regarding conference call to discuss complaint and motion to dismiss; conference with H. Ray III, C. Limpus and I. Wang to discuss status of case and hearing on Wednesday.” [Adv. Doc. No. 87-2, p. 3-4], 15 . See also Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717 (""The time of two or three lawyers in a courtroom or conference when one would do may obviously be discounted.”); In re Leonard Jed Co., 118 B.R. 339, 347 (Bankr.D.Md.1990) (<HOLDING>); In re Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Ass’n, 89 B.R.

    ### Response:
    holding that excessive use of office conferences and unnecessary duplication of effort will re suit in reduction of fees when they are unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cases suggest that the ADA is inapplicable to arrests because an arrest is not the type of service, program, or activity from which a disabled person could be excluded or otherwise denied a benefit. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir.1997) (‘We agree with the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that although ‘incarceration itself is hardly a ‘program’ or ‘activity’ to which a disabled person might wish access, ... there is no doubt that an educational program is a program, and when it is provided by and in a state prison it is a program of a public entity.)’ ” (citing Crawford v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir.1997)), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937, 118 S.Ct. 2340, 141 L.Ed.2d 711 (1998); Rosen v. Montgomery County Maryland, 121 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Rylee v. Chapman, 2008 WL 3538559, slip

    ### Response:
    holding in a case involving a deaf person arrested for drunk driving that calling a drunk driving arrest a program or activity of the county the essential eligibility requirements of which in this case are weaving in traffic and being intoxicated strikes us as a stretch of the statutory language and of the underlying legislative intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Second Amended Complaint also includes a cause of action for copyright infringement. Prior to trial that claim was voluntarily dismissed. 4 .The parties are in agreement that the common law claims are governed by New York law, as Defendants Belliard and Fell’s employment took place in New York, as did all of the events at issue in the case. 5 . Courts in this jurisdiction, typically in the context of settlement agreements or licensing agreements, have recognized that such agreements not to challenge the validity or enforceability of intellectual property ""necessarily involve the public interest and have enforced such agreements only to the extent that enforcement does not result in a public injury.” Idaho Potato Comm’n v. M & M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (discussing cases following Lear, Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that licensee was not estopped from challenging the validity of a trademark
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in a couple of scrapes, but had been fine in general and not a big trouble-maker. Defense counsel wanted the sheriff to testify because he was so well liked that ‘if he could say anything nice about Nathan, it couldn’t hurt anything.’ Specifically, defense counsel thought that Colbert could ‘humanize’ Slaton and they ‘felt like [if] the jury believed that the sheriff thought he was an OK kind of guy even though he was a prisoner, the jury — that some of that might be transferred to the jury.’ “From the nature of this testimony and the remarks of counsel during the Rule 32 hearing, it is clear that defense counsel knew how Sheriff Colbert would testify and that they wanted to call him to the stand for a valid, strategic purpose. See Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir.1995)(<HOLDING>). Specifically, defense counsel wanted

    ### Response:
    holding that the decision of which witness to call is the epitome of a strategic decision and it is one that we will seldom if ever second guess
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any state cause of action for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization. 390 U.S. 557, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 20 L.Ed.2d 126. Then, twenty years later, in Metropolitan Life, the Court extended the complete preemption principle to ERISA. 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55. The Court concluded that Section 502 of ERISA possessed “that extraordinary pre-emptive power” because “the language of the jurisdiction subsection of ERISA’s civil enforcement pro visions closely parallelled] that of § 301 of the LMRA.” Id. at 65, 107 S.Ct. at 1547, 95 L.Ed.2d at 64. The Court has declined to extend the complete pre-emption doctrine beyond the LMRA and ERISA. See, e.g., Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court of Del., 366 U.S. 656, 81 S.Ct. 1303, 6 L.Ed.2d 584 (1961) (<HOLDING>). The complete pre-emption doctrine ' does not

    ### Response:
    holding that the natural gas act did not completely preempt state law claims within its scope and thus the federal court did not have removal jurisdiction over the contract price dispute filed in state court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tex. 278, 317 S.W.2d 916, 921-22 (1958), in which the supreme court held that the plaintiffs overt act in seeking out a juror and asking her to “do all you can to help me” was sufficient to demonstrate probable harm. The McCaslin court noted that “[a] juror’s disavowal of influence derived from misconduct is not a proper inquiry.” Id. at 920. Instead, the court explained, the presence or absence of injury “must be drawn from overt acts such as conversations and physical actions, i.e., what was said and done.” Id. The Losiers argue that the jurors undoubtedly knew the paralegal, Monica Lee, worked for the defendants’ attorneys because she was introduced in voir dire, and therefore the juror, Robert Mulvey, was aware of her relationship to the defendants. Cf. Mercado, 106 S.W.3d at 397 (<HOLDING>). The Losiers further contend that because the

    ### Response:
    holding that there could be no conscious or subconscious influence from shadow jurors contact with juror when juror was unaware of shadow jurors affiliation with a party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    common law of arbitration would apply to disputes arising between them. The arbitration provision at issue in this case is an “all issues” arbitration provision of the type disfavored by the Georgia common law of arbitration. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Wilbanks, 162 Ga.App. 154, 290 S.E.2d 122 (1982). Such a clause would be enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act but not under Georgia common law. Id. At the time Booth and Hume executed their employment agreement, the Georgia courts took the position that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted the state’s substantive arbitration law, at least where state law would render the arbitration agreement void. See, e.g., West Point-Pepperell v. Multi-line Indus., 231 Ga. 329, 330-31, 201 S.E.2d 452, 453-54 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, when Hume and Booth agreed that

    ### Response:
    holding that wjhere such a transaction involves commerce within the meaning of the federal arbitration statute the state law and policy with respect thereto must yield to the paramount federal law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court before the first appeal. In that note, the IRS stated that the return of the ADR dividends to IES’s income for tax years 1991 and 1992, should IES be entitled to its claimed capital-loss carrybacks, was not an issue on summary judgment. That was true. It would be a distortion of the IRS’s position to read that one sentence in a footnote in its summary judgment memorandum to constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of its right to raise the defenses of offset and equitable recoupment at some point later in the litigation, when the dividend income might become an issue. The government did raise the defenses, by seeking to amend its answer, when those defenses became an issue in the case after it lost on appeal. Cf. Buder v. United States, 7 F.3d 1382, 1386 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The other proof of waiver to which IES points

    ### Response:
    holding that offset defense was waived when it was not raised until ten days before the trial date and the government never pleaded or amended its complaint to include the setoff defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    affidavit was properly stricken, the relevant facts for analyzing summary judgment are the un-controverted ones in Defendants’ motion. Thom further contends that the. district court erred in granting Officers .McGary and Bryant qualified immunity from his § 1983 claim. We review a grant of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity de novo. Curtis v. Anthony, 710 F.3d 587, 593 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights and (2) the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation. uent arrest of Thorn. See Resendiz v. Miller, 203 F.3d 902, 903 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Based on the totality of the circumstances

    ### Response:
    holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with a direct right of appeal to the board of contract appeals is strong evidence of CDA coverage of a subcontractor’s claims. Id. In Johnson Controls, this court dismissed an agency board’s holding that the government, by “circumvent[ing] the independent authority of the prime contractor [such that the prime contractor] was acting as an agent of the government,” contracted with the subcontractor under the first part of the test, since the “holding, by implication, recognized that there was no direct contractual relationship between the government and [subcontractor] Johnson [Controls].” Johnson Controls, 713 F.2d at 1552-53. Also, because the contract required the contractor to obtain a Miller Act bond, the subcontractor had a recourse other than a direct appea BCA ¶ 17,604 (1984) (<HOLDING>); McMillin Bros. Constructors, Inc., EBCA No.

    ### Response:
    holding that government approval of a subcontract terms giving subcontractor a right to a direct appeal to the department of energy board of contract appeals among other things manifested intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    but also extend it to proceedings involving the termination of parental rights. Even if the Minnesota courts were to adopt the doctrine of abatement, it is doubtful that the doctrine would be extended to cases involving termination of parental rights. Abatement rests primarily on the dual rationales that (1) the party in interest is no longer living and (2) his rights to an appeal cannot be vindicated. Carlin, 249 P.3d at 762; Wkitehouse v. State, 266 Ind. 527, 364 N.E.2d 1015, 1016 (1977). Here, although the child’s best interests were the central focus of the termination proceedings, appellant remains a real party in interest. The termination order concerns her constitutional rights. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212-13, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Appellant concedes that she faces collateral

    ### Response:
    recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    10, 2012: The Limitations Period Ran 134 Days The District Court determined that the limitations period ran throughout this interval. Thompson argues that the Court erred by failing to carve out a period between April 10, 2012 — when he filed an out-of-time motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s denial of his petition for certification — and May 25, 2012 — when the Supreme Court of New Jersey accepted his motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration as within time but simultaneously denied the motion for reconsideration. We agree.. The Supreme Court’s acceptance of Thompson’s motion as timely is “an important indication” that the motion was “properly filed.” Jenkins, 705 F.3d at 87; see also Fernandez v. Sternes, 227 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we will exclude the time between the

    ### Response:
    holding that if a state court grants leave to pursue an out of time appeal the proper period of exclusion for  2244d purposes is all time between the filing of the request to excuse the default and the state courts decision on the merits if it elects to excuse the default
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    process, “a federal court is not limited to the consideration of evidence that would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence; any relevant material or source may be consulted.” Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477. The Court is more than satisfied that the learned opinions of the judges of the United States Courts of Appeal are an adequate source upon which to conclude that the English system is compatible with the requirements of due process of law. See, e.g., Society of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir.2002) (""the courts of England are fair and neutral forums”); Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477. 6 . This principle continues to adhere to the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act in other states. See, e.g., Society of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 332-33 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The weakness in this argument is further

    ### Response:
    holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or abuse in question. There is sufficient evidence in the record to implicate the father as the perpetrator of the abuse but not the mother. Detective LaRochelle, the lead detective investigating the allegations of child abuse, testified that he believed the father inflicted the injuries to the child, and also stated that the mother was not a suspect. After hearing from the parties and witnesses, the court concluded that the baby suffered egregious abuse and terminated the parental rights of both the father and mother. After a thorough examination of the record, we find that record is devoid of the clear and convincing evidence necessary under statute to terminate the mother’s parental rights. See R.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 975 So.2d 435, 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>); T.V. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial courts determination that clear and convincing evidence supports the termination of parental rights will not be overturned unless found to be clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    30 .""The question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious damage to his future health, and it does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (internal quotation omitted and emphasis added). Thus, the risk must be cognizable, but the consequences of that risk need not yet have materialized, in order to define the time to begin to determine whether the defendant disregarded the risk. See Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 341 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Rather, the defendant's action or inaction

    ### Response:
    holding that an eighth amendment plaintiff did not have to prove that he was actually injured by exposure to raw sewage only that such exposure posed a serious health risk
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to induce the carrier to connect the call to the desired number and to broadcast the desired signals. Such a transmission constitutes an attempt to defraud the cellular carrier, and intent to defraud is an element, along with the involvement of an “access device,” of any violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029. We see no reason why the construction and sale of “tumbling” phones should not fall within the proscriptions of § 1029. C. “Free Riding” The defendant nevertheless attempts to analogize his devices to those in McNutt by claiming that he is merely “piggybacking” onto an an existing system and getting a “free ride” without actually imposing any costs on anyone. The Tenth Circuit accepted that characterization in extending the holding of McNutt to tumbling the ESN. Brady, 13 F.3d at 340 (<HOLDING>). The district court also seems to have been

    ### Response:
    holding that  1029 does not apply to free riding on the cellular system in part because the use did not result in direct accounting losses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    predicate prior conviction for the sexual predator designation, concluding the date of sentencing was controlling. This was error. In order to be counted as a prior felony for the purpose of designating a defendant a sexual predator, “the felony must have resulted in a conviction sentenced separately, or an adjudication of delinquency entered separately, prior to the current offense and sentenced or adjudicated separately from any other felony conviction that is to be counted as a prior felony regardless of the date of offense of the prior felony.” § 775.21(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added). This means the conviction and sentence on the predicate prior felony must be entered before the current felony is committed. See id.; Sadler v. State, 112 So.3d 498, 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (<HOLDING>). Applied to this case, the Orange County

    ### Response:
    holding that a conviction and sentence for a predicate offense that is entered after the commission of the current offense does not qualify as a prior felony within the meaning of the sexual predator statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remarks does not depend on their offensiveness, but rather on their tendency to show that the decision-maker was motivated by assumptions or attitudes relating to the protected class.”). The individual who made each statement, i.e., Gold, is also the decision-maker with respect to the adverse employment acts. However, the other three factors suggest the statements are “stray comments” because, to varying degrees: their content is benign when considered in the context they were made; they are temporally remote from an adverse employment action; and/or they are unrelated to an employment decision or the decision making process. See id.; O’Connor v. Viacom Inc./Viacom Int’l Inc., No. 93 CIV. 2399 (LMM), 1996 WL 194299, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23), aff'd, 104 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). However, in considering all of the statements

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate pretext where employer allegedly referred to irish employees in derogatory terms and emphasizing that many courts have held that stray remarks in the workplace by themselves and without a demonstrated nexus to the complained of personnel actions will not defeat the employers motion for summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rules “shall be construed to secure the just. . . determination of every action.” The spirit of the Rules favors decisions on the merits, not technicalities, unless the result would be prejudicial to the other party. Since the first three counts of the complaint assert a right to recover jointly, justice is served by construing Rule 3 and Rule 20 as allowing the $185.00 filing fee to commence the wrongful death action. As to count four of plaintiffs’ complaint, the undisputed facts require allowance of the defendant’s summary judgment motion. Count four pleads a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a claim separate and distinct from the G.L.c. 161A, §21 wrongful death claims set fourth in the first three counts, Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass. 323, 334 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Further, in count four all the plaintiffs,

    ### Response:
    holding emotional distress is a distinct claim from wrongful death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    should be dismissed. The Jewell case the majority cites does not support its holding. In Jewell v. Moser, 2012 Ark. 267, we said that while we have required only substantial compliance with the procedural steps of Rule 3(e) the notice of appeal did not contain a scrivener’s error because the final order was filed after the notice of appeal. Jewell, 2012 Ark. 267. The cases where we found substantial compliance dealt with ancillary procedural requirements such as the financial-arrangement language and the ordering of the trial transcript. See, e.g., Helton v. Jacobs, 346 Ark. 344, 57 S.W.3d 180 (2001) (noting that failure to include finan cial-arrangements language in a notice of appeal no longer renders that notice invalid); Phillips v. LaValle, 293 Ark. 364, 737 S.W.2d 652 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, in Jewell, we noted that a

    ### Response:
    holding that it was not fatal when the notice of appeal did not state that the transcript had been ordered when in actuality it had been ordered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    terms” are merely those terms the parties “would reasonably regard as vitally important elements of their bargain.” Gen. Metal Fabricating Corp. v. Stergiou, 438 S.W.3d 737, 745 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.]. 2014, no pet.). KC Southern, as noted above, produced the settlement agreement as part of its summary judgment evidence. The agreement specifically states the parties have reached an agreement with regard to the resolution of the lawsuit, and that Chavez agreed to release all claims against KC Southern arising out of the accident for specific sums of money payable to each plaintiff. The agreement also provides for the payment of attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we hold KC Southern established as a matter of law that the settlement agreement contained “essential terms.” See id. (<HOLDING>); see also Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 460-61

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 11 agreement stating that one party would return shares of stock for a specific amount of money contained essential terms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    state treasury from liability _”). But protection from suit under the Eleventh Amendment “does not extend to counties and municipal corporations.” Eason, 303 F.3d at 1141; see Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 401, 99 S.Ct. 1171(“[T]he Court has consistently refused to construe the [Eleventh] Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a ‘slice of state power.’ ”). The issue before us is “whether the [School District] is to be treated as an arm of the State partaking of the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, or is instead to be treated as a municipal corporation or other political subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does not extend.” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 280, 97 S.Ct. 568(<HOLDING>). To determine whether an entity is an arm of

    ### Response:
    holding that an ohio school district is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the state and therefore it is not entitled to assert eleventh amendment immunity from suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to demonstrate that he was persecuted or tortured. Although he sought medical attention each time he was released, the BIA reasoned that Arshad did not show he suffered any harm greater than the denial of proper food and sleep, as opposed to cmy food or sleep, consistent with his claim that doctors told him to merely eat well and rest. Although the experiences Ar-shad claims to have suffered are troubling, we are not compelled to disagree with the BIA’s determination that the conditions of his detentions did not rise to the level of severity described in Fatin, for purposes of withholding of removal, or to the level of torture. Likewise, we agree that Arshad’s letter of resignation does not demonstrate past persecution entitling him to withholding of removal. See Li, 400 F.3d at 168 (<HOLDING>). As the BIA and IJ noted, the letter itself

    ### Response:
    holding that the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage  may constitute persecution if it threatens a petitioners life or freedom
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) (219 SE2d 729) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) (330 SE2d 743) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 (289 SE2d 555) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 (657 SE2d 307) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 (609 SE2d 653) (2004). 11 Moore v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 485 (1) (202 SE2d 425) (1973). 12 Brown v. Ricketts, 235 Ga. 29, 32 (218 SE2d 785) (1975). 13 Blassingame v. State, 155 Ga. App. 235, 236 (270 SE2d 399) (1980). 14 Blaylock v. State, 129 Ga. App. 230 (199 SE2d 369) (1973). 15 It is for this reason that any failure by counsel to assert such rights on behalf of a fugitive client cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Johnson v. Smith, 227 Ga. 611 (2) (182 SE2d 101) (1971) (<HOLDING>). See also Johnson v. Caldwell, 458 F2d 505

    ### Response:
    holding on appeal from a habeas corpus denial that counsel was not ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal because of defendants escape
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reasons, I conclude that defendant does not qualify as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). IT IS ORDERED that this matter is scheduled for SENTENCING on Thursday, November 12, 2009, at 10:30 a.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties file any further sentencing motions or memoranda no later than November 5, 2009. 1 . Although the two Iowa convictions were entered on the same date, the offense dates were different. Under the guidelines, sentences imposed on the same day may in some cases be counted as one sentence, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), but the ACCA looks to the date of offense, requiring that predicate convictions be “committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 2 . But cf. United States v. Dominguez, 992 F.2d 678, 682 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The CSA also forbids the distribution of a

    ### Response:
    holding that the sale of a noncontrolled substance which the defendant subjectively believes to be a controlled substance can constitute an attempt to distribute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and assent of the parties “perform[s] a cautionary function whereby the parties’ acceptance is considered and deliberate.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Aguiar further contends that the settlement judgment entered in the dis trict court is unlawful because it constitutes a waiver of his Title VII rights that is not knowing and voluntary. He argues that the settlement judgment waives his rights because it restricts him to bringing certain claims before Magistrate Judge Katz for the next two years, and then bars him from bringing those claims at all after two years. The agreement to bring claims in a particular forum, however, is not a waiver of Aguiar’s Title VII remedies and is enforceable. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 1469, 173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Further, we do not read the settlement

    ### Response:
    holding that an agreement to submit age discrimination claims to arbitration does not constitute a waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (unpublished). The prior Order entered in this case on May 25, 2004 denying respondent’s initial motion to dismiss and staying the case on exhaustion grounds constitutes an interlocutory Order, which this Court is permitted to reconsider. Moreover, justification exists for reconsideration of the decision to deny the motion to dismiss given the “intervening change in the controlling law” on statutory tolling by the Supreme Court in Lawrence, which calls into question this Court’s prior ruling on the statute of limitations issue. The law-of-the-case doctrine cannot be applied under the circumstances of this case to insulate the prior ruling “from a subsequent decision by a superior court calling that ruling into question.” Kucharski v. Leveille, 478 F.Supp.2d 928, 932 (E.D.Mich.2007) (<HOLDING>), vacated on other grounds, 526 F.Supp.2d 768

    ### Response:
    holding in a prisoner civil rights action that the lawofthecase doctrine does not apply to preclude reconsideration of a prior order denying a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds in light of an intervening change in the law by the supreme court which called into question the prior ruling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    some rational basis rather than be arbitrary and capricious). Petitioner’s prior escape, his history of attempted escapes, and possession of escape paraphernalia, guns and ammunition did provide a rational basis for initially placing him in CM status and for confining him there for some period of time. However, these violations are over ten years old, and petitioner has had only one minor disciplinary infraction since. Consequently, we believe a substantial question exists on whether the Assignment Team’s assessment that petitioner remains a severe escape risk provides a sufficient rational basis to support his continued confinement in CM in the absence of any reported objective evidence other than these ten-year old violations. B. Due Process Petitioner next asserts that hi ir.1981) (<HOLDING>) In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1990 WL 84704, at *2-3. 21 . See Leighton, 1990 WL 84704, at *2-3 (dismissing current shareholder’s appeal and holding that shareholder who was not plaintiff in derivative action lacked standing to challenge or object to derivative-action settlement because shareholder did not own stock when the allegedly actionable conduct occurred); In re Beatrice Companies, Inc., Nos. 155,156, 1987 WL 36708, at *2-3 (Del. Feb. 20, 1987) (precedential order) (dismissing current shareholder's appeal and holding that shareholder who was not plaintiff in derivative action lacked standing to challenge or object to derivative-action settlement because shareholder did not own stock when the allegedly actionable V, 2009 WL 909591, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 7, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); Somers v. Crane, 295 S.W.3d 5, 8, 10, 13

    ### Response:
    holding that lack of standing cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time by an appellate court on its own motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute. Id. Based solely on his delivery of the boat within Virginia’s boundaries, the Supreme Court of Virginia held the defendant subject to personal jurisdiction in the Commonwealth. Id. at 563-64. Because the claim asserted in Peninsula Cruise was based on the defendant’s failure to pay for repairs, not the failure to deliver the boat, the case points persuasively to the conclusion that acts of contract performance may confer jurisdiction in a breach of contract action even if those acts are not specifically related to the alleged breach. This reading of Peninsula Cruise is supported by Prolinks, Inc. v. Horizon Organic Dairy, 58 Va. Cir. 17, 20 (2001), which states in dicta that Peninsula Cruise establishes that “part performance of a contract [in the pp. 935, 937 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>). In this case, therefore, all of defendant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffemployers claim that defendant violated noncompete agreement did not arise out of defendants businessrelated visits to new york
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on an oral loan payable upon demand begins to run only after there has been a breach by the debtor, i.e., the debt- or has refused to repay the loan at the time the creditor demands repayment. As noted by the Second District, this is the rule that obtains when there is a written loan agreement providing that the loan is payable upon demand, and we see no valid basis for distinguishing between the two situations. The critical feature of both forms of loans, whether oral or written, is the provision for repayment upon demand. When that provision is the same in both instances, we see no reason to have one rule that says a demand must first be made and rejected in the one instance, but not in the other. Cf. Schreiber v. Hackett, 173 Ill.App.3d 129, 122 Ill.Dec. 914, 527 N.E.2d 412 (1988) (<HOLDING>). The cases which adhere to a contrary rule

    ### Response:
    holding that where parties to an oral loan agreed that the loan would be repaid on demand the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by participating in a decision to treat all cash received from shares held by the estate in thoroughbred race horses as income rather than creating a depreciating reserve. The circuit court noted that the daughters did not raise this argument until tlieir posttrial brief; thus, it considered the argument untimely. The daughters do not respond to the reason the circuit court gave for rejecting their argument. Instead, they argue on appeal the merits of the issue, which the circuit court did not reach, and they provide no legal authority ■as to the timeliness ground on which the circuit court relied. Based on well settled principles of appellate review, we will not reverse a judgment of a trial court under such circumstances. See, e.g., Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.1983)(<HOLDING>). D. Award of Attorney Fees to. the Personal

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to secure a reversal the appellant has an affirmative duty of showing error upon the fee ord
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the age of fourteen, constituted a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). In holding that indecent assault was a crime of violence, the Second Circuit’s focused on the fact that “lack of consent [was] a requisite element of a § 13H violation.” Id. (citations omitted). The Court held that a violation of § 13H, “by its nature, presents a substantial risk that force may be used in order to overcome the victim’s lack of consent and accomplish the indecent touching.” Id. (original emphasis). “Because the victim’s non-consent is a necessary element for conviction under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 13H, we hold that petitioner was convicted of a ‘crime of violence’ within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).” Id. at 177; see also United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir.1993)(<HOLDING>). Although the. risk of injury statute, Conn.

    ### Response:
    holding that because the crime of rape involved a nonconsensual act there was a substantial risk that physical force may be used in committing the offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is not briefed anywhere in appellants' brief or reply brief. 6 . Rule 16 was amended effective November 1, 1999, to correspond with the 1993 amendment to rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the new procedures are applicable only to cases filed on or after November 1, 1999. See Utah R.Civ.P. 16 advisory committee note. Therefore, the applicable rule for the case before us is taken from the 1997 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. . 7 . The 1999 amendment to rule 37 is also applicable only to cases filed after November 1, 1999. See Utah R.Civ.P. 37 advisory committee note. Therefore, rule 37 of the 1997 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the applicable rule to be applied in the case before us. 8 . See also Larsen v. Decker, 196 Ariz. 239, 995 P.2d 281, 286 (Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>); McAllister v. George, 73 Cal.App.3d 258, 140

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that no foundation had established bills were caused by and were reasonable and necessary results of accident
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in a civil manner free of displays of force, intimidation, or strong-arm tactics. Moreover, as in Gaddy, 698 So.2d at 1155, the defendant in this case initiated the portion of the discussion that led to his confes.sion. McLeod indicated that he wanted to cooperate with Officer Burch. Thus, this case is less like Weeks, 531 So.2d at 644, where the officer’s inducement actually caused the defendant to make an inculpatory statement, and more like Gaddy, 698 So.2d at 1155, where the officer’s inducement did not actually cause the defendant to confess. Absent the exertion of physical or psychological force or any particular and peculiar susceptibility to inducement on the part of McLeod, the officer’s stating that he would make McLeod’s cooperation known to the district (1st Cir.1985)

    ### Response:
    holding that an officers promise to bring defendants cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor did not make confession involuntary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purpose of receiving claims from an employee covered by a group insurance policy. Our research has not disclosed any Montana case that resolves this question. Perhaps the closest case is Nautilus Ins. Co. v. First Nat’l Ins. Inc., 254 Mont. 296, 837 P.2d 409 (1992), in which your Court stated that an “insurance broker is usually regarded as the agent of the insured” and that “the determination of which party a broker is acting for as to a particular matter depends on which party requested him to do the particular thing.” Id. at 411-12. There is case law from some jurisdictions which supports the position that an employer acts as an agent for an insurance company that has issued a group policy covering employees. See Norby v. Bankers Life Co., 304 Minn. 464, 231 N.W.2d 665, 669 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Bass v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10

    ### Response:
    holding that the employer may be considered the insurers agent where the employer with the consent of the insurer performs routine administrative functions such as assisting in the processing of claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    repairs totaling $30,027.63 were necessary to make the appraisal value accurate were credible by a preponderance of the evidence."" While a reevaluation of the value of the repairs and the use of an adjusted amount would not necessarily have been an abuse of discretion, we are unable to determine if the new figure was based on a reevaluation or a transcription error based on the language of the order. We remand this issue for clarification. v. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the judgment below in all but three aspects, which we REMAND to the trial court for further proceedings to det that tort damages are separate property except where intended to replace pre-divorce lost earnings). 14 . 68 P.3d 1232 (Alaska 2003). 15 . Id. at 1235. 16 . See Hansen v. Hansen, 119 P.3d 1005, 1013 (Alaska 2005) (<HOLDING>). 17 . See id.; see also Abood, 119 P.3d at

    ### Response:
    holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not possibly have been injured by the transfer and therefore cannot seek to set aside or disregard the conveyance. The New York courts, like courts in other jurisdictions, have seldom used the explicit “proof of injury” language in cases under the UFCA. Perhaps, as Kreditt-Finans has pointed out, this is because creditors ordinarily do not seek to invalidate transactions that cause them no injury and accordingly the question arises only infrequently. However, at least one New York appellate court has held that under the UFCA “creditors have causes of action only to the extent to which they have been damaged.” Buckley Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Goldman, 28 A.D.2d 640, 641, 280 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878 (1967). See Suffolk & Nassau Amusement Co. v. Ambrose, 145 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1955) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, numerous courts in other

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff who has not sustained any damage as the result of a transfer of property cannot seek to set that transfer aside as fraudulent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in threats or coercive conduct as those terms are recognized in our judicial lexicon. A threat is defined as a “communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or on another’s property, especially] one that might diminish a person’s freedom to act voluntarily or with lawful consent[J” Black’s Law Dictionary 1519 (8th ed.2004). At no point did petitioner’s statements to Sprague rise to the level of threats. Further, we respectfully disagree that petitioner was “unduly coercive.” To coerce implies the use of force or threats and we are not satisfied that petitioner’s conduct rose to the level of coercion. The petitioner was not rude or abusive or arrogant or aggressive, nor did his conduct exceed the bounds of judicial propriety. See, e.g., In re O’Brien, 650 A.2d 134 (R.I.1994) (<HOLDING>). We are mindful that we are confronted with a

    ### Response:
    holding that multiple instances of arrogant and abusive conduct warranted a public censure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    while we have held that “temporary swelling and irritation” constitute only de minimis injury under Norman, see Taylor v. McDuffie, 155 F.3d 479, 484 (4th Cir.1998), overruled in part by Wilkins, 559 U.S. 34, 130 S.Ct. 1175 (2010), we have also recognized that to satisfy Norman an inmate “néed not show that ... force caused an ‘extreme deprivation’ or ‘serious’ or ‘significant’ pain or injury.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir.1996) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992)). Moreover, on numerous occasions, applying the Norman standard, we have concluded that injuries comparable to — and arguably less severe than — those Ussery maintains he suffered were not de minimis. See, e.g., Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 448 (4th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Young v. Prince George’s Cnty., 355 F.3d 751,

    ### Response:
    holding that just two uses of a taser  even if only for a few seconds at a time  caused more than de minimis injury when the plaintiff experieneed electric shock pain and developed a scar
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nearly every case cited by the parties agrees, as does this court, that some funds must be spent on response costs prior to a declaratory judgment action being considered ripe. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has indicated that both sections 113(g)(2) and 107(a) “envision that, before suing, CERCLA plaintiffs will spend some money responding to an environmental hazard.” In re Dant & Russell, 951 F.2d at 249. Then, and only then can CERCLA plaintiffs “go to court and obtain ... a declaration that the responsible party will have continuing liability for the cost of finishing the job.” Id. at 249-50. “By requiring a plaintiff to take some positive action before coming to court,” the Ninth Circuit explains, “CERCLA ensures that the dispute will be ripe for judicial review.” Id. at 250 (<HOLDING>). See also Trimble, supra, slip op. at 10

    ### Response:
    holding that bankruptcy court could not enter judgment for 7402564 under  107a for incurred costs when such costs had not been incurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for attractive nuisance. See, eg., Thomas v. Hansen, 2013 WL 4590634 (D.Utah 2013); Hill v. National Grid, 11 A.3d 110 (R.1.2011); Craig v. Bailey Bros. Realty, Inc., 304 Ga.App. 794, 697 S.E.2d 888 (2010); MacVane v. S.D. Warren Co., LLC, 641 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.Me.2009); McDaniels v. Sovereign Homes, 2006 WL 3365499 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.2006); Butler v. Newark County Country Club, 909 A.2d 111 (Del.Supr.2006); Lieding v. Blackledge, 2004 WL 1078981 (Mich.App.2004); Mason v. City of Mt. Sterling, 122 S.W.3d 500 (Ky.2003). 4 . As we have recognized, in section 13-21-115(3)(b), the General Assembly departed from the common law's ""know or reason to know"" formulation of licensee by adopting an actual knowledge standard. Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 2013 CO 38, ¶ 29, 303 P.3d 558, 565, n. 9 (<HOLDING>). Section 13-21-115(3)(b)'s actual knowledge

    ### Response:
    recognizing that our statute represents a substantial departure from the common law where landowners owed licensees a duty of care regardless of whether they had actual or constructive knowledge of dangers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (N.D.1975). In addition, our court previously considered N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02(5), the very subsection cited by the Board, explicitly concluding the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction does not involve the merits of a claim. Schaff v. Kennelly, 69 N.W.2d 777, 779-80 (N.D.1955). Rather the denial of a motion to dismiss, like the denial of a motion for summary judgment, is “merely interlocutory and, leaving the case pending for trial, it decides nothing, except that the parties may proceed with the case.” Rude v. Letnes, 154 N.W. 2d 380, 381(N.D.1967). See also Imperial Oil of North Dakota v. Hanson, 510 N.W.2d 598, 601 (N.D.1994) (noting “[e]ven a jurisdictional reason does not normally warrant an intermediate appeal”); Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 554 (N.D.1965) (<HOLDING>); Beresina Sch. Dist. No. 23 v. Steinwandt, 60

    ### Response:
    holding a decision denying a motion to dismiss an action for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4). This Circuit has expressly held that the above provision of the REAL ID Act eliminates habeas jurisdiction over FARR Act claims. Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 511 (D.C.Cir.2009), reh’g denied (July 27, 2009), r Cir.2007) (distinguishing St. Cyr on the grounds that there existed “a plausible reading of the statutes before the [Supreme] Court under which habeas review ... was not barred,” whereas § 2242(d) clearly precluded “consideration of CAT and FARR Act claims on habeas review”); see also O.K. v. Bush, 377 F.Supp.2d 102, 118 n. 17 (D.D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>); Al-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F.Supp.2d 188, 194

    ### Response:
    holding that the farr act is expressly limited to claims arising out of a final order of removal and does not confer any legal rights outside of the removal setting
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would only include true statements in a filed pleading, Pilette answered: “That’s correct. It was probably signed under oath.” JA 295. All of this is consistent with Pilette’s testimony that her notes from the meeting with Coddington and the Motion for Guidance indicate that Coddington chose only to appeal the resentencing issue. Having made that decision with respect to the initial appeal, it is difficult to see what benefit a further waiver could provide. Coddington had already waived the right to appeal the voluntariness issue, and his success on the resentencing issue would not have allowed him suddenly to insert the voluntariness issue into the appeal after the successful-and fully concluded-remand. See People v. Kaczorowski, 190 Mich.App. 165, 475 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Mich.1991) (<HOLDING>). D. The district court lastly determined that

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants failure to appeal the voluntariness of a plea constitutes waiver of the issue on subsequent appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court’s instructions. See Bennett, 368 F.3d at 1351. Simply put, Overton has not met his burden to show that there is “a reasonable probability ... that, but for the remarks,” the outcome of his trial would be different, and thus, he has not shown prejudice to his substantial rights. See Hall, 47 F.3d at 1098. Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 1 . We deny Overton’s motion to file a supplemental brief to argue, for the first time, that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), applies to his case. It is well-established that we will not consider such arguments when they are not raised in the initial brief. See United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1299 n. 1 (11th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 830

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant waived his blakely claim as issue on appeal by failing to raise it in his initial brief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The record supports that A Beka Books was an affiliate of PCC. Thus, under the terms of Bruhn’s contract with PCC, she was an employee of PCC even though she was assigned to work with the affiliate, A Beka Books. The only support cited by the trial court regarding its ruling that A Beka Books was Bruhn’s “actual” employer was a W-2 statement of Bruhn’s 2005 wages earned at A Beka Books, and the court’s determination that A Beka Books “is a separate legal entity from Pensacola Christian College and possesses a separate FIN/EIN number than does Pensacola Christian College.” However, the record on appeal does not support either finding. Moreover, a W-2 form is not conclusive evidence of an employment relationship. See Verchick v. Hecht Invs., Ltd., 924 So.2d 944, 945-46 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). Rather, as this court stated in Hoar

    ### Response:
    holding that w2 tax forms alone did not establish an employment relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT ON EXPRESSION? The Supreme Court in Freedman outlined three procedural safeguards that a prior restraint on protected expression must contain to obviate the dangers of censorship: (1) the burden of going to court to suppress the speech, and the burden of proof once in court, must rest with the government; (2) any restraint prior to a judicial determination may only be for a specified brief time period in order to preserve the status quo; and (3) an avenue for prompt judicial review of the censor’s decision must be available. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59, 85 S.Ct. at 739. At least some of the Freedman requirements apply to content-neutral regulations such as section 2.51. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 226-29, 110 S.Ct. at 605-06 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>); see also id. at 238-39, 110 S.Ct. at 611

    ### Response:
    holding contentneutral licensing scheme was an unconstitutional prior restraint because it violated the second freedman safeguard  adequate limits on the time that the decisionmaker has to issue the license
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    N.W.2d 41 (Minn.2008). Carlson—decided nearly seven years after Holmstrom v. III. Farmers Ins. Co., 631 N.W.2d 102 (Minn.App.2001), on which Pepper relies—rejected the idea that the statute is intended to define mandatory minimum coverage. 749 N.W.2d at 47. The supreme court therefore concluded that “subdivision 3a(5) constitutes a system of priorities and as such governs the source, not the scope, of coverage.” Id. at 47 n. 4. Because the policy in this case provides coverage when an insured is injured by an underinsured motor vehicle and specifically excludes vehicles that are provided liability coverage under the policy from the definition of an underinsured motor vehicle, I would conclude that Minn. Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5), does not entitle Pepper to UIM benefits. See id. at 47 (<HOLDING>). Because I believe that the plain language of

    ### Response:
    holding that because the policy by its terms afforded the injured party no coverage neither does minnstat  65b49 subd 3a5
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the purpose of proving the truthfulness of his statement, but for the purpose of rebuttal only.’ ” Id. at 412, 105 S.Ct. 2078. The trial court included a similar limiting instruction in its final instructions to the jury. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he nonhearsay aspect of [the co-conspirator’s] confession — not to prove what happened at the murder scene but to prove what happened when [the defendant] confessed — raisefd] no Confrontation Clause concerns.” Id. at 414, 105 S.Ct. 2078 (emphasis in original). Instead, the concern was that the jury might use the co-conspirator’s statement in a manner inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause, i.e., to infer Street’s guilt even though Street had had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I . 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (<HOLDING>); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of a defendants prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    person), with RCW 9A.32.030(l)(a) (person commits first degree murder when, with a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person), and RCW 10.95.020 (listing aggravating circumstances). 5 Indeed, the trial court’s conclusion that reflection after the fact could show premeditation is probably wrong as a matter of law. To the extent that this is true, that decision is reviewed de novo. Walker, 136 Wn.2d at 771-72. Regardless of the standard applied, however, the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence did not support an inference that the shooting occurred without premeditation. 6 Br. of Resp’t at 14-15; Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 9-10. 7 Compare State v. Tamalini, 134 Wn.2d 725, 728-36, 953 P.2d 450 (1998) (<HOLDING>), with Schaffer, 135 Wn.2d at 358-59 (remanding

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant who was charged with felony murder was not entitled to a lesser included instruction on manslaughter because manslaughter is neither a lesser included offense nor an inferior degree crime with respect to felony murder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fact that Davis was seventeen years old at the time the murder was committed, the court finds that Davis’ sentence of death is unconstitutional. Pursuant to an Alabama statute, an individual convicted of a capital offense must be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See Ala.Code § 13A-5-39(l) (defining “capital offense” as “[a]n offense for which a[ ] defendant shall be punished by a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole according to the provisions of this article”); id. § 13A-5-40(a) (listing and defining Alabama’s capital offenses). Because the sentence of death is no longer constitutionally valid, the only sentencing alternative is life without parole. See Adams v. State, — So.2d-, 2006 WL 1216740, *1 (Ala.Cr.App. April 28, 2006) (<HOLDING>). Davis’ petition, therefore, is due to be

    ### Response:
    holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available  life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defendant in a case where the relevant statute awards attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party un- less the defendant is a prevailing party within the meaning of that statute. Id. at 1031 (citing Payne v. Milwaukee Cnty., 288 F.3d 1021, 1026 (7th Cir.2002) (“Briefly put, ‘costs’ cannot encompass more than the rules or other relevant statutes authorize.”)). Although we have not yet confronted this question in a Copyright Act case, Trident and Champion make clear that in this context as well, because the district court determined that attorney’s fees were not “properly awardable” to Veoh under § 505, they were not award-able under Rule 68 either. B. Even though Veoh is not entitled to attorney’s fees under Rule 68, it may be entitled to its other costs. See, e.g., Champion, 342 F.3d at 1028 (<HOLDING>). The district court, however, did not analyze

    ### Response:
    holding that even though attorneys fees were not properly awardable under rule 68 costs excluding fees were mandatory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for nonrenewal, but retaining the ""good cause” requirement for termination of a tenancy during the term of the lease. See Barrientos, 583 F.3d 1205. 4 . As discussed below, the one-year notice provision only applies to an owner's decision to terminate or not renew a project-based assistance program, and not a tenant-based assistance program like that at issue here. 5 . Under the circumstances, it would not have made any sense for Defendant to have included the other required language pertaining to the availability of ""tenant-based rental assistance” in his non-renewal notice, since Plaintiffs had already been put on notice of such by the previous owner and had been receiving such assistance since 2009. Cf. Owens v. Charleston Housing Authority, 336 F.Supp.2d 934, 946 (D.Mo.2004) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Notably, even the cases on which

    ### Response:
    holding that owners notice substantially complied with federal requirements because the owner intended to demolish the housing units and noted that ajlthough the notice did not follow the statutory language it would have been misleading had it strictly followed the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his claim is too speculative to show a reasonable possibility of persecution. Zheng argues that the BIA engaged in “reverse speculation” in this regard by assuming that he might join a church that might not be subject to persecution, but that argument stands his burden of proof on its head. Zheng bore the burden to prove that he faces a reasonable possibility of persecution if returned to China. As explained above, he has provided no basis to disturb the BIA’s conclusion that he failed to do so. Zheng also argues that the record shows a pattern or practice of persecution of unauthorized Christian churches in China. Zheng does not cite any authority finding such a pattern or practice on the basis of a similar record. Cf. Xue Zhen Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1136-38 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The only evidence of record he cites for this

    ### Response:
    holding that country reports describing sporadic persecution of unauthorized christian activities did not compel the conclusion that there is a pattern or practice of persecution in china
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Collins, the sentencing court provided three grounds for its downward departure, two of which—the defendant’s age and infirmity—were discouraged factors. See id. at 1305. The Tenth Circuit’s analysis indicated that a discouraged factor, when aggregated with other factors as grounds for departure, need not arise to the same level of atypicality as would be required were the factor the departure’s sole basis. See United States v. Jones, 158 F.3d at 501 (recognizing that, although the defendant’s support in the community was insufficiently “extraordinary” to support a departure on this basis alone, a district court did not abuse its discretion by relying on this factor as one of several grounds supporting a departure); United States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486, 1494-95 (10th Cir.1991)(<HOLDING>). 1. Aberrant Behavior. In United States v.

    ### Response:
    holding that extraordinary family responsibilities combined with aberrational nature of conduct warranted departure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Group, Ltd., 115 N.J. 614, 623, 560 A.2d 663 (1989). The PEAA applies to: (1) employment agencies; (2) temporary help service firms; and (3) consulting firms. N.J.S.A. 34:8-43. The PEAA covers an employment agency to the extent that for a fee, the business: (1) Procures or obtains, or offers, promises or attempts to procure, obtain, or assist in procuring or obtaining employment for a job seeker or employees for an employer; (2) Supplies job seekers to employers seeking employees on a part-time or temporary assignment basis who has not filed notification with the Attorney General; or (4) Acts as a placement firm, career counseling service, or resume service [N.J.S.A. 34:8-43.] See also Data Informatics, Inc. v. AmeriSOURCE Partners, 338 N.J.Super. 61, 63-64, 768 A.2d 210 (App.Div.2001) (<HOLDING>). Importantly, the PEAA regulates: “the

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff that was engaged in the business of placement of contract personnel with other entities was required to be licensedregistered under the peaa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-14, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001); and see Bejacmar v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 735, 736-37 (11th Cir.2002) (noting that Richardson had been overruled). Subsequently, in Calcano-Martinez, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ suggestion that it should construe § 1252(a)(2)(C) to mean that courts of appeals are stripped of direct Cir.2002) (stating that habeas proceedings carry a more limited scope of review than direct-review proceedings); Sol v. INS, 274 F.3d 648, 651 (2d Cir.2001); Bowrin v. INS, 194 F.3d 483, 490 (4th Cir.1999) (""Only questions of pure law. will be considered on § 2241 habeas review. Review of factual or discretionary issues is prohibited.""); cf. Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d 1286, 1291, 1293 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). We join our sister circuits in concluding

    ### Response:
    holding that statutes restricting judicial review of discretionary decisions do not preclude review of challenges to the constitutionality of ins regulations but holding that petitioners failure to receive discretionary relief does not rise to a constitutionally protected interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    invocation of an “absolute, unqualified” executive privilege, withhold information in the face of subpoena orders. 418 U. S., at 706, 707. It did so, however, only after the party requesting the information — the special prosecutor — had satisfied his burden of showing the propriety of the requests. Here, as the Court of Appeals acknowledged, the discovery requests are anything but appropriate. They provide respondents all the disclosure to which they would be entitled in the event they prevail on the merits, and much more besides. In these circumstances, Nixon does not require -the Executive Branch to bear the onus of critiquing the unacceptable discovery requests line by line. Our precedents suggest just the opposite. See, e. g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681 (1997); id., at 705 (<HOLDING>); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 753. The

    ### Response:
    holding that the judiciary may direct appropriate process to the executive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    present case, the evidence supports the conclusion that the tool-room transfer precluded Spees from working in “a class of jobs” for two reasons. First, JMI viewed Spees as being unable to weld in any capacity, thereby precluding her from employing the skills that she had acquired during the one-month training program for welding. The tool-room position, unlike a welding position, did not require any special training, meaning that Spees was effectively removed to an unskilled position and precluded from utilizing any of the welding training that she had received. JMI’s belief that Spees could not perform any type of welding work thus weighs in favor of concluding that she was precluded from working in a class of jobs. Cf Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The second reason supporting the conclusion

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff was not precluded from working in a class of jobs where an arm injury restricted her from performing any climbing while welding but did not prevent her from welding in general
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purpose of inducing CONA to enter into a contract and that CONA relied on the false representation, incurring an injury. Regarding CONA’s aiding and abetting fraud claim, CONA alleged that C & B provided substantial assistance to New America in accomplishing the fraud by misrepresenting that all five wastewater easements had been signed and recorded. Considering CONA’s claims and factual allegations against C & B, it is evident that CONA is complaining only of an injury that was caused by C & B’s alleged false representation a claims of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, deceptive trade practices, and unjust enrichment did not require certificate of merit because gist of claims was that appellant had engaged in pervasive and systemic overbill-ing) and Parker Cnty., 2009 WL 3938051, at *3 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the day of plaintiff’s accident, nor did it claim that plaintiff's booking was not governed by the contract. It merely argued that: ""the moving Defendant is not being sued by a parly with whom it was in a contractual relationship. The moving Defendant did not enter into any contract with Plaintiff, written or otherwise, in New Jersey.” 7 No evidence was presented that would quantify the difference in damages available in New Jersey and Quintana Roo. 8 Quintana Roo's interest is in fact similar to that of Virginia, which we found to be a ""significant interest in deterring unsafe property conditions and unsafe conduct of people and enterprises located there.” O'Connor, supra, 255 N.J.Super. at 549, 605 A.2d 773. See also Shuder v. McDonald's Corp., 859 F.2d 266, 271 (3d Cir.1988)

    ### Response:
    recognizing virginias interest in protecting defendants from claims and in holding down insurance costs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the underlying tax liability, to a district court of the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d) (emphasis added). 8 . Section 7429 provides, in relevant part, that: (A) In general. — Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action for a determination under this subsection. Tax Court. — [under specific circumstances] then the Tax Court also shall have jurisdiction over any civil action for a determination under this subsection with respect to all the taxes and taxable periods included in such written statement. 26 U.S.C. § 7429(b)(2) (emphasis added). 9 . Fisher, however, expressly overruled Gollehon’s ""non-frivolous allegation” test for invoking jurisdiction. See Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1172 (<HOLDING>). 10 . The Export Clause to the United States

    ### Response:
    holding that making a nonfrivolous allegation is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.1988). There, we adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s credit-as-true rule, holding that the Commissioner must accept, as a matter of law, a claimant’s subjective pain testimony if the ALJ fails to articulate sufficient reasons for refusing to credit it. Id. However, the holding in Varney II was specifically limited to cases “where there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a proper disability determination can be made, and where it is clear from the administrative record that the ALJ would be required to award benefits if the claimant’s excess pain testimony were credited.” Id. at 1401. Since Varney II, a split in authority has developed over whether the rule is mandatory or discretionary in’this Circuit. Compare, e.g., Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); with Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876

    ### Response:
    holding that when an alj improperly rejects a claimants testimony regarding his limitations and the claimant would be disabled if his testimony were credited the testimony must be credited as a matter of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    show that he is a “member in good standing” in the New Mexico State Bar before he may be admitted to practice in this Court. He was also given notice by the Order to Show Cause and at the August 7, 2012 hearing that he had to present more than just evidence that he was on probationary status as grounds for readmission. Mr. Klipstine had ample opportunity at the hearing to establish the ground of good standing in the state bar, but he is legally unable to do so. Therefore, the Court will deny his petition for readmission without prejudice to its refiling if, and when, Mr. Klipstine has successfully fulfilled his two-year period of probation and has been formally reinstated as a member in good standing in the New Mexico State Bar. See In re Smith, 329 Fed.Appx. 805, 808 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). IV. Concerns about Mr. Klipstine’s behavior

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court  did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition for reinstatement where membership in good standing in the state bar was required before attorney could be admitted to the federal bar and applicant had not been readmitted to state bar
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the doctors, precisely what the incentives were, when they were provided, why they were provided, and why they were illegal. Mastej’s complaint provides specific details about the “on-call” neurosurgeon scheme the Defendants utilized to induce six doctors to refer Medicare patients for treatment at the Defendants’ hospital. It offers specific information about the golf-trip benefit provided to four additional doctors in 2008. Mastej’s complaint identifies the names of all ten doctors who allegedly referred patients after having received these financial benefits from the Defendants. Mastej’s allegations regarding the financial incentives, which he claims violated the Stark and Anti-kickback statutes, meet Rule 9(b)’s required level of specificity. See Hopper, 588 F.3d at 1324 (<HOLDING>). But healthcare providers do not violate the

    ### Response:
    holding that specific details about time place and substance of the fraud satisfy rule 9b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiff Annette Szaley appeals the district court’s grant of summary ju 0 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Among other factors, Casanova performed many

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff who cannot establish an equal pay act claim likewise cannot establish a paybased title vii claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    All Bonds (Special Documents of Title UCC § 7201, UCC § 7202, UCC § 8102 et seq) and-Accounts regards Me and My PERSON; wind-up the Ens Legis: WILLIAM FREDERICK KEMP JR. (UCC § 9307(h)).” As plaintiffs statement regarding this relief does not assert a claim for money damages, perhaps this is a request for declaratory or injunctive relief. The Federal Circuit has explained that the Court of Federal Claims “does not have general equity jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief.” Shemonsky v. United States, 215 F.3d 1340 (Fed.Cir.1999) (upholding decision of the Court of Federal Claims that the court’s jurisdiction did not extend to injunctive or declaratory relief); see also Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed.Cir.2003); Choate v. United States, 60 F.3d 840 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). As stated by the Federal Circuit: The Court

    ### Response:
    holding that the tucker act does not provide a means by which the court of federal claims may grant injunctive or declaratory relief where the suit does not involve a preaward protest or the application of section 7428 of the internal revenue code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had until 1958 to bring the present action or be forever barred. A. The Constitution and the Statute of Limitations Plaintiffs’ first argument for avoiding the impact of the six-year statute on their cause of action is that their claim is constitutionally based, and therefore it is unconstitutional to deprive them of their constitutional right, short of a full and fair decision on the merits. Since the right to compensation for a governmental taking of private property is constitutionally protected, the argument is stunning in its potential — it would have the effect of leaving all takings claims against the United States without a termination, except by ultimate resolution in the courts. It has been the common understanding that wrongs for which the law grants a remedy are 2002) (<HOLDING>); Ave-nal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933 (Fed.

    ### Response:
    holding that regulatory ban on drift gillnet fishing was not a taking of fishing vessel and gear
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    page 21C, Defendant Harvey argues in his Fifth Supplement at pp. 16-17 that the absence of reference in Copus’ affidavit to evidence obtained in controlled trash collections as part of the state investigation vitiated the showing of necessity under § 2518(3)(c) and rendered the affidavit materially false. This argument is without merit. Even with this evidence, the state investigators had told the FBI agents that the state lacked sufficient evidence to arrest Harvey. 9 . Both parties agree that the requirements of the federal Act apply to determine whether authorization for disclosure of the contents of the state wiretap was necessary and sufficient. There has been some disagreement on this point in the reported decisions. Compare United States v. Tortorello, supra, 480 F.2d at 782 (<HOLDING>) with United States v. Marion, supra, 535 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding the new york state wiretap statute controlling on this issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. City of Presque Isle, 1998 ME 166, 715 A.2d 148, a plaintiff claiming a Freedom of Access violation was required to file a motion pursuant to Rule 80B(d) in order to present evidence to the Superior Court. See Moreau v. Town of Turner, 661 A.2d 677, 679 (Me.1995); Palesky v. Town of Topsham, 614 A.2d 1307, 1310 n. 3 (Me.1992) Marxsen v. Board of Dirs., M.S.A.D. No. 5, 591 A.2d 867, 871 (Me.1991). In Underwood, we expressly overruled Marxsen to the extent it required a Rule 80B(d) motion in order for evidence to be presented in a Freedom of Access case. We did so because 1 M.R.S.A. § 409(2) (1989) provides a claimant a trial de novo in the Superior Court. See Underwood, 1998 ME 166, ¶ 22, 715 A.2d at 155; see also Service & Erection Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 684 A.2d 1, 2 (Me.1996) (<HOLDING>) Although in Underwood we did not mention the

    ### Response:
    holding no requirement of rule 80bd motion in tax appeal where statute provides for trial de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be removed ... by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States.... This certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal. 14 . In addition, a corollary effect of the district court’s order dismissing Red Cross from the suit was to dismiss Osteopathic’s cross-claim against Red Cross as well. Clearly, if the district court had a basis of independent subject matter jurisdiction over Osteopathic’s cross-claim against Red Cross, the district court could not have dismissed Red Cross, nor could it have declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case, merely because Carr opted not to pursue his claim against Red Cross. National Research Bureau, Inc. v. Bartholomew, 482 F.2d 386, 388-89 (3d Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). Given the Supreme Court’s holding in American

    ### Response:
    holding that once an issue with independent subject matter jurisdiction is before the court it must be allowed to proceed to a conclu sion without regard to the fate of the original claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence that the statements in question were made under oath. Although Wyche contends, without supporting authority, that the “under oath” requirement cannot be established by circumstantial evidence, we disagree. First, as Wyche concedes, the other elements of the crime of perjury may be proved using circumstantial evidence. See Appellant’s Br. at 14. Second, as indicated by our standard of review, the elements of a crime ordinarily can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. See Voss, 82 F.3d at 1524-25. Case law on the issue establishes that “perjury cases, like all criminal cases, are susceptible to proof by circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274, 1280 (D.C.Cir.1975); see also United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 770 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Third, the perjury statute itself supports

    ### Response:
    holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judge Miller conducted a thorough review of all objections and responses made by Pinkston to the magistrate judge's recommendation. See Goffman, 59 F.3d at 671 (stating that ""if following a review of the record the district court is satisfied with the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations it may in its discretion treat those findings and recommendations as its own""); see also United States v. Larson, 760 F.2d 852, 857 (8th Cir.1985); Andrews v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1170-71 (10th Cir.1991). It is clear that Pinkston’s argument in this regard is nothing more than a collateral attack on the magistrate’s reasoning, masquerading as an assault on the district court’s entirely acceptable decision to adopt the magistrate’s opinion instead of conducting an evidentiary Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). To do otherwise would be contrary to our very

    ### Response:
    holding that by blindly adopting the magistrate judges findings apparently without ever having received a report and recommendation the district court violated  636b1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse the order of the t la.1992) (stating that the warnings required to comply with the self-incrimination clause of Article I, Section 9, Florida Constitution, do not have to be given in the exact form as long as an effective equivalent is given). Again based on the limited record before us, Wilford’s Sixth Amendment claim may not have merit. Even though Wilford’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to other charges, adversary judicial criminal proceedings may not have been initiated in regard to the charges of this case at the time he was interrogated by law enforcement. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-68, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001) (<HOLDING>). See also Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 639

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his sixth amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Costs 42 U.S.C. § 1988 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(d) (“Korenbaum Deck”), Ex. E, [Time & Expense Entries of Korenbaum], ECF No. 63. In total, Coe’s counsel spent approximately 100 hours more on the second appeal than they did on the first, despite having already completed the majority of the work during the first appeal. The only difference between the first and second appeal was Coe’s argument opposing this Court’s fifty-percent reduction on the attorneys’ fees award for the trial and first appeal. This Court rules that the attorneys’ fees sought by Coe for the second appeal relating to the same facts and issues presented in the first appeal are unreasonably redundant and unnecessary. See Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir.1992) (considering “whether, at the time the work 7) (<HOLDING>). A fifty-percent reduction is reasonable

    ### Response:
    holding that the quantity of relief obtained as compared to what the plaintiff sought to achieve are key elements in determining the degree of success
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    point to written language capable of reasonably being interpreted as creating a promise on the part of [the employer] to vest [the recipient’s] ... benefits.’ International Multifoods, 116 F.3d at 980 (quoting Schonholz, 87 F.3d at 78) (emphasis in the original). The court then examined the CBAs and the ERISA plan documents involved in the case in light of that standard. The court noted that each CBA provided for medical benefits “[d]uring the term of this Agreement,” and explained that “promising to provide benefits for a certain period of time necessarily establishes that once that time period expires, the promise does as well.” International Multifoods, 116 F.3d at 981 (citing LTV Steel Co. v. United Mine Workers of America (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 945 F.2d 1205, 1208 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>)). The court then concluded that this provision

    ### Response:
    holding that a cba provision which guaranteed retiree medical benefits during the term of this agreement established that retiree health benefits were no longer guaranteed once the agreement expired
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of all students as suggested in its May 27, 2005 waiver request) exceeds the scope of the Secretary’s 2003 regulations, which were subsequently affirmed by Congress in the IDEA of 2004. Thus, the Secretary argues that her “regulations are narrowly tailored to address a particular issue with respect to very small segments of the ... students with disabilities populations; in contrast, the State’s proposed plan amendment would eliminate Congress’s requirement of annual grade-level testing of these students.” Sec’y’s Reply Brief [doc. # 151], at 5. The Secretary did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in concluding that the State’s proposed plan amendments were contrary to the dictates of the Act. See, e.g., Bellevue Hosp. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 443 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The very clear message of Congress in the

    ### Response:
    holding that the department of health and human services did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in implementing statutory requirement to adjust medicare reimbursements to reflect differences in hospital wage levels across geographic areas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    first Rule 1-015(C) factor, stated in subpart (C)(1), would be whether Corporation was on notice from the Bernalillo County action of the institution of the action against Defendant such that Corporation would not be prejudiced in the joinder and in having to maintain a defense on the merits of Plaintiffs claim. This notice issue obviously would involve factual analyses of whether Defendant was the principal professional in the professional corporation “G.P. McRostie, D.O.M., N.D., P.A.,” and whether, based on Defendant’s position in Corporation, Corporation had received such notice of the institution of the Bernalillo County action that Corporation would not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the merits. See Rivera v. King, 108 N.M. 5, 11, 765 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>). The second factor, stated in subpart (C)(2),

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants had received sufficient notice where the original defendants and the newly added defendants shared an identity of interests and were represented by attorneys who were involved in the litigation from its inception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the leases, the court fails to give the required deference to permissible agency action. The court’s opinion expresses concern that DNR “singled out” the Jerrels and implies that DNR varied “the requirements of its regulations at a whim.” First, DNR did not single out the Jerrels. Their actions prompted individualized attention. DNR had authority to interpret its regulation as it did, and a duty to rein in the Jerrels’ animals. The record strongly suggests that DNR worked in good faith, dealing patiently with both the Jerrels and their neighbors. Second, unless DNR had absolutely no authority to interpret its regulation on a lease-by-lease basis, it seems inconsistent to reason that a requirement specific to the Jerrels could somehow be a regulation of general application. D. The (<HOLDING>). 28 . See State v. Anderson, 749 P.2d 1342,

    ### Response:
    holding that issuance of commercial fishing permit for closed waters to one individual was not regulation and was not abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Martinez’s state law and declaratory judgment causes of action because Martinez failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>); Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 129

    ### Response:
    holding that the declaratory judgment act 28 usc  2201 only creates a remedy and is not an independent basis for jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    before it may open a branch in Arkansas. Id. § 23-48-1001(a). These statutes, which contain express state certification requirements, demonstrate the General Assembly is capable of articulating a certification requirement when it desires one. Yet the SFA contains none. Arkansas courts presume the General Assembly has in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter when it enacts a new statute. See Cousins v. Dennis, 298 Ark. 310, 767 S.W.2d 296, 298 (1989). And when the General Assembly has demonstrated the ability to include qualifying statutory language in a statute, but chooses not to do so in a particular statute, Arkansas courts infer the omission was deliberate and evidences a different legislative intent. See Bush v. State, 338 Ark. 772, 2 S.W.3d 761, 764 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Chatelain v. Kelley, 322 Ark. 517, 910 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding the legislatures approval of granting a defendant credit against his sentence in a statute governing postsentence 17electronic monitoring by the department of correction but omission of that approval in a separate statute relating to pretrial electronic monitoring is evidence that the legislature did not intend for credit to be given for electronic monitoring while a defendant is awaiting trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which to advance any “new argument” to Judge Bryant. That being so, the publication of Viernes did not and could not justify Judge Bryant’s “reconsideration” of Judge Town’s order. Because neither the evidentiary nor legal bases of Oughterson’s de minimis arguments had changed in the interim between Judge Town’s entry of his order denying Oughter-son’s motion to dismiss and Judge Bryant’s subsequent entry of his order granting Oughterson’s motion for reconsideration of Judge Town’s order, we hold that Judge Bryant lacked any cogent reason for granting Oughterson’s motion for reconsideration, and, therefore, abused his discretion in doing so. As a final matter, we are compelled to note that, in his December 10, 1999 findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, Jud , 271-72 (1992) (<HOLDING>); State v. Park, 55 Haw. 610, 615-18, 525 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants de minimis motion because defendant established that his conduct in connection with benevolently assisting a runaway did not alter the custodial relationship with which prosecution accused him of interfering
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM: Roman Saldivar-Vasquez appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry after deportation following a felony conviction in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). He argues that the district court plainly erred in assessing him a 16-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2015) due to his three prior Texas felony convictions for burglary of a habitation, in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 30.02(a)(1), which the district court characterized as crimes of violence. See United States v. Conde-Castaneda, 753 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>). Saldivar-Velasquez argues that his

    ### Response:
    holding that  3002a is divisible and reiterating that offenses under  3002a1 qualify as generic burglary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was that of an injury to her ribs and shoulder from falling onto the springs and frame, not the risk of permanent quadriplegia from a broken neck as the result of being propelled onto the ground. 15 . As will be discussed further below, there is a genuine and material factual dispute as to whether these warnings met the industry standard. 16 . The court acknowledged, however, that ""CPLR article 14-A assumption of risk, a species of comparative fault, is a valid defense to any action to recover damages for personal injury, including a products liability action.” Lamey, id. at 166 n. 2, 594 N.Y.S.2d 490 (citing Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 106, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 450 N.E.2d 204 (1983) and Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973) (<HOLDING>)). 17 . I note that a lower appellate court in

    ### Response:
    holding manufacturer liable for defective product provided that plaintiff could not by exercise of reasonable care have discovered the defecl and perceived its danger or otherwise averted his injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would otherwise be improper may be excused under the ‘invited reply’ doctrine if the prosecutor’s conduct was an appropriate response to statements or arguments made by the defense.”). The question of whether Mazique’s girlfriend consented to the search of the home was an issue for the court, not the jury. Thus, although the comment was improper, we find it was not prejudicial to Mazique. Also, the value of the stolen cigarettes was not an element of the crime or vital to the evidence in the case; thus, the comment was not prejudicial to Mazique. We further find the solicitor’s brief comments do not rise to “extraordinary circumstances” that would excuse the failure to make a contemporaneous objection. See Toyota of Florence, Inc. v. Lynch, 314 S.C. 257, 263, 442 S.E.2d 611, 615 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Mazique finally argues this is a novel issue

    ### Response:
    holding that even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection a new trial motion should be granted in flagrant cases where a vicious inflammatory argument results in clear prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is shown by the success rather than by the mere fact of an enterprise’s promotional efforts, the normal consequence of substantial publicity may be inferred.” President & Trs. of Colby Coll., 508 F.2d at 808 (internal citation omitted). Lyons lists postal and electronic mailings, as well as social media practices, as pa tool. Absent any evidence that consumers became aware of Homecoming’s ACVSMR educational program through the ACVSMR site, the mere existence of a website is not highly probative of either an effective advertising technique or, more to the point, the public’s association of the ACVSMR mark with Lyons or Homecoming Farm' — the source of the ACVSMR programs. See True Fit Corp. v. True & Co., No. 12-11006-GAO, 2013 WL 789213, at *3-4 (D.Mass. Mar. 4, 2013) (O’Toole, J.) (<HOLDING>); Yankee Spirits, Inc. v. Gasbarro, No.

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs mark was unprotectable because plaintiff failed to prove that the public associated its marks with services from a common source despite having invested significant resources into advertising and branding id at 3
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed this bankruptcy court and the district court and held that “§ 546(a) applies to preference-avoidance actions brought by [debtors in possession (DIPs) ] as well as to those brought by trustees.” Id. 22 F.3d at 39. The court “concludefd] that for the DIP, the limitations period begins when the debtor files its petition and becomes a DIP under [Code] § 1101.” Id. 22 F.3d at 40. Century Brass only held, as every other circuit court considering the issue has held, that the limitation period of § 546(a)(1) applies to debtors in possession and that when no trustee is appointed in a Chapter 11 case, the starting date for the two-year period is the date the voluntary Chapter 11 case commenced. The court reserved decision 413, 1416-17 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 831 F.2d 97, 98

    ### Response:
    holding in a case where a chapter 11 trustee was appointed after a period during which the debt or had operated as debtor in possession that a chapter 11 trustee has two years from the date of his appointment not from the commencement of the chapter 11 case to bring avoidance actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    {2} After leaving a bar at closing time, Defendant claims he and his brother were threatened with violence by an angry mob. Both of them then sought refuge in Defendant’s truck. As the alleged attack continued, Defendant testified that he started the vehicle and began to drive “slowly” out of the parking lot. Almost immediately, police arrived on the scene, determined Defendant’s blood-alcohol level to be .14, and arrested him for DWI. {3} The metropolitan court, acting as fact finder in a non-jury trial, found that Defendant had not acted reasonably in the face of the alleged threat. As a result, the court found that Defendant’s act of driving while under the in 116 N.M. 793, 796, 867 P.2d 1175, 1178 (1994), with State v. Lucero, 98 N.M. 204, 206-07, 647 P.2d 406, 408-09 (1982) (<HOLDING>). This is a question of law that we review de

    ### Response:
    holding that duress is unavailable to defendants charged with the strict liability offense of child abuse
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    significant the fact that aid is provided to pupils and their parents, rather than directly to sectarian schools. As a result, “ ‘[a]ny aid . . . that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.’” Ante, at 9, quoting Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U. S. 481, 487 (1986). And, finally, the majority opines that “the task of a sign-language interpreter seems to us quite different from that of a teacher or guidance counselor.” Ante, at 13. But the majority’s arguments are unavailing. As to the first two, even a general welfare program may have specific applications that are constitutionally forbidden under the Establishment Clause. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589 (1988) (<HOLDING>). For example, a general program granting

    ### Response:
    holding that adolescent family life act on its face did not violate the establishment clause but remanding for examination of the constitutionality of particular applications
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    & Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255 (2d Cir.1996)). In making such a showing, the Court found it insufficient for the plaintiff to merely “point out” that the award of benefits would come from the plan administrator’s own pocket. See id. The Court, however, did not specify what kind of showing would satisfy the “improper motivation” standard. Just seven months after deciding Doyle, the First Circuit held that a plan administrator-insurer that would be responsible for paying benefits due under an ERISA-governed policy does operate under a conflict of interest, justifying application of the “reasonableness” standard of review. See Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir.1999); see also Pitman v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oklahoma, 217 F.3d 1291, 1296 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Court stated that “the requirement that

    ### Response:
    holding that plan administrator that was also insurer operated under conflict of interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contracts not to be performed within one year must be memorialized in some writin llows in Collins: The appellants attempt to distinguish Hogue from the instant facts, stating first that Hogue is not controlling in the context of public employees. We disagree. In the instant case, the appellants have failed to cite a specific statute or regulation that mandates that Bridgeport treat holiday, vacation, or sick pay as time actually worked for the purpose of calculating overtime pay. In the absence of such a law, Bridgeport, like a private employer, is free to promulgate a policy and subsequently modify that policy as long as employees are given reasonable notice of the modification. 206 W.Va. at 476, 525 S.E.2d d. of Police Comm'rs of Kansas City, 939 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Mo.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>); Swiger v. Civil Serv. Comm’r, 179 W.Va. 133,

    ### Response:
    holding even in context of employee manual that policy which included agreement to provide annual salary increase of five percent did not constitute contract between city and employees and distinction between atwill employees and public employees was not dispositive in this context
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    MCM states, “[t]o constitute an offense under the UCMJ, the adulterous conduct must either be directly prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting.” MCM (2005 ed.), Part IV, 1162c(2). To satisfy the prejudice prong of this terminal element, the offense must have a significant effect on unit or organizational discipline, morale or cohesion, or be “clearly detrimental to the authority or stature of or respect toward a service member.” Id. On the other hand, “service discrediting” conduct is punishable when it “has a tendency ... to bring the service into disrepute ... or lower it in public esteem.” Id. Moreover, there is no requirement that the Government show actual damage to the reputation of the military. Cf. United States v. Hartwig, 39 M.J. 125, 130 (C.M.A.1994)(<HOLDING>). Rather, the test is whether the appellant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that in context of article 133 ucmj 10 usc  933 violation for officers delivery of sexually lurid letter to child of tender years prosecution need not prove actual damage to the reputation of the military
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when agency action has become final). If there is no “final agency action,” as required by the controlling statute, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Federal Power Comm’n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375, 383-85, 58 S.Ct. 963, 966-68, 82 L.Ed. 1408 (1938); Geyen v. Marsh, 775 F.2d 1303, 1308-09 n. 6 (5th Cir.1985); see generally Charles A. WRIGHT et al„ Federal Practice & Prooedure § 3942 (1977). A final agency action is one that imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes a legal relationship. United States Dep’t of Justice v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 727 F.2d 481, 493 (5th Cir.1984). An agency’s initiation of an investigation does not constitute final agency action. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239-45, 101 S.Ct. 488, 493-96, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Dow Chemical Co. v. EPA, 832 F.2d 319, 325

    ### Response:
    holding issuance of administrative complaint to initiate proceedings not final agency action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.App.—Austin 1988, pet. refd) (construing it as the “experiential process ” by which control of the person is obtained); see White v. State, 601 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (noting that the force occurred while the arrest was “taking place”). Furthermore, our legislature has dictated that a person “is arrested” (past tense) “when ... actually placed under restraint or taken into custody” by an officer or another with or without a warrant. Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 15.22 (Vernon 1977); White v. State, 601 S.W.2d at 365. From this, we may conclude that the officer is no longer “effecting an arrest” once his efforts to actually restrain or control the individual are complete. Schrader v. State, supra; see Young v. State, 622 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (<HOLDING>). So too may we extrapolate that from the

    ### Response:
    holding that force exerted against an officer after an arrest is complete cannot be used as the basis for prosecuting one for resisting arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    challenged the adequacy of the BEA at trial is an exhibit it introduced regarding the 1077 methodology and testimony by district personnel that the BEA is exhausted by basic education costs. But in its complaint, the Alliance admittedly did not seek declaratory relief with respect to the BEA; instead, it sought relief regarding only the constitutionality of the special education funding scheme and, thus, a challenge to the adequacy of the BEA is outside the scope of its complaint. See In re Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wn.2d 612, 617, 772 P.2d 1013 (1989) (a court has no jurisdiction to grant relief beyond that sought in the complaint). Because Alliance did not challenge the adequacy of the BEA below, it may not do so on appeal. Martin v. Johnson, 141 Wn. App. 611, 617, 170 P.3d 1198 (2007) (<HOLDING>); see RAP 2.5(a). B. The Safety Net 1.

    ### Response:
    holding that generally appellate courts will not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from summary judgment is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523-24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)). B. Analysis 1. Lack of Consideration The essential elements of a valid, enforceable contract are offer, acceptance, and consideration. Copy Products, Inc. v. Randolph, 62 N.C. App. 553, 555, 303 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1983). When there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the lack of consideration, summary judgment is appropriate. See Penn Compression Moulding, Inc. v. Mar-Bal, Inc., 73 N.C. App. 291, 294, 326 S.E.2d 280, 283 (1985) (<HOLDING>). “A mere promise, without more, lacks a

    ### Response:
    holding trial court should have entered summary judgment for defendant where undisputed evidence established that no new consideration was exchanged for plaintiffs renewed promise to pay preexisting debt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argument that the circuit court erred in refusing to reveal the informant’s identity, we find the circuit court acted within its discretion. See State v. Humphries, 354 S.C. 87, 90, 579 S.E.2d 613, 615 (2003) (“[I]f the informant is an active participant in the criminal transaction and/or a material witness on the issue of guilt or innocence, disclosure of his identity may be required depending upon the facts and circumstances. On the other hand, an informant’s identity need not be disclosed where he possesses only a peripheral knowledge of the crime or is a mere ‘tipster’ who supplies a lead to law enforcement.”); id. at 90, 579 S.E.2d at 614-15 (“The burden is upon the defendant to show the facts and circumstances entitling him to the disclosure.”); id. at 90, 579 S.E.2d at 615 (<HOLDING>). 2. As to Pradubsri’s argument that the

    ### Response:
    holding a trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require disclosure of an informants name
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (quoting Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568), and, thus, must be “no greater in intensity than absolutely necessary under the circumstances,” see Silva, 91 Hawai'i at 81, 979 P.2d at 1107 (quoting State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 369, 520 P.2d 51, 58-59 (1974)). Moreover, while no single factor, in itself, is dispositive as to when a temporary investigative detention has morphed into an arrest, the potential attributes of “arrest” clearly include such circumstances as handcuffing, leading the detainee to a different location, subjecting him or her to booking procedures, ordering his or her compliance with an officer’s directives, using force, or displaying a show of authority beyond that inherent in the mere presence of a police officer, as well as any other event or con (1982) (<HOLDING>); Patterson, 59 Haw. at 363, 581 P.2d at 756

    ### Response:
    holding that no valid arrest had taken place before the search of the defendants person was conducted even though prior to that point a police officer had approached the defendant displayed his badge informed the defendant of his suspicions that the defendants luggage contained drug contraband informed the defendant of his constitutional rights and detained the defendant for twenty minutes after he had accompanied the officers to a police office located in the airport
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Jackie Kennedy appeals her sentence of ten years’ probation as a habitual felony offender for her felony petit theft conviction in circuit court case number 2011-CF-9916. The State appropriately concedes error, as the crime of felony petit theft is not subject to enhancement under the habitual offender statute. See Ridley v. State, 702 So.2d 559, 559-60 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse the sentence imposed

    ### Response:
    holding that the legislature amended section 8120142d florida statutes now renumbered as section 8120143c in 1992 to omit habitual offender penalties for the crime of felony petit theft
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    False Claims Act. Disagreeing, Wood argues that Congress’s decision to create the Institute as a “nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia, or ... comparable successor nongovernmental entity,” 22 U.S.C. § 3305(a)(1) — (2), demonstrates that the Institute is not a governmental entity enjoying sovereign immunity, but rather a private corporation providing services to the government. Wood likens the Institute to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the American National Red Cross, and Amtrak, three corporations created by the federal government and chartered under state or District of Columbia law that courts have held (or observed in dicta) are not part of the government for some purposes. See Ralis v. RFE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121, 1124-25 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Marcella v. Brandywine Hosp., 47 F.3d 618,

    ### Response:
    holding that radio free europeradio liberty is not a government controlled corporation within the meaning of the age discrimination employment act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    improved his handling of client matters, and that returning him to the practice of law with fewer organizational resources would act to the detriment, rather than the benefit, of the public. We cannot agree. This Court has cited approvingly the recommendation of the ABA Standards that a suspension should generally have a duration of at least six months. See In re Rosenfeld, 157 Vt. 537, 547, 601 A.2d 972, 978 (1991). “The rationale is that ‘short-term suspensions with automatic reinstatement are not an effective means of protecting the public’ because rehabilitation cannot be shown in less than six months and a six-month duration is needed to protect client interests.” Id. (quoting ABA Standards 2.3, Commentary). But see In re McCarty, 164 Vt. 604, 605, 665 A.2d 885, 887 (1995) (mem.) (<HOLDING>). Given respondent’s previous disciplinary

    ### Response:
    recognizing that periods of suspension of less than six months are appropriate in some circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    . See id. § 15.064. 22 . See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison, 966 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.1998). 23 . See id. at 485. 24 . See Tex. Gov't Code § 311.021(4). 25 . See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. 26 . See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 927-28 (Tex.1996). 27 . See Tex.R. Civ. P. 86(1). 28 . See Tex.R. Civ. P. 87(2)(a), (3)(a); Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't, 886 S.W.2d 259, 260-61 (Tex.1994). 29 . See Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tex.1993). 30 . See Tex.R. Civ. P. 87(2)(a); Masonite, 997 S.W.2d at 197 n. 16; Wilson, 886 S.W.2d at 260 n. 1 (Tex.1994). 31 . See Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 15.018(b)(2). 32 . Id. 33 . Id. § 15.001(a). 34 . See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.011(b); Transport Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d 269, 274 (Tex. 1995). 35 . See Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 759 (<HOLDING>). 36 . See Webster’s Third New International

    ### Response:
    holding that oil company foreman lacked discretion and authority to constitute an agency or representative for venue purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a defendant in an action for money damages” and ultimately “fails to satisfy the [resulting final] judgment.” DCL § 273-a. These convey- anees need not be intentionally harmful to creditors; it is the effect of the transfers alone, and not their purpose, that renders them constructively fraudulent. The concept of fair consideration merits brief elaboration. Generally, a transfer of assets is made for fair consideration if the transferor receives (or has received) “fair equivalent” value in return. DCL § 272. Thus, in most cases, the repayment of an antecedent debt is made for fair consideration. See HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 634 (2d Cir.1995) (stating that “the preferential repayment of pre-existing debts to some creditors” 668, 668, 390 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep’t 1976) (<HOLDING>). Actually fraudulent conveyances, in contrast

    ### Response:
    holding that an insolvent corporations salary payments to a corporate officer did not lack fair consideration because there was no evidence that the salary was either excessive or unreasonable or that the corporation did not receive full value in return
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in WWITB was a complete assignment of rights to Brownmark (Am. Compl. ¶ 13), and, accordingly, Brownmark has standing to sue for infringement of the underlying copyright. HyperQuest, Inc. 632 F.3d at 382. The court proceeds to examine the defendants’ second argument for dismissing the amended complaint. B. Fair Use In the alternative, the defendants argue that Brownmark’s copyright in fringement claims are barred by the question are central to the plaintiffs claim, and indeed no party argues that the court cannot rely on the videos in evaluating whether Brownmark has failed to properly state a claim for copyright infringement. However, the rub is that “fair use” is viewed as an affirmative defense, as opposed to a central element of copyright infringement. See Janky, 576 F.3d at 361 (<HOLDING>); see also Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation

    ### Response:
    holding that the two elements of a copyright infringement claim are 1 the plaintiff owns a valid copyright right and 2 the defendants copied constituent elements of the work that are original
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    910 (Ky.1995)). More specifically, Kentucky courts have consistently held that police officers only owe a duty of care to specific individuals if there -is a “special relationship” between the officer and individual. City of Florence v. Chipman, 38 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Ky.2001); Ashby v. City of Louisville, 841 S.W.2d.184 (Ky.App.1992). However, Kentucky has yet to address the specific question presented here — whether a police officer owes a suspect the duty to investigate allegations of criminal activity with reasonable care. Although Kentucky law is seemingly silent on the specific issue presented herein, other jurisdictions have uniformly refused to recognize a tort of negligent investigation. See Turner v. Taylor, No. 7:09-cv-02858-JMC, 2011 WL 3794086, at *9 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2011) (<HOLDING>); Fernander v. Bonis, 947 So.2d 584, 590

    ### Response:
    holding that officers owe a duty to the public to detect and investigate crime but owe no duty to individuals for negligent investigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and related services). Once Cherrix made a showing that DNA testing is “reasonably necessary” to his habeas petition, this Court had the discretion to provide for funds for testing or discovery that may be necessary to support the habeas petition. Cherrix has satisfied the standard of this and other courts for demonstrating that investigative services are “reasonably necessary.” This Circuit has stated that the services of an expert are reasonably necessary if either: (a) the services are needed to prepare the claims in the habeas petition, or to obtain evidence not yet acquired to support a claim in the habeas petition; or (b) the habeas petition raises claims entitling the petitioner to a hearing at which such expert would testify. See Lawson v. Dixon, 3 F.3d 743, 753 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). As will be explained in great detail herein,

    ### Response:
    holding that habeas petitioner did not need services of psychiatrist because i petitioner had already filed his petition and so did not need psychiatrist to prepare his claims and ii psychiatrist had already formed an opinion on the elements of petitioners claim so petitioner had already acquired the evidence sought
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint and Try This Matter by Jury, filed December 18, 1991, is hereby DENIED. 2) The Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply retroactively to cases pending at the time of enactment. 1 . All factual recitations contained in this Order have been alleged in the litigants’ pleadings. 2 . We expressly limit our opinion to cases filed and pending prior to the date of enactment. Accordingly, we decline to address whether the Act applies to cases filed after the Act’s effective date that challenge pre-Act conduct. 3 . Compare Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 924 (D.C.Cir.1991) and Simmons v. Lockhart, 931 F.2d 1226, 1230 (8th Cir.1991) and Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co, 913 F.2d 958, 963-64 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1990) and DeVargas, 911 F.2d at 1384 (<HOLDING>) with United States v. Peppertree Apartments,

    ### Response:
    holding that the georgetown presumption is the better rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sense impression exception is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement minimizes unreliability due to defective recollection or conscious fabrication. There is no per se rule . indicating what time interval is too long under Rule 803(1).... ” United States v. Hawkins, 59 F.3d 723, 730 (8th Cir.1995) (alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted), vacated on other grounds, 516 U.S. 1168, 116 S.Ct. 1257, 134 L.Ed.2d 206 (1996). In Hawkins, the defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the victim’s “911 call because the contents of the tape are inadmissible hearsay” and contended that the victim had time to fabricate her story. Id. at 730. We held that the victim’s “statements from the 911 tape were 60-61 (N.D.Ill.1991) (<HOLDING>); Bemis v. Edwards, 45 F.3d 1369, 1372 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding statements on 911 tape admissible as present sense impression where call was made almost immediately after the defendant left the store after a shooting incident
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to interfere, see Toulabi v. United States, 875 F.2d 122, 125-26 (7th Cir.1989), a franchise is a right that belongs to the government when conferred upon a citizen and that inheres in the sovereign power, see Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 220 (7th Cir.1991). The Seventh Circuit has held that fraud in procuring a franchise is subject to the mail fraud statute. See Borre, 940 F.2d at 220. According to Samsung, a patent, like a franchise, enables its owner to exclude others, including the government. We apply our own law to determine whether SEL’s conduct before the PTO qualifies as mail fraud for purposes of the predicate acts requirement of the federal RICO statute. See Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574, 37 USPQ2d 1626, 1631 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the district court that

    ### Response:
    holding that though we do not have exclusive jurisdiction over unfair competition claims our own circuit law nonetheless determines when inequitable conduct also constitutes unfair competition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    petitioner seeks, but instead the purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is made available.” Mack-ey, 401 U.S. at 682, 91 S.Ct. at 1175. To focus unduly on the Bailey decision without giving fill attention to the purposes of collateral review is to lose the forest in all the trees. After Teague, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not addressed whether changes in substantive statutory law should be applied retroactively. A close reading of Teague and an examination of its reasoning demonstrate that Teague should have a broader, more expansive application than it is usually afforded. Teague greatly restricted the availability of collateral relief, and it is applicable even in death penalty cases. Penry v. Lynaugh 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 228,

    ### Response:
    holding teague applies to capital cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence in the record supports the trial court's conclusion. However, the full quote from Stayer reads: In the case before us, there is ample record evidence, from which the trial court could have found that restitution was proper. Notwithstanding the mandate of the statute that the trial court's reasons be included as part of its order, we believe that the failure to do so in this case was harmless error. Nonetheless, we draw attention to this requirement for future guidance of the sentencing courts. Id. at 614 (emphasis added). ¶ 28 Subsequent cases from our supreme court make clear that record findings under section 76-8-201 are mandatory so that we may no longer assume that the trial court considered the enumerated factors. See State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997) (<HOLDING>); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1028-29

    ### Response:
    holding section 768201 is exception to general rule that appellate courts uphold  the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bills of lading (900 vs. 1800); 5) the description of the goods in the inspection document as “New Orleans” rather than “New, Original”; 6) the inconsistency in the number of boxes in the shipment both within the packing list and in relation to the bills of lading; 7) the packing list’s specification of a shipment date seven days after the list was purportedly created; and 8) the inconsistency between the weight of the goods listed in the packing list, 38,000 lbs., and the weight listed in the bills of lading, 64,800 lbs. Courts have found substantial compliance lacking in situations where the beneficiary’s documents contained much less significant and extensive discrepancies than are present here. See, e.g., Brul v. MidAmerican Bank & Trust Co., 820 F.Supp. 1311, 1313-14 (D.Kan.1993) (<HOLDING>); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank v.

    ### Response:
    holding that documents did not substantially comply where copies of letter of credit and promissory note were submitted and letter of credit required originals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also, e.g., Thoma v. Kettler, 632 A.2d 725, 728-29 n. 8 (D.C.1993) (noting that the generality of the regulation providing that “[d]ebris and other loose materials, shall not be allowed on or under stairways” and “[s]lippery conditions on stairways shall be eliminated as soon as possible” did not differ significantly in particulars from the common law standard of reasonable care in the circumstances); District of Columbia v. Mitchell, 533 A.2d 629, 639 (D.C.1987) (violation of statute requiring Department of Corrections to be “responsible for the safekeeping, care, protection, instruction, and discipline” of inmates implicitly recognized the common law duty of reasonable care and contained no specifics that could give rise to claim of negligence per se); Lewis, supra, 463 A.2d at 674 (<HOLDING>). McNeil argues that the trial court erred in

    ### Response:
    holding that negligence per se instruction was not warranted where plaintiffs alleged violation in building code provision requiring neighboring property and structures be sufficiently supported
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    include necessary requirements’ of the statute — not because the EPA ignored a factor that the statute requires it to consider, but only because it has not fully implemented the statutory goal.”). The issue raised by Oceana in challenging the Omnibus Amendment is different from the jurisdictional issues raised in the D.C. Circuit cases. Oceana argues that, because NMFS did not consider whether to include non-target bycatch stocks “in the fishery,” the Omnibus Amendment is arbitrary and capricious because the ACLs it does set for the already-managed stocks could result in overfishing of the unregulated bycatch stocks. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 18; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (<HOLDING>). The MSA’s new provisions required NMFS to

    ### Response:
    holding that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    scope of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.” The order at issue requires Exmark to “identify each ... tangible item responsive to each Request for Production or by general categories of documents.” According to Exmark, the order compels it to “organize its production in a manner more restrictive than the rules allow” because it eliminated its ability to produce documents and tangible things as they are kept in the normal course of business. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.3(c), “the responding party must either produce documents and tangible things as they are kept in the usual course of business or organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the request.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 196.3(c); see In re Colonial Pipeline, 968 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tex.1998) (orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Exmark’s argument, the rules

    ### Response:
    holding that this rule does not require the creation of an inventory of documents to be produced
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to assure fairness to the subject individual in any determination based on the information. That much, at least, is reasonably necessary. Thus, if the agency is likely to rely on the disputed information in making a determination about the subject individual and if the information is likely to be injurious to the individual if relied upon by the agency in making this determination, then the statutory standard demands that the agency, faced with an amendment request, determine that the information is accurate. The burden is on the individual to establish the inaccuracy of the challenged record. See OMB Guidlines at 38, Source Book at 1051 (advising agencies to place the burden of going forward in an amendment request on the individual); Mervin v. F.T.C., 591 F.2d 821, 827 (D.C.Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). The OMB Guidelines suggest that the agency

    ### Response:
    holding that the reviewing court correctly places the burden of proof on the plaintiff seeking amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As the Court summarized: ‘Congress’ intent to make the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism exclusive would be undermined if state causes of action that supplement the ERISA § 502(a) remedies were permitted, even if the elements of the state cause of action did not precisely duplicate the elements of an ERISA claim.’ Id. at 2499-2500; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (noting that the ‘policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.’); Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 269 F.3d 974,

    ### Response:
    holding that an action which seeks nonerisa damages for what are essentially claim processing causes of actionf clearly falls under the  1132 preemption exemplified by pilot life
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Barbee, 262 S.W.2d 122 (Tex.Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1953, no writ); Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Driskill, 244 S.W.2d 291 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1951, no writ); Smith v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 242 S.W.2d 448 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1951, no writ); Mut. Fire & Auto. Ins. Co. v. Muckelroy, 236 S.W.2d 555 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1951, no writ); Roberdeau v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Amer., 231 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1950, writ ref.'d n.r.e.); Am. Indem. Co. v. Jamison, 62 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tex-arkana 1933, no writ); Standard Accident Ins. Co. of Detroit v. Richmond, 297 S.W. 879 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1927, writ dism’d). 11 . For example, in Barbee, 262 S.W.2d at 123-24, over twenty items on the insured’s car were either unrepaired or improperly repaired. 7 So.2d 158, 160 (1952) (<HOLDING>); Dunmire Motor Co. v. Or. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that if despite repairs there remains a loss in actual market value estimated as of the collision date such deficiency is to be added to the cost of repairs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on August 9, 2005, after Appellant was referred to him by Dr. Earl Stewart. Dr. Bingham prepared a second EMG report on May 9, 2008, upon referral from Dr. Michael Caifee. Dr. Bingham noted his plan to refer Appellant back to Dr. Caifee. Finally, Dr. Valdivia prepared a third EMG report on October 23, 2009, upon referral from Dr. Stewart. There is no indication that the doctors saw Appellant on any other occasion. The records thus show that Dr. Tucker saw Appellant with much greater frequency and regularity than Drs. Bingham and Valdivia. It is unclear whether the ALJ recognized this difference and, if so, why she concluded that the opinions of all three doctors were entitled to equal weight. This ambiguity hinders meaningful review of the ALJ’s decision. See Blakley, 581 F.3d at 409 (<HOLDING>). Even if the ALJ considered Drs. Bing-ham and

    ### Response:
    holding an aljs failure to adequately explain the weight given to treating sources opinions not harmless because the aljs reasoning was not sufficiently specific to make clear that the alj recognized and evaluated the treating relationships
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bailey v. State, 312 Ark. 180, 182, 848 S.W.2d 391, 392 (per curiam); see also Millsap v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 406, at 2, 2016 WL 6803694 (per curiam). The trial court held that the motion was without merit and denied relief. Barnes lodged an appeal from the order in this court. Now before us are Barnes’s motions for extension of time to file the appellant’s brief, for appointment of counsel, and for a copy of the transcript lodged in this appeal. We dismiss the appeal because it is evident from the record that Barnes could not succeed on appeal. This court will not permit an appeal from an order that denied a petition for postconviction relief to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail. Justus v. State, 2012 Ark. 91, 2012 WL 664259. 9 S.W.3d 693 (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Even though Barnes’s petition was signed and

    ### Response:
    holding that a petition to correct sentence was properly considered as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 371 because it challenged a judgment entered on a plea of guilty on grounds cognizable under the rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    third event, however, also likely contributed to defendant’s decision to incriminate himself — the illegal seizing of his coat by the police just prior to interrogating him. Admittedly, defendant was never “confronted,” in the literal sense of the word, with the jacket, i.e., he was never directly told a witness to the murder had identified the perpetrator as wearing the same exact jacket. Nevertheless, the illegal seizure of defendant’s jacket occurred as he was being led into an interrogation room in which he would momentarily admit to shooting Merriwether, according to the testimony of the detectives. Moreover, the fact that defendant was observed wearing the jacket inside out suggests he was aware of the potentially incriminating nature of the jacket. Cf. White, 117 Ill. 2d at 225 (<HOLDING>); Turner, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 991 (“[I]f a

    ### Response:
    holding codefendants mere pres ence in police station absent any suggestion that the defendant believed or knew that his codefendant had implicated him in the crime could not constitute an intervening circumstance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). A district court reviews a bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo. See Commodore, 331 F.3d at 1259; In re Calvert, 907 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir.1990). A bankruptcy court’s decision to allow or disallow a claim is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. See In re Jazz Casino Co., L.L.C., 2004 WL 2095616, at *5 (E.D.La.2004) (noting that a bankruptcy court’s decisions based upon equitable grounds are reviewed for abuse of discretion) (citing In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir.1999); In re Kolstad, 928 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir.1991)); see also Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304, 310 n. 7, 70 S.Ct. 127, 94 L.Ed. 107 (1949) (<HOLDING>) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 11). A bankruptcy court’s

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the power of disallowance of claims conferred on the bankruptcy courts embraces the rejection of claims in whole or in part according to the equities of the case and emphasizing that a bankruptcy court may therefore limit the amount of claims in view of equitable considerations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    four years out of time. A motion that does not comply with the time and numerical limitations can only be brought where the alien can establish one of four limited exceptions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (2005). One such exception, the only one alleged to be applicable here, is where the alien can establish “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality....” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) (2005). This Court has already held that a change in an individual’s personal circumstances does not qualify under the above exception; an individual must demonstrate that the country conditions have changed in order for this exception to apply. Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). In his motion to reopen, Jiang only asserts

    ### Response:
    holding that an alien failed to qualify for the changed circumstances exception by asserting only that his personal circumstances had changed by the birth of a child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and found that he had purged himself of the contempt without prejudice to his and the Bexar County Center’s pending appeal of the June 30, 2003 order. On September 25, 2003, another panel of this court denied the petition for writ of mandamus filed by Evans and the Bexar County Center, finding that Evans and the Bexar County Center had an adequate remedy by means of their appeal. Evans later filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking this court to direct the trial court to vacate the contempt judgment against him. Before oral argument, this court consolidated this second mandamus proceeding with the appeal by Evans and the Bexar County Center. II. Issues Pkesented In their appeal, Evans and the Bexar County Center (collectively referred to hereinafter as t W. 915, 917 (1925) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we hold that the Bex-ar County

    ### Response:
    holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims in exchange for severance pay and Stull’s promise to pay her another month’s medical benefits. Stull insists that it upheld its end of the bargain — it paid benefits through November 30. Although Marie did not receive severance pay, an issue discussed more fully below, Stull asserts that Marie was not contractually entitled to it because she did not fulfill the condition precedent of working through November 6. Berthony responds that the SSP’s waiver does not protect Stull, for each of Berthony’s claims arose subsequent to Marie’s acceptance of the waiver, which occurred on October 11, 1998. He submits that our precedents refuse to recognize waivers of claims arising in the future. See Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 896 n. 27 (3d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, he asserts that Stull’s concept of

    ### Response:
    holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mueller oppose entry of default judgment on the ground that the ""Law Offices of James Nabholz, III” is not an existing entity capable of being sued. Because I lack subject-matter jurisdiction, I will not resolve this issue. 2 . Although the complaint alleges that Mueller was associated with the defendant Law Office of James Nabholz, III, American Family claims that Mueller was actually in-house legal counsel for American Family. I note, however, that Mueller signed pleadings in the underlying state-court action on behalf of the Law Office of James Nabholz, III. 3 . American Family’s argument that the complaint does not state a claim against Mueller because it includes allegations of ethical violations is meritless. See Chrysler Corp. v. Carey, 5 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1031-32 (E.D.Mo.1998)

    ### Response:
    holding that ethical violations may be relevant to tort claims brought against attorneys
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the agency”)). Sigma-tech’s focus on total contract price to determine whether the eight “small business” potential bidders were capable of performing the requirements of the November 1, 2016 Solicitation is contradictory to the USASAC’s analysis of the responses to the June 6, 2016 RFI. 4/21/17 Gov’t Resp. at 26. Moreover, the Contracting Officer was not required to conduct an analysis of the eight “small business” potential bidders’ use of subcontractors and whether they would be able to perform the requirements at fair market prices, because the Contracting Officer is not required to conduct this type of analysis before making a set-aside decision. 4/21/17 Gov’t Resp. at 29-30. (citing Adams & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 741 F.3d 102, 111 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Adams & Assocs. II"") (<HOLDING>)). Finally, differences in the requirements of

    ### Response:
    holding that the rule of two does not require two separate but interrelated decisionsone as to responsibility and one as to a form of price reasonableness because that would conflate  a setaside determination with a responsibility determination made pursuant to 48 cfr  91041
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    father may be entitled to indemnity or contribution from the intended adoptive father. What we hold in this opinion, reinforced by Wallis and Ted-ford, is that the biological father is responsible at the point of conception of the child. Whether the biological and intended adoptive fathers have liability issues between themselves pursuant to an agreement is an issue we need not, and do not, address in this opinion. {35} We do note that, in some intended adoptive parent cases, a biological parent responsible for child support may be deceased, missing, unreachable, unknown, or indigent, and a court may be asked to look to the intended adoptive parent for child support. See, e.g., Geramifar, 688 A.2d at 476 (indicating that natural parents were Iranian); Wener, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 817-18 (<HOLDING>). We need not, and do not in this opinion

    ### Response:
    holding the foster parents responsible for support where the childs natural parents are unknown and noting that an earlier new york case held that an agreement to adopt did not terminate the natural parents duty of support but that in that earlier case the natural parent was alive and capable of providing for the child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    including three Louisiana entities. For various reasons, all the Louisiana companies were deemed insulated from liability to the plaintiff. After the case was removed to federal court, the plaintiff filed a motion to remand arguing, among other things, that not all defendants had consented to the removal. The court held such consent to be unnecessary, and said: [A]s a general rule, removal requires consent of all co-defendants. In cases involving alleged improper or fraudulent joinder of parties, however, application of this requirement to improperly or fraudulently joined parties would be nonsensical, as removal in those cases is based on the contention that no other proper defendant exists. Id. at 816. See also Polyplastics, Inc. v. Transconex, Inc., 713 F.2d 875 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Since the court has concluded that Seck-man

    ### Response:
    holding that a party fraudulently joined to defeat removal need not join in a removal petition and is disregarded in determining diversity of citizenship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    503 U.S. 60, 75, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992). The Ninth Circuit has held that the legislative history of Title--IX “strongly suggests that Congress meant for similar- substantive standards to apply under'Title IX as had been developed under Title VIL” Emeldi v. Univ. of Oregon, 698 F.3d 715, 724 (9th Cir.2012). Title IX’s prohibition of discrimination “on the basis of sex” encompasses both sex — in the biological sense — as well as gender. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir.2000). Furthermore, discrimination based on gender stereotypes constitutes discrimination on the basis of séx under Title VII. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>). In Nichols, the Ninth Circuit held that a

    ### Response:
    holding that discrimination against either a man or a woman on the basis of gender stereotypes is prohibited
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    transporting drugs between Guam and another United States territory constituted “importation” because it required nocence claim was available after 1996, when the First Circuit held that transporting drugs over international waters did not constitute “importation” within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). See United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d 1131, 1144 (1st Cir.1996) (en banc). We disagree. For the purposes of determining whether a claim was unavailable under § 2241, we look to whether controlling law in this circuit foreclosed petitioner’s argument. See, e.g., In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir.2000) (a claim is not available when “settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of conviction....”) (emphasis added); Davenport, 147 F.3d at 610 (<HOLDING>). The mere possibility that the Ninth Circuit

    ### Response:
    holding that when the law of the circuit was so firmly against him petitioner did not have to raise an issue to preserve it as a basis for collateral attack later on
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    him are not alleged to relate either to intimate human relations or to associations that exist for the purpose of engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment. The intimate human relations type of association is exemplified by familial relations, including marriage, raising and educating children and cohabiting with one’s relatives. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619, 104 S.Ct. at 3250. While this type of association can extend to other types of relationships, depending on the size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality and other characteristics of the “association” involved, plaintiff cites no case and this Court has not found one which would extend this type of association to the workplace. See, e.g., Copp v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 882 F.2d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). As for associations involving First Amendment

    ### Response:
    holding that intimate human relationships are generally familial in nature and do not extend to workplace associations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to appoint a custodian is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. CONCLUSION The lower court did not err in refusing to grant a restraining order regarding the use of the Shapemasters’ name and logo. Further, the appointment of a custodian is interlocutory in nature and does not fall into a delineated exception. As such, the trial court’s (1991) (ruling issue was not preserved for appellate review where the trial court did not explicitly rule on the appellant's argument and the appellant made no Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment). 4 . It is not necessary for this court to address Appellants’ remaining issues because Appellants fail to provide legal authority to support their arguments. See First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Appellant’s remaining issues are

    ### Response:
    holding when a party fails to provide arguments or supporting authority for his assertion the party is deemed to have abandoned the issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and their former counsel and the requirement that each of these parties engage in community service as a result of their conduct in this matter. While the court finds each of these alternatives deficient when employed alone, in combination, these alternatives are promising. Thus, the court will require the Esso Defendants and their former counsel to fund a community service project which will benefit the St. Thomas community — the party perhaps most aggrieved by their sanctionable conduct. 1. The Imposition of a Fine Pursuant to its inherent powers, this court has the power to sanction the Esso Defendants and their former counsel by requiring them to pay a monetary fine. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975) (<HOLDING>); F.D. Rick Co. v. United States ex rel.

    ### Response:
    recognizing the federal courts ability to impose inherent power sanctions on parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nonpublic forum, we have little trouble concluding that the Park Service Regulations are “viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose [of] the forum.” Marlin v. D.C. Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 236 F.3d 716, 719 (D.C.Cir.2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Regulations plainly do not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, but rather prohibit disruptive speech regardless of its message. Oberwetter argues that the government engages in viewpoint discrimination by hosting its own official birthday ceremony in the Memorial while excluding her celebratory dance. This argument fails because the government is free to establish venues for the exclusive expression of its own viewpoint. See Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that when the government erects a monument on public property it is not obligated to allow other monuments expressing alternative viewpoints
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 1981 claims of discriminatory termination, harassment, and hostile environment); Lewis v. American Foreign Serv. Ass’n, 846 F.Supp. 77, 79 (D.D.C.1993) (denying judgment as a matter of law denied a reasonable jury could find that defendant retaliated against plaintiff for filing EEOC charge, in violation of § 1981); Freeman v. Atlantic Ref. & Mktg. Corp., No. 92-7029, 1994 WL 156723, at *8 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 28, 1994) (stating that § 1981 extends to the same broad range of employment actions and conditions as Title ""VII); Toney, 784 F.Supp. at 1547 (stating that if § 1981(b) were applied retroactively, plaintiffs allegations of racial harassment and retaliatory discharge would state a cause of action under § 1981); Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 782 F.Supp. 106, 106-08 (S.D.Ala.1992) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Augat’s Motion for Partial

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff is entitled to assert claim of retaliatory transfer under  1981
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at night in an area, known for narcotics activity, 2) the manner in which McCray was standing with Bellflower, an individual who the police had previously encountered and who was believed to be involved in drug activity, and 3) McCray’s alleged unprovoked flight when the officers questioned him. Given the totality of the circumstances, the court is not persuaded by the Government’s arguments. The court will address these factors cited by the Government in turn. 1. The Area’s Reputation for Narcotics Activity and the Late Hour First, the court concludes that the area’s reputation for narcotics activity and the late hour of the evening are not objective factors that contribute to reason able suspicion within the context of this stop. See United States v. Carter, 1999 WL 1007044 at *4-5 (<HOLDING>). Although the reputation of an area for

    ### Response:
    holding that neither the areas reputation nor the late hour of the evening could be used to establish reasonable suspicion where a stop occurred near a hospital
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recommendation by filing its objections within ten (10) days after being served a copy thereof. See Local Rule 510.2(A); Fed.R.Civ. P. 72(b). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), in pertinent part, provides that: Within ten days of being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge Cir.1993) (stating that “[ojbjection to a magistrate’s report preserves only those objections that are specified”); Keating v. Secretary of H.H.S., 848 F.2d 271, 275 (1st Cir.1988); Borden v. Secretary of H.H.S., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). See generally United States v.

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant was enti tied to a de novo review however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not needed, and the district court agreed. As a result, the question of individualized suspicion was not fully developed before the district court, nor was Child given a full and fair opportunity to respond to the effect his prior misconduct might have on the individualized suspicion inquiry. See Meiboom v. Watson, 2000-NMSC-004, ¶ 20, 128 N.M. 536, 994 P.2d 1154 (providing that our Supreme Court will not affirm a district court ruling on a ground not relied upon by the district court if reliance on the new ground would be unfair to appellant, and as part of this, the Court “on appeal ... will not assume the role of the trial court and delve into ... fact-dependent inquiries” (omissions in original) (alteration omitted)); State v. Wilson, 1998-NMCA-084, ¶ 17, 125 N.M. 390, 962 P.2d 636 (<HOLDING>). {23} We . 578, 136 P.3d 579 (recognizing that

    ### Response:
    recognizing that unfairness precludes an appellate court from affirming on a factdependent ground not determined below
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    time thereafter, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations, both independently and with the assistance of the Court. The settlement negotiations were unsuccessful, and on August 29, 2017, the Court reserved decision. The Applicable Legal Standards The Summary Judgment Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Bankruptcy Rule 7056, provides that summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispu that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact as to each element of its claim. If it does not, then summary judgment will be denied. See Smith v. Goord, 2008 WL 902184, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008), aff'd, 375 Fed.Appx. 73 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n.4, 106 S.Ct. 2505) (<HOLDING>)). Once the moving party satisfies its initial

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment should be denied where the moving party does not show that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact with respect to each essential element of the claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    If this is all it took to admit evidence of other crimes, district courts would be reluctant to exclude evidence of dissimilar bank robberies in neighboring counties for weeks thereafter. Although we appreciate the fact that the legal standard for admitting reverse 404(b) evidence is relatively lenient, the evidence must still be relevant. Here, it was not. Even if the evidence involving the New Baden robbery should have been admitted, its exclusion was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence presented by the government at trial. We employ the harmless error standard because the defendants preserved their objection on this issue when they challenged the government’s motion in limine. See Fed. R. Evid. 103; see also Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 563 (7th Cir.1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). This court will only reverse a defendant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a definitive ruling in limine preserves an issue for appellate review without the need for later objection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    951, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940-941 (1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 987,101 S.Ct. 2323, 68 L.Ed.2d 845 (1981), held that a New York statute violated the federal constitutional right of privacy when applied to persons deciding to engage in “ ‘deviant’ [sexual] conduct, so long as the decisions are voluntarily made by adults in a noncommercial, private setting.” The New York court also held that the statute, by proscribing certain sexual conduct by persons not married to each other, but not prohibiting the same conduct by persons married to each other, violated the right to equal protection of the laws. 51 N.Y.2d at 492, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953, 415 N.E.2d at 942-943. See, e.g., Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105, 1107, 1109 (Okl.Crim.App.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 890, 107 S.Ct. 290, 93 L.Ed.2d 264 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute violated the federal constitutional right of privacy when applied to heterosexual nonviolent consensual activity between adults in private and pointing out that twentytwo states have decriminalized private consensual sodomy between adults
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    forms the basis of Plaintiffs’ first claim. Defendants attack this claim on numerous fronts. They argue that no such right exists under Michigan law and that the claim is preempted by the First Amendment and by the Copyright Act. The Court will address each argument separately. 1. Right of Publicity Under Michigan Law Plaintiffs’ right of publicity claim is governed by state law. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 459 (6th Cir.2003). Michigan has recognized a general right to publicity. See, e.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir.1983) (suggesting that Michigan courts would adopt the right of publicity and noting that Michigan has recognized a right of privacy); Tobin v. Mich. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 416 Mich. 661, 331 N.W.2d 184, 189 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Michigan never has recognized, however, a

    ### Response:
    recognizing protection against appropriation for the defendants advantage of the plaintiffs name or likeness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and of his participation in administrative investigations. See id.; Cohen, 686 F.2d at 796 (stating that an employer’s awareness is essential to showing a causal link). Proximity in time is apparent on the record: the transfers of job duties and the sub-average performance rating all occurred during the pendency of the administrative complaints and investigations. This inference of a causal link is strengthened by the closeness in time between particular events. See B. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra, at 559 & n. 145 (2d ed. 1983). The first series of transfers of job duties between August 1979 and February 1980 began less than three months after he filed his first administrative complaint. See Hochstadt v. Worcester Found, for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 318, 324-25 (D.Mass.) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir.1976). The

    ### Response:
    holding that discharge six months after eeoc settlement and a month after an informal complaint satisfies causation requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As stated in Heioleth-Packard, “A seller’s intent, unless embodied in an enforceable contract, does not create a limitation on the right of a purchaser to use, sell, or modify a patented product as long as a reconstruction of the patented combination is avoided.” 123 F.3d at 1453, 43 USPQ2d at 1658. We do not discern an enforceable restriction on the reuse of these cameras based on the package statements. These statements are instructions and warnings of risk, not mutual promises or a condition placed upon the sale. See id. at 1447-48, 1453, 123 F.3d 1445, 43 USPQ2d at 1652-53, 1657 (refusing implicit limit on modification of cartridges designed to be non-refillable and sold with instructions warning against reuse or refilling); Kendall Co., 85 F.3d at 1576, 38 USPQ2d at 1922 (<HOLDING>). These package instructions are not in the

    ### Response:
    holding that instruction meant to ensure product safety and efficiency did not have contractual significance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also Scott Timber Co. v. United States, 333 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2003) (stating that courts apply “general rules of contract interpretation in cases where the United States is a party to the contract.”). C. Disposition Of The Government’s March 8, 2002 Motion For Summary Judgment. The May 1, 1997 Contract contains a standard integration clause that provides: This award consummates the contract, which consists of (a) the Government’s solicitation and your offer, and (b) this contract award. No further contractual documents is [sic] necessary. Def.App. at 2. Therefore, as a matter of law, the terms of the contract must be construed based on the language in the governing documents, not parol evidence. See McAbee Const., Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1434 (Fed.Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts §

    ### Response:
    holding that where there is a strong presumption that the contract was  a fully integrated agreement coupled with the consistency of the evidence surrounding its execution with that presumption  the agreement was fully integrated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    earlier suicide attempt who claimed that physicians, nurses, and hospital negligently failed to prevent her jumping from second-story hospital room, and holding that issue whether plaintiffs leap from hospital room constituted superseding cause insulating defendants from liability properly . 46, 54-55, 86 A.2d 761 (1952) (affirming directed verdict for defendants and holding that even assuming school board’s negligence in failing to install guard over belt-drive mechanism of power jig saw, intervening act of classmate in throwing electric switch that started jig saw while plaintiff was cleaning it constituted superseding cause that broke chain of causation and insulated school board from liability); Glaser v. Hackensack Water Co., 49 N.J.Super. 591, 600-01, 141 A.2d 117 (App.Div.1958) (<HOLDING>). c As noted, the doctrine of superseding cause

    ### Response:
    holding that water company whose employee entered plaintiffs garage without notice to read meter was insulated from liability by intervening act of plaintiff who became frightened for safety of infant daughter and injured herself while running down stairs to first floor to ascertain who had entered garage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the significance and importance of the ability to poll the jury); State v. Behnke, 155 Wis.2d 796, 456 N.W.2d 610, 612 (1990). This does not mean, however, that Appellant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel: even if Mr. Durst’s substitution for Mr. Mozenter failed to conform to the criminal procedural rules, it does not follow that a deprivation of counsel occurred, as Appellant was in fact represented by Mr. Durst when the jury returned to the courtroom and announced its verdict. Appellant does not allege that Mr. Durst was not a member in good standing of the Pennsylvania Bar, that a conflict of interest or some other defect prevented Mr. Durst from representing him, see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1178-79, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) (<HOLDING>), or that Mr. Durst was otherwise hindered from

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant was deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel where appointed counsels representation presented a conflict of interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court’s order of June 18,1998. When “the evidence as to waiver is a written instrument, its construction and interpretation may be decided as a question of law.” Id. Because a determination of the waiver issues raised by the State does not depend on facts not presented below, but rests on the interpretation of written instruments and the law, we address the State’s arguments raised for the first time on appeal as a matter of law. Defendant’s Pleas of Guilty and No Contest {13} Although Defendant may have waived objections to defects in the proceedings that occurred up to the point of the guilty and no contest pleas, including any right to a speedy trial, he did not waive his objections to subsequent defects in the proceedings. See State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410, 414, 882 P.2d 1, 5 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,

    ### Response:
    holding voluntary plea of guilty or no contest waives objections to prior defects in the proceedings and also operates as a waiver of statutory or constitutional rights emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    working conditions; a racial discrimination claim alleging wrongful termination based on racial animus; and a claim alleging a racially hostile work environment. (See Doc. 1). “Because the legal standards governing each of these categories of claims are the same, it is unnecessary to evaluate separately the Title VII ... and the § 1981 causes of action.” Pears v. Mobile County, 645 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1089 (S.D.Ala.2009). Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits intentional race discrimination in the making and enforcement of public and private contracts, including employment contracts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Section 1981 liability must be founded on

    ### Response:
    holding unequivocally that  1981 protects against racial discrimination in private employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nonrenewal in February 2012 and then merely elaborated on this reason in his response to the EEOC. See Elam, 601 F.3d at 881 (“While ‘[substantial changes over time in the employer’s proffered reason for its employment decision support a finding of pretext, this does not mean that an employer cannot elaborate on its proffered reason.’ ” (quoting Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417 F.3d 845, 855 (8th Cir. 2005))). Rather, Eppard’s response to the EEOC, viewed in the light most favorable to Dunn, is a shift away from his alleged statement that Dunn’s nonrenewal was unrelated to his job performance, and the discrepancy between these two statements is substantial enough to indicate pretext and thereby avoid summary judgment. See Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Taken together, the affidavits from Dunn’s

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff raised genuine fact issue com cerning pretext by presenting evidence that his employer initially told him that he was terminated because of poor performance but later claimed the termination was due to a lack of work
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    figure by calculating the amount that MN Supply would have earned had it invested the profits it lost from 1997 to 2002 at an eighteen percent rate of return. Trial Tr. at 809-10. It appears to us that this figure therefore represents “prejudgment interest” under Minnesota law. See ZumBerge v. N. States Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 103, 110 (Minn.Ct.App.1992) (interpreting expert’s “calculation of the time value of the losses, i.e., what the ZumBerges would have accrued in interest if they would have put the loss amount in the bank each year earning 10% interest” as “prejudgment interest” such that expert’s calculation should not have been considered by the jury); Security Prot. Servs., Ltd. v. Evenson, Nos. C4-92-556, C8-92-561, C6-92-1336, 1993 WL 14338, *3 (Minn.Ct.App. Jan.26, 1993) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the District Court correctly

    ### Response:
    holding that experts calculation of amount which plaintiff would have earned had it invested all of the money that it sought as damages was evidence of prejudgment interest that should not have been considered by the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is-not that the affidavit fails to “articulate ... the basis for [Brannan’s] belief’ or that it was merely “eonelusory.” Kelly, 21 F.3d at 1555. Rather, the court understands the Plaintiffs to be saying that Brannan intentionally falsified, or recklessly made, his affidavit so that it does, on its face, establish probable cause. Cases which have discussed the arguable probable cause standard have not been concerned with alleged lies by the affiant officer. In Lowe, for example, there was “no dispute as to the facts in the possession of [the defendant police officers] at the time of the issuance of the search warrants.” Id. at 1569. The question was whether those facts constituted arguable probable cause to pursue a warrant against the Plaintiffs. Id.; see also Swint, 51 F.3d at 996 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have not even attempted to show

    ### Response:
    holding that there was not arguable probable cause to conduct extensive searches on night club and its patrons where only evidence was of one patron selling drugs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1973). In this case the injury to Milledge's ankle is without explanation. It is thus classified as a neutral risk in that the cause of the injury is neither personal to Milledge nor distinctly associated with her employment. The injury would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of her employment placed Milledge in the parking lot where she was injured. In turn, The Oaks has not carried its burden of demonstrating that this unexplained accident, which precipitated the ankle injury, was the result of idiopathic causes. Milledge is thus entitled to compensation under the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act. This does not however end our analysis. Milledge sought worker's compensation not for her ankle injury alone, bu 000) (<HOLDING>); Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. v. Borough of

    ### Response:
    holding that arising from on premises accidentseven those which under other facts might present a neutral risk ie weather conditionsare compensable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    afforded the plan’s administrator discretion in determining eligibility payments, and thus, an ar bitrary and capricious standard of review applied to the administrator’s decision to terminate benefit payments. Id. at 505. Likewise, in Donato v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375 (7th Cir.1994), the Seventh Circuit found that the language “upon receipt of proof’; “[a]ll proof must be satisfactory to us”; and “must describe the event, the nature and the extent of the cause for which a claim is mad rd of review applies. The fact that the plan’s language does not contain an explicit grant of discretionary authority to the plan’s administrator is irrelevant. Id.; Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v. SwedishAmerican Group Health Benefit Trust, 901 F.2d 1369, 1371 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly

    ### Response:
    holding that magic words conveying discretion are unnecessary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    report promptly their complaints at prison or risk forfeiture of their claims will likely result in “a more efficient grievance procedure” and “lead to the improvement of prison conditions”). Moreover, inmates required to comply with the exhaustion requirement may realize that ""monetary damages are unnecessary or that monetary damages would not fully compensate [them] for [their] injuries.” Sal-lee, at 771. 21 .This conclusion is reached, in part, upon review ol an affidavit filed by PRCC Institutional Ombudsman Bedwell and copies of plaintiff’s grievances. These documents go solely toward Couch's argument that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and are properly considered in evaluating Couch's 12(b)(1) motion. See Williams v. U.S., 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 22 . DOP 10-2.10 states that: [plrior to

    ### Response:
    holding that in ruling on a rule 12b1 motion the court may consider exhibits outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes regarding jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also be liable for all injuries and property damage sustained by any person or domestic animal as a result of an attack by the dangerous dog. Id. § 2602(12). It is unclear why the Legislature provided for two definitions of one single term in two different subsections of the same statute. Nonetheless, ‘“[i]t is well established the [courts] should, if possible, construe statutes harmoniously.” V.I. Taxi Assoc. v. W. Indian Co., Ltd., 66 V.I. 473, 484 (V.I. 2017) (internal quotations omitted); see also Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 2016) (‘“A court must therefore interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, and fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.”) (internal citations omitted); Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 365 (4th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). Thus, all of the terms defined in section

    ### Response:
    recognizing the rule that whenever possible statutes should be read in harmony and not in conflict with each other
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his ease is not in itself a sufficient justification for the assessment of fees.” Id. at 986 (quoting Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14, 101 S.Ct. 173, 178, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980)). The district court declined to find the complaint “meritless for purposes of § 1988 fees.” R. 304 at 11. As we have made clear in the sanctions discussion above, this is not a case in which the attorneys and parties have filed clearly wasteful or frivolous papers. Nor have they conducted an insufficient legal and factual investigation before filing meritless claims. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 1988. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Munson v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Directors,

    ### Response:
    holding a district court may in its discretion award attorneys fees upon a finding that plaintiffs action was frivolous unreasonable or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an expert voice identification analysis because his “decision on the trial strategy made that motion unnecessary.” He also testified that, to his knowledge, there was no local expert witness but that he ""made the strategic choice before needing to attempt to locate an expert.” 7 . While none of our previous cases explicitly hold that a failure to investigate can be deficient only if such failure leads to the exclusion of admissible evidence, the underlying assumption in our prior cases is that an investigation would have resulted in, at the very least, admissible evidence. See, e.g., Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 604 (finding failure to investigate defendant's background and the facts underlying an ""accidental shooting” theory was professionally unreasonable); Bryant, 28 F.3d at 1418 (<HOLDING>); Loyd, 977 F.2d at 157-59 (holding failure to

    ### Response:
    holding counsels failure to investigate alibi witness and eyewitnesses to the crime amounted to constitutionally deficient performance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the conduct of defendant’s business,” Tuxxedo Network, Inc. v. Hughes Communications Carrier Servs., Inc., 753 F.Supp. 514, 517 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (Cedarbaum, J.), satisfying the second prong of the test. Fitzpatrick avers that the services performed by excess line brokers are so important that if their services were not available Anglo would have to perform their role itself. Anglo argues that Anglo could not take over the tasks of excess line brokers because insurance brokerage and underwriting are completely different and because excess line insurance is rarely written without a broker. This dispute misses the point of the test, which is the importance of the agents’ services to the principal, not the feasibility of the principals’ performing the agents’ role. Gelfand, 385 F.2d at 121 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). The fact that excess line

    ### Response:
    holding that test is whether services provided by new york representative are sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform them the corporations owm officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the poisonous tree. At the hearing in this matter, AUSA Norm Cairns acknowledged that the Tenth Circuit’s case law examining this question does not resolve the instant inquiry. See 2/3/11 Tr. of Proceedings at 70 (“[W]e hope to get some clarification from this Court, potentially from the Tenth Circuit, one way or the other.... [This] was something of a test case[J”). The Court has therefore looked beyond Tenth Circuit authority to out-of-circuit case law, as well as a district court opinion from elsewhere in this Circuit, for guidance. Whereas the Tenth Circuit has expressly held that identity evidence may be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, other circuit courts have held precisely the opposite. See, e.g., United States v. Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 443 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that identityrelated evidence is not suppressible when offered in a criminal prosecution only to prove who the defendant is
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    where Board fails to provide adequate statement of reasons or bases, the Court is precluded from effectively reviewing the Board’s adjudication). B. Inadequate Notice With regard to his remaining claims, Mr. Coker seeks remand and argues on appeal that the Secretary failed to provide the notice required by 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a). In supplemental briefing, he asserts that the Secretary “never advised through a VCAA notice letter or otherwise on what evidence would be needed to substantiate any of the aforementioned claims.” Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at 2-3. In this instance, however, the Board found that Mr. Coker had received notice “through the issuance of [Statements of the [C]ase and [Supplemental [Sta , 2005); see also Hernandez v. Starbuck, 69 F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Jotori Dredging, Inc., 999 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the appellant who comes to the court of appeals as the challenger of the underlying decision bears the burden of demonstrating the alleged error and the precise relief sought and where the appellant fails to meet this burden the court of appeals is not required to manufacture the appellants argument citing fed rapp p 28a and natl commodity  barter assn v gibbs 886 f2d 1240 1244 10th cir1989
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    information from class counsel on the risks and potential value of the litigation;” the “contingency, novelty and difficulty” of the case; and “the skill shown by counsel”). “As always, when determining attorneys’ fees, the district court [is] guided by the fundamental principle that fee awards out of common funds be reasonable under the circumstances.” Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 221862, *14 (N.D.Cal.2007), aff'd, 331 Fed.Appx. 452 (9th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 1.The Result Obtained for the Class. “The result achieved is a significant factor to be considered in making a fee award.” In re Heritage Bond Litig., 2005 WL 1594403, *19 (C.D.Cal.2005); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (<HOLDING>). As the court previously found, the settlement

    ### Response:
    holding that the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    identifying physical characteristic outside [the Fifth Amendment’s] protection.” Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967). This is so because “[t]he handwriting itself (as opposed to the content of a written statement) is physical, not testimonial evidence.” United States v. McDougal, 137 F.3d 547, 559 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 266-67, 87 S.Ct. 1951). Thus, it is settled that a defendant in a criminal case may be compelled to furnish a handwriting exemplar and it is also settled that “introducing samples of the defendant’s handwriting at trial do[es] not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” McDougal, 137 F.3d at 559. A prosecutor is likewise permitted to comment on, and indeed prese 10th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Given these conclusions, it is now necessary

    ### Response:
    recognizing that defendant had no right to withhold the requested exemplars
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    one-year period was interrupted from May 23, 1997, through December 14, 2006, due to the pendency of the first (1997) PCR application. See id. § 2244(d)(2). Unless some other tolling mechanism is in play, however, the one-year period expired on December 19, 2006 — more than eight months before the petitioner first sought federal habeas relief. In this venue, the petitioner argues that both his second PCR application and his Rule 35(a) motion constituted tolling mechanisms. If this argument is even partially correct (that is, if either of these filings served to toll the limitations period), the federal habeas petition would be timely. Accordingly, we inquire as to the effect of each filing. A. The 2005 PCR Application. Although the petitioner failed to mention the 2005 PCR applic 03) (<HOLDING>); Hodge v. Greiner, 269 F.3d 104, 107 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding for the same reason that motion for appointment of counsel does not toll the period for filing a federal habeas petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his version of the incident. McCollough argues that removal of “allegedly” from his statement “conveyed a completely different meaning to the average person” in that the revised statement read as an admission by him that he hit a player with a ball. McCollough’s Brief in Response to Cross-Appeal at 10. [35] The parties’ arguments demonstrate quite clearly that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the defamatory imputation of the altered statement that was published. The true implication of the statement necessarily requires consideration of extrinsic evidence by the trier of fact. [36] The Defendants also argue that the statement cannot be defamatory because it accurately states what occurred. See Gatto v. St. Richard School, Inc., 114, N.E.2d 914, 924 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). They point to affidavits of witnesses who

    ### Response:
    holding that truth is a complete defense to defamation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entity from Masco because after the trial, La Gard merged with Masco and is now a division of Masco. Hence, we hold that standing was not, and is not, lacking on the part of either La Gard or Masco in this appeal. We, therefore, have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1994), and Mas-Hamilton’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is denied. II. Infringement A patent infringement analysis involves two steps. First, the court determines the scope and meaning of the asserted claims. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372-74, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). Claim construction is a question of law, reviewed non-deferentially on appeal. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456, 46 USPQ2d 1169, 1174 (Fed.Cir.1998) (in banc) (<HOLDING>). Second, the properly construed claims are

    ### Response:
    holding we review claim construction de novo on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    himself. To the extent VanHoesen sought new counsel because his third assigned attorney proposed to pursue an insanity defense, the request is properly reviewed in the context of defendant’s unwillingness to work with any of the three attorneys appointed for him. See United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir.1997) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “she was coerced into self-representation because the district court, on the eve of trial, refused to replace her third court-appointed attorney”). In sum, a court does not deprive a defendant of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it is the defendant himself who creates the conflicts that result in a breakdown of attorney-client communication. See generally Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (<HOLDING>). 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence Having failed

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no right to a meaningful attorneyclient relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951)). In fact, the hotel staff had no authority even to enter Bass’s room, except for housekeeping purposes, unless (1) Bass himself consented or (2) his tenancy was terminated. United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir.1987) (noting that when “a hotel guest’s rental period has expired or been lawfully terminated, the guest does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hotel room”); United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1295-96 (8th Cir.1986). In this case, Bass’s tenancy had not been terminated by eviction at the time the police searched his hotel room. Although the hotel manager testified that he personally considered Bass evicted once he had been arrested, the manager’s personal beliefs have no legal import. See Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490 (<HOLDING>). The manager informed no one at the time that

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures  would disappear if it were left to depend upon the unfettered discretion of an employee of the hotel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (7 Otto) 381, 385, 24 L.Ed. 1104 (1878). Keying on this distinction in the nature of the proceeding, Griffin argues that although forfeiture actions “may be civil in form, [they] are in their nature criminal.” One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 697, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 1249, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 383, 6 5. Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886)). Consequently, Griffin explains, even if section 881 is a civil remedy, its effect is quasi-criminal and proceedings brought pursuant to the section are therefore subject to the ex post facto clause. It is true that forfeiture statutes like section 881 have been considered criminal for certain purposes. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965) (<HOLDING>); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that forfeiture statute is subject to the fourth amendments prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the PSLRA’s more rigorous standard. Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Daou’s “pipeline” expectations, however, fail to satisfy the PSLRA’s requirements. The complaint alleges that Daou misrepre-_ sented its “pipeline” expectations, stating that its position was “extremely strong” and “remained healthy and would fuel future earnings growth,” that “visibility of future earnings was outstanding,” and that the company’s “momentum was increasing.” Although these projections might have been overly optimistic when made, they do not rise to the level of a material misrepresentation actionable after enactment of the PSLRA: Congress enacted the PSLRA to put an end to the practice of pleading “fraud by hindsight.” See e.g., Medhekar v. United States Dist. Ct., 99 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 988. Under the

    ### Response:
    holding that congress intended for complaints under the pslra to stand or fall based on the actual knowledge of the plaintiffs rather than information produced by the defendants after the action has been filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    why it answered the special verdict form in the way that it did. The difficulty in granting judgment as a matter of law is in determining whether the jury was engaged in “honestly and in good faith exonerating the servant and capriciously rendering a verdict against the master, or honestly and in good faith finding the servant guilty of [discrimination], but [] capriciously exonerating] him because of the financial ability of the employer to better pay the judgment.” Eckleberry v. Kaiser Found. N. Hosps., 226 Or. 616, 359 P.2d 1090, 1095 (1961). See also Freeman v. Chicago Park Dist., 189 F.3d 613, 615 (7th Cir.1999) (“There is no priority of one answer over another when the verdicts are inconsistent.”); Danner v. International Med. Mkt’g, Inc., 944 F.2d 791, 794 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). We will not intrude on the province of the

    ### Response:
    holding that trial judge should have granted new trial rather than judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the judge could not know in what order the jury reached its inconsistent verdicts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the petition was filed, however, the Commissioner mailed the taxpayer a second notice of transferee liability with respect to the same liability. See id. The taxpayer petitioned the Court with respect to the second notice. See id. The Court dismissed the second action, stating that the taxpayer had no right to file the second petition because former section 272(f) precluded the Commissioner from mailing the second notice as a valid notice. See id. at 988; cf. Kiker v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 1955) (stating that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was not invalid under former section 272(f) because, among other reasons, it determined an additional deficiency on account of fraud); Rowan Cotton Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1944) (<HOLDING>), aff’g on this issue 1 T.C. 865 (1943). Later,

    ### Response:
    holding that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was valid where it determined a deficiency in a different type of tax than did the earlier deficiency notice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which are identical to the requirements- of Paragraph B of Listing 12.08, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Turner did not meet those requirements. Compare 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.07 with id. § 12.08. 3. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination of Turner’s RFC. The RFC was consistent with the opinion issued by State reviewing psychologist Dr. Heather Barrons, the only medical opinion in the record that addressed Turner’s workplace limitations. Though the ALJ failed to mention Dr. Barrons’ opinion in his decision, any error was harmless as the ALJ’s RFC finding was consistent with her opinion and not contradicted by the opinion of any treating or examining physician. Cf. Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725-27 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that the alj erred by failing to mention the contrary opinion of a treating physician
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    immune from liability for gathering additional evidence after probable cause is established or criminal proceedings have begun when they are performing a quasi-judicial function. See, e.g., Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33, 96 S.Ct. 984 (stating that “[preparation, both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a trial, may require the obtaining ... of evidence”); Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 643 (9th Cir.1999) (when the majority of the investigation had been conducted by the time the grand jury was impaneled, the fact that the prosecutor interviewed other witnesses after impaneling grand jury did not preclude him from being protected by absolute immunity); Freeman ex rel. The Sanctuary v. Hittle, 708 F.2d 442, 443 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). However, even after the initiation of

    ### Response:
    holding that the prosecutor was absolutely immune to civil suit for damages when the investigator acting under the authority of the district attorneys office told the plaintiffs landlord that he was not getting as much rent from plaintiffs lease as he could get from someone else because the investigator was performing an investigative function pursuant to the preparation of the prosecutors case and within the scope of the prosecutors duties in initiating and pursuing the states case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    made clear that “[f]or regulation of employees it is not necessary that the act regulated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public service.” United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101, 67 S.Ct. 556, 570, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947). Later, with the full development of Pickering cases into a discrete area of First Amendment law, the Supreme Court reinforced United Public Workers’s holding. In 1983, the Court ruled that a governmental employer is not required to “tolerate action which he reasonably believe[s] would” cause the harm against which the prophylactic measure is directed. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1693, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); see also Sanjour v. EPA, 984 F.2d 434, 440 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and brackets

    ### Response:
    holding that employer is not required to tolerate action which it reasonably believed would cause harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with generally accepted accounting principles. 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,974. 4 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(c) appears to apply to rates of duty rather than appraisement issues. 5 Defendant’s Reply Brief did not clarify the Cheurón deference discussion in its brief-in-chief to note the refinement of Chevron found in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Christensen. The government cannot pick and choose which Supreme Court cases it will follow. 6 Although the court concludes that TD 85-111 is not entitled to Chevron deference under a Christensen analysis, the court does not decide whether a similar policy promulgated through adjudication with the attendant procedural safeguards would warrant greater deference than that granted TD 85-111. Cf. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 416 (1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that board of immigration appeals should be accorded chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms concrete meaning through a process of casebycase adjudication
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the interrogations lasted more than a few hours. Appellant was offered food by the police and told he was free to leave the station at any time on Friday. Also, the police made sure that Appellant was well rested and fresh before they interrogated him on Saturday. In addition, when the police told Appellant that the hair found in Teresa’s hand matched Appellant’s hair, they were communicating the information that they received from SLED. Even if the information were untrue, it is not, alone, enough to render the confession involuntary. See Von Dohlen, 471 S.E.2d at 695; State v. Rabon, 275 S.C. 459, 272 S.E.2d 634 (1980)(“A misrepresentation, while relevant, may be insufficient to render inadmissible an otherwise valid confession”); State v. Register, 323 S.C. 471, 476 S.E.2d 153 (1996)(<HOLDING>). Since the initial confession was voluntary,

    ### Response:
    holding defendants confession was voluntary and admissible when police misrepresented to defendant that he had been seen with the victim the night she was murdered that his tires and shoe matched impressions found at the murder scene and that the police had dna evidence establishing defendants guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Section 1452 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] party may remove a claim or cause of action to the district court for the district where such civil action is pending, if such district court has jurisdiction-of such claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title.” Therefore, by its plain language, section 28 U.S.C. § 1452 differs from 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) in that the former permits “a party” to remove a lawsuit to federal court while the latter permits removal by the “defendant or defendants” in the case. Accordingly, the Court finds that all of the Defendants to this action were not required to join in the notice of removal filed by Defendant American Security Insurance Company under 28 U.S.C. § 1452. See Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 763 F.2d 656, 660 (4th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). See also Daleske v. Fairfield Cmtys., Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that in bankruptcyrelated matters any one party may remove the state court action without the consent of the other parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jurisdiction over the supplemental state claims that plaintiff had also filed. Id. at 256. The court, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), disagreed, stating, “[i]n a federal-question case, the termination of the foundational federal claim does not divest the district court of power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction but, rather, sets the stage for an exercise of the court’s informed discretion.” Id. at 256-257. Perhaps defendants mean to argue that the court must dismiss the pendent state claims because the federal claims have not only been determined to be without merit, but that they never were “substantial” within the constitutional sense in which that term was used in cases such as United Mine Workers v. Gibbs and Newman v. Burgin. Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been dismissed, that a wife “cannot state a claim for loss of consortium due to any alleged violation of [her husband’s] civil rights under Section 1983” (citing. Niehus, 973 F.2d at 533-34)); McNabb v. City of Memphis, No. 03-2334 ML/P, 2004 WL 2384958, at *6 (W.D.Tenn. Mar.8, 2004) (dismissing wife’s loss-of-consortium claim “as [it] relates to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because a § 1983 claim is personal to the individual claiming injury,” without further discussion except to note that “[p]laintiffs concedefd] that [wife] may not recover for loss of consortium pursuant to § 1983”; however, because plaintiffs also brought state law claims, wife’s loss-of-consortium claim in connection with those was not dismissed); Hakken v. Washtenaw County, 901 F.Supp. 1245, 1255 (E.D.Mich.1995) (<HOLDING>); Jenkins v. Carruth, 583 F.Supp. 613, 616

    ### Response:
    holding without discussion that since the state tort claims are dismissed there can be no claim for loss of consortium
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defense of her Indian status, and should not be considered for any purpose on appeal. Even so, these offenses show nothing pertinent because, for all we know, they are not even Bruce’s and we have no way of knowing whether tribal jurisdiction was contested or conceded. 2 . United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 4 How. 567, 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1846). 3 . See Keys, 103 F.3d at 761(stating that lack of enrollment of two-year old who had been treated as member of the tribe by the tribe and her parents does not control determination of her Indian status); United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding § 1153 indictment that charged defendant as an Indian against challenge that it was deficient for failing also to charge that he was enrolled as enrollment th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of having filed an application for enrollment in the yurok tribe and previous entry on the pawnee tribal roll and the fact that defendants had held themselves out to be indians within the meaning of  1153 established indian status under  1153
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Kentucky Supreme Court quickly rejected this claim on direct appeal, stating that “[t]he trial judge determined that the trial strategy used by Bowling’s counsel had a better chance of success than any of which the trial judge could think in light of the strong evidence of guilt presented by the prosecution.” Bowling I, 873 S.W.2d at 180. This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. First, it is not clear that Bowling has shown constitutional deficiency. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the focus of the Sixth Amendment is not on “the accused’s relationship with his lawyer,” but on “the adversarial process.” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988) (quotation omitted); see also Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192, 197 (6th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Yet, the one-hour total consultation time

    ### Response:
    holding in a noncapital case that strickland was not violated when the defendants attorney did not interview the defendant until the night before trial and then for only thirty to fortyfive minutes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Allocco v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., No. 02 Civ. 1029(LMM), 2002 WL 1402084, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 27, 2002) (internal citations omitted) (citing Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (1983)). New York law “implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, pursuant to which neither party to a contract shall do anything which has the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.” Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400, 407 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, there can be no covenant of good faith implied unless there is a contract between two parties upon which to imply it. See Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 198-99 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the only

    ### Response:
    holding that the implied covenant can only impose an obligation consistent with other mutually agreed upon terms in the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is subject to general rules of evidence but is ""generally inadmissible""). Justice WALLACE, JR., concurring and dissenting. In my view, the Court is not required to address the difficult issue of whether the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard is a prerequisite to a consent search of a home. Defendant did not raise that issue at his suppression hearing or before the Appellate Division. We have frequently “expressed our reluctance to decide issues that were not addressed in the trial court or the Appellate Division.” Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 547, 897 A.2d 1018 (2006). Moreover, “[w]e have applied that principle even when a constitutional issue is presented.” Ibid. Although the majority opinion recognizes that the issue of the standard for a consent search 2d 793 (1990) (<HOLDING>); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 145-58, 519

    ### Response:
    holding warrantless searches of garbage bags left on curb for collection invalid under state constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Even still, under a proper application of Farrar a court should grant attorney’s fees whenever a plaintiff has successfully established a violation of section 2000e-2(m) and obtained either declaratory or some limited form of injunctive relief. Thus, under Farrar the answer to the first question posed above remains the same because it will only be under the most unusual circumstances that a plaintiff will not be awarded either of these remedies. To be eligible to recover attorney’s fees under section 1988 (the statute at issue in Farrar) a party must be the “prevailing party.” In Farrar the Supreme Court first held that a plaintiff who recovers only nominal damages is in fact a prevailing party for purposes of section 1988. 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct. at 574 (<HOLDING>). The Court then went on to decide what amount

    ### Response:
    holding that the prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The mere fact that the accident occurred is not sufficient grounds for concluding that Mullins was probably negligent, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is therefore inapplicable. See Drake, 924 P.2d at 1391. In his affidavit, Seligman asserts that the circumstances of the accident support an inference that Mullins may have fallen asleep at the wheel. However, Seligman’s opinion is insufficient to establish that “in the ordinary course of events, [the] injury would not [have] occur[red] except by the negligence of [Mullins].” Drake, 924 P.2d at 1391. Specifically, Seligman has not ruled out other possible causes of the accident and has therefore failed to establish a probability that the accident occurred as a result of Mullins’s negligence. See Mireles, 872 P.2d at 866 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs claim that the accident could only

    ### Response:
    holding that while a foundation for an inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be based on the testimony of an expert witness the experts testimony must establish that the occurrence indicates the probability of negligence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    However, we believe that the ALJ’s limited reliance on the PRFCA was harmless because it was not the sole basis for his conclusion. The ALJ also relied upon substantial objective medical evidence that contradicted the opinions of Drs. Pascual and Gates, Humphreys’ treating physicians. First, the objective diagnostic findings of record contradicted the treating physicians’ opinions. In particular, Humphreys completed an exercise stress test in June 2001, performing at a level of at least 10.1 METS. See Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairments, 170-71 (American Medical Association, ed. 4th ed.1995) (explaining that patients who can exercise from 7 to 16 METS are classified as having no resulting limitations); see also Moore v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Notably, Humphreys was able to exercise for

    ### Response:
    holding that 101 mets is more than enough for the performance of light work
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court clearly abused its discretion in denying Dillard’s motion to compel arbitration. Accordingly; without hearing oral argument, we conditionally grant the writ of mandamus and order the trial court to vacate its order denying Dillard’s motion to compel arbitration, and to enter a new order compelling arbitration of Garcia’s claims. Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(c). We are confident the trial court will comply, and our writ will issue only if it does not. 1 . Cf. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 230 n. 2 (Tex.2003) (citing cases supporting the rule that “if a party retains the unilateral, unrestricted right to terminate the arbitration agreement, it is illusory.""); Tenet Healthcare Ltd. v. Cooper, 960 S.W.2d 386, 388-89 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.)

    ### Response:
    holding that an arbitration agreement in an employee handbook was illusory where the employer expressly reserved a right to unilaterally rescind any provisions of the handbook
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    analysis applies when an aggravating circumstance is invalidated under McConnell. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err by striking the felony aggravating circumstance, determining that the error was prejudicial given that it was the only aggravating circumstance found by the jury, and concluding that the appropriate remedy was a new penalty hearing. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we reject the State’s contention that McConnell was wrongly decided and conclude that a new penalty hearing is the proper remedy in cases where the sole aggravating circumstance has been struck. We therefore affirm the district court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. Gibbons, C. J., Douglas and Cherry, JJ., concur. 1 120 Nev. 1043, 102 P.3d 606 (2004) (<HOLDING>), rehearing denied, 121 Nev. 25, 107 P.3d 1287

    ### Response:
    holding that it is unconstitutional to base aggravating circumstance in capital prosecution on felony that was used to obtain firstdegree murder conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to distribute electric power). Second, the Siewerts’ claims are based on “maintenance, operation or inspection.” Minn.Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(d). The first negligence claim’s reference to “handling, supplying, distributing, selling and placing in the stream of commerce” can reasonably be construed as implicating the “operation” of the electrical system and its components. It falls under the excepti s sufficient to raise a triable issue. Minnesota courts have long rejected the argument that a plaintiff must establish a regulatory or statutory violation to establish a duty element. See Edgewater Motels, Inc. v. Gatzke, 277 N.W.2d 11, 18 (Minn.1979) (explaining that industry cannot be permitted to set its own standard of care); Muehlhauser v. Erickson, 621 N.W.2d 24, 28 (Minn.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). Minnesota courts have also held that under

    ### Response:
    holding that to find negligence jury need not find violation of federal motorcarrier regulation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the nature and limits of the expert’s testimony. Richey, 498 F.3d at 362. Fautenberry’s counsel could not be faulted for not diagnosing Fautenberry’s mental impairments on their own, but once they decided to present a psychologist to the sentencing panel, they were under an obligation to understand the basics of their witness’s testimony. See Richey, 498 F.3d at 362-63; Skaggs v. Parker, 235 F.3d 261, 269 (6th Cir.2000) (stating that counsel had “a responsibility to present meaningful mitigating evidence” when the court concluded that it was ineffective assistance of counsel when defense attorneys called a neurop-scyhologist who had falsified his credentials and whom counsel knew had previous ly done a laughable job at the first trial); Driscoll v. Delo, 71 F.3d 701, 709 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Because they failed to grasp the basics of

    ### Response:
    holding that defense counsel was defective for failing to understand the laboratory tests performed and the inferences that one could logically draw from the results when challenging the states expert
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nolle prosequi, the trial court has broad discretion in making its findings regarding “good cause.” In striking the proper balance between the prosecution’s discretion to nolle prosequi an indictment and the Court’s power to prevent abuses of executive prerogative, courts have recognized that the prosecution is first and presumptively the best judge of where the public interest lies, and the trial court should not merely substitute its judgment for that of the prosecution. United States v. Hamm, 638 F.2d 823, 828 (5th Cir. 1981). Some courts have sought to further define the appropriate standard for making such decisions by recognizing that a court should defer to the prosecution’s request for nolle prosequi unless the prosecution is clearly wrong. Id., see Wallace, 848 F.2d at 1468 (<HOLDING>). Striking the proper balance in this area of

    ### Response:
    recognizing courts discretion to deny dismissal if motion is prompted by considerations clearly contrary to public interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    agreement between Local 1812 and USIA, see Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), Article II, § 1 (noting that bargaining unit includes “[a]ll non-professional and professional non-supervisory domestic General Schedule (GS & GG) ... employees of USIA nationwide”, with exceptions not applicable to Suzal); cf. id., Article XVI, § 3(b)(2) (observing that Smith-Mundt appointees “shall be assigned to positions identified as pay plan GG”), and under the terms of that agreement he could pursue grievances through the negotiated procedure even though he was outside the protection of the civil service laws, see id., Article XXIII, § 2(a) (entitling “any employee” to file a grievance). If dissatisfied with the Voice of America’s disposition of his grievances 743 F.2d 895, 912-15 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). But both of Suzal’s theories about why the

    ### Response:
    holding that shortterm layoffs of seasonal employees in accordance with conditions agreed upon at the start of employment are not furloughs within the meaning of  7512
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gen. Laws § 21—28—4.01(c)(2)(iii). Based on this change, the Defendant argues that law enforcement officers should be precluded from considering the smell of marijuana when determining if reasonable suspicion exists. (Def.’s Mot. to Suppress 16-17.) The Defendant cites to a case from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for support. (Id. at 19-20.) For starters, and to state the obvious, the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts do not bind this Court, particularly when there is a First Circuit case that is controlling on this issue. Moreover, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts declined to adopt the same rule as the state court, citing Staula. See United States v. Thompson, No. 12-10365, 2014 WL 108312, at *3 (D. Mass. Jan. 13, 2014) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, although it too would not be

    ### Response:
    holding that the odor of marijuana is still a relevant factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (noting as factors relevant to the showing “whether the party has a possessory interest in the things seized or the place searched; whether the party can exclude others from that place; whether the party took precautions to maintain the privacy; and whether the party had a key to the premises”). To meet the first part of the test with regard to items seized, the defendant must show by his conduct that he sought to preserve the items as private. Stallings, 28 F.3d at 60. Here, Defendant expressly disclaims having any ownership interest in the premises or the bag seized. As such, he lacks a sufficient privacy interest to support a motion to suppress the trash bag or the items located therein. See Pierson, 219 F.3d at 806; United States v. Sanders, 130 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); accord United States v. Porter, 107 F.3d 582,

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants statements disclaiming ownership of bag constitute a surrender of any legitimate expectation of privacy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    identical to that at issue. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 771 F.3d 391, 399 (7th Cir. 2014). 45 . Rood v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 936 A.2d 488, 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (internal citations omitted). 46 . In relatively recent unpublished decisions, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has interpreted the duty to defend in title insurance cases, without any suggestion of limiting the scope of the duty to defend either through the language of the policy or as a matter of Pennsylvania law. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. McClain, No. 3423 EDA 2014, 2016 WL 1436613 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2016) (non-precedential); Dutch Run-Mays Draft, LLC v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., No. 2002 EDA 2012, 2013 WL 11250726, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2013) (non-precedential) (<HOLDING>). The Court does not cite these

    ### Response:
    holding that if there are multiple causes of action and one would potentially constitute a claim within the scope of the policys coverage the insurer would have a duty to defend until it could confine the claim to a recovery excluded from the policy internal quotation marks and citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of access in the context of criminal trials, see Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, the federal courts of appeals have widely agreed that it extends to civil proceedings and associated records and documents. See, e.g., N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Autk, 684 F.3d 286, 305 (2d Cir.2011) (finding a right of access to administrative civil infraction hearings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir.1984) (“We hold that the First Amendment does secure a right of access to civil proceedings.”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (finding a right of access to litigation committee reports in shareholder derivative suits); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). The California Supreme Court has also so

    ### Response:
    holding that the first amendment limits judicial discretion to seal documents in a civil case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stay is among the most basic of debtor protections under bankruptcy law.” Id. at 975; see also In re Steenstra, 280 B.R. 560, 566 (Bankr.D.Mass.2002). In re Weber, 283 B.R. 630, 633 (Bankr.D.Mass.2002). Section 362(a)(1) specifically bars “the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under [the Code] ....” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (emphasis supplied). The statute is clear. The stay applies only to the debtor and not to co-defendants. Austin v. Unarco Industries, Inc., 705 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1247, 104 S.Ct. 34,

    ### Response:
    holding that the protections of the automatic stay apply only to actions against the debtor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the evidence____” Section 3731 prior to amendment did not speak to the level of proof. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in construing the False Claims Acts required that allegations in a civil action be proven by showing “specific intent to defraud” the United States by “clear, unequivocal, evidence.” United States v. Ekelman & Associates, Inc., 532 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir.1976); United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310, 314-15 (6th Cir.1962). While federal appellate courts are yet to address the issue of retroactive application of the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act, other federal district courts have reached differing conclusions on the issue. See United States ex rel. Boisvert v. FMC Corporation, No. 86020163 (N.D.Cal. September 9, 1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bekhrad, 672 F.Supp. 1529

    ### Response:
    holding that the 1986 amendments may not be applied retroactively to cut off a defense which existed under the old law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would support any theory of innocence. During his plea colloquy, he admitted to the factual basis for his plea, and he has never denied that hundreds of pornographic images of children were found on his personal computer and computer disks in his residence. A mere assertion of innocence is not sufficient to contradict the defendant’s sworn admission of guilt at a plea hearing. See United States v. Rasmussen, 642 F.2d 165, 166-69 (5th Cir.1981); see also Carr, 740 F.2d at 344 (noting that if an assertion of innocence were enough to withdraw a guilty plea, withdrawal would be an automatic right). Felice contends that if he could prove that his attorney was ineffective, he would be entitled to withdraw his plea. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Felice alleged that his coun sel was

    ### Response:
    holding that ineffective assistance can render a guilty plea involuntary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the fact that her brother had a drug problem or had been charged with a crime. As to the former rationale, other white jurors had made the same claim and had not been excused; as to the latter, it is not clear from the record that it was this particular juror who stated that her brother had been arrested. The trial court overruled the objection. The Melbourne decision charged the courts with the duty to insure that race-based peremptory challenges do not render the jury selection process fundamentally unfair. The penalty for such an improper peremptory challenge is a new trial. In this case, however, the incomplete, unreconstructed, and unavailable record has impeded this court from the exercise of this important duty. Compare Rozier v. State, 669 So.2d 358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>), with Velez v. State, 645 So.2d 42 (Fla. 4th

    ### Response:
    holding that trial minutes were not sufficient substitute for transcript of voir dire and could not afford meaningful review when both sides exercised peremptory challenges
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    property at the time of his bankruptcy filing, which in that case was less than the $7500 homestead exemption. Id. at 115-116. To determine the value of the debtor’s equity, the court subtracted the amount of the other unavoidable liens from the fair market value of the property determined as of time of the bankruptcy filing. Id. at 116. Although the Third Circuit opinion did not expressly acknowledge what the result would be if the amount of the debtor’s equity exceeded the value of the $7500 homestead exemption, the Bankruptcy Court decision had recognized that the debtor could avoid the lien only to the lesser of the amount of the value of his equity or of the amount of his homestead exemption. 160 B.R. 524, 525-26 (Bankr.D.N.J.1993); see also In re Arevalo, supra, 142 B.R. at 115 (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Abrahimzadeh, 162 B.R. 676, 680

    ### Response:
    holding that debtor could not avoid a judicial lien where after accounting for unavoidable liens and mortgages he had no equity in the property and therefore no interest on which to avoid the judicial lien
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the employee and such as to render the employee unfit for his or her position, thus making dismissal justifiable and for the good of the service.” Perry v. State Civil Serv. Comm’n, 38 A.3d 942, 951 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011) (citations omitted) (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. State Civil Serv. Comm’n, 4 A.3d 1106, 1112 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010)). Here, the Chancellor ultimately found that the University suspended and subsequently discharged Fisler as a result of his poor job performance over an extended period of time following repeated warnings relating to his poor job performance. Continuing and regular poor job performance in the face of repeated warnings certainly meets the requirements for a just cause termination. See, e.g., Wei v. State Civil Serv. Comm’n, 961 A.2d 254, 259 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (<HOLDING>), appeal denied, 601 Pa. 705, 973 A.2d 1008

    ### Response:
    holding that employees insubordination and continued unsatisfactory work performance provided just cause for employees removal where employee failed to complete or make progress on the project given to him even though he was capable of doing such project was offered help on the project was relieved of certain duties in order to complete the project and had been reprimanded for not having completed the project
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    King v. VeriFone Hldgs., Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1145 n. 24 (Del.2011) (citation omitted); Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216. 41 . In re Oracle Corp. Deriv. Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 941 n. 62 (Del.Ch.2003). 42 . See N.Y. Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual § 303A.02 (2013), http://nysemanual. nyse.com/lcm [hereinafter NYSE Rules] (""Independence Tests”). 43 . Byorum Dep. 11:17-21. 44 . Id. at 13:15-16, 88:20-23. 45 . Pis.' Br. in Opp’n 13-14; Byorum Dep. 56:6-60:3. 46 . Byorum Dep. 14:2-9. 47 . Id. at 20:15-20. 48 . Id. at 57:12-17, 60:22-61:4. 49 . Mat 59:14-20. 50 . Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050-54 (Del.2004); see Byorum Dep. 19:4-6. 51 . Byorum Dep. 16:5-9. 52 . See, e.g., Crescent/Mach I P'rs, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 980-81 (Del.Ch.2000) (<HOLDING>); State of Wisc. Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, 2000 WL

    ### Response:
    holding that an allegation that there was a longstanding 15year professional and personal relationship between the controlling stockholder and a director alone fails to raise a reasonable doubt that the director could not exercise his independent business judgment in approving the transaction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reads: The pledge of allegiance to the flag ... shall be rendered by students standing with the right hand over the heart. The pledge of allegiance to the flag shall be recited at the beginning of the day in each public elementary, middle, and high school in the state. Each student shall be informed by posting a notice in a conspicuous place that the student has the right not to participate in reciting the pledge. Upon written request by his or her parent, the student must be excused from reciting the pledge. 2 . See Circle Schools v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir.2004) (applying strict scrutiny to, and holding unconstitutional, a requirement that a parent must be notified if a child chooses not to say the pledge); Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636, 637-38 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a school may have its classes recite the pledge so long as it does not compel pupils to espouse its content
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court set forth the appropriate standard of judicial review of benefit determinations by fiduciaries or plan administrators in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989). The Court held that a denial of benefits challenge under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) should be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan grants the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115, 109 S.Ct. 948. When a plan grants such authority, the abuse of discretion standard applies. Id. Thus, Raytheon argues, under Firestone, deference should be given to the administrator’s determination that Ms. Hogan wa , 174 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we agree with the district court

    ### Response:
    holding that the court should review de novo the administrators decision that a property settlement agreement constituted a qdro because it involves interpretation of a settlement agreement and statutory construction not interpretation of the plan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    practical and lawful meaning to their terms.” Id. (citing Whitley v. Royal Trails Property Owners’ Association, Inc., 910 So.2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)). This Court finds that this observation militates more in favor of Plaintiffs legal position. This Court finds that the cases cited by Defendants are distinguishable because they involved parties to a contracts that attempted to terminate an agreement based on the other party’s alleged breach, unlike the situation in this case where the Defendants that breached are the parties attempting to terminate. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir.1983) (finding some of franchisee’s breaches immaterial); Westcap Gov’t Secs., Inc. v. Homestead Air Force Base Fed. Credit Union, 697 F.2d 911, 913 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). This Court agrees that facts of the cases

    ### Response:
    holding that in the absence of a termination provision an eight day late delivery of mortgagebacked securities was not so material that it entitled the buyer to terminate the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bay Boot-ery account. D. In or about July, 1995, Michael caused Thomas Lazarus of Federated Insurance Company to mail an approved estimate, authorizing the payment of over $27,000 for repairs to a late model Mercedes to Finish Line Too in Garden City Park. E. On or about July 10, 1995, Michael caused Federal Insurance Company to issue and send through the mail a check payable to Bristol Manor in the amount of $27,796.37 for repairs to a Mercedes Benz automobile. F. The defendants used or caused to used the mails on numerous other occasions, the precise dates of which are presently unknown. Compl. ¶ 87. Reviewing these allegations as a whole the Court finds that Zigman has sufficiently pled a single instance of mail fraud sufficient to support a RICO claim. See Altman, 48 F.3d at 103 (<HOLDING>). In paragraph A, Zigman alleges that the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a mailing must be sufficiently related to the fraudulent scheme to support a charge of mail fraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    friendly or collusive lawsuits between family members.” Reid, 352 So.2d at 1173. Moreover, even if Florida did hot have a stated policy interest in allowing family member exclusions, the West court skipped the analysis of competing state interests when a clause in an out-of-state insurance contract explicitly conflicted with Pennsylvania policies and law. West, 807 A.2d at 920. Thus, the Court must next analyze the relevant contacts the states have with the underlying insurance contract. Florida’s contacts with the insurance policy outweigh Pennsylvania’s interest in the application of its law. See Hammersmith, 480 F.3d at 226-27. Mr. and Ms. Weber are residents of Florida, and so the “place of delivery” for the insurance benefits would also be in that state. Ryan, 619 F.Supp.2d at 138 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the insurance contract was

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a court may look to the place where the failure to receive the expected benefits was felt in determining which law to apply
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her whole for the wrongs she suffered. As to her additional claims under Title VII, namely her sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims, it is unlikely this Court would be with jurisdiction to entertain them, as it appears that Figueroa has not exhausted her administrative remedies. The charges filed by Figueroa before the EEOC on November 3, 2008; August 10, 2008; September 16, 2010; and March 30, 2011 all contain a checkmark under retaliation, but none under discrimination based on sex. Thus, it appears that Figueroa’s Title VII claims of sexual harassment and hostile work environment have not been under the scrutiny of the EEOC; as such, allowing Figueroa to intervene with them would probably prove futile. See Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 339 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); and United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers,

    ### Response:
    holding that a title vii cause of action is limited to those discrimination allegations in the complaint that have been under the scrutiny of a formal eeoc complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the afternoon “chopping wood and dismantling a fireplace” was inconsistent with the intoxication defense). Petitioner’s ability to speak intelligibly while allegedly intoxicated also contradicts his intoxication theory. Petitioner’s speech, even after he had consumed all the alcohol that he claims to have consumed, was understandable to both Eggleston and Detective Guevara, as Eggleston was able to repeat Petitioner’s words verbatim at trial, and Guevara testified that Petitioner had explained the details of being robbed by one male and one female on “the footbridge that goes across Little Patuxent Parkway from the waterfront towards the mall.” Such clear, detailed speech is inconsistent with the level of intoxication required to negate a specific intent. See Netter, 79 So.3d at 483 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Petitioner’s decision to wear a

    ### Response:
    holding that the evidence did not generate an intoxication instruction because among other things a witness testified that you could  understand what the defendant was talking about
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pro/E software in this case constituted a sale of goods, the first issue to be resolved is whether Massachusetts law allows parties to a contract for a sale of goods to contractually limit damages, and provide limitations periods on initiation of contractual claims. Under Massachusetts law, a contractual one year limitations period does not violate Massachusetts public policy, and is expressly permitted under the Massachusetts UCC. Mass. Gen. Law ch. 106 § 2-725; Hays v. Mobil Oil Corp., 930 F.2d 96, 100 (1st Cir.1991). Similarly, the Massachusetts UCC allows parties to a contract for the sale of goods to limit damages as long as such limitation would not be unconscionable. Mass. Gen. Law ch. 106 § 2-719. See also, PC COM, Inc. v. Proteon, Inc., 946 F.Supp. 1125, 1138 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, Massachusetts law permits parties

    ### Response:
    holding that under massachusetts law contractual provision in computer goods sales contract limiting consequential damages was not unconscionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a credit on any amount previously paid the employee pursuant to G.S. § 97-61.5. Further, the remaining provisions of G.S. § 97-61.5 providing for loss of other benefits “if the employee thereafter engages in any occupation which exposes him to the hazards of asbestosis or silicosis without having obtained the written approval of the Industrial Commission as provided in G.S. 97-61.7” must still apply. Under any other interpretation, a plaintiff whose lung impairment is due to silicosis or asbestosis, rather than another occupational lung disease, would be denied access to potential compensation provided by G.S. § 97-31(24), a result which appears to us to be patently unfair and possibly constitutionally infirm. See, e.g., Walters v. Blair, 120 N.C. App. 398, 462 S.E.2d 232 (1995) (<HOLDING>). By a separate assignment of error, plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding a workers compensation statute unconstitutional because it treats persons with asbestosis differently than persons with other occupational diseases and does so without any valid reason
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of coverage prevented an insured from taking steps to prevent a loss is sufficient to support a jury finding that the misrepresentation was a producing cause of damages.”). Nevertheless, Defendants insist that Plaintiffs claim must be dismissed because she does not allege that Walker provided any false Information — and, accordingly, that she does not adequately allege the second element of a negligent misrepresentation claim. (MTD at 22.) “[T]o prove negligent misrepresentation,” they claim, “a plaintiff must establish that the defendant gave false in formation”; “[misleading but not false information is insufficient....” (MTD at 22.) While at least one Texas court has agreed with Defendants’ contention, see Continental Savings Ass’n v. Collins, 814 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.App.1991) (<HOLDING>), that court cited no precedent and relied

    ### Response:
    holding that the furnishing of misleading information cannot support a claim for negligent misrepresentation the information must be false
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the permissible scope of detention for a routine traffic stop based on an equipment violation. We have held that a police officer may, during a routine traffic stop, “ask about the driver’s authority to operate the vehicle,” check the driver’s license and registration, and ask about travel plans. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221. The officer may also ask a driver to remove an obstruction from a vehicle’s dashboard if the vehicle’s VIN is not otherwise visible from outside the car. Caro, 248 F.3d at 1245. However, we have generally required that further questioning by an officer of an investigative nature, including a request to search a vehicle, be legitimately related in its investigative purpose to the officer’s reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. See id. at 1246 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Doyle, 129 F.3d 1372, 1377

    ### Response:
    holding an officer could not ask for consent to search a cars passenger compartment for an additional vin when the vin on the dashboard was visible from outside the car
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to lift the restitution lien. First, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”) requires full, not partial, restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, 3771(a)(6); United States v. Grice, 319 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir.2003) (per cu-riam). The district court does not have the authority to discharge a restitution obligation that is not fully satisfied. Here, the restitution obligation has not been fully satisfied. Moreover, a civil settlement in bankruptcy court does not discharge the criminal restitution obligation mandated by the MVRA. A bankruptcy settlement subsequent to the imposition of restitution in criminal court does not waive the requirement of restitution. See United States v. Edwards, 595 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Cloud, 872 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.l989) (<HOLDING>). This is so because restitution serves penal

    ### Response:
    holding that the existence of a prior bankruptcy settlement does not preclude a subsequent criminal restitution order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Budget chose a federal forum for a declaration under Hawaii law. In balancing the relevant factors under such circumstances, “[t]his kind of forum shopping could be avoided by requiring district courts to inquire into the availability of state court proceedings to resolve all issues without federal intervention.” Id. Here, we cannot determine from the present record if the district court considered whether Budget could have filed an action for indemnification, or for a declaration under Hawaii law, either on the date this federal action was filed, or on the date the district court decided the merits of the novel state issues presented in the complaint. We are not certain that the district court “came up with the right answer” when it decided the merits. See Golden Eagle, 95 F.3d at 812 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the district court’s failure to

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts error in exercising jurisdiction was harmless error because the court properly applied the relevant state law to the undisputed material facts and came up with the right answer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    behavior was consistent with methamphetamine use, his subjective belief — that defendant’s methamphetamine use provided a sufficient basis for concluding that she presently possessed methamphetamine — was not objectively reasonable. Although “‘reasonable suspicion’ is a relatively low barrier[,]” State v. Jones, 245 Or App 186, 192, 263 P3d 344 (2011), and “[c]ertainty about the significance of particular facts is not required for a police officer to hold a reasonable belief that they indicate criminal conduct,” State v. Briggs, 229 Or App 660, 666, 212 P3d 1276 (2009), evidence of methamphetamine use, without more, does not give rise to reasonable suspicion that defendant presently possesses more methamphetamine. Cf. State v. Lavender, 93 Or App 361, 364, 762 P2d 1027 (1988) (<HOLDING>); State v. Morton, 151 Or App 734, 739, 951 P2d

    ### Response:
    holding among other things that the officers observations that the defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance without more did not establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “Aside from considerations of race, religion or constitutionally protected conduct, none of which appear to be involved here, a public employee still assumes the risk, as far as the Constitution is concerned of being discharged for personal or political reasons.” 285 F.Supp. at 662. More importantly, there was a clear holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that affirmed the legality of such patronage firings. In 1971, Pennsylvania transportation workers sought to challenge the dismissals they anticipated under a forthcoming change of administration. AFSCME v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971). Plaintiffs contended that they “should be entitled to notice and a hearing before discharge, and that political affiliation is not a proper or lawful basis or ground for discharge.” ) (<HOLDING>) , as well as in the strong dissents to the

    ### Response:
    holding a claim for patronage dismissal was legally cognizable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remedies before filing their petitions. A court of appeals “may allow the petition to be filed after the 60th day only if there are reasonable grounds for not filing by the 60th day.” 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a); see also Sierra Club v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.1989). We have suggested before that an attempt to exhaust remedies may be a reasonable ground for delay. See Watson v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 513 F.2d 1081, 1082 (9th Cir.1975) (“Even if we assume that the sixty day statute of limitations ... [is] tolled ... when [petitioner] erroneously filed his petition with the NTSB, the filing was yet several years overdue.”). The Eighth Circuit has explicitly recognized exhaustion as a reasonable ground under § 46110(a). See Reder v. FAA, 116 F.3d 1261, 1263 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Crediting the lapse of time necessary for

    ### Response:
    holding that an unsuccessful attempt to exhaust administrative remedies  was a reasonable ground for not filing an appeal  by the sixtieth day
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the encounter and proceed on his or her way. T16 Due to the factors discussed above, we find that Hansen remained seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when, and because, Officer Huntington asked him whether there was alcohol, drugs, or weapons in the vehicle. Likewise Hansen was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when Officer Huntington requested consent to search the car. The State concedes that Officer Huntington did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious eriminal activity to justify the investigative questions. Therefore, Hansen was illegally detained when Officer Huntington asked him questions that were not reasonably related in scope to the traffic violation which justified the initial sei-zare. See United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 816 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). II. Voluntariness of Consent {17 We now turn

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant was unreasonably seized under fourth amendment when officer detained him to ask questions unrelated in scope to the reasons that justified the initial traffic stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ACCA sentence was still appropriate, relying in part on Taste’s three Massachusetts “larceny from the person” convictions, it agreed to resentencing in light of Simmons. Accordingly, the district court, accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, granted the § 2255 motion as to Taste’s Simmons claim, vacated the judgment, and ordered resentencing. At resentencing in July 2014, the district court concluded that Taste’s prior Massachusetts convictions for larceny from the person were violent felonies for purposes of the ACCA, and again applied the enhanced sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed the same conditions of supervised release as it did at the first sentencing, including the following special condition: The defendant shall subm (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Next, Taste argues the district court erred

    ### Response:
    holding district courts erroneous delegation of authority to probation officer to determine maximum number of drug tests to be administered was not structural error and therefore did not constitute plain error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fail to cite this controlling authority. In this case, although Mahabir had yet to filé her appeal when the Superior Court ruled on the attorney’s fees motions, the time to appeal had not expired since the Superior Court did not rule on Mahabir’s motion for reconsideration until March 24, 2014, giving the parties until April 23, 2014, to file a notice of appeal. V.I.S.Ct.R. 5(a)(4) (“the time for filing the notice of appeal for all parties is extended until 30 days after entry of an order disposing of the last” post-judgment motion, except that “[a] motion for attorney’s fees shall not affect the running of the time for appeal”). Therefore, the litigation remained ongoing when the Superior Court ruled on both motions for attorney’s fees. Bryan v. Fawkes, 61 V.I. 416, 448 (V.I. 2014) (<HOLDING>); see also Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559,

    ### Response:
    holding that a case remained pending where the time to file a rehearing petition had not expired
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    lab in 1988, but that “the plaintiffs classified status terminated when the legislature [in the 1994 amendments] made all positions of the lab limited appointment positions subject to the approval of the Commission.” The motion justice further ruled that, after the 1994 amendments, “as a matter of law, plaintiff had no constitutionally protected interest [as a limited-appointment, crime-lab employee] * * * to which due-process protections attached.” She based this conclusion on her belief that the 1994 amendments had stripped Wilkinson of his classified full-status employment at the crime lab because the 1994 crime-lab amendments were a specific-effect statute that superseded the general, earlier-enacted provisions of the merit system. See Casey v. Sundlun, 615 A.2d 481, 483 (R.I.1992) (<HOLDING>). This Court “reviews the granting of a summary

    ### Response:
    holding that gl1956  43326 embodies a policy of statutory construction that requires courts to give precedence to a specific statute over a general statute when the two are in conflict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conelusory allegations, such as “I was coerced,” and the “sufficient facts” required under Powell. Because Felice’s motion relies on conelusory allegations which find no support in the record, he did not provide “sufficient facts which, if proven, would justify relief’ from his earlier guilty plea. Accordingly, the district court acted within its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw without holding a hearing. Felice points to his assertion of innocence to support the withdrawal of his plea. As to his claim of innocence, Felice has made only a bare assertion that he “did nothing wrong.” He points to no facts t e because he did not consider evidence provided by Felice and because he refused to speak to witnesses. See Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1363-64 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Felice’s motion did not identify the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that ineffective assistance claims based on uncalled witnesses require a heavy showing by the petitioner because the court is forced to make a hypothetical determination of how an uncalled witness may have testified
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on appeal, and that determination that this Court will consider. 1. There is no direct evidence of pretext. The Ninth Circuit has clarified the type of evidence that will enable a retaliation claim to proceed beyond the summary judgment stage. It held that “[w]hen the plaintiff offers direct evidence of discriminatory motive, a triable issue as to the actual motivation of the employer is created even if the evidence is not substantial.” Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (1998). Direct evidence of discriminatory animus has been recognized by several circuits as “evidence which, if believed, proves the fact without inference or presumption.” Davis v. Chevron, 14 F.3d 1082, 1085 (5th Cir.1994); see also Spengler v. Worthington Cylinders, 615 F.3d 481, 491 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1222 (finding direct

    ### Response:
    holding that direct evidence of retaliation is lacking where the evidence if believed  would not require the conclusion that defendant unlawfully retaliated against plaintiff emphasis in original
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    compel arbitration in a forum outside the Northern District of Illinois.” Ferenc v. Brenner, 927 F.Supp.2d 537, 542 (N.D.Ill.2013) (citing Merrill Lynch, 49 F.3d at 327). Normally, when arbitration is dictated, a court compels arbitration in that district and stays the court proceeding. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (“If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration ... the court in which such suit is pending ... shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had .... ”). But when a court is presented with a motion to compel arbitration in a different district, the proper action is to dismiss the complaint for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3). See Ferenc, 927 F.Supp.2d at 542 (<HOLDING>); Faulkenberg, 637 F.3d at 808 (“under § 4 of

    ### Response:
    holding that claims were subject to arbitration and converting the motion to compel into a motion to dismiss for improper venue because the contract mandated arbitration in california
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contract, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duties based on PNE defendants’ conduct in canceling the fire insurance. The arbitrator in Case II dismissed all claims of plaintiffs and defendants’, including plaintiffs claim against PNE Media for “the cancellation of the insurance policy and the failure to notify plaintiff of the cancellation.” .It is well settled that under principles of res judicata a final judgment is conclusive “not only as to all matters actually litigated and determined, but also as to matters which could properly have been litigated and determined in the former action. . . .” Fickley v. Greystone Enters., 140 N.C. App. 258, 260, 536 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2000) (citations omitted); See, e.g., Holly Farm Foods, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 114 N.C. App. 412, 442 S.E.2d 94 (1994) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). “The procedural history of

    ### Response:
    holding res judicata precluded landlord from bringing second action for damages of unpaid future rents after a final judgment determined tenants damages arising out of the breach of lease in landlords first action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not apply so as to preclude a new evidentiary hearing on the enhancement issue, we have still found no basis in the record to conclude the initial hearing on this issue was inadequate. The State has pointed to no error in the district court proceeding that would entitle the State to a new hearing, nor does the record reveal any other matter that hindered the prosecution’s ability to amend the trial information prior to that hearing in order to rely on other prior convictions. In sum, the State had a full and fair opportunity to support its accusation that the defendant was a habitual offender, but its evidence was insufficient. In view of these circumstances, the prosecution is not entitled to a second bite of the apple to remedy its failure of proof. Cf. Woody, 613 N.W.2d at 218 (<HOLDING>); M-Z Enters., Inc. v. Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding state was stuck with unenhanced conviction on reduced charge to which defendant pled guilty and prosecution could not reinstate original charge upon remand the state should bear the consequences of a decision that was based on the states wrong assumption that the habitualoffender statute applied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    884 So.2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)(<HOLDING>). Affirmed. Conflict

    ### Response:
    holding that probation does not constitute a sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    member, should be separated from the decision on the class action claim, and resolved by the Administration, but guided by this Court’s decision on the merits of the class claim. Any declaratory or injunctive relief granted will thus differentiate between the class-wide claim and the individual claims. The advantages to class-wide resolution of issues such as the one presented here are apparent when noting that three other district courts have decided against the Administration in individual actions by children such as the Andres, and the Commissioner has continued denying such claims. See Agee v. Sullivan, 1991 WL 193636 (N.DAla. Mar. 29, 1991) (citing McAninch and holding that the largest payment possible should be given to the child); McAninch v. Bowen, 693 F.Supp. 353 (W.D.Pa.1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Reinkraut v. Shalala, 854 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    holding that congress did not intend to prevent children from voluntarily terminating entitlement to benefits under the account of one disabled parent in order to apply on the account of the other disabled parent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consistently asked his attorneys to forgo any defense based on insanity or diminished capacity, even in the face of overwhelming evidence of his guilt and the consequent unavailability of any other effective defense. Woodland’s attorneys argue that his refusal to heed their sound legal advice is convincing proof of his inability to consult with counsel and, thus, his incompetence. We disagree. That the accused has the right to control the nature of his or her defense is well established. See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982); see also Utah Const, art. I, § 12; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2540-41, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (identifying defendant’s 6th Amendment right to conduct his defense); State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 272 P.2d 195,199 (1954) (<HOLDING>). In Wood, for example, this court held that

    ### Response:
    recognizing defendants right under utah constitution to control his defense and represent himself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dr. Callahan to present evidence of successful lumbar fusion surgeries involving pedicle screws performed by him and possibly to present his own calculation of how many pedicle screws he had properly placed in the past. Thus, the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and potential undue delay substantially outweighed the limited legitimate probative value of the other acts evidence. Several courts have excluded evidence similar to that which Plaintiffs sought to introduce. See Lai v. Sagle, 373 Md. 306, 818 A.2d 237, 247 (2003) (noting that “[t]he fact of prior litigation has little, if any, relevance to whether [defendant] violated the applicable standard of care in the immediate case.”); Laughridge v. Moss, 163 Ga.App. 427, 294 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Cerniglia v. French, 816 So.2d 319, 322-25

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not err in disallowing evidence of alleged previous act of medical malpractice against defendant noting that the general rule in a suit for negligence is that evidence of similar acts or omissions on other and different occasions is not admissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    record, we conclude that the defendant was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the lack of admonishment. Burnett v. State, 88 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). In this context, “harm” means that “appellant probably would not have pleaded guilty but for the failure to admonish.” Id. at 638 n. 14. Reversal is only warranted if “the error may have had a ‘substantial influence’ on the outcome of the proceeding.” Webb v. State, 156 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. ref'd). We may assume from the trial court’s statements on the record that, had it been aware that the sentence imposed exceeded the plea agreement, it would have modified the sentence to reflect a $2,000 fine. See State v. Aguilera, 165 S.W.3d 695, 698 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). Such a modification would have rendered any

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court may modify sentence on the same day as the assessment of the initial sentence and before the court adjourns for the day
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    attorney] procured the indictment. See Ray, 561 S.W.2d at 481. The record also shows that appellant used this same argument in requesting his motion in arrest of judgment. But in Ray, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the appellant failed to meet his burden of showing a violation of the sanctity of the grand jury proceedings because the evidence showed that no one other than grand jurors were present during the grand jury’s voting or deliberations. See id. Therefore, ... the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a hearing on this motion because appellant did not argue that [the district attorney] was present during the grand jury’s vote or deliberations. See id. Id. at *7; see also Walter v. State, 209 S.W.3d 722, 737, 739-40 (Tex. App.—Tex-arkana 2006) (<HOLDING>), rev’d. on other grounds, 267 S.W.3d 883 (Tex.

    ### Response:
    holding that the state violated a statute by allowing the presence of nonwitness police officers during grand jury proceedings but concluding that because those officers were not present during deliberations the indictments were not void
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Oden v. Northern Marianas College, 440 F.3d 1085, 1090-91 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). APPEAL DISMISSED. ** This disposition is not

    ### Response:
    holding that this court lacks jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the supreme court of the commonwealth of the northern mariana islands which were not completed before may 1 2004
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of that status, not cases adjudicating alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien ""within the United States” if alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.1969) (noting that “since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ... th[e] appeal involve[d] an exclusion ... rather than an expulsion”); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769, 770 (2d Cir.1957) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 1368, 2

    ### Response:
    holding that the attorney generals discretionary power to suspend deportation did not apply to aliens within the country on parole because parole by statute was not to be regarded as an admission of the alien citation and internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Choice policy” refers to an insurance policy issued by Medica to Randall. 2 . Although Patch and Syring were covered by separate PHP policies, the policy language at issue in this case was identical in each PHP policy. 3 . Allen v. United States, 668 F.Supp. 1242, 1247 (W.D.Wis.1987) (interpreting a federal statute that only allowed subrogation when there was tort liability); Arizona Property & Cas. Ins. Guar. Fund v. Herder, 156 Ariz. 203, 208-09, 751 P.2d 519, 524 (1988) (interpreting ""persons or organizations who may be legally responsible” for bodily injuries in limit-of-liability clause involving ""amounts otherwise payable for damages” to include only parties who were responsible for the infliction of the injuries); Employers Health, 161 Wis.2d at 945-47, 469 N.W.2d at 175-76 (<HOLDING>); Hamed v. County of Milwaukee, 108 Wis.2d 257,

    ### Response:
    holding that a clause providing that the insurer has a right to recover damages from a responsible third party referred to a tortfeasor because the use of damages in bodily injury cases means pecuniary compensation resulting from an unlawful or negligent act by a wrongdoer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the amended complaint fails to sufficiently plead scienter. In opposition, the plaintiffs contend that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges that the defendants manipulated MSC’s reserves in order to meet predetermined earnings targets. The plaintiffs also assert that the amended complaint adequately pleads scienter. II. DISCUSSION A. The Standard of Review In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court should dismiss the complaint only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his complaint which would entitle him to relief. See King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 286 (2d Cir.1999); Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir.1996); I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The issue to consider is not whether a

    ### Response:
    holding that dismissal is inappropriate unless it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not constitute a dangerous condition. The undisputed evidence establishes that, on the date of the accident, southbound drivers at the limit line of the railroad crossing had an unobstructed view of the tracks to the northwest despite the configuration of the intersection. Thus, there was no substantial risk of injury to drivers using due care while crossing the railroad tracks. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 830(a) (“ ‘Dangerous condition’ means a condition of property that creates a substantial ... risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.”); id. § 830.2 (defining non-dangerous condition); see also, e.g., Chowdhury v. City of L.A., 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 45 Cal. Rptr.2d 657, 661-63 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Appellants’ expert declarations do not raise

    ### Response:
    holding that an intersection with inoperative traffic signals due to a power outage was not a dangerous condition as a matter of law because the city could not be charged with foreseeing that a motorist using due care would speed through the intersection without heed to inoperative traffic signals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contest, Johnson’s motion to intervene is not precluded by the three-month statutory period contained in Indiana Code section 29-1-7-18. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions that Johnson et al be named as a plaintiff in this will contest. Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. DARDEN, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur. 1 . Morgan also maintains that because Johnson did not address the issue of whether the trial court properly dismissed her Interve-nor’s Complaint as untimely, it is waived. Because this issue is intricately linked with whether Johnson should have been named as a plaintiff to the proceeding rather than a defendant under Indiana Code section 29-1-17-7, we address it. 2 . But see Smith v. Mitchell, 841 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Ind.Ct.App.2006)

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the will contest due to sisters failure to tender a proper summons to interested parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reads in pertinent part as follows: The at e and district court that Rule 11 does not govern state courts. See Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1467 (10th Cir.1995) (explaining that Rule 11 does not apply in state courts). Therefore, it cannot be a basis on which to challenge a plea in a state court criminal proceeding. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (""[Fjederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”). 3 . Holt also argued below that this violated the due process clause of the Sixth Amendment, but he failed to persist in that argument before this Court. So, as we discussed regarding Holt's claim that the state court judge’s actions violated Rule 11, we need not consider this argument. See Phillips, 422 F.3d at 1080

    ### Response:
    recognizing that we lack jurisdiction to consider issues not raised in the parties briefs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the court rejected a trustee’s argument that a post-petition filing of a mechanic’s hen in accordance with New York Lien Law constituted a preferential transfer: Section 547(c)(6) provides ... that a trustee may not avoid the fixing of a statutory hen that is not avoidable under section 545. Mechanics’ hens duly filed pursuant to state law are not avoidable under section 545. Consequently, this court disagrees with the trustee’s position. Id. at 60. Although the hen in that case received the benefit of New York’s “relation-back” provision, the court’s preference decision did not rely on that fact. The court looked instead to whether the henor had filed his notice of hen within the statutory time period. See also In re Wisner, 77 B.R. 395, 397-98 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1987) (<HOLDING>). In In re APC Construction, Inc., 132 B.R. 690

    ### Response:
    holding that mechanics hen arising under new york lien law is statutory hen as opposed to judicial hen
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    United States after deportation. The parties agree that the government’s failure to allege specific intent rendered the indictment defective under Pemillo-Fuentes. The government asserts, however, that Velasco-Medina waived his objection to the indictment’s sufficiency by failing to raise it before the district court. Velasco-Medina responds that the indictment’s defect deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the case ah initio, and thus requires that we overturn his conviction. We find neither argument availing. The government’s position that Ve-lasco-Medina waived any objection to the indictment’s sufficiency by failing to raise it in the district court has been repeatedly rejected in this Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Godinez-Rabadan, 289 F.3d 630, 632 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Geiger, 263 F.3d 1034, 1039

    ### Response:
    holding that indictments sufficiency is jurisdictional in nature and may be raised initially on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lehman Holdings and Aurora admitted that Lehman Bank’s home office had been in Delaware when the loans were bought and resold. Lehman Holdings’ App’x at 782, 1492, 2107, 3062, 3733; Aurora’s App’x at 11; Aurora’s Opening Br. at 11; Lehman Holdings’ Opening Br. at 23. Because L 272, 1298 (11th Cir.1999) (referring to the “principal place of business” as a “term of art”). Regardless of where Lehman Bank’s executives resided or met, all of Lehman Bank’s actions were “subject to direction from the home office” in Delaware. 12 C.F.R. § 545.91(a). With all of the bank’s actions subject to direction from the home office in Delaware, any reasonable fact-finder would have to conclude that Lehman Bank’s principal place of business was in Delaware. See Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB, 937 A.2d at 103-104 (<HOLDING>). As a result, Lehman Bank is considered a

    ### Response:
    holding that lehman bank had its principal office in delaware rather than new york based in part on lehman banks establishment of its home office in delaware
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an official-capacity suit and a personal-capacity suit turns on the capacity in which the named defendant has been sued. It does not turn on the capacity in which he or she has acted. A state official can be held personally liable under § 1983 for his or her official acts. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27-31, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). 15 . The Secretary mistakenly believes that Burns’ perceived lack of standing to seek prospective relief warrants a determination that her claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Docket No. 21 at 7. Nonetheless, the question of whether the requested relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment does not turn on whether Burns herself has standing to seek such relief. Palomar Pomerado Health System v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. James, 998

    ### Response:
    recognizing that while young may be sufficient to overcome a states otherwise valid defense under the eleventh amendment it does not provide a plaintiff with standing to seek prospective relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    them because it was made while Kevin was under arrest but before he was informed of his Miranda rights. They further argue that the public safety exception to Miranda as announced by the United States Supreme Court in Quarles does not apply in the instant case because the threat of exposure to the contents of the gassing generator was not an imminent threat to public safety. [¶ 22] Generally, a defendant who is in custody must be advised of his or her Miranda rights prior to an interrogation by law enforcement in order for statements made during the interrogation to be admissible against him or her in the defendant’s subsequent trial. State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 21, 928 A.2d 746. Statements made by a defendant in custody before being given a Miranda warning may still b Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Bilynsky, 2007 ME 107, ¶¶

    ### Response:
    holding that officers premiranda questions concerning active methamphetamine production were within the public safety exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (strike based on age where no explanation given as to why the venireman was “too young” held pretextual); State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Mo.App.1987) (strike of elderly individual where prosecutor stated into the record that elderly jurors are more subject to intimidation, but where no voir dire was conducted along this line, held pretextual under Batson). See also Colbert v. State, 304 Ark. 250, 801 S.W.2d 643, 646 (1991) (striking racially cognizable veniremen without even propounding a question to them raises an inference of bias under Batson). There is nothing in this record which supports a finding that the peremptory strike of juror Prince passes constitutional muster. It is, therefore, our duty to reverse. Conerly v. State, 544 So.2d 1370, 1372 (Miss.1989) (<HOLDING>). II. Six of the State’s nine peremptory

    ### Response:
    holding that a single unlawful strike compels reversal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any modification of the consent decree should be barred pursuant to the “continuous violation” doctrine. Under that doctrine, a defendant to a contempt proceeding may not challenge the validity of the underlying injunction as a defense to violating that injunction. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 318-19, 87 S.Ct. 1824, 18 L.Ed.2d 1210 (1967). Or, more simply, parties have a duty to comply with an ongoing injunction until it is dissolved. To illustrate, if the plaintiff had brought a contempt action against the defendants, focusing on retrospective, instead of pro- spective, relief, the “continuous violation” doctrine would have defeated any defense that focused solely on the validity of the underlying injunction. See, e.g., Kindred v. Duckworth, 9 F.3d 638, (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). But the plaintiff has not brought a contempt

    ### Response:
    holding that the implementation of a policy that violated a consent decree could give rise to contempt proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on behalf of an employee. Id. at 136, 111 S.Ct. 478. Thus, both the existence of a pension plan and a pension-defeating motive behind the termination were critical elements to the state cause of action. Id. at 140, 111 S.Ct. 478. The Court reasoned that to allow the state cause of action would lead to ""different substantive standards applicable to the same employer conduct, requiring the tailoring of plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction. Such an outcome is fundamentally at odds with the goal of uniformity that Congress sought to implement.” Id. at 142, 111 S.Ct. 478. Moreover, the offensive conduct was already prohibited by ERISA, and thus the state statute would create an alternate enforcement mechanism. Id. at 145, 1 1th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We have previously stated that ""state law

    ### Response:
    holding that an employees claim against plan administrator for denied benefits is preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by ascertaining whether a Kansas statute or constitutional provision governing this case has expressly waived Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 3142. Though Kansas has generally authorized suits brought in state court against state educational institutions, see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 76-713, its statutes have not expressly- waived Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Brennan, 451 F.2d at 1290; see also Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241, 105 S.Ct. 3142 (“Although a State’s general waiver of sovereign immunity may subject it to suit in state court,- it is not enough to waive, the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment ... [absent] intend ] to subject itself to suit in federal court.” (citations omitted)); Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Nor is there any waiver provision in the

    ### Response:
    holding that utah did not waive its eleventh amendment immunity with respect to a suit brought in federal court because state statute provided for exclusive original jurisdiction in its own courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is a tool the jury may utilize to gauge the defendant’s intent and is helpful in situations in which the defendant’s intent to deceive may be unclear. For example, if the defendant asserts that he was merely joking, that the statements were mere puffery, or that the statements were merely sharp business dealing, evidence that the statements would have deceived a person of ordinary prudence and comprehension is evidence that defendant actually intended to deceive. United States v. Coffman, 94 F.3d 330, 333-34 (7th Cir.1996) (Posner, J.) (rejecting “unreasonable victim argument”; the ordinary prudence standard helps the jury determine if defendant had fraudulent intent and helps distinguish between sharp dealing and fraud). Thus, the ordinary pruden r, 609 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); Linden v. United States, 254 F.2d 560, 567-68

    ### Response:
    holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and procedure of the federal courts.” Cooler & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). Rule 9011, like Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, “only applies to acts undertaken in a case before the court.” Davant v. Bailey (In re Bailey), No. 09-2564, Adv. No. 10-15, 2010 WL 3277908, at *2, 2010 Bankr.LEXIS 2449, at *4 (Bankr.N.D.W.Va. Aug. 13, 2010) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burke, 897 F.2d 734, 739 (4th Cir.1990)). As evidence in support of her Motion, the Debtor cites to Beneficial’s failure to dismiss the Circuit Court case and the letter she received from Beneficial. Rule 9011 only applies to documents filed in this Court; therefore, the documents filed in State Court cannot be a basis for granting the Debtor’s Motion. See Nationwide, 897 F.2d at 739 (<HOLDING>); In re Bailey, 2010 WL 3277908, at *2-4, 2010

    ### Response:
    holding that misrepresentations in documents filed in state court in no way constituted a basis for imposing federal rule 11 sanctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    visa. ‘Eligibility to receive such visa’ is unambiguous, and because the phrase is unambiguous, our inquiry must end with the statute’s plain language.” Id. The Nyaga court went on to consider the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1154 and concluded that “the plain meaning of ‘shall remain eligible to receive such visa’ does not change, nor is it rendered ambiguous.” Id. at 915. All circuits that have addressed this issue have read the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(l)(I)(ii)(II) in the same way even in the wake of what may seem to be harsh results, such as when defendants failed to even process the applications of otherwise eligible diversity participants before the end of the fiscal year. See Mohamed, 436 F.3d at 81; Coraggioso, 355 F.3d at 734; Carrillo-Gonzalez, 353 F.3d at 1079 (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit addressed the plight of

    ### Response:
    holding that the doctrine of equitable tolling has no application in cases involving the congressionallymandated oneyear deadline of the dy lottery program
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    policy language, not a statute, and the policy language did not have an actual physical contact requirement. Latham, 482 S.W.2d at 657. Five years after Latham, the Legislature added the actual physical contact requirement to the uninsured motorist statute. See Act of May 6, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 182, § 1, art. 5.06-l(2)(d), 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 370, 371 (repealed 2005). No other substitute exists for the requirement of actual physical contact with the motor vehicle itself. Texas courts have uniformly rejected the contention that a collision with cargo and other objects falling from a car satisfies the requirement of actual physical contact with a motor vehicle. See, e.g., Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Deville, 988 S.W.2d 331, 333-34 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 867 S.W.2d 74,

    ### Response:
    holding that water pump falling from truck and striking insured was not actual physical contact with a motor vehicle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Commercial Union Ins. Co. of Am., 759 F.2d 826, 828 erm “caused” is ambiguous. Georgia law requires courts to construe ambiguous terms in insurance against the insurer. ALEA London Ltd. v. Woodcock, 286 Ga.App. 572, 649 S.E.2d 740, 745 (2007). Courts must likewise construe exclusions from coverage against the insurer. Id. Facing unsettled legal territory and mindful of Georgia principles of insurance contract interpretation, the Court concludes that the ambiguous causation standard must be strictly construed against Cincinnati. Exclusion H does not exclude coverage based on ordinary employee negligence. It excludes coverage only if an employee acts with knowledge of or intent to further a forgery, or intentionally disregards relevant bank policies. See Empire Bank, 27 F.3d at 335 (<HOLDING>); cf. Citibank Tex., N.A. v. Progressive Cas.

    ### Response:
    holding loss was caused by an employee who ignored bank policies by instructing subordinates to cash corporate checks without proper documentation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    59 . Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). 60 : See Bell Atl., 127 S.Ct. at 1970. 61 . Id. at 1964. Accord ATSI, 493 F.3d at 98 n. 2 (applying the standard of plausibility outside Twombly's anti-trust context). 62 . Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir.2007) (emphasis in original). 63 . Bell Atl., 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Accord id. (“The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard ....”). 64 . ATSI, 493 F.3d at 98 (quoting Be 82 . In re Par Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 733 F.Supp. 668, 675 (S.D.N.Y.1990). Accord In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Lapin v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 506

    ### Response:
    holding that a duty to disclose arises whenever secret information renders prior public statements materially misleading
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    J. The Florida Parole Commission (“Parole Commission”) issued an order revoking Robert B. Olsen’s (“Olsen”) parole. Thereafter, Olsen filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court, seeking review of the Parole Commission’s order. The circuit court entered an order denying Olsen’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, and Olsen then appealed the circuit court’s order to this Court. Because the circuit court’s review of the Parole Commission’s quasi-judicial action is the equivalent of an appeal, plenary appeal to a district court to review the merits of the circuit court’s order is not authorized. See Sheley v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 720 So.2d 216, 217 (Fla.1998) (<HOLDING>). We, therefore, treat Olsen’s notice of appeal

    ### Response:
    holding that after an inmate has been afforded judicial review of the parole commissions actions a second opportunity for judicial review on the merits by plenary appeal from a circuit courts order would improperly provide the inmate with a second full bite at the apple in the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a denial of due process.’ ” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (internal citations omitted). Vouching occurs when the prosecutor interjects his personal opinion about the credibility of a witness or the strength of the evidence as a whole. Rodriguez v. Scillia, 193 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir.1999); United States v. Alexander, 163 F.3d 426, 429 (7th Cir.1998). In such a situation, vouching introduces credibility evidence that would have been inadmissible during trial. However, a prosecutor may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence adduced at trial, even going so far as to call a defendant a liar if the record supports that accusation. See United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1409-10 (7th Cir.1992); see also Morgan, 113 F.3d at 89 (<HOLDING>). Looking at the comment in isolation, two

    ### Response:
    holding that a prosecutor calling a witness an honest citizen was a fair inference from the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    30 months’ imprisonment, with three years’ post-prison supervision, and ordered to pay, among other obligations, $1,144 in court-appointed attorney fees. On appeal, he raises three assignments of error. We write to address only his third assignment, in which he contends that the trial court plainly erred in imposing $1,144 in court-appointed attorney fees without a basis in the record to determine that defendant had the ability to pay them, and we reject the other assignments without discussion. The state concedes that the court committed plain error when it imposed attorney fees in this case, because the record is devoid of evidence that defendant would be able to repay them. We agree and accept the state’s concession. See State v. Coverstone, 260 Or App 714, 716, 320 P3d 670 (2014) (<HOLDING>). Given the amount of attorney fees imposed,

    ### Response:
    holding that imposition of courtappointed attorney fees is plain error when the record is silent as to the defendants ability to pay the fees ordered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    id. The qualified immunity defense shields officials from liability stemming from the perfor- manee of a discretionary function “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). [¶ 17] In the present case, the defendants are entitled to the qualified immunity defense because “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known 00 (D.Mass.1994) (finding “[a] public employee’s suspension with pay does not implicate a constitutionally protected property interest”); Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470, 882 P.2d 511 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 746

    ### Response:
    holding that a suspension with pay does not violate any recognized property interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a water association has “made service available.” Although the water association in North Shelby had never actually “provided” water service to the disputed area, the court found that it had “made service available” to potential customers by virtue of the proximity of the water association’s distribution lines to the disputed area. Id. at 22. Additionally, the court held that even though the water association’s distribution lines were simply “adjacent to,” but not “within” that property, the water association had still made service available. Moreover, the water association in North Shelby was capable of providing such service within a “reasonable” time after application was made for the service. Id.; See also Lexington-South Elkhorn Water District, 93 F.3d 230, 237 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Glenpool Util. Services Authority v. Creek

    ### Response:
    holding that whether an association has made service available is determined based on the existence of facilities on or in the proximity of the location to be served
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Table). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), a defendant has the right to appeal (1) a sentence imposed in violation of the law, (2) a sentence imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the Guidelines, and (3) an upward departure from the Guidelines. United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 664, 667 (6th Cir.1990) (paraphrasing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)). Because Lively is challenging her sentence on the grounds that the district court failed to consider certain directives contained in the sentencing reform act of 1984, specifically 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) & 3582(a), Lively is appealing her sentence on the grounds that it was imposed in violation of the law. Consequently, this is an appealable issue under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Byrd, 984 F.2d 251, 252 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). The parties agree that,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants appeal based on the district courts alleged error in not considering defendants medical condition when sentencing defendant in violation of  3553a2d was appealable under  3742a1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege certain elements of the crime. We review the sufficiency of an indictment de novo. United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 364 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir.2004). Bello-Bahena asserts that the district court should have dismissed the indictment because it failed to allege (1) voluntary entry, (2) inspection and admission by an immigration officer or actual and intentional evasion of inspection, and (3) knowledge of presence in the United States. However, each of these claims is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Rivera-Sillas, 376 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir.2004) (“That clause [§ 1326] does not require the indictment to specifically state that the defendant alien voluntarily entered the United States.”); id. at 892 (<HOLDING>); id. at 893 (holding that an indictment under

    ### Response:
    holding that a found in indictment need not allege all of the elements of entry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (""[A] prima facie case requires only a minimal showing before shifting the burden to the employer.” (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993))). In contrast, we apply a ""rigorous standard” when evaluating pretext at step three. Cherry v. Ritenour Sch. Dist, 361 F.3d 474, 479 (8th Cir.2004). 7 . Doucette offered six comparators at the district court; on appeal, she focuses her argument on two of them. The district court discounted evidence related to these two employees, finding Doucette had not corroborated their alleged misconduct beyond her own deposition and declaration. We note that Doucette may support her argument as to the existence of a disputed fact with materials in the record that include deposi , 109-10 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406,

    ### Response:
    recognizing ageplusgender discrimination claim when complaint brought claims under adea and title vii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiff used BOX Partners instead of BOX Packaging. Multiple exhibits, including countless invoices, paperwork, correspondence, and advertisements, refer only to BOX Partners, and not BOX Packaging. While many of these invoices are from more recent years, the record reveals that Plaintiff started to use BOX Partners more frequently over referring to itself as Box Packaging. Plaintiff also changed the sign outside its office from BOX Packaging to BOX Partners and employees use “box-partners.com” email addresses. Irrespective of when all of these changes occurred, Plaintiffs inconsistent use of BOX Packaging contradicts its attempts to establish a secondary meaning through exclusivity, length and manner of use. See Gimix, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 699 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Plaintiff is correct that a product

    ### Response:
    holding that inconsistent advertising of an alleged protected trademark for five years did not establish secondary meaning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    omitted). The Fuller court emphasized (1) the seamen’s contacts with the state, (2) the state’s interest in protecting its residents, and (3) the federal interest in uniformity of law where the job situs is in international waters. Plaintiff distinguishes Fuller and invites an application of the reasoning in Greene on the basis that the Washington statute is not in conflict with the federal law, but merely supplements it. In this regard, the Court concludes that the double wages imposed under RCW 49.52.040 are punitive in nature, as plaintiff concedes by his own description. Punitive damages are disallowed in an action for maintenance and cure. Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Management Corp., 57 F.3d 1495, 1502-05 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 708, 133 L.Ed.2d 663 (1996) (<HOLDING>). This case was based primarily on the United

    ### Response:
    holding attorneys fees available for willful failure to pay maintenance and cure but no additional punitive damages allowable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Circuit adopted a 50/50 split for tenants by the entireties because a 50/50 split was “far simpler and less speculative,” and because the Third Circuit viewed a § 7403 sale as equivalent to a consensual sale, id. However, the far greater weight of the cases support a different approach. See Harris v. United States, 764 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (5th Cir.1985) (valuing the spouses’ life estates and contingent survivor interests and determining that, based on her higher life expectancy, the wife had a 50.98% interest.); United States v. Gibbons, 71 F.3d 1496, 1500 (10th Cir.1995) (requiring the valuation of an ex-wife’s life estate and survivor interest and concluding that she was entitled to greater than one-half the total value of the property); In re Pletz, 221 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, while this Circuit has never

    ### Response:
    holding that proper valuation requires consideration of the life expectancies of the joint tenants and rejecting the proposition that the wifes share was limited to a half interest in the life estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the issue of retroactive application of the amendment. Thus, we agree with the defendant that Paradise stands for the proposition that, for certain types of criminal statutes, such as a statute of limitations for the prosecution of a crime, the language of the statute must “clearly necessitate] ”; State v. Paradise, supra, 189 Conn. 353; a retrospective application in order for one to be given. We agree with the state, however, that footnote 5 of Paradise and the holding in In re Daniel H. make clear that statutes affecting “other areas of the criminal process”; State v. Paradise, supra, 353 n.5; may be given retrospective effect if the legislative history evinces a clear and unequivocal intent for such a retrospective application. Id.; see In re Daniel H., supra, 237 Conn. 376 (<HOLDING>). Our task, then, is to determine whether P.A.

    ### Response:
    holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was established in this circuit that a constructive amendment required reversal, even under plain error review. See Olson, 925 F.2d at 1175 (“[A constructive] amendment always requires reversal because it deprives a defendant of his right to be tried on the grand jury’s charge.”); United States v. Solis, 841 F.2d 307, 309 (9th Cir.1988) (same); United States v. Pazsint, 703 F.2d 420, 424 (9th Cir.1983) (same). However, in United States v. Shipsey, 190 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.1999), we stated that “fw]e have not had occasion to determine whether reversal is always required after United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), which recognizes more discretion for courts reviewing for plain error.” Id. at 1087; see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (<HOLDING>). . In Shipsey, we found it unnecessary to

    ### Response:
    holding that even if a defendant is able to show that there was a plain error that affected his substantial rights a court of appeals is not required to reverse a conviction unless it finds that the error seriously affected the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and anti-competitive effects. For this reason, such restraints generally are not deemed per se illegal, but, rather, are tested under a rule of reason analysis. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723, 108 S.Ct. 1515, 99 L.Ed.2d 808 (1988). Vertical price-fixing agreements, however, are a special subset of vertical restraints. As such, they qualify for different treatment. A vertical price-fixing agreement that establishes a minimum price normally is regarded as a naked restraint of trade and, thus, as illegal per se. See Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 724, 108 S.Ct. 1515; Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404-09, 31 S.Ct. 376, 55 L.Ed. 502 (1911); cf. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, the district court concluded that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a maximum vertical price maintenance scheme is not per se illegal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hills Club Apartments, 68 So.3d 954, 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Paddock v. Chacko, 522 So.2d 410, 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). One can “assume” such a duty by takin lity alone. Aguila, 878 So.2d at 396. A duty requires one to be in a position to “control the risk.” Id, Thus, in cases of psychiatric facilities, they are liable for a patient’s self-harm because they are “in a position to exercise measures to prevent the suicidal patients from inflicting injuries on themselves.” See Paddock, 522 So.2d at 416. But where a patient commits suicide outside of a facility’s “range of observation and control,” a duty is not present. See Tuten, 84 So.3d at 1068. See also Peklun v. Tierra Del Mar Condo. Ass’n, 25 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 226, 119 F.Supp.3d 1361, 2015 WL 4638602 (g.D.Fla. Aug. 4, 2015) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, Regions did not assume a

    ### Response:
    holding a condominium association had no duty to a woman who had committed suicide after the association removed the womans dog because while the association knew the dog was essential to the womans will to live the association had no authority to prevent the womans suicide
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the original district court’s findings were corroborated by an abundance of trial testimony indicating that Wyche separated drugs and counted money for the conspiracy, collected money from individuals selling drugs, distributed cocaine for sale and supervised drug sales. Given Wyche’s extensive involvement, the 31 kilograms of cocaine base were reasonably foreseeable to him and thus he may be held responsible for that quantity. See United States v. Duncan, 639 F.3d 764, 767-69 (7th Cir.2011) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he did not foresee the conspiracy handling over 4.5 kilograms of cocaine base as “[imjplausible” and “baseless” where conspiracy sold “staggering amount of crack” and defendant had access to “stash-locations” and “high-level meetings”); Thomas, 114 F.3d at 256-57 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the 2012 district court did not

    ### Response:
    holding defendant responsible for conspiracys entire drug quantity where defendant played managerial role in the conspiracy coordinated drug distribution and shared in conspiracys profits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing labeling and advertising regulations.” Id. Congress sought to protect “commerce and the national economy” specifically from the effect of “diverse, nonuniform and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising” rules, id., not from more stringent regulation generally. See Altria Grp., 555 U.S. at 78-79, 129 S.Ct. 538 (explaining that the “Act’s pre-emption provisions promote its second purpose” by preventing States from “enforcing rules that are based on an assumption that the federal warnings are inadequate”); Reilly, 533 U.S. at 542-43, 121 S.Ct. 2404 (paraphrasing the second purpose as “to protect the national economy from interference due to diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and a F.3d 594, 600 (8th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>); Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that the labeling act did not preempt design defect claim against cigarette manufacturer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id., § 164, at 579. This parallel between the Privacy Act and the common-law torts of libel per quod and slander suggests the possibility that Congress intended the term “actual damages” in the Act to mean special damages. The basic idea is that Privacy Act victims, like victims of libel per quod or slander, are barred from any recovery unless they can first show actual— that is, pecuniary or material — harm. Upon showing some pecuniary harm, no matter how slight, they can recover the statutory minimum of $1,000, presumably for any unproven harm. That Congress would choose to use the term “actual damages” instead of “special damages” was not without precedent. The terms had occasionally been used interchangeably. See, e. g., Wetzel v. Gulf Oil Corp., 455 P. 2d 857, 862 (CA9 1972) (<HOLDING>); Electric Furnace Corp. v. Deering Milliken

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff could not establish libel per quod because he did not introduce any valid and sufficient evidence of actual damage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1418. In order to satisfy Rule 9(b) in connection with a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must plead with particularity (1) a specific misrepresentation of material fact, (2) the knowledge by defendants of its falsity, (3) the ignorance by the plaintiff of its falsity, (4) the intention of defendants that it should be acted upon and (5) that plaintiff acted upon it to his or her detriment. In re Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 710. Consequently, Rule 9(b) demands increased specificity in the pleadings to establish violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Pursuant to Rule 9(b), allegations concerning misrepresentations of material fact must be pleaded in greater detail. Stevelman v. Alias Research Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.1999); see e.g. In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1417-18 (<HOLDING>); Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272,

    ### Response:
    holding that pursuant to rule 9b where plaintiffs allege that defendants distorted certain data disclosed to the public by using unreasonable accounting practices  plaintiffs must state what the unreasonable practices were and how they distorted the disclosed data
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    expenses that were incurred by the child from fall 2006 through the child’s 2009 fall semester of college. Specifically, the father argues that the mother’s evidence of the child’s previously incurred educational expenses was hearsay, and that he should not be required to pay those expenses because he had been paying child support at the same time that those expenses were incurred. However, we will not consider these arguments presented by the father because the father has not complied with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P., by failing to include “citations to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts of the record relied on.” Rule 28(a)(10). See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Motley, 909 So.2d 806, 822 (Ala.2005) (quoting Ex parte Showers, 812 So.2d 277, 281 (Ala.2001)) (<HOLDING>). The father also argues that the mother failed

    ### Response:
    holding that a failure to comply with rule 28a10 provides an appellate court a basis for disregarding the appellants arguments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    marks and citation omitted); State v. Telles, 1999-NMCA-013, ¶ 12, 126 N.M. 593, 973 P.2d 845. Although Defendants contend that evidence of Victim’s .245 percent BAC would have tended to show that Defendants were reasonable in their apprehension and that Victim was the first aggressor, Defendants have not supplied authority to support this proposition. There undoubtedly is in many instances a correlation between alcohol and violence. However, as the district court observed, although it is clear that BAC may demonstrate impaired ability to drive a motor vehicle, a correlation between BAC and aggressiveness seems speculative unless tied more specifically to an individual’s history. As such, the probative value of the BAC evidence in this case is questionable at best. Cf. id. ¶ 14 (<HOLDING>). Even if some relevance had been found, the

    ### Response:
    holding bac of 05 percent not relevant in vehicular homicide case to show that the victim somehow contributed to the accident
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the easement. An express easement properly encompasses technological developments that “further the particular purpose for which the easement is granted.” Id. (citing Restatement (Third) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) §§ 1.2 Cmt. d, cmt. a, 4.10 & cmt. a). Citing the Restatement, Marcus Cable expressly recognized, as an example of appropriate application of the doctrine of technological advancement or development, that a holder of an easement granted in 1940 for the purpose of telephone transmission could properly attach transmitters to its poles for cellular telephone transmissions unless that use would interfere unreasonably with the ser-vient estate. See id., 90 S.W.3d at 702 (citing Restatement (Third) of PROPERTY (Servitudes) § 4.10 illus. 13); see also Cor-ley, 246 F.Supp.2d at 578-79 (<HOLDING>). We hold that the express terms of the

    ### Response:
    holding that easements using terms telephone telegraph and communications could properly be utilized for both internal communications and for thirdparty voice and data communications
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sex with and propositioning her. His expression, taken as a whole, lends itself to three possible interpretations: Rogers intended (1) to illicit a sexual response from Emily; (2) to communicate his sexual attraction to her; and/or (3) to compel Emily to view a picture of him masturbating. On any of these interpretations, a jury could reasonably find prurient his sexual interest in and pursuit of a child. The jury could also find shameful his desire to expose Emily to such graphic and sexual-ized content. The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence emphasizes a distinction between parties who consent to privately receive and possess obscene materials and those who endure unwilling exposure. Compare Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. American Library Ass’n

    ### Response:
    holding that the first and fourteenth amendment forbid criminalizing the private possession of obscenity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the scenes look at all the cool kids, EXPN-style.” Most importantly, however, we observe that the page features slang phrases such as “[d]udes rollin’ deep” and “[kickin' it with much flavor,” neither of which is susceptible to a literal interpretation, and neither of which one would expect to hear uttered by anyone but a teenager or young adult. A reasonable viewer exposed to the main page would expect to find precisely that type of youthful, non-literal language on the rest of the site. Next, we examine the “specific context and content of the statements, analyzing the extent of figurative or hyperbolic language used and the reasonable expectations of the audience in that particular situation.” Underwager, 69 F.3d at 366. Again, the al.App.3d 543, 216 Cal.Rptr. 252, 257 (1985) (<HOLDING>). The “Green Carpet Gallery” pokes fun at many

    ### Response:
    holding that an obvious joke told during an obvious comedy performance was not defamatory as a matter of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In that case, the Court noted the plaintiff had a “legally binding promise” from the Government when it was awarded the contract. Id. at 578. However, when the Government decided to terminate that contract, the Court reasoned that the plaintiff was left with only the possibility that it would be awarded the contract again. Id. The Court concluded that “[i]n such a situation, it would be to create a legal fiction to find a contract existing....” Id. Accordingly, the Court found jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Id. In more recent eases, this Court and the Federal Circuit have ruled that jurisdiction exists to review an agency’s corrective action decision. See, e.g., Centech Group, Inc., 78 Fed.Cl. at 506; Chapman Law Firm v. United States, 490 F.3d 934, 938 (Fed.Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>); Man-Tech Telecomm. & Info. Sys. Corp. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the courts inquiry into the reasonableness of the governments proposed corrective action was proper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gillis contends A&P’s manner of curing was unreasonably protracted, he failed to respond to David’s letters that spelled out exactly how A&P planned to cure. As a result, this Court is not left with a definite or firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Consequently, the district court did not err. Because this Court finds neither clear error in the district court’s findings of fact nor abuse of discretion in the its exercise of jurisdiction, this Court affirms the district court’s judgment. AFFIRMED. 2 . The Travelers standard is intended for pure declaratory judgment cases and therefore may not have been appropriate in the instant case, which included a counterclaim for monetary damages. See Diamond Offshore Co. v. A & B Builders, Inc., 302 F.3d 531, 539 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Yet even if the Travelers standard was

    ### Response:
    holding that inclusion of timely and nonfrivolous monetary damages removed a suit from the realm of a declaratory judgment action for purposes of determining exercise of jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a further purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new expression, meaning or message.” Id. “[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.” Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164). See also, Pac. & S. Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir.1984)(noting that the distinction between creative and non-creative uses can be helpful in calibrating the balance in the fair use analysis). In some cases, the transformative nature of a work overshadows and outweighs its commercial purpose. This is particularly true in the realm of parody, as “a parody’s aim is, by nature, to transform an earlier work.” Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269. (<HOLDING>). See also, Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114

    ### Response:
    holding that the transformative nature of the wind done gone a parody of gone with the wind outweighed its commercial purpose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    directly against a third-party tortfeasor. The trial court granted Appellees’ preliminary objections. Based on the Superior Court’s decision in Reliance Insurance Company v. Richmond Machine Company, 309 Pa.Super. 430, 455 A.2d 686 (1983), the trial court explained that only the injured employee has the right of action against a third-party tortfeasor and not the employer/insurer. Emphasizing that the cause of action against the third-party tortfeasor exists for one indivisible wrong, the trial court held that the employer’s/insurer’s right of subrogation under Section 319 of the WCA must be achieved through an action brought in the name of or joined by the injured employee. Trial Court Opinion at 2 (citing Moltz v. Sherwood Bros., Inc., et al, 116 Pa.Super. 231, 176 A. 842, 843 (1935) (<HOLDING>)); Scalise v. F.M. Venzie & Co., et al., 301

    ### Response:
    holding that the right of the employerinsurer to subrogation against a tortfeasor must be achieved through a single action brought in the name of the injured employee either by joining the employer or insurance carrier as a party plaintiff or as a use plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are based on different relation back doctrines and wrongful death statutes. However, multiple states, as well as cases based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which have similar “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” language in their relation back doctrines, have supported wrongful death claims relating back to the filing of the original complaint. See Lewin v. Am. Export Lines, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 389, 398 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“Here, Plaintiffs seek to add a new claim, i.e. wrongful death, arising from the asbestos exposure asserted in the original Complaints. Based on the standard set forth in Rule 15(c)(2) and Sixth Circuit case law, this claim should ‘relate back’ to the original pleadings.”); Sompolski v. Miller, 239 Ill.App.3d 1087, 180 Ill.Dec. 932, 608 N.E.2d 54, 57-58 (1992) (<HOLDING>); In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 612

    ### Response:
    holding that a wrongful death claim related back to a personal injury claim in an automobile accident case where the wrongful death claim  arose from the same transaction or occurrence as the original complaint and the defendant was advised of the essential facts necessary to prepare his defense even with the added claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). In particular, prison officials violate inmates’ rights under the Eighth Amendment when they subject them to the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 319,106 S.Ct. 1078. “[T]he core judicial inquiry” when a prison official is “accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the” Eighth Amendment is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7-8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). As a result, Coon cannot satisfy the first

    ### Response:
    holding that arrestee whowas detained by a law enforcement officer for approximately 6 to 45 minutes outside in zero degree weather with a significant windchill was not subjected to excessive force
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are accessible only to the seller and could not be discovered by the buyer. In Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal.Rptr. 201 (Cal.Ct.App. 1963), the rule was stated as follows when dealing with an “as is” sale: [W]here the seller knows of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property which are known or accessible only to [the seller] and also knows that such facts are not known to, or within the reach of the diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer. Id. at 204. Other courts have followed this rule and recognized that an “as is” provision in a contract for the sale of realty does not preclude an action by the buyer for nondisclosure. See, e.g., Rayner v. Wise Realty Co., 504 So.2d 1361 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1987) (<HOLDING>); Silva v. Stevens, 589 A.2d 852 (Vt. 1991)

    ### Response:
    holding as is clause does not bar a claim for nondisclosure against real estate agency that failed to inform buyer of damage to home from prior termite infestation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    persons. Fla. Stat. § 768.74(5). Taking each factor in turn, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in upholding the jury’s award of compensatory damages. The first factor asks whether the award evinces passion or prejudice. The district court cited Goldsmith v. Bagby, 513 F.3d 1261, 1275 (11th Cir.2008), to show the validity of an emotional damages award equal to a claimant’s salary. See Myers v. Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc., No. 6:04-cv-1542-Orl-28DAB, 2008 WL 4710898, at *15 n. 13 (M.D.Fla. Oct. 23, 2008). But the validity of the compensatory award was not at issue in Goldsmith, see 513 F.3d at 1267-68, 1276-77, and, as the defendants argue, its relevance to our inquiry is therefore limited. Cf. Bravo v. United States, 532 F.3d 1154, 1166-67 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, 583 F.3d 1297 (2009).

    ### Response:
    holding that damages are to be compared only against awards tested for size in reported appellate decisions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    — a reference that is in tension with Olson. Compare Crider, 885 F.2d at 296 with Olson, 546 U.S. at 46, 126 S.Ct. 510 (""the [FTCA] requires a court to look to the state-law liability of private entities, not to that of public entities.”). However, we then held, consistent with Olson, that we ""must disregard state rales of sovereign or official immunity in analyzing the scope of FTCA liability, because these conflict with Congress’s analogy to 'private person’ liability ...."" Crider, 885 F.2d at 296. Based on this holding, we determined that because neither a state law enforcement officer nor a private person would have had a duty to the plaintiff to detain a drunk driver, the park rangers also had no such duty, and thus the Government was not liable under the 007 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Here, the record shows that Villafranca was

    ### Response:
    holding that detaining club patrons in handcuffs for three hours after subjecting them to strip searches and warrant checks was unlawful
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc., 124, F.2d 1224 (6th Cir.1984), the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction was never addressed. Accordingly, Triax has no precedential effect. Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 312, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 171 L.Ed.2d 424 (2008). In the case at bar, the district court was not given sufficient opportunity to address the motion to intervene prior to the filing of the notice of appeal. Once such notice was filed, the district court was without jurisdiction to address the motion. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Lobasso’s motion to intervene. VII. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing Taylor’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In addition, we affirm the denial of Lobasso’s 54 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Taylor contends that there is a

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff lacked article iii standing when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty if anything increased his retirement distributions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no reasonable reader would interpret the photograph of the Knievels as a serious allegation of criminal wrongdoing. We acknowledge, like the district court did, that taken in isolation and given a literal interpretation, ESPN’s suggestion that Evel is a pimp is “sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false.” See Underwager, 69 F.3d at 366. But we assess the meaning of the word in the context in which it was used. Because the caption cannot reasonably be interpreted literally in this context, the fact that its literal interpretation could be proven true or false is immaterial. The Knievels correctly point out that the fact that a statement is an attempt at humor does not immunize the speaker against liability for defamation. See Polygram, 216 Cal.Rptr. at 260 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Arno v. Stewart, 245 Cal.App.2d 955,

    ### Response:
    holding that the jocular intent of the publisher will not relieve him from liability if it is reasonable to not understand the utterance as a joke
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “had been intellectually ‘slow’ all his life,” had difficulty understanding complex matters, and was on the “low range of the intelligent quotient scale,” as well as psychiatric testimony that he was competent to stand trial. This court determined that the waiver was valid. Id. at 177-78. We said: Merely because an accused exhibits equivocal signs of borderline mental deficiency, or may even be suffering from a mental illness at the precise time of the waiver, those facts alone may not automatically mandate a finding of incompetence to waive. Id at 178. Under Wold therefore, evidence of Camacho’s borderline mental deficiency alone does not automatically mandate a finding of incompetence to waive. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The Iowa Supreme Court has held that mental

    ### Response:
    holding that mental condition by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion should not dispose of inquiring into constitutional voluntariness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    read a copy of the court’s January 21, 1997, order setting the default judgment damage hearing. Leigh contacted its current counsel which entered an appearance the next day, January 29,1997. Only at this point did Leigh begin to pursue the defense of this matter in a vigorous manner. While miscommunication due to poor internal communication systems is understandable, it is not excusable. Air Canada, 810 F.2d at 1537. It is not enough to argue that a mail clerk misplaced the complaint, Id., or to contend that the Postal Service lost the complaint, Baez, 518 F.2d at 350. Instead, organizations must have systems for “checking up on process to see that it has in fact reached its destination and that action is being taken.” Air Canada, 810 F.2d at 1537; see also Baez, 518 F.2d at 350 (<HOLDING>). Throughout this action Leigh lacked a system

    ### Response:
    holding that internal procedural safeguards could and should have been established to prevent the loss of a complaint by the postal service and the consequent entry of default judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issue on the merits. 3 . In her Respondent’s brief, Quick relies on this court’s opinion in Kolb v. Cook, 284 S.C. 598, 602, 327 S.E.2d 379, 382 (Ct.App.1985), in which we held a tort claimant seeking to recover damages from sources other than the distributable or distributed assets of the probate estate does not need to file a verified claim or account with the personal representative of the deceased tortfeasor. Quick asserts the funds from the UGMA account were not a distributable asset of the probate estate because she has a vested title in the proceeds from account and she is entitled to a constructive trust. While we find this argument intriguing, we decline to consider it on appeal. See I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 420 n. 9, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 n. 9 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 4 . In light of our disposition herein, we

    ### Response:
    holding when reversing a lower courts decision it is within an appellate courts discretion as to whether to address any additional sustaining grounds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the parties, as well as the court, repeatedly refer to the case as a wrongful death suit. On the other hand, the types of damages sought by Phillips suggest she might have meant to bring both wrongful death and survival actions. Importantly, however, Phillips never refers to herself or any of the plaintiffs as personal representatives of the Decedent’s estate, nor does she clearly assert that she is in fact the Decedent’s executor or administrator. Under Mississippi's general survivorship statute, only executors, administrators, and temporary administrators may bring a survival action. Miss Code Ann. § 91-7-233 (1994). Thus, without alleging the appropriate legal status, Phillips could not have brought a survival action. See Berryhill v. Nichols, 171 Miss. 769, 158 So. 470, 471 (1935) (<HOLDING>). Because Phillips could only have brought this

    ### Response:
    holding that recovery for pain and suffering of deceased allegedly caused by the negligence of doctor can only be had in suit by personal representative and not by next of kin or heirs at law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Gaming Center because Williams was being ejected. This time, the police officers who responded called Mayor Jackson, reported that Williams was creating a disturbance, and asked for guidance. Jackson responded by directing the officers to bring Williams to his office for questioning. The police handcuffed Williams, placed him in a police car, and brought him to the mayor’s office for interrogation. Williams seeks to hold the town liable based on Jackson’s action. There is no question that probable cause was required to detain Williams in this manner. As a Fourth Amendment matter, placing a suspect in handcuffs and transporting him to a government office for interrogation must be supported by probable cause. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630, 123 S.Ct. 1843, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285, 1288

    ### Response:
    holding that involuntary transport to a police station for questioning is sufficiently like arrest to invoke the traditional rule that arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause internal quotation marks and brackets omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    instead suggest that the debtor faces the high stakes of litigation and therefore should cooperate. Accordingly, after reconsideration, this Court affirms its prior Ruling granting summary judgment for Plaintiff on his claim under § 1692e(5). B. The Remaining FDCPA Claims Under §§ 1692e(2)(A) and (10) Having affirmed its prior Ruling on Plaintiffs § 1692e(5) claim, this Court also affirms its prior Ruling granting summary judgment for Plaintiff on his claims arising under §§ 1692e(2)(A) and (10). Courts have long held that after finding a valid claim under a more specific subsection of § 1692e, such as § 1692e(5), further analysis under § 1692e(10) is “somewhat dupli-cative.” Kapeluschnik, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22883, at *26; see Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1321; Pipiles, 886 F.2d at 25-26 (<HOLDING>). See generally Gaetano v. Payco of Wis., Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that the the vagueness of the language in a notice suggested defendant would take actions it did not intend to take and therefore violated both  1692e5 and 10
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    than he who do not hold a license. Furthermore, Krishner only articulated Vernon’s job deficiencies for the first time during Meyers’s investigation. This additional evidence suggests that Port Authority’s reasons could have been a pretext for retaliation. Because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Port Authority’s reasons are pre-textual or not, the Court denies defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs Title VII and ADEA retaliation claims in regards to the failure to promote. IV. Punitive Damages Vernon is seeking punitive damages against Port Authority for its willful, F.2d 807 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 943, 112 S.Ct. 2281, 119 L.Ed.2d 206 (1992) (same); Recreation World, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 1998 WL 107362, *12 (S.D.NY.1998) (<HOLDING>); Shifa Serv. Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. &

    ### Response:
    holding that port authority is immune from punitive damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the intimidation of witnesses in an effort to suppress their testimony. Further, the conclusion of the District of Columbia Circuit, in Moóre, that the collection of information for use in a prosecution is necessarily investigative rather than advocatory conduct demonstrates a much narrower conception of the advocatory role than is justified by Imbler, in which the Court explicitly recognized that ""[pjreparation, both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a trial, may require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33, 96 S.Ct. 984 (emphasis added). 7 .Rowell’s trial testimony included an in-chambers conference that involved the state court, counsel for the parties, and Rowell. The conference appeared to relate 1 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654,

    ### Response:
    holding fabrication not protected because no probable cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    private party. The court considered whether that new requirement applied only to the named plaintiff or also to all absent class members. Id., 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 559, 207 P.3d at 25. The court concluded, based on the language of the initiative, that only the named plaintiff needed to show such an injury in fact. Id. Individuals could remain part of the class even if they had suffered no injury in fact. Id., 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 559, 207 P.3d at 35. That case, however, was in state court and did not address federal courts’ standing requirements. Before the enactment of Proposition 64, uninjured plaintiffs could bring UCL claims in state court, but not federal court. See, e.g., Seibels Bruce Group, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. C-99-0593 MHP, 1999 WL 760527 at *6 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 21, 1999) (<HOLDING>); Boyle v. MTV Networks, Inc., 766 F.Supp. 809,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff did not have standing to assert ucl claim in federal court because it did not establish a distinct and palpable injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    7 (1999) (“a breach of the duty to assist ... cannot form the basis of a CUE claim”); Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 377, 383-84 (1994); see also Hayre, 188 F.3d at 1330-32 (ratifying Cajfrey, supra). Second, the Court’s authority to consider claims of CUE in Board decisions is premised upon, inter alia, 38 U.S.C. § 7111, which took effect on November 21, 1997. See Pub.L. No. 105-111, 111 Stat. 2271 (1997) (the provisions of Pub.L. 105-111 “apply to any determination made before, on, or after the date of the enactment.”). Section 7111 requires that such arguments must be raised to the Board in the first instance and decided by the Board on the merits; they may not be raised in the first instance on appeal to the Court. See 38 U.S.C. § 7111(e); Ledford v. West, 136 F.3d 776 (Fed.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The record shows that the appellant made no

    ### Response:
    holding that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear a cue claim raised for the first time on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). And under the Board’s practice, “any issues that may be presented during the representation proceeding must be offered there.” Pace Univ. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C.Cir.2008). Thus, the Board claims, UC Health’s objection to the Regional Director’s authority comes too late. We have consistently held, however, that challenges to the composition of an agency can be raised on review even when they are not raised before the agency. See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 497 (D.C.Cir.2013), aff'd on other grounds, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 189 L.Ed.2d 538 (2014); Mitchell v. Christopher, 996 F.2d 375, 378-79 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Since this challenge directly involves the

    ### Response:
    recognizing an exception allowing parties to raise for the first time on review  challenges that concern the very composition or constitution of an agency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the court erred because Wal-Mart retained control over his work and is therefore directly liable for his injuries. A. Premises Liability (Vicarious) under Restatement § 422(a) ¶ 12 Arizona courts have consistently recognized that a landowner is not liable for the negligent conduct of an independent contractor unless the landowner has been independently negligent. See Welker v. Kennecott, 1 Ariz.App. 395, 401-04, 403 P.2d 330, 336-39 (1965) (citing Restatement (First) of Torts § 409 (1934) (“Except as stated in §§ 410 to 429, the employer of an independent contractor is not subject to liability for bodily harm caused to another by a tortious act or omission of the contractor or his servants.”)); see also E.L. Jones Constr. Co. v. Noland, 105 Ariz. 446, 454, 466 P.2d 740, 748 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Restatement § 409 cmt. b (explaining that the

    ### Response:
    recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    incorrectly because Act 21 violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. However, we must follow the decisional law established by our own Court. Blumenstock v. Gibson, 811 A.2d 1029, 1039 (Pa.Super.2002). Moreover, we observe that following our decision in In re S.A, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied a subsequently filed petition for allowance of appeal. In re S.A., 597 Pa. 733, 952 A.2d 678 (2008). Therefore, unless or until In re S.A. and In re A.C. are overturned by an en banc panel of this Court, or by a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, they continue to be viable precedent for this Court and for the courts of common pleas. Id. See also, Sorber v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 451 Pa.Super. 507, 680 A.2d 881, 882 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Hence, we cannot afford Appellant the relief

    ### Response:
    holding that even though petition for allowance of appeal was pending before the pennsylvania supreme court decision remained binding precedent as long as the decision had not been overturned by our supreme court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unreasonable task in proving the point of initial injury.” Ibid. In Joe Harden Builders, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 326 S.C. 231, 486 S.E.2d 89 (S.C.1997), the South Carolina Supreme Court replied to a federal district court’s certified question regarding the appropriate trigger of coverage when defective construction results in progressive and continuous property damage. The plaintiff contractor sought payment under a subcontractor’s insurance policy. The court held that “coverage is triggered at the time of an injury-in-fact and continuously thereafter to allow coverage under all policies in effect from the time of injury-in-fact during the progressive damage.” Id. at 91. See also Lincoln Electric Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d 672, 690 (6th Cir.2000)(<HOLDING>); Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd. v. First Ins. Co. of

    ### Response:
    holding in dispute over coverage for personal injury claims relating to welding fumes and asbestos exposure that exposure would presumably trigger defendant insurers policy but remanding case to allow defendant to rebut this presumption with evidence of injuryinfact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Coffees’ contention that the Government’s moving of the documents from their home in Ohio to Philadelphia should not permit the Government to bootstrap its desire for venue here. This factor is thus neutral. Disruption of the Defendant’s Business Thomas Coffee argues that he is currently employed as a “remodeler/handy-man” in Ohio under the company name “Coffee Enterprises, Inc.”. He argues that he will have to stop working during the trial if it is held in Philadelphia, whereas in Ohio he will be able to work after court or during breaks. Thus, Coffee pére argues that this reality favors transfer. Thomas Coffee also notes that the “marginal” nature of his business should not make this factor stand any less in his favor, see United States v. Haley, 504 F.Supp. 1124, 1128 (E.D.Pa.1981) (<HOLDING>). At today’s hearing, defense counsel

    ### Response:
    holding that this factor favored transfer when one of the defendants was merely planning to pump gas at night during trial on the basis that defending criminal charges should not include the penalty of financial ruin where the trial might be conducted properly and legally in a forum near defendants homes and businesses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the actual damages and the punitive damages is the same. The jury in the state case found that Scarborough willfully and maliciously injured Fischer by instigating the criminal charges and the petition for a protective order. Scarborough’s willful and malicious conduct resulted in the actual damages and, with the jury’s finding of outrageousness, supported the punitive damages. Because the holding in In re Ratcliff, 199 B.R. 185 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1996), the decision relied on by the bankruptcy court in this case, differs from our opinion, we decline to follow it. Finally, we note that our holding today regarding the dischargeability of punitive damages is consistent with our sister Circuits. See Abbo v. Rossi, McCreery & Assocs., Inc. (In re Abbo), 168 F.3d 930, 931-32 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Hagan v. McNallen (In re McNallen), 62 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding punitive damages nondischargeable under  523a6 when such damages are based on the same conduct as the underlying nondischargeable judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    teacher, only four months after plaintiff was terminated. See Paquin, 119 F.3d at 31 (“hir ing a less qualified person can support an inference of discriminatory motive (citing Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153-54 (D.C.Cir.1993)). If it is true that the Business and Finance Academy had to reduce the number of social studies teachers to one, it is questionable how only four months later it was able to accommodate a second social studies teacher, who happened to be younger than the plaintiff. See, e.g., Aka, 156 F.3d at 1293 (“If the jury can infer that the employer’s explanation is not only a mistaken one in terms of the facts, but a lie, that should provide even stronger evidence of discrimination.”); but see Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937, 941 & n. 4 (6th Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). However, in light of the other facts

    ### Response:
    holding that where adea plaintiff was not replaced until three months after his discharge and the discharge occurred in the context of a reduction in force due to economic necessity  substantially weakenedhis  claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on appeal as to the correctness of that basis for the judgment of the trial court. “ ‘An argument not made on appeal is abandoned or waived.’ ” Muhammad v. Ford, 986 So.2d 1158, 1165 (Ala.2007) (quoting Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Heilman, 876 So.2d 1111, 1124 n. 8 (Ala.2003)). Moreover, it is well settled that, in order to secure a reversal, “the appellant has an affirmative duty of showing error upon the record,” Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.1983), and that “ ‘[i]t is not the function of this court to search a record on appeal to find evidence to support a party’s argument.’ ” Ellison v. Green, 775 So.2d 831, 833 (Ala.Civ.App.2000)(quoting Brown v. Brown, 719 So.2d 228, 230 (Ala.Civ.App.1998)). See also Soutullo v. Mobile County, 58 So.3d 733, 739 (Ala.2010) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, even if we agreed with ALDOT that

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure of the appellant to discuss in the opening brief an issue on which the trial court might have relied as a basis for its judgment  results in an affirmance of that judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    district court proceedings. See Boushel, 985 F.2d at 409; see also Kozeny, 236 F.3d at 619 (concluding a stay was not a final appealable order because a judgment in the foreign litigation would “not necessarily end the litigation in [the United States]”). Even if the district court gives the Austrian courts’ damages award res judicata effect, the effect is not of sufficient magnitude to render the stay immediately appealable because the damages issue is more than offset by issues relating to the constructive trust, the recognition of the assignment, and the recognition of the Austrian judgments. Michelson, 138 F.3d at 514 (requiring the stay to give res judi-cata effect “on all or an important part of the subsequent federal case” to be immediately appealable); Boushel, 985 F.2d at 409 (<HOLDING>). The district court’s stay order is not

    ### Response:
    holding some res judicata effect from a foreign judgment was insufficient to make a stay immediately appealable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    two months earlier. Defense counsel’s failure to present evidence from the previous trial is much more likely to affect the outcome of the sentencing phase. Because so much time passed between the conviction and the sentencing, and this evidence was substantial enough that it reasonably could have altered the balance between the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, there does seem to be a reasonable probability that, but for defense counsel’s failure to reargue the favorable evidence from trial, the judge would have sentenced Pizzuto to life rather than death. Also, considered cumulatively with counsel’s other deficiencies discussed below, defense counsel’s failure to contest the State’s case in aggravation was prejudicial. See Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438-39 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Taking into account the deficiencies in the

    ### Response:
    holding that the cumulative impact of multiple deficiencies in defense counsels performance prejudiced the defendant in a capital trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to meet these requirements. First, simply by virtue of the fact that Dr. Hyde is going to be giving opinion testimony at trial, they are entitled to all of the opinions contained in his report. Pursuant to rule 1.280, to be discoverable, the requested matter must not be privileged and must be relevant. Here, for the reasons discussed above, Dr. Hyde’s standard of care opinion is privileged and is not relevant. Second, Respondents argue that they need these opinions because they are entitled to explore Dr. Hyde’s “motive” and “bias.” In addition to failing to explain this theory, Respondents also overlook that offering an expert’s unpresented opinions simply to attack the expert’s credibility is improper. See Jordan ex rel. Shealey v. Masters, 821 So.2d 342, 348-49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, although Dr. Hyde’s opinion related

    ### Response:
    holding that using the opinions of an expert that were not testified to during trial which were irrelevant and solely used to destroy the credibility of the expert was not admissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in which he has a legal right to engage, by means of instilling in him a fear” of certain specified harms ""if the demand is not complied with”). 278 , See State v. Pauling, 149 Wash.2d 381, 69 P.3d 331, 336 (2003) (construing state extortion statute to incorporate a “wrongfulness” element, borrowed from federal law, limiting its reach to threats aimed at obtaining property that lack any nexus to a claim of right (citing Jackson, 180 F.3d at 70-71)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 986, 124 S.Ct. 470, 157 L.Ed.2d 379 (2003); State v. Hynes, 159 N.H. 187, 978 A.2d 264, 278-79 (2009) (following Pauling in implying element of ""wrongful” acquisition of property into extortion statute so as to exclude ""legitimate claims to property through threats”); People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 628, 636-37 (1999). (<HOLDING>). 279 .See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. —,

    ### Response:
    holding that criminal threat prohibition was impliedly limited to threats of illegal or unlawful acts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm. 1. The district court did not err in dismissing Smillie’s third amended complaint, replacing John Does with named individual Defendants, as barred by the statute of limitations. There is no evidence in the record satisfying the requirements of relation back. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir.2002) (as amended). Smillie did not advance any relation back argument before the district court, and conceded as much at oral argument. By assuming relation back was automatic, Smillie offered no proof to trigger the provision and failed to show that Defendants were provided notice of the complaint and were not prejudiced by the amendment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C); Miguel, 309 F.3d at 1165 (<HOLDING>). The district court, therefore, did not err in

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs amended complaint could not relate back because there was no evidence in the record that the defendant had notice of the suit within the 120 day period required by rule 4m
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an additional continuance nine days before trial; and the Court had already continued resolution of this case eight times (docs.# 32, # 52, # 66, # 79, # 93, # 94, # 96, # 97). Moreover, the government indicated that the additional discovery material consisted mostly of summaries of earlier disclosed evidence. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that it was entirely proper to require that the trial proceed as scheduled. Cf. United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 904 (10th Cir.1999) (affirming denial of motion to continue trial more than a half day where the defendant had just received additional discovery material, but continuance motion was made the day of trial and three prior continuances had been granted); United States v. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d 608, 620 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). B. Denial of Motion to Suppress Huber also

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to continue trial three months where although trial was complex and records were voluminous court had already granted two prior continuances and continuance of three weeks was sufficient to prepare for trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to media coverage, none indicated that their exposure had caused them to form fixed, unchanging opinions of the defendant’s guilt. None indicated that their exposure would interfere in any way with their ability to render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court. Based on such a record, together with the fact that a significant number of potential jurors had not formed a fixed bias against the appellant due to news reports or other information, and the fact that a one year and nine-month span between the murder and trial had lessened the publicity and its impact, we held that the trial court had not abused its discretion by denying the appellant his request for a change of venue. Id. at 316-18; see also Commonwealth v. Crews, 536 Pa. 508, 640 A.2d 395, 398-99 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Here, nineteen years after the murders,

    ### Response:
    holding that even where there is inflammatory pretrial publicity an adequate coolingoff period between the publication of such material and the trial which in crews was six to eight months together with the trial courts exercise of its discretion to evaluate bias and impartiality during voir dire sufficiently supported the trial courts conclusion that pretrial publicity did not prevent the capital defendant from receiving a fair trial by an impartial jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recast their simple breach of contract claim into a tort claim to avoid the reality that the statute of limitations has run on their contract claim. But the allegations are for a simple breach of an oral contract — Figaro-la borrowed $25,000 from the Walkers which he promised to repay within three weeks, and the loan remains unpaid. The complaint thus alleges a failure to comply with the terms of the contract. The Walkers had four years to bring a breach of contract action against Figarola, but they failed to do so. They cannot now seek a remedy in tort for a debt which could have been discharged by the payment of money by simply alleging that Figarola never intended to keep his promise to repay the debt. See Hotels of Key Largo v. RHI Hotels, Inc., 694 So.2d 74, 78 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>).

    ### Response:
    holding that misrepresentations relating to the breaching partys performance of a contract do not give rise to an independent cause of action in tort
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nce for West Virginia Lawyers, vol. 1, § 5-2(c) at 479 (1994)). Suggesting that Ms. Day might have changed her mind if called to the stand and instructed that she did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege to invoke, Appellant maintains that it was precipitous on the trial court’s part to assume that she would refuse to testify in open court. We agree. As the trial court correctly recognized during the in camera hearing, the Fifth Amendment privilege that Ms. Day was citing as a basis for not taking the witness stand was not available to her given both her acquittal and the grant of immunity extended to her. Following her acquittal, any lingering concerns that Ms. Day may have had with regard to self-incrimination were entirely extinguished by the grant of immunity. Because .2000) (<HOLDING>). Those courts that require the assertion of

    ### Response:
    recognizing that policy reasons undergirding assertion of fifth amendment privilege outside jurys presence apply even if privilege is invalid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at that end of town. The call was for a suspicious person being a Hispanic male. The officer went specifically to that location and the juvenile matches the description of being a Hispanic male[,] and[,] according to the officer’s testimony, he. was wearing gang attire, large baggy clothes. We uphold the trial court’s findings, with the exception of the finding that the dispatch call was about “suspicious activity,” because Officer Henderson testified that the dispatch was about a “suspicious person” at the Exxon gas station. Officer Henderson testified as follows: A [T]he [dispatch] call was a suspicious person at the [Exxon] station at the corne tely 6:00 p.m. on a summer evening in front of an open business. Cf. State v. Rinck, 303 N.C. 551, 555-60, 280 S.E.2d 912, 916-20 (1981) (<HOLDING>); State v. Blackstock, 165 N.C. App. 50, 59,

    ### Response:
    holding circumstances supporting a reasonable basis for a stop included that the defendants were walking along a road at an unusual hour of approximately 135 am
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in that provision. I, however, focus on the phrase “upon consideration of,” which I believe has the same meaning and effect as “consider.” We have recognized that a statute requiring a government official to “consider” certain factors “implfies] wide areas of judgment and therefore of discretion.” Carolina Tobacco Co. v. Bureau of Customs and Border Prot., 402 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing Sec’y of Agric. v. Cent. Roig Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 611-14, 70 S.Ct. 403, 94 L.Ed. 381 (1950)). In Carolina Tobacco, we added that “[i]n considering the factors, the port director may give them whatever weight he deems appropriate; he may conclude that particular factors should be given no weight whatsoever.” Id.; cf. Brehmer v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 294 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, in Central Roig the Supreme Court

    ### Response:
    holding that the administration complied with a provision of the collective bargaining agreement requiring it to give consideration to nondisciplinary measures in certain circumstances when it considered the possibility of additional training but concluded that in light of the failure of the prior retraining to improve brehmers performance additional retraining would be ineffective
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    holding the legislature’s adoption of statutes for renewal by affidavit neither repealed the statute tolling an action based on a person’s absence, nor precluded the separate action on the judgment for renewal: Of course, it may be easier to renew a judgment by affidavit; but it by no means follows that the old judgment may not be made the basis of a new suit, and many cases arise where it is an advantage to be able to bring suit, instead of renewing by affidavit — the case at bar being an example. It is our conclusion that the two remedies are not inconsistent, and that a judgment creditor may either sue upon his judgment, or renew it by affidavit, if he complies with the respective laws. Id. at 487-88, 137 N.W. at 450 (emphasis added). See also Herzig, 2011 ND 7, ¶ 12, 793 N.W.2d 371 (<HOLDING>); Jahner, 515 N.W.2d at 186 (holding Ryan case

    ### Response:
    holding no tolling under ryan and ndcc  280132 when there was no claim judgment debtor was absent from the state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is different in that Mark acknowledges having received some notice, but not forty-five days’ notice as required by Rule 245. He contends that we should reverse the trial court on that basis alone. It is true that courts view Rule 245 as a mandatory requirement. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Abbott, 863 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied); see also Platt, 991 S.W.2d at 484; In re Estate of Crenshaw, 982 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex.App.Amarillo 1998, no pet.); Hardin v. Hardin, 932 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1995, no writ). That a rule is mandatory, however, does not necessarily mean that a party cannot waive the rights granted under that rule. See, e.g., Pena v. Pena, 986 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1998), pet. denied per curiam, 8 S.W.3d 639 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). Error resulting from a trial court’s failure

    ### Response:
    holding that a party who fails to comply with the mandatory requirements for requesting a judges recusal waives his right to complain of the judges failure to recuse himself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    With respect to the opt-out policy, the Court stated: ''[I]t is not inconsistent to have a policy disfavoring the impingement of certain types of liens upon exemptions, whether federal-or state-created. We have no basis for pronouncing the opt-out policy absolute, but must apply it along with whatever other competing or limiting policies the statute contains.” Owen, 500 U.S. at 313, 111 S.Ct. at 1838. 7 . The United States Supreme Court left open the question whether the lien attached prior to the acquisition of the property interest, meaning the lien would not have fixed on an interest of the debtor and section 522(f)(1) would not apply. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991). Compare Matter of Macke, 136 B.R. 209, 211 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1992) (<HOLDING>) with In re Reinders, 138 B.R. 937, 942-43

    ### Response:
    holding even though debtor would have been entitled to iowa homestead exemption but for former spouses iowa code section 59821 lien debtor could not avoid the lien because it attached to the homestead prior to or simultaneously with debtors acquisition of the interest in the homestead
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of this repudiation of the Authority’s contractual obligation, the Developers filed suit in the district court asserting breach of contract and quantum meruit. • The Authority’s use of and exercise of dominion and control over the Facilities constitutes a taking of the Facilities without compensation in violation of the Takings Clause. The Authority’s actions are intentional and those actions were a proximate cause of the taking of the Facilities, which were owned by the Developers at the time of the taking. The Developers did not consent to the taking, and received no compensation for the taking, which was for a public use. The Developers seek damages for the property taken. In reviewing the Authority’s challenge to the Developers’ pleadings, we const vApp.-Austin 1951, writ ref'd) (<HOLDING>); Hightower v. City of Tyler, 134 S.W.2d 404,

    ### Response:
    holding by texas supreme court that takings claim failed as a matter of law because the state took possession of the property in question under a contract with the plaintiff and therefore with the plaintiffs permission and consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    codified in the FSIA, constitute an unconstitutional statutory delegation of congressional authority to the Executive in violation of the separation of powers embodied in the Constitution. In order to determine whether this statute violates the separation of powers inherent in the structure of the Constitution, we must first look at the relevant constitutional provisions. The Constitution assigns to Congress the power to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. This power derives from Congress’s power in Article I “[t]o constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, and in Article III to “ordain and establish” inferior courts, U.S. Const. art. Ill, § 1. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34, 43 S.Ct. 79, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922) (<HOLDING>); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v.

    ### Response:
    holding that lower federal courts derive their jurisdiction wholly from the authority of congress  provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    OPINION PER CURIAM. We have for consideration proposed amendments to the Florida rules of court and forms intended to minimize the amount of unnecessary personal information included in documents filed with the courts. Reducing the amount of extraneous personal information in court records is another necessary step in the Court’s ongoing effort to provide the public with electronic access to nonconfidential court records. As part of that effort, we re cently adopted procedures that allow clerks of court to readily identify and screen from the public confidential information filed with the courts and refine the procedures for sealing and unsealing court records. See In re Amends, to Fla. Rule of Jud. Admin. 2420 & Fla. Rules of App. Pro., 31 So.3d 756, 757 (Fla.2010) (<HOLDING>). The amendments at issue here further

    ### Response:
    recognizing that refinement of rule governing confidential court records was a necessary step in providing the public electronic access to court records
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rigoberto Chavez-Gallegos, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order affirming without opinion the decision of an immigration judge denying his motion to reopen proceedings in which he was ordered deported in absentia. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review questions of law de novo, Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 981 (9th Cir.2007), and we review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Id. We grant the petition for review and remand for further proceedings. The agency erred in concluding that Chavez was precluded from filing a motion to reopen on the ground that he departed the United States after he was ordered deported. See id. at 982 (<HOLDING>). The agency also abused its discretion in

    ### Response:
    holding that 8 cfr  100323b1 does not preclude motions to reopen filed by aliens who have been deported after the completion of immigration proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Supreme Court recently held in Beckles v. United States, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 886, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017), that the Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 892, 895, 897. The Court explained that, unlike the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause, which was invalidated in Johnson v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), “§ 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause is not void for vagueness.” Id. at 895, 897. Hamilton’s Virginia conviction for unlawful wounding remains a crime of violence under the residual clause post-Rec/cfes, notwithstanding that the Government conceded in the district court that the residual clause was void for vagueness. See United States v. Lee, 855 F.3d 244, 247 (4th Cir. 2017) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the district court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that virginia conviction for unlawful wounding qualified as a crime of violence under the career offender guidelines residual clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in cash. Also, the state emphasizes that defendant does not contend that the 10-minute detention for the purpose of permitting the victim to make an identification was unlawful. The state argues that, under the circumstances, the police did not exploit or trade on the fact that they handcuffed defendant and put him in a patrol car to obtain the victim’s identification of him and that, therefore, the trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. We agree with the state’s argument. The fact that the identification by the victim occurred after an illegal arrest does not automatically result in its exclusion from evidence if the identification would have occurred anyway as a result of the lawful stop. See generally State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27, 38-42, 854 P2d 399 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Here, defendant does not contest the legality

    ### Response:
    holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.’ ” Id. at 403, 531 S.E.2d at 490 (citation omitted). In this case, the State offered four photographs into evidence, two of which were of drugs and drug paraphernalia found in defendant’s home during the search. Two more, those at issue here, were of guns found in defendant’s house. Defendant, in essence, argues that he was prejudiced because people commonly associate guns with drug dealers, and as such, the jury in this case inferred that he was in fact a drug dealer from these photographs. This inference, however, is permissible. Boyd, 177 N.C. App. at 172, 628 S.E.2d at 803. See State v. Smith, 99 N.C. App. 67, 72, 392 S.E.2d 642, 645 (1990) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 328 N.C. 96, 402 S.E.2d 824

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court could properly determine that evidence of a gun was relevant to the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine because as a practical matter firearms are frequently involved for protection in the illegal drug trade
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nullify the effect of Section 55—9—104(j). See In re Bristol Assocs., Inc., 505 F.2d 1056, 1060 (3d Cir.1974); Robert H. Bowmar, Real Estate Interests as Security Under the UCC.: The Scope of Article Nine, 12 UCC L.J. 99, 107 (1979) (hereinafter Bowmar). In support of their position, the Alsups also cite to cases from other jurisdictions that have concluded that transactions involving security interests in real estate contracts, deeds of trust, mortgages, and leases are not subject to Article 9. See, e.g., Shuster v. Doane (In re Shuster), 784 F.2d 883 (8th Cir.1986) (applying Minnesota law held Article 9 did not apply to an assignment of a vendor’s interest in the real estate contract); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Larson (In re Kennedy Mortgage Co.), 17 B.R. 957 (Bankr.D.N.J.1982) (<HOLDING>); In re Bristol, 505 F.2d at 1061-62 (holding a

    ### Response:
    holding article 9 inapplicable to an assignment of a mortgage on real estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it is not fined by the IATC. Although the Club's complaint states a claim against the Minors for fraud, the Minors also argue that the small claims court properly dismissed the Club's fraud action because the action is against public policy,. The Minors argue that allowing the Club to recover the costs of an IATC sanction would discourage tavern owners from being careful when checking the identification of patrons and would undermine the legislature's efforts to place responsibility upon the tavern to prevent minors from entering the tavern. Aceord-ing to the Minors, every court to consider an action similar to the Club's fraud action against the Minors has rejected such an action on public policy grounds. Seq, eg., Sanctuary, Inc. v. Smith, 12 Kan.App.2d 38, 733 P.2d 839, 840 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Ray's Liquors, Inc. v. Newland, 52 Ill.App.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the strict regulatory policy expressed in the statute would be rendered less than strict if private clubs could pass on the costs of unknowing violations to minors in suits for fraud and allowing the club to recover the penalties imposed for the violation would undermine the legislatures policy of imposing an absolute duty upon the club
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mistake, partiality, prejudice, or corruption is shown, or the damages appear to be grossly exorbitant. The verdict must be clearly and immoderately excessive to justify the granting of a new trial. The amount must not only be greater than that which the court would have awarded, but so excessive as to offend the conscience and judgment of the Court. Id. at 426 (quoting Stark v. Lehigh Foundries, 388 Pa. 1, 130 A.2d 123, 135 (1957)). In Mirabel v. Morales, 57 A.3d 144, 150-51 (Pa.Super.2012), this Court held that counsel’s references in closing argument to race appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury, and were so egregious that no curative instruction could alleviate the taint, necessitating a new trial. See Mittleman v. Bartikowsky, 283 Pa. 485, 129 A. 566, 567 (1925) (<HOLDING>). Dr. Schadt does not direct our attention to

    ### Response:
    holding that counsel calling the opposing party the newer slicker members of his race was so manifestly improper and so glaringly out of place in an orderly trial of the issue created in this case that we cannot say the verdict represents the decision of an impartial jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the course of mental health counseling. See id. at 561. Any threat of disclosure of such information would obstruct, if not bar, successful treatment. See McCormick § 98, at 447. Moreover, unwanted disclosure of highly personal information separately implicates one of the most fundamental tenets of all law—the right to privacy. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 561. Thus, we are not just dealing with a strong belief recognized by statute, but a right with roots found in our constitution. The privilege necessarily recognizes a right to protect the privacy interests of the individual to keep private information from public disclosure, independent from the need for optimum medical treatment recognized by statute. See McMaster v. Bd. of Psychology Exam’rs, 509 N.W.2d 754, 758-59 (Iowa 1993) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, all fifty states and the

    ### Response:
    recognizing a constitutional right of privacy in mental health records
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    merits, the court held Bolt was qualified to testify that Feltes failed to follow the work papers and perform all of the required interviews and inventory checks. II. Issues. Kircher raises two issues on appeal. The first deals with error preservation while the second deals with whether Bolt was qualified to testify as to generally accepted CPA auditing standards, whether the accountant breached those standards, and causation. III. Error Preservation. A ruling sustaining a motion in limine is generally not an evidentiary ruling. Twyford v. Weber, 220 N.W.2d 919, 923 (Iowa 1974). Rather, a ruling sustaining a motion in limine simply adds a procedural step to the introduction of allegedly objectionable evidence. Id.; accord Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 310, 317 (Iowa 1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, a motion in limine “serves the useful

    ### Response:
    recognizing a ruling sustaining a motion in limine merely adds a procedural step to the offer of evidence and that if the evidence is not offered there is nothing preserved to review on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    graduating class. 3 . The exhaustion requirement of IDEA is not required in certain circumstances. Where the plaintiff is not seeking relief “also available” under the IDEA, exhaustion is not a prerequisite to the filing of a civil action. Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 420 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir.2005) (emotional distress injuries and lost income for parent); but see Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 308 F.3d 1047, 1049-50 (9th Cir.2002) (plaintiff cannot avoid exhaustion requirement merely by limiting relief to money damages, which is not available under IDEA). Exhaustion is not required where educational issues are not at dispute. See Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275 (where claim for monetary damages could proceed because all educational issues had already been resolved); Blanchard, 420 F.3d at 921 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, when the validity of a blanket

    ### Response:
    recognizing that ideas administrative remedies cannot compensate injuries that are completely noneducational
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the doctrines of absolute judicial immunity and qualified public official immunity. See Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 284-85, 653 A.2d 436, 442 (1995) (noting that this Court has “distinguished between the qualified and narrower immunity for discretionary acts generally accorded to public officials, and absolute judicial immunity, which, unlike qualified immunity, applies regardless of the nature of the tort and even where the suit against the judge alleges that he acted in bad faith, maliciously or corruptly” (citations omitted)). While the parties, the trial court, and the intermediate appellate court in this case have focused on the concept of qualified judicial immunity, no such doctrine has been adopted by the Maryland Court of Appeals. See Parker, 337 Md. at 283, 653 A.2d at 442 (<HOLDING>). The doctrines of absolute judicial immunity

    ### Response:
    holding that the common law principle of absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts has neither been abrogated nor been modified in maryland emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from antitrust liability under the Sherman Act and the Virgin Islands Anti-monopoly Law. Under Rule 56(c), this Court must accordingly grant defendant CAI’s motion for partial summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). B. Antitrust Liability Under The Sherman Act. CAI argues that VIPA is immune from antitrust liability under the Sherman Act as a result of the doctrine of governmental immunity. As defendant CAI correctly notes, virtually all levels of government have been granted some degree of immunity from the operation of antitrust law generally and the Sherman Act specifically. See Sea Land Service v. Alaska Railroad, 659 F.2d 243 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 919, 102 S.Ct. 1274, 71 L.Ed.2d 459 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307,

    ### Response:
    holding that a railroad owned and operated by the federal government was immune from antitrust action under the governmental immunity doctrine which protects the federal government its agencies and instrumentalities from the reaches of antitrust law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not file a reply in response to the Medical Center’s answer and affirmative defenses, the Mays have waived any argument that the action is barred by the statute of limitations because a misnomer occurred and/or because there was an identity of interest between the Auxiliary and the Medical Center. However, the Mays filed a response to the Medical Center’s motion for summary judgment wherein they raised the misnomer issue and asserted, somewhat inartfully, that the Medical Center had been acting as the Auxiliary when it engaged in discovery. And the transcript of the hearing reveals that the trial court was clearly aware of all of the arguments being made. Thus we are not persuaded by the Medical Center’s preservation argument. Cf. Corya v. Sanders, 76 So.3d 31, 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). Further, the Medical Center never raised the

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant waived reliance on new york law because 1 she relied on florida law in answer and affirmative defenses and failed to file any response or affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and 2 there was no transcript of the motion hearing provided
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    12 . “[A] rule which would require the Union to divine the legal complexities of the contractual relationship on a construction site, at the risk of committing an unfair labor practice, would be unfair and unrealistic.” J.F. Hoff Electric Co., 642 F.2d at 1274. 13 . The statute provides a cause of action to “[w]hoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any violation of [section 8(b)(4)].” Once again, however, the courts have declined to give a literal meaning to the words of the statute, and in this context have set far more restrictive “standing” requirements than the statutory language, taken alone, would support. See Fulton v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 695 F.2d 402 (9th Cir.1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3775 (U.S., March 25, 1983) (No. 82-1678) (<HOLDING>). The issue of whether or not David Butler,

    ### Response:
    holding that courts should look to the standing principles  developed under section 4 of the clayton act for guidance in interpreting section 303s standing requirements id at 406 for a recent discussion of standing under the clayton act see associated general contractors v california state council of carpenters us 103 sct 897 74 led2d 723 1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    926 (1943) (“It becomes the duty of the board to make full and exhaustive inquiry, and to that end the board may not only examine any competent witness at the conclusion of his direct and cross examination upon all matters material and relevant to any issue, but it may also subpoena and examine other competent witnesses.”) This Court has permitted the Commission to consider authoritative, trustworthy, and rehable medical guides; however, those guides must be introduced into evidence by witnesses able to testify that the guide is the recognized authority. Pomerinke v. Excel Trucking Transp., Inc., 124 Idaho 301, 306, 859 P.2d 337, 342 (1993). The Commission is not entitled to use medical guides to assess claimants and formulate its own opinions regarding a claimant’s health. See id. (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the referee improperly

    ### Response:
    holding the commission properly considered a medical guide because it was used merely to support expert testimony and not to assess and formulate its own impairment rating for claimant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Tyrone D. Lester appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Lester was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to life in prison with a mandatory minimum fifteen-year term as a habitual violent felony offender. He now raises five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons expressed below, we reverse as to three of his allegations; we affirm a .1999) (<HOLDING>). The trial court apparently recognized that

    ### Response:
    holding the inherent prejudice in such cases results from the defendants inability due to counsels neglect to make an informed decision whether to plea bargain
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Harries v. Dutton, 594 F.Supp. 949, 961 (M.D.Tenn.1984) (“In the judgment of this Court, the conditions of confinement inflicted on Mr. Harries are so adverse that they have caused him to waive his post-conviction remedies involuntarily.”). Mr. Comer describes the conditions of his confinement in nothing short of Orwellian terms. He tells us that he is in “sensory deprivation,” has no access to legal materials, is permitted nothing in his cell, and must walk continuously for fear of becoming a “veggie.” Mr. Comer’s choice between execution at the State’s hands and remaining in the particular conditions of his confinement may be the type of “Hobson’s choice” that renders his supposed decision to withdraw his appeal involuntary. Cf. Gilbert v. Lockhart, 930 F.2d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The record is incomplete as it bears on Mr.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that providing defendant with hobsons choice between incompetent lawyer or no lawyer violates right to counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    courts to referee a political dispute about Puerto Rico’s constitutional limitations on structural changes to high-level political appointments. This we will not and need not do. Cf. El Dia, 963 F.2d at 497 (“Simply because an equitable remedy may be available does not necessarily mean that it must automatically issue.”). Comity concerns are particularly compelling on the facts of this case. Because the very existence of continuing property interests in these high-level political appointments implicates these difficult Commonwealth constitutional questions, the authority to remove these officials — and so the necessity of pre-deprivation procedures — may be obscure prior to litigation. Cf. S. Commons Condo. Ass’n v. Charlie Arment Trucking, Inc., 775 F.3d 82, 85-86 (1st Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, the parties not only fail to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that in some circumstances an afterthefact remedy under state law may be adequate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provides protection against prior encumbrances created by Crescent. To hold otherwise allegedly would render it a quitclaim deed. A special warranty binds the grantor and the grantor’s heirs. See Knotts, 217 S.C. 99, 102, 59 S.E.2d 850, 851 (1950). However, “[t]he grantor can, and often does, limit [covenants] so as to exclude existing encumbrances.” G.W. Thompson, Thompson on Real Property § 82.10(c)(3) (Supp. 2005); see § 27-7-20; see also Steele v. McRaney, 855 So.2d 1114, 1122-23 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (finding language grantee would take “subject to” matters a survey or inspection of the property would have uncovered prevented grantee from prevailing in breach of deed covenant claim); Kamenar R.R. Salvage, Inc. v. Ohio Edison Co., 79 Ohio App.3d 685, 607 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Here, exceptions (5) and (6) in the habendum

    ### Response:
    holding when a deed provides grantee would take subject to the state of facts which a personal inspection or accurate survey would disclose grantee has no claim against grantor for power line easement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A.2d 749 (1993); McCullough v. Xerox Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 135, 581 A.2d 961 (1990), allocatur denied, 527 Pa. 624, 592 A.2d 45 (1991); and Grant v.GAF Corp., 415 Pa.Super. 137, 608 A.2d 1047 (1992), affirmed, 536 Pa. 429, 639 A.2d 1170 (1994).) My reasons for disagreement follow. First, I must disagree with the majority’s rationale for distinguishing these four cases. The majority opines that “if the employee [in the four cases cited supra] cannot meet the lesser burden of proof required in the workmen’s [sic] compensation action, then he should not be given another opportunity to prevail in a civil action.” (Majority opinion at 507.) The identical argument could, however, be raised instantly: 96); Liberty Baking Co. v. Com., W.C.A.B., 63 Pa.Cmwlth. 517, , 439 A.2d 1276, 1279 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, I cannot agree with the distinction

    ### Response:
    holding that the rules governing pleading in a workmens compensation case do not mirror the pennsylvania rules of civil procedure and that pleadings in compensation cases should be liberally construed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only a limited and specified time period to discover breaches and damages that should be obvious upon regular and diligent inspection is intuitively obvious. Had these two accrual provisions not been reconcilable by construing the scheme as a whole, however, subsection 108(4), as the more specific of the two, would nevertheless prevail. See § 24-205. In Regional Transportation District v. Voss, we acknowledged and applied a rule favoring the application of the longer, rather than the shorter, of two equally applicable statutes of limitation. 890 P.2d 663, 668 (Colo.1995). Much like analogous rules of choice applicable to statutes or contractual provisions in other contexts, this rule is a rule of last resort. See id.; cf. People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 70 P.3d 1188, 1198-99 (Colo.2003) (<HOLDING>); Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 22:16

    ### Response:
    holding rule of lenity in the penal context to be a rule of last resort
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Acito, 47 F.3d at 52 (quotation omitted). Moreover, the Class Complaint is silent as to how IAC’s decision to remit tax on the wholesale price it paid for rooms, rather than on the full retail price paid by customers, contributed to the deterioration of its relationships with hotel chains or customers. Although the Complaint advances other alleged misstatements (CC ¶¶ 44-48, 53, 56, 57-59, 74), none of these are accompanied by particularized facts explaining-why plaintiffs believe that the statements were fraudulent. See, e.g., CC ¶ 44 (“We are convinced that this merger [with IAC] will enhance the growth prospects for Hotels.com....”); CC ¶45 (“[W]e had a great quarter. Travel revenue was up 93% and EBITDA for tra ing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 811 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Duane Reade, 2003 WL 22801416, at *6, aff'd

    ### Response:
    holding that puffery is not actionable under the securities laws
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of government, in its various changes, has never recognized this power as an executive prerogative.’ 15 Md. at 456. The Court in Baltimore said that the Constitution ‘so far from treating ... the appointment power as an inherent executive power, indicates that it belongs where the people choose to place it.’ Id. at 457. Addressing the separation of powers question, the Court concluded: ‘In considering the question as to separation of the departments, we are to bear in mind that the Declaration of Rights is not to be construed by itself, according to its literal meaning; it and the Constitution compose our form of government, and they must be interpreted as one instrument.... The former announces principles on which the government, about to be established, will be based. 1-42 (1897) (<HOLDING>); Warfield v. Com’rs of Baltimore County, 28

    ### Response:
    holding that the governor had no power to make the appointment of officer of the school commissioner for cecil county without the consent of the senate when the office was not vacant because the legislature which had created and therefore controlled the office had not delegated that power to the governor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pension Plan & Trust v. United States, 194 F.3d 1279, 1289 (Fed.Cir.1999); AG Route Seven P’ship v. United States, 57 Fed.Cl. 521, 527 (2003). The Federal Circuit in First Hartford held: [Such exceptions include suits] by an intended third-party beneficiary, by a subcontractor by means of a pass-through suit when the prime contractor is liable to the subcontractor for the subcontractor’s dam ages, and by a Miller Act surety for funds improperly disbursed to a prime contractor. However, the common thread that unites these exceptions is that the party standing outside of privity by contractual obligation stands in the shoes of a party within privity. 194 F.3d at 1289 (citations omitted) (footnote added); see also Alpine County, Cal. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The third-party beneficiary status exception

    ### Response:
    holding that in order for a plaintiff to file suit against the government on a contract claim in the court of federal claims a plaintiff must have either direct privity or thirdparty beneficiary status
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Trooper Weilminster, handcuffed her behind her back. (PI. Aff. ¶ 11; PI. Dep. 108:11-113:10.) Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, whether Trooper Nolan even had probable cause to arrest her is questionable, and there is no indication that she was trying to resist arrest. Plaintiff visited the hospital following her departure from the police barracks, and complained of injuries including bruised wrists. (PL Dep. 196:12-197:10, 201:13-19.) She also testified that she informed the hospital staff that she had sustained an injury to hear head and knees. (Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (<HOLDING>); Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641,

    ### Response:
    holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its right of judicial review, PLM was required to file the instant lawsuit before this Court within sixty days of the TTAB ruling. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b). Although PLM is nominally the “plaintiff and counter-defendant” on the case caption, it is Prolacto who initiated the overall legal dispute here. Moreover, Prolacto has elected to cross-appeal to this Court for further review of the TTAB’s findings, as well as assert stand-alone causes of action under federal law and D.C. common law. Thus, Prolacto has availed itself of not only United States law, but of District of Columbia law. A party that chooses to initiate litigation and invoke the legal protections of the forum should expect to appear for deposition in that jurisdiction. See Cobell v. Norton, 213 F.R.D. 43, 47 (D.D.C.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Dollar Sys., Inc. v. Tomlin, 102

    ### Response:
    holding that an elderly named representative class member failed to present sufficient evidence that his health problems require holding his deposition in montana rather than washington dc
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that could support a judgment. See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Tex.2009) (""Bare, baseless opinions will not support a judgment even if there is no objection to their admission in evidence.”); Coastal Transp. Co., Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 233 (Tex.2004) (observing that ""conclusory or speculative” opinions are “ ‘incompetent evidence’ ... [that] cannot support a judgment”); Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Gossett, 156 Tex. 252, 294 S.W.2d 377, 380 (1956) (""It is well settled that the naked and unsupported opinion or conclusion of a witness does not constitute evidence of probative force and will not support a jury finding even when admitted without objection.”); Casualty Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50, 132 S.W.2d 97, 99 (1939) (<HOLDING>). We agree with Gardner that testimony is not

    ### Response:
    holding that bare conclusions of lay fact witnesses did not amount to any evidence at all and that the fact that they were admitted without objection added nothing to their probative force
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    249 (D.D.C.1970) (extending qualified privilege to the minutes and reports of a hospital review committee); Mewborn v. Heckler, 101 F.R.D. 691 (D.D.C.1984) (denying discovery of peer review materials to plaintiff in a case under the FTCA); Laws v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 656 F.Supp. 824 (D.D.C.1987) (finding a letter written by the attending obstetrician to the chairman of the Department of Anesthesiology at defendant hospital privileged as part of a peer review of the attending obstetrician’s work); Doe v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of Fort Wayne, 113 F.R.D. 677 (N.D.Ind.1987) (finding Indiana privilege statute applicable to federal civil rights claim brought by plaintiff doctor following peer review and loss of staff privileges); Weekoty v. United States, 30 F.Supp.2d 1343 (D.N.M.1998) (<HOLDING>). 39 . See Nilavar v. Mercy Health

    ### Response:
    recognizing a selfcritical analysis privilege for materials related to hospital morbidity and mortality conferences
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as appellate courts in reviewing sufficiency challenges to such awards: (1) whether the plaintiff lost the esteem of his/her peers; (2) whether the plaintiff suffered physical injury as a consequence of her emotional distress; (3) whether the plaintiff received psychological counseling or other medical treatment; (4) whether the plaintiff suffered a loss of income; (5) the degree of emotional distress; (6) the context of the events surrounding the emotional distress; (7) the evidence tending to corroborate the plaintiff’s testimony; (8) the nexus between the challenged conduct and the emotional distress; and (9) any mitigating circumstances. Price, 93 F.3d at 1254 (citing Spence v. Board of Educ. of Christina Sch. Dist., 806 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d C ., 375 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). 9 . The DOT contended that Akouri did not

    ### Response:
    holding that the supreme courts opinion in reeves v sanderson plumbing prods inc 530 us 133 120 sct 2097 147 led2d 105 2000 does not require a pretext instruction to be given in employment discrimination cases and thus does not affect the holding in palmer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the juvenile’s potential for rehabilitation; and (14) any other relevant factor related to the juvenile’s youth. See generally Commonwealth v. Knox. We recognize that some of the factors may not apply to a particular juvenile’s case and that some of the factors may overlap. Nevertheless, we believe that providing the trial court with guidance on individualized sentencing for juveniles charged with capital murder comports with the guidelines of Miller. Conclusion The juveniles have failed to show that the holding in Miller requires this Court to dismiss the capital-murder indictments against them. Accordingly, their petitions for a writ of mandamus are denied. 1120140 — PETITION DENIED. 1120202 — PETITION DENIED. STUART, PARKER, MAIN, WISE, and BRYAN, J 012]-P.3d - (Col.Ct.App.2012) (<HOLDING>); In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir.2013)

    ### Response:
    holding that because minor defendant was mandatorily sentenced to life imprisonment without parole and because his case was still pending on direct appeal when miller was released the minor defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    law recognized the causal link between a complaint and the ensuing arrest, it was in the situation where “misdirection” by omission or commission perpetuated the original wrongful behavior. See, e.g., Hand, 838 F.2d at 1428. If, however, there had been an independent exercise of judicial review, that judicial action was a superseding cause that by its intervention prevented the original actor from being liable for the harm. See Restatement of Torts (Second) § F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (2d Cir.1997) (concluding that the neutral, advisory role played by probation officers prevented the chain of causation from being broken where the sentencing judge adopted a recommended sentence which violated a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights); Lanier v. Sallas, 111 F.2d 321, 324-25 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The purported misrepresentation here,

    ### Response:
    holding that a judges decision to commit plaintiff to a mental health facility did not sever the chain of causation where that decision was based in part on a misrepresentation made by defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” Chase-Baker v. Dep’t of Justice, 198 F.3d 843, 845 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)). On appeal, Ms. Plasai argues that the settlement agreement should be voided as involuntary. Because Ms. Plasai first questioned the voluntariness of the settlement agreement in a petition for review by the full board, not during the dismissal proceeding with the AJ, she has waived this argument before us. See Bosley v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 162 F.3d 665, 668 (Fed.Cir.1998) (“if the party ... raises an issue for the first time in a petition for review by the full Board, this court will not consider the issue.”); see also Sargent v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 229 F.3d 1088, 1091 (Fed.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, even if Ms. Plasai had properly

    ### Response:
    holding that the issue of the voluntariness of a settlement agreement is waived on appeal if not raised before the board
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    authority and significant discretion to protect the revenue of the United States by requiring enhanced bonding. Def.’s Resp. Br. 11-12 (citing Section 623 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1623 (2012); 19 C.F.R. § 113.13(d) (2016)). Plaintiff demonstrates inadequate likelihood of success on the merits to warrant granting a preliminary injunction. Even where a movant shows that it will be irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction, “the movant must demonstrate at least a ‘fair chance of success on the merits’ for a preliminary injunction to be appropriate.” U.S. Ass’n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 413 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690-91, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) (<HOLDING>). The court will only set aside CBP’s enhanced

    ### Response:
    holding it is an abuse of discretion to grant a preliminary injunction because difficult legal issues are present without even considering likelihood of success
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an implied bias claim “should hesitate before formulating categories of relationships [that] bar jurors from serving in certain types of trials.” Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1990). And our precedent disfavors extending implied bias to cover relationships between jurors and Government witnesses. In United States v. Ferri, we held that the occupational acquaintance between the husband of a juror and a Government witness did not justify a presumption of bias. 778 F.2d at 993. Likewise, in Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, we concluded that a juror who was the ex-wife of a non-critical police officer witness, and who interacted with him occasionally, was not presumptively excludable. 502 F.2d at 934. See also Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 793-94 (8th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 1385,

    ### Response:
    holding that the county coroner who retrieved and autopsied the victims in the defendants murder trial did not fall within a category of jurors presumed biased as a matter of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his disabilities will force him to miss 10 days of work every month. We agree with this contention in part and disagree with it in part. In refusing to give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, an ALJ must adhere to certain agency-imposed procedural requirements. The ALJ must “evaluate every medical opinion [ ] receive[d]” and must “give good reasons in [his] notice of determination or decision for the weight [ ] give[n]” to a treating physician’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. A treating physician’s opinion receives controlling weight when it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and is “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. Even when h Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); see also Hall v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.

    ### Response:
    holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in McDonnell Douglas Corp.). 43 . McGarry v. Board of County Comm’rs of Pitkin County, 175 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir.1999) (citing Griffith v. Colorado, 17 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir.1994)); Cole, 43 F.3d at 1381. 44 . Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1957 *25 (D.Kan. February 1, 2002)(quoting Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of Kan., Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.1982)(internal quotations omitted)). 45 . 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993). 46 . Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 5l) at 20. 47 . Goldsmith, 996 F.2d at 1163. (""The defendant’s awareness of the protected statement, however, may be established by circumstantial evidence."") (citations omitted). 48 . Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir.1999). 49 . See Id. (<HOLDING>). 50 . Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc., 873

    ### Response:
    holding that closeness in time between the alleged retaliatory acts and the protected conduct raises a genuine issue as to a causal connection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the estate the debtor’s ""aggregate interest in any property” up to a specified dollar amount. 7 . In his summary judgment opposition, Segal explained he did not disclose these payments because he mistakenly believed he was required to disclose amounts received during the two years immediately preceding the filing of his bankruptcy petition, rather t Act, courts have continued to rely on the standard articulated therei ether the monies due to Segal under the Consulting Agreement are post-petition wages, it is not clear to this Court that wages is the salient classification. Under § 541(a)(1), the dispositive issue is whether the debtor has a legal or equitable interest in the payments as of the commencement of the case, not whether the payments are wages. See Clark, 960 F.2d at 477 (<HOLDING>). And § 541(a)(6) refers to ""earnings from

    ### Response:
    holding a football players earnings from games played after he filed for bankruptcy protection were not property of his bankruptcy estate under  541a1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The benefit of all reasonable presumptions and inferences runs to the party-opposing summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 239 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed.Cir.2001); H.F. Allen Orchards v. United States, 749 F.2d 1571, 1574 (Fed.Cir.1984) (noting that non-moving party shall “receive the benefit of all applicable presumptions, inferences, and intendments”). When resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court may neither make credibility determinations nor weigh the evidence and seek to determine the truth of the matter. Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 147

    ### Response:
    holding that cjredibility determinations the weighing of the evidence and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are  not functions of a judge  ruling on a motion for summary judgment  
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Hancox, 49 F.3d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1995). 2 . At the revocation hearing, Johnson's counsel cited the corresponding policy statement in the Sentencing Guidelines, which provides: In the case of a defendant who fails a drug test, the court shall consider whether the availability of appropriate substance abuse programs, or a defendant's current or past participation in such programs, warrants an exception from the requirement of mandatory revocation and imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3565(b) and 3583(g). 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a), 3583(d). United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (""U.S.S.G.”) § 7B1.4 applic. note 6 (2000). Given that Johnson violated the terms of his supervised release in 2001, this provision applied. See United States v. Cofield, 233 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 952, 121 S.Ct. 1424,

    ### Response:
    holding that for purposes of revoking supervised release the applicable guidelines are those in effect at the time of the supervised release violations rather than those in effect at the time of initial offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sought to be introduced, unless called to testify thereto by the party to whom such intérest is opposed or unless the testimony of such deceased person in relation to such transaction or statemént is introduced in evidence by the party whose interest is opposed to that of the witness or has been taken and is on file in the case. No person who is an incompetent witness under this section shall make himself competent by t follows the lead of such states as Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah. See J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 601[03] (1990). See also 2 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 578 (Chadbourn rev.1979)(<HOLDING>); M. Ladd, Uniform Rules of Evidence —

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the dead mans statute is a survival from an earlier and much broader incompetency statute and characterizing its survival as deplorable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the process afforded the parties, the extent to which the decisionmakers utilized the assistance of experts where necessary, and finally the soundness of the fiduciary’s ratiocination.” Chalmers, 61 F.3d at 1344; Exbom v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and We 7th Cir.1998) (opining that if a doctor gives his reasons for disagreeing with the opinions of other medical providers, the court must affirm the plan administrator’s decision under the deferential standard). Drs. Kurkjian and Laping provided reasoned medical expert opinion regarding Reagan’s medical condition, and UNUM’s plan administrator did not err in relying upon the one while excluding the other. See Trombetta v. Cragin Fed. Bank for Sav. Employee Stock Ownership, 102 F.3d 1435, 1438 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Reagan’s assertion that because

    ### Response:
    holding that a plan administrators decision may not be deemed arbitrary and capricious so long as it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation based on the evidence for that decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    To the contrary, C.M. implicitly waived her right against self-incrimination and testified in her mother’s defense. Despite appointed counsel s presumed advice, C.M. s testimony exonerated her mother of the charged offense and inculpated herself. Though not clear, appellant appears to suggest that the trial court’s conduct in some manner shaded or inhibited C.M.’s testimony. Appellant does not refer us to any portion of the record to support her contention that C.M.’s testimony was altered in some manner by the trial court’s conduct. To the contrary, on redirect examination, C.M. confirmed that her testimony was the same as the statement that she had given police on the day of her mother’s arrest in this case. See Johnson v. State, 208 S.W.3d 478, 503 (Tex.App.Austin 2006, pet. ref d) (<HOLDING>). Given the context and circumstances of the

    ### Response:
    holding that trial courts perjury admonishment to defense witness did not violate defendants due process rights because it had no effect on trial testimony record revealed that testimony was consistent with previous recorded statement given to defense counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc., 731 F.3d 592, 599 (6th Cir.2013); see also Capriotti v. Con-sol. Rail Corp., 878 F.Supp. 429, 434 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (“Under a negligence per se theory, if a plaintiff proves that a statutory violation has occurred[,] he need not prove the traditional negligence elements of foreseeability, duty[,] and breach, but he is still required to prove causation.”). The standard for causation under FELA leans favorably to the injured employee, requiring juries to be instructed that “a defendant railroad ‘caused or contributed to’ a railroad worker’s injury ‘if [the railroad’s] negligence played a part— no matter how small — in bringing about the injury.’ ” McBride, 131 S.Ct. at 2644 (alteration in original); see also Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in order to prove the element of

    ### Response:
    recognizing that felas language on causation is as broad as could be framed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes” by reference to “the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis added); McKay, 110 F.3d at 373 (same); Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 539-40 (9th Cir.1997) (same). Given that the determination of whether a claimant is disabled is made on an individual basis, and that the court may consider the manner in which a claimant’s personal education and prior work experience limits his ability to pursue employment in other sectors of the economy, the district court’s conclusion that Burns is disabled was reasonable and does not conflict with decisions by this and other circuits that similar lifting restrictions do not render claimants “disabled” und r.1998) (<HOLDING>). But see Williams v. Channel Master Satellite

    ### Response:
    holding that a trained computer technicians carpal tunnel syndrome did not render him disabled under the ada because he could still function as a computer repair technician
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ports. In addition, Special Agent Itnyre saw miscellaneous papers next to the coffee table that also displayed prostitution related information much like the open notebook. (See Hr’g, Gov. Ex. 15. (“escort pandora’s” and “outcall pearl city lhr@300”).) Moreover, Special Agent Itnyre knew that Defendant had identified the hotel room as the room in which he had been staying with Nishimura, and that Nishimura assisted Defendant in his prostitution business. Although only y United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 441 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir.2006). Further, the mere opening of the notebooks showed information identical to that of the first notebook and provided substantial probable cause to believe that they were “trick books” associated with criminal activity. See Issacs, 708 F.2d at 1369-70 (<HOLDING>). Finally, fourth, the agents had a lawful

    ### Response:
    recognizing the propriety of a brief perusal of the books if items validly being searched for might reasonably be located within the book
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    repeated attempts to get up and eventually took appellant to the patrol car to prevent “injury to himself or to me or to other persons out on the scene.” The first officer testified these steps were consistent with police protocol regarding how to treat a person who may be violent. She also testified she was still investigating the incident when she went to the patrol car and asked appellant what happened. See id. (“The investigative detention did not evolve into an arrest simply because appellant was escorted to the patrol car and handcuffed. [The officer] did only that which was reasonably necessary to ensure his own safety while investigating appellant’s possible involvementf.]”); see also Turner v. State, 252 S.W.3d 571, 580 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Appellant has not presented evidence to

    ### Response:
    holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2406. Thus, the problem with the order of the district court before us boils down to a matter of standard of review. Had the district court applied de novo review to the magistrate judge’s order, we would have no need to remand the case. See United States v. Weissberger, 951 F.2d 392, 398 (D.C.Cir.1991) (finding that the magistrate judge exceeded her authority but that any defect was cured by the district court’s de novo review of the original order). However, in its analysis, the district court repeatedly underscored its deferential stance with regard to the magistrate judge’s order. There is simply no way to read the district court’s analysis as a product of its independent judgment. Therefore, we must vacate the district court’s order and remand. See Ocelot Oil, 847 F.2d at 1464 (<HOLDING>). In light of the accelerated nature of this

    ### Response:
    holding that although the district court had reviewed the record thoroughly it had done so constrained by the assumption that the magistrates order must be affirmed absent clear error and therefore remanding for the court to review the record in light of its own independent judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    If the defendant fails to do so and summary judgment is granted against the defendant, he will not be entitled to raise the affirmative defense at a later time in a motion for summary judgment. 2 . Statom seems to argue that Reiswerg’s liability somehow established joint and several liability of CGG and that CGG waived its statute of limitations defense by failing to ""raise the statute of limitations defense or any defense to Reiswerg's liability.” Appellee's Brief at 21 (emphasis added). However, Indiana courts have recognized that ""[wjaiver is usually a matter of personal privilege; it must be made by the person whose rights or remedies are to be affected.” In re S.L., 599 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind.Ct.App.1992); see also Wabash Grain, Inc. v. Smith, 700 N.E.2d 234, 238 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Thus, the fact

    ### Response:
    holding that grain ele vator operator was not estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense as a result of related corporations action in an identical federal court action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    factor listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and made explicit note of its focus on Cogswell’s history and characteristics, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the need to avoid any unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants. Regarding this last factor, the district court noted that the disparities among the sentences that the court had imposed on the co-defendants were attributable to a number of factors, including that each defendant had different ist the government may receive sentence reductions. See Vázquez-Rivera, 470 F.3d at 449 (finding the defendant’s sentence not to be unreasonable “simply because his co-defendants agreed to help the government in exchange for reduced sentences”); United States v. Rodríguez, 162 F.3d 135, 152 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Taking into account Cogswell’s age, level of

    ### Response:
    holding that the law allows the government to offer reduced sentences in exchange for assistance even if it results in sentences of such disparity as would strike many as unfair
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her experience of “looking at baby brains for 45 years of my life.” Id. at 306. Doctor Shane, on the other hand, insisted that neuroblasts would no longer be present in the brain of a child Mat’s age. Id. at 288. The Court could continue on in this vein, but it should by now be obvious that it takes an expert to make sense of the slides and the literature in the record. Petitioner’s expert witness identifies objects as one thing, and respondent’s expert says they are something else. The Special Master found Dr. RorkeAdams to be more credible than Dr. Shane and provided a detailed explanation for this finding. See Nordwall, 2008 WL 857661, at *8-9. It is not the job of the Court to second guess the credibility judgment of experts or to reweigh the evidence. See Bradley, 991 F.2d at 1575 (<HOLDING>). As a reasonable fact-finder could rely on Dr.

    ### Response:
    holding that because the special master saw the witnesses and heard the testimony he has broad discretion in determining credibility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (claiming ineffective assistance of counsel), he concedes that the basis of his trial counsel’s objection in the trial court did not include his present contention that MAI-CR3d 310.50 and § 562.076 violate his right to due process of law or to present a defense. Rule 28.03 provides that counsel must make specific objections to instructions considered erroneous before the jury retires, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. It also provides that the objections must be raised in the motion for new trial in accordance with Rule 29.11. Assignments of error cannot be broadened or changed by raising them for the first time on appeal. State v. Howard, 896 S.W.2d 471, 493 (Mo.App.S.D.1995). See also State v. Reichert, 854 S.W.2d 584, 591 (Mo.App.S.D.1993) (<HOLDING>). In addition, “[t]o preserve a constitutional

    ### Response:
    holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. State, 166 So.3d 147, 149 (Ala.Crim.App.2014). The record indicates that the circuit court considered the presumptive sentencing standards before it entered a sentence departing from those standards. The record further indicates that Snow did not object to the circuit court’s departure from the presumptive standards on the basis that the State provided no proof of any aggravating factor or on the basis that the circuit court failed to state any reasons for its departure from the recommended sentence under the presumptive standards. The rules of preservation are well settled. “‘Review on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and timely raised at trial.’ ” Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So.2d 793, 794 (Ala.2003)(citing Newsome v. State, 570 So.2d 703, 717 (Ala.Crim.App. )(<HOLDING>). Because Snow did not raise the challenges to

    ### Response:
    holding circuit courts decision to depart from the presumptive sentencing recommendation and impose a prison sentence was reversible error where defendant objected on the basis that the state failed to give notice of aggravating factors that would justify a dispositional departure from the presumptive sentencing recommendation and the trial court failed to state on the record a reason for its departure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conspirators or participated in every stage of the conspiracy ....” Alred, 144 F.3d at 1415. Thus, the dispositive question is not whether Brown and Hall dealt with each other, but whether each of them participated in the overall conspiracy. We are persuaded that the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate to a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that Hall and Brown were participants in a conspiracy that furthered a common scheme to supply large quantities of drugs in a haven to meet the demand of their customers. C Brown asserts that “there was insufficient evidence that [he] possessed, much , whereas Brown’s convictions began in 1991, only six years prior to the beginning of the conspiracy charged at trial. See United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1312 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1300

    ### Response:
    holding that eight years between prior convictions and the beginning of the charged conspiracy was not too remote
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). A federal court defining the role of a state official for purposes of determining liability under § 1983 must look to state law. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 484, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1300-1301, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). As explained above, a sheriff or his deputies are state executive officers under the Constitution of the State of Alabama. Ala. Const., art. V, § 112. “Suits against these officials in their official capacities are effectively suits against the entity that those officials represent.” Free v. Granger, 887 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1989). Consequently, in the present case, the § 1983 claim against Deputy Sheriff Hancock, as a state officer, makes the State of Alabama a real party in interest. See Free, 887 F.2d at 1557. (<HOLDING>). “The eleventh amendment to the Constitution

    ### Response:
    holding that a  1983 action against a sheriff made the state of alabama a real party in interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which are not subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction, to open their service territories to competition in the sale of electric generation services, and “confirmed” the authority of the Commission to similarly open the service territories of public service corporations. We reject the Cooperatives’ contention. ¶ 56 Article 15, Section 3 directs the Commission to prescribe just and reasonable rates for services without regard to market structure. Thus, even assuming the legislature is exclusively empowered to implement competition, if the contested rules are reasonably necessary steps in ratemaking within the competitive market, the Commission possesses plenary authority to enact them. Woods, 171 Ariz. at 294, 830 P.2d at 815; see also U.S. West I, 197 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 30, 3 P.3d at 944 (<HOLDING>). If not, the Commission was only authorized to

    ### Response:
    holding some competitive rules clearly related to ratemaking power and thus within commissions constitutional authority to promulgate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not moot and ruled on the motion for summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding the case was moot at the time the district court had entered its judgment and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment in a moot case. 949 F.2d at 1095. Unlike the case before us, Beattie was moot before the district court even ruled on it. The Court of Appeals properly concluded no judgment could enter on an already moot case. In Tosco, the Tenth Circuit addressed only briefly the issue of vacatur. It did not illustrate why vacatur was appropriate in that ease but rather cited two distinguishable Supreme Court eases without explanation of their applicability. 826 F.2d at 948 (citing Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 104 S.Ct. 373, 78 L.Ed.2d 58 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Great Western Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that universitys new policy against discriminatory acts of allmale honorary society mooted the societys appeal seeking to prevent secretary of health education and welfare from interpreting the law to require the university to ban societys activities from campus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was not present in the copy of the cross-claim complaint that IICNA filed with the court on February 27, 2007, and the claim was not present in any pleading or motion filed with the court until IICNA filed its motion for summary judgment on June 25, 2007. The claim relating to the invalidity of the Non-Pyramiding endorsements has not been pled, and summary judgment cannot be granted for unpled claims. See Aldinger v. Spectrum Control, Inc., 207 Fed.Appx. 177, 180 n. 1, 181 (3d Cir.2006) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a claim on the grounds that the party had not raised the issue in its pleadings, but instead first raised the issue in a brief filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment); cf. White v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, IICNA’s motion for summary

    ### Response:
    holding that a party could not pursue an employment discrimination claim under one article of a labor agreement when the complaint was framed exclusively in terms of another article of the same agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence demonstrating that attempts were actually made to separate the fees by claim at the time the fees were incurred and that further separation of the time was impracticable. The trial court’s findings of fact 9-11 and conclusions of law 3-7 show that the trial court based its segregation ruling on both of these legal standards. We conclude that the two legal standards advocated by Britannia are not proper under current Texas law and that Air Routing’s position regarding the legal standard is correct. Britannia correctly asserts that several courts of appeals, in applying the Sterling standard, have compared the essential elements of the claims in question. See Geodyne Energy Income Production P’ship I-E v. Newton Corp., 97 S.W.3d 779, 789-90 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. granted) (<HOLDING>); Z.A.O., Inc,, v. Yarbrough Drive Cent. Joint

    ### Response:
    holding segregation was required in part because the claims have significantly different elements than the claim for which attorneys fees are recoverable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    grant by Judge Ryan. The trial court found otherwise. This claim has not been resurrected on appeal. 7 . St. Clair’s argument that extreme wantonness is equal to intentional conduct is simply incorrect. While intentional homicides are treated the same as aggravatedly wanton homicides — both being murder — for purposes of determining a defendant’s culpability, that does not mean that the mental states are the same. 8 . Roark went on to say, however, that the fact that the defendant murdered the kidnapping victim could be used to satisfy the require ment of proving a statutory aggravating circumstance under KRS 532.025. That conclusion is questionable in light of this Court's reading of that statute in St. Clair's most recent appeal. See St. Clair Bullitt II, 451 S.W.3d at 643, 649-50, (<HOLDING>). More importantly, for purposes of the

    ### Response:
    holding that jury must find one of the eight listed statutory aggravators before imposing death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to make such ecclesiastical decisions was vested was impermissible under First and Fourteenth Amendments); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) (determination of qualifications of a chaplain is canonical in nature); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, supra, 344 U.S. at 118, 73 S.Ct. 143 (appointment of Archbishop is a matter of ecclesiastical government with which courts could not interfere); Protestant Episcopal Church v. Graves, supra (dispute between breakaway local parish and hierarchical parent church over church property is unquestionably doctrinal in nature, the ecclesiastical determination of which only incidentally affects the control over local church property); Elmora Hebrew Center, supra, 125 N.J. at 420, 593 A.2d 725 (<HOLDING>). Without doubt, matters of church discipline

    ### Response:
    holding that only religious authorities can determine scope of duties of orthodox rabbi
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    $25, and a single gentleman, and they can only attend on Friday night, is $100 charge. (Board Hr’g Tr. at 17.) This pricing structure seems geared more toward maintaining a felicitous gender balance for the operation of a swingers’ club than to the operation of a restaurant. It is therefore highly questionable whether the Property’s use as a club was subordinate to its use as a restaurant. However, the use of the Property as a venue for its patrons to engage in sexual activity is certainly not customary and incidental to its use as a restaurant. MAJ bore the burden of proving that the use of the Property for patrons’ sexual activity was an accessory use to the Property’s use as a restaurant. See Smith v. Zoning Hearing Board of Conewago Township, 713 A.2d 1210, 1213-14 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (<HOLDING>). In attempting to meet this burden, MAJ tries

    ### Response:
    holding that owners of an airport failed to meet their burden of showing that their skydiving business was an accessory use to the airport
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defendant's ""expectation of privacy is, if anything, diminished as a consequence of the antagonism between him and the [third party]” and emphasizing that that is ""particularly true when the occupant of the premises is prompted to cooperate with the police because the defendant has committed a crime upon that other person); United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.1990) (upholding consent by defendant's girlfriend — who lived in the same premises as defendant — and stressing that she ""assisted the police to avoid possible criminal implication of herself”). 26 . People v. Sanders, 904 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Colo.1995). See also People v. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286, 422 N.Y.S.2d 652, 397 N.E.2d 1319 (1979) (upholding fiancee’s consent to search apartment shared with def las 1990, pet. ref’d) (<HOLDING>); Grays v. State, 905 S.W.2d 54,

    ### Response:
    holding that appellants father had authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom where house defendant lived in was owned by his parents room was not locked and defen dants family was not denied access to bedroom
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    identified as the individual in the field cultivating and caring for the patch, and (3) the final harvesting of the field had been completed immediately pri- or to the search warrant application, the issuing magistrate judge reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had recently harvested a large quantity of marijuana plants and that the most likely place to store these plants and the implements used in the harvesting would be at his residence adjacent to the patch. See United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir.1986) (“It is reasonable to assume that certain types of evidence would be kept at a defendant’s residence and an affidavit need not contain personal observations that a defendant did keep such evidence at his residence.”); see also Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1205 (<HOLDING>). The affidavit also included the opinion of

    ### Response:
    holding that issuing judge may draw reasonable inferences from the material presented in the warrant application
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motion to dismiss. A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity As a threshold matter, we must determine if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immu nity. If so, a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was proper. See Lovely, 570 F.3d at 782 n. 2 (6th Cir.2009) (“[Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional doctrine ....”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.2006) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court’s judicial power.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immunity, we need not address the issues of diversity jurisdiction and federal-question jurisdiction. See Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). MBF argues that CNI waived its

    ### Response:
    holding that if an entity enjoys tribalsovereign immunity federal jurisdiction is otherwise irrelevant and dismissal of the suit is proper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    business, as well as the source of its revenues. In their motion, Defendants argue that LPI and LPHI are distinguishable entities and that, therefore, the Court should dismiss all of the claims that are based in part on LPI’s business since LPI is not a named Defendant in this case. The' Court disagrees. The record is literally stocked with evidence demonstrating that there is no meaningful difference between LPI and LPHI. For instance, LPI and LPHI share physical offices and have a consolidated Board of Directors. (Dkt. No. 135-4 at 7). Along the same lines, the two companies file consolidated financial statements and LPHI reports on LPI’s litigation in its annual reports.. (Id. at 10). Miller v. MSX-IBS Holding, Inc., No. 09-cv-15046, 2012 WL 458486, at *7 (E.D.Mich. Feb. 13, 2012) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, even LPHI’s employees and managers do

    ### Response:
    holding that consolidated financials are usually necessary for a fair presentation when one of the entities in the consolidated group directly or indirectly has a controlling financial interest in the other entities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by Florida. After testing the sufficiency of the statutory aggravating circumstances and weighing all statutory aggravating evidence against the relevant mitigating evidence, the jury returns a recommendation of either life imprisonment or the death penalty. Fla.Stat. § 921.141(2) (1985). A recommendation of life may only be overturned if ""the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."" Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975). Although Florida is not constitutionally obligated to make a jury the sentencing authority in capital cases, Spaziano v. Florida, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Baldwin v. Alabama, -U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 2727, 86 L.Ed.2d 300 (1985) (<HOLDING>), indicates that a state’s greater power to

    ### Response:
    holding that under the alabama death penalty statute because the judge did not consider the jurys recommendation the statute which forced the jury to sentence the defendant to death whenever aggravating circumstances existed was not unconstitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). II. Count I — Challenge to USDA Regulations A. Restrictions on the use of biological products The VSTA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to enact regulations “as may be necessary to prevent the preparation, sale, barter, exchange, or shipment as aforesaid of any worthless, contaminated, dangerous, or harmful virus, serum, toxin, or analogous product for use in the treatment of domestic animals, or otherwise to carry out this chapter.... ” 21 U.S.C. § 154 (emphasis added). The USDA refers to viruses, serums, toxins, and analogous products as “biological products” and has instituted a licensing regime for “[e]very person who prepares biological products” subject to the VS an, 521 U.S. 642, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 138 L.Ed.2d 724 (<HOLDING>) Plaintiff goes on to note that the agency has

    ### Response:
    holding that the phrase means reasonably designed to prevent expanded the secs authority beyond those acts specifically enumerated in the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court nevertheless dismissed these claims in their entirety, concluding that “Section 1981 is not a substitute for an employment discrimination claim.” We have previously noted our “puzzlement” with this conclusion, Leung v. New York Univ., 495 Fed.Appx. 124,125 n. 1 (2d Cir.2012), and we now hold that it was error. Congress “intended § 1981 to apply to employment discrimination” and Section 1981 “provid[es] a vehicle for every employee to remedy racial discrimination in the workplace.” Lauture v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 216 F.3d 258, 263, 264 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, despite the district court’s concerns, plaintiffs’ failure to point to a specific written contract outside of their employment relationship is not fatal to their claim. See id. at 260 (<HOLDING>). In addition, “42 U.S.C. § 1981 encompasses

    ### Response:
    holding that an atwill employee may sue under  1981 for racially discriminatory termination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bravo, 203 F.3d at 780. The court, however, failed to analyze the § 3553(a) factors when it denied Frazier’s motion, and summarily held that “the factors in § 3553(a) weigh strongly against any reduction in Frazier’s 360 month sentence.” While it is true that the district court was not required to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors individually, see Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d at 1322, it was required to provide some explanation as to why it denied Frazier’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. See U.S. v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir.2005) (finding the district court adequately addressed the § 3553(a) factors when it considered “ ‘all the obvious things that you would normally take in consideration,’ particularly, ‘the age of the child.’ ”); U.S. v. Vautier, 144 F.3d 756, 761 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Smith, 568 F.3d 923, 928 (11th

    ### Response:
    holding that district court adequately considered the  3553a factors when it cited defendants demonstrated violence and  all the other considerations that went in to the establishment of this defendants sentence 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    compelled action by the Garden. Accordingly, the trial court’s order is reversed in this respect and this action remanded for further proceedings. 2. The trial court also dismissed Appellants’ request for injunc-tive relief; this was proper in part. Appellants sought a permanent and interlocutory injunction prohibiting the Garden “from causing the arrest or prosecution” of licensed individuals who carry weapons at the facility. As Appellants recognize on appeal, however, the Garden is not a government entity and it lacks the power to administer the criminal law. Because the Garden lacks the authority to administer the criminal law, enjoining the Garden from “causing” an arrest or prosecution would be fruitless. See generally State v. Wooten, 273 Ga. 529, 531 (2) (543 SE2d 721) (2001) (<HOLDING>). Further, this portion of Appellants’

    ### Response:
    recognizing the broad discretion of prosecutors in making decisions about whom to prosecute and what charges to bring
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    facial vagueness challenge as he contends. 8 . Appellant’s first point of error addresses the state constitution and his second point addresses the federal constitution. The corresponding ""due process” provision of the Texas Constitution provides: ""No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.” Tex. Const, art. I, § 19. Historically, courts have equated the due course of law clause in the Texas Constitution with the guarantee of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Norris v. State, 788 S.W.2d 65, 72 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, pet. ref’d); see also University of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>). Appellant does not provide substantively

    ### Response:
    holding there is no meaningful distinction between due course and due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the officer testified that he felt the lump in the front pocket of the defendant's jacket and that he examined the lump with his fingers and determined it to be crack cocaine wrapped in cellophane. Id. The Supreme Court adopted the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding that the search was unconstitutional. The rationale for finding the search unconstitutional was because the officer concluded that the lump was contraband only after "" 'squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket'-a pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon."" Id. at 378, 113 S.Ct. at 2138. Therefore, despite the officer's lawful right to place his hands on the defendant's jacket pursuant to the Terry exc , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 856, 110 S.Ct. 161, 107 L.Ed.2d 118 (<HOLDING>). Second, the officers were justified in

    ### Response:
    holding that taillight and license plate violations justify investigatory stop of automobile
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 716, 160 L.Ed.2d 734 (2005). 2. Non-Delegation The Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). Consistent with this text and the principle of separation of powers, the non-delegation doctrine generally permits “no delegation” of legislative powers to another branch of government. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 581 U.S. 457, 472, 121 S.Ct. 908, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). Among Congress’s legislative powers is the authority to determine the temporal scope of a statute. See, e.g., City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the U.N., 618 F.3d 172, 195 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). That determination is particularly

    ### Response:
    recognizing congresss  responsibility for fundamental policy judgments concerning the proper temporal reach of statutes  quoting landgraf v usi film prods 511 us 244 273 114 sct 1483 128 led2d 229 1994
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    address as 55-03 Van Doren Street; such repetition of one address indicated that the applications might include fraudulent statements; and he ordered all files in the file cabinets seized — even the ones that he had not individually searched. These actions bear none of the hallmarks of a general search: They suggest a fairly systematic inventory, not “indiscriminate rummaging,” and a search for items enumerated in the warrant, not an “exploratory” search for items not mentioned there. Indeed, federal courts have repeatedly held that such actions as were taken by the INS agents in this case, standing alone, do not support a finding that government agents have flagrantly disregarded the terms of a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1363 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (collecting cases). Accordingly, even assuming

    ### Response:
    holding that where government agents were authorized by a warrant to search for broad categories of documentary evidence and records belonging to each category were found in every drawer of some file cabinets the officers did not grossly exceed the terms of the warrant when they seized entire file cabinets so that complete suppression was required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    one of ADVA’s statutory duties is to assist veterans in presenting and pursuing claims against the United States for veteran’s benefits arising under laws of the United States or of Alabama if that veteran has given ADVA a power of attorney. Ala. Code § 31—5—4; see also Ala. Admin. Code r. 920-X-3-.01. But, an allegation that ADVA made an improper misrepresentation amounts to a negligence or legal malpractice claim, just as an allegation of improper medical care would amount to a medical malpractice claim. And, “[a] malpractice [claim] will not lie under [Section] 1983” because it is a claim arising under state common law—not a constitutional violation. Bass v. Sullivan, 550 F.2d 229, 232 (5th Cir.1977); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, any malpractice claim alleged

    ### Response:
    recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    removable. This distinction is important because the BIA’s reopening of a case vacates the final order of removal and reopens the administrative removal proceedings. See id. During administrative removal proceedings, the government has the burden of proving by “clear and convincing evidence” that the petitioner is subject to removal on the basis of his convictions. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A); see also Pickering v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 525, 527 (6th Cir.2006) (concluding that, once the petitioner produces evidence that his conviction has been vacated, “the [pjetitioner is deportable only if the* government can show, with clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence, that the conviction was vacated solely for immigration reasons”); Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125, 1130 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Sandoval v. INS, 240 F.3d 577, 581 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that in a case where the petitioner obtained postconviction relief reducing his felony conviction to a misdemeanor the evidence of record is legally insufficient to satisfy the inss stringent burden of proof and thus  the order for removal must be reversed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stating that “[an] argument that the trial judge exceeded his discretion by enjoining the appellants beyond the time specified in the ... contract is without merit”). We agree with Guy Carpenter. The expiration of the one-year contract limit does not make this issue moot. If this Court remands, the district court has the power under Texas law to craft an injunction that extends beyond the expiration of the non-solicitation covenant. Exercising this equitable power might be particularly appropriate given the district court’s year-long delay before ruling on the motion to reconsider. We note that neither case Provenzale cites in support of his mootness argument is relevant to the facts of this case. See Hi-Line Electric Co. v. Dowco Electrical Products, 765 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); John R. Ray & Sons, Inc. v. Stroman, 923

    ### Response:
    holding an appeal of injunction moot where the injunction expired three months before the appellate court heard arguments in the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Senator Fritz Hollings, the sponsor of the TCPA, stated that “[e]omputerized calls are the scourge of modern civilization. They wake us up in the morning; they interrupt our dinner at night; they force the sick and elderly out of bed; they hound us until we want to rip the telephone right out of the wall.” Mims, 132 S.Ct. at 752. Initially, the Court notes that several district courts, including district courts within the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that a plaintiff demonstrates a violation of privacy interests, and therefore an injury-in-fact, after receiving automated calls. See, e.g., Schumacher v. Credit Prot. Ass’n, No. 4:13-CV-164, 2015 WL 5786139 (S.D.Ind. Sept. 30, 2015) (<HOLDING>); Ikuseghan v. Multicare Health Sys., No.

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff had constitutional standing because he received over fifty calls over three months from an automated caller
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (referring to “reason to know” as a “finding of fact”). Constructive knowledge. The government argues that Bertucco had “reason to know” of the presence of dyed fuel because (i) he signed the stamped ticket, and (ii) as a matter of settled law, his act of signing the ticket charged him with constructive knowledge of its contents. The district court agreed: Here, regardless of whether Bertucco ... paused to read the whole delivery ticket, [he] had constructive knowledge of the presence of dyed diesel by virtue of the “RED DYED” stamp. ConEd, 34 F.Supp.2d at 165. The district court equated constructive knowledge with “reason to know,” an equation the parties do not contest, and that is consistent with precedent. See, e.g., Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, 145 F.3d 516, 524 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Hayman, 992 F.2d at 1262. In general,

    ### Response:
    holding that constructive knowledge satisfies the reason to know standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    withstand a motion to dismiss should be denied. Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548-49 (D.C.Cir.1999). The second amended complaint does not cure the deficiencies outlined in the proceeding text of this opinion; however, the plaintiffs maintain that ""§ 1983 claims brought against city officials in their personal capacity are not subject to the exhaustion requirement.” Pls.' Supp. Mem. at 4 n. 2. But, there appears to be no basis in law for this distinction. See Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 368 F.Supp.2d 30, 34 (D.D.C.2005) (maintaining claims against defendants in their individual capacities because District of Columbia's motion to dismiss explicitly restricted scope of motion to defendants in their official capacities); Runkle v. Gonzales, 391 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). The court, therefore, denies the plaintiffs'

    ### Response:
    holding that constitutional claims against defendants in their individual capacities were precluded by plaintiffs failure to exhaust administrative remedies under pertinent statutory scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in order “to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands.” Id. at 443, 93 S.Ct. 2523. Because the search was a result of a function “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute,” it was permissible. Id. at 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523. Although Dombrowski involved the search of a vehicle, some lower courts have relied on the community caretaking rationale in upholding warrantless searches of homes. United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir.2006); United States v. Stafford, 416 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1521-22 (6th Cir.1996). But see United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 535 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204,

    ### Response:
    holding that community caretaking exception applies only to automobile searches
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to all remaining counts. 4) Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Counter-Statement of Material Facts is DENIED. 1 . A shakedown is a routine procedure on the RHU, wherein corrections officers search inmates' cells for contraband. (Barnes Dep. 18:16-19:1.) 2 . 42 U.S.C. § 1985 requires the action of ""two or more persons.” 3 . To the extent that Plaintiff is arguing the Defendant Macon had a history of making racially inappropriate comments (see Doc. 32, Ex. SS, TT, UU), Barnes has not shown that any of those comments were made toward him or ever even heard or perceived by him. Even if Barnes did hear of these incidents second-hand, they would not be sufficient to create a hostile work environment. See Caver, 420 F.3d at 263 (<HOLDING>). 4 . The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff cannot meet hostile work environment threshold simply by pointing to comments directed at other individuals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    activities of Cooper’s enterprise affected interstate commerce. See, e.g., Keltner, 147 F.3d at 669 (interstate commerce requirement satisfied when defendants traveled between several states and committed some of the RICO predicate acts in another state); United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir.1989) (interstate commerce requirement satisfied when group members traveled between states to discuss and carry out RICO conspiracy). Second, Cooper argues no enterprise was in existence in 1993. However, every enterprise begins somewhere. There is no requirement that an enterprise be in existence before the first predicate act is committed as long as that first act relates to and is continuous with the subsequent acts in the pattern. See H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 239, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (<HOLDING>), Cooper’s third argument, that the Griffin

    ### Response:
    holding that racketeering predicates must be related and amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1987) (noting that the plaintiffs decision to sue only under the state law theory, eschewing a claim under the CBA, was entitled to deference under the well-pleaded complaint rule). Regardless of whether this choice serves them well on the merits, it is entitled to deference under the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. (“Caterpillar’s basic error is its failure to recognize that a plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining agreement is permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agreement, including state-law contact rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collective bargaining agreement”). If Plaintiffs do not wish to press their additional CBA rights in this case, federal law does not force them to do so. Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 639, 646 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Chavez v. Don Stoltzner Mason Contractor,

    ### Response:
    holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    standard has been met in this case, I would vacate the district court’s order and remand with instructions to reconsider the balance of the public and private interests consistent with this opinion. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 1 . This sentence represents the entirety of the state court’s factual findings regarding the parties' private interests in this case. As discussed infra, however, the district court described these findings differently in its order. 2 . Plaintiffs' interest in being present for trial is a private interest weighing in favor of ' Plaintiffs' choice of forum which should be considered separate and apart from the issue of whether Guatemala provides an adequate forum. See Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1150 (C.D.Cal.2005) (<HOLDING>); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F.Supp.2d 1116,

    ### Response:
    holding that because plaintiffs would be able to file their case in colombia  plaintiffs concerns as to their safety are more appropriately considered in the private interest factors analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    work is done once they have ruled proffered evidence admissible or inadmissible” instead of assessing whether the expert’s testimony fits the task at hand). 32 . Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). 33 . Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). 34 . Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). 35 . Cole, supra note 31, at 819-24. 36 . Id. 37 . 928 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (discussing the importance of assessing the reliability of scientific evidence and how trial judges must act as gatekeepers to weed out ""junk” science; concluding that the scientific testimony of a psychologist on the reliability of eyewitness identification is relevant and may be admissible). 38 . 354 S.W.3d 425, 435-36 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 94

    ### Response:
    holding that psychologists testimony on the reliability of eyewitness testimony was both relevant and reliable and thus should have been admitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interest in monitoring probationers. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164. In Samson, the Supreme Court held that the state had a legitimate supervisory interest in warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees. Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2200-01. Specifically, this interest was considered legitimate because parolees are more likely to commit crimes in the future, and expeditious supervisory measures are required in order to prevent parolees from having the opportunity to “anticipate searches and conceal criminality.” Id. at 2201. This rationale finds foundation in the impracticability of obtaining a search warrant, a rationale similar to the underlying motivation used to support the administrative or “special needs” exception. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (<HOLDING>). The search at issue in Samson involved a

    ### Response:
    holding a search permissible where the officer reasonably believed he faced an emergency situation that would result in the destruction of evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“The underlying idea [of double jeopardy] ... is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty""). 13 . Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672-73, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). 14 . Id. at 676, 102 S.Ct. 2083. 15 . Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). 16 . Peterson, 117 S.W.3d at 815, n. 37 (citing Bauder, 921 S.W.2d at 699). 17 . Id. at 816-17. 18 . See, e.g., People v. Batts, 30 Cal.4th 660, 666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67, 68 P.3d 357, 361 (2003) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original); see also United States

    ### Response:
    holding that the state constitutional double jeopardy clause may bar retrial when the prosecutor subjectively believes that an acquittal was likely when he intentionally committed misconduct and the court determines from an objective perspective that the misconduct actually deprived the defendant of the reasonable prospect of an acquittal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is essential.”) As fuel break maintenance is necessary and foreseeable, the effects of such maintenance must be addressed within the EIS. See Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 720 (9th Cir.1988) (“[A]n EIS must cover subsequent phase of development when ‘[t]he dependency is such that it would be irrational, or at least unwise, to undertake the first phase, if subsequent phases were not also undertaken.’ ”); Blue Mountains, 161 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring EIS to consider five related timber sales where actions part of one recovery strategy and were reasonably foreseeable); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (requiring that EIS consider reasonably foreseeable future actions); Cf. Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps, 222 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the

    ### Response:
    holding eis did not need to consider subsequent phases of project where impractical to do so because subsequent phases had not received approval and many planning decisions had not been made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the above-mentioned classes employing any person in this Commonwealth.” 8 . See Second Supplemental Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff Scungio Borst & Associates in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of Robert DeBolt, undated, at 1-3 (R.R. at 66-68). 9 . 410 SLD and Kenworth did not appeal the judgment against them and are not involved in the instant appeal. 10 . See, inter alia, Ward v. Whalen, Í8 Pa. D. & C.3d 710 (Ct.Com.Pl.Allegheny 1981) (Wettick, J.) (interpreting Section 260.2a as permitting actions against agents in their personal capacities); Amalgamated Cotton Garment and Allied Indus. Fund v. Dion, 341 Pa.Super. 12, 491 A.3d 123 (1985) (approving Ward but limiting it to instances where an employer itself defaults); Mohney v. McClure, 390 Pa.Super. 338, 568 A.2d 682 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Act of Feb. 17, 1994, P.L. 73, No. 7 §

    ### Response:
    holding that such actions are permissible only against officers and agents involved in salient decisionmaking
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with Appellee’s chiropractic business. Though Appellant contends that Mr. Bodkin’s testimony was not based upon a sound valuation method and competent evidence, as required by Helfer I, this Court disagrees. Mr. Bodkin reviewed both experts’ written reports and his testimony revealed that he was clearly knowledgeable with regard to their valuation calculations. He explained, in detail, why he found the valuation calculation of Appellant wife’s expert to be seriously flawed and why he concurred with the valuation formulated by Appellee husband’s expert. Both Mr. Bodkin and Mr. Costanzo agreed that the business has no excess earnings, which supported Mr. Bodkin’s conclusion that there is no enterprise goodwill to be valued. See May, 214 W.Va. at 406 n. 18, 589 S.E.2d at 548 n. 18 (<HOLDING>)’” (quoting Alicia Brokars Kelly, “Sharing a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that  goodwill is excess earning power once the normal rate of return for identifiable tangible and intangible assets is determined any rate of return in excess of a normal return is attributable to unidentifiable intangible assets  goodwill
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Hughes Unit {e.g., the potentially small number of Native American religious adherents). That issues of fact remain as to the neutrality of the application of TDCJ’s volunteer policy differentiates this case from those we have previously considered. Requiring neutrality ensures that the prison’s application of its policy is actually based on the justifications it purports, and not something more nefarious. Were we to ignore Turner’s neutrality requirement, we would allow prison regulators to justify a policy based on a legitimate interest applicable to the overall prison population, while applying the policy in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner in violation of a particular subgroup’s First Amendment rights. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Cit 69 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Dingle v. Zon, 189 Fed.Appx. 8, 10 (2d.

    ### Response:
    holding that issue of material fact as to neutrality in application of prison regulation required reversal of district courts grant of summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    751 (1888) (“The provision of the present constitution enlarging the homestead exemption cannot be given retroactive application ... so as to embrace in 1877 all property which in 1859 did not exceed in value the enlarge exemption prescribed by the constitution of 1876, without regard to value in 1877.”); Wright v. Straub, 64 Tex. 64, 66 (1885); McLane v. Paschal, 62 Tex. 102, 106-07 (1884). 12 . See Dallas Power & Light Co. v. Loomis, 672 S.W.2d 309, 310 (Tex.App.—Dallas, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 13 . See In re Niland, 825 F.2d 801, 807 n. 2 (5th Cir.1987) (suggesting that earlier amendments were not retroactive until Tex. Prop. Code § 41.002(c), passed in 1984, applied changes in the definition of homestead to homesteads ""whenever created”); In re Starns, 52 B.R. 405, 413 (S.D.Tex.1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Barnhart, 47 B.R. 277, 282

    ### Response:
    holding that amendment receives retroactive application because tex propcode  41001c provides retroactivity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to stay. This Court reviews the decision of the Bankruptcy Court to decline to award the requested sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. Jones v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 617 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir.2010) (reiterating that the Sixth Circuit reviews the decision of the District Court to award sanctions under Rule 11 under an abuse of discretion standard). The Docket Sheet of the Adversary Proceedings identifies Judge Clark’s decision of February 13, 2003, as Adv. Doc. #287. That document is not, however, part of the record on appeal in this matter. This Court is unable to review this assignment of error since Wenrick, the Appellant, neglected to include Judge Clark’s decision in the record on appeal. Hicks v. Floyd County Bd. of Ed., 99 Fed.Appx. 603, 605-06 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). See also United States v. Johnson, 584 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that it could not review the district courts rulings on the admissibility of exhibits since they were not included in the record on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if it has “good cause therefor” and if “the dismissal is not to avoid the provisions of Rule 8.” See State v. Johnson, 113 Ariz. 506, 508, 557 P.2d 1063, 1065 (1976) (“Absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecution or prejudice to the defendant, the State may move to dismiss a prosecution, and the court may grant the motion, at any time.”). Once the case is dismissed, the Rule 8 time limits begin anew. State v. Mendoza, 170 Ariz. 184, 187, 823 P.2d 51, 54 (1992). ¶ 21 In this case, the State sought dismissal of the information so that it could present the case to the grand jury under the correct theory of the offense. A trial court could reasonably find that this was “good cause” and “not to avoid the provisions of Rule 8.” See Johnson, 113 Ariz. at 508, 557 P.2d at 1065 (<HOLDING>). The law does not support the statement that

    ### Response:
    holding that if the states criminal complaint against defendant had a jurisdictional defect the prosecution had the right to attempt to correct the defect and a motion to dismiss is one method of doing this
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that will trigger heightened federal substantive due process protection from statutory sex offender registration schemes. See Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 479 (6th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1053, 120 S.Ct. 1554, 146 L.Ed.2d 460 (2000); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F.Supp.2d 456, 467 (S.D.N.Y.1998); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied sub nom. Russell v. Gregoire, 523 U.S. 1007, 118 S.Ct. 1191, 140 L.Ed.2d 321 (1998); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1102-04 (3rd Cir.1997), cert. denied sub nom. W.P. v. Verniero, 522 U.S. 1109, 118 S.Ct. 1039, 140 L.Ed.2d 105 (1998); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1268-69 (3rd Cir.1996); see also Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 1164, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712, 96 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding convicted sex offender had not been deprived of liberty interest for purposes of procedural due process challenge to sorp
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the M.T. Cole “A” lease, we hold there is no evidence of the factors enumerated in section 2.03(a) of the Act of an intent of the parties to create a partnership for any business purpose other than the purpose that is unenforceable under the statute of frauds. There is no evidence that Phelps and Helms had a right to receive a share of profits from any business other than the development of the M.T. Cole “A” lease and there is no evidence of a written agreement to share any specific percentage of profits with respect to any specific ownership interest in the lease. There is no evidence of an intent to be partners in anything other the development of the field, which would require the establishment of a joint venture and a joint operating agreement, both 4 S.W.2d 334, 335 (1939) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we sustain issues four and six.

    ### Response:
    holding damage award immaterial when no liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the ensuing loss provisions do not provide coverage for the claimed loss. Bad Faith and CPA Claims Capelouto also contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his bad faith and CPA claims. Our review of the trial court’s dismissal of these claims is de novo, and we note that we may sustain the trial court’s judgment on any theory established by the pleadings and proof. Stuart v. American States Ins. Co., 134 Wn.2d 814, 818, 953 P.2d 462 (1998); Weiss v. Glemp, 127 Wn.2d 726, 730, 903 P.2d 455 (1995). In Coventry Associates v. American States Insurance Co., 136 Wn.2d 269, 961 P.2d 933 (1998), our Supreme Court recently held that a first party insured may have a cause of action against an insurer for bad faith even in the absence of coverage. See Coventry, 136 Wn.2d at 277-83 (<HOLDING>). Our laws require insurance companies to “be

    ### Response:
    holding however that a first party insured is not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and without proper instructions, the probability of prejudice is great); see also State v. White, 246 S.C. 502, 144 S.E.2d 481 (1965) (finding where the jury had absolute discretion with regard to the issue of mercy, it was impossible to determine whether the solicitor’s improper argument actually prejudiced defendant; however, the probability of prejudice was great, and defendant was entitled to a new trial). The solicitor’s improper comments prevented petitioner from having the jury fairly consider the possible sentencing alternatives. Further, the jury instructions failed to cure the prejudice caused by these comments. Thus, because the probability for prejudice is great, we grant petitioner a new trial on the burglary charge. See Chubb v. State, 303 S.C. 395, 401 S.E.2d 159 (1991) (<HOLDING>). As to the portion of the closing argument

    ### Response:
    holding because determination of guilt and whether mercy should be recommended should be made in one proceeding by the same jury petitioner is entitled to a new trial on the burglary charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    wrong” but she was correct. In Civil Action No. l:03-CV-023-C, Plaintiff complained that “Nurse Janet” had denied him medical tre or Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 138, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (applauding the institution of grievance procedures by prisons but not suggesting that such procedures are constitutionally required); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir.1996) (“[A] state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir.1994) (“[T]he Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or access to any such procedure voluntarily established by a state.”); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir.1993) (quotation omitted) (<HOLDING>); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that a prison grievance procedure is not a substantive right and does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of harm posed by the conditions. Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir.2004); Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 267-68 (8th Cir.1996). Even if the Court accepts as true all of Plaintiffs allegations regarding the conditions he encountered at the CCDC, he has failed to establish that those conditions created a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (explaining that “extreme deprivations” are required in order to sustain a conditions of confinement claim, and that “only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis” of a constitutional violation); Wilson v. Setter, 501 U.S. 294, 305, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, as to the subjective element,

    ### Response:
    holding that nothing so amorphous as overall conditions can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the United States, 497 F.3d 972 (9th Cir.2007). In that case, the Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (“Cedars-Sinai”) brought a state-law action against the administrator of a federal employees’ benefit plan alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation in connection with partial reimbursement of claims for medical treatment. The administrator removed the suit to federal district court. Id. at 974. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that Cedars-Sinai’s claims were preempted by the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”), 5 U.S.C. § 8901. FEHBA and ERISA are different federal statutes, but their preemption provisions are analytically similar. See, e.g., Botsford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., Inc., 314 F.3d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, our opinion in Cedars-Sinai was based

    ### Response:
    holding that fehbas complete preemption provision closely resembles erisas express preemption provision and precedent interpreting the erisa provision thus provides authority for cases involving the fehba provision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 321 F.Supp.2d 642, 647 (D.Md.2004) (finding that' conduct undertaken for personal reasons by law enforcement officers while they were off-duty and driving their personal cars was outside the scope of their employment under Maryland law). Indeed, the Maryland Court of Appeals has held that an employer is not liable for an employee’s off-duty operation of the employee’s personal vehicle, even where the employee is negligent in driving his personal vehicle to or from his place of employment. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 32-32, 660 A.2d 423 (1995). Additionally, where an employee engages in criminal conduct, such conduct is typically considered outside the scope of employment. See Tall ex rel. Tall v. Board of Sch. Comm’rs, 120 Md.App. 236, 259, 706 A.2d 659 (1998) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Dyar was off-duty at the time

    ### Response:
    holding that inter alia employees criminal conviction for alleged tortious act demonstrated employee was not acting in scope of his employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Trotter, No. 07 C 4749, 2012 WL 4060308, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 14, 2012) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Standard Bank & Trust, 172 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir.1999)). As for the accrual date, however, courts in this district have held that “it is reasonable for the [City] to have time to review plaintiffs’ fee petitions, like a client would have, without being charged interest.” Blackwell, 2012 WL 469962, at *12 (internal quotations omitted). Consistent with these rulings, the interest will accrue not from the date of judgment, but from “30 days after [P]laintiff submitted his fee information to the defense as required by Local Rule 54.3(d)(l)-(2).” Ragland, Slip Op., at 40. See also Judah M. v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, Dist. 299, 798 F.Supp.2d 942, 953-54 (N.D.Ill.2011) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff submitted his Local Rule 54.3(d)

    ### Response:
    holding that prejudgment interest should accrue 30 days after fee petition was filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    extinguished and “the patentee’s only protection is that afforded under the patent law.” Id. This black-letter rule is rooted in principles of the supremacy of federal law. Id. (“These provisions of federal patent law prevail over any inconsistent State remedies.”). Here, plaintiff contends that its agent, William Cohen, contacted Reebok in May 1986 “for the purpose of exploring Reebok’s interest in manufacturing and/or marketing athletic footwear utilizing plaintiffs air bladder trade secret.” (First Am.Compl. ¶ 12.) The gravamen of plaintiffs state law claims is thus that Reebok used plaintiffs trade secret in the development of The Pump shoe line. Plaintiff Stutz’s Rule 30(b)(6) designee, Warren Liu, has stated in deposition testimony that the trade secr .Supp. 523, 533 (D.Cal.1958) (<HOLDING>). Here, it is undisputed that Reebok did not

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff could recover royalties only for products manufactured by defendant after disclosure of secret but before issuance of patent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by incorporation of federal law. The United States Supreme Court has resolved only a handful of cases in the civil rights area over the years. The literature is full of documentation of various splits in the federal circuits on numerous questions that the Supreme Court has not resolved. The stability of incorporating a handful of Supreme Court precedents is outweighed by dragging into Iowa law the many controversies in the federal caselaw that have not been resolved. 23 .No one would suggest, for instance, that if Iowa were to adopt a statute modeled after the statute of another state, we would be compelled to follow the interpretations of the supreme court of the other state in interpretation of Iowa law, See Crosby v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 276 So.2d 661, 665 (Miss. 1973) (<HOLDING>). 24 . For an interesting discussion, see Tyler

    ### Response:
    holding that when mississippi adopted a statute modeled after a georgia enactment decisions of the georgia courts did not bind mississippi courts in interpretation of the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This determination is consistent with cases from other courts that have emphasized the distinction between the product and the process of tattooing and have held that the physical process of tattooing is conduct subject to Spence’s “sufficiently imbued” test. See, e.g., Hold Fast Tattoo, 580 F.Supp.2d at 660 (analyzing tattooing under Spence’s framework based on the premise that “[t]he act of tattooing is one step removed from the actual expressive conduct”); Yurkew, 495 F.Supp. at 1253-54 (regardless of “whether ... the image conveyed by the tattoo[ ] is an art form or amounts to art,” “the process of tattooing is undeniably conduct” that is subject to the Spence test). These courts then held that tattooing fails the Spence test. See, e.g., Hold Fast Tattoo, 580 F.Supp.2d at 660 (<HOLDING>); Yurkew, 495 F.Supp. at 1253-54 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that the act of tattooing  itself is not intended to convey a particularized message
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we have jurisdiction over the appeal from that order and vacate it because the legislature has specified that such registration orders must be entered at the time of sentencing. 1 . Serrano still may seek relief pursuant to Rule 32.1(f), Ariz. R.Crim. P. See State v. Whitman, 684 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 7, n. 2, 234 Ariz. 565, 324 P.3d 851, 2014 WL 1385396 (Ariz. Apr. 9, 2014). 2 . The terms of § 13-3821 do not prohibit a trial court from requiring sex offender registration following a suspended sentence and revocation of probation, and we do not address that situation here. Similarly, this case does not concern registration of a juvenile offender, for whom the statute prescribes different procedures. See § 13-3821(D); In re Javier B„ 230 Ariz. 100, ¶ 1, 280 P.3d 644, 645 (App.2012) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The current language in § 13 — 4033(A)(3)

    ### Response:
    holding an order imposing sex offender registration after the juvenile courts initial disposition can be a final appealable order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    identity of the owner and operator of Hospital Damas) and that the issue was actually litigated before and adjudicated by the bankruptcy court—were erroneous. Along similar lines, L.C.V. does not make any argument with respect to prongs three and four: that the bankruptcy court decided the issue in a final judgment and that the resolution of the issue was essential to the bankruptcy court’s judgment on the merits. In light of L.C.V.’s failure to offer a discrete argument that any of these issue-preclusion prerequisites have not been met, we need not dwell on them. See Robb Evans, 850 F.3d at 32 (sidestepping consideration of three prerequisites that were not challenged by party resisting issue preclusion and limiting analysis to only prerequisite in dispute); Daniels, 736 F.3d at 88 (<HOLDING>). Instead, we proceed to tackle L.C.V.’s

    ### Response:
    holding that party resisting issue preclusion waived for lack of developed argumentation any argument that issue was not the same in earlier and later cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (stating that “[t]his Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”). The recipient of a mailed item, on the other hand, has a reasonable expectation that the mail will not be detained by postal employees beyond the normal delivery date and time. In other words, an addressee’s possessory interest is in the timely delivery of a package, not in “having his package routed on a particular conveyor belt, sorted in a particular area, or stored in any particular sorting bin for a particular amount of time.” United States v. Demoss, 279 F.3d 632, 639 (8th Cir.2002) (Hansen J., concurring). See also England, 971 F.2d at 420-21 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Vasquez, 213 F.3d 425, 426

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no fourth amendment seizure where delivery of package was not delayed because it is the extent of the interference with the defendants possessory interest in the property that determines whether a seizure has occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an enterprise which was engaged in racketeering activity. Government Brief at 27. According to the Government: Although many of the substantive offenses in the [Redacted Superseding] Indictment charge only some of the [Defendants, all of those counts are charged as schemes in connection with the RICO conspiracy. Thus, although each defendant may have had a different role in the RICO conspiracy, all defendants were centrally involved in the conspiracy. Id. at 27-28; see United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 447, 106 S.Ct. 725, 731, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (explaining that joinder of multiple defendants in a single trial is proper under Rule 8 when an indictment “charge[s] all the defendants with one overall count of conspiracy”); United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 719 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1372, 131

    ### Response:
    holding that there was a sufficient basis for joinder of seven defendants in a single trial where all the defendants were charged with participation in a single overarching drug conspiracy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    checkpoint. He asserts that the defendants unconstitutionally retaliated against his exercise of that right when they arrested him for doing so. The district court dismissed this claim after finding it was reasonable to restrict filming at an airport security checkpoint, a nonpublic forum. The defendants add that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they reasonably believed they had probable cause to arrest Mocek, and at the time of the arrest, it was not clearly established that plaintiffs could maintain retaliation claims for arrests supported by probable cause. We agree. To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected activity, (2) the government’s actions caused him injury that w (3d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 130 Fed.Appx.

    ### Response:
    holding there was no clearly established right to videotape police officers during a traffic stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    United States v. Resto, 824 F.2d 210, 211-12 (2d Cir.1987) (upholding sufficiency of evidence to support defendant’s conviction for aiding sale of narcotics, including expert testimony explaining that “steerer” typically stands short distance from dealer to solicit and screen potential buyers and guide them to dealer); United States v. Cruz, 797 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir.1986) (sustaining admissibility of expert testimony concerning practice of exchanging food stamps for narcotics); United States v. Khan, 787 F.2d 28, 34 (2d Cir.1986) (upholding trial court’s admission of expert testimony concerning customs of narcotics dealers in Pakistan, including testimony about heroin prices and transfers of heroin with payment deferred); United States v. Daniels, 723 F.2d 31, 32-33. (8th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pugliese, 712 F.2d 1574,

    ### Response:
    holding admissible expertwitness testimony that drug dealers commonly register cars and apartments in names of female friends to conceal narcotics activities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regarding the failure of the trial court to conduct an in camera inspection. CONCLUSION We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 1 . Appellees are the Texas Department of Public Safety Officers Association (“DPSOA”); Billy Don Ivey, Jerry Moore, and Charlie Adams (members of the Board of Directors of DPSOA); Mary Pat Becnel, now Maty Pat Holt (a former employee of DPSOA); and Jeff Heard, individually and d/b/a Jeff Heard & Company, and Jeff Heard & Company, P.C. (DPSOA’s accountant and his firm). 2 . Although Ginsberg involved the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the decision is premised on self-incrimination cases. See, e.g., Henson v. Citizens Bank, 549 S.W.2d 446 (Tex.Civ.App. — East-land 1977, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The supreme court in Republic Insurance

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff in a civil action could be forced to either elect to invoke the privilege against selfincrimination or abandon the claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of. A. Error as to Jury Instructions Given 148 We will first dispose of the Gorostietas' argument regarding jury instructions 16, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, and 28. ""It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed."" State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 111, 974 P.2d 269; Walker v. U.S. Gen., Inc., 916 P.2d 908, 908 (Utah 1996). Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the ""[bJrief of the appellant shall contain ... [an] argument [that] shall contain the contentio . 3655, 1995 WL 1315955, 1995 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 11, **17 (affirming admission of bills where physician testified as to reasonableness and necessity); Martinez v. Kurdziel, 612 A.2d 669, 676 (R.1.1992) (<HOLDING>); Castillo v. Am. Garment Finishers Corp., 965

    ### Response:
    holding that statute does not remove plaintiffs burden of proving causation and reasonableness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inconsistent out-of-court statements of a state witness which had implicated a defendant in the murder of a cashier at a gas station. The witness in Moffett, like the witnesses in the instant case, admitted making the prior statement but insisted that the contents were untrue. Moffett, 456 So.2d at 717. The Court in Moffett explained that where a nonparty witness admitted making the prior out-of-court statements, the statements where reduced to written form, should never be introduced into evidence. Id. at 719. The basis for not allowing such prior inconsistent written statements into evidence is that no necessity for further proof exists with respect to such statements once an admission of the prior inconsistency has been made. Id.; see Davis v. State, 431 So.2d 468, 473 (Miss.1983) (<HOLDING>); Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss.1975)

    ### Response:
    recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    L. King, 6 Collier on Bankruptcy § 727.16[1] at pp. 727-72, 727-73. To the extent necessary, the Motion to Dismiss will be treated as a motion for summary judgment on stipulated facts. 3 .FRCP 12(b)(6) is incorporated in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012, applicable in adversary proceedings in bankruptcy. 4 . The opinion of another court in this District in Caughey v. Succa (In re Succa), 125 B.R. 168 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1991) (Monroe, Bankr. J.), has been cited as holding that equitable tolling applied to § 727(e)(1). See Roost v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds ), 189 B.R. 199, 201 (Bankr.D.Or.1995). The court in Sueca, unlike many courts addressing the issue, held that equitable tolling applies to § 727(e)(2). See e.g., Davis v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 187 B.R. 984 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1995) (<HOLDING>); contra, Dwyer v. Peebles (In re Peebles)

    ### Response:
    holding that equitable tolling does not apply to  727e2 malloy v frank in re frank 146 br 851 bankrndokla1992 same
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Encinitos fails to discuss how it was harmed as a result of any delay. See id. Accordingly, we conclude ExxonMobil did not waive its right to mandamus relief. CONCLUSION We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying ExxonMobil’s motion to abate. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The trial court is ordered to (1) vacate the June 21, 2010 Order Denying Defendants’ Amended Motion to Abate, and (2) enter an order granting Defendants’ Amended Motion to Abate. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply within fourteen days. 2 . Encinitos Ranch, et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., et al., No. 07-12-14420-CV (79th Dist. Ct., Brooks County, Tex.). 3 . See In re AutoNation, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 663, 668 (Tex.2007) (orig.proceeding) (<HOLDING>); In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 118

    ### Response:
    holding that mandamus was appropriate for forum selection clauses because failing to enforce such a clause resulted in judicial inefficiency by enabling forumshopping wasting judicial resources delaying adjudication on the merits and skewing settlement dynamics contrary to the parties contractedfor expectations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shown that the Defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with New York to exercise personal jurisdiction over them without violating due process and offending traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Jurisdiction Over NIBC Has Not Been Established With respect to NIBC Capital, Aquiline has not cited to a New York contact of jurisdictional significance. As noted above, the Plaintiff has not contested the facts set forth in the Verhoog Declaration. While Plaintiff alleges that NIBC Capital sent certain emails and faxes to New York in response to Aquiline’s solicitation of business in Belgium, those sporadic contacts are not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over NIBC Capital. See, e.g., Pryor, Cashman, Sherman & Flynn v. Haisfield, 1990 WL 165687, at **2-3 (<HOLDING>). Bernstein acknowledges in her affidavit that

    ### Response:
    holding that two meet ings in new york and numerous telephone calls and correspondence to new york were not sufficient to confer jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael M. Hachigian appeals a summary judgment in favor of Transcontinental Insurance Co. (“Transcontinental”) in a diversity action alleging the breach of an insurance contract and a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. We affirm the grant of summary judgment. Hachigian’s malpractice insurance policy covered “claims made against [Hachigian] and reported to [Transcontinental] during [the] policy term.” The policy defined “claim” as “the receipt of a demand for money or services, naming [insured] and alleging a wrongful act.” Because California’s notice-prejudice rule does not apply to “claims made” policies, the terms of Transcontinental’s contract with Hachigian should be strictly enforced. See Burns v. International Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Accord Helfand v. National Union Fire Ins.

    ### Response:
    holding that noticeprejudice rule does not apply to claimsmade policies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    standard is satisfied only if she actually suffered a physical impairment that substantially limited one or more of her major life activities.”). Additionally, neither Jackowski’s knowledge of Coming’s health conditions nor human resources employees’ awareness of, or maintaining a file pertaining to, Coming’s FMLA leave establishes that Corning had a record of disability. See Shepard v. UPS, Inc., 470 Fed.Appx. 726, 730-31 (11th Cir.2012) (“Shepard cannot demonstrate that he had a record of having an impairment based solely on his pri- or medical leaves of absence and testimony that it was common knowledge at UPS that he had leukemia, because he failed also to produce evidence that his impairment substantially limited him in a major life activity.”); Reis, 442 F.Supp.2d at 1248-49 (<HOLDING>); Coleman v. Ga. Power Co., 81 F.Supp.2d 1365,

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of discussions with a supervisor regarding a health condition submission of various doctors notes to a former supervisor hospitalization and the occurrence of several telephone calls reporting her hospitalization was insufficient to show a record of disability because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that her impairment substantially limited a major life activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the doubt or should have questioned the prosecutor’s credibility. We conclude that this determination was an unreasonable determination of the facts because the prosecutor failed to offer any credible justification for striking Jurors 016 and 019. First, we note that the prosecutor consistently identified Jurors 016 and 019 as “both young.” However, the record re veals that Juror 019 was at least a middle-aged grandmother. Indeed, Juror 019 informed the court that she was a retired nurse with seven grown children, the youngest of which had five children of her own. A prosecutor supplied with this information could not credibly identify Juror 019 as young. This incorrect factual statement supports Collins’ argument that the prosecutor was not credible. See McClain, 217 F.3d at 1222 (<HOLDING>); Caldwell v. Maloney, 159 F.3d 639, 651 (1st

    ### Response:
    holding that reasons for excusing black jurors that were objectively contradicted by the record provided evidence of purposeful discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    — was visible from the location of the first sign. The operational plan to be implemented by the checkpoint was two-fold. Law enforcement officers stationed at the checkpoint itself were to request and examine motorists’ driver’s licenses and vehicle registration cards and be alert for impaired drivers. In addition, narcotics officers observing from unmarked vehicles nearby were to watch for motorists who threw items out of their vehicles or who made u-turns or other evasive actions upon seeing the “K-9 CHECK POINT AHEAD” signs. The narcotics officers planned to investigate any vehicle involved in such conduct. The narcotics on was properly admitted as evidence seized pursuant to a lawful arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nelson, 102 F.3d 1344, 1346

    ### Response:
    holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he received and read the letter. „ He further testified that he was able to read the determination and understand that he disagreed with its conclusions. He argues only that he failed to properly comprehend the notice of his rights to appeal. In support, the only evidence regarding good cause for the late filing was Westbrook’s own testimony, and we defer to the Commission regarding witness credibility. Lucido, 441 S.W.3d at 174 (citation omitted). Although Westbrook broadly argues that it is “illogical” for the Appeals Tribunal to make assumptions based on “facts that are ... not in the record,” we find nothing in the decision that is illogical or based o d not establish good cause by showing he misplaced the document); Taylor v. St. Louis Arc, Inc., 285 S.W.3d 775 (Mo.App.E.D.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because competent and substantial evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that claimant did not establish good cause because she erroneously thought the determination was not final
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of, or immediately after, the return of the verdict.” Azimi v. Jordan’s Meats, Inc., 456 F.3d 228, 240 (1st Cir.2006) (emphasis added). The Azimi court noted that this rule allows a plaintiff to avoid the tactical dilemma that occurs when a plaintiff is forced to choose between asking for only compensatory damages and risking a zero-dollar verdict, on one hand, or requesting a nominal damages instruction and giving the jury an easy “out” on the other hand. Id. Miller argues that this is the dilemma he faced. Before addressing the tactical dilemma issue, it must first be noted that, although .the First Circuit has adopted an exception to Rule 51(c)(2), many circuits that have addressed similar issues have declined to do so. See Oliver v. Falla, 258 F.3d 1277, 1282 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Piaubert v. MacIntosh, 10 Fed.Appx. 503 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that the right to nominal damages for eighth amendment violations can be waived if such damages are not timely requested
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of 1992, and legal review was the “main work” on the film through July of that year. This evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to appellee, does not raise a fact issue as to the existence of actual malice. The evidence, which we have reviewed in its entirety, shows only that the legal department took a protracted amount of time to review Women on Trial. It does not show that the legal review was based on fears that statements in the documentary were untrue and were known to be untrue by those involved in the production. Appellee’s suspicions about the reasons appellant’s legal department chose to “continuously” review the film and decided to indemnify Joseph Feu-ry Productions, Inc. is not sufficient to raise a material issue of fact. See Schauer, 856 S.W.2d at 450 (<HOLDING>) (citing International & G.N.R. Co. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that mere surmise or suspicion of malice does not carry the probative force necessary to form the basis of a legal inference of malice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Columbia v. Whitley, 640 A.2d 710, 712 (D.C. 1994) (quoting Mason v. United States, 346 A.2d 250, 251 (D.C. 1975)). 3 .The complaining witness had been served with a subpoena, but the government neither sought enforcement of the subpoena nor notified the court that the witness was under subpoena. The trial judge indicated that had he been informed of these facts, he ""probably would have not dismissed the case” but only reassessed Lyles’ bond arrangements. 4 . District of Columbia Circuit precedent prior to February 1, 1971, is binding on this court. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971). 5 . The opinion does not specify whether the oral dismissal was with or without prejudice or dis 1, 466 P.2d 755, 757 (1970)); Gowler v. Oklahoma, 589 P.2d 682, 688 (Okla.Crim. App.1978) (<HOLDING>). 8 . In Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462,

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial judge has unquestionable authority to withdraw an order of dismissal that has not been fully perfected by filing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as defined in section 790.001(13). A “weapon” is defined in section 790.001(13) as “any dirk, knife, metallic knuckles, slungshot, billie, tear gas gun, chemical weapon or device, or other deadly weapon.” § 790.001(13), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). Again, since a BB gun is not enumerated, in order to be prohibited under section 790.115(2), the subsection charged, it must be a deadly weapon. See Hutchinson v. State, 816 So.2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (reversing conviction for robbery with a weapon, to wit a starter pistol, because the starter pistol did not fall within the definition of weapon supplied in section 790.001(13), unless the pistol was considered deadly, and there was no evidence to support such a finding); Mitchell v. State, 698 So.2d 555, 559-60 (Fla. 2d DCA) (<HOLDING>), approved, 703 So.2d 1062 (Fla.1997). “A

    ### Response:
    holding that a bb gun is not a firearm and thus falls within chapter 790s definition of weapon only if it is an other deadly weapon
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    location upon its return. See Davidson, supra; State v. Prine (Mar. 6, 1991), Summit App. No. 14780, unreported, 1991 WL 35156 (noting that “in resolving any perceived inconsistency between this holding and that of any prior case, the reader is advised that the holding of this case has been approved by a majority of the members of the court”); State v. Brenner (July 30, 1990), Butler App. No. CA8909-127, unreported, 1990 WL 107319; State v. Smoot (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 702, 600 N.E.2d 772; State v. Burton (Nov. 29, 1991), Lake App. No. 90-L-15-138, unreported, 1991 WL 252865 (stating that it was inclined to follow the interpretation in Prine, supra, but was not required to reach that issue). But, see, State v. Young (Apr. 11, 1991), Delaware App. No. 90-CA-40, unreported, 1991 WL 57176 (<HOLDING>). Holzapfel does not allege that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a failure to conduct a new rfi survey after removing the instrument for repairs does not comply with ohio admcode 37015302c
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the timing of the wife’s complaints, three months after the alleged threatening calls, as well as the timing of Anura’s application for asylum and generation of documents mere weeks before the deadline, appeared to be the creation of evidence rather than the credible recitation of events. The record does not compel the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Pal v. INS, 204 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir.2000). Further, the IJ found that even if Anura had been credible in his account of the alleged threatening incidents, they would not have amounted to past persecution. Threats standing alone “constitute past persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual ‘suffering or harm.’ ” Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The IJ also reasonably discounted Anura’s

    ### Response:
    holding that alien who had received numerous death threats and whose colleagues were murdered by the military had not proven past persecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the time limitation should be tolled for the 170 days when the application was out of his hands. We disagree. As the district court convincingly noted: “Mr. Marsh chose to rely upon assistance from the prison legal access attorney and an inmate law clerk despite the fact that he was raising in the state courts only the unexhausted claims he already had raised in federal court.” R. doc. 11, at 5-6. The fact that an inmate law clerk was assisting in drafting the state petition does not relieve Mr. Marsh from the personal responsibility of complying with the law. See Henderson v. Johnson, 1 F.Supp.2d 650, 655 (N.D.Tex.1998) (noting that although inmate had received assistance from fellow inmate, he could have filed the petition himself at any time); see also Steed, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Mr. Marsh asserts that between the

    ### Response:
    holding that attorney miscalculation of aedpa time period did not justify equitable tolling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. 563, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977), the Court held that under subsection 1202(a), proof that the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce was sufficient to satisfy the statutorily required nexus between the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and commerce. Although Scarborough was a possession case rather than a receipt case, the Court noted parenthetically that there was no congressional intent to support a distinction between the two: “Congress was not particularly concerned with the impact on commerce except as a means to insure the constitutionality of Title VII.... All indications are that Congress meant to reach possessions broadly.” Id. at 575 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. at 1969 n. 11. See also United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1347 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 999

    ### Response:
    recognizing scarborough holding that commerce nexus satisfied upon showing that possessed firearm had traveled at some time in interstate commerce
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his misrepresentations was justifiable. Mr. Ragonese strenuously argues that it was not, based upon the Falcones’ knowledge of certain facts, including the incompleteness of the project, Mr. Ragonese’s history of absence from the project, and the threatened subcontractor’s lien. Although Mr. Ragonese argues cursorily in his brief that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that his misrepresentations caused the Falcones’ loss, he excluded this issue from his Statement of Issues. During oral argument, Mr. Ra-gonese admitted that he had not raised the causation issue below and that he included it in his brief on appeal essentially as an afterthought. We therefore deem the causation issue waived. See City Sanitation, LLC v. Burdick (In re Am. Cartage, Inc.), 438 B.R. 1, 9-10 (D.Mass.2010) (<HOLDING>). The Falcones argue that their rebanee on Mr.

    ### Response:
    holding that where issue raised for first time on appeal was not encompassed or inferred by any listed issue it is waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the testimony of the witness. However, contradiction of collateral facts by other evidence is not permitted, as its only effect would be to show that the witness is capable of error on immaterial points, and to allow it would confuse the issues and unduly prolong the trial. State v. Kimble, 140 N.C. App. 153, 167, 535 S.E.2d 882, 891 (2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 178, 626 S.E.2d 833 (2005). While the denial of a conviction may be contradicted by extrinsic evidence from a public record, the facts surrounding prior convictions will normally be collateral, and extrinsic evidence is inadmissible if used solely to contradict the witness’ denial of such collateral matters. See State v. Dalton, 96 N.C. App. 65, 70, 384 S.E.2d 573, 576 (1989) (<HOLDING>); State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 517, 212 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants denial of a conviction may be contradicted by introducing public records which prove such a conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1252, 1256 (10th Cir.1998) (observing that a warrantless arrest is permissible “if facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing an offense”) (quotation omitted and italics omitted). Owens also stated that the Eidsons’ son had “turned [them] in,” Aplt. App. at 359, when in fact, the mother and grandmother of their son’s girlfriend had contacted law enforcement. Owens’ statement may have led the Eidsons to think that resistance to a search would have been futile, as their unlawful conduct had been exposed by someone with direct knowledge of it. See United States v. Escobar, 389 F.3d 781, 786 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). But it appears that Owens was merely stating

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants consent to a search of their luggage was undermined by officers misrepresentation that a drug dog had alerted to their luggage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their actual knowledge may be imputed to the city. A title VII employer has actual knowledge of harassment that is known to “higher management” or to someone who has the power to take action to remedy the problem. See Nash, 9 F.3d at 404. The “management” and “remedial power” standards blur together, however, when we examine who may be considered “management,” for to be considered a “manager,” a person must have the ability to exert control over employees. This includes someone with the power not only to hire and fire the offending employee but also to take disciplinary action, to provide significant input into employment decisions, to instruct the offending employee to cease the harassing behavior, or to implement other means of taking remedial action. See Williamson, 148 F.3d at 466 (<HOLDING>) ; Nash, 9 F.3d at 404; Wattman, 875 F.2d at

    ### Response:
    holding that employer includes supervisor with some authority to address the harassment problem in organization with strong chain of command where supervisor could direct offender to cease and discipline if offender failed to comply
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    621 (2005), to conduct a full resentencing hearing and to impose a non-guideline sentence guided only by the sentencing goals set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). He acknowledges that U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10, p.s. (2008) limits the scope of the proceeding and the extent of the reduction the district court may make under § 3582(c)(2), but contends. that, after Booker, this policy statement must be regarded as advisory, not mandatory. We affirm. We review an order granting or denying a § 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 186 (4th Cir.2010). Lara-Alvarez’s claim is without merit because Booker is inapplicable to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. See Dillon v. United States, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2693-94, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that  3582c2 does not authorize a resentencing but merely provides for a sentence reduction within the bounds established by the sentencing commission and that booker does not apply to  3582c2 proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    basic underlying relationship. Like a switch from a dealership to a “tight agency” or a restructuring that leaves only the premium business in the dealer’s hands, a termination is surely a “change” in the parties’ relationship. Section 135.03 itself does not distinguish, for purposes of the good cause requirement, among actions that “terminate, cancel, fail to renew or substantially change” the dealership agreement. Thus, if Rexnord was entitled to argue that its own economic circumstances constituted good cause for its attempted change and its ultimate termination of Ziegler’s dealership, we see no logical reason why Zenith cannot attempt to do the same with respect to Morley-Murphy’s dealership. Cf. East Bay Running Store, Inc. v. NIKE, Inc., 890 F.2d 996, 1000 n. 6 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The Wisconsin Supreme Court was careful to

    ### Response:
    recognizing but not deciding that contrary to what remus held ziegler seemed to contemplate a grant orbased inquiry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    protected speech. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14, 16-17, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); see also Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990). Moreover, contribution regulations need not take the form of absolute dollar limits in order to prompt First Amendment scrutiny; by increasing the effort required to engage in political speech, restrictions on the permissible methods of funding such speech implicate free expression as well. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986) (recognizing a burden on speech when legislation allowed the plaintiff to make political expenditures only from a segregated fund); Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. Heideman, 504 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). By banning a contribution method preferred by

    ### Response:
    holding that idahos version of the vca burdened political speech
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Producers’ counsel acknowledged that netting is rational behavior, but stated that “we contend that the way the statute is written in these types of situations ... you have a problem being a buyer in the ordinary course [if you utilize netting].” The Court finds this contention, in light of established practices in the oil and gas industry, to be an untenable proposition. The Downstream Purchasers bought and sold oil and gas on credit with the Debtors agreeing to pay the following month. Although the Downstream Purchasers did not pay for the oil on the sale date, they gave “new value” in the form of a promise to pay, increasing the Debtors’ accounts receivable. This increase in accounts receivable is considered “new value.” See In re Black Diamond Mining Co., 2011 WL 6202905, at *24 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, payment in the form of oil is

    ### Response:
    holding that new value was created in the form of an increase in accounts receivable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    property or the validity of the tax assessment, appellant chose to ignore the notice. This citation provided appellant all the notice to which it was entitled when it was originally served with process and gave appellant the opportunity to appear and defend the suit. We overrule appellant’s first point of error. Rule 2 instrument in writing, the damages shall be assessed by the court, or under its direction, unless the defendant demands and is entitled to a trial by jury. Tex.R.Civ.P. 241. A claim is liquidated if the amount of damages may be accurately calculated by the trial court from the factual, as opposed to the conclu-sory, allegations in plaintiffs petition and the instrument in writing. Novosad v. Cunningham, 38 S.W.3d 767, 773 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.) (<HOLDING>); Mantis v. Resz, 5 S.W.3d 388, 392

    ### Response:
    holding that suit to recover amount due for professional services was a liquidated claim proved by written instruments where plaintiff attached original invoices to verified petition and motion for default judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that calls for the exercise of professional judgment (see 12/17/09 Tr. at 103; Defs.’ Mem. at 33 (“no credible argument can be made that there is a systemic lack of professional judgment exercised by treating professionals in the IDD system”)), that proposition is not supported by Youngberg. Youngberg expressly states that a court must “make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised ” in attempting to protect the rights of an involuntarily committed individual. 457 U.S. at 321, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). As other courts have recognized, in order for this requirement to have any substance, it cannot be met purely at the systemic level; rather, professional judgments must be implemented in a timely fashion. See, e.g., Thomas S., 902 F.2d at 252 (<HOLDING>); Halderman v. Pennhurst, 901 F.2d 311, 324 (3d

    ### Response:
    holding that district court properly imposed liability because it found that many of the decisions of the treating professionals had not been implemented and found areas in which the decisions of the treating professional substantially departed from accepted standards
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any evidence that CHL or McLennan relied upon AEC’s service letters or bulletins or that those letters and bulletins increased the risk to McLennan in any way. To the contrary, both CHL and McLennan ignored those warnings, and the record does not support any reasonable inference that AEC’s service letters and bulletins were misleading or that they masked the potential for danger in any way. We conclude that AEC did not owe McLennan any negligence-based, post-sale duty to warn. Even if McLennan were able to establish the applicability of either the Bradshaw duty or the negligent undertaking theory, any such duty would still be subject to the principle that there is no need to warn of dangers that are generally known. See In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 919 F.2d at 1085 (<HOLDING>); see also Argubright, 868 F.2d at 766; Hagans,

    ### Response:
    holding in a negligence action that the air traffic controllers failure to warn of an impending danger cannot be the proximate cause of an injury after the pilot himself discovered its presence appreciated the danger and decided to fly ahead into it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assert, there is no difference, under the circumstances of the case at bar, between a false imprisonment and false arrest claim, the inclusion of both theories in the complaint will make no difference. If, on the other hand, there is a difference, then plaintiffs are entitled to assert both claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(2) (authorizing alternative claims, and alternative statements of claims, regardless of consistency). The motion to dismiss the false arrest claim will be denied. IX Finally, the City challenges plaintiffs’ claim for an award of punitive damages against the City, noting that punitive damages are not available against a city under the relevant federal or state law. See e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (<HOLDING>); § 768.28(5), Fla. Stat. (indicating that

    ### Response:
    holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under  1988
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the fact that the object's incriminating character was not ""immediately apparent"" to the officer rendered the search outside the scope of Terry and thereby unconstitutional. Id. at 378-80, 113 S.Ct. at 2139. Applying these principles to the present case, we find that the officers properly stopped the car and properly initiated a pat-down search of Jackson. Further, we find that Officer Thompson properly removed the container from Jackson's pocket. We find, however, that Officer Thompson violated Jackson's fourth amendment rights when he seized the contents of the container, the identity of which was not ""immediately apparent"" to him. First, the officers were clearly justified in stopping the car for the traffic infraction. See Black v. State, 621 N.E.2d 368, 370 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. State, 527 N.E.2d 706, 708

    ### Response:
    holding that police officers may stop vehicles when they observe minor traffic violations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court order that found him to have committed “ethical violations.” Other than making the finding of attorney misconduct, this order neither expressly identified itself as a reprimand nor imposed any sanction, monetary or otherwise. The order was, however, mailed to every court in which Butler had been admitted to practice. Thus, the injury Butler may claim is the damage widely done to his professional reputation. The question of whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, therefore, distills to the question of when, if ever, an order thus affecting an attorney’s professional reputation imposes a legally sufficient injury to support appellate jurisdiction. For the reasons detailed below, we hold that it does. Heretofore we have not directly addressed this question. See id. at 1040 (<HOLDING>). Instead, we have held that damage to an

    ### Response:
    recognizing that we have not decided whether an attorney is directly aggrieved by an order simply finding misconduct and declining to decide the question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in conduct that would result in offensive bodily contact. It is undisputed in this case that there was actual force used in restraining and arresting Mr. Cunningham. The evidence presented at the trial demonstrated that the bodily contact was offensive in nature. Therefore, plaintiff has established the first two prongs of the test for a battery — namely, he has proved that there was bodily contact that was offensive in nature. Plaintiff must also prove that the offensive contact was “made with intent.” While the plaintiff must prove intentional contact, he “is not required to prove an intention to cause the specific injuries resulting from the contact.” Masters v. Becker, 22 A.D.2d 118, 120, 254 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (2d Dep’t 1964); see also Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d at 441 (<HOLDING>). The contact in this case was unquestionably

    ### Response:
    holding that federal employee committed a battery when he jumped on plaintiffs back and began to ride plaintiff piggyback resulting in plaintiff falling and being injured even though federal employee intended no harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the shipping company records indicated the weight of each shipment, the court estimated the weight of marijuana in each shipment by multiplying the total shipment weight by sixty-two percent — the average weight percentage of marijuana found in the three discovered deliveries. The government prosecuted Willie and Luis Reveles in a joint trial. The jury found them both guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The jury also found the brothers guilty of possession with intent to distribute the marijuana. The court sentenced Willie to 262 months of imprisonment and Luis to 121 months. II A Willie first challenges his conviction based on Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Before the trial began, the prosecution

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants sixth amendment confrontation clause rights are violated when a court admits into evidence an incriminating statement given by a nontestifying codefendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the government contractor defense in a subsequent lawsuit. Here, however, Mr. Hayashi’s e-mail to Mr. Jarrett cannot be similarly characterized as a specification of Defendant JTSI’s obligation under the contract for security and information services. II. Count II: Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy Plaintiffs also claim that they were terminated in violation of public oth a Common Law Parnar Claim and a Claim Under § 378-62 Simultaneously Although Parnar claims may be brought where there would otherwise be no remedy for wrongful termination, Parnar claims are generally duplicative, and thus disallowed, where statutes and regulations creating the public policy have their own built in remedy. See Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 76 Hawaii 454, 464, 879 P.2d 1037, 1047 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Batacan v. Reliant Pharmaceuticals,

    ### Response:
    holding that where statutory or regulatory provisions which evidence the public policy themselves provide a remedy for the wrongful discharge provision of a further remedy under the public policy exception is unnecessary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is whether the Commission properly found that Williston violated section 154.21 by not charging the rates prescribed in its effective tariff. Section 154.21 provides in relevant part: No natural-gas company shall directly or indirectly, demand, charge or collect any rate or charge for or in connection with the transportation or sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or impose any classifications, practices, rules or regulations, different from those prescribed in its effective tariff and executed service agreements on file with the Commission, unless otherwise specifically provided by order of the Commission. 18 C.F.R. § 154.21; cf. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251, 71 S.Ct. 692, 695, 95 L.Ed. 912 (1951) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, the Commission does not

    ### Response:
    holding that a utility can claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the commission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a single yard sign advocating the opposing position — for example, “Oppose School Vouchers,” or “Abolish the National Guard.” The Supreme Court has “frequently condemned such discrimination among different users of the same medium for expression,” which is another form of content-based speech regulation. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286; see also First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (“In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue.” (emphasis added)). Cf. Ackerley Communications of Mass., Inc. v. City of Somerville, 878 F.2d 513, 518 (1st Cir.1989) (striking down 0 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In short, because some types of signs are

    ### Response:
    holding that prohibiting external illumination of political signs while allowing it for other signs was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction since the message on the sign determines whether or not it may be externally illuminated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ordinance. The statutes’ plain language reflects a significant dichotomy of usage. Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-37(a) (1994) (legislating that for an early step in annexation process a municipality has to pass a resolution) with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-49(e) (1994) (describing the final step in municipality’s annexation process as enactment of an ordinance). Furthermore, the distinct usage of the terms within the annexation laws also leads us to believe that a resolution of intent is more in the nature of a proposed ordinance. A resolution is used by a municipality as an early step looking to enactment of the annexation ordinance. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-37(a) (1994); see also Asheville Industries, Inc. v. City of Asheville, 112 N.C. App. 713, 716-17, 436 S.E.2d 873, 875-76 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In contrast to the contextual usage of

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a resolution of intent marks the beginning of the annexation process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    every reasonable presumption should be indulged against its waiver.”); see also College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 681-82, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2229, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (recognizing in different context that “[cjonstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3255, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) (recognizing that “Article Ill’s guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are other personal constitutional rights that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal matters must be tried.”); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F.Supp.2d 811, 813 (N.D.Tex.2002) (<HOLDING>). The Texas Supreme Court’s recognition in In

    ### Response:
    holding prelitigation waiver of jury trial must be made knowingly and voluntarily and courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver of that right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    circumstances.”). Because we agree with the rationale in McCloud I, we reject Gulf’s attempt to differentiate this case on the aforementioned basis. 7 . In Carnes, this court applied the ""going and coming rule” and declined to adopt the ""employee’s own conveyance rule” in finding that a newspaper delivery person was not acting within the course and scope of her employment as she drove her vehicle home after completing her deliveries for the day. 227 Ariz. at 34, VI, 251 P.3d at 413. In general, under the going and coming rule, ""an employer is not liable for the tortious acts of his employee while the employee is going to or returning from his place of employment."" Id. at 35, V 11, 251 P.3d at 414 (quoting State v. Superior Court (Schraft), 111 Ariz. 130, 132, 524 P.2d 951, 953 (1974) (<HOLDING>)). The employee's own conveyance rule is a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that reimbursement of a national guardsmans travel expenses in the form of a mileage allowance did not bestow in the state a right of control
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    4 . This part of Rule 705 has been read to allow expert witnesses, in both direct and cross-examination, to describe events, conversations, and the contents of written reports that were otherwise inadmissible, for example, as hearsay. In such cases, the testimony is admitted not as substantive evidence but ""for the limited and independent purpose of enabling the jury to scrutinize the expert’s reasoning.” United States v. Wright, 251 U.S.App.D.C. 276, 285, 783 F.2d 1091, 1100 (1986); see abo United States v. 01 (stating that expert’s recounting of statements by codefendants did not violate confrontation clause because statements were not introduced for truth of matter asserted and declarant testified at trial); cf. Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Whether the trial court may order

    ### Response:
    holding that otherwise hearsay evidence disclosing the basis of an expert witness opinion should be admissible if  the impeaching evidence has sufficient guarantee of reliability that the prophylactic effect of the hearsay rule is not necessary to ensure trustworthiness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    multiple instructions, “we think it more appropriate to examine the adequacy of the charge that was given”). That is, the bad result instruction sufficiently informed the jury that it could believe that Chesser simply had a bad result with the PEG tube or that the bad result could have been caused by his pre-existing conditions and instructed the jury that a bad result alone would not support a negligence finding against Ap-pellees. See id. at 430 (explaining that unavoidable accident instruction sufficiently informed jury of and submitted defendant’s sole proximate cause inferential rebuttal defense that fatal auto accident was not caused by defendant’s negligence but by presence of cattle on the roadway); Williams v. Viswanathan, 64 S.W.3d 624, 628-29 (Tex.App-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Looking to the adequacy of the charge given,

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence existed to support bad result instruction when doctor admitted that patients care worsened under his care but denied that he was negligent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prosecutor’s characterization of the defendant’s case as a ‘fairy tale.’ However, ‘[a] prosecutor is not precluded from vigorous advocacy, or the use of colorful adjectives, in summation.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir.1992)). see also Pineda v. Miller, No. 03 CV 1344(NG)(MDG), 2006 WL 2239105, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006) (“[T]he prosecutor’s comments regarding the weaknesses in petitioner’s defense [we]re proper responses to the efforts of defense counsel to attack the credibility of the undercovers.”) (citing United States v. Bautista, 23 F.3d 726, 733 (2d Cir.1994) (“The government is ordinarily permitted to respond to arguments impugning the integrity of its case.”) (citation omitted)); United States v. Elias, 285 F.3d 183, 190-92 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). One habeas court in this Circuit has noted

    ### Response:
    holding that prosecution comments during summation that grossly mischaracterized the defenses argument and said that the defense was  insulting a battered victim do not require a new trial when they constitute an aberration in an otherwise fair proceeding the trial judge issued a curative jury instruction and the defendant most likely would have been convicted even without the improper remarks
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or limb of the officer or another may result, and has included in the warrant a direction that the officer executing it is not required to give such notice. [¶ 18] Probable cause determinations must be made after reviewing the facts. presented in a particular case. State v. Van Beek, 1999 ND 53, ¶ 15, 591 N.W.2d 112. It is no longer sufficient to merely allege drugs are present to justify issuance of a no-knock warrant. Herrick I, 1997 ND 155, ¶ 21, 567 N.W.2d 336 (overruling per se rule permitting no-knock warrant in all drug case). “[P]roba-ble cause is not established for a no-knock search warrant where the reviewing court is given information indicating nothing more than probable cause [that] an easily disposable drug is located in a suspect’s residence.” Van Beek, at ¶ h Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). However, such circumstances were not shown in

    ### Response:
    holding exigent circumstances found because detailed affidavit alleged drug transactions were conducted near the bathroom for quick disposal of the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    merit-less.” See Rabideau v. City of Racine, 243 Wis.2d 486, 627 N.W.2d 795, 805 (2001) (noting that an action is frivolous when it cannot “be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law”); of. Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.1 (describing a claim as not frivolous if it is based on “a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law”). Similarly, a claim is “indisputably meritless” when it clearly is procedurally barred, it asserts the infringement of a legal interest that plainly does not exist, or the record completely contradicts it. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827; Hodges, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d at 1212; see also People v. Alcozer, 241 Ill.2d 248, 350 Ill. Dec. 1, 948 N.E.2d 70, 77 (2011) (<HOLDING>). A claim lacks an objective, good-faith basis

    ### Response:
    holding that procedural defects can result in a conclusion that a postconviction petition is frivolous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court was not clearly erroneous in accepting [the officer's] testimony that he only promised to make [the defendant's] cooperation known to the United States Attorney’s office and gave no guarantee of a reduced sentence. Although [the officer] told [the defendant] that cooperating defendants generally ‘fared better time-wise,’ this statement did not amount to an illegal inducement: 'telling the [defendant] in a noncoercive manner of the realistically expected penalties and encouraging [him] to tell the truth is no more than affording [him] the chance to make an informed decision with respect to [his] cooperation with the government.' ” (Quoting United States v. Ballard, 586 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir.1978)). Accord United States v. Levy, 955 F.2d 1098, 1105 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Meirovitz, 918 F.2d 1376,

    ### Response:
    holding that federal agents indication to defendant that his cooperation would be reported to the united states attorney did not make defendants confession involuntary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Constitution’s standing requirements to bring particular actions in federal court.”); Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 46 (2d Cir.1997) (“The [defendant] appropriately looks to the [Rehabilitation Act’s] language to determine whether Congress granted an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.”). The scope of Title VII’s private right of action therefore depends on whether Congress intended to insulate such an action from prudential concerns. A number of courts have considered whether prudential concerns limit standing under Title VII and have denied standing to plaintiffs alleging injury because of third-party discrimination. See Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Childress, 134 F.3d at 1209 (Luttig, J.,

    ### Response:
    holding white female employee lacks standing under title vii to allege injury on behalf of black applicants to employment agency who were discriminated against because of race
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it has no obligation to pay those invoices because Reliable has not shown that it had submitted proper invoices to the City in accordance with the conditions precedent for payment set forth in the contract. In addition, the City maintains that Reliable cannot benefit from the contract (ie. be paid by the City) since it materially breached the contracts when it submitted fraudulent invoices. Although, generally, Reliable would be correct in arguing that its right to payment accrued once conforming goods were delivered to the City, an exception to the rule exists when either a condition precedent has not been fulfilled or when the party has materially breached the contract. John J. Calnan Co. v. Talsma Builders, Inc., 77 Ill.App.3d 221, 32 Ill.Dec. 695, 699, 395 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Robinhorne Construction Corp. v. Snyder, 113

    ### Response:
    holding that right to payment does not accrue until condition precedent has been fulfilled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Act.” 815 ILCS 525/40(c) (emphasis added). That plaintiff did not report the illegal activity directly to the Illinois Attorney General or State’s Attorney is not fatal to his claim of retaliatory discharge. See Michael v. Precision Alliance Group, LLC, 2011 IL App (5th) 100089 ¶ 24, 351 Ill.Dec. 890, 952 N.E.2d 682 (2011) (“[I]n no instance has Illinois required, an employee to make a direct report to a government agency.”). Defendants’ argument that there is no express or implied private right of action under the Illinois Prizes and Gifts Act is also misplaced. Plaintiff is alleging the common law tort of retaliatory discharge, not an implied or express statutory private right of action. See Bea v. Bethany Home, Inc., 333 Ill.App.3d 410, 415, 266 Ill.Dec. 781, 775 N.E.2d 621 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Harris v. Bethesda Lutheran Homes, Inc., No.

    ### Response:
    recognizing the difference between statutory cause of action for retaliation and common law tort of retaliatory discharge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States, 669 F.Supp.2d 32, 44 (D.D.C.2009); see also Gardner v. United States, 213 F.3d 735, 737 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.2000) (“Mr. Gardner’s defamation claim against the United States is barred, because suits for libel or slander are prohibited under the Federal Tort Claims Act.”). Therefore, the plaintiffs defamation and misrepresentation claims are dismissed for this independent basis. Moreover, with respect to the plaintiffs DCHRA claims, “[t]he D.C. Council, not Congress, enacted the DCHRA, and there is no federal statute that evinces Congress’s intent to waive the United States’ immunity from suit under the DCHRA.” Marcus, 813 F.Supp.2d at 17. Accordingly, the plaintiffs DCHRA claim is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See id.\ see also Jordan v. Evans, 404 F.Supp.2d 28, 31 (D.D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above,

    ### Response:
    holding that sovereign immunity bars dchra claim against the department of commerce
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” TexR. Civ. P. 97(a). There is a split in the courts of appeals regarding whether an order severing a compulsory counterclaim will automatically constitute an abuse of discretion. Compare Rucker v. Bank One Tex., N.A., 36 S.W.3d 649, 651' (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied); Goins v. League Bank & Trust, 857 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); and Mathis v. Bill De La Garza & Assocs., 778 S.W.2d 105, 106-07 (TexApp.-Texarkana 1989, no writ) (all holding that severance of a compulsory counterclaim is an abuse of discretion), with In re Occidental Permian Ltd., No. 07-03-0016-CV, slip op. at 4, 2003 WL 1799012, at *2 (Tex.App.-Amarillo April 7, 2003, orig. proceeding [pet. for mandamus filed]) (<HOLDING>); see also Hart v. Attorneys-At-Law, No.

    ### Response:
    holding that so long as trial court abides by rule 41 it is not error to sever and proceed separately with compulsory counterclaim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and such opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses”; see also Ronald L. Carlson & Michael Scott Carlson, Carlson on Evidence 398 (3d ed. 2015). 11 Weeks v. State, 270 Ga. App. 889, 893 (2) (608 SE2d 259) (2004) (punctuation omitted); accord McCrickard v. State, 249 Ga. App. 715, 718 (2) (549 SE2d 505) (2001); see also Burgess v. State, 292 Ga. 821, 822 (2) (742 SE2d 464) (2013) (“A witness need not be formally educated in the field a witness possesses such learning or experience to qualify as an expert witness lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless manifestly abused.” (punctuation omitted)); Griffin, 243 Ga. App. at 286 (5) (same); see also United States v. Anderson, 560 F3d 275, 281-82 (1) (C) (5th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Shamsud-Din, No. 10 CR 927,

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert testimony from the director of a center specializing in serving victims of sexual exploitation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    R. 347; see also Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2341, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (concluding SEC has specifically approved arbitration procedures of NASD and NYSE). Ottman agrees he signed the U-4 registration agreement, but argues his defamation claim does not involve significant aspects of the employment relationship and is only tenuously linked to his employment. See Ateas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of Am., 292 Minn. 334, 340-50, 197 N.W.2d 448, 452-57 (1972) (concluding no agreement to arbi trate exists because controversy not within scope of arbitration clause). We are asked to determine whether Ottman’s defamation claim, as described in his complaint, falls within the scope of the U-4 registration agreement. See Morgan, 729 F.2d at 1167 (<HOLDING>); Johnson, 530 N.W.2d at 795 (concluding

    ### Response:
    holding complaint allegations must be examined in light of parties contractual terms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of life insurance as security for a child support obligation. The child support statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 20-3-160 (1976), has since its inception recognized the availability of life insurance as security for the support obligation. The statute is silent as to the appropriate standard, yet Wife is constrained by longstanding case law to concede that life insurance may not be required to secure the payment of child support in the absence of a compelling reason to do so. The alimony statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 20-3-130, was amended in 1990 to expressly provide for life insurance on the supporting spouse for the benefit of the supported spouse. Before 1990, such relief was available pursuant to case law. See Hardin v. Hardin, 294 S.C. 402, 404-405, 365 S.E.2d 34, 35-36 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Section 20-3-130(D), like the child support

    ### Response:
    recognizing that family court may under special circumstances require a supporting spouse to secure an alimony obligation with a life insurance policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on those more likely to prevail, far from evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It has long been settled that a state’s capital sentencing scheme may not allow for the imposition of the death penalty in channeling and limiting of the sentencer’s discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362, 108 S.Ct. 1853. A statutory circumstance that is alone too vague to provide meaningful guidance to the sentencer may be accompanied by a limiting instruction which does provide sufficient guidance. See Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 1-3, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653, 110

    ### Response:
    holding that a limit ing instruction which defined the terms heinous atrocious or cruel in equally vague language was not constitutionally sufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    markets. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97, 104 S.Ct. 2237, 2245, 81 L.Ed.2d 71 (1984). 16 . The Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is no bright line separating the cases receiving strict scrutiny from those in which the scrutiny is less strict. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579, 106 S.Ct. 2080, 2084, 90 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986). 17 . The statute struck down in Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources read, in relevant part: A person shall not accept for disposal solid waste ... that is not generated in the county in which the disposal area is located unless the acceptance of solid waste ... that is not generated in the county is expli e Disposal Auth., 814 F.Supp. 1566, 1580 (M.D.Ala.1993) (<HOLDING>). 18 . MMWAC argues that the ordinance is

    ### Response:
    holding that three municipal flow control ordinances similar to the one here at issue discriminated against interstate commerce
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Construed broadly, plaintiffs’ allegations that the VOA defendants, with intent to defraud, characterized the Gulati segment as a pro bono feature and a public service to the Indian-American community without disclosing the fact that Gulati paid for the segment, thereby inducing plaintiffs’ reliance and causing injury, are sufficient to plead common law fraud. Plaintiffs’ third cause of action therefore withstands the VOA defendants’ motion to dismiss. We remand to the district court to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. While we conclude that plaintiffs’ pleading of their state law fraud claim survives defendants’ motion to dismiss, we render no opinion as to the ultimate merits of this claim. See Bernheim, 79 F.3d at 321 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations

    ### Response:
    holding that the issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in dispute. Appellees argued at trial that under the exception to the doctrine, the testimony was admissible. On appeal, Appellees maintain that the admission of Vega’s testimony was proper, but that if the court erred in admitting it, any error was harmless because the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment without Vega’s testimony. We agree. The general rule in Texas is that evidence of other acts by a party with persons not a party to the lawsuit are irrelevant, immaterial, unfairly prejudicial, and thus, inadmissible. See Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Vollmer, 805 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied); see also Tex.R. Evid. 403; Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Roberts, 849 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1993, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). This Court noted the exception to the

    ### Response:
    holding that the doctrine of res inter alios acta no longer exists independent of texas rules of evidence 401404 governing the admissibility of relevant and character evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    all of the elements of the crime, which appellant challenges beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, we must keep in mind that the credibility of witnesses and the wei t into Burger’s occupied car at close range, causing a bullet to narrowly miss Mandy McConnell who was sitting in the back seat. (N.T., at 24.) It can be inferred that appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury to Mandy because the bullet he fired into the car missed her by only three inches. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229, 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000) (finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim); see also Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa.Super.1998) (<HOLDING>). Further, testimony indicates that when Mandy

    ### Response:
    holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deprived the defendant of a fair trial and resulted in a deprivation of the defendant’s liberty without due process of law, see People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 354; 662 NW2d 376 (2003) (improper questioning by the prosecutor is nonconstitutional error); People v Mezy, 453 Mich 269, 285-286; 551 NW2d 389 (1996) (plurality opinion of WEAVER, J.) (applying the nonconstitutional harmless-error standard to review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct), while others hold that it constitutes constitutional error, People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 272, 276; 662 NW2d 836 (2003) (“Generally, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is a constitutional issue____”), citing People v Pfaffle, 246 Mich App 282, 288; 632 NW2d 162 (2001); but cf. People v Taylor, 159 Mich App 468, 471; 406 NW2d 859 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Thus, domestic decisions do not settle this

    ### Response:
    holding that prosecutorial noncompliance with a discovery order is an error of nonconstitutional magnitude
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a warrant can be obtained. Id. at 2505-07. Therefore, ICE officers may make warrantless arrests for suspected immigration violations only when they have both probable cause for the arrest and probable cause that the subject is likely to escape. De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[E]ven if an agent has reasonable belief, before making an arrest, there must also be a likelihood of the person escaping before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.”); Westover v. Reno, 202 F.3d 475, 480 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding arrest was “in direct violation” of § 1357(a)(2) because “[w]hile INS agents may have had probable cause to arrest Westover ... there is no evidence that Westover was likely to escape”); Mountain High Knitting, Inc. v. Reno, 51 F.3d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 496-97

    ### Response:
    holding that arrests under  1357a2 require an individualized determination of flight risk
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (3)[are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’” Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006)). Defendants’ argument fails because the collateral order exception does not apply to orders denying a motion to withdraw the reference. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 826 F.2d at 1180 (reasoning that “[ojrders denying revocation of a reference to the bankruptcy court do not conclusively determine any substantive issue; they merely address where that issue will initially be decided,” and that such orders remain subject to review on appeal). Mahia’s professed right to a jury trial warrants no different conclusion. See Germain v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 930 F.2d at 1040 (<HOLDING>). Further, although Chateaugay addressed the

    ### Response:
    holding that ruling as to whether or not there will be a jury trial does not meet the third precondition to immediate appealability under the cohen doctrine for such an order is entirely reviewable on appeal from the final judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.W.2d 790, 799 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.). The Board’s findings and conclusions only cite one reason for granting Redland nonconforming rights — the preexisting leases. But Redland argued two alternative theories before the Board — actual, preexisting use and the diminishing asset doctrine. Redland argues that under Murmur, we must uphold the Board’s decision if there is evidence from which the Board could have granted nonconforming rights based on the latter two grounds, even though the Board only cited the preexisting leases in its findings and conclusions. We rejected this argument on original submission and held instead that we may affirm on a ground not cited by the Board only if we conclude that ground applies as a matter of law. See Flores, 860 S.W.2d at 626 (<HOLDING>). In their motions for rehearing, Redland and

    ### Response:
    holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that requires special treatment. Each year, the major collections firms handle tens of thousands of payments on behalf of their clients. Requiring clients to endorse each monthly payment would require an extraordinary amount of effort, reduce the efficiency at both the client’s and firm’s office, and as a result, significantly increase the client’s costs. In addition, such a practice would likely delay the deposit of payments and thereby increase the number of insufficiently-funded checks. Although those circumstances are decidedly different from the examples set forth in IMO Opinion 635, there is no language in that opinion indicating that the extraordinary circumstances enu merated therein were intended to be exhaustive. See State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 300, 558 A.2d 833 (1989) (<HOLDING>). A cost effective collection system reduces

    ### Response:
    holding the examples listed in evidence rule 55 now njre 404b were not exclusive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    First, she must come forward with evidence either of past persecution or of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Tamas-Mercea, 222 F.3d at 423. Second, she also must show that the persecution she endured (or is likely to endure in the future) was on account of her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. See id. “Persecution encompasses more than threats to life or freedom; non-life threatening violence and physical abuse also fall within this category.” Id. at 424. However, to sustain an asylum application, the conduct “must rise above mere harassment.” Roman, 233 F.3d at 1034. This court has recognized that actions such as “detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of propert (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, we cannot say that the evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that having to report to the police being subject to regular questioning and surveillance and having difficulty finding employment can reasonably be characterized as mere harassment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under a business interruption policy after destruction of one subsidiary’s manufacturing facility); see also 3 Couch on Insurance § 40:15 (3rd ed. 2003) (“Where a parent corporation and it subsidiaries are covered by the same policy, rights of subsidiaries are wholly separate and [the] parent has no right to recover for loss suffered by subsidiary.”); compare Wood Goods Galore, Inc. v. Reinsurance Ass’n of Minn., 478 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn.Ct.App.1991) (allowing insured to recover under business interruption policy for lost retail sales at one location after an accident at its remote manufacturing facility since both facilities were owned by a single corporate entity); contra Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp., 141 F.2d 443, 446 (10th Cir.1944) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the district court that, under

    ### Response:
    holding that parent corporation could recover under business interruption policy for lost profits of one subsidiary resulting from accident at a separate subsidiary since the two were integrated operations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that prepare and administer standardized admissions tests such as the ACT, SAT, LSAT, and MCAT. 9 Section 99.33 provides in relevant part: (a)(1) An educational agency or institution may disclose personally identifiable information from an education record only on the condition that the party to whom the information is disclosed will not disclose the information to any other party without the prior consent of the parent or eligible student. There are certain exceptions to this rule, but none that bear on the questions we must decide in this appeal. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 99.31. 10 Many of the cases cited to us, or which our research uncovered, were based on the obsolete definition of ""student"" cited above or upon incomplete research. See Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>); Norwood v. Slammons, 788 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.

    ### Response:
    holding 20 usc  1232g provides no private right of action and employs an outdated definition of student
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or controversy.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (emphasis added); see also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923) (denying municipal taxpayer standing to challenge federal spending measure because the taxpayer’s “interest in the moneys of the Treasury— partly realized from taxation and partly from other sources — is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable”); Hollingsworth v. Perry, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2662, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (“[A]n asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone[.]”). Legislative standing. The general rule that individual legislators lack standing to sue in their official capacity as congressman or senator foll h Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). We held in Baird that to the extent that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a michigan house member and a michigan state senator lacked standing to challenge gaming compacts that were approved by a concurrentresolution procedure requiring only a majority of votes cast rather than by the ordinary legislative process that would have required a majority of the votes of all members in each house
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    305 S.W.3d 141, 152 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). In this case, appellant seeks to arbitrate a claim against appellees to collect its fees under the contingency fee agreement. In this context, for there to have been a waiver, appellant “must [have], at the very least, engage[d] in some overt act in court that evince[d] a desire to resolve the [same] arbitrable dispute through litigation rather than arbitration.” Haddock v. Quinn, 287 S.W.3d 158, 177 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied). Thus, it is relevant that appellant previously litigated its claim to the same attorney’s fees under the same contract in the suit against Brown in Harris County. See In re Christus Spohn Health Sys. Corp., 231 S.W.3d 475, 481 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2007, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, we note that appellees contend —

    ### Response:
    holding hospitals prior litigation conduct in criminal case constituted waiver of right to arbitrate where prior litigation involved developing evidence as part of strategic plan for defense of civil suit for damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and explained that “[b]ecause the law presumes parents will perform their obligations to their children, it presumes their prior right to custody, but this is not an absolute right.” Id. This Court further explained that “[w]hen a parent neglects the welfare and interest of his child, he waives his usual right of custody.” Id. at 437, 119 S.E.2d at 191. See also Wilson v. Wilson, 269 N.C. 676, 677, 153 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1967) (stating that “[w]hile it is true that a parent, if a fit and suitable person, is entitled to the custody of his child, it is equally true that where fitness and suitability are absent he loses this right”); In re Gibbons, 247 N.C. 273, 280, 101 S.E.2d 16, 21-22 (1957) (recognizing that the legal right of a parent to custody may yield to the interests of 551 (<HOLDING>); cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs.,

    ### Response:
    holding that an illinois statute that conclusively presumed every father of a child born out of wedlock to be an unfit person to have custody of his children violated the due process clause and that due process required the father to be given an opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    party responsible” therefore turns on which one of the two men was found more credible. This court, in reviewing administrative decisions both in and outside of the labor context, has consistently accorded substantial deference to the credibility determinations of the ALJ. See, e.g., NLRB v. Taylor Mach. Prods., Inc., 136 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir.1998) (“We afford even more deference to Board determinations of credibility and will not normally set aside the Board’s choice between conflicting testimony.”); Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 392 (6th Cir.2004) (according “great deference” to an ALJ’s credibility determination in assessing whether an applicant’s claim of subjective pain was believable); see also Dantran, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 171 F.3d 58, 72 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). ALJs, after all, are the only judicial

    ### Response:
    recognizing a hearing officers latitude in making credibility calls
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    misconduct has occurred. "" 'Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when the prosecutor's comments call the jurors' attention to matters not proper for their consideration and when the comments have a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the jury by significantly influencing its verdict.'"" State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264, ¶18, ed to theft of the computer, making any reference to theft of software irrelevant. Such tactics have been rejected in Utah. See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ¶ 29, 992 P.2d 951 (finding ""[the prosecutor far exceeded appropriate prosecutorial zeal and seriously corrupted the integrity of the truth-finding function of the trial"" when he referenced conduct of the defendant that did not in any way relate to the charges); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 348-49 (Utah 1998) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, I would conclude that the

    ### Response:
    holding that encouraging the jury to determine its verdict based upon evidence outside the record jeopardizes a defendants rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    asked to determine whether, in Wyoming, a commercial easement in gross is freely assignable. Declining the request to answer so broad a question, we affirm the decision of the district court on other grounds. I. ISSUES Appellants state the issues on appeal: 1. Is a commercial easement in gross an assignable easement? 2. Is the grantee of an easement in gross judicially estopped to deny its as-signability when he signs a stipulation in a prior proceeding which conveys to the heirs, executors and assigns? Appellees restate the issue: A Whether the easement granted to Francis and Elvira Thar in 1976 is assignable. II. FACTS In 1976, Edwin N. Moran (Moran), granted an easement across his land to Francis and Elvira Thar (the Thars). The easement provided access to a landloc 946, 947 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Newhoff v. Mayo, 48 NJ.Eq. 619, 23 A, 265,

    ### Response:
    holding that an easement by prescription may be obtained against the holder of a present interest but that that prescriptive easement is subject to divestment if and when the property passes to the holder of a future interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a lien against her property,” 694 So.2d at 1358; and that the statute of limitations should have been tolled until the mother actually discovered that the hen had been filed. This court rejected the mother’s argument that the mother and daughter had a confidential relationship. Noting that the daughter and her husband “had appropriated [over $50,000] to themselves from [the mother’s] bank account, without [the mother’s] consent or permission,” 694 So.2d at 1358, the court held that “it could not be said that there existed such a ‘confidential relationship’ between the parties that [the daughter and son-in-law] occupied a role which inspired confidence that they were acting in good faith for [the mother’s] interest.” Id. Compare Jordan v. Mitchell, 705 So.2d 453, 461 (Ala.Civ.App.1997)(<HOLDING>). In Cannon v. Gilmer, 135 Ala. 302, 304-05, 33

    ### Response:
    holding that no confidential relationship existed between unmarried cohabitants because the female cohabitant neither relied upon any promise nor depended upon any financial expertise of the male cohabitant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The generic offense does not necessarily require, however, one of the specific purposes identified by the MPC. Instead, the generic offense of kidnapping requires restraint plus the presence of some aggravating factor, such as circumstances that create a risk of physical harm to the victim, or movement of the victim from one place to another. See De Jesus Ventura, 565 F.3d at 877-78 (“The most common approach defines kidnapping to include a particular nefarious purpose. And the majority approach requires some kind of heightened intent beyond the mere intent to restrain the victim’s liberty. Most critically, a substantial majority of jurisdictions ... require some additional element of intent or severity.”). See also United States v. Moreno-Florean, 542 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The Michigan statute at issue in this case

    ### Response:
    holding that in addition to 1 knowing removal and confinement and 2 force threat or fraud the generic contemporary offense of kidnapping requires the specified purposes identified in the mpc or additional aggravating elements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir.2004). We review factual findings for substantial evidence. See, e.g., Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006). We deny the petition for review. We reject Lopez-Castro’s claim that she is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal based on her membership in a particular social group, namely, decent law abiding citizens of El Salvador who share a common immutable fear of the MS 13 and 18th St. gangs whom the government cannot control. See Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855-56 (9th Cir.2009); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 860-62 (9th Cir.2009); see also Velasco-Cervantes v. Holder, 593 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>) (citing Soriano v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1166

    ### Response:
    holding that government material witnesses do not constitute a particular social group
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of availability and accessibility”). 13 . Id. 14 . Id. 15 . Gardner v. State, 567 A.2d at 414. 16 . See Childress v. State, 721 A.2d 929, 931 (Del.1998) (explaining that “a drug-sale operation is a 'continuing felony' the 'locus’ of which is wherever the defendant keeps his contraband”) (citing Kornbluth v. State, 580 A.2d 556, 560-61 (Del.1990)); see also Wilson v. State, 343 A.2d 613, 618 (Del.1975). 17 . Childress v. State, 721 A.2d at 931-32; Wilson v. State, 343 A.2d at 618. 18 . Childress v. State, 721 A.2d at 931 (citing Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447A). 19 . Mack v. State, 312 A.2d 319, 320 (Del.1973). 20 . Id. 21 . Id. at 322. 22 . Lewis v. State, 1990 WL 38306, at *1 (Del.Supr. Mar. 19, 1990). 23 . Id., at *4. 24 . Id., at *3-4; see Childress v. State, 721 A.2d at 930-32 (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. State, 343 A.2d at 618 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding evidence was sufficient to support conviction for pfdcf where defendant was arrested immediately outside his residence and an unloaded handgun was found in the residence under the defendants bed and in the same room as the controlled substances and cash
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of “relation back” to give the beneficiary of a constructive trust priority over private intervening interests, this would not be determinative as to the IRS. The priority of a federal tax lien against competing claims is governed by federal law. See United States v. Dishman Independent Oil, Inc., 46 F.3d 523, 526 (6th Cir.1995) (“It is undisputed that when a federal lien is involved, the relative priority between competing liens is a question of federal law determined by the principle ‘the first in time is the first in right.’ ”). Federal law, however, makes no provision for the subordination of a tax lien through the use of the “relation back” doctrine. See id. at 527; United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank of San Diego, 340 U.S. 47, 50, 71 S.Ct. 111, 95 L.Ed. 53 (1950) (<HOLDING>); Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 120 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that a property right that comes into existence by court action such as a judgment lien does not relate back to some earlier date to destroy the priority of a federal tax lien
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the trial court should not be disturbed unless the error is manifest. Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985). A potential juror should be excused on motion of a party if there is any reasonable doubt that the juror possesses “that state of mind which will enable him to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence submitted and the law announced at the trial.” Id. at 555 (quoting Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7 (Fla.1959)). A trial court’s ruling on a cause challenge will be sustained on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Kessler v. State, 752 So.2d 545 (Fla.1999). Based on Elledge’s equivocal responses, we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that Elledge was sufficiently rehabilitated to serve on the jury. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 656 So.2d 426 (Fla.1995) (<HOLDING>); Hamilton v. State, 547 So.2d 630 (Fla.1989)

    ### Response:
    holding that it was error to deny cause challenge because although juror stated he could follow courts instructions his other responses were sufficiently equivocal to cast doubt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    order affirmatively stated that, with the termination of his probation, “there are no conditions on his rights to practice law in the jurisdictions in which he is licensed, other than those conditions and standards that govern all attorneys so licensed.” As a result of the early termination, DeNisco was subject to court scrutiny — and subject to having his license suspended — for a shorter time than called for in the judgment. We also agree with the Commission that the ease is not moot because the substantial rights of the parties will be affected. Our ruling will determine whether DeNis-co’s disciplinary record will reflect the terms of the original judgment or the reduced period of probation. See Pinnacle Gas Treating, Inc. v. Read, 104 S.W.3d 544, 545-46 (Tex.2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note that this issue appears to

    ### Response:
    holding live controversy existed in appellate court because whether trial court erred in dismissing first of two condemnation proceedings affected substantial rights of parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    detention so as to allow the seized evidence to be admitted. ¶ 9 In Brown v. Illinois, the Supreme Court applied three factors to detei’mine whether the taint of illegal conduct is sufficiently attenuated from a subsequent search to avoid the exclusionary rule. 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). Under Brown, a court must consider first, the time elapsed between the illegality and the acquisition of evidence; second, the presence of inteiwening circumstances; and third, the pux’pose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Id. Although Brown involved a confession following an illegal search, Arizona courts have applied the at gardless of how the individual officer came to know about the warrant. See United States v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425, 439 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129,

    ### Response:
    holding that initial illegal detention does not call into question validity of arrest pursuant to valid warrant wjhere the police effectuate an arrest in an illegal manner but nonetheless have probable cause to make the arrest the proper fourth amendment remedy is to exclude only that evidence which is a fruit of the illegality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As the Superior Ironworks court noted, section 38.004 specifically authorizes a trial court to take judicial notice of the usual and customary attorneys’ fees and of the contents of the case file without receiving further evidence in certain circumstances. 789 S.W.2d at 431. However, the award of appellate attorneys’ fees in this case is predicated on section 305.005 of the Finance Code, not section 38.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. This court has previously held that section 38.004 cannot be used to justify the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees recovered outside of section 38.001. See Valdez v. Valdez, 930 S.W.2d 725, 732-33 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ); see also London v. London, 94 S.W.3d 139, 147-49 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We sustain the Parr defendants’ ninth point

    ### Response:
    holding that trial courts may not use section 38004 to take judicial notice of reasonableness of attorneys fees awarded under statute other than section 38001
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. Appellant contends that “[a] conviction on uncorroborated accomplice testimony is valid only if the jury is instructed that such testimony must be carefully scrutinized, weighted [sic] with great care, and received with great caution.” Aplt. Br. at 25 (citing United States v. Chatman, 994 F.2d 1510, 1514-15 (10th Cir.1993)). We have held that when uncorroborated accomplice testimony is the only evidence supporting conviction that failure “to properly apprise the jury of the potentially unreliable nature of the accomplices’ testimony by means of a special cautionary instruction” is plain and reversible error. United States v. Hill, 627 F.2d 1052, 1055 (10th Cir.1980) (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 268, 269 (10th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). We note, however, that “[a] defendant is not

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to instruct the jury that accomplice testimony must be carefully scrutinized weighed with great care and received with caution was plain and reversible error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that remand is discretionary with the court. 17 . This local rule provides in relevant part: [I]f a motion requires consideration of matters not established by the pleadings, the moving party at the time of delivery and service of its supporting brief shall file with the Clerk such evidentiary materials, including discovery materials and affidavits, as are being relied upon and have not previously been filed, and shall serve a copy of them upon each other party; such documents shall not be attached to the brief.... Documents must be identified and authenticated by affidavit.... 18 . Converting Ameritrade's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment would preclude the possibility of Green voluntarily dismissing the action pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 41(a n. 9 (8th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). 20 . In such event, however, the case once

    ### Response:
    holding that court could consider prospectus that was not attached to complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recognized post-trial motion, defendant has forfeited his argument by failing to raise it in a posttrial motion. We disagree. In Enoch, the court held “when the defendant fails to comply with the statutory requirement to file a post[ ]trial motion,” review is “limited to constitutional issues which have properly been raised at trial and which can be raised later in a post-conviction hearing petition (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 122 — 1), sufficiency of the evidence, and plain error.” Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190, 522 N.E.2d at 1131-32. Here, because defendant raises constitutional issues of due process and equal protection, these issues are reviewable on appeal under the constitutionality exception in Enoch. See People v. Cox, 295 Ill. App. 3d 666, 670, 693 N.E.2d 483, 485 (1998) (<HOLDING>). In the alternative, the State argues the

    ### Response:
    holding defendants argument the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress was reviewable as a constitutional issue even though defendant failed to raise the issue in a written posttrial motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other areas of criminal law. Plea agreements, for example, commonly contain a provision stating that proffer information that is disclosed during the course of plea negotiations is inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt, but is admissible for purposes of impeachment. The standard plea agreement provides: “No statements made or information provided by [the defendant] will be used by the government directly against her, except for the purpose of cross-examination or impeachment should she be a witness' in any criminal trial or proceeding and offer testimony materially different from any statements made or information provided during the proffer....” United States v. Nemetz, No. 87-196-C, slip op. at 2-3, 1987 WL 17543 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1987) (quoting a standard plea agreement) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, grand jury testimony, which is

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant by signing the plea agreement waives the protection of fedrcrimp 11e6 for the purposes of impeachment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that “[t]his standard does not require ... abject deference, but nonetheless prohibits us from substituting our own judgment for that of the state court.” Snow, 474 F.3d at 696 (quotations and footnote omitted). As the Supreme Court has made clear, Even in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review. Deference does not by definition preclude relief. A federal court can disagree with a state court’s ... determination and, when guided by AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (<HOLDING>). IV. GUILT-PHASE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

    ### Response:
    holding the aedpa standard is demanding but not insatiable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has a racially disproportionate impact.” (emphasis in original)); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224, 91 S.Ct. 1940, 29 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (“[N]o case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it.”). See also Marsh v. Newton, 134 F.3d 383, at *2 (10th Cir.1998) (unpublished) (“‘To establish a gender-based claim under the Equal Protection Clause, [the plaintiff] must, .as a threshold matter, demonstrate that [the plaintiff has] been treated differently by a state actor than others who are similarly situated simply because [the plaintiff] belong[s] to a particular class.’” (quoting Keevan v. Smith, 100 F.3d 644, 647-48 (8th Cir.1996))); Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1312 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). If the plaintiff can produce evidence of

    ### Response:
    holding that to assert a viable equal protection claim plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were differently treated from others who were similarly situated to them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plaintiffs evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict, as is Mathuris evidence in this case. See also Floyd v. Kellogg Sales Co., 841 F.2d 226, 228-29 (8th Cir.1988) (reversing ■ grant of JNOV where plaintiffs evidence of retaliation was centered on three statements); contrast Grizzle, 14 F.3d at 267-68 (upholding lower court’s grant of JNOV overturning jury verdict where evidence of retaliatory motive presented by plaintiff would not support a “reasonable jury finding of retaliation without engaging in impermissible speculation”). In the alternative, SIU argues that Keon was determined to “clean house” and would have terminated Mathur as Department Chair regardless of any retaliatory motive. See McNutt v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 706, 709(7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The jury, however, was properly instructed

    ### Response:
    holding that the pricewaterhouse mixedmotives defense applies to retaliation claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    notice in § 1913. In contrast, 25 U.S.C. § 1912, applicable to involuntary termination of parental rights, expressly requires notice to “the parent of Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe.” The plain reading of section 1913 requires no notice to the tribe for a voluntary relinquishment of custody. A reading with other statutory sections does not reveal inconsistencies. No ambiguity exists. The ICWA assigns exclusive jurisdiction over an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation to the tribe. It provides concurrent jurisdiction to both the tribe and state over any Indian child who does not meet the exclusive jurisdiction requirements. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911. For all involuntary State proceedings, notice is required to the parent or Indian custodian and 1996) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1913, no tribal

    ### Response:
    recognizing the draft amendments would for the first time entitle tribes to receive notice when a voluntary child custody proceedings is underway
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    262 F.3d 677, 679 (8th Cir.2001); Larry’s United Super, Inc., v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir.2001); Keymer v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int’l, Inc., 169 F.3d 501, 504 (8th Cir.1999). Under the first part, the court must ascertain whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 679. The court next determines whether the specific dispute falls within the scope of that valid agreement. Id. If the court answers these inquiries in the affirmative, under sections three and four of the FAA, the court must stay proceedings and compel the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration. Lyster v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, 239 F.3d 943, 945 (8th Cir.2001) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Guidant

    ### Response:
    holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    actions. Defs.’ Mot. at 33-35, 40-41. Because the Court concludes that the plaintiff plainly fails to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, it need not consider whether or not the actions at issue qualify as “adverse.” 14 . Neither party submitted affidavits or deposition transcripts from Cooper or Dom, nor does the plaintiff refer to either employee in her opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. See generally PL's Opp. 15 . The defendants argue that the plaintiff's unsworn declaration is, on its face, inadmissible hearsay, which fails to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (2000) (Unsworn Declarations Under Penalty of Perjury). Defs.' Reply at 6-7; see Commercial Drapery Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 133 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Section 1746 states that an unsworn

    ### Response:
    holding that an affidavit  consisting entirely of inadmissible hearsay is not sufficient to survive summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the interstate nexus element of the crime. Glover contends that, even though the court gave the jury a limiting instruction, ie., that they were free to disregard the expert’s conclusion, the jury did not feel free to consider the evidence on their own, and were forced to either accept or reject the expert’s conclusion. Glover contends that Agent Zim-mer’s testimony should have been limited to p use expert testimony to prove the interstate nexus element of a weapons charge brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922. See, e.g., United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d 84, 88-89 (1st Cir.2000) (noting that an expert may testify that a weapon was manufactured in one state and sold in another, and thus to state their opinion as to that issue); United States v. Privett, 68 F.3d 101, 104 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1226, 116 S.Ct. 1862,

    ### Response:
    holding that pjroof of the interstate nexus to the firearm may be based upon expert testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it appears that the Commissioner has repeatedly been using this same boilerplate paragraph to reject the testimony of numerous claimants, without linking the conclusory statements contained therein to evidence in the record or even tailoring the paragraph to the facts at hand, almost without regard to whether the boilerplate paragraph has any relevance to the case. See, e.g., Angel, 329 F.3d at 1213; Oslin v. Barnhart, 69 Fed.Appx. 942, 947-48 (10th Cir.2003) (unpublished disposition); Clark v. Barnhart, 64 Fed. Appx. 688, 691 (10th Cir.2003) (unpublished disposition). As is the risk with boilerplate language, we are unable to determine in this case the specific evidence that led the ALJ to reject claimant’s testimony. See, e.g., Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, we cannot find rec ord support for

    ### Response:
    holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    So.2d 220 (Fla.1982); Cohen Bros., LLC v. ME Corp., S.A., 872 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Jatar v. Lamaletto, 758 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Adams v. State, 436 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). An expectation of privacy in a business “is not one which society is willing to protect.” Morningstar, 428 So.2d at 221 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Hill v. State, 422 So.2d 816 (Fla.1982)). Based on the record before us, it is evident that the defendant made telephone calls to the victim’s business telephone line, located in the victim’s home where he conducted his business. Although the victim may enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home, that expectation is not extended to his business. See Morningstar, 428 So.2d at 221 (<HOLDING>). We find that there was insufficient evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by a criminal defendant only after conviction. See Workman v. State, 170 Tex.Crim. 621, 622, 343 S.W.2d 446, 447 (1961). There are narrow exceptions to the rule requiring conviction before a criminal defendant may appeal. Wright v. State, 969 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1998, no pet.); McKown v. State, 915 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1996, no pet.) (per curiam). A defendant may appeal: (1) while on unad-judicated community supervision; (2) the denial of a motion to reduce bond; (3) the denial of a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus alleging double jeopardy; and (4) the denial of habeas corpus relief in extradition cases. Wright, 969 S.W.2d at 589; McKown, 915 S.W.2d at 161. But see Ex parte Shumake, 953 S.W.2d 842, 846-47 (Tex.App. — Austin 1997, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In this case, appellant is attempting to

    ### Response:
    holding no jurisdiction to review order raising amount of bail and questioning jurisdiction to review denial of motion to reduce bond
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be aggregated. Id. at 363. The government asserts that because the same Guideline sections are applicable to May’s offenses, the district court properly aggregated the total losses for May’s convictions under §§ 7201-7202. Despite the initial appeal of the government’s argument, the facts of May’s case differ from those we and other circuits have previously decided. Cseplo involved a scheme whereby the defendant skimmed money from a corporation he owned and converted the money to his own uses. 42 F.3d at 361. See also United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (11th Cir.2003) (adopting Cseplo in the context of a defendant who willfully underreported corporate income and defrauded the United States government); United States v. Spencer, 178 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, in Cseplo the government was

    ### Response:
    holding that aggregation is appropriate where defendant skimmed money from the corporation to supplement his legitimately approved salary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court.” 456 U.S. at 703, 102 S.Ct. 2099. For example, the parties may consent to jurisdiction through a forum selection clause in a contract, Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16, 84 S.Ct. 411, 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964); Dow Chem. Co. v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827, 831 (9th Cir.2005); by filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, Tucker Plastics, Inc. v. Pay’N Pak Stores, Inc., 99 F.3d 910, 911(9th Cir.1996) (per curiam); or by filing an original complaint, a counterclaim or a crossclaim, Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68, 58 S.Ct. 454, 82 L.Ed. 649 (1938); Schnabel v. Lui, 302 F.3d 1023, 1037-38 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002); cf. Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll., 434 F.3d 1127, 1138-40 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The rules governing consent are not as

    ### Response:
    holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    limiting factor. See R.M., 565 Pa. at 628'30, 777 A.2d at 452'53 (Saylor, J., dissenting). 4 . As the Superior Court noted, courts in several states have cited in loco parentis and related doctrines (e.g., ""de facto parent,” “psychological parent”) in granting standing to petition for child custody. See T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 884 n. 7 (Pa.Super.2000) (citing cases). Notably, however, most such decisions are grounded in legislative policy pronouncements. See, e.g., Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I.2000); V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539 (N.J.2000); Ellison v. Ramos, 130 N.C.App. 389, 502 S.E.2d 891 (1998); In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo.1995); Bodwell v. Brooks, 141 N.H. 508, 686 A.2d 1179 (1996); cf. Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774 (Minn.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>); but see E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711

    ### Response:
    recognizing in loco parentis as statutory ground of visitation rights but finding it inapplicable on facts presented
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judgment of witness credibility that is supported by competent, substantial evidence, as found in this case, will stand. See Gonzalez v. State, 990 So.2d 1017, 1024 (Fla.2008) (‘“As long as the trial court’s findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, “this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.”’ Blanco v. State, 702 So.2d 1250, 1252 (Fla.1997) (quoting Demps v. State, 462 So.2d 1074, 1075 (Fla.1984)).”). There is competent, substantial support within the postconviction evidentiary record for the circuit court’s conclusion that Bailey’s trial lawyers’ actions were part of reasonable trial strategy, and the (<HOLDING>)). Regarding Bailey’s assertion that Dr. Kubiak

    ### Response:
    holding that trial counsels failure to call defendants family members as witnesses during penalty phase was reasonable trial strategy and not ineffective assistance of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the facts and circumstances.” D.W. Sandau Dredging, ENGBCA No. 5812, 96-1 BCA ¶ 28,064, at 140,161, 1995 WL 739023 (1995). In this connection, “the amount of money involved, the length of time of the non-payment, and the payment procedur to pay large amounts” could constitute a material breach. Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 197 Ct.Cl. 118, 125, 455 F.2d 546, 550 (1972). However, here, the evidence established that the FBOP never refused to pay Morganti; the FBOP merely delayed payment. While the FBOP’s payment history was not perfect, it is not disputed that Morganti received $82 million in progress payments on a $110 million project that it ultimately failed to complete. In such circumstances, the FBOP’s conduct does not constitute a material breach. Id. at 124, 455 F.2d 546 (<HOLDING>); Jones Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 86-1 BCA ¶

    ### Response:
    holding that mere delay in payment for a while would not be a material breach
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has done.” Ex parte Floyd, 796 So.2d 303, 308 (Ala.2001) (quoting Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So.2d 516, 518-19 (Ala.1979)). For instance, Environ and ATOFINA cite to the case of Smith v. Medtronic, Inc., 607 So.2d 156, 160 (Ala.1992), which involved a defective pacemaker. The court there held that although the pacemaker was implanted in 1981 and its defect was discovered in 1984, the “injury-causing malfunction” did not occur until 1990, when the plaintiff underwent surgery as a result of the defect. See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Farsian, 682 So.2d 405, 407 (Ala.1996) (“Under Alabama law, [a plaintiffs] fear that his [heart] valve could fail in the future is not, without more, a legal injury-sufficient to support his claim.”); Southern Bakeries, Inc. v. Knipp, 852 So.2d 712 (Ala.2002) (<HOLDING>). '[9] Here, Russell’s negligence and

    ### Response:
    holding that oven removers did not have any present injury from oven owners alleged fraudulent behavior in concealing fact that oven contained asbestos where remover had not sought any medical care and did not plan to get any psychological treatment or counseling for the distress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of methamphetamine to the defendant and used that amount to increase his sentence under the Guidelines. See 408 F.3d at 682. The district court’s findings increased the defendant’s Guidelines sentencing range from 63 to 78 months to 121 to 151 months. See 408 F.3d at 682-83. The Tenth Circuit stated that, both before and after Congress’ passage of the Sentencing Reform Act, “sentencing courts maintained the power to consider the broad context of a defendant’s conduct, even when a court’s view of the conduct conflicted with the jury’s t, although the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Alleyne v. United States, ... — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 ... (2013), expands the rule from Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ... (2000) (<HOLDING>), to cover facts that increase the mandatory

    ### Response:
    holding that facts that increase the maximum sentence a defendant faces must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    396 (1994). This appeal clearly could have been, and should have been, decided on other grounds. Furthermore, the majority asserts, without analysis, that each of the criteria for application of the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine has been met. 212 Ill. 2d at 382-83. I see nothing in the record to justify the conclusion that any of the criteria have been met. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal as moot. Second, the issue in this case concerns whether Girot failed to comply, as a matter of law, with the secure-binding requirement of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10 — 4 (West 2002)). Where, as here, the issue is a question of law concerning only compliance with the Election Code, due process is satisfied. See, e.g., Ayers v. Martin, 223 Ill. App. 3d 397, 400 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, even if this case meets the

    ### Response:
    holding that where the issues are basically questions of law and the trial court has reviewed them de novo due process is provided
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Kearin, 807 So.2d 659, 663-64 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)). The prejudice to the defendant must be extreme to justify applying the doctrine of laches to a child support matter. Ticktin, 807 So.2d at 664. A mere delay in filing suit is insufficient to establish the applicability of lach-es to “relieve a parent from the obligation to support his or her child.” Hewett, 913 So.2d at 109. Even when the delay is accompanied by a change of financial condition, these circumstances standing alone do not justify the application of laches. See id. Rather, there must be some evidence that the change of financial condition was caused by the delay, such that the change of conditions would render enforcement of the right asserted inequitable. See Logan v. Logan, 920 So.2d 796, 799 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). The doctrine of equitable estop-pel involves

    ### Response:
    holding that the former husband failed to show the required prejudice where he did not testify that he would have acted differently during the period of delay if he had known the former wife would assert the childrens right to child support
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is a contract and the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements. State v. Frazier, 697 So.2d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). A party may waive any right to which he is legally entitled under the Constitution, a statute, or a contract. State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. E.D.S. Federal Corporation, 631 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). A defendant will not be relieved of an obligation that was included as a specific component of a plea agreement that was bargained for and voluntarily entered into by defendant. Allen v. State, 642 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). 722 So.2d at 907; see also A.D.W. v. State, 777 So.2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (acknowledging that “plea agreements are controlled by contract law”); State v. Frazier, 697 So.2d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Harrell, 721 So.2d at 1187 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    finding that section 1320a-7 was constitutional as applied to Manocchio. Specifically, the district court found that section 1320a-7 was not punitive, but rather remedial, and.therefore did not violate either the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause. II. ' ISSUE Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7, a mandatory exclusionary provision, is punitive in nature and violates the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution. III. DISCUSSION The threshold determination this court must make is whether 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 is punitive in nature and effect because both the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause apply only to punitive sanctions. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1901-02, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 613, 80

    ### Response:
    holding that double jeopardy clause is violated when a defendant punished in a criminal prosecution is penalized by a subsequent punitive civil sanction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he committed the arson. 3 If Guastella or Wasyluk is proved to have intentionally started the fire, the question will again arise whether arson committed by either or both of them will relieve the insurer, in whole or in part, from indemnifying BLT for the loss. New Jersey law is clear that if the insured is an individual who intentionally sets fire to his own property, an insurer will be relieved from having to compensate him for the resulting fire damage. Olesak v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 215 N.J.Super. 155, 158-159, 521 A.2d 849 (App.Div.1987). The more difficult question is the availability and effect of an arson defense where the insured is a corporation. Compare Miller & Dobrin Furniture Co. v. Camden Fire Ins. Co., 55 N.J.Super. 205, 218-219, 150 A.2d 276 (Law Div.1959) (<HOLDING>) and Italian Fisherman v. Commercial Union

    ### Response:
    holding that arson committed by a dominant fiftypercent stockholder was attributable to the corporation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    support of his application for asylum and found that large portions of that statement were copied from “five different asylum declarations filed in five different cases.” The plagiarism was so extensive that the IJ noted that many of the five statements had “full paragraphs identical to those of the respondent.” During the IJ’s hearing, Sliusar was asked to explain these similarities. Rather than explaining them, his testimony produced further inconsistencies with his prior testimony to the court and the asylum officer. Given the obvious plagiarism in his application, his inability to explain why his statement was so similar to others, and the inconsistencies within his own sworn testimony, the IJ properly found Sliusar not credible. Ahir v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 912, 918-19 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The record also supports the IJ’s

    ### Response:
    holding that inconsistencies between an aliens application and testimony and an inability to explain those ineonsistencies establishes frivolousness by a preponderance of the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    question is one of first impression for this court, the Ninth Circuit has previously held that “both applicants for and recipients of [service-connected death and disability] benefits possess a constitutionally protected property interest in those benefits.” Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. Derwinski, 994 F.2d 583, 588 n. 7 (9th Cir.1992). Additionally, seven of our sister circuits have addressed similar questions concerning statutorily mandated benefits. “Every regional circuit to address the question ... has concluded that applicants for benefits, no less than benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in the receipt of public welfare entitlements.” Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees’

    ### Response:
    holding an applicant for a disabled childs annuity was denied due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    questions whether we have jurisdiction over CTF’s cross-appeal of the District Court’s stay, and has moved to dismiss CTF’s appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Marriott argues that the stay is not a final order and is therefore not appealable. We agree that a stay is usually not a final order because it provides only a temporary respite from litigation. Marcus v. Twp. of Abington, 38 F.3d 1367, 1370 (3d Cir.1994). However, when a stay amounts to an effective dis missal of the underlying suit, it may be subjected to appellate review. Cheyney State Coll. Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 735 (3d Cir.1983) (citing Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)); see also United States v. Spears, 859 F.2d 284, 287 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). We have also recognized that an indefinite

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate review was effectively foreclosed unless we exercised pendent jurisdiction because the issues would become moot and untouchable because of the procedural limbo in which the decision placed the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Act, the rest of the case was devoted to a statute limiting contingency fee agreements for Civil War claims. Id. Other cases have followed Nutt and Calhoun to hold that attorneys may not take a contingency interest in or a lien against claims against the United States. See United States v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 386 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir.1967) (“A contingent fee in a judgment against the United States is an assignment subject to the Anti-assignment Act.”); Kearney v. United States, 152 Ct.Cl. 202, 285 F.2d 797, 800 (1961) (“[A] contract between an attorney and a client which gives the attorney an interest in the client’s claim against the Government is exactly what the anti-assignment statute forbids.”); Pittman v. United States, 127 Ct.Cl. 173, 116 F.Supp. 576, 580 (1953) (<HOLDING>). However, Honig is not asserting a right akin

    ### Response:
    holding that nutt stands for the broad principle that any attempt to impress a lien upon the proceeds of a claim against the united states as security for the payment of an attorneys fee is within the ends to which the prohibition of the act was aimed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the defendant of the specifics of the charges he must defend against at trial. In this case, the family court’s discretion should have been exercised in light of the purposes of a bill of particulars, which is designed to enable the defendant to “prepare for trial and to prevent surprise.” State v. Balanza, 93 Hawai'i 279, 286, 1 P.3d 281, 288 (2000) (emphases added) (citing State v. Reed, 77 Hawai'i 72, 78, 881 P.2d 1218, 1224 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Balanza, 93 Hawai'i at 288, 1 P.3d at 290). This court has held that a bill of particulars is not required if the information called for has been provided “in some other satisfactory form.” Reed, 77 Hawai'i at 78, 881 P.2d at 1224 (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Balanza, 93 Hawai'i at 288, 1 P.3d at 290 (<HOLDING>). However, without being apprised in the

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying reeds motion for bill of particulars when reed did not deny that the transcripts of the preliminary hearing and police reports provided him with the information that he claimed was lacking in the complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purpose of the form (drafted by and to give assistance to the clinic) and the circumstances of execution.” Id. at 1056. One of those circumstances was the husband’s execution of the consent forms in blank. The court, therefore, doubted that the form represented the parties’ intent in the event of a dispute between them. Id. at 1056-57. Nevertheless, the court addressed and rejected the enforceability of such an agreement: With this said, we conclude that, even had the husband and the wife entered into an unambiguous agreement between themselves regarding the disposition of the frozen preembryos, we would not enforce an agreement that would compel one donor to become a parent against his or her will. As a matter of public 6 U.S. 40, 51, 119 S.Ct. 977, 986, 143 L.Ed.2d 130, 144 (1999) (<HOLDING>) and Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,

    ### Response:
    holding that private insurers decision to seek review by private utilization review organization of reasonableness and necessity of medical treatment though authorized by pennsylvania workers compensation statute did not involve state action to the extent necessary to trigger due process guarantees under fourteenth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    charge of another who is helpless adequately to aid or protect himself is subject to liability to the other for any bodily harm caused to him by (a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the other while within the actor’s charge, or (b) the actor’s discontinuing his aid or protection, if by so doing he leaves the other in a worse position than when the actor took charge of him. New Jersey’s Good Samaritan Act, N.J.SA. § 2A:62A-1, however, shields from civil liability volunteers who, in good faith, render care at the scene of an emergency, even if they do so unreasonably. Lundy, 34 F.3d at 1180. Although the Act does not apply when there was a preexisting duty that was breached, we have already determined that issue against Mrs. Abramson. See id. (<HOLDING>). Moreover, there is no allegation much less

    ### Response:
    holding that the preexisting duty exception does not apply where the preexisting duty is a limited one and the alleged negligence is the failure to provide a level of assistance beyond that required by the preexisting duty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    period. (Defs.’ Ex. 18 (Blood Aff.) ¶ 5.) As such, they were deprived of neither their ultimate- wages nor the immediate use of those wages. Accord Lovejoy-Wilson, 263 F.3d at 224 (finding adverse action from week-long suspension where plaintiff “may have at least suffered the loss of the use of her wages for a time”); cf. Markel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys., 276 F.3d 906, 911 (7th Cir.2002) (“Typically, adverse employment actions are economic injuries such as dismissal, suspension, failure to promote, or diminution in pay.”)(quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (emphases added)). Moreover, there is no indication that the suspension served, or could have served, as the basis for any subsequent adverse action against plaintiff. See Russell, 257 F.3d at 819-20 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the fact that Dickerson and Reed were

    ### Response:
    holding that an unrealized risk of future adverse action even if formalized is too ephemeral to constitute an adverse employment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the confirmation order, the court is barred from revoking the confirmation order — even if the order was procured by fraud. For reasons that are amplified in point III, below, the statute bars revocation of the confirmation order in this case because an order satisfying the mandatory statutory predicate cannot be drafted. Another noteworthy feature of this statute is the relatively short time frame in which a cause of action may be filed. The request to revoke the confirmation order must come “before 180 days after the date of the entry of the order of confirmation.” Courts have been very strict in their adherence to this 180-day rule. See, e.g., BFP Invs., Inc. v. BFP Invs., Ltd., 150 Fed.Appx. 978, 979 (11th Cir.2005); In re Orange Tree Assocs., 961 F.2d 1445, 1447 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); In re Medical Analytics, Inc., 410 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    holding that a request made within 180 days of a modified confirmation order  entered three months after the original confirmation order  but more than 180 days after the original confirmation order was timebarred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 16) This claim will be tried at the Phase One trial. RELEVANT LAW Under Plaintiffs’ direct operator liability claim that will be tried during Phase One, Plaintiffs must prove that sole agents of Anaconda “manage[d], directed], or eon-duct[ed] operations specifically related to pollution, that is, operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental regulations.” Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66-67, 118 S.Ct. 1876, (document # 1221 at 10) Under the rule of Bestfoods, Plaintiffs must prove their “arranger” liability claim through evidence that Anaconda sole agents arranged for disposal of hazardous substances owned or possessed by Anaconda. See, Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, 861 F.Supp. 931, 941 (C.D.Cal.l993)(<HOLDING>); Raytheon Constructors, Inc. v. Asarco, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that arranger liability claim requires proof that defendant arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances owned or possessed by defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    constitutional scrutiny of police action. {¶ 70} By that era, the Supreme Court recognized that a juvenile could “receive[] the worst of both worlds” in the juvenile court system by being provided “neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.” Kent, 383 U.S. at 556, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84. In a series of cases, the court addressed that concern. {¶ 71} Although the court had recognized a due process interest in juvenile court proceedings as early as 1948, see Haley v. Ohio (1948), 332 U.S. 596, 601, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224, the understanding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to juvenile proceedings because of the juvenile’s liberty interests was more fully developed in Kent (<HOLDING>), and crystallized in In re Gault (1967), 387

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the admonition to function in a parental relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness and holding that a juvenile is entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether juvenile court jurisdiction should be waived before being released to a criminal court for prosecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    even in the Hugheses and Calhoun’s trial brief, they argued that the Hugheses had sustained $9,262.50 in damage but did not argue that Calhoun had sustained any damage. Because we conclude that the damages awards were not supported by evidence in the record, we must reverse the trial court’s judgment on this issue. See, e.g., Blair v. Cooper, 392 So.2d 1205, 1207 (Ala.Civ.App.1981). V. Additionally, the Darnalls argue that the trial court erred in admitting a “Google Earth” aerial photograph and an Alabama Atlas and Gazetteer as exhibits. We need not determine whether these exhibits were admissible, because, even if their admission was error, the Darnalls have not shown how the error was injurious to their ease. See New Plan Realty Trust v. Morgan, 792 So.2d 351, 363 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>). They argue that the Google Earth map showed

    ### Response:
    holding that the appellants bear the burden of showing that an error in the admission of evidence has   probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the appellants   quoting atkins v lee 603 so2d 937 946 ala1992 quoting in turn rule 45 ala rapp p
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    450 (1999). The plaintiff fails to meet this burden. Garrett has produced scant evidence to show that his impairment substantially limits his ability to work. Garrett provides no evidence of the number of jobs from which he is precluded because of his impairment. The plaintiff has admitted that he can work in a variety of jobs. See Plaintiffs dep. pp. 176-177. Plaintiff admits that he can work most jobs that do not require “sport type activities”. Id. In fact, plaintiff has worked a variety of jobs since he was fired from Autozone. See id. at 226-231. Without some evidence that Garrett is precluded from a broad range of jobs, his impairment does not meet the definition of disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). See Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 806 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); See also, Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., 153

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff who could not perform some jobs because he wore a pacemaker was nevertheless still capable of performing most jobs in the workforce
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at PA. However, this alone, does not prove discriminatory intent. Notably missing is any evidence that the disparity is the result of discrimination. To the contrary, there is no evidence that women at PA have repeatedly sought and been turned down for the partnership rank. See, e.g., Roberson v. Snow, 404 F.Supp.2d 79, 91 (D.D.C.2005) (ruling that plaintiffs attempt to show pretext by pointing to historical disparities within the company was unavailing because he “failed to show actual statistics comparing rates of promotion at [the company] between similarly situated black and white employees, or even statistics comparing rates of hiring black and white applicants to their presence in the applicant pool”); Metrocare v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 679 F.2d 922, 930 (D.C.Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Having considered all of the record evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that while proper statistical evidence can be the most important vehicle for showing class discrimination the plaintiff failed to compare the percentage of blacks hired for given jobs with the percentage of blacks qualified for those positions and it was not sufficient to merely show that black managers formed a smaller percentage of the manager pool than did managers of other races
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reasonably available means”). Generett has satisfied neither the Brady nor the Trombetta test. Brady v. Maryland, to begin with, does not apply. The LeSabre from which Officers Teeters and Smith recovered the firearm — as Generett himself appears to recognize, see Generett Br. at 13 (“[T]he disposal of the car, in essence, destroyed potentially useful evidence that may have been exculpatory in nature.”) — was at best only potentially useful evidence. See Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 548, 124 S.Ct. 1200, 157 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2004) (deeming destroyed evidence to be only “potentially useful” when “[a]t most, [the defendant] could hope that, had the evidence been preserved, a fifth test conducted on the substance would have exonerated him”); Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333 (<HOLDING>); Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488 — 89, 104 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure of the police to refrigerate  clothing and to perform tests on   semen samples can at worst be described as negligent and did not violate the due process clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F.Supp.2d 509, 514 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (explaining that initial suit was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction despite the fact that the diplomat had left his post because service was effected prior to the diplomat’s departure). The certification of Defendants’ status of diplomats by the State Department prior to service of the Amended Complaint therefore applies throughout the continuation of the suit, making Defendants immune from subject matter jurisdiction in this Court. Additionally, Defendants properly asserted that the “commercial activity” exception in Article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention does not apply to the hiring of a domestic employee, therefore immunity is neither waived nor eliminated. See Mufti, 73 F.3d at 538 (<HOLDING>). Thus, Defendants sufficiently proved they

    ### Response:
    holding that the employment of a domestic servant does not void diplomatic immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court grants defendant Greenwood Hospitality Management LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment [55] as to all claims and its Motion to Strike Each of Plaintiffs Declarations in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [76]. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant Greenwood Hospitality Management LLC and against plaintiff Karen Hoosier. This is a final and appeal-able order. It is so ordered. 1 . Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that affidavits or declarations “used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on th , 604-05 (7th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); Mach v. Will County Sheriff, 580 F.3d 495,

    ### Response:
    holding that an isolated comment is not direct evidence of discrimination even if a plaintiff interpreted it as motivated by a discriminatory animus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    outside the limitations period by establishing a liability cut-off if notice of the first violative behavior is not given within 180 days. CP at 22 (emphasis added). Therefore, we hold that the 180-day limitations provision in the agreement unreasonably favors Fred Lind Manor and thus is substantively unconscionable. Severance of the Substantively Unconscionable Provisions ¶42 Fred Lind Manor urges us to sever any provisions we find to be substantively unconscionable arguing that the essential term of the parties’ bargain, i.e., arbitration, should be retained. Adler, however, contends that because the substantively unconscionable provisions pervade the entire agreement, we should refuse to sever those provisions and declare the entire agreement void. See Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1180 (<HOLDING>). The 2 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208

    ### Response:
    holding that the employers insidious pattern of seeking to tip the scales in its favor during employment disputes justified a decision to declare the entire agreement unenforceable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a procedural violation by not specifying the minutes of instruction to be devoted to each of KL.’s services in her individualized educational programs. School districts need not specify minutes of instruction if they are reasonably known to all “involved in both the development and implementation of the IEP.” See 64 Fed.Reg. 12,479. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the amount of time to be devoted to KL.’s services was clearly known to KL.’s individualized educational program team. Even if the minutes were not known, however, Plaintiffs have failed to set forth a plausible argument that this procedural violation resulted in the denial of a free appropriate public education. Cf. O’Toole v. Olathe Dist. Schs. Unified Sch, 144 F.3d 692, 705-06 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the District did not violate the

    ### Response:
    holding that an individualized educational program that merely provided for educational services as appropriate did not result in the denial of a free appropriate public education
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence should be excluded on the basis of unfair prejudice or any other ground of inadmissibility set out in Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. The Defendant instead claims that the lay testimony was improper under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 701(a), which provides that non-expert witnesses may testify as to opinions only when they are “rationally based on the perception of the witness” and are either “helpful to a clear understanding of the -witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” Rule 701(a) authorizes the admission of this testimony. Mr. Payne and Mr. Car-ringer merely testified to the presence of asbestos without offering a scient 354 N.C. 572, 558 S.E.2d 867 (2001); Olinger v. Pretty Prods., Inc., No. 96-CA-29, 1997 WL 33814208, at *4 (Ohio Ct.App. Nov. 7,1997) (<HOLDING>); Per-man v. C.H. Murphy/Clarlc-Ullman, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he hesitate to answer questions at any time.” The trial court made extensive findings of fact in accord with this evidence. Defendant did not except to any of these findings. Id. The Court then held that “[f]rom these findings the trial court correctly concluded that the statement ‘was made freely, voluntarily, understanding [sic] and knowingly ....’” Id. at 20, 277 S.E.2d at 529. The Court concluded, therefore, that the trial court properly admitted the defendant’s incriminating statements. In this case, the trial court made comparable findings based on similar evidence. Under McCoy, therefore, the trial court’s findings in this case support its conclusion that defendant’s three statements were voluntary and admissible. See also State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1, 17, 372 S.E.2d 12, 20 (1988) (<HOLDING>), vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 433, 108

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not err in admitting statements made two hours after defendants blood alcohol level was 026 when trial court found that during questioning the defendant was coherent and that his answers  were extremely reasonable responsive and appropriate 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    David to sell his hundreds of franchises in the U.S., and a ""breach"" scenario, in which, due to defendants failure to perform, David, three years later, had to set up prototypes himself and then sell the franchises. See D.Mem. re Causation and Damages at 9-13; D.Exh. A. 7 . While the most recent Kenford decision sets forth a stricter rule than previously articulated, prior cases — in both New York and federal courts — have also set forth high standards for when lost profits for new businesses can be awarded. These cases make clear that lost profit claims by new businesses must be certain, specific, and precise. See, e.g., Hirschfeld v. IC Securities, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 332, 521 N.Y.S.2d 436, 439 (1st Dep’t.1987), appeal dism’d, 72 N.Y.2d 841, 530 N.Y.S.2d 556, 526 N.E.2d 47 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Perma Research & Development Co. v. Singer

    ### Response:
    holding that such damages could be recovered but only if the plaintiffs were experienced in the business and if the lost profits could be ascertained with some certainty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314 n. 38, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (“Congress could, without raising any constitutional questions, provide an adequate substitute [for habeas corpus] through the courts of appeals.”). An adequate substitute for habeas corpus must fulfill the traditional role of the writ, which is to give the petitioner “a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation of relevant law.’ ” Boumediene v. Bush, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2266, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008) (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302, 121 S.Ct. 2271). A petition for review with the court of appeals constitutes “an adequate substitute for district court habeas corpus jurisdiction.” Puri, 464 F.3d at 1042; see also Mohamed v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Alexandre v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 1204,

    ### Response:
    holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    challenged here was constructed to prevent one thing: seasonal holiday displays of a religious character. The absence of an explicit list of permissible subjects upon which discourse is permissible in this nonpublie forum does not mean that there is no “otherwise includible subject” for discussion in the forum. In Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1296-97, for example, the school board announced two policies prohibiting the distribution of “written material that is of a religious nature” and “written material ... which expresses religious beliefs or points of view.” This court recognized that the policies impliedly allowed the distribution of all other written material, and concluded that the prohibition of religious speech was unconstitutional. See also Good News/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d at 1506-07 (<HOLDING>); Searcey v. Crim, 815 F.2d 1389 (11th

    ### Response:
    holding that a policy generally encouraging the moral character and development of youth by permitting on school premises the boy scouts and girl scouts but not permitting a religious youth organization violates the first amendments prohibition of viewpoint discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the waiver provision largely referred to “sentence” in the context of the term of imprisonment. See id. (discussing “probable sentencing range” and “sentence within the maximum provided in the statutes of conviction”). As such, we find the plea agreement’s waiver provision is ambiguous as to whether “sentence” includes the amount of restitution, or refers only to term of imprisonment. For example, on the one hand, restitution is part of “sentence” in the colloquial sense in that it is a determination for the district court after guilt has been adjudged. On the other hand, resti tution is not simply “imposed in accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements” as the plea agreement specifies. J.A. 30 1Í 4; cf. United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Rather, Appellant’s challenge is levied

    ### Response:
    holding that term any sentence within plea agreements waiver of right to appeal provision did not include restitution because of ambiguity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which vary from one facility to the next, from one tour to the next, and from one day to the next. Plaintiff herself has stated that the number of hours actually spent at the MPLSM per week vary considerably. Defendant is free to expand or contract the duties of an employee to suit its changing needs, but in so doing cannot alter plaintiff's right to seek protection under the Rehabilitation Act on the basis of her own job description. Numerous courts entertaining Rehabilitation Act claims have looked to position descriptions in assessing the essential functions of a job. See e.g., Treadwell, 707 F.2d at 476 n. 5; Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 298; Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533, 535 (10th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 267, 62 L.Ed.2d 184 (1979); Jasany, 33 FEP Cases at 1117 (<HOLDING>); see also Daubert v. U.S. Postal Service, 733

    ### Response:
    holding that because plaintiff was not hired as a general postal employee to serve various functions within the post office but was employed specifically as the operator of a high speed letter sorting machine defendants duty to provide reasonable accommodation for his handicap was limited to adjustments within the job for which he was hired
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on by the Blasingame court have been overruled. Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435 (Me.1978) was overturned by Bahre v. Pearl, 595 A.2d at 1035 and Kenney v. Porter, 557 S.W.2d 589 (Tex.Civ.App.1977) was overturned by Kenney v. Porter, 604 S.W.2d at 301-02. 21 .In his concurrence to the Court of Appeals’ opinion, Judge Susano asserted that he felt bound by the Blasingame decision, but urged the Supreme Court to “revisit Blasingame” because he felt that “the cases espousing the majority view are arguably the better-reasoned cases on the subject at hand.” 22 .It is not necessary for us to address the policy debate concerning whether closely-held stock is commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or markets or is commonly recognized as a medium for investment because the O 70, 374 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Nelson v. Brostoff, 70 Or.App. 486, 689 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the judicial admission exception did not apply to prove the existence of an oral agreement for the sale of stock where the defendant offered his deposition testimony acknowledging that the parties agreed to have a document transferring the stocks drafted by an attorney because the defendants references to the agreement were in terms of a tentative or incomplete agreement and because any admission of such a contract would necessarily have to include a statement of the price and quantity terms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to have been concerned that since Nix had “never before held office” and at the time of the complaint had taken few steps to establish his candidacy, LaRoque, 755 F.Supp.2d at 175, the risk he would change his mind was unacceptably high, thus raising the possibility that the court would end up “render[ing] an advisory opinion in ‘a case in which no injury would have occurred at all,’ ” Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 500 (D.C.Cir.1994) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2130). But when plaintiffs filed their complaint, the election in which Nix planned to run was only nineteen months away, a far cry from the more than four-year gap that sank Senator Mitch McConnell’s standing in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225-26,124 S.Ct. 619,157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United

    ### Response:
    holding that senator mcconnell lacked standing to challenge a provision of the bipartisan campaign reform act of 2002 bcra that at earliest would have affected him in his 2008 reelection campaign
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    broader, requirement of knowledge in other state statutes. The analogous section of the Oregon Blue Sky Law provided for the liability of every director, officer or agent of the seller, if such director, officer or agent with knowledge of the violation personally participated or aided in any way in making [the sale] * * *. [Emphasis added.] Ore.Rev.Stat. § 59.250(1). The Oregon Supreme Court, sitting in banc, held that “such knowledge is established by proof that the person knew the security was unregistered and it is not necessary, in addition, to prove that the person knew that the law required the security to be registered.” Spears v. Lawrence Securities, Inc., 239 Or. 583, 399 P.2d 348, 350 (1965) (in banc). See Lolkus v. Vander Wilt, 258 Iowa 1074, 141 N.W.2d 600, 604 (1966) (<HOLDING>). In their petition appellants Dayan and Bibi

    ### Response:
    holding that notwithstanding similar provision code of iowa  50223 1962 defendants could not because of their inexperience in the field of security sales claim immunity because of ignorance of the statutes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this regard, in Benavidez v. City of Albuquerque, 101 F.3d 620-627 (10th Cir.1996), we spoke as follows: When the pre-termination process offers little or no opportunity for the employee to present his side of the case, the procedures in the post-termination hearing become much more important. Such a post-termination hearing represents the only meaningful opportunity the employee has to challenge the employer’s action, and requiring a dismissed employee to prove in this context that he was terminated without just cause may increase the risk of an erroneous deprivation. It is often difficult to prove a negative, and where the pre-termination process has been minimal, the employee’s fate may depend entirely upon the post-termination hearing. Cf. Lavine, 424 U.S. at 585, 96 S.Ct. at 1016 (<HOLDING>); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525, 78

    ### Response:
    recognizing that wjhere the burden of proof lies on a given issue is of course rarely without consequence and frequently may be dispositive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a blood specimen to police after they properly secured that specimen from appellee for medical purposes. Where a non-governmental party has “a legitimate independent motivation” for engaging in the challenged conduct, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. See United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1433 (9th Cir.1990) (concluding that for the conduct of a party to be subject to the Fourth Amendment that party must have acted with the intent to assist the government in its investigations for administrative purposes and not for an independent purpose). Consequently, evidence obtained by private parties and turned over to the police is not obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S.Ct. 574, 576, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921); Attson, 900 F.2d at 1433 (<HOLDING>). There is no evidence before this Court that

    ### Response:
    holding that doctor who drew blood for purely medical reasons did not possess the requisite intent to engage in a search or seizure under the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a basis for a RICO violation, those allegations must meet a heightened sentation to whom and the general content of the misrepresentation. See Saporito, 843 F.2d at 675; Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 658-59 (3d Cir.1998); Klein v. General Nutrition Companies, Inc., 186 F.3d 338, 345 (3d Cir.1999); see also First Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 178 (2nd Cir.2004) (requiring RICO violation based on bankruptcy fraud to be pleaded with heightened particularity); see also Lum, supra, (requiring mail and wire fraud-based RICO claim to be subject to Rule 9(b) pleading standard). In addition to mail and wire fraud, the Amended Complaint also pleads the predicate acts of money Coast Ingredients, Inc., 2004 WL 941815 *19 (W.D.N.Y.) (<HOLDING>); and see Perlman v. Zell, 938 F.Supp. 1327,

    ### Response:
    holding that claim of trading in counterfeit goods need only meet rule 8a2 notice pleading standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to consent in sexual battery cases. See Engle v. State, 290 Ga. App. 396, 398 (2) (659 SE2d 795) (2008); Carson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 21, 24 (5) (b) (576 SE2d 12) (2002); Hendrix v. State, 230 Ga. App. 604, 606 (3) (497 SE2d 236) (1997); see also Haynes v. State, 302 Ga. App. 296, 302 (3), n. 4 (690 SE2d 925) (2010) (applying age of consent to hold that the state is “not required to prove lack of consent to establish sexual battery”). Our cases in that regard are consistent with the principle, expressed by our Supreme Court in connection with a case involving rape, “that the element of‘against her will’was automatically shown by [the minor victim’s] age.” Drake v. State, 239 Ga. 232, 233 (1) (236 SE2d 748) (1977). See also Lee v. State, 300 Ga. App. 214, 216 (1) (684 SE2d 348) (2009) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted; emphasis supplied);

    ### Response:
    holding state could prove aggravated sexual battery by showing among other things that the victim did not consent or lacked the capacity to consent in case where defendant father argued he had been addressing minor daughters medical and hygiene needs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that she made specific arguments outlining her objections to the jury instructions at the charge conference; however, arguments made at a charge conference do not preserve a subsequent challenge to a jury instruction on appeal. Rather, an objection “must be made at the close of the court’s initial instructions to the jury, and it must be stated with sufficient clarity or specificity to preserve the error.... ” McElmurry v. Uniroyal, Inc., 531 So.2d 859, 859 (Ala.1988). The objection made by McDonald at the close of the trial court’s instructions to the jury was not specific and accordingly fails to meet the requirements of Rule 51, Ala. R. Civ. P., for preserving any alleged error in jury instructions for appellate review. See also Burnett v. Martin, 405 So.2d 23, 27 (Ala.1981) (<HOLDING>). Because the alleged error was not preserved

    ### Response:
    holding that an exception to the charges having to do with contributory negligence  charges two three and four was insufficient to preserve issue for appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that even assuming, arguendo, that defendants’ failure to oppose Keosay’s reduced bail bond increased the danger of significant harm to Ammy, the defendants’ conduct, when viewed in total, was not conscience shocking such as to constitute a violation of substantive due process. Finally, the court concludes that the County defendants are entitled to assert prosecutorial immunity from plaintiff Sophapmysay’s lawsuit. Therefore, the County defendants’ and defendant Driebilbus’s respective motions for summary judgment are granted. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . Although the complaint refers to defendant Lori Limits, ""Limits’s” actual name is Lori Limoges. Therefore, the court will use Limoges actual name in this opinion but will continue to use ""Lori Limits” in the caption to t (1st Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 107, 93

    ### Response:
    holding that private attorney who acted as courtappointed counsel for child in state juvenile delinquency proceedings was not acting under color of state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a concealed firearm on a prior instance is relevant to a charge of possession of a firearm in his car while he sought to transport drugs.... Introduction of a prior conviction for carrying a concealed weapon helped the government establish that Gomez was aware of the dangers of and law relating to concealed weapons and rebut Gomez’s claim that the gun was for an innocent purpose and its presence was mere accident or coincidence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing such evidence. 927 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir.1991) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Coleman, — F.3d - (3d Cir.2003) (“Coleman put at issue during trial whether he had knowledge of, and thus possessed, the shotgun and narcotics found in the apartment in which he resi (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 913

    ### Response:
    holding that the introduction of evidence of previous instances in which the defendant had been present in an automobile with a shotgun were admissible under fed rules of evid 404b  to show that his presence in the car with the shotgun on the occasion in question was intentional and not a mistake or accident
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    . See 29 C.F.R. part 1630, § 1630.1 (1992). 20 . See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1992). 21 . 29 C.F.R. Part 1630, Appendix to Part 1630-Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, § 1630.1(a). 22 . Id. at § 1630.2(j). 23 . See infra Part 11(A)(2). 24 . See 29 U.S.C.S. § 706(8)(B)(iii) (1990). 25 . 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir.1986). 26 . Id. at 935. 27 . 755 F.2d 1244, 1249-50 (6th Cir.1985). 28 . Id. at 1249; see also Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir.1992) (applying these factors in affirming summary judgment against plaintiff on grounds that he failed to establish that he was regarded as handicapped). 29 . 755 F.2d at 1249 n. 3. Such a ""narrow range of jobs"" need not be numerically insignificant. See, Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). This court takes judicial notice that New

    ### Response:
    holding that a perceived impairment that prevented the plaintiff from successfully applying for a position as a police officer for the city of new york did not constitute a substantial limitation of a major life activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2757. Circuit courts have consistently applied this principle in sustaining plans designed to redress past discrimination’s lingering effects. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 770 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir.1984) (“It is sufficient for the employer to show a conspicuous imbalance in its workforce” to justify a race-conscious remedy.), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3331, 92 L.Ed.2d 737 (1986); Bushey v. New York State Civil Service Commission, 733 F.2d 220, 228 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1117, 105 S.Ct. 803, 83 L.Ed.2d 795 (1985) (“[A] prima facie case of employment discrimination through a statistical demonstration of disproportionate racial impact” satisfies the remedial predicate.); Van Aken v. Young, 750 F.2d 43 (6th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 750

    ### Response:
    holding that city may remedy imbalance in the composition of the fire department created by traditional segregative practices
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had discriminated against him as a result of a handicap when it terminated him in March 1995. The Commission took no action during the next 180 days. As he was entitled to do, Mr. Ross withdrew this complaint and the Commission issued a notice of dismissal on December 11, 1996. Mr. Ross did not file his lawsuit against Jim Adams Ford until July 21, 2000. His complaint contained two counts. In count II, he alleged that he had been terminated in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. See § 440.205, Fla. Stat. (1993). The trial court dismissed this count because it was filed more than four years after Mr. Ross’s termination and was barred by the statute of limitations provided for statutory claims in section 95.11(8)(f). See Scott v. Otis Elevator, 524 So.2d 642 (Fla.1988) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Ross does not challenge this ruling on

    ### Response:
    holding fouryear period for statutory actions applies to section 440205 claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    find the design of the card-holding container nonfunctional. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as against Continental’s claims for trade dress infringement and unfair competition. 1 . On July 7, 2000 this Court issued an order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and entering final judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims. (See Memorandum Opinion and Order re: Trade Dress Claims.) This memorandum incorporates several minor editorial changes and corrections. Because more than 10 days have passed since entry of final judgment, this memorandum cannot effect any change in the judgment or extend the time to appeal. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(d)-(e); Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 738 F.2d 1230, 1231 (11th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Scott v. Younger, 739 F.2d 1464, 1467 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    accord those opinions little weight. For the reasons set forth below, the evidence the ALJ cites as contradicting the opinions of Santiago’s treating physicians is not substantial. For example, the ALJ completely disregarded Nunez’s opinion that Santiago’s depression met the B Criteria on the ground that Nunez expressed his view by signing a report that the ALJ believes was written by Malinowska. (Tr. 23.) However, even if the ALJ’s handwriting analysis is accurate and the report was written by Malinowska, there is no reason to believe that the report Nunez signed does not reflect his own view. Nor is there any legal principle which states that a doctor must personally write out a report that he signs for it to be afforded weight. See Ruiz v. Apfel, 98 F.Supp.2d 200, 209 (D.Conn.1999) (<HOLDING>). Since Nunez signed his name to the report and

    ### Response:
    holding that alj must give weight to a report signed by doctor even though it was prepared by someone else
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entitle him to credit against his sentence, and which is a factor affecting security level and parole decisions. Generally speaking, inmates have no legally protected interest in remaining in a particular location of confinement. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226-27, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). Although plaintiff argues that the ability to take and complete classes is a protected liberty interest, he has not pointed to a state statute creating such an interest. See id.; Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). Further, the potential effect of preventing plaintiff from taking classes on the duration of his sentence is “too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause.” Sandin, 515 U .S. at 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (<HOLDING>). VIII Challenge of the seizure of plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding that effect of misconduct record on duration of sentence was too attenuated even though it was a relevant consideration for parole
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Aristides Omar Mantilla petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that Mantilla failed to establish eligibility for asylum. Mantilla did not establish a connection between threats made against his family and one of the five statutory grounds for asylum. See Cruz-Navarro v. INS, 232 F.3d 1024, 1028-30 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Mantilla also has presented no evidence that

    ### Response:
    holding that dangers arising from police work do not support a claim of persecution on account of a protected ground
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would not shock the conscience. Accordingly, we hold that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar the plaintiffs’ substantive due process theory. VI. The defendants finally argue that since the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests federal courts of jurisdiction to order relief that prevents the enforcement of an order previously entered by a state court, Rooker-Feldman precludes the plaintiffs’ attempt to obtain an injunction against the closure of Desi’s and further harassment by the defendants. We disagree. The plaintiffs’ request for an injunction against the closure of Desi’s pursuant to the state court’s order is moot, as the state court’s injunction has expired and Desi’s has resumed operations. See, e.g., Orion Sales v. Emerson Radio Corp., 148 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Hodges v. Schlinkert Sports Assocs., 89 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that where a district courts preliminary injunction preventing the appellant from terminating its agreement with the defendant had expired the appellants appeal of the district courts decision to grant that injunction was moot
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “injuries caused by defects existing on their property and . . . the law does not regard natural accumulation of snow and ice as an actionable property defect.” Id. at 79. Liability may attach, however, “where some act or failure to act has changed the condition of naturally accumulated snow and ice, and the elements alone or in connection with the land become a hazard.” Sullivan, 416 Mass, at 827, citing Aylward, 412 Mass, at 80, n.3. In this regard, courts in the Commonwealth have typically assessed liability to defendants in three distinct areas: (1) where the plaintiff sustained injuries from a fall on an unnatural accumulation of ice or snow that formed as a result of water flowing from a defective roof, see Baldassari v. Produce Terminal Realty Corp., 361 Mass. 738, 744 (1972) (<HOLDING>); (2) where the plaintiff sustained injuries

    ### Response:
    holding that the juiy would have been warranted in finding that snow melted and flowed through holes in the roof   which the defendant negligently had failed to repair and thus created an unnatural accumulation of ice resulting in the plaintiffs fall
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    should be denied as to the Plaintiffs’ common law tort claims for negligent hiring and supervision (Count 3), negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count' 6), negligence (Count 7), and loss of services (Count 8). B. Negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Defendants argue that Mrs. Reiber’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress fails for another reason also. They argue that “‘[t]o maintain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show that she suffered a .direct physical impact.’ Neal, [ 2005 WL 1939955 at *10] (citing Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (Ind. 2005) (stating that ‘[a]s modified, the [impact] rule still requires physical impact’); Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1263-64 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Ketchmark v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 818

    ### Response:
    holding that in being discharged employee did not sustain the direct physical impact required to maintain an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    B. Validity of Petitioner’s Marriage Under New York Law Petitioner concedes that his marriage ceremony “was not done according to New York laws [sic ].” (Pet. Mem. at 4.) Nonetheless, Petitioner maintains that his marriage is valid under New York law, because: 1) the marriage was authorized under Polish law, and, therefore, should be recognizable in all jurisdictions (Pet.’s Mem. at 3); and 2) “there is no strict requirement for how marriage should be performed.” (Id. at 9.) Petitioner makes two arguments in support of his position that a marriage authorized under Polish law is valid in New York State. First, Petitioner argues that his consular marriage should be recognized under New York law, because “New York State has a history of recognizing judgments rendered in fo .Ct. 1944) (<HOLDING>). Second, Petitioner relies on Article 25(c) of

    ### Response:
    holding that a ceremonial marriage performed under the laws of a foreign power by a foreign consular officer on united states territory was invalid because it did not comply with the laws of new york state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consider both separately. With respect to the Peace Child Care Center, Inc., the determination to be made is whether it was operated primarily for religious purposes and whether it was operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by the Church. The record reflects no disagreement that the now defunct child care center was primarily subsidized by the Church. The only step remaining is determining if the child care center was operated primarily for religious purposes. The evidence on this issue is not disputed. The Church’s bookkeeper testified that the function of the child care center was to take care of children and provide an outreach for the church. See St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 784-85, 101 S.Ct. 2142, 68 L.Ed.2d 612 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, Co-manic’s testimony that she

    ### Response:
    holding the federal unemployment tax act section exempting service performed in employ of church after which florida molded its unemployment law was meant to apply to schools that have no separate legal existence from the church and therefore employees working within such schools are in employ of the church
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    valid[.]” (citation omitted)). In Georgia v. Randolph, the Supreme Court reiterated a narrow exception to this rule, holding that “a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.” 547 U.S. at 122-23, 126 S.Ct. 1515; see also Fernandez, 134 S.Ct. at 1134 (emphasizing Randolph does not extend to cases where the objector is not present and objecting). Put another way, the Supreme Court has held that “a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.” Id. at 120, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (footnote omitted) (<HOLDING>). Subsequent courts have applied Randolph in

    ### Response:
    holding search invalid under the fourth amendment when a physicallypresent occupant expressly objected to a search  notwithstanding the consent of a fellow occupant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    until peremptory challenges are exercised. 22 . In McCrory v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243 (2d Cir.1996), the court observed: If ... a Batson objection may be raised after the jury has been sworn and trial has begun, there can be no remedy short of aborting the trial. This would permit the defendant to manipulate the system to the extreme prejudice of the prosecution and give the defendant a strong inducement to delay raising the objection until trial is underway. As the trial judge is unlikely for reasons of judicial economy to abort the. trial, the defendant may have the opportunity to test his fortunes with the first jury, preserving the opportunity for a mistrial and a second round in the event of a conviction. See United States v. Dobynes, 905 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (8th Cir. [1990]) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 877, 111 S.Ct. 206,

    ### Response:
    holding that batson challenge raised for the first time after trial was untimely in part because only remedy after trial is vacating the conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cannot prevail. The second temporal issue relates to when the mold and bacteria came into existence. There is no evidence whatsoever, undisputed or otherwise, of when the mold and mildew came into existence. This shortfall in the evidence that Panorama put forth to support its motion for summary judgment impacts all counts of the complaint, but especially the count for negligence. The Schornbergs in their complaint state that they were advised in June 2003 that the water intrusion they had detected a month earlier had caused growth of mold and bacteria. However, the complaint is not evidence. Straub v. Village of Wellington, 941 So.2d 1269 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (stating that a complaint is not admissible to prove or disprove a fact in issue). Evidence that the mold and bacteria w A 1999) (<HOLDING>); Floyd v. Homes Beautiful Constr. Co., 710

    ### Response:
    holding that despite release language discharging defendant from claims upon or by reason of any matter cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of these presents release did not bar any claims accruing after the date of execution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the Supreme Court has recognized as giving rise to standing if allegedly infringed. West Virginia’s claimed injury does not involve the State’s interest in the enforcement of its own laws. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601, 102 S.Ct. 3260 (identifying as a sovereign interest “the power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal”). It does not involve a demand that West Virginia’s sovereignty be recognized by another state.' See id. (identifying as a sovereign interest “the demand for recognition from other sovereigns”). It does not involve the State’s real property, see E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 519, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (recognizing “Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory”); its public fisc, see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Small Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2604-05 (<HOLDING>); or another form of proprietary interest, see

    ### Response:
    holding that the threatened loss of over 10 percent of a states overall budget  is economic dragooning that leaves the states with no real option but to acquiesce in a federal demand
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pennington, judge of the 38th Judicial District Court, Uvalde County, Texas. 5 . The trial court also denied the District’s motion to sever the partial summary judgment granted by the trial court. Because the trial court denied the severance motion, the court's summary judgment ruling is not at issue in this appeal. 6 . (emphasis added). The fact that the Board approved the permit applications upon the condition that the District’s General Manager confirm each applicant’s installation of a water well flow meter, compliance with the Rules of the Kinney County Groundwater Conservation District, and payment of all fees due and owing to the District does not diminish or affect the definitiveness of the District’s order in this instance. See Tex.-New Mexico Power Co., 806 S.W.2d at 233 (<HOLDING>). 7 . The District argues the cases cited in

    ### Response:
    recognizing that conditions placed on the issuance of a permit do not necessarily diminish or eliminate the definitiveness of the order approving the permit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an insurer to defend when there may be no ultimate duty to indemnify. This is true because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. We are satisfied that the interests of justice and the conservation of scarce judicial resources support the course we have chosen.” Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Brennan, 534 A.2d 353, 354 (Me.1987) (citation omitted). We therefore conclude that the hardship to the insurer is outweighed by the competing interests of preventing duplicative litigation and sparing insureds the costs of defending a collateral action brought by the insurer to determine its obligations under the insurance contract before the nat parties’ stipulation of fact to determine duties to defend and indemnify); cf. Bowen v. Hanover Ins. Co., 599 A.2d 1150 (Me.1991) (<HOLDING>). In Dolley, the insurer filed its declaratory

    ### Response:
    holding that insurer had no duly to indemnify insured in view of the parties stipulation of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    challenge the computation of the compensatory damages. 7 . Although some of these events did take place prior to the plan's confirmation, the claims are not barred by res judicata because the breaches of fiduciary duly did not occur until well afterward. The pre-confirmation events are looked at only for background, pattern of activity, and for evidence of motive. See n.4, supra. 8 . We also find that the punitive damages were proportional to the compensatory damages, less than a 2 to 1 ratio, and that there is therefore no need to discuss a possible conflict between Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (suggesting that punitive damages disproportionate to compensatory damages may violate due process), and Kirkbride, 555 A.2d at 803 (<HOLDING>). See Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952

    ### Response:
    holding that punitive damages do not need to be proportional to compensatory damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    secured to the defendant’s dock and had the effect of extending the dock’s work area. The barge was moved infrequently, primarily to launch the newly constructed concrete barges. This Court, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 7 S.Ct. 336, 30 L.Ed. 501 (1887), concluded that the barge was a construction platform not designed for the transportation of passengers, cargo, or equipment across navigable waters, and that “the status of the craft [was] governed by the proposition that, ‘as a matter of law, a floating dry dock is not a vessel when it is moored and in use as a dry dock.’ ” Id. at 1002 (citations omitted). The barge in question was merely an extension of the dock. See also Watkins v. Pentzien, Inc., 660 F.2d 604 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Leonard v. Exxon Corp., 581 F.2d 522 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that two barges fastened together moored to bank of river and used to weld pipeline together were not vessels
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the state has placed its imprimatur on a particular religious creed. This symbolic inference is too dangerous to permit.” Brandon v. Board of Ed. of Guilderland Cent. School District, 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir.1980); see Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 750, 764, 96 S.Ct. 2337, 2346, 2353, 49 L.Ed.2d 179 (1976). Here, since defendants display Martin’s painting in a high school auditorium, students view the painting each time they enter the auditorium. Further, defendant School District uses the auditorium for numerous events at which elementary students are required to attend. Susan Affidavit, Doc. 7 at ¶ 4. Accordingly, this court’s scrutiny of the painting and its placement must be all the more discriminating. See Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 390, 105 S.Ct. at 3226 (<HOLDING>). Taking into account the significant message

    ### Response:
    holding that the inquiry into endorsement test must be conducted with particular care when many of the citizens perceiving the governmental message are children in their formative years
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nev. 412, 537 P.2d 321 (1975); Mitchell v. Ridgway, 77 N.M. 249, 421 P.2d 778 (1966); Kelly v. Willis, 238 N.C. 637, 78 S.E.2d 711 (1953); Burnett v. Rice, 39 Ohio St.3d 44, 529 N.E.2d 203 (1988); Kathren v. Olenik, 46 Or.App. 713, 613 P.2d 69, 75 (1980); Watzig v. Tobin, 292 Or. 645, 642 P.2d 651 (1982); Reed v. Clark, 277 S.C. 310, 286 S.E.2d 384 (1982); Higgins v. Vinson, 549 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn.App.1976); Beck v. Sheppard, 566 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.1978); Rhiness v. Dansie, 24 Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970); Rice v. Turner, 191 Va. 601, 62 S.E.2d 24 (1950); Dawson v. Woodson, 180 W.Va. 307, 376 S.E.2d 321 (1988); Hinkle v. Siltamaki, 361 P.2d 37 (Wyo.1961). The rules regarding negligence in such situations are the same as in ordinary negligence 190 Cal.Rptr. 729 (App.Dep’t Super.Ct.1983) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Hardy, 70 Cal.App.2d 6, 160 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs evidence that the ranchers cows had escaped several times over the past 10 years constituted sufficient evidence for jury to properly find simple negligence and to award compensatory damages where the plaintiffs sustained damages when their car collided with a cow owned by the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    EmCare, which resulted in Scott’s firing. Also similar to Scott, the plaintiff in Butler used the same equipment as the manufacturer’s employees and produced the goods that were the manufacturer’s core business. See id. But there are important differences between the two cases. For example, the manufacturer’s employees supervised the Butler plaintiff on the factory floor. See id. Here, Scott was supervised by an EmCare employee. Further, the Butler plaintiff performed the same tasks as the manufacturer’s employees, whereas all hospitalists like Scott were EmCare employees. Given these differences, Butler does not convince us that the jury here rendered a verdict against the great weight of the evidence. Cf. Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co. Inc., 617 F.3d 182, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). The relationship between Scott and the

    ### Response:
    holding that joint employment determination was a complex mixed question of law and fact properly determined by jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fairly have granted Appellants’ petition to open. However, under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to do so. Order affirmed. Gantman, J. concurs in the result. 1 . See Balk v. Ford Motor Co., 446 Pa. 137, 285 A.2d 128 (1971) (ruling that court did not abuse discretion in striking default judgment where insurer lost client's court papers and prejudice lacking); Duckson v. Wee Wheelers, Inc., 423 Pa.Super. 251, 620 A.2d 1206 (1993) (deeming insurer’s delay reasonable excuse); Provident Credit Corp. v. Young, 300 Pa.Super. 117, 446 A.2d 257 (1982) (en banc) (forgiving delay when disadvantaged party was aban doned by multiple attorneys for want of ability to pay); cf. Jung v. St. Paul’s Parish, 522 Pa. 167, 560 A.2d 1356 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Manson v. First Nat'l Bank in Ind., 366 Pa.

    ### Response:
    holding that non pros should have been opened where parties were engaged in settlement negotiations and rule to file complaint was intermingled with discovery requests
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (BIA 1992). Its construction of ambiguous statutory provisions — like the term “crime involving moral turpitude” — is entitled to Chevron deference. Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir.2012). Consequently, this court “must uphold the BIA’s construction [of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)® ] unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Kellermann v. Holder, 592 F.3d 700, 702 (6th Cir.2010) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our circuit has held— along with a number of other circuits— that the BIA’s interpretation of “crime involving moral turpitude” is reasonable. Novatchinski v. Holder, 516 Fed.Appx. 526, 530-31 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); Ghani v. Holder, 557 F.3d 836, 841 n. 3 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding the bias interpretation reasonable and listing cases reaching the same conclusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    represent conflicting interests; that Mitchell’s representation of Williams did not have an adverse effect on Mitchell’s representation of Chambers; and that Mitchell did not have a conflict of interest while representing Chambers. We observe that the Supreme Court has not held that the standard applied by the state court applies to claims of successive representation conflicts. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (declining to decide whether to extend standard for multiple concurrent representation conflicts in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)— conflict actually affected adequacy of representation—to successive representation conflicts); but see Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 797-98 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming that the state court

    ### Response:
    holding that cuyler standard applies to all multiple representation conflicts whether concurrent or successive under preaedpa law and holding teague bar inapplicable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    denies the remainder of RMC’s motion. It is further ORDERED that LSC’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to the Georgia incident. The court denies the remainder of LSC’s motion. It is further ORDERED that RMC’s challenge under the FOIA is denied. It is further ORDERED that the LSC Decision is remanded to LSC and LSC is instructed to fashion a proper remedy in accordance with this order. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . In actuality, SCLSA operated as an arm of PLS in 1994 and 1995. (Mem. in Supp. of Pis.' Mot. for Summ.J. at 6) (citing Berkowitz Dep. of 9/22/97, at 19.) - 2 . Local legal services organizations have also recently challenged these restrictions in court, questioning their legality under the Constitution. See Velazquez v. Legal Services Corp., 985 F.Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (<HOLDING>); Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Services Corp., 981

    ### Response:
    holding that ban on use of nonlsc funds for class actions violates first amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to withdraw his pleas on the basis that he pleaded guilty with the understanding that he would not be sentenced as a habitual offender. The portion of the transcript of the plea hearing that Harris attached to his motion appears to support this claim. However, Harris again failed to allege prejudice, because he failed to allege that he would not have pleaded if he had known that the trial court would sentence him as a habitual offender. When a defendant, in a rule 3.850 motion, seeks to withdraw his plea on the ground that it was involuntary because he was provided incorrect information regarding the consequences of the plea, he must allege that he would not have accepted the plea if he had been fully aware of the consequences. See State v. Taylor, 738 So.2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). Again our affirmance is without prejudice to

    ### Response:
    holding that for a facially sufficient claim that the plea was involuntary based on misadvice of counsel defendant must allege he would not have accepted the plea agreement but for the misadvice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    banc) (extending claim to adult children); Miller v. Subia, 514 P.2d 79, 80 (Colo.App.1973) (implication that action would be allowed upon display of adequate evidence); Wilkie v. Roberts, 91 Fla. 1064, 109 So. 225, 227 (1926) (but the law in Florida at present is unclear; in Yordon v. Savage, 279 So.2d 844, 846 (Fla.1973), the Court held that Wilkie permitted either parent to recover for the loss of the child's companionship, society and services. But other cases have limited Wilkie to authorizing only damages for lost services. See Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So.2d 503, 506 (FIa.1956); City Stores Co. v. Langer, 308 So.2d 621, 622 (Fla.App.1975); Dymek v. Nyquist, 128 Ill.App.3d 859, 83 Ill.Dec. 52, 59, 469 N.E.2d 659, 666 (1984) ; Ferguson v. Burkett, 454 So.2d 413, 416 (La.App.1984) (<HOLDING>); First Trust Co. of North Dakota v. Scheels

    ### Response:
    recognizing a 1982 amendment giving rise to this claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the level of persecution; 2) that the persecution was on account of one or more of the five protected grounds; and 3) that the persecution was committed either by the government or by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control. Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir.2000). We have defined persecution as “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive.” Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir.1969). Threats and attacks can constitute persecution even where an applicant has not been beaten or physically harmed. See, e.g., Artiga Turcios v. INS, 829 F.2d 720, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). Here, Ganut and his party were attacked by

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioner had established persecution even though he had not been physically harmed and received only an indirect threat relayed by a neighbor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an appeal”). 46 .See, e.g., Milton v. United States, 105 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir.1939) (""The word ‘filed’ ... is, as applied to court proceedings, a word of art, having a long established and well understood meaning, deriving from the practice of filing papers on a string or wire. It requires of one filing a suit, merely the depositing of the instrument with the custodian for the purpose of being filed.... [I]t charges him with no further duty[.]”); Black’s Law Dictionary 660 (8th ed. 1999) (defining ""file” as ""To deliver a legal document to the court clerk or record custodian for placement into the official record”). The distinction between filing and service is well-established in our jurisprudence. See, e.g., Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, 424 A.2d 61, 67-68 (D.C.1980) (en banc) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in the original). 47 . See Henderson

    ### Response:
    recognizing the clear understanding that the manner by which an action is commenced via filing of the complaint with the court  presents a completely different and separable array of considerations from the manner by which service of process is to be made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appear before us on appeal. 3 . There is some dispute as to when the process of amending the City’s zoning ordinance began. However, since we conclude that the City has no intention of re-enacting the allegedly unconstitutional segments of the zoning code, we need not decide what initially motivated the City's comprehensive overhaul of its entire zoning ordinance. 4 . In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. 5 . We cataloged many of the Supreme Court decisions on this subject in our Coral Springs decision: See, e.g., Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 474, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 1252, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 582-83,

    ### Response:
    holding that a commerce clausebased challenge to florida banking statutes was rendered moot by amendments to the law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir.1992); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 968 F.2d 695, 699 (8th Cir.1992). The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the record. Vette Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir.1980) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis Given the absence of direct evidence of age discrimination in the present case, plaintiffs disparate treatment claim is best analyzed at the present stage of the litigation as a McDonnell Douglas pretext case. See Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 & n. 1 (8th Cir.1997) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2510, 138

    ### Response:
    holding that the facts of the ease fall under the mcdonnell douglas standard which does not require direct proof of discrimination for the plaintiff to make a submissible case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    487 U.S. 1242, 108 S.Ct. 2918, 101 L.Ed.2d 949 (1988); Julius v. Johnson, 840 F.2d 1533, 1540 (11th Cir.) (allowing double-counting of felony-murder factor), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 960, 109 S.Ct. 404, 102 L.Ed.2d 392 (1988). I. Improper Prosecution Arguments Coe cites four statements made by the prosecution at the sentencing stage that he claims were improper. First, Coe complains that the prosecutor improperly injected his expertise into his death-penalty argument. The prosecutor said that he took his decision to seek the death penalty very seriously; that the decision was difficult; that he had only ever requested the death penalty once before. Coe cites Eleventh Circuit precedent that is directly on point. See, e.g., Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1410 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). But Kemp ultimately held the error to be

    ### Response:
    holding very similar commentsto be prejudicial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    version of the peculiar risk doctrine, that is, under either section 413 or section 416. Privette, 5 Cal.4th 689, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721 (1993); see also Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc., 18 Cal.4th 253, 264 n. 2, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 878, 955 P.2d 504 (1998); Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy, 25 Cal.4th 1235, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 25 P.3d 1096 (2001) (applying the peculiar risk analysis of Privette to section 410, negligent hiring, and holding hirer not liable for the negligent performance of a hired contractor for injuries to the contractor’s employees). When considering a hirer’s liability under the peculiar risk provisions, the courts consistently distinguished the issue before them from the tort theory set forth in section 414. Toland, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 955 P.2d at 511 n. 2 (<HOLDING>); Camargo, 25 Cal.4th at 1245, n. 2, 108

    ### Response:
    holding that the grant of review did not extend to and therefore we do not decide  whether privette  would preclude an employee of an independent contractor from seeking tort recovery from workplace injuries under the theory of section 414
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the case, because the court treated the Guidelines range as mandatory and “the Supreme Court has now excised the mandatory nature of the Guidelines in Booker.” Shelton, 400 F.3d at 1330 (reviewing Booker claim for plain error). In Shelton, we concluded that “it was Booker error for the district court to sentence Shelton under a mandatory Guidelines scheme, even in the absence of a Sixth Amendment enhancement violation.” Id. (citation omitted). Based on the excision of the mandatory provisions of the Guidelines, in cases involving preserved Booker error, we have required the Government to show that the mandatory, as opposed to the advisory, application of the Guidelines did not contribute to the defendant’s sentence. See United States v. Paz, 405 F.3d 946, 948-49 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The government bears the burden to show that

    ### Response:
    holding that the government could not meet its burden under harmless error analysis because the record indicated that district court would have imposed shorter sentencing under advisory guidelines scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    due process requirements. And that question is not before us now. As such, I cannot agree that a procedure created and used for § 1226(a) detainees tells us anything about the constitutional adequacy of the procedures governing unreasonably prolonged detention under § 1226(c). Our decision regarding what due process requires in this context perhaps should bear upon the protections owed to § 1226(a) detainees, not the other way around. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, which has adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard for § 1226(c) detainees, appears to have adopted the same standard for § 1226(a) detainees. See Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1087 (applying a clear and convincing evidence standard to a class comprised of aliens detained under § 1226(a) and (c)); Singh, 638 F.3d at 1205 (<HOLDING>). Significant deprivations of liberty warrant

    ### Response:
    holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applies in casascastrillon 535 f3d at 948  1226a  bond hearings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    majority correctly points out that certain federal courts recognize the application of res judicata to a dismissal without prejudice under a factual scenario similar to this case. Majority Opinion ¶ 8. However, our appellate courts appear to disagree with this federal position 9, ¶¶ 9-10, 141 N.M. 127, 151 P.3d 88 (denying the application of res judicata to the dismissal of a foreclosure action without prejudice that was based upon significant inactivity by the bank); Salazar v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 1990-NMCA-003, ¶¶ 11-13, 109 N.M. 443, 786 P.2d 57 (denying the application of res judicata to a recommended decision arising during the first of two workers’ compensation administrative proceedings where the first claim was dismissed without prejudice); Bralley, 1985-NMCA-043, ¶ 18 (<HOLDING>); Chavez v. Chenoweth, 1976-NMCA-076, ¶¶ 25-27,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the words without prejudice when used in an order or decree generally indicate that there has been no resolution of the controversy on its merits and leaves the issues in litigation open to another suit as if no action had ever been brought
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deportation proceedings have been completed.’ Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2399, 72 L.Ed.2d 786[, 805] (1982) (the bracketed words are substituted for the words ‘child’ or ‘children’ in the original).” St. Joseph’s Hosp., 142 Ariz. 94, '688 P.2d at 991. The St. Joseph’s Hosp. court went on to conclude: “Given these words from the nation’s highest court concerning a field of federal legislation, it is unnecessary to pursue the matter further. There is no federal impediment to an undocumented alien becoming a resident of an Arizona county. We have been cited to no state law which would create such an impediment.” St Joseph’s Hosp., 142 Ariz. 94, 688 P.2d at 992. See also Cabral v. State Bd. of Control, 112 Cal.App.3d 1012, 169 Cal.Rptr. 604, 607 (Cal.Ct.App.1980) (<HOLDING>). Many other state courts have held that aliens

    ### Response:
    holding that an alien who entered this country illegally from mexico could establish domicile
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has provided none. Accordingly, this argument must be rejected as well. D. Conclusion In consideration of the foregoing, the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted as to that portion of the requested relief that has not been mooted by the USTR’s removal of Gilda’s products from the retaliation list. Accordingly, Gilda’s imports of rusks or toasted breads from Spain entered after July 29, 2007 must be liquidated without the 100 percent retaliatory duty described herein. Further, the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection shall refund to the plaintiff all of the retaliatory duties (described herein) collected on Gilda’s toasted bread imports from Spain between July 29, 2007 and March 23, 2009. See Shinyei Corp. of America v. United States, 355 F.3d 1297 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). 1 . The plaintiff's motion for summary

    ### Response:
    holding that reliquidation is not prohibited where a decision of customs is not being challenged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under Article 9 by selling the collateral; it is an action to enforce the obligation of the buyer to pay the full sale price to the seller, an obligation which is an essential element of all sales and which exists whether or not the sale is accompanied by a security arrangement.”); First Nat’l Bank in Albuquerque v. Chase, 118 N.M. 783, 887 P.2d 1250, 1252 (1994) (“a deficiency action is essentially an action for the price and is, therefore, part of the general sales aspect of the agreement”). Admittedly, CFCU exercised its right to repossess the vehicle under SCUCC Article 9. See S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-609 (2003) (allowing repossession of collateral after default); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-610(a) (2003) (allowing the sale of collateral after default); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-615(d) (2003) (<HOLDING>). However, as assignee to the sales contract,

    ### Response:
    holding the obligor liable for any deficiency following sale
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her payments for escrow items never decreased. The Court finds that plaintiff alleges that Chase’s duty to make flood insurance payments arises from the mortgage agreement. The Court, therefore, rejects Chase’s argument that plaintiffs claims arise out of and are preempted by the NFIA. See Rentrop v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 07-384, 2008 WL 2465288, at *3 (S.D. Miss. June 12, 2008) (“In my opinion, [mortgageej’s duty to make these payments, if any, does not arise under the NFIA[,] [but] would arise, if at all, from the terms of the contracts that govern the business relationship between [mortgagee] and the plaintiffs or from the course of dealings concerning these premium payments.”); Bennen v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-5742, 2006 WL 3240786, at *1-2 (E.D.La. Nov. 6, 2006) (<HOLDING>). (ii) Breach of Contract Plaintiff asserts

    ### Response:
    holding that because plaintiffs claims did not challenge the handling administration or payment of his flood claim or compliance with the act or the regulations the state law claims for breach of contract and tort are not preempted by the nfia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for a serious health condition, the employer may request certification by the employee's health provider. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(a). Simpson v. Office of the Chief Judge of the Cir. C. of Will Cnty., 559 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir.2009); Kauffman, 426 F.3d at 886. Certification is sufficient if it provides the date the serious health condition began, its probable duration, relevant medical facts, and a statement that the employee is unable to work. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b); 29 C.F.R. § 825.306. Kauffman, 426 F.3d at 886. If the employee fails to submit certification of her condition in a timely manner, then an employer is entitled to deny FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.313. Simpson, 559 F.3d at 709. Under the regulations, if an employer finds a certification incomplete, the emplo t *4 (N.D.Ill.2009) (<HOLDING>); Sewall v. Chi. Transit Auth., 2001 WL 40802

    ### Response:
    holding a plaintiff to be ineligible for fmla leave wherein the plaintiff had not accumulated enough work hours
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    undisputed that Mr. Avila engaged in protected opposition to discrimination when the union filed a grievance on his behalf on September 2, 2003, alleging national origin discrimination. See Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir.2004) (indicating that lodging union grievance asserting discrimination constitutes protected activity). It is also undisputed that Mr. Avila suffered an adverse employment action when he was terminated. See Fye, 516 F.3d at 1228 (stating “termination ... is clearly an adverse employment action”). Finally, it is undisputed that Mr. Avila established a causal connection between his protected activity on September 2, 2003 and his termination nine days later. See Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Mr. Avila established a prima facie

    ### Response:
    holding that twentyfour days between protected activity and termination is sufficient to infer existence of causal connection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or sentencing, when it was cognizable and the trial court had jurisdiction, the Setzer appellant had waived his right to raise the issue. Id. (“[W]e find it clear that practical considerations dictate that this issue be deemed waived when, as in the instant case, it is not raised until almost two years after disposition of the charges which gave rise to the confiscation of property.”); Commonwealth v. Romberger, 474 Pa. 190, 378 A.2d 283, 286 (1977) (“It is a fundamental doctrine in this jurisdiction that where an issue is cognizable in a given proceeding and is not raised it is waived and will not be considered on a review of that proceeding.”). The Commonwealth Court has likewise previously applied a waiver analysis in the same circumstances. One 1990 Dodge Ram Van, 751 A.2d at 1237 (<HOLDING>). The trial court in this case agreed with the

    ### Response:
    holding the appellant waived the issue of return of property by failing to raise it following trial or sentencing for the underlying crimes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as standardized, pre-printed forms that each plaintiff had to sign, and, from a negotiating standpoint, Amoco clearly had greater bargaining power than plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the court does not find that the contracts are so “one-sided” or unfair as to render either the integration clauses or the contracts themselves unenforceable. Even construing the standardized contracts strictly against Amoco and in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there is nothing that could reasonably be considered shockingly unfair or offensive about the wording of the contracts or the inclusion of the integration clauses therein. Standardized contracts with integration clauses have been a common part of plaintiffs’ and Amoco’s franchise relationship. See Adams, 13 Kan.App.2d at 497, 774 P.2d 355 (<HOLDING>). In addition, this case does not involve the

    ### Response:
    holding that nolostprofits clause in parties agreement was not unconscionable as a matter of law in part because similar clause had been in the agreement between the parties for years
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be a mitigating factor because it does not relate to a defendant’s character or background or to the circumstances of the offense. We are unpersuaded by defendant’s argument. In Martini I, supra, the Court rejected the same argument advanced by defendant. 131 N.J. at 313, 619 A.2d 1208. There, the Court concluded that although the trial court should instruct the jury during the penalty phase on potential noncapital sentences, “the court should inform the jury that defendant’s possible sentence for the other convictions should not influence its determination regarding the appropriateness of a death sentence on the murder count.” Ibid. Martini I’s holding in this regard is in harmony with the Court’s pronouncements in related contexts. See Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 603, 610 A.2d 814 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, it would lead to an incongruous

    ### Response:
    holding that although court should inform jury about defendants prior sentences the court should instruct the jury that it should not consider prior sentences in its decision to impose a life or death sentence because they are not statutory aggravating or mitigating factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defendant’s fear at the time of the incident. E.B., 531 So.2d at 1054. As part of that foundation, the defendant must establish that the victim committed some overt act at or about the time of the incident that reasonably indicated a need for action by the defendant in self-defense. Id.; Sanchez v. State, 445 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Hager v. State, 439 So.2d 996, 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Once the proper foundation is laid, the defendant may introduce evidence of the victim’s reputation or of specific i 356, 357 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (concluding that the trial court erred by excluding testimony that the victim had a reputation as a bully because there was no showing that the defendant had knowledge of the victim’s reputation); Marcum v. State, 341 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, the purpose of specific acts

    ### Response:
    holding that where an issue is the identity of the initial aggressor it is irrelevant whether the defendant was aware of his adversarys reputation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statutes do not mandate the issuance of an injunction, and that plaintiffs must still show some tangible irreparable environmental injury. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982); Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987); Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648 (2nd Cir.1989) (applying Weinberger and Amoco and concluding that they require a showing of irreparable injury apart from the violation of NEPA procedural requirements). Although NEPA violations may not create a presumption of irreparable injury, the Court believes that such violations do create a type of injury that courts must consider when deciding whether to grant injunctive relief. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497 (1st Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). More specifically, such violations by their

    ### Response:
    holding that nepa is designed to prevent harm to the environment through inadequately informed decision making and that courts should take account of this harm and its potentially irreparable nature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Feb. 14, 2012) (Lauriat, J.); Lantor Inc. v. Ellis, Civil No. 98-01064, 1998 WL 726502, **9-10 [9 Mass. L. Rptr. 221] (Norfolk Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 1998) (Gants, J.). “It is well settled that a material breach of contract by one party excuses the other party from performance as matter of law.. .” HRPT Advisers, Inc. v. MacDonald, Levine, Jenkins & Co., P.C., 43 Mass.App.Ct. 613, 626 n.16 (1997), citing Hastings Assocs., Inc. v. Local 369 Bldg. Fund, Inc., 42 Mass.App.Ct. 162, 171 (1997). Therefore, the question of Colameta’s conduct only becomes relevant if the court determines as a matter of law that Protégé’s conduct did not constitute a material breach of the 2007 Employment Agreement that discharged Colameta’s obligations under that agreement. See, e.g., Ward, 15 Mass.App.Ct. at 101 (<HOLDING>). A breach is material if it is “of ‘an

    ### Response:
    holding that employers wrongful discharges of the plaintiffs constituted breaches of the employment agreements so material as to discharge the plaintiffs from any further obligations under the contracts ie covenants not to compete and to allow them to recover contract damages for total breach
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have had a track record of reliability, their tips corroborated the first informant’s tip and to some extent each other’s tips, which also “render[s] their information enough to support a finding of probable cause.” United States v. Fulgham, 143 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir.1998). In like fashion, in United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir.1999), a case where the sufficiency of an affidavit upon which a search warrant was challenged, we said: The affidavit contained information provided by two different informants whose stories were remarkably consistent. “[CJonsistency between the reports of two independent informants helps to validate both accounts.” United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562, 566 (1st Cir.1996); see also United States v. Fulgham, 143 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112,

    ### Response:
    holding that the magistrates finding of probable cause was supported by among other things the reciprocally corroborative consistency in the information provided by two separate informants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    It is not the duty of this Court to construct arguments for or find support for appellant’s right to appeal from an interlocutory order; instead, the appellant has the burden of showing this Court that the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on the merits. Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 380, 444 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1994). Plaintiff has not addressed the appealability of the interim order here and thus has failed to meet her burden of showing that the appeal has been properly taken. This Court has recognized that similar “interim” orders entered in the domestic context are not immediately appealable. See, e.g., Dixon v. Dixon, 62 N.C. App. 744, 303 S.E.2d 606 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Smart v. Smart, 59 N.C. App. 533, 297 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a mandatory injunction entered pursuant to nc gen stat  5020i ordering one party to return property to the former marital home pending final resolution of the action for divorce and equitable distribution is not immediately appealable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    years 1999, 2000, and 2001. See, e.g., Def.’s Ex. 6-8 (containing Certificate of Assessments and Payments for plaintiffs 1999, 2000, and 2001 tax years indicating that no payment had been made). A Certificate of Assessments and Payments “is routinely used to prove that a tax assessment has in fact been made.” Rocovich, 933 F.2d at 994. Where, as here, a plaintiff has failed to allege that he paid the full amount of the assessed taxes that are the basis of his refund claim, the court may accept as true the assertions contained in a Certificate of Assessments and Payments indicating that the plaintiff has not fully paid the assessment. Daniels v. United States, No. 97-442T, 1999 WL 302450, at *3 (Fed.Cl. Apr.14, 1999); see also United States v. Chila, 871 F.2d 1015, 1018 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Dallin ex rel. Estate of Young v. United

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a certificate of assessments and payments is  presumptive proof of a valid assessment  quoting united states v dixon 672 fsupp 503 506 mdala1987 affd 849 f2d 1478 11th cir1988
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the United States Supreme Court has also recognized that “the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.” Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 675, 685 n. 13, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979). While “the requirement that the act must be willful or purposeful may not render certain, for all purposes, a statutory definition of the crime which is in some respects uncertain ... it does relieve the statute of the objection that it punishes without warning an offense of which the accused was unaware.” Id. (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035-36, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1995), (plurality opinion)). See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates, at 499, 102 S.Ct. at 1193-94 (<HOLDING>); Robinson v. State, 600 A.2d 356, 365 (1991).

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a scienter requirement may mitigate a laws vagueness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and did not schedule her for any work on Saturdays. (Pl.’s Mem. of Law at 4). Indeed, Dr. Eckstein’s proffered position at Beth Israel was conditioned upon her receiving Sabbath observance accommodation like that which she had at NYU. (Id.) In order to prevail over defendants’ summary judgment motions, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that the facts surrounding defendants’ refusal to hire her give rise to an inference of religious discrimination. Stetson v. NYNEX Service Co., 995 F.2d 355, 359-360 (2d Cir.1993). Because defendants offered the same position to someone else with similar religious practices, an inference of discrimination cannot be drawn from their refusal to hire plaintiff. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Wiltel, Inc., 81 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Eng v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 93 Civ

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case in a religious discrimination suit because among other reasons employer hired someone else with identical religious practices
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had not been made. Id. at 1310. However, he also stated his view “that from a purely technical standpoint a public defender may appear as ‘next friend’ with as much justification as the mother of [one or another capital defendant].” Id. As noted above, there is no issue of competence in this case; the reason for seeking next friend standing is inaccessibility, and the government has conceded that. There being no “technical” impediment to appointing a lawyer to serve as next friend, it is not surprising that courts have done so in appropriate cases. See, e.g., Miller ex rel. Jones v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir.2000) (granting next friend status to lawyer seeking to stay execution and remanding for hearing on defendant’s competence); Ford v. Haley, 195 F.3d 603, 624 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); In re Cockrum, 867 F.Supp. 494, 495

    ### Response:
    recognizing that lawyer who had represented petitioner for years was as fit as a relative to serve as next friend
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    AND JUDGMENT TACHA, Circuit Judge. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(f); 10th Cir.R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Defendant Marco Antonio Arreola-Najera plea 6 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). This circuit has not resolved the issue. As

    ### Response:
    holding that note 9 did not authorize downward departure based on drug purity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    771 F.2d 235, 242 (7th Cir.1985)(disapprov-ing “of a trial judge’s procedure in entering a jury room, despite agreement by both counsel and the presence of a court reporter, to give a supplemental instruction after the jury had already begun its deliberations” and noting that discourses between a judge and the jury during deliberations undermines the appearance of justice). In short, the Court cannot say, under the circumstances, that there exists no reasonable possibility that the jury’s verdict was not influenced by an improper communication. Cheek, 94 F.3d at 141. A criminal defendant has a right to a fair trial, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, and a right to be present at every stage of the trial. Fed. R.Crim. Pro. 43(a); see United States v. Coffman, 94 F.3d 330, 335-36 (7th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Pressley, 100 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant is entitled to be present at all stages of his trial  and a judges response to a note from the jury is one of those stages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In re Amy Unknown provided no clarification on this provision, which has unambiguously required proximate cause under the plain language of the statute since its enactment in 1994. Because Gonzalez failed to raise arguments regarding “other losses” and specific categories of damages in his initial briefing, he has waived this issue on appeal. In any event, fact questions “capable of resolution by the district court upon proper objection at sentencing can never constitute plain error.” Gonzalez’s argument that Vicky’s costs for “educational ... counseling needs” predated his criminal acts and therefore this category of costs could not be proximately caused by his crime is a factual issue. It cannot be the basis for plain error, and even were we to consider i 6 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Cf. Rita. 551 U.S. at 359, 127 S.Ct. 2456

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts statement that it believed sentence would adequately address the objectives of punishment and deterrence was adequate explanation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the scope of the duty to avoid causing emotional distress that results from negligence. A. Duty and Foreseeability In general, courts rely on the concept of “foreseeability” to determine whether the defendant owed a duty to the claimant in a negligence action and examine whether the risk to the claimant was “reasonably foreseeable” to the defendant. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Shannon, 696 A.2d 1359, 1366 (D.C.1997); Haynesw orth, v. D.H. Stevens Co., 645 A.2d 1095, 1098 (D.C.1994). If the injury that befell the plaintiff was “reasonably foreseeable” to the defendant, then courts will usually conclude that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to avoid causing that injury; if the injury was not “reasonably foreseeable,” then there was no duty. Compare Shannon, 696 A.2d at 1366 (<HOLDING>), with Galloway v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 632

    ### Response:
    holding that because playground accident due to poor maintenance could have been reasonably foreseeable to the district trial court properly denied districts motion for judgment on the ground it owed no duty to child using playground
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    198 N.J.Super. 214, 217, 486 A.2d 932 (App.Div.1985)); see also Buck v. Henry, 207 N.J. 377, 390, 25 A.3d 240; (2011); In re Attorney Gen.’s “Directive on Exit Polling: Media & Non-Partisan Pub. Interest Groups ”, 200 N.J. 283, 297-98, 981 A.2d 64 (2009); DKM Residential Props. Corp. v. Twp. of Montgomery, 182 N.J. 296, 307, 865 A.2d 649 (2005). The Court’s construction of N.J.S.A 39:4— 88(b) gives meaning to all of the! statute’s language, and thereby effects the intent of the Legislature. Moreover, if N.J.S.A 39:4-88(b) precludes only unsafe lane changes, a driver would not violate the statute even by allowing a vehicle to straddle two lanes or swerve back and forth over the lines defining traffic lanes, unless that conduct created a safety issue. See State v. Lewis, 185 N.J p.1998) (<HOLDING>); Rowe v. State, 363 Md. 424, 769 A.2d 879,

    ### Response:
    holding that violation of fl stat ann  316089a requires evidence that the drivers conduct created a reasonable safety concern
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1988, when Section 9711(h) required a remand for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment in instances where this Court vacated a defendant’s sentence of death, he would not have been subjected to the possibility of a second death sentence under the amended version of Section 9711. Appellant’s Brief at 42. Thus, Appellant claims he is subjected to harsher punishment than individuals who had their death sentences vacated by this Court prior to 1988. This Court, however, has repeatedly rejected the argument that “retroactive” application of Section 9711(h)(4) offends a defendant’s due process and equal protection rights, and we have held that application of Section 9711(h)(4) is constitutionally permissible. See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 546 Pa. 870, 381-82, 685 A.2d 96, 102 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Young, 536 Pa. 57, 66, 637

    ### Response:
    holding that application of section 9711h as amended did not deprive appellant of any constitutional right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Apex are evident in this case: the viability of the legal malpractice claims alleged by the clients depends on the outcome of personal injury litigation in Mexico and in federal court, where the only procedural progress has been the determination of a presumptive forum in Mexico. See id. The alleged injuries are intertwined with and dependent upon further hypothetical adjudication by both Mexican courts and the federal district court. Similarly, in the context of accounting malpractice, the Texas Supreme Court held that a cause of action for' negligence based on the accountant’s use of the cash instead of the accrual method of accounting for tax purposes did not accrue until the Internal Revenue Service had assessed a tax deficiency. Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 158 (Tex.1967) (<HOLDING>); see also Street v. Honorable Second Court of

    ### Response:
    holding that cause of action for malpractice did not arise until the tax deficiency was assessed because prior to assessment the plaintiff had not been injured
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.3d at 560-62, 566-67. 17 . Id. at 566-67. 18 .Id. at 567. 19 . United States v. Hazlewood, 526 F.3d 862, 864 (5th Cir.2008). 20 . United States v. Scruggs, 714 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir.2013). 21 . 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 22 . Scruggs, 714 F.3d at 262 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 23 . See id. at 263 (""Even though a [subsequent Supreme Court case] might have rendered the instant information factually insufficient, it did not divest the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case.” (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Scruggs, 691 F.3d 660, 668-69 (5th Cir.2012) (reaching a similar conclusion). 24 . United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630-31, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). 25 . See Scruggs, 691 F.3d at 668 (<HOLDING>). 26 . United States v. Carreon-Palacio, 267

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no jurisdictional defect when the language of the charging document tracked the statutory language even though the facts proffered at the plea hearing were insufficient to establish that the defendant committed the crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exculpatory findings.” Standing as it does, “could have” is merely an introduction to speculation and is not a substitute for “concrete evidence.” Id. There was no abuse of discretion, and there is no basis to disturb the judge’s denial of the motion to suppress. See Commonwealth v. O’Day, ante 296, 307 (2003) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss due to inadequate showing that Commonwealth’s intentional destruction of infernal device denied defendant access to exculpatory evidence); Commonwealth v. Cintron, supra at 785 (affirming denial of motion to dismiss or suppress due to defendant’s failure to show that access to original fingerprint would have provided evidence more favorable than did access to photographs of fingerprint); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 403 Mass. 258, 277 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Neal, 392 Mass. 1, 12 (1984)

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant failed to show that lack of photographs of test plates used to analyze blood stains prejudiced his case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    date of April 24, 1996, are given a one-year grace period in which to file their habeas petitions, that is, until April 24, 1997. See Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir.1998). Moreover, the grace period will be tolled while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent claim or judgment is pending.” 28 U.S .C. § 2244(d)(2). Specifically, “a state court petition is ‘pending’ from the time it ís first filed until finally disposed of and further appellate review is unavailable under the particular state’s procedures.” Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir.1999), aff'd on other grounds, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (U.S. 2000); see also Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104,

    ### Response:
    holding that the tolling provision excludes time during which properly filed state relief applications are pending but does not reset the date from which the oneyear statute of limitations begins to run
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    so long as probable cause existed for the one offense). The fact that the offense was a misdemeanor is also immaterial to our Fourth Amendment analysis. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418, 421-24, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (a police officer is permitted to arrest without a warrant if a misdemeanor is committed in the officer’s presence). Thus, the officers in this case had, at least, arguable probable cause to conclude that Smithson had violated the city’s sound ordinance. Accordingly, we conclude that Brown, Westemeyer, McBride, and Richardson are entitled to qualified immunity on appellees’ Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. See Johnson v. Schneiderheinz, 102 F.3d 340 (8th Cir.1996); see also Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). B. First Amendment To be successful on his

    ### Response:
    recognizing that warrantless arrests with probable cause do not give rise to  1983 claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503.” See Official Bankruptcy Form B 10 (Dec.2007) available at www.uscourts.gov/ rules/BK_F orms_Pending_2008/ B_010_1208v4.pdf (last visited September 9, 2009). 5 . The court in In re MicroAge discounted this policy concern because ""[a]ny creditor that has received an avoidable transfer may find itself compelled to return that transfer, whether it does business with the reorganized debtor or not.” 291 B.R. at 512. But doing business with the reorganized debtor and filing a request for payment of administrative expenses might have other consequences, such as waiving the vendor’s right to a jury trial in any preference action initiated by the debtor. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 58-59 & n. 14, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989) (<HOLDING>); In re CBI Holding Co., 529 F.3d 432, 438 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding defendant to a preference action has a right to a jury trial pursuant to the seventh amendment of the united states constitution but that right can be waived by filing a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    permanent order to prevent the relocation. 4. A proceeding filed pursuant to this subsection must be filed within thirty (30) days of receipt of notice of a proposed relocation. K. The relocating person has the burden of proof that the proposed relocation is made in good faith. If that burden of proof is met, the burden shifts to the non-relocating person to show that the proposed relocation is not in the best interest of the child. 17 The first statute gives the custodial parent a ""presumptive right"" to relocate. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 2001 OK 30, ¶ 18, 23 P.3d 278, 282. The second statute requires notice of intent to relocate and provides for a hearing procedure if the non-custodial parent objects to relocation. Other than in Harrison v. Morgan, 2008 OK CIV APP 68, ¶ 15, 191 P.3d 617, 621 (<HOLDING>), there has been no effort to construe the

    ### Response:
    holding that section 1123 did not repeal 10 0s2011  19
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and is not intended to affect, establish, or diminish any liability of commercial builders, contractors or renovators.”). Indeed, part of the court’s rationale was that California homeowners generally would not be insured for an injury suffered after conveyance of the property. Id. at 483. No such analysis has been offered here. Second, unlike Strakos, Preston focused on “ownership and control as a fundamental requirement for ascribing liability,” rather than the creation of a dangerous condition. Id. at 483. Strakos also rejected the accepted work doctrine, a doctrine that eliminated a defendant’s liability after work was accepted because the defendant no longer controlled the property. Strakos, 360 S.W.2d at 790 (explaining that liability should not exist day 704, 706-08 (1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Carroll v. Dairy Farmers of Am.,

    ### Response:
    holding former plant owner liable for negligent design of conveyor belt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Tex.App.-Tyler, July 23, 2008, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (evidence sufficient to support tampering conviction when defendant, stopped for traffic offense, admitted that he had a ""marijuana roach” and then ate it). 1 . Several states have adopted similar approaches. See, e.g., State v. Fana, 109 Conn. App. 797, 953 A.2d 898, 912 (2008) (stating that modification of judgment to lesser-included offense proper when ""the element, which the reviewing court found the evidence insufficient to support, was distinct from the other elements of the charged crime”; when that element was eliminated, ""the remaining elements were themselves adequate to support a conviction of a lesser included offense”) (citations omitted); Ritchie v. State, 243 Ind. 614, 189 N.E.2d 575, 577 (1963) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). ALCALA, J., filed a

    ### Response:
    holding that reviewing court in a proper case may modify a judgment of conviction below and affirm it as a conviction of a lesser degree of the offense charged or of a lesser crime included therein where the errors do not affect the conviction of the lesser offense 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a breach of the warranty as to what the furnace would do under proper care and operation. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Similarly, in Smith v. Pickands, 148 Mich. 558, 112 N.W. 122 (1907), the plaintiff contracted to sell fruit trees, which the contract warranted would be “delivered in a healthy condition.” Id. at 122. The defendant accepted the trees, some of which later died. The court instructed the jury that the burden was on the defendant buyer to prove that the trees were not, in Mich.App. 308, 225 N.W.2d 742, 745 (1975) (“[A]s to goods accepted, the burden is on the buyer to establish any claimed breach of warranty.”) (citing M.C.L.A. § 440.-2607.(4) ). See also Alberta Ltd. v. Stedelbauer Chevrolet Oldsmobile (1975) Ltd., 2001 ABQB 909, 302 A.R. 316, para. 25 (Can.) (<HOLDING>). The facts of this case are similar to those

    ### Response:
    holding that burden is on purchaser to show defect that breaches warranty agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    UFOC and Franchise Agreement, and that it had been “advised to seek professional assistance, to have professionals review the documents and to consult with other franchisees regarding the risks associated with the purchase of the franchise.” (Ex. A. Disclosure Ack-nowlegment Statement.). Each was also advised in the body of the Agreement that “BEFORE SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, FRANCHISEE SHOULD READ IT CAREFULLY WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF LEGAL COUNSEL....” (Ex. A. § 23.12.) This is not the advice of a party engaged in “bargaining naughtiness.” Under these circumstances, plaintiffs’ unsupported assertion of procedural unconscionability rings hollow. On the issue of substantive unconsciona-bility, plaintiffs point to the provision of the Franchise Agr 306 Ill.Dec. 157, 857 N.E.2d 250 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91

    ### Response:
    holding the class action waiver provision of cellular telephone service contract unconscionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), to support the conclusion that Anderson was denied a fair trial. Anderson, 574 So.2d at 93-94. The district court concluded the Florida Supreme Court’s denial of relief as to this claim was not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” See id. § 2254(d)(1). Jurists of reason would not debate the correctness of the district court’s conclusion. In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s presumption of innocence is undermined and his right to a fair trial violated when the state compels him to stand trial in prison or jail clothing. 425 U.S. at 504-06, 512, 96 S.Ct. at 1692-94, 1697; see also United States v. Harris, 703 F.2d 508, 509-11 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). As we explained in United States v.

    ### Response:
    holding a defendants due process rights were violated where he was compelled to wear prison clothing during jury voir dire
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that intent is not an element of a cause of action for the laundry list violation of “representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law.” Id. at 289-90 (citing Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 17.46(b)(12)). We agree with the court of appeals that the rationale of Crawford v. Ace Sign would not automatically foreclose a DTPA cause of action when a contract or a part thereof is void by operation of law. But a contract is a mutual undertaking. An aspect of an agreement that proves unenforceable because it is against public policy does not, standing alone, constitute a violation of section 17.46(b)(12). There must be something more. Cf. Best v. Ryan Auto Group, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 670, 671-72 (Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>). There must be a representation “that an

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of representations outside the contract was legally sufficient evidence to support a section 1746b12 claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We have drawn no distinction between the protections offered by Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution and those offered by the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution when analyzing alleged discrimination between similarly situated taxpayers. Roosevelt v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 1999 MT 30, ¶¶ 16-46, 293 Mont. 240, ¶¶ 16-46, 975 P.2d 295, ¶¶ 16-46; Kottel v. State, 2002 MT 278, ¶ 47, 312 Mont. 387, ¶ 47, 60 P.3d 403, ¶ 47; Montana Dept. of Revenue v. Barron, 245 Mont. 100, 111, 799 P.2d 533, 540 (1990); see also 71 Am. Jur. 2d § 340 (2007) (explaining that there is nothing in the unit method of valuation that is inherently opposed to either the federal or the various state constitutions); Beaver County v. Wiltel, Inc., 995 P.2d 602, ¶¶ 24-26 (Utah 2000) (<HOLDING>). ¶30 Most of PPLM’s arguments amount to an

    ### Response:
    holding that central assessment by the unit method of valuation did not violate the equal protection clause of the united states constitution or the uniform operation of laws provision in the utah constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    authority. Miss.Code Ann. § 79-29-303(1) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[n]o act of a manager or member in contravention of a restriction on authority shall bind the limited liability company to persons having knowledge of the restriction.” Miss.Code Ann. § 79-29-303(4). In this case, the Bankruptcy Court correctly found that Earwood was not authorized to convey title to Northlake and that Northlake had knowledge of the unauthorized act because Earwood owned North-lake. Earwood could not bind Kinwood. Miss.Code Ann. § 79-29-303(1). The question, however, is whether a subsequent BFP thereafter obtains clear title. No Mississippi court has ever considered these statutory provisions in light of a claimed BFP. Thus, this Court considered the rules of statutory construction and th pp.2002) (<HOLDING>). Although Mississippi has not considered the

    ### Response:
    holding that minors have authority to ratify or avoid conveyances upon reaching majority at which point conveyances become void ab initio 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not elevate the telephone call into a Fourth Amendment seizure: That [the detective] told [the suspect] he would secure an arrest warrant if [the suspect] refused [to go to the police station] does not alter the outcome; [the suspect] was free to demand that [the detective] do just that. [The detective] was not even confronting [the suspect] physically; [the suspect] could have hung up the phone. That [the detective] may have been verbally abusive does not elevate the phone call, with the distancing inherent in the tenuousness of a telephone connection and the ease with which [the suspect] could have hung up the phone, into a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 200; cf. Butitta v. Carbajal, No. 96-16553, 1997 WL 345719, at *1 (9th Cir. June 23, 1997) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Because Silvan and Alanna could have

    ### Response:
    holding that police officers did not violate the fourth amendment by telephoning an individual and threatening to seize a motorcycle in her possession and to arrest her without a warrant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (E.D.Va. Aug. 22, 2005) (Memorandum Opinion). 5 . Lentz has sent several ex parte communications to the Court throughout the course of these proceedings, despite repeated admonitions not to do so. Most recently, on January 19, 2006, the Court received an ex parte communication from Lentz consisting of two handwritten notes contained in an envelope that itself included a handwritten note. Although Lentz sought to offer these notes as his Court-ordered handwriting exemplars, these ex parte communications are clearly insufficient in this regard as they were neither written in a controlled situation nor written in the style required of an appropriate handwriting exemplar. Even defendant himself recognizes in his ex parte communication that a handwriting d 1172, 1177 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). 8 .See, e.g., United

    ### Response:
    recognizing that handwriting exemplars fall outside the protection of the fourth and fifth amendments and comment on the refusal to provide an exemplar is permissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or otherwise, and no disposition, charge, encumbrance, sale or assignment of the income or of the principal of this trust or any part hereof by any beneficiary hereunder shall be of any validity or legal effect or in any way recognized by said TRUSTEE.” Because of the provisions of this classic spendthrift clause, neither Neal’s creditors nor transferees had any right to rely upon the Trust for the satisfaction of their claims. Johnson v. Morawitz, 292 F.2d 341, 344 (1961), citing In re Watts, 160 Kan. 377, 162 P.2d 82, and Sherman v. Havens, 94 Kan. at 657, 146 P. 1030. Cf. Connett v. Justus Enterprises of Kansas, Inc., 1989 WL 65444, *7 (D.Kan.1989) (discussing the inalienability of interests in spendthrift trusts in Kans .1994), rev’d on other grounds 115 F.3d 333 (5th Cir.1997), (<HOLDING>). Cf. Klebanoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 362

    ### Response:
    holding that ijnter vivos trust distributions are not considered interest obtained by bequest devise or inheritance 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must be supported by a new probable cause justification. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005); Arizona v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2509, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012) (“[D]elay[ing] the release of some detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status ... would raise constitutional concerns.”). Moreover, although Morales continued to be detained by ACI officials, and not by Donaghy himself, it was also clearly established that a law enforcement officer is “responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)); see also id. at 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (<HOLDING>); Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest can be held liable for the arrest where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by appeal.” See id. Appeals from the general sessions court to the circuit court are governed by Tennessee Code Annotated sections 27-5-101 to - 107 (2000), -108 (Supp.2007). Section 108(a) states that “[a]ny party may appeal from an adverse decision of the general sessions court to the circuit court of the county within a period of ten (10) days on complying with the provisions of this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) The relevant “provision” of chapter five in this case is Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 and its requirement that an appealing party file a bond for costs of the appeal. Accordingly, filing a bond within the ten-day period is a condition precedent to the timely perfection of an appeal. See Love v. Coll. Level Assessment Servs. Inc., 928 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tenn.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Red Boiling Springs v.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an appellants obligation to timely perfect her appeal from the general sessions court is mandatory  and if it is not complied with the circuit court has no jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    40, 46 (1953). One of those factors is the civil nature of the proceedings. Id. Assuming the proceedings are civil in nature, as Shetsky and rule 702(f) indicate, rule 115 of the General Rules of Practice reflects the traditional practice for a civil action by implicitly placing the burden on the moving party to obtain a hearing date. Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.02 reads: A hearing date and time shall be obtained from the court administrator or a designated motion calendar deputy. A party obtaining a date and time for a hearing on ot guarantee the right to a hearing on all motions. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 43.05 (stating that the court “may direct that [a motion] be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions”); see also Braith v. Fischer, 632 N.W.2d 716, 723 (Minn.App.2001) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2001). Here, we

    ### Response:
    holding no abuse of discretion when district court declined to hear oral testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be complete and that the requested information was therefore not necessary to evaluate her claim. It is the governmental agency that may, pursuant to Bivins, determine when a claim is capable of evaluation. Further, Crockett's eight-month delay in providing the requested information without any explanation of the reason for that delay was not responsive to Insurer's March 26 or May 9 requests for the information within fourteen days. Again, once a request for information to evaluate the claim has been filed, Bivins does not contemplate that the claimant then controls when the 90-day period begins to run. 17 Second, a request for information does not always erase the 90-day time period. See Trent By and Through Trent v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Johnston County, 1988 OK 15, 755 P.2d 615 (<HOLDING>); Doe v. Indep. School Dist. No. I-89, 1988 OK

    ### Response:
    holding that the 90day evaluation period begins to run from the time notice of a claim has been filed even though the public agency requests additional information after that date
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    desire to reunite with his child. Second, their interaction with Kish gave no reason to doubt his credibility. Kish gave Defendants a detailed account of the alleged plan to accomplish Steiner’s suicide, along with a diagram indicating where he had personally observed the medications. Kish repeated his allegations under oath before the Wayne County Assistant Prosecutor, Stevens, and his testimony remained consistent. Accordingly, Defendants had reasonable grounds to believe they would find medications at Re-gets’s home and Steiner’s hotel room. Re-gets has failed to cite any authority that Defendants were required to more thoroughly investigate Kish and his claims before seeking the issuance of the search warrants. See, e.g., United States v. Kini-son, 710 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Regets also argues that Kish’s statement

    ### Response:
    holding that a known informants statement can support probable cause even though the affidavit fails to provide any additional basis for the known informants credibility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cruel and unusual punishment will be violated since he may be incompetent at the time of execution. These claims have been repeatedly rejected by this Court. See, e.g., Chavez v. State, 132 So.3d 826, 831 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S —, 134 S.Ct. 1156, — L.Ed.2d—(2014) (“Summary denial of a lethal injection challenge is proper where the asserted reasons ... are based upon conjecture or speculation.”); Henyard v. State, 992 So.2d 120, 130 (Fla.2008) (‘We [have] previously found section 945.10 facially constitutional and decline to recede from our decision now.”); Hall v. Moore, 792 So.2d 447, 450 (Fla.2001) (explaining that it is premature for a death-sentenced individual to present a claim of incompetency with regard to his execution if a death warrant has not been signed). III. HABEA (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as discussed above, this issue is

    ### Response:
    holding that claims raised in a postconviction motion cannot be relitigated in a habeas petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and relies upon the decision in Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402, 951 A.2d 1110, 1122-23, for doing so. See op. at 482-85, 967 A.2d at 391-92. However, Gibson involved a first post-conviction request for collateral relief in which the petitioner was not required to establish that a miscarriage of justice had occurred. I believe the Majority accords insufficient weight to the fact that Appellant has already had the benefit of collateral review of his death sentence. The consequences of this are of great significance: in the context of a serial PCRA petition, unless Appellant can make a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of justice has resulted, he is not entitled to any relief from his judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Lawson, 519 Pa. 504, 549 A.2d 107, 112 (1988) (<HOLDING>)- A petitioner makes a prima facie showing if

    ### Response:
    holding that a second request for collateral relief will not be entertained unless a strong prima facie showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    flooding, which has, among other things, damaged their home. On June 15, 2012, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit alleging violations of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Count I), as well as nuisance, trespass, and negligence under Illinois law (Counts II-IV)- Count I is brought under the “citizen suit” provision of the Clean Water Act. At least 60 days before filing their Clean Water Act citizen suit, Plaintiffs were required to give notice of the alleged violation to (1) the EPA, (2) the state in which the alleged violation occurs, and (3) the alleged violator. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1) (“[n]o action may be commenced” without notice to the EPA, the state, and the alleged violator); see also, e.g., Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 31, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper

    ### Response:
    holding that an identical notice requirement in resource conservation and recovery act was a mandatory precondition to suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims. The irrelevance of the exception, howevér, is obvious in light of Mr. Chavez’s failure to cite any extraordinary circumstances. Instead, he circles back to his “ripeness” argument and states that “[ujnless the Government can read [his] mind, it has absolutely no idea what the basis — factual or legal — may be for appealing on the grounds of ineffective assistance and so the Government has absolutely no factual basis in which to root an argument that there are no ‘extraordinary circumstances’ lending themselves to a direct appeal.” Resp. at 12. But it is Mr. Chavez’s burden, not the government’s, to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances to justify a.direct appeal of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Last, Mr. Chavez maintains that enforcement

    ### Response:
    recognizing that it is the defendants burden to demonstrate a reason to depart from the general practice that a defendant must generally raise claims of ineffective assistance counsel on collateral review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to counts three and five on May 26,1998. Prior to sentencing, defendant moved to have the sentence imposed in accord with the September 15, 1992 Guidelines, which defendant claimed were in effect when he committed the offenses on January 15, 1998. The statewide presumptive plea offer for the subject offenses under the September 1992 Guidelines was 364 days in the county jail as a condition of probation. Defendant argued that a sentence imposed in accord with the February 1998 Guidelines would violate the ex post facto provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions because the application of those guidelines made the punishment for the crime more burdensome than the September 1992 Guidelines. See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 68-69, 70 L.Ed. 216, 217 (1925) (<HOLDING>). The motion was denied and defendant was

    ### Response:
    holding that one way in which the ex post facto provision of the constitution can be violated is by applying a law that makes more burdensome the punishment of a crime after its commission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to deliver a subpoena to the witness but was unsuccessful on three separate occasions. Id. at 159-60. The trial court subsequently ruled that the witness's previous testimony could be admitted at trial because Reynolds did not refute that he had been instrumental in concealing or keeping the witness away. Id. at 160. ¶ 39. The Reynolds Court began its analysis with the following: The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away. The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitima ) overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (<HOLDING>); and Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant was permissibly excluded from going to view the scene of the crime as part of his trial in dicta justice cardozo stated that no doubt the privilege afforded by the sixth amendment may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is unbiased and unprejudiced.""). Such bias or prejudice exists only where there is an undisputed claim or the judge has expressed an opinion on the merits of the controversy before him. Carter, 761 N.E.2d at 435. Adverse rulings and findings by the trial judge do not constitute bias per se. Id. ""Instead, prejudice must be shown by the judge's trial conduct; it cannot be inferred from his subjective views."" Id. Leo argues that he ""has certainly shown the actual personal bias of the trial judge by showing that Joseph and she had improper ex parte communications and failed to comply with Trial Rule 65(B)."" Appellant's Reply Brief at 9 n. 17. Further, Leo argues that after the ex parte meeting, "" discretion by denying Leo's motion for change of judge. See, eg., Leisure, 589 N.E.2d at 1169 (<HOLDING>). IL. The next issue is whether the trial court

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellants motion for change of judge where the appellant failed to demonstrate actual bias
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rather, this litigation is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 24), under which this Court must decide whether the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Doc. # 22), viewed through the prisms of Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6) and the PSLRA, state a claim for relief. The Plaintiffs merely seek to have the Court consider the allegations set forth by the Trustee in his complaint, when it engages in that analysis. In effect, the Plaintiffs are requesting that the Court give them leave to amend to include the allegations set forth by the Trustee in his complaint. Such an amendment would be appropriate, even though it would occur after the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #22) had been fully briefed. Cf. E.E.O.C. v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 546 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). However, rather than treating Plaintiffs’

    ### Response:
    holding in an appeal from the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 that when the papers before the sixth circuit indicate that the plaintiff could submit an amended complaint that would state a claim upon which relief can be granted the proper course is to remand to permit the plaintiff to amend
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters states herein.” The declarations of Kurokawa and Hart complied with HRCP Rule 56(e). “In instances where Hawaii case law and statutes are silent, this court can look to parallel federal law for guidance.” Gold v. Harrison, 88 Hawai'i 94, 104, 962 P.2d 353, 363 (1998) (quoting State v. Ontai 84 Hawai'i 56, 61, 929 P.2d 69, 74 (1996)). As the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are substantially similar to the HRCP, we look to federal ease law for guidance. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the Rule 56(e) requirement of personal knowledge and competence to testify may be inferred from the affidavits themselves. See Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1018 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Lockwood v. Wolf Corp., 629 F.2d 603, 611

    ### Response:
    holding that it was proper for court to rely on affidavits of defendants representatives in negotiations because their personal knowledge and competence to testify are reasonably inferred from their positions and the nature of their participation in the matters to which they swore
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    implied by silence or failure to act after the nonbreaching partners learn of the breach”). A rule that acquiescence, waiver, or ratification is sufficient would be consistent with analogous rules governing corporate opportunities. See, e.g., Impala Platinum, Ltd. v. Impala Sales (USA), 283 Md. 296, 324, 389 A.2d 887 (1978) (fiduciary duty is ""to make full disclosure of all known information”); Maryland Metals v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 46-47, 382 A.2d 564 (1978) (shareholder may pursue corporate opportunity when corporation makes clear its lack of interest or abandons previously expressed interest). Contrary to the Partnership's contention, we have not resolved this question in the partnership opportunity context. See Dixon v. Trinity Joint Venture, 49 Md.App. 379, 431 A.2d 1364 (1981) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See, e.g., Thomas v. Schmelzer, 118

    ### Response:
    holding that general partners must notify limited partners of partnership opportunity to purchase adjacent property but not addressing whether  9404 requires affirmative consent of partners after such notice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and grand jury testimony were revealed before the State placed them in witness protection. Specifically, rsonal safety in this case outweighs the defendants’ right of confrontation, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in this ease by ordering disclosure of the witnesses’ current addresses and telephone numbers. The district court’s disclosure order ignores the safety concerns articulated by the prosecution which the court itself acknowledged in its order delaying disclosure of the witnesses’ identities. Furthermore, the disclosure order defeats the purpose of placing the witnesses under witness protection, which is designed to protect the safety of prosecution witnesses by making their location unknown. See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), modified, 690 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.1979); United

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court properly barred certain questions about witness who was in federal witness protection program
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Health Care Fraud Information No. 09-CR421, which charged him with health care fraud of $2.9 million. The Government contends petitioner’s claim is meritless as he was never prosecuted for the health care fraud violations in 1999 because he fled the jurisdiction on the date of his scheduled court appearance. Therefore, the 2009 N.D.N.Y. prosecution was the first time any jeopardy could attach to the petitioner’s prosecution. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const, amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause affords a defendant protection from: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense af Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Petitioner failed to appear in the M.D. Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding that in order for a pretrial dismissal to trigger the protections of the double jeopardy clause there must be an adjudication of elements of the offense charged in a way that reflected a genuine risk of conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    similar to that of the district corad; in this case. That is, they refuse to view the guideline restrietively, and allow the enhancement where a direct implication of death follows from the 10th Cir.)(stating without detailed discussion that robber’s statement to teller to put money in bag or “the person behind me will shoot someone” is considered an express threat under the guidelines, citing the commentary), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 926, 114 S.Ct. 333, 126 L.Ed.2d 278 (1993); United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir.1992)(concluding that combination of threatening teller with statement “You don’t want to find out” and appearance as if he had gun under his coat constituted express threat of death); United States v. Strandberg, 952 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir.1991)(<HOLDING>). In so ruling, these courts have looked to the

    ### Response:
    holding that sjection 2b31b2f does not require that the defendant state that he intends to mil the teller if his demands are not met
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Because we agree with the district court that the inner layers of claim 1 must be construed as closed to unrecited resins, including LDPE, we see no error in the district court’s conclusion that dependent claim 10 is invalid. Independent claim 1 excludes LDPE from the inner layers, while dependent claim 10 includes it. As such, claim 10 is inconsistent with claim 1 and, indeed, contradicts claim 1. A dependent claim that contradicts, rather than harrows, the claim from which it depends is invalid. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) (requiring that “a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed” (emphasis added)); Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>); Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan,

    ### Response:
    holding a claim invalid under preaia 35 usc  112  4 for claiming subject matter that was nonoverlapping with the claim from which it depended
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    caught in the middle of acrimonious custody battles, I agree with the Court’s holding that the Texas Family Code does not afford a trial court such discretion. But the treatment of attorney’s fees in modification and enforcement proceedings has been more complicated than the Court might indicate. I write separately to briefly explain this history and to illuminate why this subject has resulted in a lack of uniformity among the courts of appeals. I. The Common-Law Doctrine of Necessaries As the Court notes, the underpinnings of the doctrine of necessaries may be traced back over three centuries to English courts. 419 S.W.3d 292, 298-99 (citing Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 Mioh. L.Rev. 1767, 1767 (1984)). The doctrine implied a contract between a 101-02 (1889) (<HOLDING>); see also In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319, 327 n.

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys fees are necessaries for the criminal de fense of a child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    failed to foresee or expect the damage caused by the installations of the foundations. Ante, at---. I do not believe that this is correct. The complaints allege that the failure to satisfy code requirements regarding the footers may not have been intentional. See, e.g., J.A. 277, 289-90 (first Ellerbe complaint alleging that “[t]he defective footers” may be “due to and based upon a systematic and fundamental misunderstanding [of] ... the requirements for footers in the State of Maryland”). And, although the complaints allege some intentional torts, they also allege causes of action against the parks for, among other things, negligent misrepresentation, violation of building code, negligence, breach of warranty, and torts arising from breach of contract. See Brohawn, 347 A.2d at 850 (<HOLDING>); Minnick’s, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 47

    ### Response:
    holding that liability insurer had duty to defend insured against complaint that alleged intentional tort and negligence in the alternative even when policy excluded coverage for intentional torts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded under § 1988,” id. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, and in a concurring opinion, Justice O’Conner wrote that “[wjhen the plaintiffs success is purely technical or de minimis, no fees can be awarded,” id. at 117, 113 S.Ct. 566 (O’Conner, J., concurring). The Court disagrees with defendants’ characterization of plaintiffs victory in this case. First, rather than a nominal sum, the $30,000 in compensatory and punitive damages awarded by the jury was substantial and easily distinguishable from the cases cited by defendants. See Carroll v. Blinken, 105 F.3d 79, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s reduction of requested attorneys’ fees because, inter alia, “[tjhere was no damage award”); Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). In Pino, the Second Circuit specifically

    ### Response:
    holding that district court erred in awarding attorneys fees in civil rights action where plaintiff only recovered 1 in nominal damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    held that an action for breach of warranty was a contract action, and therefore governed by the statute of limitations for contract actions. The court explained that: [Wjhile an action for breach of a statutorily implied warranty of fitness may involve, incidentally, some showing of negligence, the contract breached is not merely one to use due care, but is a separate (implied) contract of guaranty that the goods are fit for the purpose for which they are bought and sold. Id., 305 N.Y. at 147 (emphasis added). The court overruled two earlier cases where lower courts had held that breach of warranty claims sounded primarily in tort for statute of limitations purposes. See Buyers v. Buffalo Paint & Specialties, Inc., 199 Misc. 764, 769-70, 99 N.Y.S.2d 713, 719 (Sup.Ct.Erie Co. 1950) (<HOLDING>); Schlick v. New York Dugan Bros., Inc., 175

    ### Response:
    holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the new therapies might “negatively impact[]” the sales of certain flea and tick products. (CAC at 92). Plaintiffs say this was too little, too late. It was too little, they argue, because the statement was merely a “benign reference” to the new therapies, insufficient to adequately warn investors. (CAC ¶ 92). It was too late, they suggest, because subsequent SEC filings addressed the competitive potential of the new therapies more thoroughly. However, “Mere allegations that statements in one report should have been made in earlier reports do not make out a claim of securities fraud.” Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir.1995) (defendants’ lack of clairvoyance simply does not constitute securities fraud), citing Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627-28

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants failure to anticipate future events did not constitute securities fraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Credle-Brown v. Conn. Dep’t. of Children & Families, No. 04-CV1167, 2009 WL 1789430, at *1 (D.Conn. June 24, 2009) (“[T]he Court finds that a plaintiff cannot bring a claim under section 1983 where the deprived federal rights are only those rights guaranteed by the ADA.”); South Middlesex Opportunity Council, Inc. v. Town of Framingham, No. 07-CV-12018, 2008 WL 4595369, at *15-16 (D.Mass. Sept. 30, 2008) (finding that “the FHA contains a comprehensive enforcement mechanism for the rights cited by the Plaintiffs under [42 U.S.C.] § 3604” and therefore concluding “that the FHA enforcement mechanism forecloses complementary relief through § 1983.”); Homebuilders Ass’n of Mississippi Inc. v. City of Brandon, Miss., No. 07-CV-716, 2009 WL 1635763, at *11 n. 3 (S.D. Miss. June 10, 2009) (<HOLDING>); Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Examiners,

    ### Response:
    recognizing the validity of the holding in south middlesex with respect to parallel claims under  3604 of the fha and section 1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Evans is that Respondents’ constitutional rights were violated only when the police decided not to “arrest” them, and let them go. In this regard, we agree with the intermediate appeals court of Massachusetts: Under that principle, it cannot be said that [the defendant’s] constitutional rights were violated when he was first searched; if he had been arrested immediately afterwards ..., no question could now arise as to the constitutional validity of the search. It is thus apparent that the defendant is contending for a nonsense proposition: that his constitutional rights were violated at the moment when the police decided not to arrest him and instead let him go. Commonwealth v. Skea, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 685, 470 N.E.2d 385, 393 (Mass.Ct.App.1984) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the failure of the

    ### Response:
    holding that while search incident to arrest could not justify search in that case probable cause plus exigency justified search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shall forthwith be mailed to all parties. Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “A party ‘may file objections within ten days or he may not, as he chooses, but he ‘shall’ do so if he wishes further consideration”. Negron v. Cir.1993) (stating that “[o]bjeetion to a magistrate’s report preserves only those objections that are specified”); Keating v. Secretary of H.H.S., 848 F.2d 271, 275 (1st Cir.1988); Borden v. Secretary of H.H.S., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). See generally United States v.

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant was entitled to a de novo review however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    courts have held that “the UCC is a party’s exclusive remedy when statutory provisions are applicable to the factual circumstances of a given case.” Peters Family Farm, Inc. v. Sav. Bank, No. 10CA2, 2011 WL 497476, at *4 (Ohio Ct.App. Jan. 28, 2011); see also Dice v. White Family Cos., 173 Ohio App.3d 472, 480, 878 N.E.2d 1105 (Ohio Ct.App.2007) (“[T]he UCC provides the exclusive remedy where the dispute is governed by its statutory provisions. Common law causes of action may not be raised to circumvent the UCC’s rights, claims, and defenses where the statute applies.”); NCS Healthcare, Inc. v. Fifth Third Bank, N alternative legal theories, the above authority makes clear that the Ohio UCC provides the exclusive remedy to enforce negotiable instruments. Cf. NCS, 2005 WL 1484025 at *8 (<HOLDING>). Under these circumstances, Plaintiff fails to

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiffs common law breach of contract and negligence claims cannot be raised where the ucc already governs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to accept transfer of Mrs. West and the undisputed evidence shows,that Dr. Huxol never refused to accept transfer of Mrs. West. 1. No Prívate Cause of Action under EMTALA against Individuals EMTALA provides a private cause of action directly- against participating hospitals for violation of the duties created -by the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (authorizing private suits “against the participating hospital”). However, courts, including the .Sixth Circuit, have held that EMTALA does not provide a plaintiff with a private cause of action against a physician. Moses v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Ctrs., Inc., 561 F.3d 573, 587 (6th Cir.2009) (“EMTALA does not authorize a private right of action against individuals.”); see Eberhardt v. City of L.A., 62 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); King v. Ahrens, 16 F.3d 265, 271 (8th

    ### Response:
    holding that emtala does not allow private suits against physicians
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issue of Claimant’s initial eligibility for benefits under the Act. Furthermore, the cases cited by the Department in support of its position are inapposite because they relate to circumstances in which a government entity has made a mistake in enforcing the law or administering its duty to the public at large, and do not relate to statutorily bestowed entitlements of government employees or specific private citizens. See Otte v. Coving-ton Township Road Supervisors, 589 Pa. 44, 650 A.2d 412 (1994) (Department of Environmental Resources mistakenly believed it was estopped from enforcing the provisions of the Sewage Facilities Act, Act of January 24, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1535, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 750.1-750.20(a)); Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Company, 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Western Maryland R.R. Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that the commonwealth did not waive its right to enjoin the pollution of public waters by a mining company
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Corp., 440 F.Supp. 1237 (D.N.J.1976). There the patentee had granted the licensee the right to make and sell its product in specialty form only, but not in bulk for sale to others. The court reasoned that a patentee’s right to shut off all competition must necessarily include the lesser right to restrict the exercise of the granted privilege so long as the patentee does not attach a condition that enlarges his monopoly beyond that given by the patent statute and the patent itself. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F.Supp. 41, 226 (D.Del.1953) (upholding license which limited the licensee’s output to a specific quantity), aff’d 351 U.S. 377, 76 S.Ct. 994, 100 L.Ed. 1264 (1956); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 62 S.Ct. 1070, 86 L.Ed. 1461 (1942) (<HOLDING>); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309

    ### Response:
    holding invalid scheme by which patentee extended patent monopoly by requiring pricefixing arrangement between itself and each of its licensees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in this court. Beyond the record provided for a direct appeal, Golden is not entitled to free transcripts to assist in the preparation of either a postconviction motion or a petition for extraordinary relief. Goggins v. Pinellas Co., Cir. Ct. of Sixth Jud. Cir., 685 So.2d 1334, 1335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). As the trial court pointed out in its dismissal order, the transcripts requested are a part of the record for his direct appeal. Golden is not entitled to anything more. A motion to credit jail time is normally a motion authorized by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Hines v. State, 842 So.2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). However, rule 3.800(a) prohibits the filing of such a motion during the pendency of a direct appeal. See Day v. State, 770 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). Since Golden filed his motion during the

    ### Response:
    holding that effective january 13 2000 a party may not file a rule 3800a motion during the pendency of a direct appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between the funds seized and the illegal activity was that the tainted funds had previously passed through the same interbank account. II At the time of the seizure, the civil forfeiture statute provided that the United States could acquire through forfeiture “[a]ny property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of ... section 1956 [money laundering] ... or any property traceable to such property.” 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The Government concedes that the funds in the Banamex account were not “involved in” or “traceable to” the money laundering enterprise and, thus, were not subject to forfeiture under the statute as it stood at the time of the seizure. See United States v. $448,342.85, 969 F.2d 474, 476-77 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Instead, the Government argues that the funds

    ### Response:
    holding that money seized from a bank account must be traceable to illegal activity in order to be subject to forfeiture even if account previously contained proceeds of illegal activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the undisputed allegations of the underlying complaint, there is no plausible way that Hanft could be legally entitled to the personal profit he gained, and therefore, application of the exclusion need not await final adjudication of the underlying action. Moreover, it is unlikely that the issue of whether Hanft was “legally entitled” to the loan proceeds will ever be adjudicated in the underlying action. In the underlying action, the Diehls have asserted causes of action against Hanft for rescission and breach of contract. Whether Hanft was “legally entitled” to the loan proceeds is not an element of either of these causes of action which the factfinder in the underlying case would be required to determine. See Shane v. Hoffmann, 227 Pa.Super. 176, 324 A.2d 532, 536 (Pa.Super.Ct 1974) (<HOLDING>) a false representation of an existing fact; 2)

    ### Response:
    holding elements of rescission are 1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bring a RCRA ISE claim is evidence that the defendant’s discharges, and Little Hocking’s reasonable concerns about the effects of those discharges, directly affected its economic interests in running a water distribution Facility. If this Court or a jury finds that Defendant is liable under RCRA for the environmental contamination of Plaintiffs Wellfield, then Plaintiffs injury may be redressed through injunctive relief. 2. Notice Defendant argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Count I because Plaintiff failed to meet mandatory pre-filing notice requirements under 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(b)(1)(A) in order to make a claim under § 6972(a)(1)(A) for violations of RCRA. See Sierra Club Ohio Chapter v. City of Columbus, 282 F.Supp.2d 756, 763 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (Marb-ley, J) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding notice provision in rcra and clean water act are virtually identical and citizens notice to violators under either act must strictly comply with statutory notice requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    applicable under the contract; and (3) what volume of gas is covered by the properly redetermined price. Under the parties’ agreement, however, the extent to which these “additional matters” are nonarbitrable is open to serious question. For example, in varying degrees, the plaintiffs’ three examples of “additional matters” appear to fall within the scope of the parties’ dispute on price rede-termination. As such, the three issues may be arbitrable as necessary sub-issues, to be resolved by the arbitrators in their ruling on the price redetermination question. See Prudential Lines, 704 F.2d at 59 (noting that the resolution of an arbitrable dispute may “necessarily implicate[] resolution of several sub-issues); McAllister Bros. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519, 523 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). In any event, even if the plaintiffs’ fifth

    ### Response:
    holding that whether the contract was abandoned by movant was inextricably tied up with the merits of the underlying arbitrable dispute regarding the adequacy of the movants contract performance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    P.2d 164, 167 (Colo.App.1998) (excluding an employer’s contribution to an employee’s pension plan from the calculation of weekly benefits); Luce v. United Techs. Corp., 247 Conn. 126, 717 A.2d 747, 755 (1998) (finding that the calculation of “wages” under the state’s workers’ compensation laws does not include pensions); Rainey v. Mills, 733 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Ky.Ct.App.1987) (declining to find statutory support to include fringe benefits, such as employer pension plan contributions, in weekly wage calculation); Barnett v. Sara Lee Corp., 97 Md.App. 140, 627 A.2d 86, 90-91 (1993) (finding that pension plans could not be considered in the calculation of weekly wages for the purpose of determining a claimant’s industrial loss of use); In re Gagnon, 158 N.H, 391, 965 A.2d 1154, 1159 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Shaw v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 362 N.C. 457, 665

    ### Response:
    holding that weekly wages are calculated using a claimants pretax pay and therefore it was not unjust for the collective bargaining agreement to exclude employer payments to an employees pension plan from the definition of wage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as proficiently. Id. 1.5 emt. The referral agreement between Hollender and Eggen complied, at least in part, with Minn.R.Prof. Conduct 1.5(e). The record demonstrates: (1) Hollender met with the client, evaluated internal reports from an expert witness, referred the medical malpractice case to Eggen, and consulted on the case; (2) by letter to Eggen, Hollender confirmed his entitlement to a referral fee of one-third the amount of Eggen’s fees; (3) Eggen advised the client in writing that he would be consulting with Hollender on the ease, and that he and Hollender would share the attorneys’ portion of any recovery; (4) the client did not object to the fee as a complete defense in a civil suit. See Minn.R.Prof. Conduct Scope (<HOLDING>). While the professional rules may evidence

    ### Response:
    recognizing professional rules do not augment substantive legal duties or extradisciplinary consequences
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when Officer Brinson interviewed Thu-mann or Broderick. Nor does it provide any information about Thumann or Bro-derick, other than appellant’s alleged longtime friendship with Broderick’s family. Nor does it establish any reason for believing the information of either informant to be reliable and credible other than the confirmation of their information from the results of execution of the search warrant itself. And ex post facto confirmation of the reliability of information in a search warrant affidavit cannot be used to establish reliability for the purpose of establishing probable cause to obtain the warrant in the first place. There is, therefore, no basis for the magistrate to have relied upon the credibility and reliability of these informants. See Wilkerson, 726 S.W.2d at 545 (<HOLDING>); McKissick, 209 S.W.3d at 212 (including

    ### Response:
    holding that hearsay may be relied on to show probable cause when substantial basis exists for crediting it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Anton Cross appeals from the sentence the District Court imposed after he pleaded guilty to a drug-conspiracy offense. His counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the District Court (1) erred in determining that the Fair Sentencing Act did not apply retroactively to Cross and (2) abused its discretion in sentencing him. As to the District Court’s determination regarding the applicability of the Fair Sentencing Act, we find no error in light of this Court’s recent decision in United States v. Sidney, 648 F.3d 904, 910 (8th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). As to the court’s imposition of sentence, we

    ### Response:
    holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    than in Steve Jackson Games and Konop. Defendant’s proemail operated to obtain the e-mails before they were received by its intended recipients. While the e-mail in Steve Jackson Games was retrieved from storage in a computer and the website in Konop was accessed under false pretenses, the e-mails in this case were accessed by the procmail as they were being transmitted and in real time. However, the presence of the words “any temporary, intermediate storage” in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) controls. On the facts of this case, it is clear that the electronic communications in this case were in a form of electronic storage. It may well be that the protections of the Wiretap Act have been eviscerated as technology advances. See United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1047-51 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). As the stipulation reached by the parties

    ### Response:
    holding intercept did not occur because there was no contemporaneous acquisition but commenting that under the narrow reading of the statute few seizures will constitute interceptions under wiretap act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must run while defendant is incarcerated for parole violation); cf. N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(3)(x)(D) (stating that harshest penalty for violating post-release supervision served after determinate prison sentence is “reincarceration up to the balance of the remaining period of post-release supervision, not to exceed five years”). In these circumstances, there is no denying that Bussey’s 22-month term of incarceration was served “in connection with” his conviction for a state crime. See Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir.2004) (stating that “in connection with” is expansive term synonymous with “relating to,” “associated with,” “with respect to,” and “with reference to” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Jackson, 426 F.3d 301, 304-05 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 640 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding federal supervision tolled under  3624e during state incarceration for parole violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the standard of care. See Hyman & Armstrong, P.S.C. v. Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 114(Ky. 2008) (concluding that, although information about a drug in the package insert and the Physicians’ Desk Reference “is relevant and useful information regarding the prescribing physician’s standard of care, it is not the sole determinant of the standard of care”); Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, 16-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (observing that such materials are “intended to comply with the FDA’s regulations, to provide advertising and promotional material, and to limit the manufacturer’s liability” and cannot, by themselves, be considered prima facie evidence of the prescribing physician’s standard of care; Morlino v. Medical Center of Ocean County, 684 A.2d 944, 949 (N. J. Super. App. Div. 1996) (<HOLDING>); Craft v. Peebles, 893 P.2d 138, 151 (Haw.

    ### Response:
    holding that package inserts and parallel physicians desk reference information may be considered by the jury along with expert testimony to determine the appropriate standard of care
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (per curiam). In response, Ms. Bon-illa-Holguin’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) (authorizing counsel to request permission to withdraw where counsel conscientiously examines case and determines that appeal would be wholly frivolous). Counsel states that the only arguable nonfrivolous issue presented in the record is ineffective assistance of trial counsel in negotiating the appeal waiver, but that argument should be raised in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, rather than on direct appeal, since the district court has not had an opportunity to develop the factual record on the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Ibarra-Coronel, 517 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). We gave Ms. Bonilla-Holguin an opportunity to

    ### Response:
    recognizing claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel usually must be raised in collateral proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, in which the Court, without citation to any cases, held that a wife was not bound by the limited tort election made by her ex-husband. Kail v. Kalsek, Case No. GD99-15479 (Allegheny Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas May 31, 2001). Although the facts in Kail seem identical to Bujfetta (the wife was covered but not the named insured on her ex-husband’s policy and only became the named insured after her ex-husband was removed from the policy), the Court determined that a new policy was created and the ex-husband’s election could not bind the wife. Despite this contradiction, we cannot revisit our conclusion in Bujfetta simply on account of a Court of Common Pleas decision. See Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338, 1341, 1343 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914

    ### Response:
    holding that we are required to predict the position which the pennsylvania supreme court would take in resolving this dispute  and in the absence of a clear statement by the pennsylvania supreme court to the contrary or other persuasive evidence of a change in pennsylvania law we are bound by the holdings of previous panels of this court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.1992) (upholding Section 1983 claim where plaintiffs complaints concerned the routine use of sexually suggestive language by police officers toward all female officers as well as systemic instances of other forms of sexual harassment), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1644, 123 L.Ed.2d 266 (1993); Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449, 1460 (7th Cir.1990) (in banc) (finding public interest where there was a “wholesale change in the highest police echelons allegedly only on a racial basis”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2796, 115 L.Ed.2d 970 (1991). Here, however, there has been no violation of the First Amendment, because Saulpaugh’s complaints were “personal in nature and generally related to her own situation.” Ezekwo v. NYC Health & Hospitals Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 781 (2d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 657, 116

    ### Response:
    holding that residents complaints about aspects of residency program that negatively affected her did not implicate matters of public concern
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a jury that they rose to the level of a “meeting” as defined by the Freedom of Information Act, and consequently, would not be prohibited by the statute. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 1-200(2) ("" 'Meeting' means any hearing or other proceeding of a public agency, any convening or assembly of a quorum of a multimember public agency, any any communication by or to a quorum of a multimember public agency ... to discuss or act upon a matter of which the public agency has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power. 'Meeting' does not include ... any chance meeting, or a social meeting neither planned nor intended for the purpose of discussing matters relating to official business”); Lawson v. East Hampton Planning and Zoning Comm’n, 2005 WL 3662907 at *1-3 (Conn.Super.Ct. Dec. 13, 2005)

    ### Response:
    holding that procedural irregularities do not amount to a denial of fundamental fairness even where there was a recess during which there were unrecorded conversations between commission members
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    wholly independent right the resolution of which demands the exercise of a judicial power substantially different in scope than the power to decide a particular claimant’s entitlement to compensation under the Vaccine Act. What petitioners seek is a declaratory-judgment respecting the constitutional legitimacy of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(c) — the statute that authorizes the Secretary to promulgate regulations modifying the Vaccine Injury Table. That relief raises an issue that is intimately tied to the power to review the Secretary’s regulations and, as such, it is an issue appropriate for consideration by a United States court of appeals pursuant to Section 300aa-32 of the Vaccine Act. See Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 138-139, 67 S.Ct. 544, 551-552, 91 L.Ed. 794 (1947) (<HOLDING>) The issue lies beyond our jurisdiction to hear

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a court granted jurisdiction by statute to review the legality of administrative orders is also empowered to examine the constitutionality of the statute by virtue of which such orders were entered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    premium payments owed to the insurer which the client then paid to the broker. Id. (citing Unified Servs., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 218 Ga.App. 85, 460 S.E.2d 545 (Ga.Ct.App.1995)). 24 . In making these determinations, I have not relied on the Expert HR defendants' response to LM’s Rule 56.1 Statement. Under Local Rule 56.1(b), responses must contain ""in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” The Expert HR defendants have not done so, but instead have issued unsupported denials for the vast majority of LM's Rule 56.1 Statement. This response is improper, and is therefore stricken. 25 . See, e.g., Am. Home Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 122 Cal.App.3d 951, 966, 175 Cal.Rptr. 826, 834 (1981) (<HOLDING>). 26 . As noted above, even if some other basis

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the corporate entity is disregarded to prevent fraud or an injustice not to inflict an obligation on an innocent corporation and that the fraud or inequity sought to be eliminated must be that of the party against whom the alter ego doctrine is invoked
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In an attempt to prove such a fact, Electric Mobility points to the rather feeble deposition testimony of Michael Flowers, the President of Electric Mobility, who testified that he believed that the time period in which Electric Mobility ordered and received Bourns potentiometers from Hall-Mark “was a broader period of time.” See Kenneth M. Denti Out-of-Pocket Expense Aff., Ex. F (Flowers Dep.) at 715. In sum, I conclude that this is not an “appropriate” case in which to exercise my discretion to excuse the consequences of Electric Mobility’s judicial admission. Cf. MacDonald, 110 F.3d at 340 (finding that trial court was within discretion to conclude attorney’s remarks were not “deliberate voluntary waivers” and did not constitute judicial admissions); Belculfine, 527 F.2d at 944 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brewton, Crim. No.

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not abuse discretion in not binding government to casual statements made by its attorney
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.” Id. at 494, 114 S.Ct. at 1737 (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). Thus, Custis contemplated that the procedural bar applied in cases where defendants waived their right to counsel. [¶ 7.] The federal circuits analyzing Custis confirm that conclusion. See United States v. Rubio, 629 F.3d 490, 493-94 (5th Cir.2010) (denying collateral attack on prior convictions because the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing an invalid waiver of counsel); United States v. Reyes-Solano, 543 F.3d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Krejcarek, 453 F.3d 1290,

    ### Response:
    holding mississippi convictions counted as criminal history points because the defendant did not testify that he was unaware of his right to counsel or that his waiver was invalid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1982). “Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party” does not constitute state action in the First Amendment context. See id. at 1004-05, 102 S.Ct. 2777; see also Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“[I]f, for constitutional purposes, every private right were transformed into governmental action by the mere fact of court enforcement of it, the distinction between private and governmental action would be obliterated.”). Thus, when a court merely enforces obligations explicitly assumed by the parties, there is no state action. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669-70, 111 S.Ct. 2513. To hold otherwise would mean that courts could never enforce non-disclosure agreements. See United Egg Producers v. Standard Brands, Inc., 44 F.3d 940, 943 (11th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). Formal constitutions and bylaws of

    ### Response:
    holding that court enforcement of a settlement agreement is not state action for constitutional purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2007), establishes a limitation on the introduction of relevant evidence: “Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” The “neighborhood code of silence” testimony at issue often arises in prosecutions involving crimes occurring in prison or stemming from gang activity, but also in cases where victims or witnesses are generally reluctant to cooperate with law enforcement. It is relevant on the issue of a witness’s credibility and to explain why witnesses may have given conflicting statements concerning a crime. See United States v. Montes-Diaz, 208 F. App’x 565, 566 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); People v. Trujillo, 2002 WL 31474459

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony on inmate code of silence to show witness bias and help explain why the government failed to call certain witnesses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1) (emphasis added). Rule 8(a)(1) is satisfied if the complaint generally “say[s] enough about jurisdiction to create some reasonable likelihood that the court is not about to hear a case that it is not supposed to have the power to hear.” Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir.1994). Thus, it is “not essential that a complaint set forth the statutory basis for the court’s jurisdiction in order to assume jurisdiction, if the facts alleged provide a basis for the assumption of jurisdiction.” AmSouth Bank v. Dale, 386 F.3d 763, 779 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Rohler v. TRW, Inc., 576 F.2d 1260, 1264 (7th Cir.1978)). See also Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Blanchard v. Terry & Wright, Inc., 331 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims was proper on the basis of supplemental jurisdiction even though the plaintiffs had erroneously claimed diversity jurisdiction because a legitimate federal question was also presented and the state law claims formed part of the same case or controversy as the federal claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that any of the shareholders participated in any fraudulent or unlawful activity. As a mere passive recipient of the ShowBiz stock, a defendant here has only a small number of possible individual defenses, such as the claim that he only acted as a conduit for the actual recipients of the stock, or that he had a smaller number of shares than alleged. In such circumstances, a court’s conclusions regarding the primary legal and factual issues in the first case would not only form the basis for the application of stare decisis in subsequent eases; they would almost inevitably prove dispositive in those cases. See Lynch Corp. v. MII Liquidating Co., 82 F.R.D. 478, 483 (D.S.D.1979) (certifying defendant class of shareholders under (b)(1)(B)); Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 18 (N.D.Ohio 1972) (<HOLDING>). Also significant is the fact that, were the

    ### Response:
    holding that b1b certification of a defendant class is appropriate for the purpose of deciding common issues in a bankruptcy trustees action to recover voidable preferences and fraudulent conveyances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exceeds the original equipment cost — i.e., factors that, according to New § 1-201(37)[3], are consistent with true lease status); Owen, 221 B.R. at 61 (concluding that Brighb-Line Test did not establish a per se security agreement and then applying the following criteria in its reversionary interest analysis: (1) whether the option price is nominal; (2) whether the present value of the rental payments exceeds the original cost of the leased property; and (3) whether the lease term covers the total useful life of the equipment); Taylor, 209 B.R. at 487 (determining existence of significant rever-sionary interest by applying a mix of the Residual Value Factors contained in New § 1 — 201(37)[2] and the factors set forth in New § l-201(37)[3](a), (b), and (c)); Murray, 191 B.R. at 316 (<HOLDING>); Howell, 161 B.R. at 289-90 (determining that

    ### Response:
    holding that factors cited by the debtor  including the fact that present value of total rental payments exceeds the equipments cost and the agreement contains net lease provisions  do not establish that the lessor relinquished its reversionary interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    County[, 387 Md. 52, 874 A.2d 470 (2005)]? (4) Whether the highly restricted Agricultural Zone area may be used for an S.M. facility, private driveway, and lot area for lots developed in the adjoining Rural-Residential Zone Area, where the Agricultural Zone itself would not permit that lot density? (5) Whether the Court of Special Appeals allowed the equivalent of a disguised rezoning or unauthorized density transfer (a.k.a. De facto rezoning of the property)? 20 . We focus, for the purposes of this opinion, primarily on the purposes and underlying reasons for establishment of the R.C. 2 and R.C. 5 zones. For a more extensive historical discussion of the Resource Conservation Zones in Baltimore County, see Security Mgmt. Corp. v. Baltimore County, 104 Md.App. 234, 655 A.2d 1326 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 339 Md. 643, 664 A.2d 886

    ### Response:
    holding that placement of property in baltimore countys rc4 resource conservation zone did not constitute a deprivation of the landowners constitutional rights to either equal protection or substantive due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the VE. See Evans v. Chater, 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir.1995) (concluding there was error when ALJ omitted from hypothetical functional limitations arising from impairment). Even if the ALJ could be faulted for not including standing and walking in the hypothetical, any error was harmless in light of the ALJ’s unchallenged finding that Williams can perform a full range of light work. And the VE understood that Williams had an RFC to perform the full range of light work. Further, no medical evidence suggests Williams’ ability to walk or stand was limited. Lastly, we reject Williams’ contention that reversal is necessary because the ALJ allegedly failed to ask the VE whether the VE’s testimony can be reconciled with the DOT. See Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1175-76 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Because Williams does not contend that the

    ### Response:
    holding that alj must ask ve how ves testimony corresponds with dot and obtain reasonable explanation for any conflicts between testimony and dot
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also Custer v. Coward, 293 Ga. App. 316, 319 (2) (667 SE2d 135) (2008) (acknowledging, in a dog-bite case, that the plaintiff’s cause of action could be based either on the premises-liability statute or the dangerous-animal-liability statute); Wade v. Am. Nat’l. Ins. Co., 246 Ga. App. 458, 461 (1) (540 SE2d 671) (2000) (same). Notably, although Tackling’s complaint did not indicate which theory of liability she was suing under, she references both OCGA § 51-3-1 and OCGA § 51-2-7 in her appellate brief. 7 Abundant Animal Care, LLC v. Gray, 316 Ga. App. 193, 195 (1) (728 SE2d 8 2d 206) (2009) (noting that evidence that a dog barked at a child amounted only to menacing behavior and did not serve as evidence of the dog’s vicious propensity); Custer, 293 Ga. App. at 319 (1), (2) (<HOLDING>); Wade, 246 Ga. App. at 460 (1) (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that dog owners were entitled to summary judgment either under the premisesliability or dangerousanimalliability theories when the dog that bit the plaintiff had never previously attacked or bitten a human and the owners had no superior knowledge of the dogs propensity to bite
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to defendant’s motion to admit the deposition testimony, nor did plaintiff’s counsel raise it orally when he renewed his motion to exclude the deposition on the first morning of trial. Plaintiff’s failure to present this argument to the trial court operates as a waiver on appeal. Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier, 161 Vt. 168, 180, 638 A.2d 561, 569 (1993). Accordingly, we decline to address it. ¶ 16. Finally, the cases cited by plaintiff are unavailing. For example, in Cameron v. Burke, this Court upheld the trial court’s ruling that the defendant was not unavailable for purposes of Rule 32(a)(3)(E) because she decided not to appear at a trial in which she was a party. 153 Vt. 565, 574, 572 A.2d 1361, 1366 (1990); accord King v. Int’l Harvester Co., 181 S.E.2d 656, 661 (Va. 1971) (<HOLDING>); see also Avis Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Cooper, 641

    ### Response:
    holding that outofstate plaintiff had procured his own absence at trial of his case where record contained no intimation that his absence resulted from any reason other than his own volition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    over the years to reverse its position, I and my colleagues would not have undertaken this litigation on a contingent fee basis had it been thought that there was any likelihood of a fee being restricted to a small percentage of the amounts recovered. Although I knew that the Court ultimately sets the fee, and that no amount was guaranteed, I was specifically aware in taking the matter on that the usual range of fee awards in common fund cases was 20-30 percent. Additionally, Michael Malakoff, e because other class action attorneys refused to represent Plaintiffs and Adelman had difficulty finding co-counsel. The district court erroneously ignored these facts in concluding that it would not apply a risk multiplier. With respect to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s ho d 562, 583 (3rd Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). We hold that risk should be assessed when an

    ### Response:
    holding that risk is measured at the point when the attorneys time was committed to the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to find at least one aggravating circumstance before it may impose death. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-67, 96 S.Ct. at 2920-22 (reviewing Georgia sentencing scheme); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-51, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2964-66, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) (reviewing Florida sentencing scheme). By doing so, the sentencing authority narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty according to an objective legislative definition. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 878-79, 103 S.Ct. at 2743-44. The legislature must provide “clear and objective standards,” so that the sentencing authority is given “specific and detailed guidance,” and the process of imposing the death penalty is “rationally reviewable” on appeal. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1765, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Appellant contends, in part, that the use of

    ### Response:
    holding that an aggravating circumstance in the georgia death penalty statute was unconstitutionally vague
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which it relates. Thus, when the affirmative defense of comparative negligence is raised, a negligence claim and the affirmative defenses of comparative and/or contributory negligence are inextricably intertwined.”). In a case raising the same issue as the one before us, the Kansas Court of Appeals reasoned as follows: The process of determining comparative fault, when only two parties are involved, is a “zero sum game.” When negligence is moved out of the plaintiffs column, it must move into the defendant’s column. Evidence that tends to exculpate plaintiff in a comparative fault case places fault upon the defendant, and evidence of subsequent remedial conduct to prove negligence is prohibited [by Rule 407]. DiPietro v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 28 Kan. App.2d 372, 16 P.3d 986, 991 (2000) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 19 We agree with the analysis in DiPie-tro

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of subsequent remedial conduct to disprove a plaintiffs comparative fault is inadmissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jury from the accused and isolating its sentencing decision from the fact that the death sentence, if imposed, will actually result in the execution of a fellow human being.” J. Sullivan, supra, 15 N.M. L. Rev. 63. Consequently, “[t]he right to speak without threat of disclosing otherwise undisclosed information such as a prior record may prove valuable or decisive, to a capital defendant seeking to avoid the death penalty.” Id., 42. Moreover, I see “no reason why a capital defendant should have a lesser right to explain his position and ask for mercy by being sworn and subject to cross examination than a non-capital defendant, who has an unfettered right to allocute.” (Emphasis added.) United States v. Chong, supra, 104 F. Sup. 2d 1236; see State v. Strickland, supra, 243 Conn. 354 (<HOLDING>). As this court has stated, statutes must be

    ### Response:
    recognizing right of allocution in probation revocation proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its attendant inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 760. However, we do not even reach the application of this stringent standard here because defendant failed to preserve the sufficiency of the evidence issue for appeal. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 provides that “[m]otions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before submission of the case to the jury.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(2). This case was submitted to the jury on February 24, 2003, judgment was entered on February 26, and Autocentro moved for judgment as a matter of law for the first time on March 10. Simply put, defendant’s failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence procedurally defaults this claim on appeal. See, e.g., Keisling, 19 F.3d at 758 (<HOLDING>). As we observed in Keisling: “[rjequiring the

    ### Response:
    holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Circuit’s decision in Krishna. In TWU-NYC Private Bus Lines Pension Trust v. Adams, a court in this District held that, where the provisions of the plan clearly indicate that the designated joint survivor annuitant could not be changed once the participant retired, enforcing a waiver in a marital settlement agreement would violate the requirements of § 1104. See No. 99 Civ. 10784, 2003 WL 22383288, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2003). “Unless a pension plan provides otherwise, once a participant retires, the designation of surviving annuitant is irrevocable even if the named annuitant waives all rights to the annuity.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Marshall, 856 F.Supp. 604 (D.Kan.1994)); see also Oglesby v. AT & T Corp., 527 F.Supp.2d 528 (N.D.Tex.2006), aff'd, 257 Fed.Appx. 770 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Hallingby attempts to differentiate the

    ### Response:
    holding that a waiver would not be enforceable where the participant has retired and the pension plan clearly states that beneficiary election is irrevocable upon retirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is supported by and entirely consistent with our recent decision in Patel v. State, supra, where we held violative of OCGA § 17-8-57 a trial court’s statement before jurors that “[v]enue is proper in Fayette County.” Although the trial court in the instant case did not specifically reference “venue” in its statement, we find no substantive difference between a court’s statement that “[v]enue is proper in Fayette County” and a statement that the crime “happened in Muscogee County.” Both statements inform or intimate to the jury the trial court’s opinion as to a critical element of the State’s case, thereby potentially influencing jurors in their evaluation of whether the State has met its burden of proof at trial. See also State v. Anderson, 287 Ga. 159, 161 (695 SE2d 26) (2010) (<HOLDING>). The State asserts that reversal is not

    ### Response:
    holding that trial courts question whether venue had been established and questioning of a witness as to the location of the crime followed by the comment i just wanted to make sure constituted an improper expression of opinion that venue had in fact been proven
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testimony of the appellants girlfriend that Reed was “excluded” from entering the bedroom without express permission. Notably, several courts have applied a different test and a different presumption. Mainly, these courts have followed the view that, when two autonomous adults jointly occupy a dwelling and have separate bedrooms, each occupant generally has a higher expectation of privacy in his or her own bedroom. Absent some showing that one occupant has exercised control, retained control, or come to an understanding with other occupants that control will be shared over the others’ bedrooms, these courts start from the presumption that an occupant exercises sole control over his own bedroom and has no joint access to others’ bedrooms. The State can overcome this presumption 1990) (<HOLDING>); Glenn v. Commonwealth, 48 Va.App. 556, 633

    ### Response:
    holding that where the accused lived in his grandmothers home for approximately three months paid a portion of the bills and the grandmother knocked on the door before entering the room the accuseds occupancy of the room was not so exclusive as to deprive the grandmother of her authority to consent to a search of the accuseds room
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    matrix_8.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2011). Because the plaintiff does not indicate when Hamlett graduated from law school, the court has calculated her appropriate hourly rate based on her bar admission date. 5 . Although the District of Columbia is statutorily limited in the award that it may pay, the court may award attorney’s fees and costs greater than the cap. Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C.Cir.2000). The court, however, cannot enforce the payment of any award above the fee cap amount. See Jaclcson, 603 F.Supp.2d at 96 (limiting the plaintiffs' recovery to $4,000 but noting that the court is not precluded from awarding fees above the cap); see also Pullins-Graham v. District of Columbia, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27805, at **11-12 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2004)

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants could not be held in contempt for failure to pay more than the fee cap amount because the court cannot order the djefendants to violate an act of congress to pay the total award
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court's rejection of the defendant's insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim was not unreasonable under AEDPA); Knowles, 556 U.S. at 114, 129 S.Ct. 1411 (finding that the Ninth Circuit erred because the state court’s decision that the defendant was not deprived of effective counsel was not ""contrary to, or ... an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Wright, 552 U.S. at 126, 128 S.Ct. 743 (reversing the Seventh Circuit and stating, ""because our cases give no clear answer to the question presented, let alone one in [the defendant's favor, it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Carey, 549 U.S. at 72, 127 S.Ct. 649 (<HOLDING>); Rice, 546 U.S. at 334, 126 S.Ct. 969 (finding

    ### Response:
    holding that the ninth circuit improperly granted habeas relief because the state courts decision that it was not inherently prejudicial when court spectators wore buttons depicting the murder victim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the corporation to proceed unaffected by frivolous litigation and protects the directors’ ability to pursue appropriate levels of risk without fear of liability, so long as their actions are consistent with the duty of loyalty.”). 21 . See id. at *12. 22 . See App. to Zhongpin Opening Br. at 541 (Oral Arg’t Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, July 24, 2014). 23 . See Zhongpin, 2014 WL 6735457, at *12 (""Although In re Cornerstone questioned the merit of forcing disinterested directors to face the same pleading standard as interested fiduciaries in cases subject to entire fairness, the Court’s examination of precedent left it with no other choice.”). 24 . Id. 25 . See Zhongpin, 2014 WL 6735457, at *12; Cornerstone, 2014 WL 4418169, at *12. 26 . See, e.g., Malpiede, 780 A.2d 1075, 1094 (Del.2001) (<HOLDING>); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch.2002).

    ### Response:
    holding that on a motion to dismiss a plaintiff must allege wellpleaded facts stating a claim on which relief may be granted had plaintiff alleged such wellpleaded facts supporting a breach of loyalty or bad faith claim the section 102b7 charter provision would have been unavailing as to such claims and this case would have gone forward
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the costs of an expert witness, that it is the service of the subpoena on the witness, not the service of the subpoena on the opposing party, which is dis-positive. Town of Chapel Hill v. Fox, 120 N.C. App. 630, 632, 463 S.E.2d 421, 422 (1995). Plaintiffs concede that subpoenas were served on both expert witnesses for which defendants sought costs. In sum, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of either deposition costs or of expert witness costs. Accordingly, the trial court’s order awarding costs to defendants is affirmed. AFFIRMED. Judge TYSON concurs. Judge JACKSON concurs in the result by separate opinion. 1 . We acknowledge that this Court’s opinions have been inconsistent with regard to deposition costs. Compare Oakes, 173 N.C. App. at 520, 620 S.E.2d at 48 (<HOLDING>), with Morgan, 173 N.C. App. at 581, 619 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that deposition expenses are not an allowable cost
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has established sufficient case law on the issues in the instant case. As was in Herman, the disputed issues in this case include: (1) whether the Plan was an ERISA-covered pan, (2) whether Holman was a fiduciary as defined by ERISA, and (3) whether Holman breached his duty under ERISA. The Sixth Circuit has defined when a person is a “fiduciary” under an ERISA plan. See, e.g., Seaway Food Town, Inc. v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 347 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing ERISA fiduciary status); Hamilton v. Carell, 243 F.3d 992, 998 (6th Cir.2001) (same). Similarly, several Sixth Circuit cases have discussed whether a fiduciary has breached his duty to ERISA plan participants. See, e.g., Abbott v. Pipefitters Local Union No. 522 Hosp., Medical, and Life Ben. Plan, 94 F.3d 236 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Berlin v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 858

    ### Response:
    holding that trustees did not breach their fiduciary duty by deciding to set independent contribution rates for each local union
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was surrendered,” or those that “have only a peripheral relation to the reason the amendment was submitted.” Id. at 1841, 62 USPQ2d at 1712. Nor is recourse to the doctrine of equivalents foreclosed where there is “some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question.” Id. at 1842, 62 USPQ2d at 1714. The patentee bears the burden of overcoming the presumption by “showing that the amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in question.” Id. at 1842, 62 USPQ2d at 1713. An estoppel also may be found on the basis of arguments made during prosecution of the application to secure the allowance of claims. See Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979, 52 USPQ2d 1109, 1113 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54

    ### Response:
    holding that the scope of coverage of the claims may change if a patentee has relinquished a potential claim construction in an amendment to the claim or in an argument to overcome or distinguish a reference
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that a person whom an officer has formally and “physically” arrested is “in custody” for purposes of article I, section 10. See State v. Vallesteros, 84 Hawai'i 295, 301, 933 P.2d 632, 638 (1997) (“arrest” involves, inter alia, “talcing an alleged violator into extended physical custody”); State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 301 n. 6, 687 P.2d 544, 550 n. 6 (1984) (observing that “[i]f the defendant had been arrested before being asked if she had been drinking, Miranda warnings were clearly in order”); State v. Amorin, 61 Haw. 356, 360, 604 P.2d 45, 48 (1979) (noting that “it is undisputed that after his arrest, the defendant was in the custody of [the police]” (citing, generally, Patterson, 59 Haw. 357, 581 P.2d 752)). Cf. State v. Nakoa, 72 Haw. 360, 366, 817 P.2d 1060, 1064 (1991) (<HOLDING>); State v. Ryan, 62 Haw. 99, 101, 612 P.2d 102,

    ### Response:
    holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the age of the older maintenance person. In the second hypothetical, a company with a phone bank lays off the oldest operator. The company could not prevail on a motion for judgment as a matter of law in such a case on the theory that a desire to eliminate the particular phone used by that operator was the sole motive for the lay-off. We proffer these extreme hypotheticals to clarify our decisions in similar cases. We have stressed that the similarity of the jobs held by an older and younger employee is the touchstone for determining whether a lay-off of the older may be found to be an ADEA violation by a trier of fact. In Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, Div. of W.R. Grace & Co., 964 F.2d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir.1992), for example, we held that an inference of discrimin 771 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Meinecke v. H & R Block, 66 F.3d 77, 84 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that evidenee that an employer fired qualified older employees but retained younger ones in similar positions is sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of discriminatory intent and to require the employer to articulate reasons for its decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Machete called Machete Kills, that the Program is unconstitutional because it violates rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Machete Productions, L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281 (5th Cir.2015). The court held that because the Program statutes and regulations made clear that grants were discretionary, Machete Productions could not demonstrate that it had a clearly established right to the grant funds such .that it had a property interest in a Program grant that triggered the Due Process Clause. Id. at 290. The court also held that the Program's statutes and regulations were not unconstitutionally vague. Id. (citing National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588-89, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) (<HOLDING>)). 14 . Because of our disposition of Machete's

    ### Response:
    holding that while due process clause protects against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of vague standards when government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign the consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    immunity is an affirmative defense. Perry v. Texas A & I Univ., 737 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Thus, the burden is on the defendant to establish all elements of the defense. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex.1984). Government employees are entitled to official immunity from suit arising from the performance of their (1) discretionary duties in (2) good faith as long as they are (3) acting within the scope of their authority. Baker v. Story, 621 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Tex.Civ.App in pursuit and roadblock entitled to immunity). Several states that have recently considered the issue have also held that the actions of a police officer during a high-speed chase are discretionary. See, e.g., Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38 (Minn.1992) (<HOLDING>); Youngblood v. Clepper, 856 S.W.2d 405, 408

    ### Response:
    holding that police officers who engaged in a dangerous highspeed chase of a fleeing suspect were immune from suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    269, 196 P.3d 970 (stating that a party may not seek a declaratory judgment when additional fact-finding or agency expertise is necessary). Thus, despite the fact that both the Smiths and the Stillmans presented identical and purely legal questions, the Smiths were required to comply with the administrative process they started, while the Stillmans remained free to seek a declaratory judgment. Smith, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 17, 23-25, 27, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300. In Smith, the question of law was limited to whether the agency “had [the] right to even make a decision.” Id. ¶ 17; see Baca, 2008-NMSC-047, ¶ 21, 144 N.M. 530, 189 P.3d 663 (stating that the validity of a contract presents a purely legal question); Stennis v. City of Santa Fe, 2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 14, 143 N.M. 320, 176 P.3d 309 (<HOLDING>). In declaratory judgment actions, arguments

    ### Response:
    holding that whether a city has the authority to enact a particular statutory scheme is a purely legal question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court after December 19, 2004. Martin maintains that Local Rule 7 conflicts with Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that he in fact timely submitted his response because the federal rules trump the local rules, which gave him an additional three days to file his response. Rule 6(e) extends deadlines tied to service of process by mail. It states, “[wjhenever a party must or may act within a prescribed period after service and service is made under Rule 5(b)(2)(B), (C), or (D), 3 days are added after the prescribed period would otherwise expire under subdivision (a).” Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e). Because Local Rule 7 requires action within twenty days of filing, as opposed to service, Rule 6(e) is inapplicable. See Lauzon v. Strachan Shipping Co., 782 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Rule 6(e) applies to those obligations

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 6e did not extend the period in which a workers compensation carrier was required to pay a compensation award under the longshore and harbor workers compensation act where the act required payment within ten days of filing of the order as opposed to within ten days of service of notice provided for in the rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of any of the other witnesses. Thus, only a small, albeit important, portion of the testimony admitted at trial was erroneously admitted. Defendant calls to our attention several cases in which courts, when faced with similar situations, have found that the admission of expert testimony, in sexual abuse cases, which vouches for the credibility of other witnesses constitutes reversible or even plain error, and our own research has unearthed several other such cases. See, e.g., Whitted, 11 F.3d at 786-87 (plain error); United States v. Birdsall, 47 M.J. 404, 410 (C.A.A.F.1998); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colin C, 419 Mass. 54, 643 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Mass.1994); State v. Gokey, 154 Vt. 129, 574 A.2d 766, 772 (Vt.1990). But see, e.g., Brown v. State, 523 So.2d 729, 730 (Fla.Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Rather, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 140,

    ### Response:
    holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mandatory language must always be construed as jurisdictional. Similarly, we conclude here that although the language requiring the trial to be held within thirty days is mandatory, the language is not necessarily jurisdictional because there are limited instances where the court would retain jurisdiction beyond the thirty-day time period, most notably where a continuance for good cause or in the interest of justice has been granted under section 394.916(2). The district courts in Kinder, Reese, and Osborne also made determinations that the language was not jurisdictional. Kinder, however, is the only decision that appears to recognize the analytical distinction between jurisdiction and whether the provision should be construed as mandatory or directory. See Kinder, 779 So.2d at 515 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, because these indefinite

    ### Response:
    holding that the thirty day time limit was mandatory but not jurisdictional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had been taken over by Jamaicans, thereby suggesting that it was more likely that the defendant was guilty of the drug sales with which he had been charged. Although the government argued that these references were “fleeting” and “insignificant,” the Court concluded that the “fairness, integrity [and] public reputation of judicial proceedings” were “seriously affected.” Id. at 26. Similarly, in United States v. Cabrera, 222 F.3d 590 (9th Cir.2000), the Court found that the government’s references to the drug market falling under the control of Cuban dealers, its suggestion that the Cubans were flight risks, and its description of how Cubans tended to package their drugs, were plain error where defendant was also Cuban. See also Withers v. United States, 602 F.2d 124, 125 (6th Cir.1979)(<HOLDING>). While we find the government’s mention of

    ### Response:
    holding that prosecutors reference to the fact that not one white witness has produced contradictory evidence was plain error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    process. Assuming arguendo that a protestor has standing to bring a bid protest, it would seem that the standing requirement to challenge an override should not be any higher. Such a determination, however, does not end the court’s inquiry since panels of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have taken different approaches regarding the evidence required to satisfy the “substantial chance” doctrine in a bid protest ease. Compare Information Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2003) (a protestor must establish “that its chance of winning the award was ‘greater than ... insubstantial ... if successful on the merits of the bid protest.’ ”); with Alfa Laval Separation, Inc. v. United States, 175 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); with Data General Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that a protester is not required to show that but for the alleged error the protester would have been awarded the contract instead a protester must show there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract but for the alleged error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be said to have reached a consensus that the inhumane treatment of a huge number of persons accused of no crime and held in confinement is a violation of the law of nations.”). But see Sarei, 221 F.Supp.2d at 1162 n. 190 (concluding that “plaintiffs have not demonstrated that prohibitions against cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (other than torture) and gross violations of human rights constitute established norms of customary international law”); Xuncax, 886 F.Supp. at 186 (finding that “it is evident that the prohibition against [cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment] poses more complex problems of definition than are presented by norms forbidding torture, summary execution, disappearance or arbitrary detention”); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F.Supp. 707, 711-12 (N.D.Cal.1988) (<HOLDING>). e. War crimes “After the Second World War,

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no cognizable claim for cruel inhuman and degrading treatment due to the lack of a precise definition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arrest, or “seizure,” has been removed. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 204, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). Therefore, the first step in our inquiry is to determine whether or not Appellant was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 206-07, 99 S.Ct. 2248. A law enforcement officer can seize a person by either the use of physical force or a show of authority to which the person submits. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991); Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A show of authority occurs when, considering the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,

    ### Response:
    holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1368; see also Jennings, 323 F.3d at 275 (stating that the defendant “has other avenues he can pursue to fall within the ... exception of 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(B)(ii)”). Consequently, we agree with those circuits holding that, in states where civil rights are not removed for a misdemeanor conviction of a crime of domestic violence, an individual convicted of such a misdemeanor “cannot benefit from the federal restoration exception.” Smith, 171 F.3d at 623. One circuit has disagreed, seeing an inconsistency in a scheme that bars misde- meanants who have never had their civil rights removed from possessing a gun, but allowing those who have had their rights removed, but then restored, to possess a gun. See United States v. Wegrzyn, 305 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We do not believe this reasoning is sound.

    ### Response:
    holding that misdemeanants under michigan law cannot be convicted under 18 usc  921a33bii because their civil rights were never lost
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their guns and worrying about prosecution for possessing large capacity weapons). That argument might have some force if the Act banned large capacity weapons outright instead of licensing them. For example, in Peoples Rights Organization, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522 (6th Cir.1998), where the plaintiffs challenged successfully on vagueness grounds a municipal ordinance banning assault weapons, the preenforcement challenge was ripe for review because the law presented those plaintiffs with a “Hobson’s choice[:][t]hey [could] either possess their firearms in Columbus and risk prosecution under the City’s law, or, alternatively, they [could] store their weapons outside the City, depriving themselves of the use and possession of the weapons.” Peoples Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 529 (<HOLDING>). Here, the plaintiffs have a third option:

    ### Response:
    holding that city ordinances ban on assault weapons was vague because the ordinance lacked a scienter requirement and its definitions of assault weapons inter alia unfairly required gun consumers to ascertain the developmental history of particular weapons or monitor the precise types of ammunition available for their weapons
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the extent that these arms of the state were citizens, they would unquestionably be diverse from defendants. Thus, one might argue that the fact that they are not citizens at all should not destroy federal juris diction, just as the fact that they are not citizens cannot create it. 22 .See, e.g., World Trade Center Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir.2003) abrogated on other grounds in Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 126 S.Ct. 941, 163 L.Ed.2d 797 (2006) (""Defendant Port Authority presents a closer question on jurisdiction because it is a state-created body, thereby raising the possibility that it is a not a ""citizen” of any state, the effect of which would be to destroy diversity.”); Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409, 416 (D.C.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Chisholm v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that absent dismissal of the district of columbia federal diversity jurisdiction would be lacking in suit against a diverse codefendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    control,” id. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (internal quotation marks omitted), the statute’s langu riminate [made in the United States] ... does not create a claim under the civil rights acts — there must be an act.” (citing Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 742 (1st Cir.1980))). Accordingly, Section 1981’s territorial limitation is defined by the location of the subject of the discrimination, not by the location of the decisionmaker. We agree with those courts that have held “that an individual, whose primary workstation is abroad, cannot characterize otherwise extraterritorial employment as domestic solely because employment decisions were made ... in the United States.” Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l Corp., 217 F.Supp.2d 59, 68 (D.D.C.2002); see also Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 559 (<HOLDING>); DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785

    ### Response:
    holding before the amendment providing the adea with extraterritorial force see note 2 ante that an adea claim by an american employee against an american employer was properly dismissed because the employee lived and worked overseas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the separation of church and state cannot substitute for requirement of injury in fact). Thus even if the crosses offend plaintiffs, that offense is insufficient to entitle them to maintain suit. Notwithstanding the insufficiency of psychological injury, the Supreme Court has held that the required injury need not be severe and need not be economic. An example of a non-economic injury which the Supreme Court has held confers standing is the deprivation of a citizen’s beneficial use of a public park. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 2415, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973) (claimed impediment to plaintiffs’ recreational use of natural resources is sufficient to confer standing). The rationale 1088 (D.D.C.1971) (<HOLDING>); rev’d 495 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir. 1973). Here,

    ### Response:
    holding no violation of federal establishment clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the fairness of the trial or in any way materially impaired or prejudiced the judicial power of the court”). The People offer an additional argument about how Kendall’s opinion prejudiced the Ford case. According to the People, Kendall “deliberately contaminated the jury pool” by “publicly argu[ing] that the People lacked sufficient evidence to convict the Ford defendants,” directly resulting in Paris’s acquittal. People’s Br. at 19. This is pure conjecture, and as conjecture it is belied by the fact that Judge Carroll was ultimately able to select an impartial jury for Ford’s trial. More importantly, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court did not rely on this theory in convicting Kendall. Nor can we. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73, 85 S. Ct. 546, 13 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1965) (<HOLDING>); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509

    ### Response:
    holding that the sixth amendments guarantee of a trial by jury requiresthe jury to base its verdict only on the evidence presented at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. 756, 767 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109 n. 8, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (“We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable'to follow the court's instructions and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v. Walker, 99 F.3d 439, 443 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (""We have no cause to doubt that the jury followed the court's curative instructions [to disregard improper testimony], therefore we do not believe the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.”); United States v. Burroughs, 935 F.2d 292, 295 (D.C.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). 7 . See United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that ujnless there is some good reason for finding otherwise  courts proceed on the basis that the jury does comply with cautionary instructions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not itself offend the Constitution, the fact that each official does not ‘represent’ the same number of people does not deny those people equal protection of the laws.” (citing Sailors)). Moreover, contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions (see Warden Compl. ¶ 51), this is the ease whether or not the body is appointed by officials who are themselves elected, see Sailors, 387 U.S. at 109-10, 87 S.Ct. 1549; Oliver, 306 F.Supp. at 1289, and whether or not the elected officials could theoretically appoint themselves to fill the positions at issue. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Board of Educ., 385 F.Supp. 223, 22A-26 (E.D.N.Y.1974) (three-judge panel), aff'd, 420 U.S. 985, 95 S.Ct. 1418, 43 L.Ed.2d 667 (1975); cf. Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 109 S.Ct. 1433, 103 L.Ed.2d 717 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In short, notwithstanding the similarities

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute that established new york citys board of estimate violated the equal protection clause  even though the boards officials were not directly elected  because borough presidents when elected became members of the board ex officio
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). See discussion supra. By its terms, the release agreement at issue here is to be construed according to the contract law of Illinois, and the Court so construes it. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 243 n. 8, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) (stating that “a [federal] court ordinarily must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits” (citing Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941)); In re Marriage of Adams, 133 Ill.2d 437, 141 Ill.Dec. 448, 551 N.E.2d 635, 638 (1990) (citing Reighley v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 390 Ill. 242, 61 N.E.2d 29, 33 (1945) (<HOLDING>)). Federal courts’ “role in interpreting a

    ### Response:
    recognizing the applicability of choice of law clauses in contracts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    big difference in this case, but the City Council members never testified to any such legitimate, good-faith belief, and we can find no evidence to that effect in the record.. Therefore, it seems that the City Council terminated Singleton simply because of the conversation between his wife and daughter. In this country, guilt is individual. We do not, as a general rule, punish A for the sins of B. Nor does the law today generally impute the actions of one spouse to another, or the actions of an adult child to the parent. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educational Television Comm’n, 93 F.3d 497, 501-02 (8th Cir.1996) (“We do not think any general inference can be drawn from the opinion of one spouse to that of the other.”), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 986) (<HOLDING>). And courts have held that a parent is not

    ### Response:
    holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    70 . The dissent does not challenge our statement that the Supreme Court in Frisby expressed a special solicitude for the home. Dissent at 81. But it does imply that we are ""penalizing rhetoric because it may have encouraged listeners to contact [Carpenter]."" Dissent at 81. That is not what we are doing. We are instead recognizing that harassment of even public figures is actionable if the claimant can prove the elements of IIED and can prove that the intended purpose of the words was merely to harass. If Leykis had merely ""encouraged listeners to blanket Carpenter with objections to the show's cancellation,"" his speech would not have been intended to ""merely harass"" and would not be actionable. 71 . Gormley v. Dir., Conn. State Dep't of Prob., 632 F.2d 938, 941-42 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787

    ### Response:
    holding that connecticut may criminally punish harassing phone calls because the statute punishes both harassing conduct and speech
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in his cross-appeal, that the new evidence of subtle neurological impairments would not have significantly affected the jury’s deliberations during the guilt/innocence phase. Given the weakness of the new mental health evidence and the overwhelming evidence of the intentional and deliberate nature of Lance’s crimes, we conclude that it is essentially beyond possibility that the jury would have failed to convict Lance of the murders. We further conclude that it would have been highly unlikely that the new mental health evidence would have led the jury to render a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, which would not foreclose a death sentence in any event. See OCGA § 17-7-131 (a) (2) (defining “[mjentally ill”). See also Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 764 (12) (620 SE2d 778) (2005) (<HOLDING>). B. Evidence from Forensic Experts Lance

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute that provides for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill does not preclude a death sentence as the result of such a verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the Alabama authorities. The Government argued that Benton’s prior convictions were all entitled to a presumption of regularity. The District Court, after reviewing Benton’s arguments with counsel in open court, agreed with the Government. Benton’s criminal history was pegged at Category IV. Using the total offense level of 23, the resulting Guidelines range was 70-87 months’ imprisonment. The District Court next discussed its sentencing rationale, and sentenced Benton to 70 months, which was the bottom of the suggested Guidelines range. Pursuant to the exception stated in his appellate waiver, Benton appealed the District Court’s calculation of his criminal history We apply a presumption of regularity to court proceedings. See United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 698 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). On appeal, Benton contends that the District

    ### Response:
    holding that absent evidence to the contrary court proceedings are presumed to be procedurally proper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tends to invade the privacy of others.” S.C.Code. Ann. § 16-17-470(A) (2003). “Peep” has been defined alternatively as “to look cautiously or slyly; a brief look: glance; a furtive look.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 867 (9th ed.1990). There is clearly evidence that Caldwell peeped at each of the young victims’ privates. Finally, even if we were to assume arguendo subsection (D) of the statute applied, we find there is evidence Caldwell did intentionally look at the privates of the three young victims for more than just a brief period of time in other than a casual or cursory manner. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing reasons, we find no reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to sever the trials, denial of Caldwell’s motion to suppress th 17 S.E.2d 92, 93 (1992), (<HOLDING>). 5 . Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding in camera hearing was needed to determine whether the incourt identification was of independent origin or was the tainted product of the circumstances surrounding a bond hearing where a witness saw a suspect at a bond hearing prior to his incourt identification of the suspect and the witness may have gotten a fix on the suspect at the bond hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discrimination claims occurred well over two years before Smith commenced this litigation. Thus, they are barred by NJLAD and § 1983’s statutes of limitations. Smith’s claims cannot be saved under the continuing violation theory, because an employer’s failure to promote is quintessentially a dis Crete employment action. See AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (U.S.2002)(“Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act. Discrete acts such as ... failure to promote ... are easy to identify. Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’ ”); see also Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, 113 F.3d 476, 484 (3d Cir.1997)(<HOLDING>). Likewise, discriminatory discipline actions

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs failure to promote claim and train claims are discrete instances of alleged discrimination that are not susceptible to a continuing violation analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    warranty of merchantability claim because no warranty attached to the custom designed Kona Pacific meal feed, which was for an unknown species and thus had no ordinary purpose. Plaintiff counters that a warranty attaches to all products, even those that are custom made. Plaintiff submits that the issue of whether the feed was defective or unfit for the ordinary purposes for which it was used is disputed. The implied warranty of merchantability is arguably the broadest warranty in the Uniform Commercial Code, and is “implied by operation of law into every sale of goods by a merchant seller.” Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hosp. Inc., 66 Haw. 287, 249-50, 659 P.2d 734, 744 (1983) (citations omitted). Merchantability means, among other things, tha pp.3d 594, 798 N.E.2d 618, 624-25 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The Court does not refute that these cases

    ### Response:
    holding that granting of summary judgment was proper as to breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim because the product at issue was a newly created component made especially for the plaintiff and  no average or usual standards for determining ordinary performance or quality for the components eould be determined because the parts had never previously been manufactured
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the following Conclusions of Law: 1. Sections 501 and 502 are complementary sections which together provide for filing and allowing pre-petition claims and certain enumerated types of post-petition claims. 2. Section 50S, which needs no complement, is set apart from sections 501 and 502 by its scope and its terminology. 3. To subject administrative expense requests filed under § 503, which also provides for their allowance, to preemptive disallowance under authority of § 502 discounts the plain meanings of both sections. L Section 502(d) does not apply to administrative expenses that are allowable under § 503. ORDER IT IS THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that Movants’ request for administrative expenses is GRANTED. 1 . Compare In re Lids Corp., 260 B.R. 680, 683 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (Walrath, J.) (<HOLDING>); Camelot Music, Inc. v. MHW Adver. and Pub.

    ### Response:
    holding that administrative expense claims are accorded special treatment under the bankruptcy code and are not subject to section 502d
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the bankruptcy estate and, if so, whether 1) the claims are subject to a statutory exemption from the estate or 2) the bankruptcy trustee has abandoned them. 1. Plaintiffs Causes of Action The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that upon a filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, the trustee “steps into the shoes of the debtor for the purposes of asserting or maintaining the debtor’s causes of action.” DiMaio Family Pizza & Luncheonette, Inc. v. The Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 460, 464 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting In re Rare Coin Galleries, Inc., 862 F.2d 896, 901 (1st Cir.1988)). Courts have held that the definition of “property” as used in § 541(a)(1) extends to causes of actions such as present in this case. See, e.g., In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 890 (7th Cir.1981)(<HOLDING>)(citing cases). Thus, this Court must first

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no question  that the estate includes causes of action such as the truth in lending claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    phone calls, and his car was stolen, but then returned by the police without any payment to the FARC. Such threats and acts of intimidation, without any significant harm, do not rise to the level of past persecution. See id. Turning to future persecution, we cannot say that the record compels the finding that Alzate will more likely than not be subjected to persecution upon removal. See Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1029 (11th Cir.2004) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 125 S.Ct. 2245, 161 L.Ed.2d 1063 (2005). The BIA concluded that Alzate’s fear was not objectively reasonable. As the BIA noted, despite Alzate’s subjective fear of the FARC, Alzate was able to return to Colombia several times without suffering any harm. See Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812, 816-17 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). During one of his return visits, Alzate made

    ### Response:
    holding that an applicants claim of asylum is weakened even undercut when the applicant has returned to the country without incident
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    River. The trial court overruled appellee’s exceptions, finding no case holding access to navigable water prevents property from being landlocked. Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/08, at 3. An en banc Commonwealth Court vacated and remanded, finding the Board should have considered evidence regarding river access. In re: Private Road in Speers Boro, II, Washington County, No. 1016 C.D. 2008, unpublished memorandum at 13-14 (Pa.Cmwlth. filed November 20, 2009). The court further noted the Monongahela River has long been considered a public highway and “place of necessary resort,” and other jurisdictions have considered water access in determining whether necessity exists. Id., at 12-13 (citing Balliet v. Commonwealth, 17 Pa. 509, 514 (1851); In re Daniel, 656 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Minn.2003) (<HOLDING>)). Thus, the court concluded, “a proper

    ### Response:
    holding access to property by navigable lake was per se bar to finding of necessity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the beginning of any unreasonable delay. General Provision 76(c) clearly states: ""Unless specifically authorized by the Contracting Officer in writing, no construction will be started until the CQC plan is approved” (emphasis added). No written authorization to proceed was given to Avedon and' Avedon’s CQC plan had not been approved. The court thus finds no basis for Avedon’s reliance on this NTP and no basis for an unreasonable delay claim based on this incident. Even assuming arguendo it had a right to rely on the NTP, Avedon would be hard pressed to show the Navy delayed unreasonably subsequent to the NTP. The delay time after August 22 attributable to the Navy was only six days from August 31 to September 6. Cf. Joseph Corman Corp. v. United States, 246 F.Supp. 602 (D.Mass.1965) (<HOLDING>); Chaney, 190 Ct.Cl. at 712-13, 421 F.2d at 735

    ### Response:
    holding a delay of notice to proceed from march 4 to september 26 of the same year was not improper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dismissed on June 20, 2009. Both actions were consolidated on June 24, 2009. 3 . The district court dismissed Cooper's Title VII race discrimination claims concerning his transfer to Harvey as barred because Cooper’s EEOC charge addressing those claims was untimely filed. The district court did analyze Cooper’s adverse employment action claims under § 1981, noting that the Title VII framework was equivalent. Cooper does not challenge the dismissal of his Title VII race discrimination claims concerning his transfer to Harvey, and accordingly, we do not review the district court's dismissal of those claims. However, we do evaluate, as the district court did, Cooper’s § 1981 claims concerning his transfer to Harvey. 4 . Cf. Keeton v. Flying J, Inc., 429 F.3d 259, 265 n. 2 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Policastro v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 297 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that where an employee was transferred to a new job site over 120 miles away that transfer while not per se an adverse employment action was an appropriate factor for the jury to consider in determining whether an adverse employment action occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pursuit of a court action to enforce the resulting agreement, without violating the Act.” Id. at 260. Several circuit cases have held that interest arbitration clauses survive the expiration of section 8(f) collective bargaining agreements, and the interest arbitration awards have been enforced in those cases. See Sheet Metal Workers Local 20 v. Baylor Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., 877 F.2d 547, 556 (7th Cir.1989) (enforcing interest arbitration award even though employer refused to negotiate and the col lective bargaining agreement had expired), abrogated on other grounds by International Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150 v. Rabine, 161 F.3d 427, 430 (7th Cir.1998); Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 206 v. R.K. Burner Sheet Metal, Inc., 859 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Sheet Metal Workers Local 57 Welfare Fund v.

    ### Response:
    holding that interest arbitration clauses survive the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and rejecting the argument that contractual interest arbitration obligations are canceled by the absence of a statutory duty to bargain
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1124 (9th Cir.2008) (citing Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-92, 73 S.Ct. 921). In Triton Marine, however, we found it unnecessary to conduct a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis because the contract at issue contained a choice-of-law clause. See Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 413; see altso Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 588-89, 73 S.Ct. 921 (“Except as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the law which the parties intended to apply.”). Relying on prior Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit case law, we concluded that “absent compelling reasons of public policy, a choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract should be enforced,” and a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis was unnecessary. Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 415; see also Bominflot, Inc., 465 F.3d at 148 (<HOLDING>). Thus, for the reasons set-forth in Triton

    ### Response:
    holding that the choice of law question was made easy by the partys contractual provision agreeing that english law would apply
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rigorous review. Because a statement’s factuality “does not divorce the speech from its moral or ideological implications,” Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246, a person’s rig ave emerged, which in their own way have become as significant for. expressive liberty as the right not to be silenced by a disapproving public entity. One of those adjunct rights is the right to listen. See Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (observing that the-First Amendment “protects both a speaker’s right to communicate information and ideas to a broad audience and the intended recipients’ right to receive that information and those ideas”). Another is the right to express oneself through conduct. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty, Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Yet another is the right not to utter

    ### Response:
    holding that a public school may not without evidence  of substantial disruption punish students for wearing armbands protesting the vietnam war
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in lieu of intended loss.” United States v. es allegedly received in the June 18, 1988, accident amounted to $23,-019, $10,000 of which was for “pain and suffering.” Three months later, he settled for $4,000. Most of the claims were settled in a similar manner, at least until the scheme began to unravel. The use of an objective “probable loss” analysis is particularly appropriate in a case such as the one before us. Each substantive count was tied to a different accident and a corresponding attempt to defraud. Many of these discrete facets of the ongoing scheme had flowered into fully realized crimes for which the actual loss, i.e., the settlement with the insurance company, provides conclusive evidence of the probable loss. See United States v. Bailey, 975 F.2d 1028 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We find no clear error in the court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that intended loss applies to attempt crimes only and that outofpocket loss is the relevant figure under  2f11 for fully realized crimes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Withdrawal” of the Rule 59 motion and a notice of appeal to this court. On January 5, 2011, the clerk of this court ordered briefs on whether this court should summarily dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The order framed the issue as follows: Whether this court has jurisdiction where the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after entry of final judgment on September 27, 2010, and where the appellant withdrew his motion to vacate? See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. [sic] 2360, 2366 [168 L.Ed.2d 96] (2007) (“To day we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement”). See also Vanderwerf v. Smithkline [sic] Beecham Corp., 603 F.3d 842 (10th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). De Leon v. Marcos, No. 10-1578 (10th Cir.

    ### Response:
    holding that where the appealing party withdraws its postjudgment motion and the district court does not issue an order on the motion or the withdrawal the time to appeal begins to run from the entry of final judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Use Act (“CUA”) and the Medical Marijuana Program Act (“MMPA”) do not change the probable cause analysis. Although “[pjrobable cause depends on all of the surrounding facts, including those that reveal a person’s status as a qualified patient or primary caregiver under” [the CUA or MMPA], People v. Mower, 28 Cal.4th 457, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 335, 49 P.3d 1067 (2002) (citations omitted), Carpenter has not alleged that Deputy Beuer possessed any information suggesting that Carpenter had such a status. Moreover, the police are not required to investigate the existence of affirmative defenses under the CUA or MMPA once probable cause has been established. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir.2003); People v. Fisher, 96 Cal.App.4th 1147, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 838, 839, 841 (2002) (<HOLDING>); People v. Wright, 40 Cal.4th 81, 85, 51

    ### Response:
    holding cua is an affirmative defense to be raised at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of electronic communications. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 2511(l)(e) (placing restrictions upon “any person who . . . intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic commu nication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication”). The Court correctly observes that these are “content-neutral law[s] of general applicability"" which serve recognized interests of the “highest order”: “the interest in individual privacy and ... in fostering private speech.” Ante, at 526, 518. It nonetheless subjects these laws to the strict scrutiny normally reserved for governmental attempts to censor different viewpoints or ideas. See ante, at 532 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioners have not established the requisite  need    of the highest order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lerer, Inc. v. District Court, 111 Nev. 1165, 1168, 901 P.2d 643, 645 (1995); NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330. 9 See Pan v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 224, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004) (noting that if appellate jurisdiction is proper, writ relief is inappropriate because an appeal is an adequate remedy). 10 See Nev. Const, art. 6, § 4; Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels, 100 Nev. 207, 678 P.2d 1152 (1984). 11 NRAP 3A(b)(1). 12 109 Nev. 662, 665, 856 P2d 244, 246 (1993). 13 See Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000) (clarifying that “a final judgment is one that disposes of all the issues presented in the case, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues”). 14 Cf. State v. Ducker, 35 Nev. 214, 225-26, 127 P. 990, 993-94 (1912) (<HOLDING>). 15 Ashokan, 109 Nev. at 665, 856 P.2d at 246.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that in the case provided for by law as mentioned in a former version of nrs 2090 with respect to injunctive relief refers to the sections of the statutes concerning injunctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been committed. See id. at 642-43, 78 S.Ct. 932 (citations omitted); NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263, 90 S.Ct. 417, 24 L.Ed.2d 405 (1970). The availability of an award of backpay before the NLRB “does not mean that Congress necessarily intended this discretionary relief to constitute an exclusive pattern of money damages for private injuries.” Russell, 356 U.S. at 645, 78 S.Ct. 932. Indeed, the LMRDA, which was passed after the NLRA, authorizes federal courts to award “such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.” 29 U.S.C. § 412. Courts have interpreted this provision to mean that punitive damages, compensatory damages, and attorney fees may be available under the LMRDA. See generally Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Vandeventer v. Local Union No. 513 of the

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may award attorneys fees in a successful lmrda action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    According to the court, the requirement that ERISA plans be maintained in writing precludes oral modifications of such plans, and the doctrine of estoppel cannot be used to alter this result. Id. Further, the court explained that ERISA requires that each plan shall “ ‘provide a procedure for amending such a plan, and for identifying the persons who have authority to amend the plan.’” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3)). The court stated that by explicitly requiring that each plan specify the amendment procedures, Congress rejected the use of informal written agreements to modify an ERISA plan. Id. (citation omitted); see also Adams v. Thiokol Corp., 231 F.3d 837, 843 (11th Cir.2000) (citing Nachwalter); Smith v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 36 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, a

    ### Response:
    holding that any modification or amendment to an erisa plan can be supplemented or ap plied only after the amendment has been appropriately adopted in a formal complete and written form
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    retain jurisdiction. 1 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). 2 626 F.3d 170 (3d Cir.2010). Ray was decided after the motion judge denied defendant’s suppression motion. 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 4 Officer Sztukowski testified that eight officers and police cars appeared at defendant’s home, and Officer D'Onofrio testified that four or five officers met him at the home. 5 See State v. Stott, 171 N.J. 343, 361, 794 A.2d 120 (2002) (stating that for community caretaker exception to apply police must be totally divorced from their criminal investigation responsibilities but citing to cases and factual circumstances applying the emergency aid exception); State v. Garbin, 325 N.J.Super. 521, 525-27, 739 A.2d 1016 (App.Div. 1999) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 164 N.J. 560, 753 A.2d 1153

    ### Response:
    holding that community caretaker exception applied but citing and relying on cases discussing the emergency aid exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Report, the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the objection and motion for de novo review, and the papers filed in support of and in opposition to defendant’s motion to quash, the Court deems the matter suitable for decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for January 21, 2005, and rules as follows: 1. The deadline to file an objection to the Report is ten court days after October 28, 2004, the date of service of the Report, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 72(b), ie., November 11, 2004, to which date three days are added to account for the service of the Report by mail, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e), thus extending the deadline to November 14, 2004, to which date, because November 14, 2004 was a Sunday, one court day is added, see Fed.R.Civ 573, 580 (N.D.Cal.1999) (<HOLDING>). 3. The Court, having reviewed the file de

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiff must make some showing that an act giving rise to civil liability actually occurred finding plaintiff entitled to conduct discovery to learn identity of defendant where plaintiff offered evidence sufficient to demonstrate defendants committed an unlawful act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    administrative code); Regan v. City of New Brunswick, 305 N.J.Super. 342, 353-55, 702 A.2d 523 (App.Div.1997) (reinstating complaint, where employee did not identify until appeal the criminal statutes he believed were being violated, on the basis that they were identifiable from the record and from the employee’s description of the nature of the illegal conduct he suspected). However, the court must make that identification before permitting trial of a CEPA claim under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c. It “must first find and enunciate the specific terms of a statute or regulation, or the clear expression of public policy, which would be violated if the facts as alleged are true.” Fineman v. New Jersey Dep’t of Human ane v. Gilian Instrument Corp., 271 N.J.Super. 476, 493-94, 638 A.2d 1341 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 136 N.J. 298, 642 A.2d 1006

    ### Response:
    holding cepa claim to have been properly dismissed because employees general invocation of federal labor and tax law was inadequate basis for reasonable belief in illegal activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the traditional purposes for similar fact evidence. Id. In this case, the prior kidnapping was clearly not similar fact evidence. Therefore, the focus of the inquiry is on whether it is relevant to the issue of premeditation; that is, whether the prior kidnapping is evidence that the murder in this case was not a heat-of-passion crime. And even if this evidence is probative, an important question still must be asked: whether the prejudicial effect of admitting the prior crime substantially outweighs its probative value. Although McWatters does not support the view that the prior kidnapping was relevant, I recognize that the prior kidnapping may be relevant under the case law relied upon by the trial court below in allowing the evidence. See Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377 (Fla.1994) (<HOLDING>); King v. State, 436 So.2d 50 (Fla.1983)

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of two prior incidents of violence by the defendant toward his wife in the months before the murder were relevant to premeditation where defendant claimed that it was a heat of passion killing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1981 but, rather, reflect only conclusions. Those conclusions, being based on faulty if unexpressed premises, are unsupportable. As such, this court finds that those cases do not represent a helpful, or appropriate, mode of analysis for the resolution of the issue presented here. A second approach, adopted by many courts, allows Hispanic plaintiffs and those of other ethnic groups to state a claim under section 1981 sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Nonetheless, these courts have required the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to allege “racial” discrimination and/or to bear the burden of producing evidence that the alleged discrimination was of a “racial,” as opposed to a national origin, character. See, Bullard v. OMI Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>); Khawaja v. Wyatt, 494 F.Supp. 302, 304-05

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the distinction between national origin and racial discrimination is an extremely difficult one to trace and holding that plaintiffs allegations of racial discrimination were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [to satisfy these elements], for on a motion to dismiss [the court] presume[s] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude SCWF alleged facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. SCWF asserted that construction of the Connector would harm its members’ ability to use and enjoy the relevant area for a variety of educational, scientific, recreational, and aesthetic purposes, and that one or more of its members currently use the land for such purposes. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-39, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (an organization may sue on behalf of its members); id. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1361 (<HOLDING>); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63, 112 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that harms to  aesthetic conservational and recreational as well as economic values are cognizable injuries for the purposes of demonstrating standing quoting assn of data processing serv orgs inc v camp 397 us 150 154 90 sct 827 25 led2d 184 1970
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    characterization of losses as passive or nonpassive be treated as an affected item. From such silence petitioners conclude that the section 469 issue involves a nonpartnership item within the meaning of section 6231(a)(4), to which section 6229 does not apply. Petitioners state in this regard that “Since the partnership items adjusted by the decision [i.e., the amount of losses] are irrelevant to the nature, duration, or quality of petitioners’ participation in the partnership’s activities, the [section] 469 issue cannot be an affected item under section 6231(a)(5).” Although the affected items regulations do not expressly mention section 469, we do not think that the regulations are meant to provide an exhaustive list of such items. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. at 555 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, we question petitioners’

    ### Response:
    holding that section 104a classification by partner of a guaranteed payment is an affected item
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.” 365 U.S. at 144, 81 S.Ct. at 533. When the defendant claims that it is immune from liability based upon activities before an adjudicative body, the immunity can be overcome if the sham exception applies, although the elements of the exception are not entirely certain. Compare Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940, 97 S.Ct. 1571, 51 L.Ed.2d 787 (1977), noted in 30 Vand.L.Rev. 75 (1977) (<HOLDING>) with Associated Radio Service Company v. Page

    ### Response:
    holding that repeated baseless opposition before an adjudicative body does not result in loss of noerrpennington immunity absent conduct external to or abusive of the adjudicatory process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Miss.1989); Whitehurst v. State, 540 So.2d 1319, 1327 (Miss.1989); Gangl v. State, 539 So.2d 132, 135-36 (Miss. 1989); Griffin v. State, 533 So.2d 444, 447-48 (Miss.1988). The statute does not discuss amendments to the indictment, but permits the submission of lesser included offense instructions. Sanders v. State, 479 So.2d 1097, 1105 (Miss.1985). Larceny is a lesser included offense of robbery, in that larceny contains all of robbery’s elements save force or threat of force. Jones v. State, 567 So.2d 1189, 1192 (Miss.1990). Moreover, several other states allow prosecution-sponsored amendments to lesser included offenses because the defendant is presumed to be on notice of lesser included offenses to the original charge. Williams v. United States, 641 A.2d 479, 482-83 (D.C. 1994) (<HOLDING>). See also Green v. State, 619 So.2d 952, 953

    ### Response:
    holding fifth amendment not violated under above rationale
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), thereby “fulfilling their duties to safeguard the future of the Tree Boa.” Tree Boa, 918 F.Supp. at 902. Alternatively, Judge Finch found that he was compelled to dismiss plaintiffs’ ESA claims with respect to the Tree Boa for failure to provide proper notice to the Secretary and the alleged violator as required by 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A). Judge Finch did not address the merits of plaintiffs’ claims brought pursuant to § 9. C.Alternative Holdings Because Judge Finch determined that he did not have the power to hear plaintiffs’ ESA claims, any findings made with respect to the merit of those claims are not essential to the judgement and cannot support the application of collateral estoppel. See Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C.Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>); Bokunewicz v. Purolator Products, Inc., 907

    ### Response:
    holding that collateral estoppel is not applicable to finding against plaintiff on merits where court also held that plaintiff lacked standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the court acknowledged: [I]t is extraordinary for dischargeability litigation that hinges on a debtor’s medical condition to actually hinge on medical testimony. This is because all dis-chargeability litigation involves real persons who are debtors under the Bankruptcy Code, and cannot afford to hire medical experts to testify to the effect of their disease on their disease on their earning capacity. When medical testimony is offered by the debtor it is to lay skepticism to rest, and in this writer’s experience the medical condition of any debtor has never been the subject of dueling experts in § 523(a)(8) litigation. 219 B.R. 665, 669 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1998). Yet despite this awareness, courts often hold that the debtor has failed to sustain his burden of proof. See Lowe, 321 B.R. at 860 (<HOLDING>); Folsom, 315 B.R. at 165 (holding that the

    ### Response:
    holding without any substantive evidence to corroborate the debtors testimony regarding her medical conditions the court must find that the debtor has failed to sustain her burden under the second prong of the brunner test
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir.2007) (quotations omitted). Although we do not automatically presume that a sentence within the guidelines range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect that to be the case. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.2008). A sentence well below the statutory maximum sentence also signals reasonableness. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. Moreover, we have held that a defendant’s sentence was reasonable in light of the command to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities where, due to a defendant’s leadership role, he received a sentence greater than the sentences of his eodefendants. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1350, 1357 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Ultimately, we will vacate a sentence only if

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants 121month sentence was reasonable even though his codefendants sentences ranged from 41 to 53 months imprisonment because the defendant had coordinated the offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in this court on direct review,” Santos v. Reno, 228 F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir.2000) (quotation omitted), and asserts that this “requirement of exhaustion” is maintained in the permanent rules by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d). Aplee. Br. at 10-11. But under § 1252(d), “[a] court may review a final order of removal only if — (1) the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right....” Appealing a decision of the BIA through a petition for review is not an administrative remedy-it is a judicial remedy. The government has apparently confused the concept of exhaustion of administrative remedies with the concept of procedural bar. Generally, a habeas petition cannot be used to substitute for direct appeal. Cf. United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d 287, 291 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McBride, 788 F.2d 1429,

    ### Response:
    holding that habeas proceedings are not available to test the legality of matters which should have been raised on direct appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1966) (reversing conviction where bailiff said of defendant to juror “[o]h, that wicked fellow, he is guilty.”). The question that we must initially address, however, is whether the court erred in finding that the Roberts Affidavit was obtained in violation of Local Rule 5.01(d). This is a factual finding that we reverse only if clearly erroneous. See United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir.2002). Having considered the bri t contact with jurors, the district court’s use of these powers is informed by interests important to the integrity of the judicial process. One such interest is the court’s strong 'interest in protecting jurors from threats and needless harassment from unsuccessful parties. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267, 35 S.Ct. 783, 784, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, this circuit’s pattern instruction

    ### Response:
    recognizing that jurors should be protected from being harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must also be justiciable; it must be within the competency of the court.”); Int’l Mgmt. Svcs. Inc., 80 Fed. Cl. at 9. In this case, the court is unable to provide Plaintiff with the requested injunctive relief. As discussed infra, PlaintifPs failure to appeal the April 28, 2009 SBA size determination to the OHA prior to the May 8, 2009 award to VETS, as a matter of law, created a presumptively valid contract that now cannot be invalidated by the court. Chapman, 63 Fed.Cl. at 35. When the United States Court of Federal Claims has exercised jurisdiction to review SBA and OHA size determinations, it has recognized the non-justiciability of such cases, if the contract becomes presumptively valid by virtue of an award prior to the CO being notified of an appeal to the OHA. Id. at 35-36 (<HOLDING>); see also Int’l Mgmt. Svcs. Inc., 80 Fed Cl.

    ### Response:
    holding that the court had jurisdiction to review an sba size determination but plaintiffs claim was nevertheless not justiciable because the plaintiff failed to file an appeal to the oha prior to award which made the contract at issue unchallengeable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 756; Hughes, 401 F.3d at 547. Turner argues that her base offense level should have been 14, because she pled gui rner had not accepted responsibility for clear error. Denial of the adjustment because of continued criminal conduct after indictment is not clearly erroneous. United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 34 (4th Cir.1993). We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in denying Turner the adjustment for continued drug use on pretrial release. Finally, in her supplemental brief, Turner asserts that the district court erred in applying the guidelines as a mandatory scheme to deny her a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The court undeniably regarded the guidelines as mandatory, and therefore erred. United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 216-17 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). However, a defendant must show that the error

    ### Response:
    holding that even in the absence of a sixth amendment violation the imposition of a sentence under the former mandatory guidelines regime rather than under the advisory regime outlined in booker is plain error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is invalid. OAR 291-124-0016(2) held invalid; Health Policy and Procedure #P-A-02.1 held invalid. 1 ORS 423.075 is one of the statutes that OAR 291-124-0016 implements. 2 DOC makes other arguments about the validity of OAR 291-124-0016(2). We reject them without further discussion. 3 Smith v. TRCI, 259 Or App 11, 312 P3d 568 (2013), presented a similar issue. The petitioner in that case argued that a newsletter that announced a change in DOC rules was a rule that should have been adopted through rulemak-ing procedures. Id. at 15. We held that the newsletter’s “pronouncement of the necessary effect of valid rules *** [was] not itself a rule that was subject to the formalities of rulemaking.” Id. at 17. 4 See Burke v. Children’s Serv. Div., 26 Or App 145, 151-52, 552 P2d 592 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Gray Panthers v. Pub. Wel. Div., 28 Or App

    ### Response:
    holding that the childrens services division decision to stop making child care payments for recipients of public assistance was not an internal management directive because the decision did not affect individuals solely in their capacities as members of the agency involved the plaintiff and others similarly situated were entitled to proper notice and an opportunity to be heard before childrens services division or the department of human resources could issue a rule terminating the program of direct childcare payments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    crew drilled for oil and gas. However, before the crew could drill, the barge was used to transport its specialized drilling equipment over water to the drilling site. 2. Another line of cases developed in this Circuit concludes that certain structures that float upon the water are not vessels. The clearest examples of such floating craft that do not qualify as vessels are dry docks and similar structures that maritime law has never considered, at least while secured to land, to be vessels. Cook v. Belden Concrete Prods., Inc., 472 F.2d 999, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Atkins v. Greenville Shipbuilding Corp., 411 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.1969). In Cook, the structure at issue was a large flat-deck barge upon which the defendant’s employees fabricated concrete barges. The barge w 978) (<HOLDING>). Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co., Inc., 741

    ### Response:
    holding that platform consisting of four flatdeck barges moored to banks of mississippi river more or less permanently by steel cables was not a vessel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the legitimate justifications provided for the challenged practice, and we determine whether the anti-competitive aspects of the challenged practice outweigh its procompetitive effects.” (footnote omitted and emphasis added)); Eleventh Circuit: U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 1001 (11th Cir. 1993) (""The elements of a conspiracy to monopolize under Section 2 are (1) an agreement to restrain trade, (2) deliberately entered into with the specific intent of achieving a monopoly rather than a-legitimate business purpose, (3) which could have had an anticompetitive effect, and (4) the commission of at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,''); D.C. Circuit: Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>); Fed. Circuit: Intergraph Corp. v. Intel

    ### Response:
    holding within discussion on courts subjectmatter jurisdiction that a wouldbe monopolist or member of a conspiracy to monopolize comes within the condemnation of the sherman act when it engages in anticompetitive conduct  quoting spectrum sports 506 us at 456 113 sct 884
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    results to be imbalanced while the other reader found four of the strips to show imbalances. The defense expert found five of the- strips to be imbalanced. No court can accurately assess those conclusions, because the dots fade and begin to disappear almost immediately. With such gross disparities in an admittedly subjective test, the Court cannot conclude that dot-intensity analysis is reliable. D. Even if dot-intensity analysis were presumed to be generally accepted, the evidence should have been rejected here because the assumptions underlying it were so numerous, complex, problematic, and potentially flawed as to render it substantially more confusing and prejudicial than probative in this specific context. See N.J.R.E. 403; Cavallo, supra, 88 N.J. at 520, 443 A.2d 1020 (<HOLDING>). Expert testimony, especially testimony such

    ### Response:
    holding that expert evidence even if admissible under njre 702 must be excluded if it poses the danger that prejudice confusion and diversion of attention exceeds its helpfulness to the fact finder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that reasonable suspicion exists ... need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, 122 S.Ct. 744. Thus, reasonable suspicion exists even though the facts at hand could evidence a legitimate transaction. Finally, the length of Mr. Cervine’s detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Based on the troopers’ testimonies and the dispatch log records, the district court concluded that the traffic stop, detention, and canine search of Mr. Cervine’s vehicle lasted approximately fifty minutes. Cervine, 169 F.Supp.2d at 1214-15. We have upheld similar waiting periods as satisfying the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 802-03 (10th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 926, 118 S.Ct. 326, 139 L.Ed.2d 252 (1997) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion Considering the totality of

    ### Response:
    holding that the arresting officer acted reasonably in detaining defendant for five minutes from the time he stopped defendant  and for an additional thirtyeight minutes while he waited for the canine unit to arrive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the officials designated in it, including judges, were over a year away from the end of their term of office. It rejected an equal-protection challenge by several Texas judges hoping to run for the higher judicial office without being forced to resign. As discussed above, the Court observed that the law served the purpose, among others, of ensuring that a judge will not neglect duties or devote less than the judge’s full time and energies to the responsibilities of the judicial office. Id. at 968. Conversely, the Court noted that the burden on potential candidates, who were not barred from running for o Haw. 1990) (rejecting equal protection and First Amendment challenges to resign-to-run clause in Hawaii Constitution); Acevedo v. City of North Pole, 672 P.2d 130, 135-36 (Alaska 1983) (<HOLDING>); In re Dunleavy, 2003 ME 124, ¶ 22, 838 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that states interests were sufficiently important to justify the rule prohibiting dual officeholding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CFEPA and Title VII. Therefore, the court shall assume that Pecoraro’s CHRO case qualifies as ""an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. 5 . Additionally, courts outside this Circuit, faced with factual circumstances similar to the facts at bar, have also read the participation clause in a broad and expansive manner to honor Title VII's remedial goals. See, e.g., Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 413-14 (4th Cir.1999) (finding that the use of participation clause claim is not determined based on an employee’s testimony regardless of how unreasonable that testimony may be, and to hold otherwise ""would do violence to the text of that provision and would undermine the objectives of Title VII.”); Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 443

    ### Response:
    holding that the antiretaliation provision of title vii reaches to employees who involuntarily participate in such proceedings and employees who do not seek to assist title vii claimant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mental institutions, like prisoners, are deprived of unrestricted association with friends, family, and community; they must contend with locks, guards, and detailed regulation of their daily activities. In addition, a person who has been hospitalized involuntarily may to a significant extent lose the right enjoyed by others to withhold consent to medical treatment. . . . We should not presume that he lacks a compelling interest in having the decisions to commit him and to keep him institutionalized made carefully, and in a manner that preserves the maximum degree of personal autonomy. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 384-86 (1983). 30 Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶ 61 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 31 Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1091 (three-judge district court) (<HOLDING>). 32 State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 330, 541

    ### Response:
    holding prior version of wisconsin mental illness civil commitment statute constitutionally defective
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the children, is well within its discretion to award primary physical custody to the other parent. Also on appeal from the divorce decree, Colleen argues that the district court abused its discretion by not compelling Terry to prepare and turn over certain tax returns for the purpose of the division of community property and debt. Yet, in her opening brief, Colleen states that she does not challenge the district court’s division of community property and debt, but rather is challenging the fact that the court declined her request for pretrial discovery. Since Colleen does not challenge the ultimate distribution of community property and debt, we do not reach her argument concerning pretrial discovery. See Cottonwood Cove Corp. v. Bates, 86 Nev. 751, 476 P.2d 171 (1970) (<HOLDING>). 10 See Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 865 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a party is not aggrieved by a district court ruling in that partys favor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mischaracterize the precedent examining whether such transactions involve securities. Contrary to Defendants’ position that such transactions are analyzed solely as potential investment contracts, the precedent views such agreements as constituting both a note that is potentially a security and an agreement that is a potential investment contract. See, e.g., American Fletcher, 635 F.2d at 1251; Provident Nat. Bank v. Frankford Trust Co., 468 F.Supp. 448, 451 (E.D.Pa.1979). This is the correct approach, but all but one of the eases cited by Defendants applied overruled or outdated law. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64-65, 110 S.Ct. 945 (adopting “family resemblance” test over “investment-commercial” test for notes); S.E.C. v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394, 124 S.Ct. 892, 157 L.Ed.2d 813 (2004) (<HOLDING>). And the one post-1990 case cited by

    ### Response:
    holding that an investment contract with a fixed return can still be security
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hearsay rule if they have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,” and certain other requirements are met. Fed.R.Evid. 807. Although no such express residual exception exists under New York law, New York courts have recently recognized a constitutionally-based exception to the hearsay prohibition for certain evidence offered by defendants in criminal cases. See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579, 679 N.E.2d 1055 (1997) (allowing defendant, on constitutional principles, to introduce grand jury testimony of unavail able witness, even though such testimony did not fall within recognized hearsay exception); People v. James, 242 A.D.2d 389, 661 N.Y.S.2d 273 (2d Dep’t 1997) (same); People v. Esteves, 152 A.D.2d 406, 549 N.Y.S.2d 30, 35 (2d Dep’t 1989) (<HOLDING>); see also People v. Seeley, 186 Misc.2d 715,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the united states constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    each room with a telephone breached such motel’s duty to protect guests from assault by third parties); Lewis v. Roescher, 193 Ark. 161, 98 S.W.2d 956, 957 (1936) (declining, as a matter of contract law, to impose a duty upon innkeepers to furnish guests with working telephones after a guest fell ill in his room and was unable to summon aid). Others still have considered whether innkeepers can be liable for failing to maintain particular staff positions or provide particular services. See Zerangue v. Delta Towers, Ltd., 820 F.2d 130, 132-33 (5th Cir.1987) (invoking an innkeeper’s duty to provide safe premises where a guest was locked out of a hotel in New Orleans at 3:00 a.m. and subsequently assaulted); Gumbart v. Waterbury Club Holding Corp., 27 F.Supp. 228, 229-30 (D.Conn.1938) (<HOLDING>); Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, 5 Ill.App.2d 327,

    ### Response:
    holding that an innkeeper does not have a duty to provide each guest with a key maintain staff at the front door of the inn during the night or provide a wakeup call
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    questions in this appeal, we touch on a few preliminaries. Because the district court denied WMAS’s motion to compel arbitration and to stay judicial proceedings, this court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A). See May v. Higbee Co., 372 F.3d 757, 761-62 (5th Cir.2004). We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration and to stay judicial proceedings pursuant to the FAA. Tittle v. Enron Corp. 463 F.3d 410, 417 (5th Cir.2006). Although there are various rules for determining whether to grant a motion to compel arbitration, this case turns on a single and fundamental rule: Arbitration is a matter of contract, and, absent federal law to the contrary, this court must apply the contract law of the particular 08 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Roney & Co. v. Goren, 875 F.2d 1218, 1223

    ### Response:
    holding similar language to be an agreement to arbitrate only before the selfregulatory organizations whose rules were to be applied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1995; Morgan from January 1995 to March 1995. 3 . R.C. 119.12; Our Place, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 570, 571, 589 N.E.2d 1303, 1305. 4 . Univ. of Cincinnati v. Conrad (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 108, 111, 17 O.O.3d 65, 67, 407 N.E.2d 1265, 1267. 5 . Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 748, 750-751. 6 . Univ. Hosp., Univ. of Cincinnati College of Medicine v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 339. 343-344. 587 N.E.2d 835. 838-839. 7 . Geroc v. Ohio Veterinary Med. Bd. (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 192, 199, 525 N.E.2d 501, 507; Keaton v. State, Dept. of Commerce (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 480, 2 OBR 606, 442 N.E.2d 1315. 8 . Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners (1957), 353 U.S. 232, 238-239, 77 S.Ct. 752, 756, 1 L.Ed.2d 796, 801 (<HOLDING>). 9 . Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.

    ### Response:
    holding that a professionals license is a protected property interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the costs associated with these actions prohibitive and would effectively preclude plaintiffs from bringing such claims. Id. Second, a number of Circuits have altered or invalidated arbitration agreements where they interfered with the recovery of statutorily authorized damages. See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47-48 (1st Cir.2006) (severing as unenforceable a provision of an arbitration agreement limiting availability of treble damages under the Sherman Act); Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 n. 14 (5th Cir.2003) (severing a restriction on available remedies from an arbitration agreement after finding that a “ban on punitive and exemplary damages is unenforceable in a Title VII case”); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Parisi asserts Title VII claims and, as a

    ### Response:
    holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute  the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    effort to recruit A.L.T., however, the district court acquitted Vargas of that count. Therefore, Vargas argues that the evidence of her recruitment of A.L.T. is irrelevant and inadmissible for the purpose of showing that Vargas’s sex trafficking of E.R.J. affected interstate or foreign commerce. See Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403. Because we conclude that other evidence is sufficient to support the interstate/foreign commerce nexus, we need not address this argument. 2 . Cf. United States v. Thomas, 159 F.3d 296, 297 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that the Government sufficiently proved an interstate nexus under the Hobbs act by pointing to evidence that the cocaine an informant had planned to sell to defendants was from South America); United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Although Bolar is not “controlling

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants stipulation that the gun had moved in interstate commerce was sufficient evidence to support his conviction under 18 usc  922g1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    However, deterring harm to oneself is innate in all of the analyses of special governmental needs in similar circumstances when individuals are engaged in dangerous or safety-sensitive activities- and our discussion regarding harm to others did not limit that additional risk in any way. Id. at 323 (validating harm to oneself as part of Linn State’s primary concern arising from students under the influence while engaging in a safety-sensitive program when addressing the nature and immediacy prong of the balancing analysis). For example, in Skinner, the Court acknowledged the axiomatic nature of the governmental interest in ensuring the safety of the public “and of the employees themselves.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621, 109 S.Ct. 1402; see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 669-71, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court erred in declining to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that not only is the physical safety of border employees themselvesthose involved in drug interdiction and those who otherwise are required to carry firearmsthreatened in that line of work but also the safety of others at large should those employees carry out their duties in an impaired state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or manner” of production, and the parties are unable to agree, the trial court may, upon motion, enter an order under Rule 1.380(a) specifying the time, place and manner, and may further order who shall pay the cost of transporting the documents to the specified place of inspection. Cf Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b); 4A J. Moore, J. Lucas & D. Epstein, Moore’s Federal Practice § 34.19 (2d ed. 1984). In this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the petitioner’s objection as to the requested place of production. Discovery which is otherwise appropriate should not be refused solely because production of documents would hamper a party’s business operations. Id. at § 34.19[2], See also Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. LeMay, 93 F.R.D. 379 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, we deny the writ insofar as it

    ### Response:
    holding that an unwieldy recordkeeping system requiring heavy expenditures of time and money to produce relevant documents is not an adequate excuse to refuse discovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the prevailing party could seek enforcement of the award as a judgment under the predecessor arbitration statutes. Generally, the prevailing party could, upon compliance with the statute’s provisions, secure a judgment on the award as on the verdict of a jury in most instances. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1927, ch. X, par. 1; Rev. Stat. 1845, ch. VII, par. 8; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1917, ch. X, par. 9; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 10, par. 9. However, strict compliance with the statute’s provisions was necessary before the circuit court could exercise its subject-matter jurisdiction and enter judgment on the award. Absent such compliance, the court lacked the authority to enter judgment, and the prevailing party was relegated to his common law remedies. See Low v. Nolte, 15 Ill. 368, 374 (1854) (<HOLDING>); Eisenmeyer v. Sauter, 77 Ill. 515, 516 (1875)

    ### Response:
    holding the conditions imposed by the arbitration statute were indispensable formalities in order to give the court jurisdiction to enter judgment upon the arbitration award and explaining that where these formalities were not met the parties must be left to their common law remedies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2001, more than two months after their requests for hearings were made. On July 11, 2001, the Henrys and Skarphol moved the ALJ to dismiss the administrative actions against them based on the Commissioner’s failure to abide by the time limits set forth in N.D.C.C. § 10-04-12(2). The ALJ de nied the motions to dismiss and the Commissioner adopted the ALJ’s decision. The Henrys and Skarphol appealed to the district court, which affirmed the Commissioner’s order. On appeal to this Court, the Henrys and Skarphol contend the administrative actions against them should be dismissed because the Commissioner violated N.D.C.C. § 10-04-12(2) by faffing to set the hearings within 30 days of their requests. ' II [¶ 5] Before we consider the merits of an appeal, we must have jurisdiction. Nodak M 6) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 9] In line with this reasoning, this Court

    ### Response:
    holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court found that the maternal grandmother was not fit and qualified to receive and care for the children so that she should be given preference over a nonrelative caregiver. See § 12-15-314(a)(3)e. (“Unless the juvenile court finds it not in the best interests of the child, a willing, fit, and able relative shall have priority for placement or custody over a non-relative.”). In light of that finding, which we conclude was fully supported by the evidence in the record, although that evidence was in some respects conflicting, we hold that the juvenile court did not err in determining that the best interests of the children would not be served by placing the children in the custody of the maternal grandmother. See M.H.J. v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 785 So.2d 372 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, J.,

    ### Response:
    holding that grandmother who among other things had failed to detect obvious signs of neglect affecting the health of her grandchildren was not a suitable relative resource
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The manslaughter [instruction] says legal duty. That’s one of the elements the Commonwealth has to prove. We’re asking that that duty be defined.” As noted above, the jury acquitted Barrett of involuntary manslaughter. Accordingly, because Barrett failed to put this argument before the trial court in relation to the instructions pertaining to felony child neglect, we do not consider it for the first time on appeal. See Rule 5A:18; see also West Alexandria Prop. v. First Va. Mort., 221 Va. 134, 138, 267 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1980) (“On appeal, though taking the same general position as in the trial court, an appellant may not rely on reasons which could have been but were not raised for the benefit of the lower court.”); Floyd v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 584, 249 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1978) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons stated above, we affirm the

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate court will not consider an argument on appeal that is different from the specific argument presented to the trial court even if it relates to the same general issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    written in ""John Doe” on the line designated for the name of the person applying for medical care on behalf of the individual in custody; he had not checked the box indicating that he is a D.C. police officer or given his rank; he did not complete the portion for Harris’ name, address, and age; and he did not fill out the sections requesting the facts which led him to believe that Harris was mentally ill and a threat to himself and/or others. 2 . We therefore do not decide whether the record creates a triable issue of ""deliberate indifference.” We are quite doubtful, however, that the evidence shows more than some degree of negligence, which may not violate the due process clause, see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-34 & n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665-66 & n. 3, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 3 . State tort liability may of course bear

    ### Response:
    holding that negligence does not violate the due process clause but reserving the question whether gross negligence does
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Willis, 98 N.M. 771, 773, 652 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Ct.App.1982), illustrates the point. In Willis, we held that an unborn viable fetus is not a “human being” within the meaning of the vehicular homicide statute. The Court reasoned that since the Legislature first enacted homicide statutes, in which the killing of a human being and the killing of an unborn infant child were separately addressed, “it does not follow that the Legislature meant to include viable fetus within the definition of human being without specifically making provision therefor.” Id. {8} Since Willis, the Legislature has enacted statutes that demonstrate its intention to distinguish an unborn viable fetus from “human being.” See NMSA 1978, § 30-3-7 (2006) (stating that “[i]njury to 190, 894 P.2d 733, 737 (Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>); State v. Dunn, 82 Wash.App. 122, 916 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that mother could not be prosecuted under child abuse statute for prenatal use of heroin
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reasonable to require an employer to have two people doing one person’s job in the name of accommodation. Assistance is one thing, but performing a significant portion of the essential functions of another person’s job is another thing altogether.” Hershey v. Praxair, Inc., 969 F.Supp. 429, 435 (S.D.Tex.1997) (Kent, J.). Moreover, the ADA does not require an employer to eliminate or reallocate essential functions of a position in order to provide accommodation. See Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, 3 F.3d 922, 925 (5th Cir.1993) (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407-08, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2367-68, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1995). “Such redefinition exceeds reasonable accommodation.” Bradley, 3 F.3d at 925 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Plaintiff presents no evidence,

    ### Response:
    holding that the ada does not require an employer to hire an assistant to help a disabled employee fulfill his work responsibilities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See also Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 554, 111 S.Ct. 922, 112 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1991) (affirming the imposition of sanctions on a represented party, sophisticated in prosecuting copyright infringement actions, who had through its officers signed a pleading in violation of Rule 11 certification requirements); Project 74 Allentown, Inc. v. Frost, 143 F.R.D. 77, 83 n. 7 (E.D.Pa.1992), aff'd, 998 F.2d 1004 (3d Cir.1993) (noting that Rule 11 permits a court “to sanction the individual who signed a paper on behalf of a corporation as well as the corporation itself’); Calloway v. Marvel Entm’t Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1475 (2d Cir.1988), rev’d sub nom., Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Group, 493 U.S. 120, 110 S.Ct. 456, 107 L.Ed.2d 438 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Neither Jazz nor Benun has identified any

    ### Response:
    holding that where the party does know that the filing and signing is sic wrongful and the attorney reasonably should know then sanctions against both are appropriate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indicate that this is a decision that lies solely with the trial court. After reviewing the plain lan guage of section 39-13-208, along with the provisions of Rules 3 and 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we conclude that interlocutory review is appropriate. In 1990, the Tennessee General Assembly, following the lead of the Georgia and Maryland state legislatures, made the policy decision to prohibit the execution of any defendant “with mental retardation at the time of committing first degree murder.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-203(b) (2003). This statutory prohibition was followed by this Court’s decision in Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn.2001), in which we held that execution of mentally retarded persons was constitutionally prohibited as well. Id. at 809 (<HOLDING>). Noting that a national consensus prohibiting

    ### Response:
    holding execution of mentally retarded individuals fails to achieve legitimate penalogical objectives for punishment as required by the eighth amendment to the united states constitution and article i  16 of the tennessee constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., 17 N.D. 409, 117 N.W. 354, 357 (1908). A statutory dedication is “in the nature of a grant,” while a common-law dedication “rests upon the principles of estoppel in pais.” Cole, at 357. The dedication, therefore, is regarded not as transferring a right, but as operating to preclude the owner from resuming his right of private property, or indeed any use inconsistent with the public use. The ground of the estoppel is that to reclaim the land would be a violation of good faith to the public and to those who have acquired private property with a view to the enjoyment of the use contemplated by the dedication. Ark. State Highway Comm. v. Sherry, 238 Ark. 127, 381 S.W.2d 448, 451 (1964); Whittom v. Alexander-Richardson Partnership, 851 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Mo.1993) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, we have previously stated “the

    ### Response:
    holding because dedication is a theory premised on estoppel  the owner can be precluded from resuming rights over the property if the public acts upon the owners manifestations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or was. At trial, Fromhold explained, Extrapolation refers to being able to relate a particular concentration from one point in time to a time before or after. Retrograde extrapolation implies we’re going back in time before we have a specific value. Scientific principles that are involved that deal with the alcohol absorption, distribution, and elimination. The very factors that come into play to be able to make that type of estimate. See id. at 908-09 (defining retrograde extrapolation as “the computation back in time of the blood-alcohol level — that is, the estimation of the level at the time of driving based on a test result from some later time”). Danielson and Fromhold identified the Widmark formula as the technique used when conducting retrograde extrapolation. See id. at 909 (<HOLDING>). The experts also testified regarding the

    ### Response:
    recognizing emp widmark first calculated absorption and elimination rates in the body and his work still represents the benchmark for other scientists studies today
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    effect that defendant’s request to speak with his mother was at least an equivocal invocation of the right to silence because ""[a]fter all defendant could not speak to both the officers and his mother at the same time,” post at 579, 34 A.3d at 769, is not persuasive because it proves too much. Using that logic, a request to speak with anyone would amount to an invocation. We decline to adopt so broad a rule. 9 It is for this reason that we reject defendant's argument that the officers were obligated to re-administer his Miranda\ warnings to him after the call to his mother ended and before they continued with their interrogation. Because he had never invoked the right to silence, there was no impediment to the continuation of questioning. Hartley, supra, 103 N.J. at 256, 511 A.2d 80 (<HOLDING>). Justice ALBIN, dissenting. Defendant

    ### Response:
    holding that fresh miranda warnings are necessary after right to silence has been invoked
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of other federal circuits which have addressed the question, that the | ^McDonnell Douglas framework still applies to ADEA cases in the wake of Gross. In Cervantez v. KMGP Services Co. Inc., 349 Fed.Appx. 4 (5th Cir.2009) (unpublished per curiam), the U.S. Fifth Circuit noted: The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gross rejected the application of Title VIPs ‘motivating factor’ standard to ADEA mixed-motive cases. That holding has no affect on today’s analysis because, on appeal, [the plaintiff] did not advance a motivating-factor theory ... As [the plaintiffs] ADEA claim is based on circumstantial evidence, the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green applies. Id. at n. 7. See also Velez v. Thermo King de Puero Rico, Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 446-447 (1st Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684,

    ### Response:
    holding that the mcdonnell douglas framework still applies to adea cases postgross
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cure the defect; but where a claim is dead (because it has been forfeited prior to the assignment by the party who could have brought it but failed to), then an assignment cannot resurrect it. Whit-tington’s theory sounds plausible, but he points to no law really supporting it — and as is discussed below, there are numerous cases running in the other direction, including in practically the exact same context as here. a. Constitutional Standing Whittington does not clearly delineate whether his “standing” argument is Article Ill/constitutional or prudential/statutory in nature. Insofar as Whit-tington challenges Plaintiffs’ constitutional standing, that challenge is plainly wrong, under clear Fifth Circuit law. See, e.g., Ensley v. Cody Res., 171 F.3d 815, 819-20 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Constitutional, “injury in fact” standing

    ### Response:
    holding that the lack of shareholder standing under texas law does not implicate constitutional standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Former federal prisoner David A. Oh-man appeals pro se the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition, which challenged the calculation of his good conduct time credits by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). We dismiss this appeal as moot. Ohman contends that he was deprived of good conduct time credits under the BOP’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). Because Ohman has been released from BOP custody, we lack the ability to grant habeas remedy for his alleged injury. See Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58-60, 120 S.Ct. 1114,146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Without a live case or controversy, Ohman’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a former inmates supervised release term may not be credited with undisputed excess time in prison
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be removed notwithstanding the well-pleaded complaint rule). “The pre-emption clause is not limited to ‘state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans.’” Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97, 103 S.Ct. 2890). Rather, “common law causes of action ... based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits .. undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption under § 514(a).” Id. at 48, 107 S.Ct. 1549. Recent cases on the bread determination before the injury occurred, alleging an imminent threat to life or health, this Court would have had the statutory authority to provide prospective relief for benefits allegedly due under the plan, perhaps averting this catastrophe. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. at 531, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (<HOLDING>); Turner at 198-200 (holding that 29 U.S.C. §

    ### Response:
    holding under the exclusive civil enforcement provisions of  502a as set forth in 29 usc  1132a that a beneficiary may sue to recover benefits due under the plan to enforce the participants rights under the plan or to clarify rights to future benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from the discretionary function of interpreting the plan, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21), is co-extensive with, and reviewed under the same standard as, its authority to construe plan documents. Varity Corp., 516. U.S. at 514-15. Because § 1303(f) does not provide various specific remedies for different types of fiduciary conduct, but simply provides a broad right of action that is not explicitly limited according to the substance of a participant’s claim, there is no reason that plaintiffs cannot frame their claim as involving PBGC’s breach of its fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in interpreting Plan documents, even though they could, in theory, bring a separate action to appeal the denial of their benefits. Cf. Devlin v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 89 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). As trustee, PBGC had the power “to do any act

    ### Response:
    holding that in the context of title i varity corp did not eliminate a private cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty when another potential remedy is available
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    certain an individual is armed; rather, the issue is whether a reasonably prudent person would justifiably believe that he or others were in danger. Id. (citing O’Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex.Crim.App.2000)). In the present case, Sgt. Meisel observed a bulge in the front of appellant’s pants, and believed the object was a weapon. Sgt. Meisel conveyed this information to the uniformed officer who patted appellant down. According to Deputy Palcios, the object was located in an area where people commonly carry weapons. Deputy Palcios also explained they thought it suspicious appellant had not entered the metal detector area at the airport. These specific and articulable facts reasonably led the officers to conclude appellant might possess a weapon. See Roy, 55 S.W.3d at 157 (<HOLDING>); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,

    ### Response:
    holding pat down at airport justified after officer observed bundle under suspects clothing near waist
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Both were behaving nervously. Appellant tries to dismiss this behavior by asserting that nervousness “is an entirely natural reaction” to the presence of law enforcement and that Ms. Lewis might have “had any number of reasons” to give the police a “single inaccurate statement.” Even if these assertions were true, “[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists ... need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). Instead, Officer Chih reasonably could suspect that Ms. Lewis and her son had been trying to mislead the police so they would not find appellant and his brother and that appellant’s nervousness reflected his fear of being caught— both reasonable possibilities which lent furt . 1996) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). III. Did

    ### Response:
    holding that a temporary detention designed to last only until a preliminary investigation here the showup identification procedure either generated probable cause or resulted in the release of the suspect is consistent with the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the doctrine of equitable subrogration, the Government violated a “duty, implicit in the three-party relationship between [the Government], the contractor, and the surety,” to administer the contract in a responsible manner. PI. Mot at 18-19. This argument, however, fails to recognize that the court’s jurisdiction is dependant on the doctrine of equitable subrogation. United Surety, 87 Fed.Cl. at 587 (“Because United Surety became a performing and paying surety for Selpa, United Surety has satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the Tucker Act under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.”). Although a surety bond creates a third-party relationship, the surety does not assume privity of contract with the Government. Ransom v. United States, 900 F.2d 242, 244-45 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Without privity, the surety may only satisfy

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the Notice of Appeal pertained to Omar Tecat in CR 02-575) App. at 7. 5 . That docket entry stated: Clerk's Quality Control Message: Document [3] NOTICE OF DOCKETING filed by the USCA should have been filed in the traditional manner, on paper, as this case is not subject to e-filing at this time, as previously explained on 7/19/05. (ck) App. at 2. 6 . The question has recently arisen in the courts of appeals as to whether Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are rules that govern subject-matter jurisdiction (that may not be waived) or are merely ""inflexible claim-processing” rules (that may be waived). This concern was sparked by the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Eberhart v. United States, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 403, 407, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>), and Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455-456,

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 33 of the federal rules of criminal procedure is an inflexible claimprocessing rule that may be waived if not raised
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as fact for more than 200 years.” (Id. at 7). It is clear that the claims of excessive noise levels and the analysis of the OSHA regulations dealing with time weighted averages “present technical issues beyond the common experience and understanding of the average jury.” In re Amtrak “Sunset Ltd.” Train Crash, 188 F.Supp.2d at 1347. Although fellow employees with extensive experience in the Patchogue Yard may be able to offer testimony on their subjective impressions of the noise level of the DE and DM warning devices, they lack the technical expertise necessary to analyze whether the decibel levels of the horns were in fact higher than those of the older trains’ horns or whether these horns caused plaintiffs loss of hearing. See Thirkill v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. 950 F.Supp. at 1107 (<HOLDING>). While plaintiffs expert, Dr. Danziger, opines

    ### Response:
    holding that njeither the plaintiff nor fellow crewmen are qualified to testify as design experts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Given the unique circumstances of this case, we disagree. The victim initially told police that Peals attacked her for no reason. At trial, the victim testified that she was intoxicated and was the aggressor. Further, the victim testified that she lied to the police because she was angry with Peals. The portions of the record attached to the trial court’s order show that the victim was the only witness to testify at trial about her intoxication. Because the victim admitted at trial that she lied, the jury may have been disinclined to believe her testimony. Peals, who asserted self-defense, may have been prejudiced by counsel’s failure to corroborate her testimony concerning her intoxication with the testimony of medical personnel. Cf. Kegler v. State, 712 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court is directed to

    ### Response:
    holding in rule 3850 proceeding that trial counsel s failure to impeach witness with statements he made on night of murder was not reasonable under the circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arisen in an action “for the recovery of money only, or specific real * * * property.” Nor are we persuaded that appellants’ counterclaims transformed the action into one “for the recovery of * * * personal property.” Even if we were to so characterize appellants’ counterclaims, based upon their prayer for a declaration requiring the intestate distribution of the property, such relief would merely be incidental to the declaratory relief sought and would ripen only upon the entry of declaratory relief favorable to appellants. See Murello Constr. Co., supra, 29 Ohio App.3d at 334, 29 OBR at 461-462, 505 N.E.2d at 638. We conclude, instead, that the relief sought was primarily and predominantly equitable. See Gearhart, supra, 109 Ohio St. 418, 142 N.E. 890, paragraph one of the syllabus (<HOLDING>); accord Sessions, supra, 163 Ohio St. 409, 56

    ### Response:
    holding that an action construing a will creating a trust is equitable in nature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he failed to adequately supplement the record, and to challenge the competency of trial counsel. The failure of the appellate counsel to provide effective assistance resulted in the petitioner being denied his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the provisions of the Alabama Constitution, and Alabama law.” (C.R. 41.) This paragraph constitutes Madison’s entire argument on this issue. The circuit court when denying relief stated: “Madison does not argue his appellate counsel was disbarred because of his performance in Madison’s case nor does he proffer any facts in his Rule 32 petition indicating how he was prejudiced due to his appellate counsel being disbarred. See Adkins v. State, [930 So.2d 524] (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (<HOLDING>). Madison also fails to identify in ... his

    ### Response:
    holding that the fact that adkins defense counsel have been disciplined by the alabama state bar on unrelated matters has no bearing on their performance in adkins trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disposition of the action roughly corresponds with the framework we outlined in Meyer-land for disposing of a case which is being appealed in state court when removal is effected. According to Meyerland, ""the district court [should] take the state judgment as it finds it, prepare the record as required for appeal, and forward the case to a federal appellate court for review.” Id., 960 F.2d at 520; see also Matter of 5300 Memorial Investors, Ltd., 973 F.2d 1160, 1162 (5th Cir.1992) (citing Meyerland). We further note that the district court's failure to reenter the state court judgment on a document separate from its order, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 58, does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mollis, 435 U.S. 381, 387, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 1121, 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978) (<HOLDING>). 10 . We reject at the outset the plaintiffs’

    ### Response:
    holding that the same principles of commonsense  that led the court  to conclude that the technical requirements for a notice of appeal were not mandatory where the notice did not mislead or prejudice the appellee demonstrate that parties to an appeal may waive the separatejudgment requirement of rule 58
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally became a member of the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment as opposed to some other conspiracy. Proof that the defendant was only a member of some other conspiracy is not enough to convict. However, proof that a defendant was a member of some other conspiracy would not prevent you from returning a guilty verdict if the government also proved that the defendant was also a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. (J.A. at 3839, 3849.) The first portion of this instruction is a correct statement of law. A jury need not find that a defendant conspired with all the alleged co-conspirators in order to convict a defendant of conspiracy. See United States v. Sandy, 605 F.2d 210, 217 (6th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Thomas, 348 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding the acquittal of several jointly tried codefendants in a conspiracy case was not grounds for reversing the conviction of a codefendant and alleged coconspirator
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of promissory estop-pel. We grant transfer to address these matters. The essence of the employment-at-will doctrine is that an employment contract of indefinite duration is presumptively terminable at the will of either party. McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines (1988), Ind., 517 N.E.2d 390, 392; Streckfus v. Gardenside Terrace Cooperative, Inc. (1987), Ind., 504 N.E.2d 273, 275. The doctrine is deeply rooted in Indiana jurisprudence. See Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1980), Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1060. The doctrine has only rarely been limited. See, e.g., Bochnowski v. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan (1991), Ind., 571 N.E.2d 282, 285 (allowing claim for tor-tious interference with at-will employment relationship); McClanahan v. Remington Freight, Inc. (1988), Ind., 517 N.E.2d 390, 393 (<HOLDING>); and Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co. (1983),

    ### Response:
    holding that employee stated claim by alleging he was wrongfully discharged for refusing to commit criminal act for which he would be held personally liable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judge refused to allow the testimony. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in excluding this evidence. An accused in a criminal case is allowed to introduce evidence of a specific good character trait to show that it is improbable that he committed the offense charged, where that character trait is relevant to the offense. See Tex.R. Evid. 404(a)(1); Thomas v. State, 669 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd). If evidence of a person’s character or character trait is admissible, proof may be made through reputation or opinion testimony. See Tex.R. Evid. 405(a). However, specific instances of conduct are inadmissible to show an inference that the accused did or did not commit the offense. See, e.g., Schmidt v. State, 449 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Tex.Crim.App.1969) (<HOLDING>); Garcia v. State, 819 S.W.2d 667, 668

    ### Response:
    holding that while the defendant may offer reputation evidence on his lawabiding character he may not testify that he has never been in trouble
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has not detected •any changes or. mood swings in appellant. Plunkett also testified that appellant’s family is supportive. The family has visited appellant in inpatient care, along with the child born from appellant’s 1999 pregnancy. Plunkett said that there have been no problem with the family visits. As with Dr. Howland and Dr. Moeller, Plunkett opined that appellant is ready to be transferred to outpatient care. Plunkett also signed a report finding that appellant “has reached the maximum benefit from hospitalization.” This evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that appellant is likely to cause serious harm to others as a result of her mental illness. Not a single expert testified that appellant is aggressive, either verbally or physically. See K.E.W., 315 S.W.3d at 24 (<HOLDING>). The only evidence of aggressive behavior in

    ### Response:
    holding that an overt act may be a verbal statement or a physical act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on Same Criminal Transaction or Common Scheme A person commits capital murder if: (1) the person commits murder as defined under Section 19.02(b)(1); and (2) the person commits one of the nine aggravating circumstances listed in Sections 19.03(a)(1) through 19.03(a)(9). Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a) (West 2013). In the instant case, Saenz was charged with the aggravating circumstance contained in Section 19.03(a)(7), which requires the person to have murdered more than one person: (A) during the same criminal transaction; or (B) during different criminal transactions but the murders are committed pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct. Id. at § 19.03(a)(7). Each of the ni 46098, *2-3 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Jan. 19, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). Saenz contends that subsections (A) and (B)

    ### Response:
    holding jury verdict unanimous where jury was charged with alternate aggravating circumstance of robbery or burglary against any one of five named victims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of wrongful manipulation of the WSSC by either the Council or the Planning Commission. 281 Md. at 21-22, 376 A.2d 505. The court held that the dedication to the public of the property valued at $800,000 did not create any vested rights. 281 Md. at 23, 376 A.2d 505. The court’s rationale was that there was no evidence that TKU had been guaranteed a permit to redevelop and that no valid promises by appropriate officials had been made to the developer. The court concluded: [I]n order to obtain a vested zoning status, there must be cons 6 Md. 117, 125-26, 291 A.2d 672 (1972); City of Hagerstown v. Long Meadow Shopping Ctr., 264 Md. 481, 494-96, 287 A.2d 242 (1972); Mayor of Baltimore v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623, 624, 51 A.2d 273 (1947); Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 228, 164 A. 743 (1933) (<HOLDING>); County Comm’rs v. Arundel Corp., 82 Md.App.

    ### Response:
    holding that even if construction commences but it is based on an illegally issued permit no vested right is created
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sanctions is to compel compliance with the court’s orders and not to punish, the continuing contempt sanctions end when the contemnor complies. A civil contempt defendant “carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket. He can end the sentence and discharge himself of contempt at any moment by doing what he has previously refused to do.” State v. Pothier, 104 N.M. 363, 364, 721 P.2d 1294, 1295 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Civil contempt sanctions may be imposed by honoring the most basic due process protections-in most cases, fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994); see Turner v. Rogers, — U.S. —,—, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2520, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011) (<HOLDING>). {26} Criminal contempt proceedings are

    ### Response:
    holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ERISA. Id. at 16. The First Circuit held that there was no invidious discrimination in the employer’s decision partially to terminate benefits where a legitimate business justification for the decision was readily apparent. Id. Here, more is alleged than a disparate impact to plaintiffs as a result of a business decision to alter a plan. Plaintiffs contend that intentional misstatements regarding the modification of retirement plans at MassMutual and Monsanto caused them prematurely to sever the employment relationship with their respective companies. The MassMutual plaintiffs further allege that there was an intentional design to deprive certain employees&emdash;but not others&emdash;of enhanced pension benefits. See Rodowicz v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 857 F.Supp. at 999 (<HOLDING>). The claims of Vartanian and the MassMutual

    ### Response:
    holding that factual pleadings on this issue are weak but sufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is involved. What limits the viability of a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation is not the distinction between an economic and an interpersonal setting, but rather whether the person alleging misrepresentation was justified in her reliance on the truthfulness of the statements. It is true that the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation has its origins in commercial or transactional settings. See Neurosurgery & Spine Surgery, S.C. v. Goldman, 339 Ill. App. 3d 177, 185-86, 790 N.E.2d 925 (2003) (detailing the origins of the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation). Relying on Neurosurgery, defendants contend that fraudulent misrepresentation is only actionable in commercial cases involving pecuniary, but not physical, damages. A thorough review of the applicable law leads 87) (<HOLDING>). ‘Although the invasion of an economic

    ### Response:
    holding that pecuniary damages are essential to a fraudulent misrepresentation cause of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 3 Gear has not moved for summary judgment with respect to its claims against the City of Medford. 4 In addition to Gear’s opposition to Goba’s motion for summary judgment, Gear has filed a motion to strike photographs, the affidavit of Harry B. Nelson, Jr. (“Nelson""), certain portions of Goba’s statement of facts, and other exhibits attached to Goba’s motion for summary judgment. To the extent that the motion to strike concerned photographs submitted with the Nelson affidavit, the court did not rely on those photographs in making its decision. The only f he shareholders could bring a 93A claim against an accounting firm that actively participated in the transaction at issue); Standard Register, 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 551 (<HOLDING>); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246,

    ### Response:
    holding that the purchaser could sustain a 93a claim against the president and vicepresident of a manufacturing company because they took an active role in the dealings with the plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ex. 2. She errs in her reliance, however, because Bryant qualifies his statement by stating that the “support” was “[d]uring [the plaintiffs] absence” and that “[t]o [his] knowledge, [the plaintiff] retained the ability and latitude to interact with the staff members.” Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 2. Accordingly, the plaintiff, relying on her own self-serving affidavit, offers no direct evidence of the reassignment of her work. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n & Exs. 1, 4. This Circuit has held that “under some circumstances ... a party relying on unsupported affidavits cannot survive summary judgment.” McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d 1101, 1109 (D.C.Cir.2001) (emphasis added), vacated in part on other grounds, 320 F.3d 280 (D.C.Cir.2003); see also Arrington, 473 F.3d at 343 (<HOLDING>). Because the plaintiff offers no corroboration

    ### Response:
    holding that when a plaintiff relies entirely on his own selfserving testimony which lacks any corroboration and is contradicted by all the available  evidence a court is not obligated to reward the plaintiff with a jury trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    401, 404 (Tex.2009)). For the reasons just stated, the duty that an insurance agent owes to a client arises from the agent’s agreement to procure coverage for the client. Accordingly, the Court’s initial inquiry is whether Plaintiff has pleaded facts that, if true, would establish that Walker or Paychex agreed to procure $750,000 in coverage for Mr. Kersh. Plaintiff has done so. Plaintiff has alleged that Walker told Mr. Kersh, through Leimbach, to fax his enrollment form to Paychex. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff has alleged that Mr. Kersh faxed his enrollment form to Paychex on August 18, 2011, and that the form indicated that he was requesting $750,000 in life insurance. (Id. IT 21.) And Plaintiff has alleged that on August 22, 2011, Walker emailed Leimbach to say that Mr. Kers 966) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated a claim for

    ### Response:
    holding agent liable for fire damage after his customer requested a new policy to replace one cancelled by the insurer and the agent neither procured such a replacement policy nor alerted the customer to this failure by returning the unearned portion of the premium from the original policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in controlling acts of Congress or by interpretative decisions of this Court. 346 U.S. at 409-10, 74 S.Ct. at 205. The Court held that the federal maritime law applied in which contributory negligence did not bar recovery, only being considered as to degree. Although the accident happened in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania law of contributory negligence which would have barred recovery was held not to apply. In Kermarec, a visitor on board a vessel berthed in New York Harbor was injured while leaving the ship by a fall down a stairway. The Court held that the owner of the ship in navigable waters under maritime law owed to Kermarec the duty of exercising reasonable care toward him. It held Ed.2d 928 (1994); Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1087-89 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1060, 127

    ### Response:
    holding that federal maritime law and not state law applies to all actions for wrongful death in navigable state waters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and statements, found that Churchill would find it difficult to follow the law and was thus significantly impaired in his ability to serve as a juror. Following a careful review of the record, we agree that this was a difficult decision; however, “[ajbsent manifest abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial court’s determination of questions of juror bias.” See State v. McGuire, 110 N.M. 304, 312, 795 P.2d 996, 1004 (1990). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. {9} The trial court denied Clark’s motions to remove Rosales, Scullion, and Redford for cause. Clark states that Rosales indicated that he is against plea bargaining and was antagonistic during questioning, while Scullion indicated that he would lean more towards the death penalty. The State 991) (<HOLDING>); Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 386 S.E.2d 316,

    ### Response:
    holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ample evidence for the plaintiffs’ case to avoid summary judgment.” (quoting Acosta-Orozco v. Rodriguez-de-Rivera, 132 F.3d 97, 101 (1st Cir.1997))); González-de-Blasini, 377 F.3d at 86 (recognizing that a “ ‘prima facie case for political discrimination may be built on circumstantial evidence’ ” so long as plaintiffs have “generated ‘the specific facts necessary to take the asserted claim out of the realm of speculative, general allegations’ ” (quoting Kauffman v. P.R. Tel. Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1st Cir.1988))). The evidence here, “though thin, point[s] in different directions; that is, it tend[s] to support conflicting inferences. Summary judgment cannot be predicated on so vacillatory a record.” Mandel, 456 F.3d at 207; see also In re Varrasso, 37 F.3d 760, 764 (1st Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The judgment of the district court is

    ### Response:
    holding that a court faced with competing plausible inferences may not make its choice under the banner of summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between majority and minority shareholders in closely held companies that would apply to every transaction. See, e.g., Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, L.L.C., 867 S.W.3d 355, 391 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, judgm’t set aside by arg.) (op. on reh’g). Texas courts have, however, recognized that an informal fiduciary duty may exist between the shareholders in a closely held corporation, depending on the circumstances. See generally Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 277 (Tex.2006); Miller v. Miller, 700 S.W.2d 941, 945-46 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.) (stating that shareholders’ intimate knowledge of company’s affairs supported finding a fiduciary relationship); Tuck v. Miller, 483 S.W.2d 898, 905 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.) (op. on reh’g) (<HOLDING>); see also Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 391

    ### Response:
    holding that superior business expertise among other factors supported a finding of a confidential relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an official paper record tracing the vehicle’s ownership. In other words, the regulations at issue in this case are the “safeguards” designed “to protect purchasers in the sale of motor vehicles with altered or reset odometers” that are contemplated by the Act’s purposes. See 49 U.S.C. § 32701(b)(2) (2000). They prevent unscrupulous dealers from using their own procedures to mislead a purchaser about a vehicle’s mileage — not only with respect to the actual number of miles driven, but where those miles were driven and by whom. See 49 C.F.R. § 580.2 (2004) (“The purpose of this part is to provide purchasers of motor vehicles with odometer information to assist them in determining a vehicle’s condition and value Yazzie v. Amigo Chevrolet, Inc., 189 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1248-49 (D.N.M.2001) (<HOLDING>). The identity of former owners, of critical

    ### Response:
    holding that allegations of specific intent to defraud with respect to the vehicles mileage are not required to bring suit under  32710a when a dealer manipulated title procedures in violation of the odometer act to hide the identity of the vehicles prior owner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jones that the appointment was for three years, she understood and believed that to be the case. Id. at 1082. The court concluded that “[w]hen Dr. Jenkins took action to renew or confirm Mr. Young’s three-year appointment, he was acting in conformity with the agreement he made with Mr. Young in 1984.” Id. at 1083. Having found that Oates’ ouster was not motivated by sex discrimination, the court dismissed the action and entered judgment for the District. This appeal followed. Discussion A. Analytical Framework To make out her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Oates must establish that, acting under color of law, defendants deprived her of her constitutional right not to be discriminated against on account of her sex. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) (<HOLDING>). It is apparent that the District officials in

    ### Response:
    recognizing federal constitutional right to be free from gender discrimination that is not substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that (a)(2) is ""designed to prevent those who make false records or statements to get claims paid or approved from escaping liability solely on the ground that they did not themselves present a claim for payment or approval.” Totten II, 380 F.3d at 501 (emphasis original). But see id. at 502 (Garland, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, it is unnecessary to decide this issue here because the presentment requirement is ultimately satisfied. 89 .United States v. Warning, 1994 WL 396432, at *4, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10402, at *12 (E.D.Pa.1994) (applying intra-corporate immunity doctrine in FCA context); United States v. EER Sys. Corp., 950 F.Supp. 130, 133 (D.Md.1996) (same); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Marmott v. Maryland Lumber Co., 807 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that parent corporation and whollyowned subsidiary are legally incapable of conspiring with each other
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on speculation and conclusory allegations.’ ”) (citations omitted). Though Arco has contended that it has averred facts relevant to scienter, calling Deutsche Bank’s arguments “disingenuous” and “laughable” and claiming that Deutsche Bank “ignores the allegations” (Opp. Br. at 21-22), scienter cannot be pleaded merely by describing with rhetorical flourish the deal structure and mechanics of the transactions, when those matters were disclosed to Arco in detail. (Mov. Br. at 7-8 (citing Exs. 2-5, 8-11,14-17), 16-17, 21.) Finally, the FAC must establish reliance. Under Rule 10b-5, Arco must allege reliance on allegedly deceptive acts of which it was aware. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161, 171, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008) (<HOLDING>); Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d at

    ### Response:
    holding deceptive acts which were not disclosed to the investing public are too remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance because a plaintiff cannot rely on acts of which it is unaware
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    who stand in a particular relation to one another.” Tort, Black’s Law Dictionary 1626 (10th ed. 2014). As such, successful tort actions “are premised on the existence of a legal duty.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522,112 S.Ct. at 2620 (plurality opinion); see also Geier, 529 U.S, at 881, 120 S.Ct. at 1925 (characterizing a successful tort action as “a state law—i.e., a rule of state tort law imposing ... a duty”). Strict-liability and negligence claims like those at issue here are no exception. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 2466, 2474 n.1, 186 L.Ed.2d 607 (2013) (“[Mjost common-law causes of action for negligence and strict liability ... exist ... to ... impose affirmative duties.”); Samuel Friedland Family Enters. v. Amoroso, 630 So.2d 1067, 1068 n.3 (Fla. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer LLC, 39 So.3d 1216,

    ### Response:
    recognizing in the strictliability context that one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer  is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused even though the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product quoting restatement second of torts  402a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ohms, 881 P.2d at 849 (quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 642 (Utah 1988)). ¶ 85 Indeed, it is the judicial article itself, Article VIII, section 13, that establishes the Judicial Conduct Commission and specifically recognizes the judicial nature of the powers the Commission is authorized to exercise by mandating that this Court review all Commission findings pertaining to recommended discipline of judges and by requiring that actual orders of discipline be entered by the Court, not the Commission. See Utah Const, art. VIII, § 13; In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 863. Other jurisdictions have also held judicial conduct commissions with similar authority to be within the judicial branch. See Whitehead v. Nevada Comm. on Jud. Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 878 P.2d 913 (1994) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 86 Any attempt by the Legislature,

    ### Response:
    holding that executive branch prosecution of disciplinary charges against a judge violated the separation of powers provision in the nevada constitution a provision identical to article v section 1 of the utah constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be a materially adverse employment action, see White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 802 (6th Cir. 2004), the “change in employment conditions must be ‘more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.’ ” Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat’l Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)). The change in Kubik’s teaching schedule is just that: an alteration of job responsibilities. Although being directed to teach at 8:00 a.m. every morning might be a frustrating inconvenience, Title VII claims cannot be brought based upon “trivial workplace dissatisfactions.” White, 364 F.3d at 795. See also Turner v. Sullivan Univ. Sys., Inc., 420 F.Supp.2d 773, 787 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (<HOLDING>). The denial of Kubik’s tenure extension

    ### Response:
    holding that assignment of unfavorable class schedules did not constitute an adverse employment action absent evidence of materially adverse consequences
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the “monetary value” of his retirement options and that as a result he selected Disability Retirement, rendering him ineligible to receive VSF benefits. (See Letter to Peter Alan Holland, dated Dec. 21, 2006, attached to Compl.) Falardo now claims that the NYPD’s alleged failure to adequately inform him of his retirement options co .Ed.2d 47 (1998); Castellano v. Board of Tr. of Police Officers’ Variable Supplements Fund, 937 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.1991) (“Castellano I”) (upholding the Scheme against challenge under Equal Protection, Due Process, and Contract Clauses of the United States Constitution and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims); Castellano v. City of New York, 251 A.D.2d 194, 674 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998) (“Cas-tellano III ”) (<HOLDING>), appeal denied, 92 N.Y.2d 817, 684 N.Y.S.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs could not relitigate their claim that they were entitled to vsf benefits and that while plaintiffs could have raised additional claims in one or more of the foregoing actions they opted not to do so and they are barred by res judicata from doing so now
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Cubs’ royalties will decrease proportionately. But more to the point, the Rooftops fail to acknowledge that a primary function of a contract is to allocate risks between parties. Here, the risk is that future expansions of Wrigley Field will obstruct the Rooftops’ views. Section 6.5 provides a mechanism for the parties to dispute the Cubs’ proposed expansion projects. Section 6.6 declares that if the Cubs prevail in the dispute, their projects may proceed. That is precisely what occurred here—the Rooftops vigorously opposed the Cubs’ expansion efforts, but ultimately lost. The parties were free to allocate risk in a different manner, but chose not to do so. See McClure Eng’g Assocs., Inc. v. Reuben H. Donnelly Corp., 95 Ill.2d 68, 69 Ill.Dec. 183, 447 N.E.2d 400, 402-03 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Absent a defect in the negotiation process,

    ### Response:
    recognizing a widespread policy of permitting competent parties to contractually allocate business risks as they see fit collecting cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    near a school, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); and restricted picketing at or near a courthouse, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965). The reach of the Texas statute, to the contrary, is far more extensive than the regulations that have been upheld, and closely resembles enactments that have been declared unconstitutionally overbroad. See Coates v. City of Cincinatti, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (declaring unconstitutional an ordinance making it a criminal offense for “three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by”). Cf. Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed.2d 1104 (1980) (<HOLDING>). When a legitimate state interest was not

    ### Response:
    holding unconstitutionally overbroad an ordinance outlawing the display of a sign near a business to encourage others not to work or purchase goods there
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of no reason, why the excluded evidence supports a finding Officer Hernandez had a motive or bias to falsely testify that appellant drove erratically. 3 . Appellant argues the officers lacked reasonable suspicion and probable cause for stopping him. For simplicity and because the differences between reasonable suspicion and probable cause are not material to our analysis, we will dispose of appellant’s issues by considering the officers’ reasonable suspicion to detain him. 4 . Appellant also apparently argues the State, at least at one point, believed Officer Hernandez’s 2006 termination was relevant, admissible evidence because the State originally disclosed this evidence to appellant in a Brady filing. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>). However, appellant does not cite any

    ### Response:
    holding prosecutor has affirmative duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions because (1) the case involved an issue of first impression under Florida law regarding whether a trust beneficiary could sue a court appointed trustee, and Rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate to punish an attorney for advancing a legal theory on a question of first impression, (2) the district court failed to resolve all doubts in O’Shaughnessy’s favor, and (3) O’Shaughnessy conducted a reasonable investigation under the circumstances. After a thorough review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm. The district court did not abuse its substantial discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions against O’Shaughnessy. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 407, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Sanctions are warranted when a party files a

    ### Response:
    holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under like circumstances ⅜ ⅜ ⅞.” Minn.Stat. § 609.20(1) (1998). He is guilty of first-degree domestic abuse murder if he “causes the death of a human being while committing domestic abuse when [he] has engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.” Minn.Stat. § 609.185(6). Bradford argues that these two verdicts are inconsistent because first-degree heat-of-passion manslaughter requires intent whereas first-degree domestic abuse murder requires extreme indifference. We disagree. While domestic abuse murder only requires extreme indifference, it does not preclude the possibility that a higher level of intent may be present. See, e.g., State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 51 (Minn.1996) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that lack of intent is not an

    ### Response:
    holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the conflict between Richards and Kaiser and declining to ""resolve ... the scope of the actual innocence doctrine in the context of non-capital habitual offender sentencing”). We need not address the correctness of the district court's ruling on the scope of the ""actual innocence” doctrine because the analytical foundation for the court’s decision' — Reyes-Requena—is no longer apposite following the establishment of our own savings clause test in Prost, which, as Mr. Abernathy recognizes, does not include an actual innocence inquiry. See Brace, 634 F.3d at 1170 (rejecting a petitioner’s claim that he meets Reyes-Requena's ""actual innocence” savings clause test on the grounds that we ""explicitly declined to adopt the Reyes-Requena test in Prost""); see also Aplt. Supp. Reply Br. at 11 (<HOLDING>). 7 . As noted, the government's primary

    ### Response:
    recognizing that under prost access to  2241 through the savings clause turns solely on whether the remedy provided by  2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of mr abernathys detention
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    held that without other indicia of discretionary control, the power to limit the universe of funds available to a Plan by adding to or subtracting from an overall menu does not confer fiduciary status on a plan servicer. See Hecker, 556 F.3d at 583. In Hecker, an investment services company offered a 401(k) plan a limited menu of investment options. Because the parties’ contract expressly gave the plan the “final say” on which investment options would be included, the court held that the investment services company was not a fiduciary: “no authority ... holds that limiting funds automatically creates discretionary control sufficient for fiduciary status.” Id. The Court s the authority to change investment options did give rise to fiduciary status. See Charters, 583 F.Supp.2d at 199 (<HOLDING>); Haddock v. Nationwide Fin. Servs., 419

    ### Response:
    holding that insurer was a fiduciary to a 401k plan because the insurer had the ability to substitute investment options and the plan had no meaningful opportunity to reject substitutions because of the penalty charges associated with doing so
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    original sentence hearing went no further than “at least 1.5 kilograms.” If so, that finding is not specific enough to support any conclusion about whether Amendment 750 lowered Hamilton’s base offense level, because “at least 1.5 kilograms” is equally consist tent with a finding of 8.4 kilograms or more and a finding of less than 8.4 kilograms. So if the district court finds that its original findings were limited to “at least 1.5 kilograms,” the court will need to go further. It will need to examine the entire record before it at the time of the original sentencing to see if it can make any further findings that will resolve the issue of whether 8.4 kilograms or more of crack cocaine should be attributed to Hamilton. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 582 F.3d 641, 646 (6th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hall, 600 F.3d 872, 876 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that where the original drug quantity determination is not specific enough for the district court to determine whether it has the authority to reduce a defendants sentence under  3582c2 that court may make new findings of fact that are supported by the record and are not inconsistent with the findings made in the original sentencing proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    comply is section 6 of the Act, which provides: “In no event shall it be necessary to fix or stipulate in any contract a time for the completion or a time for payment in order to obtain a lien under this act, provided, that the work is done or material furnished within three years from the commencement of said work or the commencement of furnishing said material.” 770 ILCS 60/6 (West 2002). Based on the plain language of section 6, “the 3-year period commences with the beginning of work for which the mechanic’s lien is asserted and not with the date upon which the contract for such work was entered into.” (Emphasis added.) Robb v. Lindquist, 23 Ill. App. 3d 186, 188 (1974); see also Cordeck Sales, Inc. v. Construction Systems, Inc., 394 Ill. App. 3d 870, 877 (2009) (Cordeck Sales II) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, if the work for which a lien

    ### Response:
    recognizing that  the work to be completed in accordance with the time limits of section 6 is the work for which lien enforcement is sought
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Equal Access Law that that statute confers a private benefit. Specifically, it grants “equal access to the jails of this state” to any “person who holds a valid bail agent’s license.” I.C. § 27-10-3-18. In entitling bail agents to equal access to Indiana’s jails, the statute ensures that bail agents can do business on the same terms. And while the public might receive a benefit from that business, any public benefit is ancillary to the direct benefit conferred on bail agents. Nonetheless, Sheriff Galloway contends that the IDOI has the authority to enforce Indiana’s Bail Law, codified at Title 27, Article 10 of the Indiana Code. Accordingly, he continues, the Equal Access Law cannot create a private cause of action. See, e.g., Coons v. Kaiser, 567 N.E.2d 851, 852 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). We cannot agree. The IDOI regulates bail

    ### Response:
    holding that when a statute includes a specific enforcement provision an additional private cause of action based upon the statute cannot be judicially inferred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The single issue presented in this case is whether the FCC reasonably determined that DTE did not “fail[ ] to act to cany out its responsibility” to adjudicate the dispute between GNAPs and Verizon over whether ISP-bound calls are “local” within the meaning of their interconnection agreement. Only where there is such a failure does § 252(e)(5) obligate the Commission to step in. Otherwise - such as where the state agency actually “makes a determination” under § 252 - there is no statutory basis for FCC preemption. Under such circumstances, an aggrieved party may bring an action for judicial review in federal court under § 252(e)(6), or, if that provision is inapplicable and there is no federal question at issue, in state court. Cf. Veyizon Md., — U.S. at —, 122 S.Ct. at 1758-60 (<HOLDING>). Section 252(e)(6), entitled “Review of State

    ### Response:
    holding that federal courts have jurisdiction to review decisions of state commissions inteipreting interconnection agreements at least where review turns on issues of federal law and that this jurisdiction is not stripped by  252e6
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc., 433 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir.2005) (citing Uncle Henry’s, Inc. v. Plaut Consulting Co., 399 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir.2005)), the Trust urges that summary judgment was appropriate because the Trust was not engaged in trade or commerce, based on its status as a nonprofit corporation. We agree. In Massachusetts, a defendant’s nonprofit status is not dispositive of whether it can be liable under Chapter 93A. Compare Linkage Corp. v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 425 Mass. 1, 679 N.E.2d 191, 207 n. 34 (1997) (noting that Massachusetts courts have held nonprofit corporations lia ble under Chapter 93A) (citing Miller v. Risk Mgmt. Found. of the Harvard Med. Insts., Inc., 36 Mass.App.Ct. 411, 632 N.E.2d 841 (1994)), with Poznik v. Mass. Med. Prof'l Ins. Ass’n., 417 Mass. 48, 628 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1994) (<HOLDING>), and All Seasons Servs., Inc. v. Comm’r of

    ### Response:
    holding that mmpia was not engaged in trade or commerce because of its character as a statutorily mandated nonprofit association that was motivated by legislative mandate not business or personal reasons citing barrett v mass insurers insolvency fund 412 mass 774 592 ne2d 1317 1319 1992 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (addition) claim was excluded under exclusion “m.” Id. at 92. We conclude that exclusion “m” applies to the homeowners’ negligent-construction (addition) claim because the damage claimed was to addition work performed entirely by RDI. But the negligent-construction (original house) claim is not excluded by paragraph “m.” Specifically, the work performed on the original house by RDI was limited to the remodel and installation of the master bedroom window and other trim work. We read exclusion “m” to exclude the work performed by RDI on portions of the original house but exclusion “m” does not apply to adjacent walls and structures that had moisture damage caused by the work performed by RDI. See, e.g., Brown v. Concord, Grp. Ins. Co., 163 N.H. 522, 44 A.3d 586, 589-90 (2012) (<HOLDING>); Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. T & G Constr.,

    ### Response:
    holding that your work exclusion is triggered only where the damage at issue is to work performed by you and is caused by work performed by you  and does not apply to damage caused to original construction of a house during later repair work
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). But uncontested documents referred to in the pleadings may be considered by the Court without ce Act (“NFIA”) Any federally regulated lender making a loan secured by real property in a designated flood zone must require the purchase of insurance as a condition of making the loan. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b)(l). The NFIA e lack of a federal cause of action does not per se eliminate the possibility of a state law claim against the lender, courts applying Louisiana law have held that any duty to make a correct flood zone determination arises from the NFIA and not state law. See Duong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 499 F.Supp.2d 700, 702-04 (E.D.La.2007) (<HOLDING>). Defendant contends that plaintiffs claims

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiffs negligence claims were preempted by the nfia because any alleged duty to provide a correct flood zone determination arises out of the nfia and not from any other place in louisiana law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    protection against waiving appeals from the ASBCA to this court, that intention must be dis cernable from the text or the legislative history. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985) (“We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.”); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 705, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945) (“[T]he question of whether the statutory right may be waived depends upon the intention of Congress as manifested in the particular statute.”); McCall v. U.S. Postal Serv., 839 F.2d 664, 667 (Fed.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the burden is on Minesen, as the party

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant did not show that his voluntary waiver of a statutory right to appeal was contrary to congressional intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was sought, all parties had moved to Missouri. Missouri is responsible for the welfare of the Thompson children, and Missouri continues a father’s support obligation until his child reaches the age of twenty-one. Mr. Thompson, the husband, became subject to Missouri law upon establishing a domicile in this state. Missouri need not accede to the judgment of a sister state concerning a continuing matter that has become a purely internal affair of Missouri. In weighing the interests of Kansas under the policy reasons for full faith and credit and the interests of Missouri in the maintenance and support of minor children domiciled in Missouri, the balance must be struck on the side of Missouri. Id. at 87, 88 (citations omitted). Cf. Davis v. Sullivan, 762 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (<HOLDING>). In In re the Marriage of McCabe, 819 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the full faith and credit clause precluded modification of a foreign states decree with regard to the age of majority where the obligor remained a resident of the rendering state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Social Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Iowa 1973) (“Stare decisis is a valuable legal doctrine which lends stability to the law....”). On the other hand, stare decisis does not prevent the court from reconsidering, repairing, correcting or abandoning past judicial announcements when error is manifest, including error in the interpretation of statutory enactments. See Lehigh Clay Prods., Ltd. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 545 N.W.2d 526, 528 (Iowa 1996); Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Iowa 1978), overruled on other grounds by Parks v. City of Marshalltown, 440 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Iowa 1989). Thus, stare decisis “should not be invoked to maintain a clearly erroneous result.” Kersten Co., 207 N.W.2d at 121; accord State v. Johnson, 257 Iowa 1052, 1056, 135 N.W.2d 518, 521 (1965) (<HOLDING>). It is especially critical that stare decisis

    ### Response:
    holding the court has a duty to correct erroneous past decisions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in education records, it does limit the instances in which an educational agency can release such records. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(l). In addition, the IDEA refers to special education records as “confidential.” 20 U.S.C. § 1417(c). These express statutory mandates recognize privacy interests in special education records that Father may invoke on behalf of his son. ¶ 25 We now turn to the impact that the confidentiality of the records has on their discoverability in the present special action. We emphasize that the issue here is not relevancy for admissibility at trial rt of Appeals that congressional policy evidenced by FERPA places “significantly heavy burden on the party seeking access to student records”); Poole v. Hawkeye Area Cmty. Action Program, 666 N.W.2d 560, 565 (Iowa 2003) (<HOLDING>); Anderson by Anderson, 255 A.D.2d at 410, 680

    ### Response:
    holding that the school records of the plaintiffs nonparty siblings were admissible at trial when expert testimony established that the records were relevant according to standard relevancy test
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    weeks before his arrest from a Bob Jones in Salt Lake City as collateral for a loan to Jones. II R. 247. 6 . See also United States v. McElroy, 697 F.2d 459, 465 (2d Cir.1982) (at time of cross-examination of Government’s witness, ""it was too late properly to make a motion to suppress [statement allegedly inadmissible under Miranda ]. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3).”); United States v. Contreras, 667 F.2d 976, 978 n. 2 (11th Cir.); (recognizing that failure to make suppression motion before trial ordinarily waives right to make Miranda challenge to statements, but permitting challenge where trial court entertained and ruled on suppression motion during trial), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849, 103 S.Ct. 109, 74 L.Ed.2d 97 (1982); United States v. Badwan, 624 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir.1980), (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124, 101 S.Ct. 941,

    ### Response:
    holding that under rule 12b3 and f failure to raise inter alia claim that statements were inadmissible under miranda constituted a waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the allegations are accompanied by a statement of the facts upon which the belief is founded. See id. We apply Rule 9(b) to the plaintiffs’ various averments of fraud. Claim 1—Declaratory Relief. The defendants do not distinctly challenge these allegations and the district court did not address the issue. We assume this claim satisfies Rule 9(b). Claim 2—Breach of Fiduciary Duty. The plaintiffs raise solely a derivative claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Because this claim fails under Rule 23.1(a), we need not address the defendants’ arguments under Rule 9(b). Claim S—Fraud. The complaint’s allegations of fraud in part allege the circumstances of fraud with sufficient particularity. The complaint includes minimally sufficient allegations aga Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline

    ### Response:
    holding a complaint failed to satisfy rule 9b where the allegations were lacking in detail
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the debtor’s unexpired residential leases are not automatically deemed rejected, and a debtor in possession is generally permitted to assume or reject an unexpired residential lease at any time prior to confirmation of a plan. Id. § 365(d)(2). First, even if bona fide leases exist between the Movants and the Debtors, they are not leases of nonresidential real property. See In re Independence Vill., Inc., 52 B.R. 715, 722 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1985) (agreeing with the debtor that a lease of property used by the debtor to operate a life-care facility was not a- lease of “nonresidential real property,” as people resided in the leased property and the fact that the debtor corporation did not reside thereupon was irrelevant); see also In re Care Givers, Inc., 113 B.R. 263 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1989) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Terrace Apts., Ltd., 107 B.R. 382,

    ### Response:
    holding that leases of real property upon which the debtor operated senior nursing homes were not leases of nonresidential real property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of law and constitutional questions de novo. See Vasquez-Zavala v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir.2003). We deny the petition for review. The facts of the case are known to the parties and we do not repeat them here. I Petitioners argue that withdrawal of their applications for admission to the United States is similar to the turn-around at the border experienced by the alien in Tapia v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2005). We disagree. Their decisions to withdraw their applications for admission is more akin to the voluntary departure granted to the alien in Vasquez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 961 (9th Cir.2003). Moreover, we accord Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(l)(A) in In re Avilez-Nava, 23 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800-01 (BIA 2005) (<HOLDING>). The BIA’s “stop-time” rule is a permissible

    ### Response:
    holding that an aliens continuous physical presence is broken if the alien was offered and accepted the opportunity to withdraw an application for admission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for a government hospital beyond a private hospital’s potential liability. In fact, Kerr’s counsel conceded the statute of repose bar in a private action when stating, “by the time this client came to see me, [the estate] had clearly lost [its] right under [section] 15-3-545(A), the right to pursue any private entity because of the medical malpractice statute of repose. Six years had transpired.” To permit this medical malpractice action to proceed beyond the statute of repose would be to disregard the Tort Claims Act, particularly sections 15-78-40 and 15-78-50(b). Having found Hospital was entitled to summary judgment based on the statute of repose, we need not reach the additional ground relied upon by the trial court. Wilson v. Moseley, 327 S.C. 144, 147, 488 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1997) (<HOLDING>). III. As the six-year statute of repose in

    ### Response:
    holding if one ground proves dispositive then this court need not address the remaining grounds relied on by a trial court when it granted summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relates back to the date of the original pleading when ... the claim ... asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2) (emphasis added). See also 1966 and 1991 Advisory Committee Notes (explaining that the relation back rule was intended to remedy prior misconceptions that amendment of a pleading to correct the misnomer or misdescription of a defendant in an existing action “would amount to the commencement of a new proceeding”). Yet, the “relation back” reasoning does not apply with equal force to actions that are, in actuality, entirely new or separate proceedings. O’Donnell v. Vencor Inc., 466 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2)) (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiff attempts to relate the

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a matter of law.’ ” (quoting Hervey v. Alfonso, 650 So.2d 644, 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995))). At issue here is application of the doctrine of res judicata. “The doctrine of res judicata makes a judgment on the merits conclusive ‘not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but as to every other matter which might with propriety have been litigated and determined in that action.’ Kimbrell v. Paige, 448 So.2d 1009, 1012 (Fla.1984).” Zamora, 969 So.2d at 1112. See also Saadeh v. Stanton Rowing Found., Inc., 912 So.2d 28, 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (noting that “[r]es judicata extends only to the facts and conditions as they existed at the time the prior court rendered the prior judgment”); Hicks v. Hoagland, 953 So.2d 695, 698 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>); Gaither Corp. v. Skinner, 241 N.C. 532, 85

    ### Response:
    holding that the record also establishes identity of cause of action the facts and issues supporting the underlying transaction  a 25 million promissory note executed in june 1998 and the alleged default in 2001 existed at the time the illinois state court rendered the prior judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    America, 154 F.3d at 822. There, the Eighth Circuit opined that a claim relates to an ERISA plan when it “premises a cause of action on the existence of an ERISA plan....” Id. Applying the Eighth Circuit’s test to the case at bar, it is clear the Van Nattas’ state law claims are preempted in their entirety. Reducing the Van Nattas’ complaint to its core reveals the fact that all of their state law claims are premised upon alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee-benefit plan. As the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have previously reiterated, such claims undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), even if the state statutes at issue do not expressly make reference to ERISA plans. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 48 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must establish both (1) that the information requested was compiled for law enforcement purposes and (2) that its disclosure would involve an unwarranted invasion of a third party’s privacy. Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 413 (D.C.Cir.1982). The plaintiff does not dispute that the information he seeks was compiled for law enforcement purposes. {See Opp’n at 2-3.) Thus, the only issue in dispute is whether the disclosure of the requested information could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Given the nature of law enforcement records, the individual’s “privacy interest at stake is substantial.” SafeCard Serv., Inc. v. S.E.C., 926 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C.Cir.1991); see also Bast v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 665 F.2d 1251, 1254 (D.C.Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, an agency may resort to a “Glomar”

    ### Response:
    holding that in light of the stigma potentially associated with law enforcement investigations exemption 7c affords broad privacy rights to suspects witnesses and investigators
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relief, namely, to enjoin the Fire District permanently from violating the overtime provisions in the future. The district court found that the Fire District’s violations arose out of its failure to understand the Act’s requirements. The court found that this failure was careless, but inadvertent. The Fire District, in the court’s view, had not intended to violate the Act and had complied with the Act from the time that it learned about the Act’s requirements. The court concluded that there was “no evidence of any threatened future violation.” The record supports all these findings. We therefore find no abuse of the district court’s legal authority to determine whether or not a permanent injunction is needed. See Brock v. Big Bear Market No. 3, 825 F.2d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The judgment of the district court is

    ### Response:
    holding that a district courts discretion is not unbridled and that it must weigh finding of violation against factors indicating reasonable likelihood that violations will not recur such as intent to comply extraordinary efforts to prevent recurrence absence of repetitive violations and absence of bad faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    barrage.” Basker-ville, 50 F.3d at 431. Second, Swadow’s alleged conduct toward Hopkins was sexually neutral or, at most, ambiguous. According to Hopkins, Swadow bumped into him, positioned a magnifying glass over his crotch, flipped his tie over to see its label, gave him a congratulatory kiss in the receiving line at Hopkins’ wedding, and stared at him in the bathroom. Notably, Hopkins has not asserted that Swadow ever made an overt sexual proposition or touched Hopkins in a sexual manner. While Swa-dow’s conduct was undoubtedly tasteless and inappropriately forward, we cannot conclude that it was “of the type that would interfere with a reasonable person’s work performance ... to the extent required by Title VII.” Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 193 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Third, several of the incidents upon which

    ### Response:
    holding that allegations fell short of title vii liability where male plaintiff claimed that male coworker stood behind him and bumped into him while he mopped peeped at him in restroom and asked him to dance at christmas party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    surcharge, whichever is less, shall be retained by the Division of Motor Vehicles ...; five percent, or the actual cost of administering the cancellation notification system...., whichever is less, shall be retained by the Division of Motor Vehicles ... and the remainder shall be remitted to the New Jersey Full Automobile Insuranc 45, slip op. at 12 (“[T]he debtor is not responsible for the administrative expenses of collection charged by the DMV, because a debt that is ‘compensation for actual pecuniary loss’ is discharge-able under section 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.”). It not being disputed that surcharges are debts payable to a governmental unit and having found that surcharges are civil penalties payable for the benefit of a governmental unit and not compensation for actua (<HOLDING>); In re Lugo, 94 B.R. at 343 (noting that

    ### Response:
    holding  525 applies only where debt dischargeable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    314, 324-25 (1995) (“To establish a breach of the settlement agreement based on [the] implied covenant of good faith with respect to the reinstatement term ... it is the appellant’s burden to show that the agency’s proven retaliatory/harassing actions, under the totality of the circumstances, amounted to an unjustified and substantial deprivation of [the appellant’s] rights as an incumbent of the position in question.”). Because the record shows that Moss made only mere allegations that the 14-day suspension violated the Agreement, but did not support his bare allegations with any evidence illustrating bad faith, we find no basis to conclude that the Initial Decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. See Charley v. United States, 208 Ct.Cl. 457 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Agreement does not insulate

    ### Response:
    holding that the mere allegation of arbitrary and capricious action on defendants part absent a direct and pointed attack on the evidentiary basis of the agencys action is insufficient to warrant a judicial determination of wrongful agency action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “the voluntariness of a confession turns on whether the defendant’s will was overborne to the extent that [his] statements were not the result of a free and voluntary act.” John, 812 N.E.2d at 1224 (citations omitted); see also Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 285-87, 111 S.Ct. 1246. The SJC concluded that John’s confession was voluntary, discussing both John’s impression of the relevant meeting with Novak and his possible motivation for confessing to the FBI agent. John, 812 N.E.2d at 1224. After review of the record, we conclude that the SJC did not unreasonably apply, or act contrary to, Supreme Court law when concluding that John’s confession was voluntary. Although the SJC did not cite Supreme Court precedent, its voluntariness analysis was consistent with it. See Dagley, 540 F.3d at 16 (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). And the SJC’s

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a failure to cite supreme court decisions does not itself suggest a state court decision is contrary to such precedents   so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts them 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clause is to ascertain whether the law has retrospective effect. In the context of the present case, the question is whether the amended statute applies to prisoners convicted for offenses committed before the provision’s effective date. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 965, 67 L.Ed.2d at 24. Clearly, it does. The DOC has implemented a policy making any inmate required to participate in the SOTP who refuses treatment, is removed from treatment, or fails to meet program completion criteria ineligible for earned time. Therefore, the amended statute applies to prisoners such as Propp who were convicted for an offense committed before the amendment’s effective date. The amendment is, therefore, retrospective. See Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 960 P.2d 227, 235-36 (1998) (<HOLDING>). The State argues this conclusion is

    ### Response:
    holding similar statutory amendment was retrospective when applied to inmate who committed his crime before amendments enactment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relating to the production of White Chicks are located in California, defendants have not shown that retaining the case in this district would hinder or burden their access to these sources of proof. Relative Means of the Parties “The relative financial hardship on the litigants and their respective abilities to prosecute or defend an action in a particular forum are legitimate factors to consider.” Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 294 F.Supp.2d at 222 (internal citations omitted). Where litigation in a foreign state would have a disparate financial impact on one of the parties, the Court may base its decision to transfer or retain the case on the relative financial means of the parties. See Aetna Life & Casualty v. Owen, No. 3:04 CV 817(WWE), 2004 WL 2381744, at *3-4 (D.Conn. Oct. 13, 2004) (<HOLDING>). In this case, plaintiff has filed an

    ### Response:
    holding that a transfer to georgia was warranted largely because litigation in connecticut would have been a huge financial burden on an individual georgia defendant while plaintiffa large corporation that operates throughout the united stateswould have been easily able to afford litigation in georgia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the relevant clause as a whole, including the title, ‘Taxes,’ ” the Court of Federal Claims found “it was plainly intended as a price-adjustment mechanism in the event the Oil Companies were assessed additional or unanticipated taxes as a result of their avgas production.” Shell Remand Decision, 108 Fed.Cl. at 432 (emphasis added). It accorded a “fairly narrow tax-related meaning” to “charges,” interpreting it to mean “an encumbrance, lien, or other like financial burden or liability, especially one .that relates to real property.” Id. at 432-33. Such an interpretation, the trial court found, was consistent with the noscitur a sociis canon of interpretation, which “ ‘counsels that a word [be] given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.’ ” Id. at 432 (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). The Court of

    ### Response:
    holding that  charges should be given more precise content by taxes and fees 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    digital at the outset. Ion has failed to rebut this argument. Ion makes two arguments for limitations based on language found within the specification. First, Ion points to language from the specification that both introduces the patent and comments on its preferred embodiment. Ion argues that this language necessarily narrows the dictionary definition of “value” because the specification disavows certain forms that a value can take. If language within the specification disclaims a usage or distinguishes its patent application from prior art on the basis of a different type of use, the claim construction should reflect these self-imposed limitations. See CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1367; SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340-1341 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). It must therefore be determined whether ITW

    ### Response:
    holding that when the specification clearly disavows a feature that feature is outside the reach of the claim language even if the language might otherwise be broad enough to encompass the feature in question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and do all things that are reasonable and necessary to manage the affairs of the TEAM .... ” (capitalization in original; emphasis added). Furthermore, TDH expressly agreed to use prudent reliable methods and reasonable care for the safekeeping and proper management of each team’s funds and assets. Investors testified that TDH made all of the investment decisions and that investors were not required to do anything more than invest their money. Additionally, many team members neither met nor corresponded with other members of their team. Thus, the “economic reality” is that investors maintained a passive involvement with their investment while expecting profits to be derived solely from the efforts of TDH. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 848, 95 S.Ct. at 20 Co., 212 F.3d 180, 189 (3rd Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In this case, investors relied solely on

    ### Response:
    holding defendant sold investment contracts when it substituted new investors money for real investment return on old investors funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issue, “[w]hat is the physical location and size of the 'Quarry Property’ in the May 2000 Agreement?” Sourant similarly named ""[w]hat is the meaning of 'Quarry Property' in the May 2000 Agreement"" as a material and contested issue. 5 . Sourant argues Murphy Farrell is not entitled to declaratory relief because, among other reasons, the right-of-first-refusal provision violates the rule against perpetuities and, alternatively, Sourant did not breach the provision. But because the trial court ruled Sourant breached the provision, it necessarily found the provision valid and enforceable. The propriety of that ruling is not raised on appeal and is therefore final and serves as law of the case. See Bogard v. Cannon & Wendt Elec. Co., 221 Ariz. 325, 332, ¶ 24, 212 P.3d 17, 24 (App.2009) (<HOLDING>); Bilke v. State, 221 Ariz. 60, 63, ¶ 11, 209

    ### Response:
    holding that rulings not challenged on appeal are implicitly affirmed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2209-10, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), “speculative,” Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-46, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926-28, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), or “abstract,” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). Rather, it must be “certainly impending.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1725, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (internal quotations omitted). Ripeness, while often spoken of as a justiciability doctrine distinct from standing, in fact shares the constitutional requirement of standing that an injury in fact be certainly impending. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2634-35, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); DKT Mem’l Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 297 (D.C.Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). It is only the prudential aspect of ripeness—

    ### Response:
    holding that the constitutional requirement for ripeness is injury in fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    handed Kerri Rigsby the Ford Report, which contained King’s note; and 3) the Rigsbys attended an adjuster meeting convened by State Farm during which the company’s trainers told the adjusters that Katrina was a “ “water storm’ and that all major damage to homes was caused by flooding.” These allegations formed the basis of much of the trial and they do not significantly diverge from the Rigsbys’ original allegations. State Farm is correct that the Rigsbys relied on Dr. Ralph Sinno’s “wracking” theory at trial, but wracking is not a “theory of fraud” about which the Rigsbys could have been whistleblowers. As detailed above, the Rigsbys alleged that State Farm fraudulently misclassified wind damage as flood damage through a variety of means. St F.3d 447, 448-49, 451-52 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The Rigsbys’ knowledge was also independent

    ### Response:
    holding that relators who brought suit against a competitor and other defendants were not original sources
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “location and labels of a statutory provision do not by themselves transform a civil remedy into a criminal one,” or vice versa. Smith, 538 U.S. at 94, 123 S.Ct. 1140; see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 94, 78 S.Ct. 590 (“How simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels pasted on them! Manifestly the issue of whether [a statute] is a penal law cannot be thus determined.”). Rather, the Supreme Court instructs that “a penalty [ ] cannot be converted into [a non-penal measure] by so naming it,” and we must “ascribe to [the particular statute] the character disclosed by its purpose and operation, regardless of name.” United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294, 56 S.Ct. 223, 80 L.Ed. 233 (1935) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, “even a clear legislative

    ### Response:
    holding that even though labeled a tax on conducting retail liquor business challenged statute was nevertheless a penalty designed to punish the violation of state liquor laws
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    made from prison to Attorney Alva’s office, in which he inquired about representation for one of his co-defendants, was in error as violative of the attorney-client privilege. We need not delve into Appellant’s substantive discussion of this issue, however, because as the Commonwealth correctly notes, the issue is waived. At trial, Appellant objected to the admission of the telephone call, but only upon relevance grounds. Appellant then lodged a second objection concerning the publication of the transcript of the call to the jury. At no time did Appellant argue that the contents of the telephone call were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Accordingly, his argument to that end is waived. Pa. R.A.P. 302(a); see also Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 464 Pa. 464, 347 A.2d 305, 307 (1975) (<HOLDING>). G. Testimony of Tezzie Smith In his final

    ### Response:
    holding that preservation of the specific argument in support of the ground for reversal is required for appellate review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Just as this court should ""respect and carefully weigh the views of other circuits,” United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 941 (11th Cir.1993), a district court should do likewise. However, only the decisions of the Supreme Court and this court are binding on the district courts of this circuit. 16 . It should also be noted that the caselaw is replete with opinions that conflict with the standard asserted by the Growers. In many cases involving the FLSA, courts found that a certain item, which was obviously not directly connected to the performance of the employee’s principal activity, was nevertheless primarily for the benefit of the employer. See, e.g., Brennan v. Modern Chevrolet Co., 363 F.Supp. 327, 333 (N.D.Tex.1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir.1974) (affirming without opinion) (<HOLDING>); Masters v. Md. Mgmt. Co., 493 F.2d 1329,

    ### Response:
    holding that car salesmans use of an automobile was primarily for the benefit of the employer even though 90 of mileage was for personal use
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    traffic stop should have concluded. Accordingly, Clayborn asserts that Detective Hall could not ask for his license and registration because it was not reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the traffic stop. We disagree. On appeal from a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court reviews, the factual findings for clear error and the question of whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred de novo. United States v. Allegree, 175 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir.1999). Clayborn does not challenge the factual finding that Detective Hall’s traffic stop was justified and lawful, because it was based on an objectively reasonable, although mistaken, belief that a traffic violation had occurred. See United States v. Peltier, 217 F.3d 608, 610 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the issue is whether the

    ### Response:
    holding the fact that officers belief proved to be mistaken does not negate a finding of probable cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rev. at 1404, the employer’s clear breach of the employment contract, the employer’s benefit in terms of enhanced chances of mitigation and the public’s interest in “the need for stability in labor relations,” Pierce, 84 N.J. at 66, plaintiff retains his cause of action for breach of contract. We are confident that in the modern employment context where there is a position-specific employment contract and an employee resigns after his employer without justification forces that employee to choose from among demotion, termination or resignation, it must be concluded that the employer remains subject to liability for that breach unless facts clearly demonstrate a fairly bargained release of the employer. See also cf. Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2A 885, 887-89 (3d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Annotation, “Circumstances in Title VII

    ### Response:
    recognizing doctrine of constructive discharge under federal civil rights act and national labor relations act where employer knowingly permits working conditions to become so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the shootings to any of the charges in the indictment. Its only real probative value is to establish the criminal propensities of those involved. And even if this evidence did have some probative worth, the details of the Amoco double homicide are so chilling that its prejudicial impact substantially outweighs any such probative value. The admission of this evidence thus constitutes error that is plain. See United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir.2003) (“It is the law of this circuit that, at least where the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.”); United States v. Gore, 298 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). In sum, admission of this evidence was an

    ### Response:
    holding that error was plain when the district courts ruling was obviously contrary to the text of a federal statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 . Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 . City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 850 (5th Cir.2009). 9 . Conner v. Travis Cnty., 209 F.3d 794, 796 (5th Cir.2000) (per curiam); see also Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850; Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir.2003). 10 . Connick v. Thompson, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011). 11 . Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381-82 (5th Cir.2010). 12 . See Burge, 336 F.3d at 372 (<HOLDING>). 13 . Conner, 209 F.3d at 796. 14 . City of

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff had offered insufficient evidence to establish deliberate indifference in a failuretotrain claim in part because the plaintiff did not present evidence that the training received was inadequate or evidence of any specific additional training that the employees should have received
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    estate. 6 . In June 2007 some members of Classes 2 and 3 of the Track One plaintiffs proceeded to a bench trial against four defendants, including AstraZeneca, and the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 491 F.Supp.2d 20, 29-32 (D.Mass.2007) (In re Pharm. Trial). 7 . Howe had earlier filed an objection to the settlement that essentially cited, for three pages, Howe's earlier pleadings before the court without stating any specific grounds for the objection. During the fairness hearing, the district court properly held that anything raised in this pleading that Howe did not explain in the reply brief was waived. See TAG/ICIB Servs. Inc. v. Sedeco Servicio de Descuento en Compras, 570 F.3d 60, 66 n. 6 (1st Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The “heartland period,” which the

    ### Response:
    holding an argument waived in part because the party failed to develop it in the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    able to repay, so long as ‘[tjhose who remain indigent or for whom repayment would work “manifest hardship” are forever exempt from any obligation to repay ” (quoting Fuller, 417 U.S. at 53, 94 S.Ct. at 2124, 40 L.Ed.2d at 654)); State v. Drayton, 285 Kan. 689, 175 P.3d 861, 880 (2008) (noting statutory requirement that repayment be ordered only when defendant had ability to pay was included in statute to satisfy constitutional requirements); State v. Ellis, 339 Mont. 14, 167 P.3d 896, 900 (2007) (upholding constitutionality of state recoupment statute because it provided that “a court may not sentence a defendant to pay the costs of court-appointed counsel unless the court determines the defendant is or will be able to pay them”); State v. Morgan, 173 Vt. 533, 789 A.2d 928, 931 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Because that determination was not made here,

    ### Response:
    holding that under the sixth amendment to the united states constitution before imposing an obligation to reimburse the state the court must make a finding that the defendant is or will be able to pay the reimbursement amount ordered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contains relevant evidence. But in others, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.” Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1719 (citation omitted). In both Belton and Thornton, the vehicle occupants were arrested for possession of narcotics. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 456, 101 S.Ct. 2860; Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618, 124 S.Ct. 2127. Had Vinton been arrested merely for speeding or driving with excessively tinted windows, Gant’s evidentiary rationale obviously would not have authorized a subsequent search because under the circumstances it would have been very unlikely that evidence relevant to either of those traffic offenses would be found inside his car. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1719 (<HOLDING>). But instead, Vinton was arrested for the

    ### Response:
    holding that an evidentiary basis for the search was  lacking  because gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of his car
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    impinge on Congress’s goal of ensuring ‘a single, uniform system for regulating aviation safety.’ ” (citation omitted)). To allow a patchwork of state law and industry regulations for pilot hiring and training would strip bare Congress’s intent in passing the FAA. The state law and industry customs Plaintiff seeks to impose clearly enter the scope of the preempted field of pilot hiring and training standards, and, as such, are preempted by federal law. See Goodspeed Airport, 634 F.3d at 210; see, e.g., Ventress, 747 F.3d at 721-22 (“Our review of the applicable FARs confirms that pilot qualifications and medical standards for airmen ... are pervasively regulated.... [W]e conclude that the FAA and accompanying FARs preempt [the plaintiffs state law] claims.”); French, 869 F.2d at 4 (<HOLDING>); In re Air Crash I, 798 F.Supp.2d at 485-86;

    ### Response:
    holding that the faa and fars afford  no room for the imposition of statelaw criteria visavis pilot suitability for the medical standards which an airline pilot must meet before he will be certified
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in 8 CSR 60-2.025(9); and failing, as required by § 213.075(3), to “promptly” investigate Taylor’s complaint. Specifically, it claimed that the writ should have issued in that before a right-to-sue letter could issue to Taylor, the MCHR had a regulatory duty to give it notice of Taylor’s complaint and a statutory duty to promptly investigate the complaint, such that the breach of one or both of those duties violated due process, with respect to the issuance of the letter, mandating the setting aside of the letter. Mandamus, pursuant to § 536.150, will lie where the MCHR’s executive director’s actions in issuing the right-to-sue letter violated prescribed procedures and applicable law. See State ex rel. Martin-Erb v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 77 S.W.3d 600, 608 (Mo. banc 2002) (<HOLDING>). The writ will not issue, however, unless

    ### Response:
    holding that section 536150 gives the complainant the right to file a mandamus action to determine whether the executive directors actions were in fact accomplished under prescribed procedures and were lawful 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    object to the discharge-ability of the debt, and it became nondischargeable under section 523(a)(3)(B). Smith replied that, when a creditor is added to a petition, the creditor then has a “reasonable time” to object to dischargeability and that, if he or she does not, the debt is discharged. He noted that “some courts” have held that 60 days is a reasonable time. The court granted Smith’s motion to dismiss on March 8, 2005, and plaintiffs timely appealed. We hold that the trial court erred in granting Smith’s motion. It misinterpreted the applicable bankruptcy law. The Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide that amendments to schedules do not alter the deadlines for filing bankruptcy court complaints to determine the dischargeability of fra D.N.J. 2000) (<HOLDING>). We find persuasive In re Strano’s careful

    ### Response:
    holding that although the bankruptcy court is the preferred forum because of its greater expertise state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the standard for evaluating such claims requires a balancing of the “character and magnitude” of the rights affected against the state interests advanced by the rule. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (reaffirming cases holding that a “flexible standard” governs Fi state’s interests in prohibiting sitting judges from running for nonjudicial office justified temporary inability of voters to choose specific candidate); Adams v. Supreme Court of Pa., 502 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (concluding that standard of judicial conduct requiring sitting judges to resign upon becoming candidate for nonjudicial office did not violate First Amendment rights of judge in light of “important state interests” served by rule); In re Buckson, 610 A.2d 203, 224 (Del. 1992) (<HOLDING>). In view of the substantial interests

    ### Response:
    holding that resigntorun requirement in delaware judges code of judicial conduct did not violate first amendment interests of judges
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (vacating an award because one of the arbitrators was the son of a vice president of the defendant local union’s international union); Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1982) (affirming the vacation of an award because arbitrator failed to disclose a legal dispute between his family’s company and one of the parties to the arbitration). The inference of bias seems to be heightened when, in addition to the aforementioned factors, the party does not disclose the suspect relationship. See, Commonwealth Corp., supra; Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co., supra. Finally, almost every finding of evident partiality occurs when the arbitrator’s relationship is with one of the parties, not with a witness. Cf., Peabody v. Rotan Mosle, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1135, 1138 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (<HOLDING>); Sofia Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Amoco Transport

    ### Response:
    holding that arbitrators failure to disclose that his law partners brother was the expert witness attorney did not show evident partiality because the relationship was trivial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or of a particularly complicated issue that Congress has committed to a regulatory agency.’ ” Time Warner, 523 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., 277 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.2002)). As previously noted, plaintiffs case does not require this court to determine difficult issues of first impression better left to the FDA’s expertise, but instead only requires the application of well-understood FDA regulations directly on point. “[T]he FDA’s expertise ... is not necessary to determine whether the labels are misleading, [and the] reasonable consumer determination and other issues involved in [this] lawsuit are within the expertise of the courts to resolve.” Delacruz, 2012 WL 2563857, at *10; see also Brazil, 935 F.Supp.2d at 959-61, 2013 WL 1209955, at *10-11 (<HOLDING>); Astiana v. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., No.

    ### Response:
    holding that primary jurisdiction did not apply to claims of violation of fda regulations and guidance concerning all natural fresh antioxidant and other nutrient claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ill. App. 3d 604, 613 (2006). Henkels also argues that the trial court failed to adequately consider the circumstances surrounding the settlement. Specifically, Henkels asserts that the trial court ignored the fact that Pederson orchestrated the settlement for a nominal amount in order to circumvent its lien rights and remove an impediment to his pending malpractice action. There is no evidence that the trial court failed to adequately consider the circumstances surrounding the settlement. While the settlement amount may have been less than the amount of compensation benefits which Henkels paid to Pederson, the Act does not require a workers’ compensation settlement agreement to fully compensate the employer in order to be valid. See In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 333 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Louis Joliet Shoppingtown L.P., 377

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the compensation that an employer pays may exceed an employees recovery from third parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    right to a salary while sitting, and unauthorized by either statute or Assembly rule. I. At the outset, we address the appealability of the Speaker’s action and this court’s jurisdiction. Prior to the adoption of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, “persons aggrieved by action or inaction of state or local administrative agencies could seek review by applying for one of the prerogative writs.” Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 51, 362 A.2d 566 (1976). The 1947 Constitution superseded the prerogative writs “and, in lieu thereof,” afforded “review, hearing and relief ... in the Superior Court, on terms and in the manner provided by rules of the Supreme Court, as of right.” N.J. Const, art. VI, § 5, II4. Accordingly, “[i]n New Jersey, judicial revi , 579, 763 A.2d 295 (App.Div.2000) (<HOLDING>); Amico v. N.J. Army Nat’l Guard, 242

    ### Response:
    holding that the state police is a state agency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. Nelson, 207 F.3d at 1206 (justifying this special standard based on “the impor: tance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation” (quotation omitted)). If the plaintiff makes this two-part showing, the burden then shifts back to the defendant to demonstrate “that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quotation omitted). A With respect to the roadside sobriety tests, Jones proposes that Amundsen’s erratic driving by itself created reasonable suspicion of intoxication. According to Jones, this suspicion justified both the initial stop and the subsequent roadside testing. Because the administrati , 1017 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). We have also held that drifting onto the

    ### Response:
    holding that a car that moved from side to side left the paved portion of the road and weaved over the center of the road created reasonable suspicion of driving while intoxicated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    5, 16 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Vázquez-Rivera, 407 F.3d 476, 486 (1st Cir.2005)). If, on the contrary, no contemporaneous objection was made, we review under the four-pronged plain-error standard. United States v. Hilario-Hilario, 529 F.3d 65, 74-75 (1st Cir.2008) (citing United States v. Allen, 469 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir.2006)). “An unpreserved error is deemed plain (and, therefore, to affect substantial rights) only if the reviewing court finds that it skewed the fundamental fairness or basic integrity of the proceeding below in some major respect.” United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 972 (1st Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 100 (1st Cir.1987)); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (<HOLDING>). To make this determination, we consider all

    ### Response:
    holding that the plainerror doctrine applies in those circumstances in which absent appellate intervention a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    separate occasions, sought to litigate arbitrable claims related to the D.A. agreement: (1) in their counterclaim in the 1988 federal case; (2) in their petition filed in Baton Rouge Parish; and (3) in their petition filed in Orleans Parish. On its face, at least, it would appear that it is the franchisees, not DAI, that have invoked the judicial process. The franchisees make two arguments to support their claim that DAI has invoked the judicial process to their detriment. First, they argue that DAI and its affiliates are so related, and the claims brought by the affiliates so inextricably inte igation of the same legal and factual issues as those the party now wants to arbitrate results in waiver of the right to arbitrate”); see also Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 330(<HOLDING>). We hold today that a party only invokes the

    ### Response:
    holding that a franchisor did not waive  his arbitrable claims by prosecuting the unlawful detainer action in california state court because that action involved different issues
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    public policy. See Keneally u. Orgain (1980), Mont., 606 P.2d 127, 37 St.Rep. 154. In the prior discussion of this case, this Court determined that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing was implied in the parties’ oral, at-will, employment contract. The basis for this holding was the employer’s promulgation of an employees’ handbook, two years after Gates began employment. The handbook provided certain guidelines for termination of employees. We stated that Gates had a cause of action because “if the employer failed to follow its own policies, the peace of mind of its employees is shattered and an injustice is done.” 638 P.2d at 1067, 39 St.Rep. at 20. We then found two genuine issues of material fact: (1) whether respondent failed to afford app 3 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353 (<HOLDING>); with Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.

    ### Response:
    recognizing a tort action when employee was dismissed for filing a workers compensation claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by our decision in United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1107-12 (11th Cir.2002) (rejecting this argument because ""the jurisdictional provision here is not a traditional element, or otherwise an essential ingredient, of a criminal offense”). He also argues the MDLEA violates due process because (1) § 1903(a) does not require a nexus between the criminal conduct and the United States, (2) § 1903(f) allows for forum shopping because it sets venue at the point of entry into the United States, and (3) the provision in § 1903(d) precluding defenses based on international law violates his liberty interest in ensuring that he not be prosecuted in a jurisdiction bearing no ties to his offense. These arguments are foreclosed by United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1325-26 (11th Cir.2003)

    ### Response:
    holding a nexus to the united states is not required and noting the venue provision comports with us const art iii  2 cl 3
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    864, 107 L.Ed.2d 948 (1990), the D.C. Circuit sustained, under the Federal Constitution, the Army’s random testing of armed police and security guards among others, because of their use of and accessibility to weapons, the dangerous workplace setting, and the highly regulated nature of their positions. And, in Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557, 1558 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 963, 110 S.Ct. 404, 107 L.Ed.2d 370 (1989), the First Circuit a is not compatible with Article 1, Paragraph 7 of th 3 (finding that state constitution protects reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left at curbside); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157-58, 519 A.2d 820 (1987) (refusing to adopt good-faith exception under state constitution); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 344-47, 450 A.2d 952 (1982) (<HOLDING>); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 228, 440 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that state constitution protects privacy interests in telephone toll billing records
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for a limited reach. The statute provides for a two-year statute of limitations not merely for ‘an act or omission of the attorney’ ... but rather for ‘an act or omission in the performance of professional services.’” Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the court held that a plaintiffs claims against a law firm for tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with economic expectancy, inducement of breach of fiduciary duty, conversion of assets, and conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty were not subject to the two-year limitations period under 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b) where the law firm had never undertaken to render professional services to the plaintiff. See 2004 WL 526739, at **3-4. Cf. Sinclair v. Bloom, No. 94 C 4465, 1995 WL 348127, at *4 (N.D.Ill. June 8, 1995) (<HOLDING>). Finally, in Polsky v. BDO Seidman the court

    ### Response:
    holding that claims against an attorney for undue influence and breach of fiduciary duty were governed by the twoyear limitations period under 735 ilcs 513  2143b where the defendant was acting as an attorney for the plaintiffs when the misconduct at issue occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    what costs, under Halper, were subject to the proportionality test. The court noted that the costs to society should be included with the costs to the government in determining whether a proceeds forfeiture is remedial. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 299. The court stated: The forfeiture of proceeds of illegal drug-sales serves the wholly remedial purposes of reimbursing the government for the costs of detection, investigation, and prosecution of drug traffickers and reimbursing society for the costs of combatting the allure of illegal drugs, earing for the victims of the criminal trade when preventative efforts prove unsuccessful, lost productivity, etc. Id. (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 444, 109 S.Ct. at 1899; United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2644, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (<HOLDING>); One Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409

    ### Response:
    recognizing repayment of damages to society as remedial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not intend to fashion a minefield out of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, the legislative history mentions the provision only in passing, offering as an example of compliance that the debtor meet the disclosure requirements of § 1125 to satisfy § 1129(a)(2). Certainly, if Congress had meant that any infraction, no matter how early on in the case, no matter how minor the breach, and regardless of whether the court has remedied the violations, should result in a denial of confirmation, Congress would have given some clearer indication in the legislative history or made the statutory provision far more express. In re Landing Assocs., Ltd., 157 B.R. 791, 811 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1993); see also In re Heritage Organization, L.L.C., 375 B.R. 230, 309 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2007) (<HOLDING>). Bankruptcy courts limit their inquiry under §

    ### Response:
    holding that the debtors negotiations with a creditor to include certain modifications in the plan in exchange for acceptance did not preclude confirmation under  1129a2
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Wesley and Vergie separated it appears that Wesley returned to live in Earlean’s home where he remained until his death. At the time of his death, Earlean applied for and received widow’s benefits as Wesley’s legal spouse, a step Vergie did not take until eight years later. Moreover, the records of Los Angeles County, where Earlean resided, produced a petition for divorce filed by Wesley, but no final decree. Therefore, although there was no evidence of any further search of court records, there was sufficient substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that the presumption of validity had been overcome. See, e.g., id. (finding substantial evidence to support rebuttal of presumption absent search of court records); Vargas, 9 Cal. App.3d at 475-76, 88 Cal.Rptr. 281 (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion We agree with Gallaher,

    ### Response:
    holding that search of pertinent public records not required if evidence presented and inferences drawn therefrom show that first marriage is valid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The record demonstrates that the defense was tendered at the earliest feasible time. Moreover, Continental has consistently refused coverage, and there is no evidence that Continental would have responded favorably to an earlier tender. Under these circumstances, substantially different from those surrounding the tender in SCSC, there is no legal cause shown why Domtar should not be entitled to recover its pre-tender defense costs from Continental. 7. Additional attorney fee issues. Continental raises several additional attorney fee issues. Each merits brief attention. a. Continental, in effect, has asked us to overrule the supreme court’s decision in Morrison v. Swenson, 274 Minn. 127, 142 N.W.2d 640 (1966), where the court concluded that an insured may recover its legal fees incurr 7 (<HOLDING>). In Independent Sch. Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul

    ### Response:
    holding that insured may recover from its insurer any attorney fees incurred in successfully attempting to force the insurer to defend an action against the insured
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    develop their equitable arguments in opposition to Defendants’ defense of statute of limitations. Plaintiffs argue that even if Durham’s right to an accounting was foreclosed, factual issues existed concerning the date the statute of limitations began to run on their claims of fraud, breach of constructive trust, breach of contract, and violation of the UPA. They contend these issues involve separate and distinct claims which may be asserted independently of their right to an accounting. {31} We think each of these arguments fails as to Durham. New Mexico follows the general rule that an action for a formal accounting is a prerequisite to initiating an action at law by a partner against the partnership or another partner. See Willey v. Renner, 8 N.M. 641, 646, 45 P. 1132, 1134 (1896) (<HOLDING>) (cited with approval in Levy v. Disharoon, 106

    ### Response:
    holding one partner can not sic maintain an action at law against another partner to recover an amount claimed by him by reason of partnership transactions until there has been a final settlement of the affairs of the partnership
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the basis of loss of range of motion, these determinations should, if feasible, be “portray[ed]” (§ 4.40) in terms of the degree of additional range-of-motion loss due to pain on use or during flare-ups. Cf. Lathan v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 359, 367 (1995) (in ordering medical opinion on remand in dependency and indemnity compensation case, VA should “consider the feasibility of requesting that the physician express in percentage terms the probability that the veteran’s service-connected disability caused or contributed to death”). The Court holds that DC 5201 does not subsume 38 C.F.R. § 4.40, and that 38 C.F.R. § 4.14 does not forbid consideration of a higher rating based on a greater limitation of motion due to pain on use including during flare-ups. See Schafmth, 1 VetApp. at 592-93 (<HOLDING>); see also Quarles v. Derwinski, 3 Vet.App.

    ### Response:
    holding that bvas failure to consider  440 was improper when that regulation had been made potentially applicable through assertions and issues raised in record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    report contained information based on interviews with appellant, her daughters, and others. Because Dr. DeYoub did not testify, it is impossible to determine from the report which of Dr. DeYoub’s conclusions were based on his direct observations of appellant, and which were based on the statements of other persons. Relatedly, it is impossible to determine which conclusions relied upon by the court were based on hearsay, or even double-hearsay, let alone determine if those statements might still be admissible under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as, for example, that found in Rule 803(4) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. Therefore, it was error for the circuit court to admit Dr. DeYoub’s report. See New Empire Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 235 Ark 758, 352 S.W.2d 4 (1962) (<HOLDING>). Second, the trial judge relied upon Dr.

    ### Response:
    holding the report of doctor who was not present to testify and whose deposition had not been taken was properly excluded in action by insured against insurer on accident policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and ‘strongly recommend[ed]’ separate representation.” Id. at 2. Each Defendant thereafter executed a written Waiver of Right to Separate Representation. Dr. Migliaccio argues that such a waiver, based on specific knowledge of a contingent event, becomes void upon the happening of that contingency. We have found no authority to support this proposition. Instead, we look to the totality of the circumstances here — including each informative discussion of joint representation — to determine whether the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights have been violated. See Rodriguez, 968 F.2d at 139 (deeming “facts and circumstances” more significant than “the exact words used by the trial judge” to a waiver examination). Cf. United States v. Solomon, 856 F.2d 1572, 1580-81 (11th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1070, 109 S.Ct. 1352,

    ### Response:
    holding magistrates pretrial hearing sufficient under rule 44c and considering the district courts cursory questioning as well
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While Class counsel contended during his closing argument that Dr. Singer properly considered Comcast’s lobbying activities as evidence of its anti-competitive purpose and motives (N.T. 11/16/2009 at 30:15-31:19), “parties who petition the government for governmental action favorable to them cannot be prosecuted under the antitrust laws even though their petitions are motivated by anticompetitive intent.” Video Int’l Prod,., Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir.1988); see also Westmac, Inc. v. Smith, 797 F.2d 313, 315 (6th Cir.1986) (“[G]enuine attempts to influence passage or enforcement of laws are immune from antitrust scrutiny, regardless of the anticompetitive purpose behind such attempts.”); Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1259 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Zimomra v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that noerrpennington doctrine exempts from antitrust liability any legitimate use of the political process by private individuals even if their intent is to eliminate competition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conditions exist that may at some unknown future date be suffered by some unknown minors."" Brief of Amici New Hampshire Legislators at 8. In fact, Dr. Wayne Goldner listed in his unopposed declaration five specific conditions that could require abortion to protect a minor’s health: preeclampsia, eclampsia, premature rupture of the membranes surrounding the fetus, spontaneous chorioamnionitis, and heavy bleeding during pregnancy. Declaration of Wayne Goldner, M.D., ¶¶ 8-15. Moreover, appellee abortion providers themselves face an imminent injury — civil or criminal prosecution for performing an abortion in violation of the Act — sufficient to confer on them Article III standing. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Because of their close relationship to the

    ### Response:
    holding that physician abortion providers asserting their own rights and those of their patients had standing to challenge abortion regulation and should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in many cases with the problem of making difficult and time-consuming factual determinations based on stale records. We believe that a court’s time and energy would be better spent in handling its current caseload.... Glenn, 558 So.2d at 8; see also Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (refusing to apply a new rule retroactively to child abuse cases because it “would require courts to revisit numerous final convictions and to extensively review stale records”); Williams, 421 So.2d at 515 (refusing to apply a new rule retroactively because it would entail hearings with “evidence possibly long since destroyed, misplaced, or deteriorated” and witnesses who “may not be available or [whose] memory might be dimmed”); [State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 64 P.3d 828, 835 (Ariz. 2003) ] (<HOLDING>). 904 So.2d at 411-12. Thus, we concluded that

    ### Response:
    recognizing that conducting new sentencing hearings for arizonas 90 death row prisoners many requiring witnesses no longer available would impose a substantial and unjustified burden on arizonas administration of justice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between the two.” Fortress Bible, 694 F.3d at 219. Among the .types of burdens the courts have found to be minimal, and hence not protected by RLUIPA, are facially neutral permit and variance requirements. Thus, courts have regularly found that zoning ordinances that merely require religious institutions to go through a routine permit or variance application process do not run afoul of RLUIPA.. See, e.g., id. (“A denial of a religious institution’s building application is likely not a substantial burden if ""it leaves open the possibility of modification and resubmission.”); Konikov v. Orange Cty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir.2005) (“[Requiring applications for- variances, special permits, or other relief provisions [does] not offend RLUÍPA’s goals.”); San Jose, 360 F.3d at 1035-36 (<HOLDING>)""; Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City

    ### Response:
    holding that a citys requirement that the plaintiff refile a complete permit application did not constitute a substantial burden
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    148 Cal.Rptr. 389, 582 P.2d 980 (1978); Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal.3d 105, 111, 284 Cal.Rptr. 318, 813 P.2d 1348 (1991). Though not the only factors that can be considered in a trade secret misappropriation case, see Biocore, Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 2004 WL 303194, at *4 (D.Kan. Feb. 2, 2004), both Mattel and MGA request their application here. B. Discussion 1. Nature of the Misconduct The jury found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mattel willfully and maliciously misappropriated MGA’s trade secret information. Some courts treat a finding of willful and malicious misappropriation as support for the “maximum possible amount in exemplary damages.” 02 Micro. Intern., 399 F.Supp.2d at 1079; see also Lundquist v. Reusser, 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1214, 31 Cal.Rptr .2d 776, 875 P.2d 1279 (1994) (<HOLDING>). But this approach strips the Court of its

    ### Response:
    recognizing relationship between malice and reprehensibility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In other words, it was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to conclude that veniremember 52 was more certain and sincere in her subsequent change of answer than Robertson. Viewing the entire record as a whole, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor’s failure to strike veniremember 52 raises an inference of Robertson’s disparate treatment because of race and that the prosecutor’s explanation for striking Robertson was a pretext. iv) Robertson and Veniremember 33 Finally, we consider venire-member 38. Both veniremember 33 and Robertson provided the same answer to the prosecutor’s question regarding a potential life sentence and both were passively rehabilitated on this issue by appellant’s trial attorney. However, a review of the entire record supports the conclusion that th .App.1990) (<HOLDING>). Nor has appellant’s counsel presented

    ### Response:
    holding that production of a prosecutors juror information notes is both necessary and proper when prosecutor refreshes his memory regarding the exercise of peremptory challenges by reviewing those notes before giving testimony at batson hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Adhin, 44 So.3d at 1251-52; Avalon Assocs. of Del. Ltd. v. Avalon Park Assocs., Inc., 760 So.2d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Standing to record a lis pendens only requires a complaint that supports a claim against the specific property. Tortu v. Tortu, 430 So.2d 531, 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). On the other hand, standing to contest the validity of a mortgage belongs to the mortgagor and to third persons whose rights or interests are adversely affected by the mortgage, such as junior mortgagees or creditors with an interest or lien in Property. While their claims may have been sufficient to allow the recording of a lis pendens, as the Krauses concede, the notice did not create any interest or substantive rights in the Property. Adhin, 44 So.3d at 1251-52. d 877, 892 (La.Ct.App. 2003) (<HOLDING>); 7 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of

    ### Response:
    holding that where there was question of impropriety of party to mortgage corporate property only the corporation would have standing to complain of his unauthorized act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were generally unclear and it appears this money was completely commingled with strictly ""marital"" income. There is no indication or argument that Vonderahe improperly used this social security money for his own benefit and deprived his step-daughter of its use, nor that he ever requested that any withdrawal from her accounts be made to pay for ordinary household expenses. In fact, there is evidence that Fobar used it for her own personal benefit, as she testified that she used her daughter's social security money to pay for her own (Fo-bar's) college education. Under the circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding more property to Fobar based on her daughter's social security income. Cf. Gower v. Gower, 427 N.E.2d 703, 707-08 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion The dissolution decree is not void

    ### Response:
    holding trial court had no authority to award portion of the marital property to wifes children from another marriage even though money they received by way of social security benefits were commingled with the marital estate and used in part for the aequisition of marital property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the named driver exclusion is placed at the end of the policy rather than in the UM/UIM coverage part. But the placement of the exclusion after the “general provisions” of the policy is entirely consistent with an interpretation of the exclusion as applying to “any claim,” regardless of the specific coverage under which the claimant seeks to recover. If, in fact, the exclusion applies only to the liability coverage, as plaintiffs contend, it is more logical that the exclusion would have been placed in the policy part for “liability to others.” We do not think the location of the exclusion supports an interpretation limiting the exclusion to the liability coverage. See Rockford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 217 Ill.App.3d 181, 160 Ill.Dec. 187, 576 N.E.2d 1141, 1144-45 (1991) (<HOLDING>). In summary, we hold the named driver

    ### Response:
    holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous exclusion applied to all coverage afforded by the policy including the um coverage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mr. Brennan further testified that based on his examination of the project as compared with Morganti’s as-planned WC01 schedule and as-built progress from February 22, 1996, through termination, it was his opinion that any delays that occurred beyond WC01 were caused by Morganti and not the actions of the FBOP. As noted above, Mr. Brennan did not consider the parties’ Schedule B Agreement regarding the use of Morganti’s WC04 schedule as a baseline for measuring progress and delays, and thus his analysis disregards the parties’ stated intent. In such circumstances, the court’s role is to comb through the evidence and determine whether, based on the record, Morganti was entitled to any time beyond December 31, 1996, for critical path delays caused by Mod 192. Law, 195 Ct.Cl. at 386-87 (<HOLDING>). Although the court’s analysis “takes into

    ### Response:
    holding court may rely on other evidence in the record where plaintiffs total time theory has been rejected
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    York Univ. v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 N.Y.2d 308, 318, 639 N.Y.S.2d 283, 662 N.E.2d 763 (1995)); cf. James v. Heritage Valley Fed. Credit Union, 197 Fed.Appx. 102, 106 (3d Cir.2006) (“[Plaintiffs] claim under the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318, does not authorize a private cause of action against a financial institution or its employees.”), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 939, 127 S.Ct. 2253, 167 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2007). Because the Bank Secrecy Act does not permit a private right of action, it follows that it cannot be construed as giving rise to a duty of care flowing to plaintiffs in this case. Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiffs have not alleged a duty U.S. Bank owed to plaintiffs. Therefore, U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim i a 1996) (<HOLDING>). In extending liability to professionals such

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the duty has been applied to accountants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mot. Dis. at 3^4. b. Plaintiffs Response. Plaintiff offers no response to the Government’s argument. c. The Court’s Resolution. The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over claims asserted under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Murray v. United States, 817 F.2d 1580, 1583-84 (Fed.Cir.1987) (“Although the Claims Court has jurisdiction over a[t]aking claim, the more difficult question is whether the [plaintiff has] stated such a claim in this ease”). To invoke the court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiff must admit that the Government’s taking was authorized, because an actionable “takings” can only result from authorized federal actions. See Acadia Tech., Inc. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1327, 1329-32 (Fed.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Blanchette v. Connecticut General

    ### Response:
    holding that in a takings case the court assumes that the underlying action was lawful and decides only whether the governmental action in question constituted a taking for which compensation must be paid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the phrase refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.”) 2 . The district court entered judgment in favor of the third defendant in the bench trial, finding that Slep-Tone did not prove that defendant used the SOUND CHOICE trademark. Slep-Tone has not appealed the district court's ruling as to that defendant. 3 . At the time Slep-Tone filed its notice of appeal, there was not a final judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because its claim against one defendant (who did not participate in the bench trial and who is not a party to this appeal) had been dismissed without prejudice. See Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1978) (<HOLDING>); see also Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20,

    ### Response:
    holding that a partial adjudication on the merits followed by a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the remaining claims is not a final judgment that gives rise to appellate jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the public for sale,’ was not a catch-all phrase ... but instead should be construed under the doctrine of ejusdem generis as a comprehensive definition intended to incorporate other products or services similar in nature to those enumerated by the specific words which pre g Co., 226 F.Supp.2d 557, 561 (D.N.J.2002) (finding that the services which the plaintiff consumed, consisting of maintaining accounting records, tracking inventory, and providing data reports, were not things which the defendant sold to the public, but were incidental to a contract for the sale of products and, therefore, was not afforded the protection of the NJCFA); Shogen v. Global Aggressive Growth Fund, Ltd., No. 04-5695-SRC, 2007 WL 1237829, at *8, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31093, at *23-24 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2007) (<HOLDING>). The services which the defendants provided to

    ### Response:
    holding that a certain loan transaction was not merchandise and not available to the consumer in the popular sense where it was not advertised to the public available to consumers in the ordinary market place mass produced or available in large quantities but that it was more accurately characterized as a rare specialized and complex transaction whose availability is restricted to a small number of corporate insiders who hold a significant volume of corporate stock
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Transfer Venue of June 19,1998. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY In the spring of 1997, Plaintiff, a resident of Louisiana, served as Second. Captain aboard the M/V JIM BORDELON while the vessel was chartered to a survey company working off the coast of Texas. On May 4 of that year, the vessel was assisting in surveys off the coast of High Island, Texas. During a period of heavy seas, Plaintiff allegedly suffered an injury to his back when he was thrown from his bunk. He did not receive medical attention until he went to a hospital emergency room after leaving the vessel. On March 10,1998, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division. D ir.1966) (<HOLDING>). The Court weighs the following fa tors when

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the action should be transferred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Farmer v. Circuit Court of Md. for Balt. Cty., 31 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 1994) (“There is ... authority for treating sufficiently diligent, though unavailing, efforts to exhaust as, effectively, exhaustion, and for excusing efforts sufficiently shown to be futile in the face of. state dilatoriness or recalcitrance.”). Here, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals took over 20 years to decide Plymail’s direct appeal of his criminal conviction. Our sister circuits have found much shorter delays sufficient to excuse the exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Lee v. Stickman, 357 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is difficult to envision any amount of progress justifying an eight-year delay in reaching the merits of a petition.”); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). The magistrate judge and the district court

    ### Response:
    holding in the context of fouryear delay that a prisoner need not fully exhaust his state remedies if the root of his complaint is his inability to do so
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1 (1978)). In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, “[t]he verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this court does not “weigh the evidence or review the credibility of the witnesses.” United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir.1997). When the evidence supports differing reasonable interpretations, the Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kimble, 178 F.3d 1163, 1168

    ### Response:
    holding that the presence requirement of the carjacking statute was satisfied when keys were taken from a bank employee whose car was parked in a parking lot outside the bank
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not, in itself, confer a liberty interest in a full-time education. Giano, supra, at *3. Prison officials need not provide an educational program tailored to the specific needs and circumstances of the inmate. Gi-ano, supra, at *3 (“neither § 136 nor DOCS policies require a prison to provide an inmate with specialized educational programs”); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F.Supp. 1019, 1041 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (“only the provision of no ed ucation at all or education that was wholly unsuited to the goals of a particular inmate’s socialization and rehabilitation trigger due process protections” under § 136); Jones v. Grunewarld, 644 F.Supp. 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (§ 136 does not provide an inmate a protected property interest in a' scholarship); Lane v. Reid, 575 F.Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (<HOLDING>). Federal courts have, moreover, consistently

    ### Response:
    holding that  136 does not provide inmate a protected property interest in full time program of education
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2011 WL 4537877, at *12. In other words, only certain portions of the influenza virus generated a cross-reactive immune response. Petitioner provided no evidence that the portions of the influenza virus shown by Wucherpfennig to mimic myelin basic protein were present in the influenza vaccine Petitioner received. Special Masters Decision, 2011 WL 4537877, at *12. Petitioner also did not provide evidence that any peptide from the influenza vaccine he received was cross-reactive with myelin basic protein-specific T-cells. Id. The special master reasonably considered the lack of evidence connecting the cross-reactivity observed by Wucherpfennig to the facts of Petitioner’s case to weigh “against finding that Dr. Tornatore’s opinion is persuasive.” Id.; see Moberly, 592 F.3d at 1824 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the special master credited several

    ### Response:
    holding special master did not err in rejecting a theory of causation where there was no evidence in the record suggesting that the proposed mechanism was at work in the petitioners case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which Hinton and Wachovia agreed states that if Hinton breaches, Wachovia is entitled to foreclose on the property. On this basis, Wachovia contends that it was entitled to reject Hinton’s October payment and initiate foreclosure proceedings on the home. Hinton’s claim that Wachovia breached the May DFA by failing to state a sum certain for the “regular payment” amount is without merit. Hinton cites no authority for this proposition, and we have found none. An ambiguous term in the contract does not amount to a breach by the drafter. Rather, a significant disagreement over the meaning of a contract term could vitiate mutual assent, and thus no contract would ever have been formed. See Higgins v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, Local #3-677, 811 S.W.2d 875, 879-81 (Tenn.1991) (<HOLDING>); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20(1)

    ### Response:
    holding that both the lack of mutual assent and the indefiniteness of contract terms negate the existence of a contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of regulating the commerce in agricultural commodities itself. But because futures contracts do conLain a provision for delivery as an optional mode of compliance with obligations created by such contracts, rare as the exercise of that option is, it isn’t always easy to determine just from the language of a contract for the sale of a commodity whether it is a futures contract or a forward contract. Nagel, 217 F.3d at 440. 11 . The quoted language appears identically in each of the Producers’ affidavits. 12 . This court is no stranger to either the Eighth Circuit's decision in Camfield nor its application. This court has applied the Cam-field decision in several of its prior published decisions. See generally Waitek v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 908 F.Supp. 672 (N.D.Iowa 1995) (<HOLDING>); Kunzman v. Enron Corp., 902 F.Supp. 882

    ### Response:
    holding that physicians affidavit created genuine issue of material fact even though it directly contradicted his prior deposition testimony where physician offered a plausible explanation for the change in his testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    144, 144 (712 SE2d 139) (2011). 2 CODIS, the Combined DNA Indexing System, is a database of DNA profiles linked among the states through the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 3 See OCGA § 16-4-8. 4 See former OCGA § 16-7-1 (a) (1980). 5 See former OCGA § 16-6-1 (a) (1) (2006). 6 See former OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (2006). 7 See OCGA §§ 16-4-1; 16-8-41 (a). 8 See former OCGA § 16-5-40 (a), (b) (4) (2006). 9 See OCGA § 16-5-41 (a). 10 See OCGA § 16-11-106 (b). 11 See former OCGA § 16-11-131 (b) (2000). 12 Cook had not been apprehended at the time of (786 SE2d 882) (2016) (punctuation omitted). 24 See Jackson, 443 U. S. at 3 al court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to sever given that trial of only two defendants would not create confusion). 30 See McClendon, 299 Ga. at 615 (3) (<HOLDING>); Jones, 318 Ga. App. at 36 (5) (same). 31 See

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to sever because codefendants defenses were not antagonistic
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that zoning and land use issues are traditionally significant to states. Thus, it is often appropriate for federal courts to abstain from deciding land use issues. Addiction Specialists, 411 F.3d at 409. Land-use policy is an area where “the tenets of federalism are particularly strong”'—so strong, in fact, that the Third Circuit had to specifically point out that federal courts should not automatically abstain in cases involving land use regulation. Izzo v. Borough of River Edge, 843 F.2d 765, 769 (3d Cir.1988). As Justice Alito said when sitting on the Third Circuit, “[l]and-use decisions are matters of local concern” and a federal court should not act as a “zoning board of appeals.” United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 402 (3d. Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In land use cases, of course, an important

    ### Response:
    holding that the shocks the conscience test was appropriate to evaluate whether executive conduct violated the substantive due process clause in a landuse decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Pl.’s Opp. at 20.) Plaintiff is correct that subsection (d)(2) of section 476 authorizes Indian tribes to bring lawsuits “to enforce the provisions” of the IRA in federal court; however, this language alone does not a sovereign immunity waiver make. Indeed, as this Court reads subsection (d)(2), Congress is speaking to the power of a federal court to consider cases of this nature (actions to enforce the provisions of the IRA), and does not mention who may properly be named as a defendant in any such suit, much less expressly permit such enforcement actions to proceed against the United States. Consequently, subsection (d)(2) is, at most, ambiguous as far as the defense of sovereign immunity is concerned, and that section therefore fails to qualif ’n, 89 F.3d 897, 901 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Instead, courts considering whether a

    ### Response:
    holding that 28 usc  1361 which provides that district courts shall have original jurisdiction  to compel an officer or employee of the united states  to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    477 F.Supp. 1210, 1218 (E.D.Wis.1979), the court addressed a vagueness challenge to a provision prohibiting the use of sound amplification devices in a manner that “unreasonably interfere(s) with the use and enjoyment of the park or parkway by the public,” and held that the language was not excessively indefinite. And, the state supreme court unanimously upheld against a vagueness challenge a City of Madison ordinance prohibiting the making of “any noise tending to unreasonably disturb the peace and quiet of persons in the vicinity thereof.” Baumann, 162 Wis.2d at 665, 470 N.W.2d 296. The court stated that the reasonable-person standard was “one that has been relied f Charlotte, 706 F.2d 486, 489 (4th Cir.1983) (same); People v. Fitzgerald, 194 Colo. 415, 573 P.2d 100, 102-03 (1978) (<HOLDING>); State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345, 655 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that term unreasonable noise was not vague
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    59 (1960) (noting that a writ of error coram nobis was, at common law, a civil proceeding), appeal dismissed, 13 A.D.2d 518, 212 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1961). Most other jurisdictions agree that a proceeding on a writ of error coram nobis remains a civil matter independent of the underlying case even though its resolution may affect the underlying case. See generally Ex parte Wilson, 275 Ala. 439, 440, 155 So.2d 611, 612 (1963) (“Coram nobis proceedings are essentially civil in nature____”); State ex rel. Cutsinger v. Spencer, 219 Ind. 148, 155, 41 N.E.2d 601, 603 (1941) (“[T]he petition for the writ of error coram nobis must be considered a new proceeding, civil in nature____”); State v. Miller, 161 Kan. 210, 214, 166 P.2d 680, 683, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 749, 67 S.Ct. 76, 91 L.Ed. 646 (1946) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Sirles, 267 S.W.2d 66, 66

    ### Response:
    recognizing common law rule that the proceedings upon an application for a writ of error coram nobis were like proceedings in habeas corpus regarded as civil in character
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    340 (1992). In Denton, the Court reviewed a dismissal of an inmate’s suit brought under title 28, section 1915 of the United States Code, the federal in forma pauperis statute. 504 U.S. at 27, 112 S.Ct. 1728. The Court held that a dismissal under this statute is not a dismissal on the merits; rather, it is merely an exercise of the trial court’s discretion under the statute. See id. at 34, 112 S.Ct. 1728. Thus, when reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the inmate’s suit, the appellate court should consider whether the suit was dismissed with prejudice and if it was, determine whether the inmate’s error could be remedied. See id. If the error could be remedied, then a dismissal with prejudice is improper. Compare Denton, 504 U.S. at 27, 112 S.Ct. 1728 (<HOLDING>), with Hicks v. Brysch, 989 F.Supp. 797, 816

    ### Response:
    holding dismissal with prejudice improper when inmates error can be remedied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Procedures Act. Geathers v. 3V, Inc., 371 S.C. 570, 570, 641 S.E.2d 29, 32 (2007). Pursuant to section 1-23-390 of the South Carolina Code, “An aggrieved party may obtain a review of a final judgment of the circuit court or the court of appeals pursuant to this article by taking an appeal in the manner provided by the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules as in other civil cases.” S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-390 (Supp.2006) (emphasis added). Thus, our courts, “have consistently held that an order of the circuit court remanding a case for additional proceedings before an administrative agency is not directly appealable.” Montjoy v. Asten-Hill Dryer Fabrics, 316 S.C. 52, 52, 446 S.E.2d 618, 618 (1994). See also Davis v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 287 S.C. 121, 122, 337 S.E.2d 238, 239 (Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>); Owens v. Canal Wood Corp., 281 S.C. 491,

    ### Response:
    holding an appeal from a circuit court order remanding a workers compensation case for the purpose of making specific findings of fact is interlocutory and not reviewable by the court of appeals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    member. For example, in Dietz v. St. Edward’s Catholic Church (In re Bargfrede), 117 F.3d 1078, 1079 (8th Cir.1997), a husband used his assets to help pay his wife’s judgment debt to her church for embezzlement. The Eighth Circuit held that the husband’s claimed receipt of “benefits in the form of a release of a possible burden on the marital relationship and the preservation of the family relationship” were “indirect, non-economic benefits” to the husband that “do not constitute reasonably equivalent value.” Id. at 1080 (citations omitted). The court cited with approval cases holding that “moral obligations,” “love and affection,” and “spiritual fulfillment” are not reasonably equivalent value. Id. See also Walker v. Treadwell (In re Treadwell), 699 F.2d 1050, 1051 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Zubrod v. Kelsey (In re Kelsey), 270 B.R.

    ### Response:
    holding that debtors receipt of love and affection from his two daughters in exchange for transfers of money was not reasonably equivalent value such love and affection is of no benefit to the creditors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    liability of the defen-dani/third-party plaintiff being reduced by a corresponding percentage. See Alaska R. Civ. P. 14(c) (providing that “[j]udgment may be entered against a third-party defendant in favor of the plaintiff in accordance with the third-party defendant’s respective percentage of fault”). C. Analysis of the State’s Arguments. The State first argues that section 09.17.080 (1996) creates no legal duty between a defendant/third-party plaintiff and a third-party defendant. The State then reasons that the claim by the United States for equitable apportionment is, in essence, nothing more than a claim asserted on behalf of a private-citizen plaintiff, who is barred from asserting a claim directly. (2d Cir.1988) (same); Parks v. United States, 784 F.2d 20, 23-25 (1st Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Despite the distinction that Alaska law draws

    ### Response:
    holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar the united states from asserting an indemnity claim against a state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    legislation because it “grants Native Americans a right not enjoyed by other Americans, that is, a right to the protection of a special ethnic-based trademark for its style of goods that is not available to any other race or ethnicity.” (Def.’s Mem. 28.) As such, Specialties argues, the IACA should be subjected to strict scrutiny, a test it cannot survive. But the Supreme Court has established that statutes providing for special treatment of Indians will not be disturbed “[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974); see also United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 & n. 6, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, federal courts have long

    ### Response:
    holding that federal legislation with respect to indian tribes  is not based upon impermissible racial classifications and noting that article i  8 of the constitution gives congress the power to regulate commerce  with the indian tribes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The trial judge must undertake the familiar balancing process in which the relative degrees of relevance and prejudice are weighed and determined.... Id. at 773, 774. In homicide cases, “if there is no defense which brings into issue the state of mind of the deceased, evidence of fears or other emotions is ordinarily not relevant. But where a defense such as that of accident or self-defense is interposed ..., courts have generally allowed the admission of evidence of the victim’s fears, as probative of the question whether that person would have been likely to do the acts claimed by the defendant.” State v. Parr, 93 Wash.2d 95, 606 P.2d 263, 267 (1980). See also People v. Atchley, 53 Cal.2d 160, 346 P.2d 764 (1959), cert. dismissed 366 U.S. 207, 81 S.Ct. 1051, 6 L.Ed.2d 233 (1961) (<HOLDING>); People v. Finch, 213 Cal.App.2d 752, 29

    ### Response:
    holding admissible a letter which a woman had purportedly written to a judge 2 days before her death stating that her husband had threatened her and she feared him where the defendant husband claimed she had threatened him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1948) (Police officers conducted an illegal, warrantless search of the room McDonald was renting in a boarding house and seized allegedly illegal items that belonged to him. He and his guest were arrested as a result of the search, were jointly tried, and were parties to the appeal. After concluding that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the illegal search, the Supreme Court of the United States held that such failure was prejudicial to both McDonald and his guest, noting that if the evidence had been properly suppressed, it would have been unavailable for the State to use against either defendant at trial. Thus, the Court reversed both defendants’ convictions.). 15 See generally McBee v. State, 296 Ga. App. 42,44 (1) (673 SE2d 569) (2009) (<HOLDING>). 16 The record shows that, after Jalim’s truck

    ### Response:
    holding that even if an officer has an ulterior motive that does not authorize him to conduct a traffic stop of a particular vehicle he may still lawfully execute the stop if he observes the driver violate a traffic law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    D.C. Circuit, which held that “a party waives its work product protection in civil litigation if it discloses the privileged material to anyone without ‘common interests in developing legal theories and analyses of documents.’ ” In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 817 & n. 97 (D.C.Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. AT & T Co., 642 F.2d 1285,1300 (D.C.Cir.1980)). Steinhardt is particularly instructive. The defendants in Steinhardt were sued in a private class action for allegedly manipulating the market in two-year Treas d that there “may” not be waiver where the disclosing party and the government “share a common interest in developing legal theories and analyzing information, or situations in which the government and the dis in in the days and weeks bef .R.D. 113, 115-17 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>); Verschoth v. Time Warner, Inc., No. 00 Civ.

    ### Response:
    holding work product protection waived for disclosures to independent auditor who did not share common interests with corporation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 668, 671, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988). 11 . Id. 108 S.Ct. at 672. 12 . 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301-02. 13 . Id. § 2301(b)(2); Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir.1991). 14 . Id. § 2302(b)(11). 15 . These remedies were refined and enhanced by the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 § 3(a)(8), Pub.L. No. 101-12 § 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 16, 18. We discuss the CSRA’s original, unamended remedies, because they were in effect when the events in this case took place. 16 . Bush, 103 S.Ct. at 2406 (emphasis added). 17 . Furthermore, even if we accepted the assumption that the Rollinses’ protected activity was not directly related to the job, some cases have applied Bush even in such circumstances. E.g., Kotarski v. Cooper, 866 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The Rollinses insist that none of Mrs.

    ### Response:
    holding bush applicable when federal employee demoted allegedly because his supervisor disapproved of his living arrangements with woman friend
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the officers received reports of a man walking wet and barefoot through a neighborhood while talking to himself. It is not a stretch to imagine that such a person could have needed medical assistance or could have been under the influence of drugs or alcohol or suffering from a mental illness. The officers located Cady, who matched the description in the reports, approached him, inquired into his identity and well-being, and let him leave without hindering his departure in any way. Although a 20-minute encounter strikes us as lengthy for such an inquiry, the duration of the encounter is reasonable in light of the fact that Cady engaged the officers in a discussion about religion and his rights. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687-88, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Robinson, 30 F.3d 774, 784

    ### Response:
    holding that 20minute stop was not unreasonable where the suspects actions contributed to delay about which he complained
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Oct. 29, 2007). Plaintiffs’ conversion claim with respect to the business documents, including the client list, fails as a matter of law. While Belliard did assume or exercise control over Pure Power’s client list to the extent that he accessed the client list from a Pure Power computer and downloaded it onto a thumb drive, Belliard possessed only a copy of the client list and did not, in any way, limit or otherwise deprive Pure Power of possession or use of that list. See Hair Say, Ltd. v. Salon Opus, Inc., 6 Misc.3d 1041(A), No. 5106-01(LBA), 2005 WL 697538, at *5 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Mar. 17, 2005) (granting summary judgment on a conversion claim where plaintiff retained possession of a list of beauty salon clients that had been copied by defendants); Alpha Funding, 2007 WL 3375871, at *7 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, although the Court concludes that

    ### Response:
    holding that where plaintiff did not allege that it was deprived of or excluded from use of its own customer lists it could not establish conversion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a subjective standard for evaluating a claim of duress. Eymard v. Terrebonne, 560 So.2d 887, 890 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 567 So.2d 614 (La.1990). The fear must be “reasonable” and of “unjust and considerable injury"" to one’s person, property or reputation. Id. 560 So.2d at 890. Even if Witter could prove that his creditors “pressured” him into entering the agreement with Dornier in order to obtain favorable financial treatment, these actions would not, as a matter of law, constitute legal duress. There is no allegation by Witter that his creditors’ actions were unjust or unfounded in any way. Further, the emotional strain Witter may have experienced from his divorce is also insufficient to establish legal duress. See Adams v. Adams, 503 So.2d 1052, 1057 (La.App.2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, there is no material issue of fact

    ### Response:
    holding that the conflicting emotions caused by the strain of going through a critical period in ones life such as a separation from a spouse and the resulting division of property is not the type of strain constituting legal duress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ¶ 127.) The Complaints plausibly allege that a no-AG agreement is both very valuable to a generic manufacturer (and thus may induce it to stay out of the market) and amounts to a sacrifice by a brand manufacturer, rendering the potential anticompetitive effect plain. On a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this is sufficient. See Aggrenox I, 94 F.Supp.3d at 245 (“If some particular transfer of money would be unlawful—for whatever reason— its unlawfulness is not cured merely because the value is transferred in the form of exclusive licenses instead of cash, irrespective of whether the grant of an exclusive license would otherwise be valid.... The issue is not whether the form of the payment was legal, but whether the purpose of the payment was legal.”); see also Lamictal, 791 F.3d at 409 (<HOLDING>); Opana, 162 F.Supp.3d at 718; In re Solodyn

    ### Response:
    holding that a noag agreement because it may represent an unusual unexplained transfer of value from the patent holder to the alleged infringer that cannot be adequately justifiedwhether as compensation for litigation expenses or services or otherwiseis subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason internal footnote omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other crimes evidence was not “substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice or other considerations under Rule 403: [T]he probative value is strong because the other crimes would show how the relationships between [certain] alleged co-conspirators developed and their motives for acting, within the relevant time frame. The danger of unfair prejudice is fairly low because, except perhaps for the [excluded] Gopaul hostage taking, the other crimes evidence “adds no emotional or other pejorative emphasis not already introduced by the evidence” of the charged offense. Straker, 567 F.Supp.2d at 177-79 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Lawson, 410 F.3d 735, 742 (D.C.Cir.2005)); see also United States v. Cheng, No. 97-1016, 1997 WL 738588, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 1997) (<HOLDING>). The Court reached the same conclusion for the

    ### Response:
    holding that the rule 403 balancing favored admissibility where the uncharged kidnapping was not more sensational or inflammatory than the charged crimes while tending to show how the relationships formed among the conspirators
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    may limit affirmative defenses to a particular category of crimes without offending due process). Thus, the General Assembly may establish affirmative defenses and limit the cireumstances in which they apply, as long as they do not intrude on other constitutional protections. Id. 119 The separation of powers doe-trine ""does not require a complete division of authority among the three branches, however, and the powers exercised by different branches of government necessarily overlap."" Crowe, 126 P.3d at 205-06 (quoting Dee Enters. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 89 P.3d 430, 433 (Colo.App.2003)). The authority of the judicial and legislative branches commonly overlaps because the distinction between procedural rules and substantive law is often blurred. See Wiedemer, 852 P.2d at 436 (<HOLDING>); People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 371, 585

    ### Response:
    holding that statutes of limitation although indirectly affecting court procedure primarily concerned a matter of public policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Javin Partnership, 15 N.J. Tax 88, 94-95 (Tax 1995). However, in interpreting Chapter 117, a number of cases created a distinction between “special purpose” and “general purpose” property. See Texas Eastern Trans. Corp. v. Department of Treasury, Div. of Taxation, 11 N.J.Tax 198 (Tax 1990). Special purpose property has unique physical design, special construction materials, or layout that restricts its utility to the use for which it was built. Id. at 209 n. 2. In Texas Eastern, the court concluded that regulations of the Division of Taxation, which were meant to clarify the terms “structure,” “material injury,” and “machinery, apparatus or equipment” in Chapter 117, were not reasonably related to special purpose property. Badische Corp. v. Town of Kearny, 11 N.J.Tax 385 (Tax 1990) (<HOLDING>); Texas Eastern, supra, 11 N.J. Tax 198

    ### Response:
    holding batch ester plant machinery real property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to find that it was being utilized as a commercial establishment related to the distribution of powdered and crack cocaine. Consequently, like the defendant in Talley, Thornton did not have a legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in 2316 Eastview Avenue. Moreover, in the absence of evidence that Thornton was inside the house at 2316 Eastview Avenue with the permission of the person having authority over it, this Court must conclude that he was a trespasser. The Sixth Circuit has held that trespassers do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place on which they are trespassing. United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1067, 126 S.Ct. 810, 163 L.Ed.2d 637 (2005). See also, United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708; 711 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). However, even if the evidence had established

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant who had been living in a vacant house for approximately one week failed to demonstrate that he had a legitimate ex pectation of privacy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    event KPMG went out of business. Id. at 610-11. The court found class counsel’s skill and efficiency in obtaining the settlement weighed in favor of approving the fee request, finding class counsel to be “extraordinarily deft and efficient in handling this most complex matter” and concluding “it would be hard to equal the skill class counsel demonstrated here.” Id. at 611. Performing a lodestar cross-check to confirm the fees’ reasonableness, the court found a “handsome,” yet “fairly common” lodestar multiplier of 4.07 based upon 12,906 hours billed since the fee application in Rite Aid I at an hourly rate of $605. Id. at 611 and n. 10. For those reasons, the District Court denied Kaufmann’s objections and awarded class counsel the requested fees plus reimbur 1304, 1307 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The 2003 Amendment to Fed. R.Civ.P. 23 added

    ### Response:
    holding that an unnamed plaintiff that did not intervene nonetheless had standing to appeal a class action settlement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We cannot conclude that the state’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent because there is no precedent that is clearly applicable to these facts. The Supreme Court has held that any admission at trial of post-Miranda silence is a violation of a defendant’s due process rights. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). However, the Court allows the admission of a defendant’s pre-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes when a defendant testifies at trial. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982). Although Valentine’s sile 9th Cir.2000) (same) with United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568

    ### Response:
    holding that when no governmental action induced postarrest pr emiranda silence it could be introduced as evidence of guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entry “by means of specious documentation that concealed] the illegality of his presence,” United States v. Rivera-Ventu-ra, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir.1995), we hold that the statute of limitations was not triggered at the time he reentered the country, but rather at the time that he was “found in” the United States by immigration authorities. See id. at 282. We therefore conclude that the filing of the indictment approximately two-and-a-half years after Acevedo’s discovery was timely. For this reason, trial counsel’s alleged failure to raise or investigate further a statute of limitations defense could not have prejudiced Acevedo, and, therefore, his ineffective assistance claims on this ground fail. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Acevedo raises numerous other arguments on

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant must show actual prejudice to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    same was expected for the swim on the day of the incident. This testimony raises the question whether the Scouts were in fact like any business invitee (user) to whom the school district owed a duty of reasonable care to avoid a risk of harm. See SCRA 1986, 13-1309 (Repl.Pamp.1991) (owner of a building owes business visitor the duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises safe); Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 157, 824 P.2d 293, 297 (1992) (“in a place of public accommodation, an occupier of the premises owes a duty to safeguard each business visitor whom the occupier reasonably may foresee could be injured by a danger avoidable through reasonable precautions available to the occupier of the premises”); Castillo v. County of Santa Fe, 107 N.M. 204, 205, 755 P.2d 48, 49 (1988) (<HOLDING>). The duty of the owner or occupier includes

    ### Response:
    holding that tort claims act contemplates waiver of immunity when negligence of public employees causes unsafe dangerous or defective condition on property owned and operated by the government
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the Supreme Court of the United States from all such final decisions.” Id. It is in light of this historic and statutory backdrop that we must consider the nature of our review of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands’ decisions. At the outset, we identify three possible standards of review that we might apply to a decision of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court. First, we might define our role as that of a “super-Supreme Court,” with powers of review equivalent to that of a state Supreme Court reviewing the decision of an intermediary state appellate court. Second, our role might be framed as equivalent to that of the United States Supreme Court when it reviews decisions of a state Supreme Court. See, e.g., Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 521, 126 S.Ct. 1226, 163 L.Ed.2d 1112 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of

    ### Response:
    holding that supreme court possesses jurisdiction to review statecourt determinations that rest upon federal law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    enough that the attorney’s reading of the law is a reasonable one. Thus, once an attorney forms a reasonable opinion after conducting appropriate research, the mere fact that the attorney’s view of the law was wrong cannot support a finding' of a rule 11 violation. Sutliff, 846 P.2d at 1236 (citations omitted). Similarly, section 13 — 7—4(d) does not impose a duty on civil rights plaintiffs or their attorneys to perform perfect or exhaustive research or to reach the correct legal conclusion. It is enough that their efforts and reading of the law are reasonable. 12 . Our conclusion is consistent with the federal civil rights standard and those of several of our sibling states. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421-22, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700-01, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) (<HOLDING>); see also Sees v. KTUC, Inc., 714 P.2d 859,

    ### Response:
    holding that courts may award prevailing title vii defendant attorney fees upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous unreasonable or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad faith and fees also may be awarded if plaintiff continued to litigate after its action clearly became frivolous unreasonable or without foundation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Francisco J. Cosio, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s removal order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir.2006). We review de novo, Molinar-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir.2002), and deny the petition for review. Cosio’s 1988 conviction for possession for sale of a controlled substance constitutes an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (defining illicit trafficking in a controlled substance as an aggravated felony); see also Aragon-Ayon v. INS, 206 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Cosío was not eligible for a discretionary

    ### Response:
    holding that congress clearly manifested an intent for the amended definition of aggravated felo ny to apply retroactively to all defined offenses whenever committed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were controlling the cocaine market and that this shared nationality was relevant to the defendants’ guilt or innocence. Id. at 24. Racially inflammatory appeals by the government are unacceptable and mock any notion of racial fairness, which is “an indispensable ingredient of due process.” Id. at 24-25. The prosecutor who makes such appeals ignores the primary purpose and chief business of his client: to establish justice. Every prosecutor who makes a racial reference or comment, however, is not necessarily distorting the search for truth. Id. at 25. “An unembellished reference to evidence of race simply as a factor bolstering an eyewitness identification of a culprit, for example, poses no threat to purity of the trial. The line of demarcation is crossed, howeve , 542 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). When these factors (frequency and illegal

    ### Response:
    holding that a card identifying the defendant as a native colombian has an inherently prejudicial nature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 141, 116 L.Ed.2d 108 (1991). 3 . The facts alleged in Ms. Goren's complaint are different from those we evaluated in MCM Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assocs., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 977-79 (7th Cir.1995). In that case, the plaintiff alleged an ""association-in-fact"" enterprise consisting of several defendants and pursued RICO claims against ""lower rung"" members of the enterprise despite the fact that they had merely implemented the decisions of other members of the enterprise. The district court dismissed the claims against those defendants because, in its view, they did not play any role in the direction of the enterprise. We reversed and held that the defendants could be held liable because they had knowingly implemented the decisions of upper management and thereby part (<HOLDING>); University of Md. at Baltimore v. Peat,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant who was associated with the enterprise and engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity when he repeatedly violated the antifraud provisions of the securities laws was not liable under  1962c because he had no part in directing the enterprises affairs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1997) (unpublished disposition). The Court does not find those factual findings to be clearly erroneous. Therefore, the Court concludes that even if the letter had created a binding contract, Telelect was free to withdraw from the agreement given Baker’s inadequate performance. The Bankruptcy Court also considered whether the statements of policy published by Telelect and sent to Baker created a valid and binding contract under Virginia law. The trial court held that Telelect’s decision to send a copy of its statement of policy to Baker could imply a promise to abide by the terms of the statement as consideration for the distributor’s services. See In re JGB Industries, Adv. Proc. No. 96-3046 at 12-13 (citing Thompson v. American Motor Inns, Inc., 623 F.Supp. 409, 416-17 (W.D.Va.1985) (<HOLDING>); Michael v. Sentara Health System, 939 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    holding employee handbook or employers printed statement of policy are promises in implied offer of unilateral contract which an employee can accept by beginning or continuing to work for employer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the lack of objection from Plaintiff, the Court recommends the award of costs for all the 1,181 copies sought. Defendant also requests that it be allowed to recover $.19 per page for all recoverable copies. [D.E. 44]. In making this request, Defendant relies on Pawnbrokers and Secondhand Dealers Ass’n v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 711 F.Supp. 1084, 1086 (S.D.Fla.1989), which held that $.25 per page was reasonable. Id. In view of the advances in technology, however, a review of more recent cases in the Eleventh Circuit indicate that a rate of $.10 to $.14 per copy is more reasonable. Ferguson v. Bombardier Serv. Corp., 2007 WL 601921, * 6 (M.D.Fla. Feb. 21.2007) (reasonable rate of ten to fifteen cents per page); James v. Wash Depot Holdings, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 645, 652 (S.D.Fla.2007) (<HOLDING>). Applying the higher rate of $0.14 per copy to

    ### Response:
    holding reasonable rate of ten cents per page for copying in southern district nineteen to fifteen cents per page as unnecessarily high without factual support for increased rate for higher inhouse rate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255; (2) remand the claim to the district court for necessary factfinding; or (3) decide the claim on the record before us.” United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 468 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Morris, 350 F.3d 32, 39 (2d Cir.2003)). Marzo contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to realize, when advising him to admit to at least four instances of off-market trades, that Marzo could properly be found guilty on that conduct alone, without proof that he accepted cash kickbacks. We are not entirely convinced that Marzo’s counsel’s advice to admit to some off-market trades was unreasonable, rather than a reasonable strategic choice. See, e.g., Bell v. Miller, 500 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance  must overcome the presumption that under the circumstances the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Indiana-Kentucky Synod Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, 860 F.Supp. 1194, 1199 (W.D.Ky.1994) (""The alleged defamatory statements were made in connection with the mediation process and strictly within the confines of the church. There can be no doubt that the matters in this case concerned the minister’s current and future employment relationship with the church. As such, th 'y, 738 A.2d 839, 848 (Me.1999) (stating in dicta that ‘[a]llowing a secular court or jury to determine whether a church and its clergy have sufficiently disciplined, sanctioned, or counseled a church member would insert the State into church matters in a fashion wholly forbidden by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment’); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 444 (Me.1997) (<HOLDING>); Michigan: Teadt v. Lutheran Church Missouri

    ### Response:
    holding that first amendment barred negligent supervision claim against a church regarding sexual relationship between adult parishioner and priest during the course of a marital counseling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    incident and the suspension, investigation, and warning that followed. Doc. 88 at 16 (citing Doc. 90-4). The evidence before this Court does not indicate or suggest that Moffitt “lay in wait” to avoid legal liability as to retaliation. Here, the temporal gap of almost one year is insufficient, alone, to create an inference of causation. And the-additional evidence that Stephen points to relates to actions and e-mails from December 2013, approximately ten months before Stephen’s discharge. Further, Stephen’s intervening act of unconsented touching and stating that he would “pop a cap” in another co-worker, thereby violating the zero tolerance policy against workplace violence is sufficient to break the causal chain. Henderson v. FedEx Express, 442 Fed.Appx. 502, 506 (11th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). Stephen has not established a prima

    ### Response:
    holding that an intervening act of misconduct by the plaintiff can break the causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the trial judge, and therefore not subject to change by an appellate court, decisions apparently based upon a mistake of law or fact are reviewable under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2) (1988).” United States v. Zine, 906 F.2d 776, 777 (D.C.Cir.1990) (per curiam). The majority decides that we cannot review Hazel’s challenge in this case because of the limitation in § 3742(a)(3). There is no doubt that, once a threshold decision to depart has been made, a defendant is only allowed to challenge the reasonableness of a sentence in cases of upward departures under § 3742(a)(3). See United States v. Wright, 895 F.2d 718, 721 (11th Cir.1990) (observing that to allow review of reasonableness under subsection (a)(2) would nullify (a)(3)); United States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973, 978-79 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). But this feared redundancy would only exist

    ### Response:
    holding that one could not automatically read every departurerelated decision as an incorrect application of the guidelines without rendering  3742a3 redundant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    645 S.W.2d at 836. Because some could argue that evidence that makes the existence of a fact “highly probable” is not necessarily the same as evidence that produces a firm conviction in the existence of the fact, we reject the “highly probable” formulation. Cf In re L.R.M., 763 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 1989, no writ)(stating that “highly probable” inquiry needlessly complicates the standard of review). VII We emphasize that, as appellate courts apply the standard we announce today, they must maintain the respective constitutional roles of juries and appellate courts. An appellate court’s review must not be so rigorous that the only factfind-ings that could withstand review are those established beyond a reasonable doubt. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767-69, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (<HOLDING>). While parental rights are of constitutional

    ### Response:
    holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) (allegations insufficient where plaintiffs alleged interests in ""unspecified portions of an immense [two-million-acre] tract of territory”). 14 . The court will grant a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(c) ""if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When ruling on a summary judgment motion, courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party- Bayer v. Dep't of Treasury, 956 F.2d 330, 333 (D.C.Cir. 1992); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (<HOLDING>). “[T]he nonmov-ing party 'must do more than

    ### Response:
    holding that courts must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving partys favor and accept the nonmoving partys evidence as true
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hart memorandum to Ross, which states that the RWQCB's John Lewis had discussed the lead detected in the soil with McLaren Hart, and directed that it submit a proposed course of action to Ross. (PL’s Carson Issues, ¶ 65; Casparian 3rd DecL, Ex. 14 (August 1994 Memo Proposing Remedial Action)). Defendants object that the document is not properly authenticated. For the reasons set forth in note 160, infra, defendants’ objection is sustained. 142 . Salisbury Depo. at 75:12-80:8, Ex. 232 (May 1, 1995 Memo). While Salisbury testified to out of court statements made by Ross, the Ninth Circuit held that the testimony fell ""within the ‘basic rule of evidence ... that prior inconsistent statements may be used to impeach the credibility of a witness.’ ” Carson Harbor, supra, 270 F.3d at 873 (<HOLDING>). The Ninth Circuit also held that Dr. Amini's

    ### Response:
    holding that salisburys memo could be used to impeach ross assertion that he did not require plaintiff to remove the tar and slag materials
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    authorized to assert the mandatory injunction against defendants as they, according to plaintiff’s complaint, were the persons authorized and responsible for the land-disturbing activity. Accordingly, under the statute, the relief plaintiff was seeking did not require the inclusion of any other party besides defendants. That, however, does not end our inquiry. “ ‘The term “necessary parties” embraces all persons who have or claim material interests in the subject matter of a controversy, which interests will be directly affected by an adjudication of the controversy.’ ” Wall v. Sneed, 13 N.C. App. 719, 724, 187 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1972) (emphasis added) (citation omitted in original). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the subject matter of the controv , 611 S.E.2d 463, 465 (2005) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that, the current

    ### Response:
    holding that all property owners affected by a residential use permit are necessary parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shall be paid by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.... During the time salary for temporary incapacity shall be paid by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ... any workmen’s compensation received or collected by any such employee for such period shall be turned over to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ... and paid into the treasury thereof, and if such payment shall not be so made by the employee the amount so due the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ... shall be deducted from any salary then or thereafter becoming due and owing.... 3 . Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-1031. 4 . 75 Pa. Cons.Stat Ann. §§ 1720, 1722. 5 . The District Court also cited City of Pittsburgh v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Williams), 810 A.2d 760, 762 n. 5 (Pa. Commw.Ct.2002) (<HOLDING>), to support its reasoning. But City of

    ### Response:
    holding that the pittsburgh police department did not illegally terminate an officers hla benefits and that the police department was entitled to a subrogation interest against the officers thirdparty settlement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and team meetings. Our Lady of All Souls used the property at Block 151, Lots 1.01, 3, and 49 on the tax map of the City of East Orange. As of the October 1,1993 assessment date, the parish property was used by both the Archdiocese and the East Orange Board of Education. The Archdiocese offered weekly Mass, and held deanery meetings in the church rectory. Additionally, religious artifacts and furnishings were stored for safekeeping. The East Orange Board of Education rented space for classes on what is now Lot 2, and eventually acquired the lot following a subdivision in December 1994. The Archdiocese maintained the same activities at the parish property on the October 1, 1994 and October 1, 1995 assessment dates. The we atter Day Saints v. Morris Tp., 3 N.J. Tax 572 (Tax 1981) (<HOLDING>). New Jersey courts have never addressed the

    ### Response:
    holding that the fiveacre limitation on exemption for church property did not violate churchs constitutional protections of religious freedom where zoning ordinance required lot size in excess of five acres which resulted in partial taxation of church property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    but rather, it is a case about design of a factory to which we apply principles of ordinary negligence.”). We note that the legislature has enacted separate statutes of repose for strict liabil ity claims against sellers and manufacturers and claims against design professionals who design improvements to real property. Compare Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.008(a) (ten-year statute of repose for design professionals), with id. § 16.012(b) (West 2002) (fifteen-year period of repose for manufacturers and sellers). Additionally, chapter 150 of the Civil Pra vices, L.P. v. Gomez De Hernandez, for the proposition that Jenkins was required to prove that the acid addition system was a product and that Occidental placed it in the stream of commerce. See 249 S.W.3d 400, 402 (Tex.2008) (<HOLDING>). But New Texas Auto Auction did not involve a

    ### Response:
    holding that auctioneer who handled sale of car between seller and buyer could not be held liable for allegedly defective condition of car
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entry or eviction.’” Martin, 699 F.Supp. at 170 (applying Illinois law). Actions for “wrongful entry or eviction” deal with violations of one’s real property rights. See Okla.Stat. tit. 41, § 123 (providing a tenant with an action for wro asion of the right of private occupancy” is included in insurance policies simply to provide a “catch-all” category of offenses of the same general type as “wrongful entry or eviction.” As explained by the court in Martin, Absent a catch-all phrase such as “or other invasion of the right of private occupancy,” an insurer could resist cover in doing this, we must look to the facts alleged in East Central’s answer to Liberty’s complaint, irrespective of how East Central legally characterizes those facts. See Pearson Servs., Inc., 937 F.2d at 403 (<HOLDING>); County of Columbia, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 990

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This statement was not sufficiently separate from the original stream of profanity to merit a second contempt charge. See Lundy v. State, 596 So.2d 1167, 1168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (describing how multiple instances of contempt can be “continuous” and therefore subject to only one sanction), receded from on other grounds in Gibbs v. State, 676 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We find the interaction between Appellant and the trial court in this instance to be materially indistinguishable from that described in B.M. v. State, 523 So.2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 198 red by not providing a recital of the facts supporting the adjudication of guilt. See id. (references to “his statements,-demeanor, and behavior”’' are insufficient); see also Johnson v. State, 584 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). Appellant argues that this error should

    ### Response:
    holding that the attachment of a transcript which the court apparently tried but failed to do here is insufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in ERISA’s scope. In light of these facts, we hold that ANSI’s severance plan is an ERISA plan, and that the district court did not err in applying federal common law precedents to interpret the contractual language. II. Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The question of whether this ERISA-gov-erned severance benefit plan’s contractual language is ambiguous is a question of law requiring de novo review. Wulf v. Quantum r.1992) (same); Lakey v. Remington Arms Co., 874 F.2d 541, 545 (8th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs point out that according to the

    ### Response:
    holding that a change in employer from one federal contractor to another caused employees no lack of work
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Illinois, through its agents in the State, was occasional in the temporal sense. Compare Dal Ponte v. Northern Manitoba Native Lodges, Inc. (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 878, 884, 581 N.E.2d 329, 333 (declining to find personal jurisdiction over a Canadian corporation which solicited customers at Illinois fishing shows and accepted reservations because its relationship with the State was ""more akin to occasional or casual activity”); Baldknobbers, Inc., 107 Ill. App. 3d at 238, 437 N.E.2d at 721 (finding that a country music promoter was not subject to court’s jurisdiction because its two to five annual solicitation visits to the State constituted at best only a sporadic or occasional presence here), with Huffman v. Inland Oil & Transport Co. (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 424 N.E.2d 1209 (<HOLDING>). Here, although Appleton does not earn a great

    ### Response:
    holding that a foreign corporation was amenable to process since the record disclosed a regular pattern of its plying the waterways of the state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    against foreign nations formerly, but not currently, designated as state sponsors of terrorism, the fact that North Korea no longer has that designation does not bar attachment of North Korea’s property, or that of its agents and instrumentalities, under § 1610(g). Whether attachment of the EFTs under § 1610(g) is possible turns, instead, on whether the blocked EFTs at issue are “property of’ North Korea or “the property of an agency or instrumentality of’ North Korea. We review these legal questions de novo. Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 66-67 (2d Cir.2009) (reviewing de novo the “threshold issue of whether EFTs are indeed ‘defendant’s’ property”); see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (<HOLDING>). “[W]hether or not midstream EFTs may be

    ### Response:
    holding that a court of appeals should review de novo a district courts determination of state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could be controlled by the government or vetoed without good reason. Consistent with this principle of non-interference, courts have identified violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel where the government obtains incriminating statements from a defendant outside the presence of counsel and then introduces those statements at trial. See, e.g., id. at 176, 106 S.Ct. 477; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). Likewise, the government violates the Sixth Amendment when it intrudes on the attorney-client relationship, preventing defense counsel from “participat[ing] fully and fairly in the adversary factfinding process.” Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975); see, e.g., id. at 858-59, 95 S.Ct. 2550 (<HOLDING>); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91, 96

    ### Response:
    holding that a new york statute allowing judges in a criminal bench trial to deny counsel the opportunity to make a closing argument deprived defendant of his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regarding the question presented here: whether a state actor's contract to convey properly if successfully acquired through eminent domain is subject to U.S. Trust's heightened scrutiny analysis or is void on its face. 5 . Indeed, there is no provision in the contracts that purports to prevent the City from conveying the property to the Lessees and later taking the property for public use. Thus, these contracts contain none of the same elements the Court found unenforceable in West River Bridge and Contributors to Pennsylvania Hospital. 6 . Indeed, as a survey of our Contracts Clause jurisprudence indicates, Ordinance 05-001 is quite analogous to the state actions this court and the Supreme Court have assessed under U.S. Trust. See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 22-23, 97 S.Ct. at 1518 (<HOLDING>); Winstar, 518 U.S. at 888-89, 116 S.Ct. 2432

    ### Response:
    holding that concurrent and parallel new york and new jersey statutes that retroactively repealed a covenant between the states and bondholders in the stateowned port authority was subject to contracts clause analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (listing required processes). See R. at 1052. But he changes course in his opening appeal brief, asserting instead that the processes applied in civil-commitment proceedings are required before defendants can terminate him from the SOTMP. He did not make that argument in the district court and consequently the district court did not address it. Therefore, he has failed to preserve this argument for consideration on appeal. See Simmat v. U.S. Bur. of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225, 1240 (10th Cir.2005) (declining to consider pro se argument raised for the first time on appeal). Nor will we address the argument that Mr. Firth made in the district court, but fails to renew on appeal. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). We proceed, then, to Mr. Firth’s contentions

    ### Response:
    holding omission of issue in opening brief generally forfeits appellate consideration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Code under Title 11, unless otherwise specified. 3 . Extended to bankruptcy proceedings by Bankr.R. 7012(b)(2005). 4 . Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). 5 . Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 110 S.Ct. 2258, 110 L.Ed.2d 46 (1990). 6 . Id. at 58, 110 S.Ct. 2258 (stating that ""'property of the debtor'...is best understood as that property that would have been part of the estate had it not been transferred before the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings”). 7 . Id. at 58, 110 S.Ct. 2258; Manchester v. First Bank & Trust Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641 (10th Cir. BAP 2000)(stating that § 547(b) looks only to transfers of property which ""diminished or depleted the Debtor's estate”). 8 . See e.g. Yoppolo v. Greenwood Trust Co. (In re Spitler), 213 B.R. 995 (1997)(<HOLDING>). 9 . The Court is aware that this rule of law

    ### Response:
    holding that use of borrowed funds constituted a preference because the funds constituted hard cash available for distribution to creditors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether a suspect would submit to a blood-alcohol test was not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. Thus, a refusal to submit to such tests enjoyed ""no prophylactic Miranda protection outside the basic Fifth Amendment protection.” South Dakota v. Neville (1983), 459 U.S. 553, 564 n.15, 74 L. Ed. 2d 748, 759 n.15, 103 S. Ct. 916, 923 n.15. Subsequently, this reasoning was adopted in Illinois cases which held that a defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test is admissible even in the absence of Miranda warnings. (People v. Thomas (1990), 199 Ill. App. 3d 79, 556 N.E.2d 1245; People v. Bugbee (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 952, 559 N.E.2d 554; People v. Thomas (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 268, 558 N.E.2d 656; see also People v. Roberts (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 384, 450 N.E.2d 451 (<HOLDING>).) Based on these cases, we find that the trial

    ### Response:
    holding that the use of a defendants refusal to submit to a bloodalcohol test after miranda warnings were issued did not violate a defendants privilege against selfincrimination under doyle v ohio 1976 426 us 610 49 l ed 2d 91 96 s ct 2240
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    following assessment: As a practical matter of business, any time a shipper moves products to a terminal his ultimate intent is that they be distributed among various consumers at various consuming points. If this is the only intention, the interstate journey ordinarily ends at the terminal. However, if, at the time he moves products to a terminal his present intention is that they merely be put through the terminal on their way to specific consumers at specific consuming points the interstate journey does not end until the products reach those consumers at those points. Majure, 162 F.Supp. at 601 (finding unitary interstate transportation in a single-shipper, back-end paradigm involving through movement to specific consuming points to be interstate); see also Beggs, 167 F.2d at 704 (<HOLDING>); Shew, 370 F.2d at 380-81 (finding interstate

    ### Response:
    holding that warehouse distributions to companyowned stores constituted interstate commerce since inter alia the company knew at the time oufiofstate shipments to the warehouse commenced that the shipments were bound for its retail stores
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be both efficient and attainable, especially if it left more money for actual education. 49 . See Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 447-48. 50 . Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 344, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). 51 . Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 447 (noting that one requirement for associational standing is that neither claim asserted nor relief requested requires participation of individual members in the lawsuit); cf. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 345, 97 S.Ct. 2434 (approving associa . Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex.2001); Texas Dep’t of Protective and Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex.2001); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 558 (Tex.2000); see also Raines, 521 U.S. at 820, 117 S.Ct. 2312 (<HOLDING>). 55 . Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443.

    ### Response:
    holding that standing is an overriding and timehonored concern about keeping the judiciarys power within its proper constitutional sphere that required the court to put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of this important dispute and to settle it for the sake of convenience and efficiency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it provides that agreements executed thereunder are “subject to any constitutional or legislative restriction imposed upon any of the contracting public agencies.” Id. § 11-1-2(B). We conclude that the Joint Powers Agreement Act does not provide authority for the compacts and revenue-sharing agreements at issue. Likewise, the Mutual Aid Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 29-8-1 to -3 (Repl. Pamp.1994), does not provide authority for the compacts and revenue-sharing agreements. to gaming compacts an IGRA, sought to invest state governors with powers in excess of those that the governors, possess under state law. Moreover, we are confident that the United States Supreme Court would reject any such attempt by Congress to enlarge state gubernatorial power. Cf. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460, 111 S.Ct. at 2400 (<HOLDING>); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that through the structure of its government  a state defines itself as a sovereign
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the debtors’ consent to file this action. The leading case on such consent-based derivative suits, cited approvingly by both parties and the district court, specifies that they are permissible only as follows: A creditors’ committee [or secured creditor] may acquire standing to pursue the debtor’s claims if (1) the committee [or creditor] has the consent of the debtor in possession or trustee, and (2) the court finds that suit by the committee [or creditor] is (a) in the best interest of the bankruptcy estate, and (b) is necessary and beneficial to the fair and efficient resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings. In re Commodore Int’l, Ltd., 262 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir.2001) (intern standing by “obtaining] the permission of the bankruptcy court”); In re Gibson G'roup, 66 F.3d at 1442 (<HOLDING>). Even if permitted under the Bankruptcy Code,

    ### Response:
    recognizing derivative standing if the bankruptcy court determines that certain conditions exist and certain prerequisites are met
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    form but it moved to a different section number. Tex Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 43.0561 (Vernon Supp.2001) (former § 43.052 (Vernon 1997)). 6 . In the alternative, if appellees’ complaint is that the ordinances were untimely or are ineffective because the City did not adopt an annexation plan, those deficiencies are procedural defects under the Local Government Code as previously discussed. 7 .There is no assertion that Farmco Trust and Morton do not qualify as ""interested persons.” 8 . We have not found nor have the parties cited any cases interpreting the standing provision of the Open Meetings Act in the context of an annexation challenge. See, e.g., Laidlaw Waste Sys., 904 S.W.2d at 660 (assuming without deciding challenging party had standing); Alexander Oil, 825 S.W.2d at 437 n. 2 (<HOLDING>). 9 . The standing provision was adopted along

    ### Response:
    holding individual standing issue waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    charge. Appellants objected to the submission of special issues on the use of a deadly weapon at any stage of the trial, but they particularly argued that if such special issues were to be submitted they should be submitted during the punishment stage of trial. Appellants argued at trial, as they do on appeal, that the deadly weapon issue is clearly an issue to be decided during punishment and that it would be inappropriate to submit such an issue during the guilt-innocence stage of trial. However, this argument is inaccurate. See Luken v. State, 780 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (acknowledging that Court of Criminal Appeals has never said deadly weapon issue must be resolved at punishment stage of trial); McIntosh v. State, 865 S.W.2d 753, 771 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>). In fact, the clear wording of sections 4(a)

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court is not prohibited from submitting special issue on use of a deadly weapon at the guiltinnocence stage of trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we hesitate to affirm the adverse credibility finding solely on the basis of these differences in the affidavits. Finally, the BIA and IJ erred by relying on Kumar’s failure to present evidence to corroborate his attendance at Sikh religious facilities. The IJ did not give Ku-mar a reasonable opportunity to explain the absence of corroborating evidence. For example, when the IJ asked Kumar why he had not produced a witness to confirm that he attended Sikh facilities in San Jose and Fremont, Kumar responded “I haven’t brought it, but I can bring it.” Thereafter, the IJ never asked Kumar to make good on that offer yet then relied on the absence of any such witness to find that Kumar lacked credibility. That was unfair. See Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1246 n. 9 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Because “each of the [BIA]’s ... proffered

    ### Response:
    holding in a prereal id act case that the ij  erred by not giving petitioner an opportunity to explain his failure to provide additional corroborating evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and cash advances he made, plus interest. See Dulong, 261 S.W.3d at 894; see also Butler, 2009 WL 402329, at *3. Thus, the evidence presented by Citibank establishes its right to summary judgment as a matter of law. McFarland raises no fact issues that would preclude summary judgment. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Ins. Fund v. Simon, 980 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (citing City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979)). McFarland has not presented any evidence suggesting a different amount is owed. Based on the series of transactions reflected on the account statements, we conclude Citibank established that McFarland agreed to the full amount shown on the statements and impliedly promised to pay the indebtedness. See Dulong, 261 S.W.3d at 894 (<HOLDING>). Application of Account Stated Cause of Action

    ### Response:
    holding under almost identical facts that it was reasonable to infer that eredit card holder agreed to full amount shown on statements and impliedly promised to pay indebtedness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the leg are enough to demonstrate the imposition and fraud practiced upon this mentally weak and helpless individual. In addition, the claim agent had Ault to write in this release, 'I understand this release.' This brings forcibly to mind the act of the thief, who, in order to throw off suspicion, hurried down the street, exclaiming ‘Stop, thief!' ”). 7 . 481 So.2d 846, 848 (Miss.1985). 8 . Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). 9 . Compare Matsuura v. Alston & Bird, 166 F.3d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir.1999) (applying Delaware law and concluding that ""plaintiffs who have been fraudulently induced to settle tort claims” “may rescind the contract or they may affirm the contract and sue for fraud”), Turkish v. Kasenetz, 27 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), Exotics Hawaii-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De

    ### Response:
    holding that a party may ratify a settlement agreement induced by fraud retain the proceeds and sue to recover fraud damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Federal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the record affirmatively indicates the opposite. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316, 111 S.Ct. 2331, 115 L.Ed.2d 288 (1991). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for unjust conviction and wrongful imprisonment. “The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim for damages by any person unjustly convicted of an offense against the United States and imprisoned.” 28 U.S.C. § 1495 (2006). However, 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a) (2006), sets forth the requirements for bringing the claim recognized in § 1495: Any person suing under section 1495 of this title must allege and prove that: (1) His conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty of the offe 81 WL 21510 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff contends that the Court of Federal

    ### Response:
    holding the court lacked jurisdiction under  1495 and 2513 without a certificate of innocence from the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    105, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) and City of Passaic v. Consolidated Police & Firemen’s Pension Fund Commission, 18 N.J. 137, 113 A.2d 22 (1955). In Bulman, supra, the Court held that a twenty-five year lease arrangement under which the State would assume ownership of a building at the end of the lease did not create a present debt subject to the Debt Limitation Clause even though future rent installments would be paid out of current revenues annually appropriated. 64 N.J. at 117-18, 312 A.2d 857. Similarly, in City of Passaic, supra, a statute requiring the State to contribute annually to the Police and Firemen’s Pension Fund was held not violative of the Clause because no present debt was created. 18 N.J. at 147, 113 A.2d 22; see also State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 525, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 333, 79 S.Ct. 351,

    ### Response:
    holding statute requiring state to pay certain municipalities amounts equal to property taxes lost after condemnation for reservoir did not violate clause because tjhere is no bargain or professed contractual conventional or legal undertaking to recom pense the given loss of tax revenue but rather a truly voluntary appropriation for a lawful object 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that right."" Id. at 447. Dr. Richards and the Fund do not dispute that the Martins have a vested property right in their cause of action. However, they contend that the Martins have never had a vested right to a particular measure of damages, citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32 (1978) ("" 'A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law'""); Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 78, 88-92, ng that in a wrongful death action, the date of injury determines the tortfeasor's liability."" '[R]ights growing out of a wrong must relate to the happening of the wrong itself.' "") (citation omitted), and may not be amended unless necessary for an important public purpose. See State ex rel. Briggs & Stratton, 100 Wis. 2d at 658 (<HOLDING>). The right to unlimited damages was implicit

    ### Response:
    holding that the fixed measure of damages may not be retroactively amended simply for the purpose of offsetting the late adoption of a law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.2d 1305, 1312-12 (2d Cir.1993) (“The present violation requirement of the Act would be completely undermined if a violation included the mere decomposition of pollutants.”); Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F.Supp. 1176, 1183 (M.D.Tenn.1988) (dismissing citizen suit based on allegations made against a permanently closed manufacturing plant); Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F.Supp. 1333, 1354 (D.N.M.1995) (finding no ongoing discharge from pile of waste rock on surface); Wilson v. Amoco Corp., 33 F.Supp.2d 969, 975-76 (D.Wyo.1998) (concluding “that migration of residual contamination from previous releases does not constitute an ongoing discharge”), factual background stated in 989 F.Supp. 1159 (D.Wyo.1998); Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F.Supp.2d 81, 120 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (<HOLDING>). This court is not so easily persuaded,

    ### Response:
    holding cwa does not allow citizen suit against a past polluter for the ongoing migrating leachate plume
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to act on the principal’s behalf.” (emphasis in original)). Finally, In-tamex and Amaleo observe that the evidence indicated that Hawkspere paid ICTS no commission on the freight that ICTS collected for Hawkspere. Appellants’ Br. at 20. This fact, though, cuts directly against agency, since it indicates that Hawkspere and ICTS lacked any formal relationship at all. On this record, the court was correct to conclude that there was no triable issue of fact as to whether ICTS acted as an actual or apparent agent for Hawkspere when it accepted payment from Intamex and Amaleo. VI. Given that ICTS was not Hawkspere’s agent, it remains only to be determined whether there exists any other basis on which the Shippers might be excused from their liability ., 693 F.Supp. 80, 84 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (<HOLDING>). Thus, under the approach taken by the Sixth

    ### Response:
    holding that carrier is estopped from collecting freight charges from shipper when shipper had paid consolidator in reliance on carriers misrepresentation that it had already received its payment from consolidator and shipper would thus otherwise be unjustifiably liable for double payment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as an alternative to the federal exemptions set forth in the Bankruptcy Code? It is not unreasonable to expect that the state’s policy judgment will be set forth with sufficient clarity to permit the bankruptcy court administering the estate to identify the state exemptions with reasonable certainty. While state courts frequently refer to statutes which prohibit only certain forms of judicial process as “exemption” statutes, the term “exemption” “conventionally connotes protection against all forms of pro-cess_” William T. Vukowich, Debtors’ Exemption Rights, 62 Geo.L.J. 779, 816 (1974). Therefore, it is appropriate, in our view, to give the word its common meaning in the absence of any legislative indication to the contrary. See, e.g., Scarlett v. Barnes, 121 B.R. 578 (W.D.Mo.1990) (<HOLDING>). This approach not only provides us with the

    ### Response:
    holding in the absence of definitive state authority under missouri law a cause of action is not exempt unless immune from all types of judicial process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not determine whether counsel’s investigation into mitigating evidence in Lee’s case constituted deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland, because, even assuming the habeas court correctly concluded that counsel’s failure to investigate and present the habeas testimony of Lee’s childhood history of abuse and neglect constituted deficient performance, we conclude as a matter of law that Lee has not shown prejudice sufficient to warrant success of his overall ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U. S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.”). See also Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809 (II), n. 1 (642 SE2d 56) (2007) (<HOLDING>). 4. Actual prejudice. To determine prejudice

    ### Response:
    holding that the combined effect of trial counsels various professional deficiencies should be considered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ms. Evans’ supporting affidavit by Tom Ragland, her attorney, does not controvert any facts related to conscious indifference or delay. At the hearing, the State presented its arguments to the judge and the affidavits submitted with the motion for new trial were brought to the attention of the trial court. Ms. Evans’ attorney, Mr. Ragland, presented oral testimony and exhibits establishing the trial date setting and the letters sent to Mr. Sharp and other State employees regarding the case. Although Ms. Evans argues that employees of the State, including Mr. Sharp and Ms. Stroud’s secretary, knew about the trial setting, Ms. Evans does not specifically controvert the statement of Ms. Stroud’s belief that the case was set for a later date. See Bank One, N.A., 830 S.W.2d at 85 (<HOLDING>). In the absence of controverting evidence that

    ### Response:
    holding that the nonmovant did not controvert the statement of the movants belief and thus the first element of the craddock test was satisfied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    perjury and corroborates Maxwell’s argument that Storeh had a signature modus operandi that he employed as a witness for the prosecution at Maxwell’s trial. The preliminary inquiry, then, remains whether it was objectively unreasonable— in light of the evidence revealed over the course of the evidentiary hearing — for the Superior Court to find that Storeh testified truthfully at the 1984 trial when he stated that Maxwell had confessed. The difficulty here is not whether Storeh became a professional “snitch” who frequently committed perjury. That much is clear. Rather, the question is whether, as the state court concluded, in 1984 Storeh remained an unsophistic e court’s finding that petitioner’s confession was voluntarily obtained was objectively unreasonable); Hall, 343 F.3d at 984 (<HOLDING>); Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1057 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that the state appellate court made an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented by finding that the falsity of the jailhouse informants notes had not been proven at a hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decision whether to apply’ the doctrine of judicial estoppel in a particular case: whether the party’s later position is clearly inconsistent with its earlier position; whether the party succeeded in persuading the court in the earlier matter to accept its position, so that judicial acceptance of the contrary position in the later matter would create the perception that one of the courts had been misled; and whether the party seeking to assert the inconsistent position in the later matter would derive an unfair advantage, or would impose an unfair detriment on the other party, from being permitted to do so. Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have recognized the doctrine of judicial estoppel. See, e.g., Talavera v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 129 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (quoting McKinnon v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel  is applied to the calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions the doctrine is designed to prevent parties from making a mockery of justice by inconsistent pleadings 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sentencing judge impermissibly made factual findings in violation of tire Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, 322 P.3d 334 (2014); State v. Hilt, 299 Kan. 176, 322 P.3d 367 (2014). Further, he does not argue that the collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause should bar the State from admitting evidence of his prior acquittal. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156, 117 S. Ct. 633, 136 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1997) (applying Dowling and finding Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude sentencing judge from considering issues decided in prior case where defendant was acquitted when the sub sequent action was a lower standard of proof); Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348-49, 110 S. Ct. 668, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1990) (<HOLDING>); 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law § 384. The only

    ### Response:
    holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    114 Hawaii 302, 347, 162 P.3d 696, 741 (2007), Alaska’s constitution contains a provision that is “nearly identical in wording and substance” to article XVI, section 2 of the Hawaii Constitution. Accordingly, the court in Kaho'ohanohano cited Alaska’s case law as “instructive in interpreting our own clause.” Id. Although the issue of when an employee’s constitutionally protected benefits accrue was not squarely before the court in Kaho'ohanohano, the court twice referenced that the Supreme Court of Alaska has determined that such benefits vest or accrue upon the employee’s employment and enrollment in an ERS, rather than when the employee becomes eligible to receive the benefits. Id. at 347-48, 162 P.3d at 741-42 (citing, e.g., Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Alaska 1981) (<HOLDING>); Municipality of Anchorage v. Gallion, 944

    ### Response:
    holding that benefits under alaskas ers are in the nature of deferred compensation and that the right to such benefits vests immediately upon an employees enrollment in that system
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    denied defendant’s motion for mistrial and the trial court, therefore, would err by continuing to the sentencing proceeding with either an alternate juror or with a newly empaneled sentencing jury. The trial court ultimately seated an alternate juror for the capital sentencing proceeding. Defendant contends that the post-verdict removal of juror eleven for juror misconduct committed during the guilt-innocence phase deliberations violated his right under the North Carolina Constitution to trial by a jury composed of twelve qualified jurors. We agree. Article I, Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution, which guarantees the right to trial by jury, contemplates no more or no less than a jury of twelve persons. See State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 623, 220 S.E.2d 521, 531 (1975) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hudson, 280 N.C. 74, 79, 185 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an alternates presence in the jury room for a brief period at the beginning of jury deliberations was a violation of this constitutional right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.Bankr.R. 7056(c); Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The summary judgment procedure is appropriate in an action to review the record of an administrative agency because the reviewing court is generally limited to determining matters of law, i.e. sufficiency of record, statutory authority of agency, etc., and if there is no material issue of fact and only a question of law, summary judgment is appropriate. 6-Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶56.17[3], 56-362 — 56-364 (2d ed. 1993) (citing Milton v. Harris, 616 F.2d 968 (7th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>)). A. The Negotiated Rates Act of 1993 On

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the court is reviewing administrative record for sufficiency of evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be credible and concludes that the deputies came no closer than 120 feet from Building 2 — and thus no closer than 240 feet from the residence — on the night of May 30, 2003. Standing in isolation, the fact that the deputies were approximately 240 feet from Building 1 does not rule out the possibility that the deputies intruded upon the curti-lage. As the Second Circuit has observed, “[o]n a large parcel of land, a pond 300 feet away from a dwelling may be as intimately connected to the residence as is the backyard grill of the bloke next door.” United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1277, on reh’g, 91 F.3d 331 (2d Cir.1996). Nonetheless, even in rural areas, it is rare for curtilage to extend more than 100 feet beyond the home. See, e.g., Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297, 302, 107 S.Ct. 1134 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Van Damme, 48 F.3d 461, 464

    ### Response:
    holding that deputies who approached within 90 feet of a rural residence were not within the boundaries of the curtilage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bases for finding Campbell unsuitable for parole in 2006 were properly supported by some evidence, bearing some indicia of reliability. See Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-17 (9th Cir.2003) (setting forth due process requirements and upholding denial of parole based solely on gravity of offense and prior misconduct). Campbell’s contention that due process mandates that substantial evidence, rather than “some evidence,” support the parole suitability determination is foreclosed. See id. at 915. We do not reach Campbell’s contention that in 2006 the parole board applied the wrong suitability standards to his case because we conclude that “some evidence” supports the board’s determination under either standard. Cf. Connor v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Campbell’s remaining contentions are

    ### Response:
    holding that the application of the determinate sentencing law parolesuitability guidelines to prisoners sentenced under the indeterminate sentencing law does not disadvantage them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    counsel, respectively, do not warrant termination. See id. Santos’s allegation of a violation of 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e), regarding the right to communicate with consular officers, likewise does not warrant termination. See United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir.2001). Finally, Santos’s argument that the Government violated 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(a)by submitting the Form 1-213 without authentication does not provide a basis for termination because Santos was not prejudiced by the submission. See Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir.1993). To the extent Santos wishes to argue that the unauthenticated 1-213 should be afforded diminished evidentiary weight, he will have an opportunity to do so on remand. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for

    ### Response:
    holding that the weight accorded to documentary evidence lies largely within the ijs discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    litigation.’ Consequently, some informality of proof is appropriate.” United States v. 88.88 Acres of Land, 907 F.2d 106, 108 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)). The Court of Federal Claims (a trial-level Article I court, see 28 U.S.C. § 171) has found inadequate a party’s unsupported statement that he satisfied the EAJA net worth requirement, but in that case there was contradictory evidence in the record about the plaintiffs net worth. Doe v. United States, 54 Fed.Cl. 337, 343 (Fed.Cl.2002). The court undoubtedly saw a red flag when “the underlying cause of action began with the assertion that plaintiff was ‘a prospective buyer’ of a yacht.” Id. See also Fields v. United States, 29 Fed.Cl. 376, 383 (Fed.Cl.1993) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, the Federal Circuit (which, of

    ### Response:
    holding that a conclusory affidavit without supporting evidence is inadequate to establish net worth
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    one possible exception (30 March 2001 purchase), Financial purchased its shares after Amresco disclosed the plan (in the Y2000 10-K, signed on the day of the first purchase (30 March) and filed on 2 April). Therefore, it cannot claim' it would not have done so had it known about the plan. b. Finally, Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead scienter for any Individual Defendant because the SAC makes only general allegations and conelusory statements, such as stating they knew, or were reckless in failing to disclose, adverse material. See ABC Arbitrage, 291 F.3d at 348. Along this line, Plaintiffs’ mere allegation that the Individual Defendants were motivated by a desire to retain their jobs does not satisfy the scienter requirement. See Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1102 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Because Plaintiffs fail to plead material

    ### Response:
    holding scienter required for fraud claim not established merely by alleging defendants were motivated by jobretention goal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    al., Dobbs’ Law of Torts § 673 (2d ed. 2016) (noting that the “strength of the ‘notice’ to the plaintiff that investigation may be needed” is dependent on a number of factors including “the obscurity or obviousness of the contradiction in the defendant’s statements” and the “relationship of the parties”). Other courts that have considered the issue have concluded that it is justifiable for state unemployment agencies to rely on “weekly certifications to determine an applicant’s eligibility for benefits over specific periods of time.” See Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. v. Yuppa (In re Yuppa), 2013 WL 4854479 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio June 12, 2013) (unpublished opinion) (citing State of Colorado ex rel. Central Collection Serv. v. O’Brien (In re O’Brien), 110 B.R. 27, 32-33 (Bankr.D.Colo.1990) (<HOLDING>). Discussing the Colorado unemployment system,

    ### Response:
    holding in a decision predating field v mans that the state unemployment agency satisfied a reasonable reliance standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of temporary insanity, trial counsel were not deficient for failing to further investigate and pursue the defense. See Sawyers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (evidence showing the defendant was intoxicated and nothing more does not justify submission of an issue on temporary insanity, and refusal to submit such charge in mitigation of punishment is not error); Ex parte Lilly, 656 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (counsel’s failure to investigate the facts of a case constitutes ineffectiveness if the result is that any viable defense available to the accused was not advanced). We conclude that, had counsel requested an instruction on temporary insanity as a mitigating factor, it would have been properly denied. See Hart v. State, 537 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, because applicant knew his

    ### Response:
    holding that the evidence at trial showed hart was aware that what he was doing was wrong
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as soon as she returned home. D.J. was crying and upset when Johnson arrived home, which suggests that he was not capable of thoughtful reflection and deliberation. D.J. also had fresh blood on his lower lip that visibly showed that D.J. was in distress from the physical altercation. When D.J. told his mother that Jones had hit him in the mouth with her fist, he was still under the stress of the excitement caused by the startling event. Because D.J. was still under the stress of the event, it is reasonable to infer that he was unlikely to make deliberate falsifications to his mother. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting D.J.'s statements to his mother under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. See e.g., Robinson, 730 N.E.2d 185, 193 (<HOLDING>). IL. Lastly, Jones argues that the trial court

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial courts hearsay ruling will be affirmed on any legal basis apparent in the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    affairs, including the authority to limit tribal sovereignty. See U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to regulate Indian commerce); Worcester, 31 U.S. at 243, 6 Pet. at 561, 8 L.Ed. at 501 (stating that “[t]he whole intercourse between the United States and [Indian tribes] is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States”); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973) (stating that Congress, in its exercise of power under the Indian Commerce Clause and Treaty Clause of the Constitution, has been the sole source of federal policy for Indian affairs); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 2081, 65 L.Ed.2d 10, 29 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks,

    ### Response:
    holding that tribal sovereignty is dependent on and subordinate to only the federal government not the states
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” Id. If plain error occurred, relief is warranted where the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. The district court failed to give MoraAngel notice of its intent to impose an above-guideline sentence that included the court’s factual and legal basis for so doing. Evans-Martinez, 448 F.3d at 1167 (explaining that parties must receive notice of the basis for the variance so that the issues can be “fully aired”); United States v. Hinojosa-Gonzalez, 142 F.3d 1122, 1123 (9th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (“Both factual and legal grounds for departure are within Rule 32’s reach.”); see also Fed.R.CrimJP. 32(h); Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138-39, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (<HOLDING>). The district court’s failure to do so

    ### Response:
    holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as here, there is some evidence connecting defendant to those threats, testimony concerning the threats is admissible on the issue of consciousness of guilt.”); State v. Soke, 105 Ohio App.3d 226, 663 N.E.2d 986, 1001 (1995) (“[W]e note that evidence of threats or intimidation of witnesses reflects a consciousness of guilt and is admissible as admission by conduct.”); State v. Hicks, 333 N.C. 467, 428 S.E.2d 167, 177 (1993) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 543 S.E.2d 823 (2001)) (“An attempt by a defendant to intimidate a witness in an effort to prevent the witness from testifying or to induce the witness to testify falsely in his favor is relevant to show the defendant’s awareness of his guilt.”); Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 299 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); People v. Lucas, 151 Ill.2d 461, 177 Ill.Dec.

    ### Response:
    holding criminal acts designed to reduce the likelihood of conviction including threats against witnesses are admissible under rule 404b as showing consciousness of guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the property when the prohibitory ordinance was enacted. See Sico v. Indiana Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 166 Pa.Cmwlth. 321, 646 A.2d 655, 660 (1994) (""The doctrine of natural expansion ... applies only to nonconforming business uses”). See also Ryan, Pennsylvania Zoning Law, §§ 7.1.8 and 7.7.1 (recognizing that most, if not all lawfully pre-existing noncon-formaties receive some protection under Pennsylvania law and that the scope of protection is subject to obvious differences between nonconforming uses and nonconforming structures). The doctrine was never meant to allow for the expansion of nonconforming conditions, such as Baer’s accumulation of junk, oversize structures or encroachment into setbacks. See Constantino v. Forest Hills Borough, 128 Pa.Cmwlth. 407, 563 A.2d 953 (1989) (<HOLDING>). See also Chartiers Township v. W.H. Martin,

    ### Response:
    holding that shrubbery exceeding the height limit imposed by subsequent ordinance not protected as a preexisting nonconformity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    450 Fed.Appx. 15, 19 (2d Cir.2011) (“[B]ald assertions of discrimination ... unsupported by any comments, actions, or examples ... from which [the court] could infer that the defendants possessed a discriminatory ... motive are ... insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”). Moreover, “[a] complaint based upon a violation of [§ ] 1983 that does not allege facts establishing the personal involvement of an individual defendant fails as a matter of law.” Hernandez v. Sposato, No. 12-CV-2530, 2014 WL 3489818, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014). Plaintiff, however, fails to put forth “any meaningful comments, actions, or examples of similarly-situated persons outside of [his] protected class being treated differently.” Fouche v. St. Charles Hosp., 64 F.Supp.3d 452, 457 (E.D.N.Y.2014) (<HOLDING>); see also Lucas v. Apple Food Serv. of N.Y.,

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff s bald assertions of discrimination  unsupported by any meaningful comments actions or examples of similarlysituated persons outside of the plaintiffs protected class being treated differently  are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as separate claims, even if the several legal theories depend on different shadings of the fact, or would emphasize different elements of the facts, or would call for different measures of liability or different kinds of relief”). This reasoning applies here. It is uncontested that Plaintiffs are bringing the same claims against Alexander & Alexander in the instant lawsuit as were brought against Alexander & Alexander in the Kansas lawsuit. These claims are based on the same underlying facts. The causes of action are thus identical, even though the instant matter may require the Missouri court before which the suit was brought to apply Missouri law, while the Kansas lawsuit required the application of Kansas law. See Austin v. Super Valu Stores, 31 F.3d 615 (8th Cir.Minn.1994) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that res

    ### Response:
    holding that dismissal of prior action in louisiana federal court on the grounds of the statute of limitations bar subsequent action filed in minnesota federal district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and permanent injunction. The denial of a motion for contempt is not appealable because it is not a final order. Norman v. Norman, 692 S.W.2d 655, 655 (Tex.1985); Velez v. DeLara, 905 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1995, no writ). We therefore overrule points three and four by which Chambers complains of the court’s assessment of the final judgment. We can review the declaration that the agreed temporary injunction was void ab initio because of the lack of a bond. The supreme court has construed strictly the requirement of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 684 that, before a trial court issues a temporary restraining order or temporary injunction, the applicant shall execute and file with the clerk a bond to the adverse party. Goodwin v. Goodwin, 456 S.W.2d 885, 885 (Tex.1970) (<HOLDING>); Lancaster v. Lancaster, 155 Tex. 528, 291

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure of the applicant to file a bond before the issuance of the temporary injunction renders the injunction void ab initio
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jan.10, 2003) (identical opinion, different defendant), appeal dismissed, 99 Ohio St.3d 1549, 795 N.E.2d 686 (2003); cf. State v. Young, Nos. 19472, 19473, 2003 WL 2004025, at *6 (Ohio Ct.App. May 2, 2003) (affirming trial court’s refusal to designate defendant as sexually oriented offender, and agreeing that abduction offenses “were not motivated in any way by sexual purpose, or with a purpose to gratify Young’s sexual needs, or to allow Young to engage in sexual activity” and there was no rational relationship between “governmental goal of protecting the public from sexually oriented offenders and the facts of this case”), appeal dismissed, 99 Ohio St.3d 1549, 795 N.E.2d 686 (2003); see also State v. Washington, No. 99-L-015, 2001 WL 1415568, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct.App. Nov. 2, 2001) (<HOLDING>). A New York court also has declared a similar

    ### Response:
    holding that the designation of a defendant as sexually oriented offender for kidnapping his child where there was no evidence of sexual motivation bore no rational relationship to purpose of the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of public trust, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3; and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a), (b). 13 . Because we conclude that Garrison's sentence improperly was enhanced for abuse of a position of public trust and remand for resentencing without this enhancement, we need not address her double-counting issue. 14 . Given Garrison’s sentencing date of October 26, 1995, we use the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1994) and statutes and regulations in effect on that date. See United States v. Camacho, 40 F.3d 349, 354 (11th Cir.1994) (""The sentencing court must employ the guidelines in effect at the time the sentencing hearing is held.”). 15 . See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42-43, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1917-18, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 16 . As examples, our court has determined

    ### Response:
    holding that sentencing guidelines commentary which is interpretive and instructive to application of a guideline is binding on federal courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to decline jurisdiction under Colorado River, notwithstanding the presumption in favor of assuming jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rivera-Feliciano v. Acevedo-Vila, 438 F.3d 50 (1st Cir.2006); Currie v. Group Ins. Comm’n, 290 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2002); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 751 F.2d 475 (1st Cir.1985). In our view, this is such a case. Applying the factors, we conclude that while some are neutral to our inquiry, the balance of them strongly favors abstention. We begin with the neutral factors, which may be summarized quickly. The federal and Puerto Rico forums are equally convenient (second factor); the Puerto Rico forum is well equipped to protect the parties’ interests (sixth factor), see United States v. Fairway Capital Corp., 483 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); there is nothing vexatious or contrived about

    ### Response:
    holding that the adequacy of the state forum is relevant only when it would disfavor abstention
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    232 (2005) (recognizing Restatement [Second] of Torts § 314A[3] imposes a duty upon one in possession of land); Gragg v. Wichita State Univ., 261 Kan. 1037, 1045-46, 934 P.2d 121 (1997) (same); Gardin v. Emporia Hotels, Inc., 31 Kan. App. 2d 168, 171-72, 61 P.3d 732, rev. denied 275 Kan. 963 (2003) (same). Thus, although not in the same context, Kansas has recognized and implemented § 314A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Moreover, and in a factual scenario very similar to the one presented here, two cases from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas have specifically applied Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4) to hold that prison officials owed inmates the duty to prevent self-harm. Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1185-87 (D. Kan. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. United States, 2000 WL 33200259

    ### Response:
    holding doc and its personnel had independent legal duty to prevent prisoner from committing suicide
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    NEPA challenge. E. Jurisdictional Bar of Section 9613(h) as Applied to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Challenge — First Cause of Action The jurisdictional bar of section 9613(h) applies differently when it comes to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim. Most courts have flatly concluded that because section 9613(h) bars pre-enforcement judicial review of “any challenges to removal or remedial actions selected,” it also bars pre-enforcement judicial review of constitutional challenges to CERCLA itself. See Aztec Minerals Corp. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 98-1380, 1999 WL 969270, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct.25, 1999) (concluding that section 9613(h) barred plaintiffs due process claim as to the EPA’s regulation of a mine); Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289, 295 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1097 (rejecting

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the epa on due process grounds from regulating plaintiffs landfill
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    but only days after his success on appeal. Two weeks after the court’s ruling, the government filed the present motion For Reconsideration and to Reopen Hearing. COURT’S DISCUSSION I. Motion For Reconsideration A. Standard of Review In order to succeed on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, petitioner must establish that the newly profered evidence was unavailable at the time of the hearing. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.1999), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000); see also Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir.1993). While the court recognizes that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not binding in criminal cases, United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), the court has a strong interest in

    ### Response:
    recognizing that societys interest in admitting all relevant evidence militates strongly in favor of permitting reconsideration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    duration within which modification is possible. Accordingly, the policy that underlies Lanning also supports our reading of § 1325(b)(1)(B). III. Conclusion In summary, we hold that a bankruptcy court may confirm a Chapter 13 plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) only if the plan’s duration is at least as long as the applicable commitment period provided by § 1325(b)(4). Accordingly, we overrule Kagenveama’s holding regarding the meaning of “applicable commitment period” and affirm the bankruptcy court’s ruling. The mandate shall issue forthwith. AFFIRMED. 1 . The Trustee has never questioned Debtors' good faith in proposing the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (setting forth requirement of the debtors’ good faith). 2 . See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Debtors do not dispute the increase from

    ### Response:
    holding that a three judge panel is not bound by prior circuit precedent if an intervening decision of a higher authority undercuts the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    further provides that a violation notice must (1) Be in writing; (2) Include a statement of the violation or violations and why the notice is being issued; (3) Inform the offender of the right to appeal; (4) Include a statement that a determination of violation shall be final unless appealed in accordance with this chapter; and (5) Include a statement of penalties provided for the violation(s). Id. Meloche’s confrontation with the O’Neills lacked all the elements required by LMCO §§ 91.073(A)-(B) and 91.074(D) — sections of an ordinance that Meloche claims he created — and was not reasonably calculated to apprise the O’Neills of the allegations against them or of the procedures available to present their objections. See United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d 1315, 1323-24 (6th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); cf. Herrada v. City of Detroit, 275 F.3d 553,

    ### Response:
    holding that notice was not constitutionally adequate where the clearcut statutory procedures for notification were not followed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas, 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 409, 480 (2006). 26 . See Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 514 (Tex.1998) (""A cause of action generally accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when facts come into existence that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy.”); Moreno, 787 S.W.2d at 351 (‘‘[A] cause of action can generally be said to accrue when the wrongful act effects an injury.”); All-Tex Roofing, Inc. v. Greenwood Ins. Group, Inc., 73 S.W.3d 412 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (in claim for negligent placement of insurance with an insolvent insurer, claim did not accrue until insured was denied indemnification); Gilbreath v. White, 903 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 27 . If late filing of the reply evidence was

    ### Response:
    holding that legal injury occurred for purposes of negligence action against insurance agent when insurance company rejected the claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    explicitly stated: “Physicians providing medical services within this hospital are not employees of University Hospital. Each physician is an independent contractor.”). ' To the contrary, where patients were given no indication that the emergency-room physicians were independent contractors, courts have held that the question of apparent authority was at least a question for the jury—the trier of fact. See, e.g., Jennison v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 174 Or.App. 219, 234, 25 P.3d 358, 367 (2001) (finding it was reasonable for the patient to assume -that the radiologist was a hospital employee where nowhere on the consent form did it indicate that radiologists were independent contractors); Abdul-Majeed v. Emory Univ. Hosp., 213 Ga.App. 421, 423, 445 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Here, HKH not only took affirmative action

    ### Response:
    holding that a question of fact existed regarding whether the hospital held the doctor out as its agent if the hospital provided the doctor without explicitly informing the patient that the doctor was not its employee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sole source of water. Horse Creek is a tributary of the Peace River, and Horse Creek supplies approximately fifteen percent of the fresh water to the portion of the Peace River from which the Authority withdraws water. The Authority has a water use permit (WUP) from the Southwest Florida Water Management District that both gives the Authority the right to withdraw water from the Peace River and sets conditions on those withdrawals. Thus, as an entity possessed of a legal right to withdraw water from the Peace River, the Authority inarguably has a substantial interest in the river’s environmental integrity, and this interest could be injured by changes in the flow of Horse Creek into the Peace River. See Royal Palm Square Ass’n v. Sevco Land Corp., 623 So.2d 533, 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>). Further, the potential injury asserted by the

    ### Response:
    holding that a property owner who had the right to drain water into a specific lake had a substantial interest in that lakes environmental integrity and thus had a substantial interest in a permit that could alter the drainage into that lake
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sheriff’s Dep’t, 858 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993, writ denied). 38 . Fed. Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 405. 39 . Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312; Scott, 16 S.W.3d at 180. 40 . 932 S.W.2d at 287. 41 . Id. at 289. 42 . Id. 43 . Id. at 290, (citing Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.13(a) (Vernon Supp.2001)); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2277, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979). 44 . Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312. 45 . City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex.1995); City of Dallas v. Moreau, 718 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 46 . Moreau, 718 S.W.2d at 779. 47 . Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312; Scott, 16 S.W.3d at 180. 48 . See Salazar v. Morales, 900 S.W.2d 929, 932-34 (Tex.App.—Austin 1995, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 49 .Id. at 934; see also Barr v. Matteo, 360

    ### Response:
    holding that texas attorney general has an absolute privilege to publish in response to news reporters inquiries material about employee terminations that may be perceived to be defamatory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    threshold loss amount is determined by the date the policy was issued or renewed. The subject policies of these appeals were “issued or renewed before July 1, 2002.” MCL 500.3104(2)(a). Thus, the relevant threshold loss amount for these appeals is $250,000. Id. The current threshold is $440,000. MCL 500.3104(2)(h). 20 MCL 500.3104(25)(c). 21 See MCL 500.3104(2)(a)-(k). 22 In re Certified Question, supra at 723. 23 MCL 500.3163(1) obligated the plaintiff to provide Michigan no-fault benefits. 24 , 237 Mich App 235, 238 n 1; 602 NW2d 588 (1999) (“[T]he MCCA is not obligated to indemnify its member insurers for amounts the insurers are not obligated to pay under their no-fault policies.”); Transamerica Ins Group v Michigan Catastrophic Claims Ass’n, 202 Mich App 514; 509 NW2d 540 (1993) (<HOLDING>); J C Penney Cas Ins Co v Michigan Catastrophic

    ### Response:
    holding that the mcca was not obligated to indemnify a claim submitted by two insurers seeking to aggregate their shared losses to exceed the 250000 threshold
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case rests squarely within the group of cases that have prosecuted similar private sector frauds under federal law, and appellants’ conduct is precisely the type of misuse of the mails and wires the statutes were meant to address. See, e.g., United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir.1980). In a similar vein, appellants argue that the conduct at issue here was not illegal under New York state law and, therefore, could not form the basis of federal charges. We note that both the trial and appellate courts that were involved in the state court proceedings initially brought against the appellants and others based on the same scheme found that the type of conduct at issue here did violate state law. See New York v. Wolf, 284 A.D.2d 102, 726 N.Y.S.2d 83, 84 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (<HOLDING>), leave to appeal granted, 96 N.Y.2d 926, 732

    ### Response:
    holding that similar conduct by codefendant of grae and rybicki satisfied the elements of commercial bribery  and scheme to defraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rezoning. JUDGMENT UPHOLDING COMPREHENSIVE REZONING AFFIRMED; TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT OTHERWISE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY. 1 . We do not identify the property because its identity is of little importance in our resolution of the issues. 2 . Unless the text indicates otherwise, we shall or ""the functional equivalent” of a ""practical ouster of [the owner's] possession” could constitute a constitutional taking. -U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2892 (brackets in original). 11 . The Supreme Court has found that a regulation resulted in an unconstitutional taking on only six occasions, beginning with Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158. The cases include Lucas, — U.S. — , 112 S.Ct. 2886 (<HOLDING>); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a regulation prohibiting a landowner from building houses on his beachfront property denied him all economically viable use of his land and therefore was a taking requiring compensation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” (internal quotation omitted)). Moreover, the state is not a “person” within the meaning of section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). In an attempt to elude the sovereign immunity bar, plaintiffs essentially ask this Court to order two legislative leaders, in their official capacities, to appropriate additional funds for the Clean Elections Fund. Case law makes clear that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity, which is essentially a suit against the state itself, may be barred by the Eleventh Amendment regardless of whether injunctive or monetary relief is sought. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101, 104 S.Ct. 900.

    ### Response:
    holding that an official capacity suit should be treated as a suit against the entity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Becerra, 155 F.3d at 753-54; Lyons, 888 F.2d at 1075. As for the change-in-the-law exception, the Supreme Court did address the question whether a duty to disclose arises from a defendant’s market activities and therefore Stoneridge does not affect the legal basis of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Regents. (The Financial Institution Defendants insist Lead Plaintiff previously argued that Defendants’s alleged market activities gave rise to a duty to disclose and lists a number of examples in # 5986 at 4, 7 n. 5, 8 and nn. 6-7, and 10-11 and nn. 8-9.) Moreover, they maintain, logically Lead Plaintiff cannot rely on a case decided in 1977, Virginia Bankshares, and yet argue a change in controlling law. See Loa-Herrera v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 239 Fed.Appx. 875, 880-81 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore the Supreme Court’s refusal to

    ### Response:
    holding that an intervening change in statutory interpretation did not amount to a change in controlling law under the mandate rule where plaintiffs attempted on remand to rely on a different but related statute which could have been but was not previously raised and the interpretation of which had not changed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    attacked Edwards’s testimony based on the deal he struck with the State. While counsel also sought to impeach Prince’s and Barksdale’s testimony, he did not attempt to attack the testimony given by Bridgett or Rainey. Although the defense brought out conflicting and impeachment evidence via cross-examination, this evidence had little or no bearing on the issue of Russell's intent in the Fast Freddy’s offense. Cf. Siqueiros v. State, 685 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (recognizing cross-examination of State’s witnesses can raise issue of identity). The State provided probative evidence on the issue of Russell’s intent in the Fast Freddy’s offense through numerous witnesses, and this evidence of intent was not seriously undermined by the defense. Accord DeLeon, 77 S.W.3d at 313-14 (<HOLDING>). b. Evidence of S & A Offense The State also

    ### Response:
    holding defense crossexamination did not raise issue of intent or identity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the court. As to the distribution charge, Price and Ellis clearly are not accomplices under settled South Dakota law. “ ‘An accomplice is one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial. To render one an accomplice he must in some manner knowingly and with criminal intent participate, associate or concur with another in the commission of a crime.’” State v. Fox, 313 N.W.2d 38, 40 (S.D.1981) (quoting State v. Johnson, 81 S.D. 600, 606, 139 N.W.2d 232, 236 (1965) (emphasis supplied)). Busack was charged with distributing methamphetamine to Price and Ellis. Neither of these witnesses could be charged with distributing to themselves, therefore they were not accomplices to these acts. See State v. Bufener, 401 N.W.2d 740, 743 (S.D.1987) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, under facts demonstrating more

    ### Response:
    holding that witness was not an accomplice in distributing marijuana to himself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hearing at 11. The record indicates that all twelve defendants said, ""[yles,"" and then the trial judge said, ""[elv-eryone says yes."" Id. The trial judge then addressed Barker individually, discussing the specifics of Barker's plea agreement. As the post-conviction court concluded, ""there is no question that the twelve defendants were properly advised 'en masse' of the rights they were giving up by pleading guilty, and that the Court was satisfied that all twelve, including [Barker], understood and knowingly waived their rights."" Appellant's Appendix at 183. Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the evidence is undisputed and leads inevitably to an opposite conclusion of the post-conviction court. See, e.g., Mescher v. State, 686 N.E.2d 418, 414-415 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>), reh'g denied, trans. denied. For the

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants guilty plea was entered into knowingly voluntarily and intelligently
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2001) (reversing denial of summary judgment because plaintiff failed to provide “sufficient objective proof of the extent or degree of the alleged physical limitations resulting from the disc injuries”). Jacobson’s deposition testimony as to Molina’s neck and back limitations is based entirely upon Molina’s subjective complaints of pain, which, as stated above, is insufficient. Moreover, that evidence related to Molina’s injury in the days immediately following the accident. Without any objective evidence that these alleged limitations lasted much longer, no reasonable juror could conclude that Molina’s injuries were permanent, significant, or curtailed her customary activities for more than 90 days. See, e.g., Kim v. Kim, 266 A.D.2d 190, 697 N.Y.S.2d 676, 677 (App. Div.2d Dep’t 1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Petrone v. Thornton, 166 A.D.2d 513,

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of alleged limitations obtained soon after accident was without more insufficient to survive summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been informed of the registration requirement in order for his admission to have been valid. “For a guilty plea to be valid, it must be affirmatively shown that it was both intelligently and voluntarily given, and made with a full understanding both of what the plea connotes and of its possible consequences.” In re John D., 479 A.2d 1173, 1177 (R.I.1984) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279-80 (1969)). Before accepting a plea, the court must set forth, in language understandable to the juvenile, the “essential elements underlying certain rights.” In re John D., 479 A.2d at 1178. However, the court need not inform a defendant of collateral consequences of an admission for it to be valid. State v. Figueroa, 639 A.2d 495, 499 (R.I.1994) (<HOLDING>). Matthew argues that the state’s case is moot

    ### Response:
    holding that the sanction of deportation is a collateral not direct consequence of a guilty plea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by applying a mistaken standard of review and mischaracterizing Haverda’s rebuttal arguments. This Circuit has held that summary disposition of the causation issue in First Amendment retaliation claims is generally inappropriate. Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 113-14 (5th Cir.1992). Courts applying the Mt. Healthy doctrine in summary disposition analyses have held that if a plaintiff brings forth evidence of pretext, the determination whether the employer’s stated reasons are pretextual is a fact issue reserved for the jury. See Click, 970 F.2d at 113-14 (finding that evidence of motivation for adverse employment action, along with plaintiffs evidence supporting a contrary inference, is “fodder for the jury”); Brawner v. City of Richardson, Tex., 855 F.2d 187, 193 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Courts deciding the causation issue by

    ### Response:
    holding after considering the plaintiffs evidence of pretext that the determination whether the plaintiffs speech was the motivating factor in his discharge turns on a genuine issue of material fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conjunction with the use of FLEXLINE the significance of the relatedness factor is significantly diminished. 3. Similarity a. In evaluation the similarity of trademarks, a superficial side-by-side comparison is not the appropriate test. Wynn Oil, 839 F.2d at 1188. Rather, “the marks must be viewed in their entirety and in context.” Homeowners Group, 931 F.2d at 1109. “A court must determine, in the light of what occurs in the marketplace, whether the mark will be confusing to the public when singly presented.” Id. (citations omitted). The addition of words can be sufficient to distinguish marks. See In re Hearst Corp., 982 F.2d 493 (1992) (finding presence of term GIRL in VARGA GIRL sufficient to distinguish from VARGAS for identical goods); Frisch’s Restaurants, 759 F.2d 1261, 1266-67 (<HOLDING>). Slight modifications of a mark do not

    ### Response:
    holding that the use of the shoneys name over any subsidiary product line mark  reduces the likelihood of confusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the job of a single guard as of the time of trial; all that has been required, according to the record, is some adjustments in scheduling and job assignments, adjustments that are no more burdensome than those required from time to time for a variety of other non-penological reasons. Superintendent Vail acknowledged reluctantly that the changes had been made without causing any significant disruptions, and did not suggest any reason that the changes could not remain in effect. The burden on the prison—enlisting the cooperation of the guards’ union, adjusting job responsibilities, calling female officers away from their on-duty meals to perform searches—is minor, and a minor burden must be endured in order to preserve constitutional rights. See Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d at 1171 (<HOLDING>). (2) While the prison’s penological interest

    ### Response:
    holding required changes in prison policy not burdensome in light of the overall cost of operating the prison
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    notion that charter counties possess wide authority under Missouri Constitution Article VI, Section 18(c), to regulate municipal functions as they see fit — even in contravention of state statutes concerning the same powers. See, e.g., Casper v. Hetlage, 359 S.W.2d 781 (Mo.1962). So if section 260.247 in fact regulates a “municipal function,” serving in effect as a default regulation for political subdivisions which do not have home rule, the County is constitutionally free to exercise legislative power over that function; but if section 260.247 is “within the province of general legislation involving the public policy of the state as a whole,” then the County is bound by it regardless of its charter status. See State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Edwards, 589 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Mo.1979) (<HOLDING>). To resolve this question, the trial court

    ### Response:
    holding that the juvenile codes comprehensive control of juvenile facilities for the purpose of providing care protection and discipline of children in the juvenile facility could not be overridden by st louis countys exercise of control over juvenile facility personnel citing flower valley shopping center v st louis county 528 sw2d 749 754 mo banc 1975 state ex rel spink v kemp 365 mo 368 283 sw2d 502 514 1955
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and that “[i]t is simply best just to go to bed when that occurs.” JA 462 Getter from Mitchell K. Schwaber, M.D., to Kenneth A. Miller dated October 28, 2002). In the context of this case and this episodic disease, the ALJ has failed adequately to explain why Dr. Schwaber’s opinion (if not the opinions of other treating doctors) should not be treated as a valid medical opinion regarding “the frequency and duration of the disease’s exacerbations” rather than an opinion “on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” See Groskreutz v. Barnhart, 108 Fed.Appx. 412 (7th Cir.2004) (“The ALJ erroneously disregarded [a physician’s] opinion regarding how much weight [the applicant] could lift and how many days of work she may have to miss.”); Alexander v. Barnhart, 74 Fed.Appx. 23 (10th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Abendroth v. Barnhart, 26 Fed.Appx. 580 (7th

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the alj erred in disregarding a treating physicians opinion that a disabilitybenefits applicant might miss a day a week of work and need to lie down twice a day
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Scott, 172 F.3d at 966-67. 1. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) NEL contends that 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) should have precluded discharge. This section provides that a discharge does not apply to a debtor who, among others, “knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case ... made a false oath or account.” In order for this section to preclude discharge, NEL must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the debtor made a statement under oath; (2) the statement was false; (3) the debtor knew the statement was false; (4) the debtor made the statement with fraudulent intent; and (5) the statement related materially to the bankruptcy case. See, e.g., Lee Supply Corp. v. Agnew (In re Agnew), 818 F.2d 1284, 1289-90 (7th Cir.1987); see also Scott, 172 F.3d at 966-67 (<HOLDING>). A creditor can establish , fraudulent intent

    ### Response:
    holding preponderance standard applies to 11 usc  727a objections
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appeKant’s objections when Cook explained that the taxes, “1040” and “941,” reflected on the exhibits were personal income tax and an employment tax (social security) withholding. Cook also testified as to when the taxes accrued and that appeKant had paid $10,289.51, $13,551.60 and $14,-411.81 to satisfy income tax Kens and $60,-981.06 for the release of the employment tax, aK of which the certificates reflected. In his point of error, appeKant urges that the trial court erred in overruling an objection “concerning the reasons and detaüs” as to his tax debt. He has not pointed out where this specific objection was made if independent of his “prejudicial” and relevancy objections. We have found no such specific objection. See Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). AppeKant expressly bases his argument on

    ### Response:
    holding that the complaint on appeal must comport with the trial objection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a trustee who is liable to the fund. In this regard, the Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare states: The enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to provide both the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations.... The intent of the committee is to provide the full range of legal and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts. S.Rep. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, S.2d 857, 865 (N.Y.Sur.Ct.1941) (placing equitable lien upon the beneficial interest of a trustee/beneficiary who had embezzled trust property to compensate wronged beneficiaries of the trust); In re Burr’s Estate, 143 Misc. 877, 257 N.Y.S. 654 (N.Y.Sur.Ct.1932) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 239 A.D. 774, 263 N.Y.S. 945

    ### Response:
    holding that a trustee properly withheld trust payments owed to a prior trustee who had misappropriated trust funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    complaint. On de novo review, Decker v. Advantage Fund Ltd., 362 F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir.2004), we affirm. 1. The district court properly dismissed the claim for wrongful foreclosure. Defendants had statutory authority to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Cal. Civ.Code § 2924(a)(1). Moreover, the statute does not allow a mortgagee to sue to determine authority to foreclose. Robinson v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 199 Cal.App.4th 42, 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 811, 814 (2011); Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 819, 824 (2011). 2. The district court properly dismissed the claim for unjust enrichment. Even if such a theory exists in California, compare Melchior v. New Line Prods., Inc., 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 357 (2003) (<HOLDING>), with Lectrodryer v. Seoul-Bank, 77

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (defining “right” as claim that is “recognized or secured by law.”). In that situation, the triggering event that would vest the right to impose New York’s successor-liability law on Crown would be the entry of a final judgment, not the filing of a suit. See Dickson v. Navarro County Levee Improvement Dist. No. 3, 135 Tex. 95, 139 S.W.2d 257, 259 (1940); Durham Transp. Co. v. Beettner, 201 S.W.3d 859, 875 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied); Walls, 900 S.W.2d at 122; Trahan v. Trahan, 894 S.W.2d 113, 119 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, writ denied); Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., 798 S.W.2d at 589; see also Pimienta, 110 F.Supp.2d at 548; Thompson v. Miller, No. 03-98-00627-CV, 1999 WL 549205, at *2, 1999 Tex.App. LEXIS 5538, at *4 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). Without a final judgment, Satterfield did not

    ### Response:
    holding that any right claimant might have had to receive certain information prior to statutes amendment was not vested because his lawsuit had not been resolved
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that as a matter of law, a parent corporation cannot be a stranger to its subsidiaries’ business or contractual relations, and that no claim can be sustained against a parent for tortious interference with such relations.” Here, while Shekoy occupies the role of subsidiary and not parent, we are persuaded that the interwoven web of business arrangements likewise applies in this context and that Shekoy, as a subsidiary, cannot be a stranger to its parent Yoke’s business relations, which included the relationship between Cellchem and its customers. Therefore, Shekoy, through its parent, had a business relationship with Cellchem and its customers and is not a stranger to that relationship. Perry v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 353 FSupp.2d 1237, 1240-1241 (III) (B) (N.D. Ga. 2005) (<HOLDING>). While it is clear that the Appellants were

    ### Response:
    recognizing the supreme court of georgias endorsement in atlanta market center of a line of cases reducing the number of entities against which a claim of tortious interference with business relations may lie and in that context in re hercules and its finding that atlanta market center found that a parent corporation cannot be a stranger to its subsidiaries business or contractual relations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from the anxiety of incarceration). c. The Possibility that the Defense Will be Impaired The “impairment of one’s defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony ‘can rarely be shown.’ ” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Prejudice may be evident if witnesses are unable to recall accura of trial will be approximately thirty-five months. Because, “[e]xcessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of trial in ways neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify,” Francis, 63 V.I. at 754, the Court finds that the 1,056 day (approximately 35 months) delay in this case is presumptively prejudicial. Accord, United States v. Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701, 706-08 (6th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). However, “presumptive prejudice ... is

    ### Response:
    holding that 35month delay created a presumption of prejudice without demonstration of specific cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judges of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York have expressly concluded that Mr. Kohlmann is qualified to provide expert testimony on terrorism similar to that which he intends to provide in this case. United States v. Sabir, 2007 WL 1373184, at *1; United States v. Paracha, 2006 WL 12768, at * 18. In Paracha, Judge Sidney Stein found that Mr. Kohl-mann “possesses sufficient education, training and experience to qualify as an expert on the origins, leadership and tradecraft of the al Qaeda organization.” 2006 WL 12768, at *20. And in Sabir, Judge Loretta Preska found that Mr. Kohlmann was qualified to offer testimony on the origins and history of al Qaeda as well as Azzam Publications. See 2007 WL 1373184, at *8-9; see also Aref, 2007 WL 603508, at *16 (<HOLDING>). The Court agrees with Judges Stein and

    ### Response:
    holding that mr kohlmann could provide expert testimony on political groups in bangladesh
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to explain adequately the basis for its interpretation of “persistent” as applied to the evaluation of tinnitus under pre-1999 DC 6260. Suppl. Br. at 3. The Board reached its decision (1) without referring to the Secretary’s conclusion that an attribute of constancy was not well suited for rating a condition that, “under certain circumstances, comes and goes”, 59 Fed.Reg. at 17,297; (2) by paraphrasing only selectively from the Secretary’s 1994 Supplementary Information, ibid.; and (3) by basing its conclusion solely on one dictionary definition of “persistent” (R. at 8). See Theiss, 18 Vet.App. at 210-11 (criticizing General Counsel precedent opinion, upon which Board had relied, for “selective use of a narrow set of definitions”); see also Suozzi v. Broim, 10 Vet.App. 307, 311 (1997) (<HOLDING>). In this regard, the Court notes that

    ### Response:
    holding that secretary defines corroboration far too narrowly in interpreting 38 cfr  3304f
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in charge of other state actors who actually committed the violation.” Id. Rather, “the plaintiff must establish a deliberate, intentional act by the supervisor to violate constitutional rights.” Id. at 994-95 (quotations and citations omitted). Mr. Spencer’s filings do not provide a basis for the imposition of supervisor liability. And in the supervisors’ official capacities, Mr. Spencer was required to demonstrate that his injuries were the result of a municipal “policy or custom.” Novitsky v. City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1259 (10th Cir.2007) (“A municipality cannot be held liable for its officers’ actions under § 1983 unless those actions were caused by a policy or custom of the municipality.”); Myers v. Okla. County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 n. 2 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). A “ ‘custom’ ... mean[s] an act that,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that suits against municipal officers acting in an official capacity are treated the same as those against a municipality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence to rebut the presumption of ownership created by the certificates of title; and (3) the facts of this case do not give rise to creation of a trust. It is accordingly ORDERED that the Trustee’s objection at ECF No. 14 is SUSTAINED and the three vehicles are determined to be non-exempt property of this bankruptcy estate. ORDERED. 1 . See [ECF No. 1], at 12. 2 . See [ECF No. 17], at 5. 3 . Fla. Stat. 710.111(1)(f). 4 . See [ECF No. 27-1], at 5 (the Debtor at her 341 meeting stating, ""the reason they’re in my name is because to put them in their name the insurance would have been astronomical”). 5 . In re Kirk, 381 B.R. 800, 802 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2007) (quoting Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Bandet, 47 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1950)); see also Cannova v. Corran, 92 So.2d 614, 619 (Fla.1957) (<HOLDING>) (""The presumption is that [the individual] was

    ### Response:
    holding that a person is presumed to own all property that is titled in her name
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights and was not causally connected to plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 13-16. In addition, because Furtado was not a final policy-maker for the City, his single act of applying for an allegedly unconstitutional warrant could not create a municipal policy or custom sufficient to hold the municipality liable under § 1983. Reply Memorandum of Defendants at 5-7 (# 30); Supplementary Reply Memorandum of Defendants at 1-3 (# 36). Plaintiff responds that the search authorized by the warrant was unreasonable on its face and that a person in Furtado’s position could not have reasonably believed that the authorized search was reasonable. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 9-14 (# 24) (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952) (<HOLDING>); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86

    ### Response:
    holding stomach pump of suspect unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(l), the facts of this case are such that the USDA’s collection efforts began as a violation of the automatic stay, but ultimately became a violation of the discharge injunction upon the termination of the automatic stay once the Debtor received her discharge. The USDA notes as much, seemingly to refute the idea that any fees are warranted under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) because the automatic stay was no longer in effect by the time Debtor’s counsel contacted the USDA. We find, however, that this is a distinction without a difference as attorney’s fees would otherwise have been available as compensatory damages under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) for the USDA’s violation of the discharge injunction and would be analyzed under the same standard. See, e.g., In re Pratt, 462 F.3d at 17 (<HOLDING>); Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 230 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding debtors are entitled to establish and recover their compensatory damages under 11 usc  105a for violations of the discharge injunction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as required by § 34-36.1-3.04(c), or as a result of plaintiffs failure to timely exercise the right to exclude the property; the salient fact is that the right to exclude the real estate expired no later than January 11, 1999, when the time limit within which to withdraw the real estate expired under the terms of the declaration of condominium. Thus, in accordance with § 34-36.1-2.10(c)(4), title to unexercised declarant rights passed to the unit owners’ association as a matter of law. When a declarant fails to timely exercise his or her development or special declarant rights, those rights expire and a third party cannot thereafter revive them and convey what that third party does not own. See America Condominium Association, Inc. v. IDC, Inc., 844 A.2d 117, 131 (R.I.2004) (<HOLDING>); St. Jean Place Condominium Association v.

    ### Response:
    holding that development rights automatically expired when the declarant failed to exercise them by a date specified in the declaration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the law was passed, as the processes of manufacture had been conducted, color was an approximate, or general indication of quality. Suppose this to be so, does it derogate from the fact that color was the standard which Congress, with the lights which it had, saw fit to adopt? Does it not tend to fortify that fact? If it be found by experience that the standard is a fallacious one, can the executive department supply the defects of the legislation? Congress alone has the authority to levy duties. Its will alone is to be sought. Id. at 700. In this case, Congress has provided a clear and unambiguous test: the quantity of soluble non-sugar solids. Following the Supreme Court in Merritt, this Court will not disturb Congress’ will. Furthermore v. United States, 32 C.C.P.A. 175, 184 (1945) (<HOLDING>); Robert G. Lynch Co. v. United States, 49

    ### Response:
    holding that the addition of a enough cereal to dog food to place it in a tariff provision with a lower rate of duty was within the importers right to fashion merchandise to obtain a lower rate of duty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for “sums due in connection with equipment and materials furnished and workmen employed in the construction of the M/V Gulf Tiger.” Complaint at ¶¶ 9-10. Gulf Fleet alleges that it has a privilege under article 3237(8) because it paid the vendors who supplied the materials, equipment, and labor to the construction of the vessel. Thoma-Sea contends that mere payment of vendors does not give rise to a privilege in favor of Gulf Fleet under article 3237(8) because the privilege is limited to suppliers who actually furnish materials to a vessel, or to laborers employed in the construction of the vessel. The scope of the article 3237(8) privilege is a question of law that is appropriate for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Louisiana state law privileges are stricti juris; they cannot be a.1860) (<HOLDING>); Hill v. Phoenix Tow, 2 Rob. (LA) 35, 1842 WL

    ### Response:
    holding that a party who lends money to be used in the repairs of a vessel or to furnish the vessel with supplies does not have a privilege against the vessel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    always been interpreted to provide for a private right of action. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-87, 103 S.Ct. 683, 688-90, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983) (expressly interpreting section 10(b)’s private right of action as consistent with' securities laws’ “broad remedial purposes”). While some courts did not find the requisite congressional intent to infer a private right of action from section 17(a), see Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 574-76, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2488-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979) (legislative intent is the primary factor to consider when addressing whether a private right of action exists), other circuits found no meaningful distinction between section 17(a) and section 10(b). Compare Daniel v. Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1244-46 (7th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a private right of action exists
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This latter principle has given rise to Fifth Amendment claims in the context of court-ordered therapy requiring an admission of criminal conduct.- See generally William Wesley Patton, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent ■ Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 Ga. L.Rev. 473 (1990); Jessica Wilen Berg, Note, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Silence: Taking a Stand on Fifth Amendment Implications for Court-Ordered Therapy Programs, 79 Cornell L.Rev. 700 (1994); Scott Michael Sol-koff, Note, Judicial Use Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 Nova L.Rev. 1441 (1993). Courts have viewed such situations differently. E.g., Mace v. Amestoy, 765 F.Supp. 847, 850-52 (D.Vt.1991) (<HOLDING>); Gyles v. State, 901 P.2d 1143,1148-50 (Alaska

    ### Response:
    holding defendants fifth amendment rights had been violated when his probation was revoked based on his failure to complete a sexual treatment program that required incriminating admissions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 92, 102 S.Ct. 172, 70 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981); see also Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 679, 124 S.Ct. 2788, 159 L.Ed.2d 690 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining “prurient interest” as “seek[ing] a sexual response from”). Whether an image appeals to a prurient interest is a question of fact for a jury to determine. See Smith v. United States, 481 U.S. 291, 300-01, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 (1977) ( ss of whether or not they subjectively wish to view sexually explicit or obscene materials, may be treated by the State as legally unable to consent to do so. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-14, 214 n. 10-11, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Such is the case under 18 U.S.C. § 1470, in

    ### Response:
    recognizing the states undoubted police power to protect children its power to adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials available to youths than on those available to adults and its ability to suppress from minors material obscene as to them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    undocumented utilization of the dump by the general population over a protracted period of time, the contamination could never realistically be traced to particular contributors. • The cases relied upon by the Town do not support such a counter-intuitive proposition. In Delaney, the district court had to determine whether the Town of Carmel could be held strictly liable as an owner under CERCLA because it entered into leases with private landowners to allow septic waste haulers to dispose of such waste on the landowners’ property. In answering this question in the negative, the court concluded that plaintiffs did not present “sufficient allegations of ‘site control’ to render the leaseholder Carmel a CERCLA ‘owner.’ ” Delaney, 55 F.Supp.2d at 259; but see Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 329 (<HOLDING>). The court further rejected plaintiffs’

    ### Response:
    holding that site control alone is an improper basis for imposition on lessees of owner liability under cercla
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to third parties because trademark law does not specifically excuse the licensor from accepting performance from a person other than the original licensee. Second, NCP argues that even if trademark law did make such an excuse for the licensor, NCP had consent to license the trademark from rights derived from the Settlement and License Agreements. We agree with the Bankruptcy Judge and hold that the Appellant had no rights to the Blanks’ trademark that were as sumed by NCP in its bankruptcy proceedings. 1. Section 365(c)(1) A debtor in possession, as well as a trustee, may, subject to the bankruptcy court’s approval, “assume any executory contract from itself as debtor.” City of Jamestown v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Partners, L.P.), 27 F.3d 534, 537 (11th Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>) (applying 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)); K-4, Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that debtors in possession generally have rights powers and duties of trustees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robert Doyle Murphy appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants in Murphy’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging his due process rights were violated when he was disciplined for possessing a weapon found in his cell. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, Blanford, v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.2005), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Murphy’s due process claim because discovery of the weapon in Murphy’s cell was “some evidence” to support the disciplinary actions. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985) (<HOLDING>). We are not persuaded by Murphy’s contention

    ### Response:
    holding that due process requires that the findings and actions of a disciplinary prison board be supported by some evidence in the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 498. The Court recognizes that defendant, with some justification, is frustrated by plaintiffs careful limitation of her claim to the jurisdictional limit, as amended and as it previously existed. Defendant’s removal is based solely on plaintiffs settlement demand of $75,000.00. This is insufficient to establish the jurisdictional amount for two reasons. First, the mere existence of a settlement demand is not dispositive of the issue of the jurisdictional amount. See, e.g., King v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 940 F.Supp. 213, 217 n. 1 (S.D.Ind.1996); Saunders v. Rider, 805 F.Supp. 17, 18-19 (E.D.La.1992). Second, for diversity jurisdiction to attach, the amount in controversy must exceed the value of $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see Larkin v. Brown, 41 F.3d 387, 389 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs case is

    ### Response:
    holding under former jurisdictional limit that diversity jurisdiction did not exist where plaintiff sought damages of exactly 5000000
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that CGG waived its statute of limitations affirmative defense by failing to raise it in response to Statom's motion for partial summary judgment. In each of these cases, summary judgment was ordered against the defendant, and the defendant waived its affirmative defenses by failing to raise the defenses in response to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Flynn, 403 N.E.2d at 1126 (reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, and noting that, on remand, the defendants could not argue their affirmative defenses because they had waived the affirmative defenses by failing to argue them in response to the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment); FI & G Ortho, 823 N.E.2d at 731 (<HOLDING>); Daniels, 678 N.E.2d at 430 (holding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants waived their affirmative defense of unenforceability by failing to raise the defense in response to the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stamp. The State argued that this fact made the article and photo in the September 18 paper irrelevant. In response, Mr. Schaefer pointed out that the victim could have seen the photo on either September 16 or 17. However, when Mr. Schaefer could produce nothing to show that Plott’s photo was in any paper other than the September 18 edition, the trial court denied the motion to suppress without hearing any evidence. In his rule 3.850 motion, Plott argued that Mr. Schae-fer was ineffective for failing to obtain all of the newspaper articles and for failing to bring them to the hearing. In summarily denying relief on this ground, the trial court held that this issue was procedurally barred because it was raised on direct appeal. See Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Fla.1995) (<HOLDING>). However, the issue raised on direct appeal

    ### Response:
    holding that claims raised on direct appeal are procedurally barred from consideration in a rule 3850 motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We agree with KR. that Druhan was not appointed pursuant to the applicable rules governing such appointments and that his orders are therefore void. Initially, we note that KG.S. argues that KR.’s challenge of Druhan as the temporary probate judge is untimely. K.G.S. is correct; K.R. did not file her original mandamus petition with the Court of Civil Appeals until 17 days after Dru-han’s August 3, 2015, order denying K.R.’s supplemental motion requesting that Dru-han recuse himself. This is beyond the presumptively reasonable 14-day time in which to file a mandamus petition in an adoption proceeding. See Rule 21(a)(3) and § 26-10A~26(a). Regardless, we may consider K.R.’s argument because it concerns the probate court’s jurisdiction. See Bush v. State, 171 So.3d 679 (Ala.Crim.App.2014) (<HOLDING>). The timeliness of K.R.’s challenge to

    ### Response:
    holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    FAC contains no allegation that Lime Wire ever attempted to obtain or purchase a license from any of the counter-defendants or their respective joint ventures. Lime Wire’s retail competitors may have “faced excessive wholesale prices” for licenses as a result of the alleged price-fixing scheme (id. ¶ 36), but Lime Wire itself has n 18 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997)), Lime Wire has not established that it suffered injury-in-fact stemming from any such agreement. To the extent Lime Wire claims that it was an interbrand retail competitor of counter-defendants’ joint ventures, Lime Wire lacks standing to challenge the retail price-fixing agreement because the FAC contains no allegation that the fixed retail prices were predatory. See Atlantic Richfield, 495 U.S. at 339, 110 S.Ct. 1884 (<HOLDING>). Even accepting as true Lime Wire’s allegation

    ### Response:
    holding that vertical maximum pricefixing agreement does not cause a competitor antitrust injury unless it results in predatory pricing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    PER CURIAM. AND NOW, this 23rd day of February, 2010, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The order of the Superior Court is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Superior Court for consideration of whether the trial court improperly permitted newly-discovered evidence regarding the alleged contents of a telephone conversation between Petitioner and his wife to be introduced at trial over Petitioner’s objection, as the Superior Court erroneously found the issue to be waived because Petitioner did not also additionally request a mistrial. See Commonwealth v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 365 A.2d 1237, 1242 (1976)

    ### Response:
    holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    who assaults ... his or her spouse ... is guilty of a misdemean- or....” Because the record is incomplete as to what evidence was introduced at Sanders’ criminal trial, we cannot determine whether anything obtained as a result of the allegedly unlawful entry was essential to Sanders’ subsequent conviction. A remand is therefore necessary for further factual developments as to Heck’s applicability. Probable Cause Hearing Sanders’ second claim, that he was not afforded a prompt probable cause hearing, is unaffected by Heck, as that claim is for “monetary damages for a constitutional violation unrelated to [the plaintiff’s] ultimate conviction of the substantive offense.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 816 n. 10 (6th Cir.2003); Buckenberger v. Reed, 342 Fed.Appx. 58, 63 (5th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, in Gerstein v. Pugh, the case which

    ### Response:
    holding such claims fall within the narrow range of cases that are not barred by heck because a determination of the timeliness of the plaintiffs probable cause hearing will not affect the validity of his conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the Doctrine of Exhaustion SVC argues that, even if it had actual or constructive notice that Commerce was applying the 1996 regulations, any failure to exhaust its administrative remedies nevertheless should be excused under two established exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion — the “futility” exception, and the exception for “pure questions of law.” See generally Pl.’s Reply Brief at 12-14; Pl.’s Surreply Brief at 20-21. The Court of Appeals has recognized that “[a] party need not exhaust [its] administrative remedies where invoking such remedies would be futile.” Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 916 F.2d 1571, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1990) (citation omitted); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 148, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Emphasizing that it first

    ### Response:
    recognizing futility exception to doctrine of exhaustion where agency was powerless to grant relief sought
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claimant. Id. Smith contacted Prudential regarding his second appeal on August 1, 2005. In this letter, he did not formally request an appeal; however, on August 31, 2005, he confirmed in writing through his attorney that his August 1 letter was intended as a request for an appeal. Thus, Prudential’s review period began to run on August 31, 2005 at the latest; it expired on October 15, 2005, well before Prudential contacted Smith to seek an extension or to request further documentation. Although Pru dential did notify Smith on November 18, 2005 that it was taking a 90-day extension, by this time it was too late — the response period had expired and Smith’s appeal had been deemed denied. See Schmir v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 03-187, 2003 WL 22466168, at *3 (D.Me. Oct. 30, 2003) (<HOLDING>). Because Smith exhausted his administrative

    ### Response:
    holding that prudential could not avoid the effectiveness of a deemed denial by issuing a belated response to claimants appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words, in order to satisfy the “prejudice” requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). We have held that “Counsel has an obligation to consult with his client on important decisions and to keep him informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution.” Diaz, 930 F.2d at 834. This obligation includes the duty to inform a defendant of any plea offers. See id. at 834-35; see also Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262, 267 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981) (<HOLDING>); Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1146 (11th

    ### Response:
    holding that where a defendant pleads guilty or withdraws a guilty plea his attorney must inform him of all of the available options and possible consequences and the failure to do so can fall outside the range of competence required by attorneys in criminal cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    include circumstances such as the location of the print, the character of the place or premises where it was found and the accessibility of the general public to the object on which the print was impressed. A latent fingerprint found at the scene of the crime, shown to be that of an accused, tends to show that he was at the scene of the crime. The attendant circumstances with respect to the print may show that he was at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. If they do so show, it is a rational inference, consistent with the rule of law both as to fingerprints and circumstantial evidence, that the accused was the criminal agent. Id. at 479-80, 164 S.E.2d at 659 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tyler v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 162, 167, 487 S.E.2d 221, 224 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Turner v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 141, 148, 235

    ### Response:
    holding that fingerprint evidence coupled as it was with attendant circumstances was sufficient to prove that the defendant was the criminal agent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that accepting the latter position would create the perception that at least one of the courts was misled. Id. at 750-51, 121 S.Ct. 1808; Eastman v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir.2007). Accordingly, courts consistently hold that a debtor who conceals a legal claim and denies owning the asset in bankruptcy is judicially estopped from later pursuing that claim to the debtor’s personal benefit. See, e.g., Cannon-Stokes, 453 F.3d at 448; Jethroe v. Omnova Solutions, Inc., 412 F.3d 598 (5th Cir.2005); Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir.2003). But here it is undisputed that Matthews did not conceal her administrative complaints during the bankruptcy proceedings. See Eubanks v. CBSK Fin. Group, Inc., 385 F.3d 894, 898 & n. 1 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); see also InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that judicial estoppel was inapplicable where debtor omitted potential claim against defendant from chapter 7 schedules but orally disclosed it to the trustee during the meeting of creditors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fuentes, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 649 N.E.2d 519 (1995), which interpreted section 2 — 1202(c), defendants contend that the circuit court here lost its jurisdiction even though no Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) finding was made as to the directed verdict’s immediate appealability. Doe, relying on Rule 304(a), argues that defendants’ argument is flawed conceptually in that it fails to recognize that a posttrial motion is not a prerequisite for a trial court to retain jurisdiction to vacate or modify a directed verdict where other claims in the matter remain pending and undetermined. Doe further argues that a posttrial motion is not ever required after a directed verdict. In support of this position, Doe relies on Keen v. Davis, 38 Ill. 2d 280, 282, 230 N.E.2d 859 (1967) (<HOLDING>), and Fitzpatrick v. ACF Properties Group,

    ### Response:
    holding that a posttrial motion is not required after a grant of a directed verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that “[njothing in ... the Kansas tort claims act shall be construed as a waiver by the state of Kansas of immunity from suit under the [Eleventh] Amendment”); id. § 39-7,137 (stating same with respect to certain administrative proceedings for Kansas social welfare program). Accordingly, we hold that Kan. Stat. Ann. § 76-723 conferred upon KSU the power to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. III. In conclusion, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court for the foregoing reasons. 1 . Because neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court relied on § 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, we do not address in this case whether it is constitutional. See, e.g., Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown), 133 F.3d 237, 243-45 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Department of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset

    ### Response:
    holding 11 usc  106a unconstitutional to the extent that it purports to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was clearly untimely. The BIA also properly held that Zhang’s conversion to Christianity was a change in his personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions that would support reopening. Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 150-51 (3d Cir.2009). We have recognized, however, that an alien who has been ordered removed can file an untimely or successive asylum application based on changed personal conditions if the alien can also show changed country conditions in the motion to reopen. Id. at 150. Thus, Zhang would be eligible to file a second asylum application in reopened proceedings based on his Christian faith, if he is able to establish relevant changed country conditions since the time of his initial asylum proceedings. Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251, 252 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Zhang argued before the BIA that there has

    ### Response:
    holding that change in country conditions is measured from time of proceedings before ij
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their belief that probable cause existed to enter 214 South Fourth Street. The uncontradicted evidence that the officers were not in their usual patrol area and were unfamiliar with the home in question negates any thought that they used the situation which arose on May 13, 1999 as an excuse or ruse to gain entry to a known “drug house”. We are also struck by the great restraint that the police showed before they finally felt that they must enter the home. Even when they believed that a burglary was in progress they did not enter until they looked through the open window and saw the broken door latch and ransacked room. This, coupled with the open window, flight of four males from the home when the police approached, admission of two males that they were fleeing from the p th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>), affirmed in relevant part, 710 F.2d 431

    ### Response:
    holding that exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry where it seemed apparent that a burglary was in progress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    advertising restrictions related to product safety, the issue is not whether the restrictions were procompetitive, but whether they could be. Id. at 778, 119 S.Ct. 1604 (“[T]he plausibility of competing claims about the effects of the professional advertising restrictions rules out the indulgently abbreviated review to which the Commission’s order was treated.”). See also Areeda & Hovenkamp at ¶ 1911b (stating that courts must consider the plausibility of procompetitive effects when determining which mode of analysis to apply). Because the alleged restraints were arguably based, at least in part, on safety concerns, they may have had some procompetitive effects. It follows that an abbreviated per se analysis was inappropriate. See California Dental, 526 U.S. at 770-781, 119 S.Ct. 1604 (<HOLDING>). C. ""Whether the Testimony of David Cole

    ### Response:
    holding that a quick look analysis was inappropriate for restrictions imposed by professional association of dentists on member advertising where the likelihood of noncompetitive effects of restrictions were not obvious and restrictions could plausibly be thought to have procompetitive effect on competition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that a prosecutor's coercion of a witness would violate a defendant's rights but would not give rise to tort liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 6 . See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir.1999); LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29, 34 (1st Cir.1974) (“Due process does not permit one to be convicted upon his own coerced confession. It should not allow him to be convicted upon a confession wrung from another by coercion.”) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 430-31, 65 S.Ct 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)); McMillian v. Johnson, 878 F.Supp. 1473, 1512-14 (M.D.Ala.1995), rev’d in part on other grounds, 88 F.3d 1554 (11th Cir.1996); Tucker, 721 P.2d at 642. 7 . See, e.g., Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (<HOLDING>). 8 . See Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30, 97

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial judges action in singling out a defense witness for a lengthy admonition on the dangers of perjury effectively drove that witness off the stand and thus deprived the defendant of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    282, 312, 4 P3d 1261 (2000). “If the trial court’s decision was within the range of legally correct discretionary choices and produced a permissible, legally correct outcome, then the trial court did not abuse its discretion.” Id. Where, however, a trial court’s purported exercise of discretion flows from a mistaken legal premise, its decision does not fall within the range of legally correct choices and does not produce a permissible, legally correct outcome. See State v. Mayfield, 302 Or 631, 645, 733 P2d 438 (1987) (explaining that, in some circumstances, a trial court can err if it “fails to exercise discretion, refuses to exercise discretion[,] or fails to make a record which reflects an exercise of discretion”); see also State v. Pemberton, 226 Or App 285, 289, 203 P3d 326 (2009) (<HOLDING>). This court’s recent decision in State v.

    ### Response:
    holding that under mayfield the exercise of discretion based on a mistaken premise of law can be a failure to properly exercise discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of mandatoiy minimum sentences in this limited context.”) (footnote omitted); Shendur v. United States, 874 F.Supp. 85, 86 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (""[Section] 3553(f) reflects a congressional decision that mandatoiy minimum sentences no longer be applied mechanically.”). 2 . See also United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 5C1.2 (Nov.1995) (incorporating § 3553(f) verbatim). - 3 . The district court nevertheless appears to have imposed such a requirement, stating that ""there was not full compliance [with § 3553(f) ], for the reason that I think it was incumbent upon [Ivester] to initiate the full confession of activities to the Government at an early time, and I cannot find that he has done that.” 4 . Contra United States v. Rodriguez, 60 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Cf. USSG § 3E1.1, decreasing the

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants statements to the probation officer were insufficient to satisfy the safety valves fifth requirement the probation officer is for purposes of  5c12 not the government
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tan, 446 F.3d at 1377; see also Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 1223, 1238 (11th Cir.2007) (remanding because “the IJ failed to render a reasoned decision ... and [did] not appear to have considered evidence in the record”). We therefore remand to the agency for it to consider the entire record in evaluating Ms. Seek’s petition. We do not reach the question of whether Ms. Seek, as a mother who opposes the practice of FGM on her daughter, falls within a “particular social group” for purposes of withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). This question was not reached by the BIA, and it is most appropriately considered by the agency in the first instance. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186-87, 126 S.Ct. 1613, 1614-15, 164 L.Ed.2d 358 (2006) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Upon remand, the BIA should address this

    ### Response:
    holding it was improper for ninth circuit to determine that an aliens family constituted a particular social group for asylum purposes because proper course was to remand issue to board for initial determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    strictly, seemed to encompass only contract claims. Mazzioni Farms, 761 So.2d a 68, 1372 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (accepting parties’ stipulation that New York law applied to their insurance contracts where there was no strong public policy against applying New York law); National Can Co. v. Vinylex Corp., 687 F. Supp. 375, 376-77 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (deeming parties to have stipulated that Illinois law governed their dispute where both sides maintained in their briefs that Illinois law governed); and Ackerman v. Foster, 974 P.2d 1, 9 (Col. App. 1998) (accepting parties’ stipulation that California law applied to insurance policy). Courts in other jurisdictions have enforced choice of law stipulations on issues of tort law. Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>); Von Hundertmark v. Boston Prof’l Hockey

    ### Response:
    holding that parties may stipulate which states substantive law governs their contract and tort claims if the chosen state bears a reasonable relationship to the alleged transaction and injury in question and the stipulation does not violate public policy nor call into question the courts subject matter jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225, 1238 (10th Cir.2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (directing district court to screen prisoner cases early and dismiss defective claims). Second, Mr. Tauer is correct that the administrative-exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional; failure to exhaust does not divest this court of the power to (10th Cir.2005) (applying applicable state statute of limitations to § 1983 action); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(3) & (4) (supplying two-year limitations for actions based on fraud or injury to the rights of another). Mr. Tauer maintains that as long as he filed his grievance within two years after his constitutional rights were denied, federal litigation is not foreclosed. This court has specifically rejected this position. Ross, 365 F.3d at 1186 (<HOLDING>). Mr. Tauer also challenges the regulation

    ### Response:
    holding timebarred grievance is not considered exhausted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Council meetings, the text of Art. I, § 2, Bessemer City Ordinances, and advisory opinions written by the Ethics Commission and the Office of the Alabama Attorney General. Considering these materials in making a determination as to whether the City councillors are entitled to qualified immunity necessarily would require converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for a summary judgment because ""[i]f the trial court considers matters outside the pleadings, then the motion should be treated as a motion for summary judgment.” Stock-man v. Echlin, Inc., 604 So.2d 393, 394 (Ala. 1992). It is apparent from the language of the trial court's orders that it did not consider outside materials in reaching its decision. 6 . Cf. Chavers v. National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So.2d 1 (Ala.1981) (<HOLDING>). The claim of a breach of an implied contract

    ### Response:
    recognizing the intentional tort of bad faith in firstparty insurance actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    including vanity plates, is to aid in vehicle identification. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 304(b)(2)(C) (“[T]he primary purpose of motor vehicle plates is vehicle identification.”). Although a policy of vehicle identification is not necessarily inconsistent with a government’s intention to designate a public forum, the statement of such a legislative policy does not suggest, much less show, an intention to create a public forum. Second, as noted by counsel for the state at oral argument, Vermont’s vanity plates serve the purpose of raising revenue. Nothing about the revenue-raising aim of the vanity-plate regime suggests that Vermont intended to “create a forum for unlimited public expression.” DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); see New York Magazine v. Metropolitan Transp.

    ### Response:
    holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the law); W. Va.Code § 61-2-9a (prohibiting “harassment”). Therefore, in light of the plaintiffs need to solicit donations to cover living expenses and medical bills, I FIND that the balance of equities tips in favor of issuing a preliminary injunction. E.Public Interest Although the defendants admit that preservation of First Amendment freedoms is a significant public interest, they argue that the public will be harmed by prohibiting enforcement of an “important public safety mechanism.” (Defs.’ Mem. [Docket 18], at 16-17). However, as I previously explained, the defendants can ensure safety near intersections by enforcing other statutes. Further, the public interest generally favors protecting First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Carey v. FEC, 791 F.Supp.2d 121, 135-36 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Mullin v. Sussex Cnty., Del., 861 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs right to political speech is fully in accord with the publics interest in free speech and association
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for aliens entitled to protection but subject to mandatory denial of withholding. See Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 958-61 (9th Cir.2006). The IJ denied Aguilar’s application for deferral of removal under CAT, and the BIA affirmed. Because neither the BIA nor the IJ made an adverse credibility finding, “we must assume that [Aguilar’s] factual contentions are true.” Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 652 on El Salvador was included in the record without objection and that Aguilar attached it to his pro se brief to the BIA. Yet, neither the IJ nor the BIA considered the Country Report in denying Aguilar relief under CAT. The failure of the IJ and BIA to consider evidence of country conditions constitutes reversible error. See, e.g., Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1147-48 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that the bia abused its discretion when it denied petitioners motion to reopen by failing to consider evidence of country conditions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a (statutory) trade secret, they did no legal wrong”) (Illinois law). 11 . The court notes that, in boilerplate fashion, FS’s complaint alleges that AOS ""accepted the benefit of [FS's] assistance under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment.” (Compl. ¶ 34). Such wholly conclusory allegations, without anything more, run afoul of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require that a pleading contain ""a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>). 12 . FS dismisses Abbott Laboratories as an

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiffs complaint must contain sufficient factual matter accepted as true to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face   that is factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    answered in the negative. While the instant case does not involve a service contract, the Court would follow the same analysis here in order to determine whether an independent tort exists, and thus whether the economic loss rule applies. 2 . In Walta, the New Mexico Court of Appeals did not address the issue of whether the economic loss rule applied when a fiduciary duty existed, because the parties did not preserve the issue for appeal. 131 N.M. at 546, 40 P.3d 449. 3 . Based on the Court’s conclusion on this issue, no further analysis is necessary with regard to whether the contracts between the parties constitute commercial transactions, or whether there was great disparity in bargaining power. See Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 452 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1171-72 (D.N.M.2006)

    ### Response:
    holding that in commercial transactions when there is no great disparity in bargaining power of the parties economic losses are not recoverable in tort actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an applicable guideline”); United States v. Gonzalez, 134 Fed.Appx. 595, 598 (3d Cir.2005) (""Although the Sentencing Guidelines are not mandatory, sentences within the prescribed range are presumptively reasonable.”); United States v. Bartram, 407 F.3d 307, 313 (4th Cir.2005) (defining ""reasonable under ordinary English usage as: being in agreement with right thinking or right judgment”); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.2005) (""[I]t will be rare for a reviewing court to say ... a sentence [within a properly calculated Guidelines range] is ‘unreasonable.’ ”); United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 385 n. 9 (6th Cir.2005) (""[W]e decline to hold that a sentence within a proper Guidelines range is per se reasonable.”); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717

    ### Response:
    holding that any sentence that is properly calculated under the guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    26 (1995)) (“We have construed the provisions of the RA and the ADA in light of their close similarity of language and purpose.”); see also MX Group, 293 F.3d at 333-335 (finding standing under both the ADA and RA); Innovative Health, 117 F.3d at 47 (same). 5 . See 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1)(i) (including drug addiction as a “physical or mental impairment” that may qualify an individual as a “handicapped person” under the RA), cited in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998). 6 . We have previously noted that a corporation has standing to bring constitutional claims on its own behalf. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 472 F.2d 732, 733 (3d Cir.1973); see also First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that corporations are persons within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    actions, standing alone, demonstrates an intent to forestall review unless and until the forfeiture process is completed. The legislative history cited by the FCC sheds no light on the issue. In 1978, Congress amended the Communications Act “to unify, simplify, and enlarge the scope of the forfeiture provisions,” but made no attempt to limit judicial review. S.Rep. No. 95-580, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 109. It simply added an alternative approach, giving the FCC the option of holding an adjudicatory hearing in “the exceptional forfeiture ease, where urgency, precedent value, or convenience of the Commission warrants a proceeding exclusively under the Commission’s control until a final judgment on appeal is obtained.” Id. at 4, 1978 d 564, 566 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). We determine that nothing in the

    ### Response:
    holding that case law from other circuits squarely precluded jurisdiction over preenforcement ruling under the clean air act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial court’s award of attorney fees pursuant to either Minn.Stat. § 549.21 (1996) or Minn. R.Civ.P. ll unless the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the fees. See Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 141, 145 (Minn.1990) (applying abuse of discretion standard under both provisions). In imposing $20,000 in sanctions against Christensen, her deceased husband’s law firm and her attorneys, the trial court found Christensen’s claims to be frivolous and in bad faith because they were contrary to her stipulation in the attorney’s lien action and violated the public policy of the state. However, because we conclude Christensen’s claims are mérito- rious, and the record contains no evidence of bad faith, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding fees and costs. See id. at 144 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we reverse the award of attorney

    ### Response:
    holding a party who survives summary judgment should not be subject to sanctions for asserting frivolous claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    858 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Tex.1993) (plurality op.). Accordingly, Tello has not demonstrated that there was a genuine issue of material fact on his DTPA counterclaim against the Bank. We overrule his fourth issue. C. Tello’s Affirmative Defenses In his second and third issues, Tello contends he raised a fact issue on his affirmative defenses of fraudulent inducement and equitable estoppel sufficient to defeat the Bank’s motion for summary judgment. Tello generally refers to his affidavit, but other than the general summary judgment standards, he cites no authority. He does not cite the elements of the doctrines of fraudulent inducement and equitable estoppel, much less argue why his affidavit raised a fact issue on each element of these defenses. See Sunnyside Feedyard, 106 S.W.3d at 173 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, in response to the motion for

    ### Response:
    holding appellant waived contention that fact issue existed on legal doctrines sufficient to defeat summary judgment by referring to welldeveloped doctrines without citing basic authority as to their elements or any analysis to show a fact issue existed on these doctrines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the ground that determination not supported by substantial evidence; holding that IJ could not reject documentary evidence for the same reasons it rejected testimonial evidence; and holding that the documentary evidence established the objective component of petitioner’s claim of well-founded fear of future persecution). Here, Chen has submitted documents which support her contention that she had an abortion, that she and her husband were ordered to be sterilized, and that she and her husband were fired from their factory job for violating China’s one child policy. In the absence of an explicit rejection of petitioner’s documentary evidence by the IJ, this court must accept the petitioner’s documentary evidence as true. See Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Zahedi, 222 F.3d at 1165 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an “officer of the United States.” Brief for Respondent IBR 16-17. We find this argument unpersuasive. IBR’s broad definition of “officer of the United States” may well be favored today. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 126 (1976) (“ ‘[O]ffi-cer of the United States,’ ” as used in Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, refers to any “appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”). But there is no evidence that this was the definition Congress had in mind in 1948, when it enacted § 1442(a)(1) and the companion provision defining “agency.” Indeed, in 1948 and for some time thereafter, the relationship between certain independent agencies and the “Government of the United States” was often disputed. See, e. g., Pierce v. United States, 314 U. S. 306 (1941) (<HOLDING>); see also Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.

    ### Response:
    holding that an officer or employee of the tennessee valley authority was not an officer or employee acting under the authority of the united states or any department or any officer of the government thereof within the meaning of a criminal statute first enacted in 1884
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a material witness “[i]f it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena.” 18 U.S.C. § 3144. Under the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Therefore, an application for a material witness warrant under § 3144 must establish probable cause to believe that (1) the witness’s testimony is material, and (2) it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the witness by subpoena. See Bacon, 449 F.2d at 942-43 (<HOLDING>). Ordinarily, a search or seizure pursuant to a

    ### Response:
    holding that probable cause is the appropriate standard for  3144 material witness warrants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    First Amendment rights — punishment, in the form of termination of a contract beneficial to him, because of his speech. While Defendants assert that the contract provided no benefit to the county, from which one could infer that its termination could inflict no injury on the county, Mr. Umbehr has alleged a benefit to him from the contract. The contract obviated the need for him to individually negotiate a trash hauling contract with each city; it gave him the exclusive right to haul trash for cities that ratified the agreement; and it gave him, for at least sixty days, the right to haul trash for cities pursuant to the agreement, inasmuch as the county could only terminate the contract on sixty days’ notice. Cf. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 476 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Further, he claims monetary injury from the

    ### Response:
    holding that private contract providing for immediate termination for cause or at will termination on ninety days notice gave rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement to ninety days of continued employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the insurer’s position is ‘reasonable and legitimate.’ ” Thompson v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 875 F.2d 1460, 1462 (10th Cir.1989) (quoting Manis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 760, 762 (Okla.1984)). After carefully reviewing the parties’ briefs, the record, and relevant Oklahoma authorities, we believe that no reasonable jury could have concluded that State Farm’s evaluation and settlement offers constituted bad faith under this standard. First, we note that State Farm’s initial settlement offer was within the range it assigned to Mr. Roberts’ claim. Thus, we are not presented with the situation where an insurer has offered to settle a dispute in an amount below the range assigned to the claim by the insurer’s own investigation. See Newport v. USAA, 11 P.3d 190, 196-197 (Okla.2000) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, because we have determined that

    ### Response:
    holding that after a reasonable investigation an insurer must promptly settle a claim for the value or within the range assigned to the claim as a result of its investigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no immediate action to cure the code violations because the Debtor had filed a bankruptcy petition and the automatic stay would have to be lifted before IPC could proceed. Notwithstanding this explicit admonition, the Knights thereafter served the Notices and then filed the unlawful detainer complaint seeking to recover possession of the Property. The reason given by the Knights’ counsel for his chosen course of action— bankruptcy court is slow — does not help them escape the conclusion that their actions were willful. Although the Knights may not have had the specific intent to violate the automatic stay, the Knights knew of the automatic stay and their actions were intentional, thus satisfying the definition of a “willful” violation of the automatic stay. See Bloom, 875 F.2d at 227 (<HOLDING>). The district court was correct in reversing

    ### Response:
    holding knowledge of the bankruptcy petition and action taken thereafter was sufficient to find a willful violation of the stay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    liability under New Jersey’s local law for conduct that would not be illegal under New York’s law. The New York Legislature made its enactment narrower than federal RICO, instead of broader as did our Legislature. See Ball, supra, 268 N.J.Super. at 107, 632 A.2d 1222. New York also precluded private litigants from pursuing cases that prosecutors with limited resources might decline, as opposed to New Jersey’s decision to encourage private litigants with the prospect of treble damages and counsel fee awards. Cf. Lindsey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 34 F.Supp.2d 636, 646 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (observing that Congress included a private cause of action in federal RICO “[t]o facilitate the enforcement of its provisions”); Metro. Int'l, Inc. v. Alco Standard Corp., 657 F.Supp. 627, 634 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (<HOLDING>). As in P.V., supra, 197 N.J. at 148-49, 962

    ### Response:
    recognizing that to facilitate and strengthen enforcement congress created rico with a private right of action for treble damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from Ridgely’s harassment.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 22. She notes her doctor’s statement from the May 2007 letter that “it may be possible for [the plaintiff] to return to a position within DHHS in a part time capacity in 6-8 months,” but “she may not be able to to [sic] return to the office in which she is currently employed.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 40. Given the doctor’s prognosis, the plaintiff potentially could have returned to work 13-14 months after she first went on leave, but the doctor offered no guarantee that she would return in that time. Furthermore, the letters .C. May 24, 2006) (stating that “[a]n employer is not required to provide an indefinite leave of absence”). Therefore, the plaintiffs request for an accommodation that would allow her to “complete her treatment 74 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Because the plaintiff argued to the OPM that

    ### Response:
    holding that a social security disability determination is a legal proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conduct violations in August 2015. (ECF No. 26-1, at 3). Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on July 28, 2015. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff seeks money damages and injunctive relief. Several weeks later, the action was transferred to this court. (ECF Nos. 16; 17). Plaintiff moved for emergency injunctive relief on September 2 (ECF No. 24), which the court denied (ECF No. 25). Shortly thereafter, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. (ECF Nos. 26; 27), Plaintiff was provided with a Roseboro notice, which advised him of the pendency of the motion to dismiss and his entitlement to respond within 17 days. (ECF Nos. 28; 29); see Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff responded in opposition, and

    ### Response:
    holding that pro se plaintiffs should be advised of their right to file responsive material to a motion for summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the interception of communications “within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting.” I concur in the result reached by the majority, however, because, under the circumstances of this case, suppression of the evidence is not mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 2515. Under the majority’s interpretation of the statute any federal district court, circuit court of appeals or appropriate state court may authorize a wiretap any place in the country. A judge in the Southern District of New York may now authorize a tap on a phone in Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin, Nome, Alaska or Prescott, Arizona, even if no calls are ever placed to the east coast, as long as the listening post is set up in Manhattan. See, e.g., United States v. Burford, 755 F.Supp. 607, 609-11 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (<HOLDING>). Law enforcement officials are now able to

    ### Response:
    holding that judge in southern district of new york could authorize wiretap in maryland
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to preserve error. See id.; Clausen v. R.W. Gilbert Constr. Co., 309 N.W.2d 462, 467 (Iowa 1981). Such a challenge does nothing to inform a trial judge how particular instructions were confusing, or were unfairly defense-oriented,- or improperly placed on the plaintiff impossible burdens of proof. A. Whether instruction nine improperly incorporates allocation of burdens of production under McDonnell Douglas. Sievers objected to instruction nine on two grounds, both of which she raises- on appeal. She first complains instruction nine improperly incorporates the shifting burdens of production under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). She relies on Grebin v. Sioux Falls Independent School District, 779 F.2d 18, 20 (8th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Recently, we described the elements of a

    ### Response:
    holding that in jury cases trial courts should not incorporate in instructions the threepart mcdonnell analysis of prima facie case answer and rebuttal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hausted his administrative remedies and attach the appropriate documentation, including administrative decisions, demonstrating exhaustion.”); see also Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 489-90 (6th Cir.2002) (reaffirming the rule of Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102 (6th Cir.1998), requiring a prisoner to plead exhaustion with particularity and attach to the complaint dispositions of available administrative remedies to demonstrate it). Most circuits that have considered the issue, however, including this circuit, have held that nonexhaustion is an affirmative defense, and that therefore defendants bear the burden of proof and prisoner plaintiffs need not plead exhaustion with particularity. E.g., Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d at 28-29; Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117-18 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Casanova v. Dubois, 304 F.3d 75, 78 n. 3 (1st

    ### Response:
    holding nonexhaustion to be an affirmative defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Madigan, Cir.) (same), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 531, 157 L.Ed.2d 412 (2003). Nonetheless, the court in Theodoropoulos II also recognized an exceedingly narrow exception. It stated that although “as a general rule, courts are required to strictly enforce statutory exhaustion requirements[,]” there are “some limited circumstances in which an exception to the general rule might apply.” 358 F.3d at 172-73. We invoke the narrow leeway afforded by Theodoropoulos II and hold that in light of the unusual facts of Pichardo’s case, an exception is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Courts have historically interpreted procedural rules to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (<HOLDING>); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111

    ### Response:
    holding that in the case of state procedural default a federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate among other things that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    lot. He said that less than fifteen seconds passed before Appellant caught them and struck them with his truck three times, jarring them. Gary testified that Appellant followed them after Randy turned right and was “coming up on [them] really fast.” Gary said that after Randy hit the brakes, Appellant “barely missed” them and drove into a ditch. This evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Appellant intentionally or knowingly threatened Randy and Gary with imminent bodily injury. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(2); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; see also Dominique v. State, No. 01-09-00385-CR, 2010 WL 1571180, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 8, 2010, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). The evidence is also legally sufficient to

    ### Response:
    holding evidence legally and factually sufficient to sustain conviction for aggravated assault on a public servant and stating that the jury reasonably could have inferred that dominiques conduct was intentional based on his repeated attempts to run down the police officers who stood in his way
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judicial opinions for the meaning of economic loss will support the conclusion that all monetary damages are economic. Unfortunately, the imprecise use of the term “economic loss rule” by this court led many to erroneously conclude that it was a rule of general application that precluded recovery in tort of virtually any harm that could be measured in dollars if a business relationship also existed between the parties. Ill ¶56 Third, again, the independent duty doctrine is not a rule at all; rather it is an analytical tool used by courts to decide whether there is an independent duty cognizable in tort in the first instance. Whether or not we recognize a tort often involves policy considerations. See, e.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 232, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (<HOLDING>); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,

    ### Response:
    recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in interpreting the Ohio statute. City of Columbus Civil Serv. Comm’n v. McGlone, 82 Ohio St.3d 569, 697 N.E.2d 204, 206-07 (Ohio 1998) (‘We can look to regulations and cases interpreting the federal is under either misperception. First, there is no evidence that Continental believed that Gayer had a substantially limiting impairment that she in fact did not have. Continental did believe that Gayer could not lift over 40 pounds, but Gayer does not dispute this fact. The inability to lift over 40 pounds, however, is not, in and of itself, a disability. Indeed, “[f]ederal case law supports that a maximum weight restriction is not a disability as defined by the ADA.” Law v. City of Scottsdale, No. 98-6335, 2000 WL 799742, at *4 (6th Cir. June 15, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (<HOLDING>); see also McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg. U.S.A.,

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff who was under a 40pound lifting restriction was not disabled as defined by the ada and listing five cases from various circuits including our own in which courts have held that weight restrictions alone do not render a plaintiff disabled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and a consumer services division in Atmore, Florida. Plaintiff offers services throughout the United States. SBC Communications, Inc. (hereinafter, collectively referred to with its co-defendant subsidiaries as “Defendant” or “Defendants”) is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San Antonio, Texas. Defendant seeks a transfer of this case from its current setting in the Texarkana Division to the San Antonio Division of the Western District of Texas. Defendant maintains that the Eastern District of Texas has no connection to the facts at issue in this case, while the San Antonio Division of the Western District of Texas is intimately connected. In response, Plaintiff details specific acts on the part of both Plaintiff and Defendant occurring in the Eas ir.1966) (<HOLDING>). In determining whether to grant a motion to

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the action should be transferred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 29-28-105 (1994). We agree with Telectronics that these slight variations in language make a difference in the impact of the law. However, we agree with Plaintiffs that these types of variations can be managed with proper jury instructions. Other variations pointed out by Telectronics are either insignificant or irrelevant to the issues presented in this case. For example, Telectronics asserts that Plaintiffs failed to analyze how states deal with compliance with federal regulations. In this instance, this variation is likely to be immaterial because the Supreme Court recently found the FDA “regulations” under which the “ J” Lead was allowed to proceed to market does not provide protection to the public. See Medtronic v. Lohr, — U.S.-,-, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2254, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find that the strict

    ### Response:
    holding that fdas substantial equivalence doctrine does not preclude state law claims because the approval process did not involve safety and thus provide little protection to the public
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.”)). Therefore, neither Colman nor Watson is relevant to the issue of personal jurisdiction. ¶ 13 Because the Paria court’s findings are not binding on PGM, there are insufficient undisputed facts to support the conclusion that PGM is a privy of parties in the Paria litigation or a party to a fraudulent transfer. In particular, PGM and Westches-ter dispute whether the transfer of Paria’s assets was for value, and, as we have concluded, the Paria court’s finding on that question is not binding on PGM. ¶ 14 We therefore reverse the dismissal of PGM’s complaint and remand for a hearing on the issue of whether PGM is the alter ego of Paria or Stephen Zimmer nc., 758 P.2d 451, 455 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, Westchester provided the

    ### Response:
    holding that burden was on nonmoving party to show issue was not litigated where moving party presented supreme court opinion showing issue had been litigated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relationship.” Id. Hall contends that the CSRA does not preclude her Bivens action because although the CSRA provides for administra-five or judicial review of the action taken against her, her Bivens claim is not against her supervisor. Hall’s argument is without merit, however. The salient fact here is that the wrongful acts Hall alleges were taken against her arose out of her federal employment relationship. Because they did arise out of her federal employment, Bush and Zimbelman dictate that Hall’s claim is precluded. That the CSRA does not provide the remedy that she would prefer is of no moment. ■ See Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-90, 103 S.Ct. 2404 (refusing to allow a Bivens action even though “existing remedies [did] not provide complete relief’); Zimbelman, 228 F.3d at 370-71 (<HOLDING>); cf. Lombardi v. Small Business Admin., 889

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs were not released from the exclusive remedial framework of the csra when their claims arose from their federal employment even though the csra provided plaintiffs with no remedy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    procedures fell within the discretionary function exception and that its “judgment in deciding what tests were necessary to meet reasonable safety requirements ... require[s] a balancing of social and economic interests and a tailoring of safety requirements to local conditions.” In so holding, we noted that “ [determination of safety requirements involves a balancing of social, economic or political policies” and that “when Congress leaves the establishment and enforcement of safety standards to an agency, it intends an exercise of that discretion to fall within the discretionary function exception.” Id. at 1047-48 (citing Cunningham v. United States, 786 F.2d 1445, 1447 (9th Cir.1986)); accord Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 724 F.2d 871, 876-77 (10th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Sidestepping these cases, Airlog argues that

    ### Response:
    holding that terminal control area design was left to the discretion of the faa designer and that competing interests were weighed and then policy decisions were made which the discretionary function exception was intended to cover
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relied upon does not support a removal.” Id. To establish an affirmative defense of disability discrimination due to alcoholism, an appellant must show (1) “he suffers from an addiction,” and (2) “that the addiction caused the misconduct.” Avant v. Dep’t of the Navy, 60 M.S.P.R. 467, 476 (1994). The AJ determined. Mr. Wyrick did not provide any evidence regarding his alcohol addiction or any treatment and that, even if he had, mitigation due to alcoholism is “outweighed by the seriousness of the offenses in relation to [Mr. Wyrick’s] position, his prior disciplinary record, and the fact that there is no reason to conclude that [Mr. Wyrick’s] failure to be fully truthful was caused by his use of alcohol.” Resp’t’s App. 42; see Huettner v. Dep’t of the Army, 54 M.S.P.R. 472, 475 (1992) (<HOLDING>). “It is a well-established rule of civil

    ### Response:
    holding a defense of alcoholism was outweighed by the seriousness of the offense and the appellants prior disciplinary record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    light as to undermine confidence in the [second jury’s] verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. at 1566. 5 . We agree with the district court that the state habeas court made a scrivener’s error where, at one point, it appears to endorse a conclusion that Ishman's testimony was material. All of the court’s other findings and conclusions cut against this isolated discrepancy. 6 . The district court expressly refused to decide whether the ""troubling facts” surrounding the State’s nondisclosure of Ishman’s correct name and location constituted suppression for Brady purposes. 7 . Additionally, this Court has held that a Fourteenth Amendment violation will not lie “if the defendant, using reasonable diligence, could have obtained the information...."" In re Smith, 142 F.3d 1993) (<HOLDING>). 11 . When asked about the materiality of

    ### Response:
    recognizing this texas rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must report it to the IRS every year as part of the IRS’s regulation of offshore banking, and in part because they need the information to access their foreign bank accounts.” In re Grand Jury Investigation M.H., 648 F.3d at 1076. The Fifth Circuit has concluded similarly, stating that records are “customarily kept” in satisfaction of the required records exception’s second prong where they “are of the same type that the witness must report annually to the IRS pursuant to the IRS’s regulation of offshore banking: the name, number, and type of aceount(s), the name and address of the bank where an account is held, and the maximum value of the account during the reporting period.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d at 435; see also In re Grand Jury Investigation M.H., 648 F.3d at 1075 (<HOLDING>). This Court agrees. Accordingly, the records

    ### Response:
    holding in a nearly identical case that second prong of required records doctrine met
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a new trial. We have been unable to find any prior decisions that are directly on point. However, State v. Johans, 613 So.2d 1319 (Fla.1993), would appear to support appellants’ argument. In Johans, the trial court had failed to require the state to give a race-neutral reason for an objected-to challenge of a prospective juror. The supreme court said that “[a] race-neutral justification for a peremptory challenge cannot be inferred merely from circumstances.... The burden imposed on the party required to provide a race-neutral justification is, at worst, minimal.” Id. at 1321. It then a rule would also help to ensure that the constitutional rights of prospective jurors are respected. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128, 140-42, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Abshire v. State, 642 So.2d 542, 544 n. 7

    ### Response:
    recognizing that potential jurors as well as litigants have a right based in the equal protection clause to nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provisions of the statute condition the protection offered on a showing that military service adversely affected the ability to assert or protect a legal right, Congress’s omission of any such requirement in this section was deliberate). ii Application of Section 526 There is no dispute, and the Court so holds, that the appellant’s period of military service on active duty in the U.S. Army from May 16, 2011, to June 29, 2012, satisfies the SCRA’s definition of “military service.” 50 U.S.C. app. § 511(2). Thus, applying section 526 to the facts of this case, the Court holds the appellant’s time to file an NOA from the Board’s October 25, 2011, decision was tolled until June 29, 2012, the date he was released from active duty. See Diamond v. United States, 344 F.2d 703, 707 (Ct.C1.1965) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the appellant had 120 days from

    ### Response:
    holding that tolling under similar provision in the soldiers and sailors civil relief act ended upon release from active duty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursu.- it to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while s’ :ing in the course of professional practice or except as otb rwise authorized by ORS 475.005 to 475.285 and 475.8401 475.980.” ORS 475.840(3) contains or refers to a number of terms that are defined by statute, including “controlled substance,” ORS 475.005(6), “marijuana,” ORS 475.005(16), “practitioner,” ORS 475.005(18), “prescription,” ORS 475.005(19), “knowingly,” ORS 161.105(8), “intentionally,” ORS 161.085(7), and “possess,” ORS 161.015(9). When the legislature provides a specific meaning for a word used in a statute, courts have no authority to add or subtract from that definition. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 339 Or 438, 445, 121 P3d 657 (2005) (<HOLDING>). ORS 475.005 does not include a definition of

    ### Response:
    holding that by using a very specific meaning of the words oral communication the legislature limited the reach of a statutory suppression remedy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because of an imputed political opinion. Singh testified that the Indian police were interested in him because of his relationship to Khan, his domestic servant. An “applicant’s association with, or relationship to, people who are known to hold a particular political opinion” may serve as indirect evidence of an imputed political opinion. Garcia-Milian, 755 F.3d at 1032 (quoting Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 658 (9th Cir.2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted). That appears to be precisely the case here. The Punjabi police asserted that Singh was a “traitor” based solely on his association with Khan, a reason we have repeatedly held to support the conclusion that a political opinion has been imputed to the applicant. See, e.g., Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1070-72 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The police targeted Singh and imputed

    ### Response:
    holding that persecutors statements indicating that they had chosen her because of her fathers relationship to the philippine government constituted persecution on account of an imputed political opinion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court Intervention 'Unit, following the issuance of a Protective Order removing the children to Polinsky by the Juvenile Court and the subsequent return of the children to the Mann home. Pis. Opp. and Resp. to Defs. Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 3, ECF No. 203. As such, Monge and Solis played no role in the initial removal of the Mann children. Moreover, Monge and Solis are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to the actions they took following the court order. See Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 842 (9th Cir.2010) (noting that “[ajbsolute immunity is extended to state officials, such as social workers, when they are performing quasi-prosecutorial and quasi-judicial functions” such as the execution of court orders); Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1109 (<HOLDING>); see also Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that social workers enjoy absolute quasijudicial immunity when making postadjudication custody decisions pursuant to a valid court order  quotation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    63 . Id., at pp. 81-82. 64 . Id., atp. 88. 65 . See note 16, supra, and accompanying text. 66 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Shelia Bailey, atp. 101. 67 . Id., atpp. 102-03. 68 . Id., at p. 103. 69 . Id., at p. 104. 70 . Id., atp. 105. 71 . Id., atpp. 105-06. 72 . Id., at p. 107. 73 . Id., atp. 107. 74 . Id., atpp. 108-09, 114, 126. 75 . Id., atpp. 108-09, 126. 76 . Id., atp. 109. 77 . Id., atp. 109. 78 . Id., atp. 110. 79 . Id., atpp. 115-16. 80 . Id., atpp. 124-25. 81 . Id., atp. 134. 82 . Id., at p. 134. 83 . Id., atp. 137. 84 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, atp. 138. 85 . Id., atp. 139. 86 . Id., atp. 143. 87 . Id., atp. 143. 88 . Id., atp. 144. 89 . Report of Dr. Michael A. Ro 2 L.Ed.2d 860 (1995); Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Tex.Crim.App.1990)(<HOLDING>). The Texas Penal Code provides in pertinent

    ### Response:
    holding sections 801 and 204 of the texas penal code work together to impose the burden on the defendant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as available only when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party. In that instance, the diligent party must be protected lest he be faced with interminable delay and continued uncertainty as to his rights.” The court went on to say that the possibility of being held in default acts as a deterrent to those parties resorting to delay as an element of their litigation strategy. 10 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2681 (1983) (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C.Cir.1970)). Some courts have considered default judgement to be an appropriate sanction when a respondent fails to answer the writ. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Cady, 660 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In Ruiz v. Cady, the court reasoned that if

    ### Response:
    holding that although default judgement should be rare in a habeas corpus proceeding it should be preserved as a sanction against a respondents unwarranted delay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    citing Seymour v. Potts & Callahan Contracting Co., 2 F.R.D. 38, 39-40 (D.D.C., 1941) (stating that while there is no express provision in Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59 for a motion to rehear, there is implied recognition of such a procedure). Plaintiff argues for inclusion of the newly discovered evidence under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 52, 59, 60, and 61. Specifically, Plaintiff cites Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b) as the standard for introduction of newly discovered evidence. Mr. France’s main argument for failing to pursue these documents earlier rests on the ground of “excusable neglect.” See In re Paine Webber Short Term U.S. Gov’t Income Fund, 1995 WL 512703 (S.D.N.Y. August 29, 1995), citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc., 507 U.S. 380, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (<HOLDING>). While it is not entirely clear which Federal

    ### Response:
    holding that the excusable neglect inquiry is at bottom an equitable one that should be made by considering the danger of prejudice to the nonmoving party the length of the delay and its potential impact upon judicial proceedings the reason for the delay including whether it was in the reasonable control of the movant and whether the movant acted in good faith 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.3d at 379. Deering’s argument that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him because his crime did not take place on federally-owned land and the Tenth Amendment reserves drug prosecutions such as his to the states is without merit. See United States v. Owens, 996 F.2d 59, 61 (5th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (prosecution under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846 did “not run Cir.1996) (where defendant did not object below, this court reviews for plain error only), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1133, 117 S.Ct. 998, 136 L.Ed.2d 877 (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 1 . The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. 2 . Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)

    ### Response:
    holding that suppression by government of evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material to guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doors. Reddock fled from the house as police were arriving. 9 . At the time, Boyd’s co-defendants included appellant Walker and Owens. 10 . Boyd’s additional argument, that he was entitled to a separate trial because of Easter-ling's and Travis's testimony that they knew Boyd from selling drugs, has no merit. This could have come in even in a separate trial. For example, the testimony that Easterling blurted — that he and Boyd ""used to hustle together” — came in as the prosecutor was asking questions designed to elicit that “a person who actually knew [Easterling] [and presumably knew that Easterling sometimes had large sums of cash] was Brian Boyd.” 11 . At that point, the defense had stricken seven white jurors. 12 . See also Robinson v. United States, 878 A.2d 1273, 1277 (D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). 13 . The court did not make a finding about

    ### Response:
    holding that tire purposeful exclusion of prospective jurors because they are black and female is discrimination on account of both race and gender in direct violation of batson 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the premises to serve the common interests of the hotel and defendant. The results of tracking in enough snow and water to create a five-foot puddle were obvious and easily foreseeable; the severity of the harm created by this condition readily apparent; the opportunity to notify of the condition and insure prevention of the obvious danger readily available and the fairness of imposing such duty indisputable. Defendant claims that the custom in the industry precludes the imposition of a duty to notify. Even if it is the custom of a delivery person- not to alert the premises owner of a hazard that he has created, the custom is wrong. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173, reh’g denied, 160 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.1947); see also The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662, 53 S.Ct. 220, 77

    ### Response:
    holding that tugs not equipped with radios were unseaworthy despite the custom among carriers to rely upon their crews to supply their own radios noting courts must in the end say what is required there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a lien to Lot 125. Applicable principles of contract interpretation show that the trial court did not err in finding that a valid contract existed between DNS and the Family Trust for the construction of a seawall on Lot 125. Accordingly, the court was correct in ruling that DNS was precluded from recovering against the Family Trust under the theory of quantum meruit, because a valid contract existed between them, and DNS failed to bring a breach of contract clainl against the Family Trust. While DNS argues that if the Family Trust was a party to the seawall contract, then a breach of contract claim against the Trust was tried by acquiescence, there is no evidence to support this argument. See generally Alfred S. Austin Constr. Co., Inc. v. Narnia, 220 So.2d 36, 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we affirm the trial court’s order

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court erroneously entered judgment pursuant to a theory which was neither pleaded nor tried by acquiescence or otherwise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 167-68, 823 P.2d 22, 34-35 (1991) (rejecting double jeopardy argument and finding aggravating factor applied to each of defendant’s first degree murder convictions when both murders were committed during commission of offense); see also State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 131, 871 P.2d 237, 252 (1994) (same). 9. Is the death penalty proportional in this case? See State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 417, 844 P.2d 566, 584 (1992) (proportionality review not constitutionally required and court no longer conducts them). 10. Is death by lethal gas cruel and unusual punishment, barred by the 8th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution and article 2, § 15 of the Arizona Constitution? No. State v. Williams, 166 Ariz. 132, 142, 800 P.2d 1240, 1250 (1987) (<HOLDING>); see also Ariz. Const, art. 22, § 22 (approved

    ### Response:
    holding that execution by lethal gas is not cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by either 8th and 14th amendments to united states constitution or article 2  15 of the arizona constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    incriminating information. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Drury v. State, 368 Md. 331, 335-36, 793 A.2d 567 (2002). The circuit court, however, found that Minehan was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, a finding we uphold after examining several cases and closely reading the transcript of the interrogation. Custody means a formal arrest, or another serious restriction on freedom of movement. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602. It is an objective state that is entered when a suspect is “led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is being deprived or restricted of his freedom of action or movement under pressures of official authority.” Bond v. State, 142 Md.App. 219, 228, 788 A.2d 705 (2002) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). Practically speaking, we must consider: where

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant was in custody when police questioned him in his bedroom late at night
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    about what course of conduct is best, but a court must “remember that the ultimate issue is whether the patients’ basic liberty interests are being safeguarded, not whether the optimal course of treatment as determined by some expert is being followed.” Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1248 (2d Cir.1984). “[Cjonstitutional standards are met when the professional who made a decision exercised ‘professional judgment’ at the time the decision was made.” Id. The court concludes that the Youngberg test is the appropriate standard in this case for determining whether the defendants’ violated M.H.’s substantive due process rights by their use of physical and mechanical restraints. See Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, 737 F.2d at 1245-46 (<HOLDING>); see also Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021,

    ### Response:
    holding that youngberg standard was appropriate to analyze whether students at state operated school for the mentally retarded were deprived of their right to freedom from undue bodily restraint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    highway and road design standards generally accepted at the time the road or highway was designed and constructed.” 4 . From the record, it is apparent that the trial court rested it ruling on MHTC’s argument that the PSC had exclusive jurisdiction over the placement of both the railroad crossing and the bridges. 5 . All statutory references are to RSMo 1994 unless otherwise noted. 6 . By the adoption of § 622.015, RSMo 1986, the legislature transferred all powers, duties, and functions relating to transportation activity within the State from the PSC to the Division of Transportation of the Department of Economic Development. Coon v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, 826 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Mo.App. W.D.1992). 7 . See also Walker v. St. Louis-Southwestern Ry., 835 S.W.2d 469 (Mo.App. E.D.1992) (<HOLDING>). 8 . See § 386.550, RSMo 1986 (""In all

    ### Response:
    holding claims that a railroad crossing was extrahazardous that warning devices were inadequate and that the train was not operating at a speed commensurate with the hazardous nature of the crossing were all preempted by federal law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    created, not the individual features.” Gateway, Inc. v. Companion Prods., Inc., 384 F.3d 503, 507 (8th Cir.2004). A parody does not receive absolute protection from trademark law; however, “a parody contained in an obvious editorial context is less likely to confuse, and thus [is] more deserving of protection than [trade dress and trademarks] displayed on a product.” Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir.1994). Although the Lanham Act does not require that a parody carry a disclaimer, the fact that the parody carries a label stating “satire” or “parody” “should alert most consumers” that the item is a parody. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 496 (2d Cir.1989). See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 28 F.3d at 776-77 (<HOLDING>). When determining the likelihood of confusion,

    ### Response:
    holding that ad parody violated lanham act but that by using an obvious disclaimer defendant could have substantially lessened risk of consumer confusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the 90-day time period, the BIA does not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion to reopen. Abdi, 430 F.3d at 1150. Additionally, the BIA may deny a motion to reopen even if the alien establishes a prima facie case for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). In this case, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Likollari’s motion to reopen. As the record shows, the majority of the evidence presented could have been presented during his asylum proceedings, and the remainder of the evidence failed to establish changed country conditions. First, the affidavit of Likollari’s attorney, Marina Meyerovich, could not be considered evidence of changed circumstances because an attorney’s arguments are not evidence. Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, Likollari’s sister’s and parents’

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he believed $15,000 would be reasonable. He also testified that, should the case go on to the Texas Supreme Court, another $5,000 to $7,000 would be required. O’Farrill’s attorney cross-examined the witness regarding the witness’s experience in filing appeals. O’Farrill’s attorney then took the stand and testified that reasonable appellate fees for an appeal to this court would be $1,500, and another $1,500 for an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court. This conflicting testimony raised a fact issue, which was resolved by the trial judge when he awarded $10,000 in appellate fees for an appeal to this court and $5,000 for an appeal to the state supreme court. This amount was somewhat less than requested and a great deal more than O’Farrill’s attorneys argued was reasonable. See id. (<HOLDING>). Legally sufficient evidence was before the

    ### Response:
    holding that conflicting testimony raised fact issue fact finder was not obliged to accept one experts testimony over the other
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Convention without any reservation, understandings or alterations specifically pertaining to its scope, we would find it difficult to interpret the statute as narrowly as the defendants suggest: Such a construction would likely create a conflict with our international treaty obligations, with which we presume Congress meant to comply fully. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, § 115, cmt. a (1987) (""It is generally assumed that Congress does not intend to repudiate an international obligation of the United States by nullifying a rule of international law or an international agreement as domestic law, or by making it impossible for the United States to carry out its obligations.”); Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1023 (5th Cir.1988) (King, J. dissenting) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that there may be some variation

    ### Response:
    recognizing the presumption that congress does not intend to violate international law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” “Since the [Supreme] Court’s decision in Imbler, courts have taken a functional approach to absolute immunity.” “The analytical key to prosecutorial immunity ... is advocacy-whether the actions in question are those of an advocate.” “If the challenged actions of the prosecutor were not performed in his role as advocate, if they do not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings, then only qualified immunity applies.” But courts will bar § 1983 suits arising out of even unquestionably illegal or improper conduct by the prosecutor so long as the general nature of the action in question is part of the normal duties of a prosecutor. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 413, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984 (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Shankland, 800 F.2d 77, 80 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that a prosecutor accused of knowingly presenting false testimony at trial is protected by absolute immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because the police officers’ actions were ‘discretionary’ for the purposes of qualified immunity under federal law, they were also performing 'discretionary functions’ for the purposes of [immunity under state law].”); Greiner v. City of Champlin, 816 F.Supp. 528, 545 (D.Minn 1993) (""The federal doctrine of qualified immunity does not apply to claims brought under [state] law.”). 3 . While some jurisdictions have held that a high-speed chase does not involve an officer's discretion, see Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 627 A.2d 1090, 1100-01 (1993) (noting that discretionary immunity is limited to discretion exercised at highest levels of government in matters of .policy or planning and is not applicable in pursuit case); City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So.2d 1222, 1226 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>), the officers involved usually have had their

    ### Response:
    holding that immunity did not shield officers involved in 25mile highspeed chase of traffic violator because decisions by officers to continue the chase were operational rather than discretionary acts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    errors in it. Id. at Ex. 2, ¶ 29. Moreover, she failed to prepare for the March 10, 2004 meeting, and then became so emotional during the meeting that she could not function. Id. at Ex. 2, ¶¶ 31-33. She admits that she was falling behind at work, that she lacked focus, and that she was misplacing things. (R. Doc. 30-5 at Ex. 4, pp. 173-74, 180). The evidence supporting each of these contentions is not in dispute. When there is overwhelming and uncon-tradieted evidence that an adverse employment action was taken for other reasons, mere temporal proximity between the adverse action and an employee’s protected activity is insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether an employee was fired for taking leave. See Swanson v. General Services Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Alfonso-Ferro v. Stolthaven New Orleans,

    ### Response:
    holding in a race discrimination case that close timing is an element of the plaintiffs prima facie case but insufficient on its own to rebut a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason that explains the action and its timing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . Mejorado mentions that the court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by preventing him from consulting with Reyna during the suppression hearing, but fails to adequately brief this assertion. The closest that Mejorado comes to arguing the point is the Delphic reference in his reply brief to McKas-kle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). Mejorado, however, does not explain how McKaskle, which held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right are not violated when a trial judge appoints standby counsel, or any other case or authority supports his view. Accordingly, the issue is waived. United States v. Bailentia, 717 F.3d 448, 449 (5th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 543, 187

    ### Response:
    holding that an inadequately briefed assertion is waived on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Polsby v. Shalala, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1940, 123 L.Ed.2d 646 (1993). Because the Supreme Court vacated Polsby on this ground, no meaningful argument can be made that the Supreme Court in any way addressed the merits of the present issue or concluded Polsby to be legally incorrect. See United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 983 F.2d 578, 581-82 & n.2 (4th Cir.1992) (adopting reasoning of vacated opinion where vacatur did not address the issue). In light of the Supreme Court’s action, we write on a clean slate. 2 . See Reed, 939 F.2d at 492-93. 3 . See Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 198-200 (3d Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 590, 130 L.Ed.2d 503 (1994); Passer v. American Chem. Soc’y., 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509

    ### Response:
    holding employees under age discrimination in employment acts adea parallel retaliation provision includes former employees as long as the alleged discrimination is related to or arises out of the employment relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to another.” Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla.2000). The appellant argues that a farm tractor is a dangerous instrumentality because the legislature defines a farm tractor as a “motor vehicle” and extensively regulates their use. This argument is without merit. Although a farm tractor meets the statutory definition of a “motor vehicle,” at least three of our sister courts have held that statutory definitions of “motor vehicle” are not controlling in determining whether a device is a dangerous instrumentality. See §§ 316.003(12) & 322.01(19), Fla. Stat. (2008); Festival Fun Parks, LLC v. Gooch, 904 So.2d 542, 545-46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Edwards v. ABC Transp. Co., 616 So.2d 142,

    ### Response:
    holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that state courts should generally follow the twists and turns in federal law would be ironic in light of the congressional intent to allow, if not encourage, state experimentation. G. A Note on Law of the Case, Stare Decisis, and Dictum. If one looks through our ICRA cases, federal cases are often simply cited for propositions of law without substantive discussion. Often times in this setting, we were simply restating legal principles that the parties were not contesting in the case. When a legal principle is embraced by the parties by agreement and is not contested on appeal, the court’s subsequent recitation of the legal principle is not a holding in the case that was a product of an adversary proceeding. See Berger v. Gen. United Grp., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 1978) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that because plaintiffs assumed delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants we would consider delaware law but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    UMBC adopted a policy that addresses Plaintiffs’ facial constitutional challenge, namely by revising the policy to no longer allow university administrators to relocate an event for any reason. Additionally, and more importantly in light of the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Valero, there is no evidence in the record that UMBC has any intention to reenact its former Policy on Facilities Use. “Defendants have made the [revised Policy on Facilities Use] as public and as permanent as possible” by formally changing the policy, alerting the Court to the revision, and updating their public website to include the revised policy. Alpha Iota Omega Christian Fraternity v. Moeser, No. 1:04CV00765, 2006 WL 1286186, at *4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28065, at *16 (M.D.N.C. May 4, 2006) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the court would be engaging in purely advisory theoretical analysis if it were to enter a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of a nonexistent policy and refusing to do so at 4 2006 us dist lexis 28065 at 2627
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Unionamerica Insurance Company Limited, and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London subscribing to Lloyd’s Excess Liability Claims Made Policy No. N00060A96 — of the Missouri plaintiffs claim. When the insurers denied Amtrak’s request for coverage, it filed suit. Before the Court is defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, which seeks the dismissal of Amtrak’s complaint on the ground that it failed to give timely notice of the Missouri case as required by each of the insurers’ policies. For the reasons below, the Court will grant defendants’ motion. BACKGROUND The facts underlying the present dispute are familiar and need not be repeated here, this being the third dispositive motion to have arisen from the parties’ disagreement regarding insurance coverage. See Amtrak, 365 F.3d at 1107 (<HOLDING>); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Lexington Ins.

    ### Response:
    holding that the missouri claim was not covered under an identical set of policies covering the period from october 1 1997 to september 30 1998
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court explained this concept as follows: It is true, when the defendants ... purchased or erected their breweries, the laws of the state did not forbid the manufacture of intoxicating liquors. But the state did not thereby give any assurance, or come under an obligation, that its legislation upon that subject would remain unchanged. Indeed, ... the supervision of the public health and the public morals is a governmental power, continuing in its nature, and to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may require; and that, for this purpose, the largest legislative discretion is allowed, and the discretion cannot be parted with any more than the power itself. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669, 8 S.Ct. 278, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (<HOLDING>). While the owner of land might once have been

    ### Response:
    holding that a state statute that prohibited manufacture of alcoholic beverages was not a taking even though such manufacture was legal before the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    days. We have held that an insurer or self-insured employer’s failure to serve the denial on a claimant’s attorney may be such “good cause.” See, e.g., Freres Lumber Co. v. Jegglie, 106 Or App 27, 806 P2d 164 (1991); Cowart v. SAIF, 94 Or App 288, 765 P2d 226 (1988). See also ORS 656.331(l)(b) (setting forth situations in which insurers and self-insured employers may not contact claimants without also contacting their attorneys); OAR 436-060-0015 (same). The legislature has not created any similar mechanism with respect to ORS 656.295(8). If a petition for judicial review is not filed before the order becomes final, we lack the authority to consider why the petition was not timely. Cf. Pease v. National Council on Comp. Ins., 113 Or App 26, 29, 830 P2d 605, rev den 314 Or 391 (1992) (<HOLDING>). 10 Because of that “slippage” between the

    ### Response:
    holding that agency properly dismissed appeal not filed within statutory time limit where the legislature has not chosen to provide a way around the limitation for those who were unable to meet it for some reason
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is somewhat perplexed by C. Line's insistence that it is entitled to a license under a statutory scheme that C. Line itself admits is void. See PL's Br. 7 n. 2 (""The City of Davenport attempts to regulate live nude dancing by requiring the owners of cabaret businesses to obtain licenses from the City of Davenport to operate their cabaret businesses offering live nude dancing under Davenport City Code chapter 5.16. Under the Mall Real Estate case, Davenport City Code chapter 5.16 is null and void.”). 24 . Ordinarily, once a party seeking a civil contempt finding meets the burden to proffer clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnors violated a court order, the burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to show an inability to comply. See Chicago Truck Drivers, 207 F.3d at 506 (<HOLDING>) that they were unable to comply with the court

    ### Response:
    holding that a contempt finding may be averted if the alleged contemnor establishes 1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    however, provide an extension of time to otherwise comply with a nonbankruptcy statutory deadline to record a continuation of a security interest or mortgage. See In re Chase, 2000 WL 33712297, at *9 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2000) (“Under Section 362(b)(3), the automatic stay does not prohibit the perfection of an interest in property if such perfection occurs within [thirty] days as provided by Section 547(e)(2)(A)”); In re Planned Protective Svcs., Inc., 130 B.R. 94, 98 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1991) (“[T]he post-petition recordation of a lien interest generally would be a violation of the automatic stay. However, § 362(b)(3) provides an exception for acts of perfection which are authorized under ... 547(e)(2)(A)”) (footnote omitted); cf. In re Millivision, Inc., 331 B.R. 515, 522-23 (Bankr.D.Mass.2005) (<HOLDING>). In other words, if 201 Forest had filed for

    ### Response:
    holding that the automatic stay exception under  362b3 did not override the trustees  544a strong arm powers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    legislature’s stated goal when it enacted § 82-1451(0) to “more effectively protect the public health, safety, and welfare,” we conclude that the nondisclosure provisions of § 32-1451.01(0) and (E) do not apply when the Board “determines that a criminal violation may have occurred involving the delivery of health care[.]” A.R.S. § 32-1451(0). ¶ 15 This is not the only situation in which the legislature has distinguished between civil and criminal cases when addressing evidence involving confidential or privileged information. For example, the legislature has enacted separate statutes for the corporate attorney-client privilege, providing a broader privilege in civil proceedings than in criminal proceedings. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix, 204 Ariz. at 231, ¶ 16, 62 P.3d at 976 (<HOLDING>). Although the Diocese in that case argued that

    ### Response:
    holding that the legislature may create or expand privileges by statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    do appear to use the phrase “jurisdictional fact” to connote an essential allegation of fact needed to establish subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ex Parte Hayes, 25 Fla. 279, 282-83, 6 So. 64 (Fla. 1889) (stating “[t]he question, then, is, did the court acquire jurisdiction of the case? We think not. In a special proceeding of this kind everything the statute makes an ingredient of the case must be made to appear in the beginning. The affidavit or complaint of the prosecu-trix before the magistrate is the foundation of the proceeding, and, if it fails to show jurisdictional facts, the action on it of either the magistrate or the court to which it is sent will be coram non judice and void”); City of Jacksonville v. L’Engle, 20 Fla. 344, 348 (Fla. 1883) (<HOLDING>); Deans v. Wilcoxon, 18 Fla. 531, 550 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding if the legislature had the power to confer upon the county commissioners jurisdiction to hear and determine the question as to whether or not a town was of undue extent and to deprive it of a part of its territory then the proceeding being statutory before a body of limited powers the record must show affirmatively that such a case was brought before them as they were authorized to hear and determine and that all the jurisdictional facts were found to exist where the jurisdiction and power to hear and determine depends upon the existence of a fact that fact must appear or the proceedings are coram non judice and void
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “final decision”); accord Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 937 n. 3 (8th Cir.1994); Duda v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 834 F.2d 554, 555 (6th Cir.1987); see also Harper v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 678, 680 (4th Cir.1988) (remand orders in social security cases are generally not final, appealable orders). Thus, because Iwachiw’s appeal was not from a final decision of the Commissioner, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his suit. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975). 2. Injunctive Relief and Other Claims The court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction also precluded it from granting Iwachiw’s motion for interim injunctive relief. See DiLaura v. Power Auth. of State of N.Y., 982 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Fitzgerald v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 232,

    ### Response:
    holding that lack of subject matter jurisdiction precluded court from awarding injunctive relief as well as damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was insufficient to convict him. The District Court denied these motions. Wrensford and Muller appeal. II A Wrensford argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his involuntary transportation to the police station and detention in a cell constituted an arrest without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We agree and conclude that Wrensford’s transportation to C Command and placement in a cell was a de facto arrest. The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause....” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A “seizure” occurs when, “taking i 19 (plurality opinion) -(<HOLDING>); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207, 212,

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant had been subjected to an illegal arrest when after detectives requested and did not return his airline ticket and drivers license he was asked to come with the officers from the concourse into an interrogation room approximately 40 feet away where his suitcases were searched
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court never explicitly addressed the Appellants’ immunity claims, we must decide whether we have interlocutory jurisdiction to review an implied denial of those claims. We join the other Circuit Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue and hold that we do. See Lowe v. Town of Fairland, 143 F.3d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir.1998); Zayas-Green v. Casaine, 906 F.2d 18, 23 (1st Cir.1990); Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 741 (2d Cir.1988); Craft v. Wipf, 810 F.2d 170, 173 (8th Cir.1987); Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir.1986) (per curiam); see also Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 146-147 (3d Cir.1997) (suggesting interlocutory jurisdiction might exist where denial of qualified immunity claim can be inferred); Ryan v. Burlington County, 860 F.2d 1199, 1203 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Allowing this case to proceed to trial

    ### Response:
    holding that a district courts order is final and immediately reviewable under mitchell if the appellants properly raised a claim of qualified immunity in the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    eighteen-year period of possession, the evidence .is sufficient to establish title to the Disputed Property in the Estrada parties under the twenty-five-year statute. See Duke, 128 S.W.2d at 485 (adverse possession may be established by party claiming adversely and paying taxes on’.land, when claim of title is made in tangible form calculated to bring notice to those adversely affected by it); Sterling, 456 S.W.2d at 534-35. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude, as a matter of law, that the trial court’s findings and conclusions that the Estrada parties did not establish their adverse possession claim are supported by legally insufficient evidence and that the evidence affirmatively establishes the Estrada parties’ adverse possession claim. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 816, 821 (<HOLDING>); see also Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code § 16.026;

    ### Response:
    holding that we must sustain legal sufficiency or noevidence challenge if record shows that evidence conclusively establishes opposite of vital fact and matter is established as matter of law if reasonable people could not differ as to conclusion to be drawn from evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conduct of the defendant and his agents is a principal cause of the great disparity in the number of persons of each race who are registered and eligible to vote.” (Emphasis added) The figures themselves reveal the obvious: neither unregistered whites nor unregistered Negroes pay the poll tax, theoretical duties of citizenship notwithstanding. 11 . Pub.L.No.89-110, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 et seq., approved August 6, 1965. 12 . See United States v. Ward (Louisiana), 5 Cir., 1965, 352 F.2d 329, modifying on rehearing 349 F.2d 795; United States v. Ramsey, 5 Cir., 1965, 353 F.2d 650 [No. 2315, Nov. 12, 1965]. 13 . United States v. Mississippi, S.D.Miss., No. 3791, pending. See also United States v. Texas, W.D.Tex., 1966, 252 F. Supp. 234 [Feb. 9, 1966] (<HOLDING>). 14 . See 30 Fed.Reg. 9897 (August 7,1965);

    ### Response:
    holding texas poll tax unconstitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not of itself create an inference that a given act done by him was within the scope of employment. If, however, it is also proved that the act tended to accomplish an authorized purpose ... there is an inference that it was within the scope of employment.” Restatement § 228 Cmt. b. Even though some acts forbidden by the employer, including tortious or criminal acts, may be considered within the scope of employment, the “master is not responsible for acts which are clearly inappropriate or unforeseeable in the accomplishment of the authorized result.” Restatement § 231 Cmt. a.; § 229. . Several courts have held that sexual harassment is, by its very nature, not within the scope of employment. See, Jansen v. Packaging Corp of America, 895 F.Supp. 1053, 1061, n. 9 (N.D.Ill.1995) (<HOLDING>); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406,

    ### Response:
    holding that restatement  2191 is inapplicable to alleged sexual harassment by a supervisor was sexual harassment within the scope of antonis employment of course not
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    suffered from an anxiety disorder that might disappear in one to two years, but might never improve. Consequently, she required unpredictable breaks of indeterminate time to recover from a condition she exhibited at work previously. Emerson worked at a job which required prompt, accurate handling of emergencies such as gas leaks and downed power lines that could pose significant danger to the public. Although Emerson argues that she is unlikely to suffer a panic attack at work, she has already suffered two. By its very nature, the consultant job could be stressful, and Emerson would be in contact with a supervisor who caused her further stress. This evidence is enough for us to find that Emerson posed a direct threat in the consultant position. See, e.g., Bekker, 229 F.3d at 671-72 (<HOLDING>); Borgialli, 235 F.3d at 1294 (determining that

    ### Response:
    holding that doctor who was suspected of drinking on the job posed a direct threat although she had not injured any patients
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of those damages. See, e.g., Birkenbuel v. M.C.C. Construction Corp., 962 F.Supp. 1805, 1306 (D.Mont.1997) (stating that it is up to the defendant to present evidence that shows the damage computation exceeds $75,000 and finding without such evidence that “it is impossible to say whether the Complaint states a claim for the jurisdictional amount”); see also Garza v. Bettcher Industries, Inc., 752 F.Supp. 753, 763 (E.D.Mich.1990) (discussing examples of specific facts sufficient to establish the jurisdictional minimum including where “plaintiffs medical records revealed that he had undergone four separate surgical procedures for his injury”). Of course, the Defendant also can submit other evidence that may demonstrate the amount in controversy. See, e.g., Cohn, 281 F.3d at 840 (<HOLDING>). But Defendant cannot carry its burden by

    ### Response:
    holding that a settlement letter is relevant evidence of the amount in controversy if it appears to reflect a reasonable estimate of the plaintiffs claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    EAJA application as premature, the court granted the Government’s December 26, 2006 Motion for an Enlargement of Time to respond thirty days after the earhest date on which the application properly could have been filed. Accordingly, on January 29, 2007, the Government filed a Response (“Gov’t Resp.”), together with three exhibits. On February 15, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Reply (“Pl.Reply”). II. DISCUSSION. A. The Relevant Statute. The Equal Access to Justice Act authorizes: a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ... incurred by bstantially justified,” to mean: “justified in substance or in the main-—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Smith v. Principi, 343 F.3d 1358,

    ### Response:
    holding that the governments position must have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    period and was not deferred during the period when the divorce judgment was being appealed. Title 14 M.R.S. § 1602-C(2) expressly states that post-judgment interest “accrues from and after the date of entry of judgment and includes the period of any appeal,” except for good cause shown. Thus, absent a finding of good cause, Brown was obligated to pay post-judgment interest from on or about November 2, 2007, to the date when the sums ordered in the divorce judgment were fully paid in 2008. The entry is: Judgment regarding prejudgment interest affirmed. Judgment regarding post-judgment interest vacated. Remanded for further proceedings. 1 . M.R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2) allows parties ten days after service of notice to file objections to a referee's report and then states, in A.2d 176, 183 (<HOLDING>); Allen v. Allen, 629 A.2d 1228, 1230 (Me.1993)

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by waiving postjudgment interest reviewing the predecessor to section 1602c on child support arrearage for good cause noting that this court was required to assume that the court made all necessary findings to support that decision because the parties failed to file a transcript or statement in lieu thereof
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defendant’s “sexual propriety” evidence for errors of law. See State v. Bea, 318 Or 220, 224, 864 P2d 854 (1993) (declining to accept the state’s concession as to a legal conclusion). See also Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77, 948 P2d 722 (1997) (“In construing a statute, this court is responsible for identifying the correct interpretation, whether or not asserted by the parties.”). 5 See also Laird C. Kirkpatrick and Christopher B. Mueller, 1 Federal Evidence § 101 at 551 (2nd ed 1994) (“character evidence means proof relating to commonly-recognized human qualities that might be called innate or essential to the person being described”). 6 Other jurisdictions have similarly construed and applied their analogues to OEC 404. See State v. Anderson, 211 Mont 272, 292, 686 P2d 193, 204 (1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. Miller, 709 P2d 350, 353-54 (Utah

    ### Response:
    recognizing that evidence of the defendants sexual mores and good character functioned to establish his reputation for morality and personal truthfulnessconduct and beliefs inconsistent with the charges filed against him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    justified by a reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence); cf. Wilder v. Turner, 490 F.3d 810, 815 (10th Cir.2007) (“A field sobriety test is a minor intrusion on a driver only requiring a reasonable suspicion of intoxication and an easy opportunity to end a detention before it matures into an arrest.” (quotation omitted)). The record also does not demonstrate that the underlying reasonable suspicion had dissipated prior to the field sobriety tests. Although the district court found that the evidence regarding Amundsen’s behavior during the stop did not provide additional evidence of impairment, the court’s findings do not demonstrate that Amundsen’s conduct dispelled Jones’s earlier suspicions of intoxication. Cf. United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561-62 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Millan-Diaz, 975 F.2d at 722 (holding that an

    ### Response:
    holding that an officer violated the fourth amendment because the reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation regarding a temporary registration sticker completely dissipated when the officer approached the car and determined the sticker was valid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    July 6, 2011) (characterizing database keyword searching as the nontaxable “ESI equivalent of having a room full of reviewers physically review paper documents”); Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 170 (approving of cases “recognizing] that gathering, preserving, processing, searching, culling and extracting ESI simply do not amount to ‘making copies’ ”). To be sure, it may be more or even most convenient for a producing party to create a database of ESI. But activities undertaken only “for the convenience of counsel are not taxable.” Gupta v. Walt Disney World Co., No. 6:05-cv-1432-Orl-22UAM, 2007 WL 2002454, at *3 (M.D.Fla. July 5, 2007) (citing Helms v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 808 F.Supp. 1568, 1570 (N.D.Ga.1992), aff'd, 998 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir.1993) (table)); see CBT Flint, 737 F.3d at 1330 (<HOLDING>). Defendants are not entitled to an award of

    ### Response:
    holding that copying costs are taxable if they are necessary to make copies of information required to be produced and not incurred just to make copies for the convenience of the producing party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that if the determination of damages is “mechanical and uneontroversial,” immediate appeal is allowed). In the instant case, the district court entered its sanctions order on March 14, 1996, but did not quantify the amount of the sanctions. On April 19, 1996, the district court entered a judgment granting SLU’s summary judgment motion, thus triggering the 30-day period for filing the notice of appeal on the merits of her case. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. Hill filed her notice of appeal on May 17, 1996, from both the sanctions order and the grant of summary judgment. The district court had not yet reduced the sanctions to a sum certain, however, and thus, we hold that the sanctions order was not yet final. Accord Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 4 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). On August 27, 1996, the court ordered payment

    ### Response:
    holding sanctions order not final where the amount of sanctions had not yet been determined
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Colo., Div. of Youth Services, 17 F.3d 1323, 1330 (10th Cir.1994). The Court will address each of these bases for liability in turn. 1. Scope of Employment Restatement § 229 provides a general definition of “scope of employment”, stating that “[t]o be within the scope of employment, conduct must be of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized.” The comments to the Restatement provide further explanation of the meaning of “scope of employment”: “Proof that the actor was in the general employment of the 18 (10th Cir.1987) (“sexual harassment simply is not within the job description of any supervisor or any other worker in any reputable business”) (citation omitted); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Although the effect is to restrict

    ### Response:
    recognizing that acts are not within the scope of employment and a master is insulated from liability under restatement  2191 where the servant was acting entirely for his own benefit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appointed. The trustee filed several adversary proceeding on July 11, 1988 seeking to avoid preferential transfers. These proceedings were filed more than two years from commencement of the Chapter 11 case, but less than two years from conversion to Chapter 7 and appointment of the trustee. The bankruptcy court, noting that the Tenth Circuit had reserved decision in Zilkha on whether the subsequent appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 case would affect the § 546(a) limitation period, ruled that such an appointment would begin a new two-year period by which avoidance actions must be brought. Id. at 989. Three other courts have come to the same conclusion as the D-Mart court. See Daff v. Regal Recovery Inc. (In re Continental Capital & Credit, Inc.), 158 B.R. 828 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1993) (<HOLDING>); Sapir v. Green Forest Lumber Ltd. (In re

    ### Response:
    holding on facts similar to those in dmart that the  546a limitation period runs from appointment of chapter 7 trustee after case was converted from chapter 11
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    apartment being held by the creditor. In order to effectuate the closing, the borrowers were required to pay a fee for the creditor to deliver the security at the clos ing. The court held that the fee was not a condition to the loan and “was not incident to the extension of the loan, but rather to the extinguishment of the debt....” Stutman, 1996 WL 539845, at *2-3. In Adamson, the plaintiffs alleged that they were required to pay certain fees as a condition of releasing the deeds of trust after they had completed payments on their mortgages. The fact that release fees would be charged was not disclosed at t they are required by the creditor. Rodash v. AIB Mortg. Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir.1994) abrogated on other grounds by, Veale v. Citibank, F.S.B., 85 F.3d 577 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Based on the bare allegations in the amended

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants violated tila as a matter of law by failing to disclose as part of the finance charge the charge imposed for payment of federal express delivery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Commonwealth’s efforts to equate the present circumstances with situations in which a Rule 1925(b) statement is filed, but the statement is later alleged to have omitted meritorious issues. In this regard, it is well established that the decision whether to presume prejudice or to require an appellant to demonstrate actual prejudice “turns on the magnitude of the deprivation of the right to effective assistance of counsel.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 482, 120 S.Ct. at 1037. As we observed in Lantzy, the failure to perfect a requested direct appeal is the functional equivalent of having no repre sentation at all. Id. at 225, 736 A.2d at 571 (citing Evitts, 469 U.S. at 394 n. 6, 105 S.Ct. at 835 n. 6 (1985)); see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988) (<HOLDING>). The difference in degree between failures

    ### Response:
    holding that the complete denial of counsel on direct appeal requires a finding of prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unless otherwise stated, all statutory references shall be to Title 11 of the Unites States Code); The Court also notes that Official Form B22C, which debtors use to calculate their current monthly income, applicable commitment period, and disposable income, directs above median debtors on line 17 to indicate that their ""applicable commitment period is 5 years.” 2 . See Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Zellner, 827 F.2d 1222, 1227 (8th Cir.1987). 3 . 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). 4 . Flygare v. Boulden, 709 F.2d 1344, 1347-48 (10th Cir.1983). 5 . In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982). 6 . Flygare, 709 F.2d at 1347-48. 7 . Id. 8 . See Zellner, 827 F.2d at 1227. 9 . 11 U.S.C.§ 1325(b)(1). 10 . Zellner, 827 F.2d at 1227. 11 . Id. 12 . In re Cranmer, 697 F.3d 1314, 1319 n.5 (10th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); In re Robinson, 987 F.2d 665, 668 n.7 (10th

    ### Response:
    recognizing the more narrow focus of a good faith analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of contraceptive measures, and at that time in the future she might want an abortion that might then be illegal under the Texas statutes.” Id. The Court concluded that the Does did not have standing: Their alleged injury rests on possible future contraceptive failure, possible future pregnancy, possible future unpreparedness for parenthood, and possible future impairment of health. Any one or more of these several possibilities may not take place and all may not combine. In the Does’ estimation, these possibilities might have some real or imagined impact on their marital happiness. But we are not prepared to say that the bare allegation of so indirect an injury is sufficient to present an actual case or controversy. Id.; see also Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1124-25(2d Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>). As with the Does, in McCormack’s case there

    ### Response:
    holding that nonpregnant plaintiffs had no standing to challenge abortion statute solely on basis of childbearing age because ajlthough some of them may in the future become pregnant and may in such event desire an abortion  it is also possible that they will not become pregnant or that if they do they will upon further reflection decide for other reasons against an abortion it is clear that any threat of harm to them is remote and hypothetical
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statutory interference with contract against Hill-Rom with a triple damage penalty; (3) common law tortious interference with contract against Hill-Rom; and (4) breach of contract against Hill-Rom. J.A. at 10-12. Stinger demanded damages of $4,498,689.00 for breach of contract against Hill-Rom Medaes and Hill-Rom; $4,498,689.00 for common law interference with contract against Hill-Rom; and $13,496,067.00 in triple damages for statutory interference with contract against Hill-Rom. On April 25, 2000, Hill-Rom and Hill-Rom Medaes moved for judgment on the pleadings. A magistrate judge recommended granting the motion, because Stinger was “not necessarily obliged to perform any services at all under the Agreement.” The district court accepted the recommendation and dism 2 (6th Cir.1930) (<HOLDING>). In the Agreement, Stinger agrees to make

    ### Response:
    holding that an executory distribution agreement that did not require the manufacturer to provide or the distributor to purchase any specific quantity of product lacked the required mutuality to enforce it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are reasonable. See Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327. The plaintiff’s invoice “ ‘need not present the exact number of minutes spent[,] nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted[,] nor the specific attainments of each attorney.’” Holbrook, ion of the DCPS fee schedule to determine prevailing attorney rates for IDEA cases. See Jackson, 696 F.Supp.2d at 103 (declining to apply the DCPS fee schedule because the defendant provided no evidence to show how it represented prevailing market rates and because precedent supported application of the Laffey Matrix). The defendants here have not offered any evidence to indicate the methodology by which the DCPS fee schedule was calculated, nor why it should be applied in this case. See Cox, 754 F.Supp.2d at 76 (<HOLDING>). The court therefore declines to apply the

    ### Response:
    holding that the laffey matrix should apply because the defendant offered no reasoned defense for its own guidelines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judg ment that the Crow Tribal Court exceeded its jurisdiction by ruling that Pease was not required to pay property taxes imposed by the County. Pease owns fee title to real property-located within the boundaries of the Crow Reservation. The property was allotted and patented in fee to Pease’s father under the Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751. Pease has failed to pay his state property taxes from 1987 to the present. In July 1991, he filed an action in Crow Tribal Court seeking to enjoin Yellowstone County from imposing state property taxes on his land. The parties agreed to stay the tribal court action pending the Supreme Court’s decision in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S.Ct. 683, 116 L.Ed.2d 687 (1992) (<HOLDING>). After the Court decided Yakima, the tribal

    ### Response:
    holding that states could impose an ad valorem property tax on fee land that had been allotted under the general allotment act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. FDIC, 733 F.Supp. 1091, 1094 (N.D.Tex.1990) (Fitzwater, J.). 4 . “Suits against state officials in their official capacity are considered to be suits against the individual's office, and so are generally barred as suits against the state itself.” Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 n. 3 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311-12, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)). Although claims for prospective injunctive relief brought against state officials in their official capacity are not suits against the state, id., Gaines does not request such relief. 5 . In view of this holding, the court need not determine whether an educational opportunity is ""property” under Texas state law. See teach v. FDIC, 860 F.2d 1266, 1274 n. 14 (<HOLDING>). 6 . The individual defendants move to dismiss

    ### Response:
    holding that property is an inherently state lawrelated term and that courts should look to state law when applying rico
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    .a personal belief in the witness’ credibility. A jury could Reasonably believe the prosecutor’s indications if ... the prosecutor implicitly vouches for the witness’ veracity by indicating that information not presented to the jury supports the testimony. United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1206 (11th Cir.1991) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Martinez, 96 F.3d 473, 476 (11th Cir.1996) (“[AJrgument to the jury ""must be básed solely on the evidence admitted at trial”). The prosecutor^ statement that Darlene Steele’s testimony would have “corroborated” Bill Steele’s was an improper attempt to bolster Bill Steele’s credibility plain error question where cumulative effect of errors compelled reversal); cf. United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1462 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The elements of this case — the introduction

    ### Response:
    holding that although prosecutorial misconduct alone would not have merited reversal the cumulative effect of the errors committed by the judge and the prosecutor  denied the defendants a fair trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testimony there was confirmed that a confidential informant existed, that Ramsey contacted him about the transaction, and that the informant met with appellant at the parking-lot buy. Also, appellant’s purchase of the cocaine, which he claimed was due to the informant’s alleged entrapment, occurred very shortly before appellant’s possession of and arrest for the same cocaine, to which the officers testified; There were no significant intervening circumstances between these two events. For these reasons, the in camera evidence showed that the informant, as an eyewitness to the purchase, could potentially give testimony necessary to a fair determination of appellant’s guilt or innocence, specifically, appellant’s entrapment defense. See Tex.R. Evid. 508(c)(2); Anderson, 817 S.W.2d at 72 (<HOLDING>); cf. Bodin, 807 S.W.2d at 318-19 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding defendant met initial burden under rule 508c2 because showed informant was eyewitness to crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    line of cases in which state courts have refused to allow an insured to be indemnified from liability resulting from the insured’s intentional causation of an injury. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 79 N.Y.2d 153, 161, 589 N.E.2d 365, 369-70, 581 N.Y.S.2d 142, 146-47 (1992)(stating that the ordinary person “would be startled by the notion that [an insured] should receive insurance protection for sexually molesting [ ] children” and “in effect, be permitted to transfer the responsibility for his deeds onto the shoulders of other policyholders,” and holding that the insured was not entitled to indemnification because he intentionally caused the children’s injuries); Public Service Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392, 400, 425 N.E.2d 810, 814, 442 N.Y.S.2d 422, 427 (1981)(<HOLDING>). The Goldfarb court concluded that allowing

    ### Response:
    holding that a further finding that the insured intended to injure the defendant would preclude any liability for the insurer for indemnification of compensatory or punitive damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this provision codifies the common-law standard for injunctive relief, generally referred to as the “need-narrowness-intrusiveness” standard. See H.R. Rep. 104-21, at 24 n.2 (1995) (explaining that the “dictates of [18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) ] are not a departure from current jurisprudence concerning injunctive relief’); see also Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 872 (9th Cir.2001); Smith v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 103 F.3d 637, 647 (8th Cir.1996); Williams v. Edwards, 87 F.3d 126, 133 n. 21 (5th Cir.1996). Likewise, the PLRA requires that any prospective relief “extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A); cf. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357-360, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In class action lawsuits such as Plata and

    ### Response:
    holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at the very least authenticated and then subsequently rejected them. Thus, the district court was presented with minimal and primarily self-serving evidence from both BNI and appellees. On this record and at this early stage in the litigation, the district court’s finding that BNI did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that none of its officers or employees actually participated in the alleged commercial activity was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, it did not err in denying BNI’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. B. Discovery Order The immunity provided under the FSIA protects foreign sovereigns from all the burdens of litigation, including the general burden of responding to discovery requests. See Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 534 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic

    ### Response:
    recognizing that foreign sovereigns possess a legitimate claim to immunity from discovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and that res judicata did not apply to Sanderson’s claim. We agree. Pursuant to the statutory requirements, the Report for Contempt became an order of the referring court when the referring court adopted the recommendation of the associate judge and signed the Report for Contempt under the notation “APPROVED AND SO ORDERED.” See id. Sanderson argues that the report could not be a final order, despite the trial court’s approval and signature, because the family code contemplates that the order is a separate document beyond the associate judge’s report. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 201.007(a)(10) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (providing that an associate judge may “recommend an order to be rendered in a case”); In re Lausch, 177 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). However, Sanderson refers us to nothing in

    ### Response:
    holding that associate judges report was not final because it required approval of the trial court and contemplated an order to follow
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or similar subjects; and nacted the TCHRA and its legislative history do not provide insight into the legislature’s intent concerning the term “state instrumentality” beyond the plain wording of subsection (8)(D). See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.002(8)(D). The Act’s former statutory provisions, and the consequences of an exclusionary construction of the term “state instrumentality,” however, weigh in favor of the conclusion that the DFW Board is a state instrumentality. As noted by the Purdin court, the Act was amended in 1997 to expressly define “state agency.” Purdin, 148 S.W.3d. at 298. The term “state agency” was given a broad definition as including (A) a board, commission, committee, council, department, institution, office, or agency i 320, 325 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the DFW Board is a state

    ### Response:
    holding special utility district to be state instrumentality subject to claims made under tchra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    workingdogs.com/doc0130.htm. These are not my words, but the words of the Arson Section Manager of the Oregon State Police. Even the guideline “published by the National Fire Protection Association suggests that evidence of a canine alert that is not confirmed by laboratory testing should not be considered valid.” Commonwealth v. Crouse, 447 Mass. 558, 855 N.E.2d 391, 402 (2006). “While the reliability of tracking dogs has been widely recognized and generally accepted by the courts, with thirty-two states approving of admissions of trailing by [dogs], courts have been much less receptive to accelerant-detection [canine alerts] not confirmed by laboratory analysis.” State v. Sharp, 395 N.J.Super. 175, 928 A.2d 165, 169 (Law.Div.2006). In fact, “[t]here is substantial scientific 7) (<HOLDING>); Sharp, 928 A.2d at 171; State v. Webber, 716

    ### Response:
    holding that reliability of uncorroborated canine alerts is questionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consideration of whether these preparation expenses are compensable under another theory of damages. See Maj. Op. at 1043 n. 9. This court has considered issues raised for the first time on appeal in “those cases in which the courts below were not presented with and did not consider the governing theory of law.” Aguon v. Calvo, 829 F.2d 845, 848 (1987). It is basic contract law that “the injured party has a right to damages based on his reliance interest, including expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance,” when expectation damages are, for whatever reason, unavailable. Restatement (Second) Contracts § 349. Cases cited in the majority opinion uphold the right to such damages under FIRREA. See Nashville Lodging Co. v. RTC, 59 F.3d 236, 245-46 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); cf. Monrad v. FDIC, 62 F.3d 1169, 1173-74

    ### Response:
    holding reliance damages recoverable under firrea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    studies, articles, or texts on the issue of causation. Without these, defendant asserts that plaintiff “provided no evidence that his job indeed caused such stress. Moreover, he provided to Support to show a connection between such stress, if in fact any existed, and aneurysm formation.” Def.’s Mem. at 10. We find that defendant’s denial was arbitrary and capricious because administrators and fiduciaries are prohibited from adding a term or extra requirement into an insurance policy that is not expressly part of it. Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund, 698 F.2d 593, 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829, 104 S.Ct. 105, 78 L.Ed.2d 108 (1983); see Duncan v. Continental Cas. Co., Civ. No. 96-2421, 1997 WL 88374, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Feb.10, 1997) (<HOLDING>); Velez v. Prudential Health Care Plan of New

    ### Response:
    holding that an insurance company could not deny a claim for longterm disability benefits based on a lack of objective medical evidence when the original policy did not refer to the objective medical evidence standard and never defined that term
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    coupled with the petitioner’s ""diminished mental capacities,” established prejudice); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (""Counsel failed to introduce available evidence that [the petitioner] was ‘borderline mentally retarded' and did not advance beyond sixth grade in school.” (citations omitted)); see also Sears v. Upton, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 3259, 3267, 177 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2010) (vacating the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision because it improperly analyzed prejudice and noting that ""[a] proper analysis of prejudice under Strickland would have taken into account the newly uncovered evidence of [the petitioner’s] ‘significant’ mental and psychological impairments""); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43-44, 130 S.Ct. 447, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (<HOLDING>). 97 . See Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274, 1299

    ### Response:
    holding that the petitioner established prejudice and noting that the jury might find mitigating the intense stress and mental and emotional toll that extensive combat experience in the korean war took on the petitioner and that the courts did not consider testimony regarding the existence of a brain abnormality and cognitive defects
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    To satisfy this prong, “extreme deprivations are required ...,” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992), and only deprivations denying “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” are grave enough to create a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392. Harsh and uncomfortable prison conditions do not automatically create such a violation. Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir.1997) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). However, a “remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993). See also Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209, 1211, 1215 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the subjective prong, there

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to provide prophylactic medication to prevent the possible future development of active tuberculosis is actual injury even though prisoner did not develop active tuberculosis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    denial of reh'g by 119 Nev. 460, 76 P.3d 22 (2003), cert. denied sub nom., Angle v. Guinn, 541 U.S. 957, 124 S.Ct. 1662, 158 L.Ed.2d 392 (2004)). 13 . See Wash. Rev.Code § 43.135.035. 14 . See FHR. Res. 6, 104th Cong. (1995), 141 Cone. Rec. 462, 463 (1995) (adding subsections (c) and (d) to House Rule XXI(5)). 15 . Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 833 (D.C.Cir.1997). 16 . Id. at 837. 17 . 141 Cone. Rec. 29463, 29476-77 (1995) (Speaker Pro Tempore rules that waiving super-majority rule only requires a majority). 18 . Skaggs, 110 F.3d at $47 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) (expressing view that House Rule XXXI(5)(c) violated the presentment clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2). 19 . See, eg., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 538-39, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash.2d 188, 949

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the us constitutions qualifications clause provides an exclusive list of qualifications for legislators notwithstanding its negative phrasing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“[A] promise is not good consideration unless there is mutuality of obligation....”); Kunzie, 330 S.W.3d at 483 (citing Baris v. Layton, 43 S.W.3d 390, 396 (Mo.App.E.D.2001)); Krusen v. Maverick Transp., 208 S.W.3d 339, 342 (Mo.App.S.D.2006). Mutuality of obligation “means that an obligation rests upon each party to do or permit to be done something in consideration of the act or promise of the other; that is, -neither party is bound unless both are bound.” Sumners, at 102 S.W.3d at 41 (quoting Aden v. Dalton, 341 Mo. 454, 107 S.W.2d 1070, 1073 (1937)). Accordingly, in a bilateral contract, where no other consideration is found, Missouri courts scrutinize whether the obligations are, in fact, mutual. See, e.g., Greene v. Alliance Automotive, Inc., 435 S.W.3d 646 (Mo.App.W.D.2014) (<HOLDING>); see also Sumners, 102 S.W.3d at 41

    ### Response:
    holding arbitration provision lacked mutuality of obligation because it allowed car dealership to exercise its primary remedy of selfhelp repossession without waiving arbitration of other disputes thereby allowing it to unilaterally divest itself of the promise to arbitrate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Alvin Johnson appeals the district court’s order granting his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion for a sentence reduction under Amendment 782. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a larger reduction in Johnson’s sentence. See United States v. Mann, 709 F.3d 301, 304 (4th Cir.2013) (standard of review); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10 cmt. n. 1(B) (2015) (addressing appropriate factors to consider in ruling on § 3582(c)(2) motion); see also Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 825-27, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (explaining that § 3582(c)(2) proceeding is not full resentencing); United States v. Smalls, 720 F.3d 193, 195-96 (4th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s

    ### Response:
    recognizing that district court is presumed absent contrary indication to have considered relevant factors when ruling on  3582c2 motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    raw data would be destroyed after two years. See Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 313. And while the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing continues to apply to Confrontation Clause violations under Crawford, that doctrine is usually applied in cases involving witness tampering or some other type of threats to witnesses to procure their unavailability. See Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 311-12; see also State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699, 703-05 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1177, 125 S.Ct. 1334, 161 L.Ed.2d 162 (2005) (defendant did not forfeit his right to confrontation under Crawford by absconding from state and remaining fugitive for seven years). The loss of evidence from a delay in trial is often predictable. See generally Black v. State, 725 N.W.2d 772, 776 (Minn.App.2007) (<HOLDING>). Thus, a defendant may be deemed to forfeit

    ### Response:
    holding that motion to withdraw guilty plea was untimely when made more than two years later given that drug evidence had been destroyed and witnesses memories had likely faded
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a substantive cause of action through which Ms. Hillman could collect Mr. Hillman’s FEGLI proceeds. Second, as noted above, FEGLIA does not contain any anti-alienation or similar provision that precludes the imposition of a constructive trust upon FEGLI proceeds. Third, if Ms. Hillman were to be able to reach the FEGLI proceeds, her actions would not be in direct contravention of any “plain and precise” requirement or “clear prohibition” expressly provided for in FEGLIA. The Court thus finds that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s rationale in Dugan does not govern this case either. 3. FEGLIA Preemption of Foreign State Equitable Remedies While there is no binding authority with respect to FEGLIA preemption of Virginia law, there are a number of foreign state a 575, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that feglia preempted a divorce decree that ordered the insured to designate his children as beneficiaries on his fegli policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court’s disposition of this juvenile case. Bill did not ask to conditionally admit to the allegations against him, thereby reserving appeal of any legal issues. Instead, he entered an unconditional admission, and indicated that he understood there would be no appeal. It is longstanding law that no defenses can be raised on appeal after entry of a guilty plea, except that no offense has been charged. Commonwealth v. Elza, 284 S.W.3d 118 (Ky.2009). The effect of the guilty plea is to waive those other defenses and any appeal that seeks to raise them. Juveniles, -of course, are not held to the same level of competency as adults, simply as a matter of law. Nevertheless, they may waive their rights in juvenile proceedings. See Commonwealth v, B.J., 241 S.W.3d 324, 327 (Ky.2007) (<HOLDING>); Kozak v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 129, 133

    ### Response:
    holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    credibility about a battered woman, we find the court’s evidential ruling unduly restrictive. 9 We note that several jurisdictions have found battered woman syndrome evidence to be admissible for certain purposes in respect of a claim of duress. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 979 F.2d 1282, 1287-88 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 943, 113 S.Ct. 1345, 122 L.Ed.2d 727 (1993); United States v. Marenghi, 893 F.Supp. 85, 92-96 (D.Me.1995), aff'd, 109 F,3d 28 (1st Cir.1997); United States v. Brown, 891 F.Supp. 1501, 1508 (D.Kan.1995); Romero, supra, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d at 338-39, rev’d on other grounds, 8 Cal.4th 728, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 270, 883 P.2d 388 (1994); State v. Williams, 132 Wash.2d 248, 937 P.2d 1052, 1058 (1997). See also Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 313-14 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 898

    ### Response:
    holding battered woman syndrome evidence relevant when defendants intent is disputed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not advise him of his appellate rights at the resentencing hearing and that he was diligent in pursuing his right to appeal the new sentence. The State does not dispute that Hull was not advised of his appellate rights at resen-tencing .... [W]e are unaware of any additional information that Hull could have provided in support of his motion. Id. at 1254. With respect to Hull’s Blakely claim, however, the court stated, Hull did not file a timely notice of appeal and thus, Hull’s direct appeal was not pending at the time Blakely was decided. It was nearly ten months after Blakely that Hull filed his motion to file a belated notice of appeal. In short, although it was later revived, Hull’s case was not on direct review when Blakely was decided. See Robbins v. State, [839 N.E.2d at 1199,] (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Hull’s claims under Blakely must

    ### Response:
    holding that blakely did not apply to a case that was final but not on direct review when blakely was decided and in which the trial court later allowed a belated appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    34 Cal.Rptr.3d 905 (2005). Here, petitioner does not have a criminal history of violence, which tends to show he is suitable for parole, rather than unsuitable. Moreover, the Governor’s finding to the contrary — especially given the length of time between petitioner’s past DUI convictions and the Governor’s reversal of the parole decision, and the fact petitioner’s alcoholism has been in remission for many years — is not supported by any evidence in the record. See Scott, 133 Cal.App.4th at 602-03, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 905 (no evidence supported Governor’s finding that inmate had a significant criminal history when only prior convictions inmate suffered were misdemeanor reckless driving involving no injury and vandalism); Pirtle v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 2007 WL 1140817, *15 (E.D.Cal.) (<HOLDING>), adopted by, 2007 WL 1544620 (E.D.Cal. 2007).

    ### Response:
    holding no evidence supported boards conclusion that inmates twentyfive year old criminal reeord which consisted of felony and misdemeanor drunk driving offenses and other misdemeanors shows that he would pose a danger to the public if released
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Appellants’ decision to bring the state court actions while the federal proceeding remained open evinces a dilatory motive. The obvious inference is that Appellants viewed the federal case as a “placeholder” that they could revisit depending on the outcome of their state cases. And regardless of Appellants’ intent, their decision to bring two state court actions while missing in action from the present case prejudiced Appellees. Appel-lees were forced to defend numerous cases in separate jurisdictions simultaneously, and Appellants’ absenteeism in the case below left Appellees alone to comply with the district court’s pre-trial deadlines. In sum, the court’s dismissal was not an abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Sherriff's Dept. Bossier Parish, 478 Fed.Appx. 809, 816 (5th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 865, 184

    ### Response:
    holding that dismissal with prejudice is warranted where case delayed for more than a few months
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    random seizures”). Even with the addition of the own the RV, “property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of [the relevant] inquiry.” United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). The court must inquire “not merely whether the defendant had a possessory interest in the items seized, but whether he had an expectation of privacy in the area searched.” Id. at 92, 100 S.Ct. 2547; see also Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (finding that an overnight guest has a protected expectation of privacy in the home in which he stays). Generally speaking, persons who borrow cars have standing to challenge searches of the borrowed vehicles. Compare United States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438, 442-43 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) (citing multiple cases from other circuits);

    ### Response:
    holding that the driver of a borrowed car had the requisite legitimate expectation of privacy to support standing for fourth amendment purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., No. H-05-4127, 2008 WL 2962206, at *5-6 (S.D.Tex. July 29, 2008) (finding only one false marking offense when the defendant “made only one separate, distinct decision to mark its stilts after it knew the stilts did not meet all the claims of [the patent at issue]”); Bibow v. Am. Saw & Mfg. Co., 490 F.Supp.2d 128, 129 n. 1 (D.Mass.2007) (opining that ""[i]t is doubtful that the statute ever intended to create such a lucrative game of ‘gotcha!’ "" by imposing a fine for each lime a press release was ""seen in some medium”); Undersea Breathing Sys., Inc. v. Nitrox Techs., Inc., 985 F.Supp. 752, 781 (N.D.Ill.1997) (fining the defendant $500 for a single decision to mark flyers); Sadler-Cisar Inc. v. Comm. Sales Network, 786 F.Supp. 1287, 1296 (N.D.Ohio 1991) (<HOLDING>); Joy Mfg. Co. v. CGM Valve & Gauge Co., 730

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant was liable for only one offense when falsely marking a device because continuous markings over a given time constitute a single offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testifying about the actual effect that the extraneous material had upon the jury’s deliberations or its verdict. To determine whether a probability of prejudice exists, the trial court should consider the following relevant inquiries: 1. The manner in which the extraneous material was received; 2. How long the extraneous material was available to the jury; 3. Whether the jury received the extraneous material before or after the verdict; 4. If received before the verdict, at what point in the deliberations was the material received; and 5. Whether it is probable that the extraneous material affected the jury’s verdict, given the overall strength of the opposing party’s case. See Doe, 101 N.M. at 366-67, 683 P.2d at 48-49; see also United States v. Hall, 85 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the trial court should hold an

    ### Response:
    holding that when determining prejudice under the objective test relevant considerations include 1 whether the extrinsic evidence was received by the jury and the manner in which it was received 2 whether it was available to the jury for a lengthy period of time 3 whether it was discussed and considered extensively by the jury 4 whether it was introduced before a jury verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations and 5 whether it was reasonably likely to affect the verdict considering the strength of the governments case and whether the governments case outweighed any possible prejudice caused by the extrinsic evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fire Dep’t, 607 F.2d 17, 27 (2d Cir.1979); see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (explaining that the Court’s concern about vague laws is that they do not give people a “reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited” and “may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning”). In this case, it is undisputed that Perez was warned by the Stewards that his conduct would subject him to a fíne. See Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 27 (rejecting vagueness challenge where plaintiff received a “specific warning” to cease his conduct and holding that plaintiff should have recognized that his actions would be viewed as a violation of the rule prohibiting “unbecoming conduct detrimental to the welfare or good name of the Department”); In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 324 (1st Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>); cf. diLeo, 541 F.2d at 953 (finding that

    ### Response:
    holding that because respondent received a direct and specific warning from the court that his continued abuse of  process would constitute conduct unbecoming a member of the bar regulation under which respondent was penalized was not vague
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “[A] seller of a ‘material part’ of a patented item may be a contributory infringer if he makes a non-staple article that he knows was ‘especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent.’ ” Husky Injection Molding Sys. Ltd. v. R & D Tool & Eng’g Co., 291 F.3d 780, 784 (Fed.Cir.2002) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 219, 100 S.Ct. 2601, 65 L.Ed.2d 696 (1980)). Section 271(c) has been interpreted to require not only knowledge that the component was especially made or adapted for a particular use but also knowledge of the patent which proscribed that use. See Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469 n. 4 (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488, 84 S.Ct. 1526, 12 L.Ed.2d 457 (<HOLDING>)) OGT alleges that Mergen is liable for

    ### Response:
    holding that section 271c does require a showing that the alleged contributory infringer knew that the combination for which his component was especially designed was both patented and infringing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling. Other offenses are included as “crimes of violence” if (A) that offense has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (B) the conduct set forth (i e., expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted involved the use of explosives (including any explosive material or destructive device) or, by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. (Emphasis added.) The guidelines, therefore, categorically define manslaughter, whether voluntary or involuntary, as a “crime of violence” for guidelines purposes. See also United States v. Sanders, 97 F.3d 856, 859-60 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in calculating the appropriate

    ### Response:
    holding that for purposes of 18 usc  924e involuntary manslaughter in ohio is a violent felony the definition of which is identical for all relevant purposes to the definition of crime of violence in  4b12a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence available to prove such intent. See id. at 578 (noting the problems associated with allowing extrinsic evidence to prove testator intent). In cases involving depletion of the decedent’s estate due to negligent tax planning, however, the personal representative need not prove how the decedent intended to distribute the estate; rather, the representative need only demonstrate that the decedent intended to minimize tax liability for the estate as a whole. Additionally, while the interests of the decedent and a potential beneficiary may conflict, a decedent’s interests should mirror those of his estate. Thus, the conflicts that concerned us in Barcelo are not present in malpractice suits brought on behalf of the estate. See Nevin v. Union Trust Co., 726 A.2d 694, 701 (Me.1999) (<HOLDING>). We note, however, that beneficiaries often

    ### Response:
    holding that the better rule is to allow only personal representatives not beneficiaries to sue for estateplanning malpractice because what may be good for one beneficiary is not necessarily good for the estate as a whole
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken."" 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 3 . The doctrine stems from the United States Supreme Court decisions in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). It is premised on both prudential grounds, namely the preservation of system consistency, and statutory grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (giving the United States Supreme Court exclusive federal jurisdiction to review state court judgments); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1334 (defining the jurisdiction of federal district courts as original, not appellate). 4 .See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Miller v. Burns (In re Burns), 395

    ### Response:
    holding that the rookerfeldman doctrine is confined to cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to bring an action “to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of’ subchapter I of ERISA or the terms of a plan. If, as plaintiff alleges, defendants engaged in acts or practices which violated ERISA and the terms of the plan, she may be entitled to obtain an injunction to prevent defendants from continuing to engage in such acts and practices even if plaintiff is also entitled to benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B). Nothing in Varity Corp. or other cases cited by defendants appears to limit actions under § 1132(a)(3)(A) — as opposed to actions under § 1132(a)(3)(B) — to cases in which relief under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is unavailable. See Keir v. UnumProvident Corp., No. 02 CIV. 8781(DLC), 2003 WL 2004422, at *1-2, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7020, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. April 29, 2003) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, I see no reason why a plaintiff could

    ### Response:
    recognizing that plaintiffs may bring action to enjoin acts and practices that violate erisa pursuant to  1132a3a and that such an action is different than a claim for benefits pursuant to  1132a1b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    divide the marital property. Moreover, the evidence sustains the trial court’s finding of “no real disparity in earnings” between the parties during the marriage. The wife has faded to demonstrate error in the failure of the trial court to reserve jurisdiction to award her periodic alimony in the future. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, THOMAS, and DONALDSON, JJ„ concur. 1 . The wife also argues that the husband reported the income received from his operation of the restaurant on the parties' joint tax return. However, the evidence is undisputed that the husband does not own any part of the restaurant property, which solely belongs to his mother. See Bonner v. Bonner, 170 So.3d 697 (Ala.Civ.App.2015) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Section 30-2-51(b) provides that, subject

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court cannot divide real property owned solely by third party witness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    threaten the employee-public servant. Similar pressure motivated by social issues likewise would not be covered by the proposed rule. As in the case of political pressure, I express no opinion on whether a clear mandate of public policy would cover that situation. The prospect of picketing in front of the employer’s place of business, threatening to withhold patronage, and other forms of economic pressure to effectuate the social goals of those protesting, should not be lightly dismissed. A rule prohibiting discharge might be totally ineffective: the protests and demonstrations would continue. Further, it might be unthinkable and perhaps unconstitutional to attempt to stop them. Cf. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. -,-, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 2530, 129 L.Ed.2d 593, 614-15 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J.

    ### Response:
    holding unconstitutional order prohibiting antiabortion protesters from demonstrating in front of family planning climes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Comment notes, this rule is the codification of the supreme court’s adoption of Rule 606(b), Fed.R.Evid., in State v. Blackwell, 664 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tenn.1984). If the defendant shows that the jury has been subjected to extraneous prejudicial information or improper influence, then we presume prejudice and the burden shifts to the state to rebut this presumption by either explaining the exposure or proving that it was harmless. Id. at 689. The information that the jurors provided the defendant cannot be offered in court unless it qualifies under one of the three exceptions in 606(b). In the present case, unless the information is extraneous, it is inadmissible under Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b). “Extraneous means ‘coming from without.’ ” State v. Coker, 746 S.W.2d 167, 171 (Tenn.1987) (<HOLDING>). The trial court in this case questioned

    ### Response:
    holding that the jurors alleged discussion about the possibility that the defendant would hire someone to kill them was inadmissible because the defendant had not shown that the jury learned of the threat from an outside source
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The appellate level of the State Bar Court of California has also consistently adhered to the ""long established principle that it is inappropriate to use the same conduct relied on to establish .a disciplinary Vlolatlon to establish an aggrava- © ting circumstance."" In re Silverton, Nos. 95-O-10829, 99-O-13251, 2004 WL 60709, at *16 (Review Dep't of the State Bar Ct. of Cal., Jan. 6, 2004); see also In re Sampson, No. 90-O-17703, 1994 WL 454888, at *12 (Review Dep't of the State Bar Ct. of Cal., Aug. 16, 1994) (""It appears that :the hearing judge used the same conduct constituting the ... violation as a finding in aggravation of the same charge. This is inappropriate.""); In re Burckhardt, No. 88-0-15079, 1991 WL 16498, at *6 (Review Dep't of the State Bar Ct. of Cal., Feb. 4, 1991) (<HOLDING>); In re Trillo, No. 85-0-13726, 1990 WL 92610,

    ### Response:
    holding that because a finding of aggravation for conduct involving bad faith dishonesty and concealment reflected the same conduct  that is properly the basis for the finding of the violation the finding in aggravation was duplicative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    altering, defacing, modifying and mutilating it, thus harming his honor and reputation as an artist. Continuing to take Pavia’s factual allegations to be true for the purposes of this motion, “The Ides of March” falls within the category of works protected under VARA. VARA deems a sculpture to be a “work of visual art” if it is “existing in a single copy ... or in multiple east, carved, or fabricated sculp tures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author.” VARA § 602, 17 U.S.C. § 101. Despite the fact that it consists of four separate elements, “The Ides of March” is alleged to be a single work of art whose elements “form an integrated whole.” Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 861 F.Supp. 303, 314 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (<HOLDING>) As a single piece, “The Ides of March” thus

    ### Response:
    holding a number of sculptural elements including art work attached to the ceiling and the floor interactive art a vast mosaic covering the majority of the floor of the lobby and portions of the walls and several sculptural elements to be a single work of art whose elements are interrelated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Kroger Tex., LP, 288 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir.2002) (stating that the Fifth Circuit has held that “specific damage estimates that are less than the minimum jurisdictional amount, when combined with other unspecified damage claims, can provide sufficient notice that an action is removable so as to trigger the time limit for filing a notice of removal”). However, the Court believes that Plaintiffs Original Petition is not such a pleading. Since Plaintiffs Original Petition contains no information about his salary or the kinds of promotions allegedly denied him, any estimate as to his potential damages would be based on supposition, not affirmative revelations. Cf. Exceleron Software, Inc. v. TGEC Commc’ns Co., No. Civ. A. 3:05-CV-2007-L, 2005 WL 3542566, at *3 (N.D.Tex. Dec.23, 2005) (<HOLDING>). To demonstrate that his Original Petition

    ### Response:
    holding that an initial pleading triggered the thirtyday time limit for removal under  1446b because it sets forth on its face express allegations as to the monetary amount of damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 2701(c)(1), or “by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user,” id. § 2701(c)(2). The district court dismissed on the ground that NetGate had authorized defendants’ access. It held that this consent was not coerced, because the subpoena itself informed NetGate of its right to object. Plaintiffs contend that NetGate’s authorization was nonetheless invalid because the subpoena was patently unlawful. Their claim turns on the meaning of the word “authorized” in section 2701. We have previously reserved judgment on this question, see Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879 n. 8 (9th Cir.2002), while other circuits have considered related issues, see, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 n. 10 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 510

    ### Response:
    holding access might be unauthorized under the computer fraud and abuse act if it is not in line with the reasonable expectations of the party granting permission internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to believe that he would be prohibited from taking the weapon on board the aircraft. Wallace’s assertion that he sought to introduce this evidence is contradicted by his statement that the parties stipulated to the existence of all elements necessary for a conviction under 49 U.S.C. § 1472(f), with the one exception concerning the question of whether a stun gun is a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the statute. Brief for Appellant at 7. Accordingly, the Government opposes Wallace’s attempt to raise the question of his intent to conceal the weapon on appeal because the record does not show any effort to introduce evidence on non-concealment at trial. See United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1012 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1593, 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Assuming, however, that this issue is

    ### Response:
    holding that errors not raised before the trial court will not generally be considered on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a variety of prescription medications on 22-23 August 2006. As a result, “the probative value of’ evidence relating to the seizure of prescription medications at the time of Defendant’s 10 February 2005 arrest “depends upon [his] having in fact committed the prior alleged offense.” Scott, 331 N.C. at 41, 413 S.E.2d at 788. Finally, “[e]vidence of other crimes is admissible when it tends to establish a common plan or sche iscellaneous bottles and a collection of unidentified pills would not tend to show the existence of such a common scheme or plan. Thus, “the probative value of’ evidence relating to items seized as part of Defendant’s 10 February 2005 arrest “depends upon [his] having in fact committed the prior alleged offense.” Scott, 331 N.C. at 41, 413 S.E.2 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1994) (<HOLDING>). After careful consideration, we are unable to

    ### Response:
    holding that in a felonious breaking or entering and possession of housebreaking implements case the erroneous admission of evidence that the defendant had committed a similar breaking or entering on another occasion for which he was later acquitted constituted harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    145, 149 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). Further, the proposition that a surgeon cannot delegate a duty to remove foreign objects from a patient has been recognized. See, e.g., Miller v. Ryan, 706 N.E.2d 244, 250 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied; Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction No. 23.03. Numerous opinions have held that a surgeon is not entitled to summary judgment under such res ipsa cases. See, e.g., Wright, 622 N.E.2d at 172 (affirming the denial of the motions for summary judgment of the surgeon and hospital); Burke v. Capello, 520 N.E.2d 439, 442 (Ind.1988) (reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to a surgeon who left a piece of cement in the patient), overruled on other grounds by Vergara By Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E.2d 185, 186-187 (Ind.1992); Balfour, 830 N.E.2d at 150 (<HOLDING>). However, our research reveals no Indiana

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of the health care provider
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by Microsoft for Hotmail users are not in electronic storage”). However, the Court need not resolve this issue now, for, consistent with numerous other courts, the Court determines that at a minimum email messages that have reached the addressee’s inbox, but which have yet to be opened by the addressee, are in “temporary, intermediate storage.” Crispin, 717 F.Supp.2d at 987(explaining that webmail messages that have not yet been opened are in electronic storage); United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 81 (1st Cir.2005) (explaining that temporary storage refers to “when a message sits in an email user’s mailbox after transmission but before the user has retrieved the message from the mail server”); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Weaver, 636 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that email messages stored on a computer but not yet read were in electronic storage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are strong.... Losses like these can be insured [through warranties]. ... The increased cost to the public that would result from holding a manufacturer liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not justified. Id. at 871-72, 106 S.Ct. 2295. The Court continued by explaining how contract law is designed to account for the costs and risks of a product's nonperformance: Contract law, and the law of warranty in particular, is well suited to commercial controversies of the sort involved in this case because the parties may set the terms of their own agreements. The manufacturer can restrict its liability, within limi 992)(citing economic loss rule to bar action for negligent termination of employment); Scott Co. of California v. MK-Ferguson Co., 832 P.2d 1000, 1005 (Colo.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Centennial Square, Ltd. v. Resolution Trust

    ### Response:
    holding that the rule bars subcontractors negligence claim because no independent duty was breached
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.” (emphasis added)). Third, Mr. Frederick offers nothing to rebut the government’s statement to the District Court that it had fully complied with its obligations under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), so we would be hard-pressed to say that the District Court abused its discretion by relying on those representations as true. Fourth, the Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) violations alleged by Mr. Frederick involved criminal activities inextricably intertwined with the criminal conspiracy and therefore not governed by the requirements for admission of evidence under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1054-55 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Mr. Frederick impeached the

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of specific uncharged drug trafficking offenses were not extrinsic to prosecution for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine where the events occurred within the time period of the alleged conspiracy and were demonstrative of the conspirators conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pursuant to section 7(a)(2) of the VCAA, that amendment to section 5107(a) is applicable to “any claim ... filed before the date of the enactment of [the VCAA] and not final as of that date.” VCAA § 7(a). The VCAA also amended 38 U.S.C. § 5103 (“Notice to claimants of required information and evidence”) and added 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (“Duty to assist claimants”). VCAA § 3(a). The appellant argues that the September 2000 BVA decision should be vacated and the matter remanded for readjudication in light of the enactment of the VCAA. Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 3-4. Specifically, he argues that the VCAA “significantly modified] the provisions of chapter 51 of [title 38 of the United States Code], which addresses ‘claims, effective dates, and payments’ ” and that, because the 001) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, because the appellant’s VCAA

    ### Response:
    holding that cue motion is not claim for benefits and that vcaa definition of claimant cannot encompass person seeking revision of final decision based on cue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). This conclusion is all the more appropriate given the relative strength of the issues that Baker’s counsel did raise on appeal. See Thompson, 598 F.3d at 285 (stating that appellate counsel is ineffective only if a Blakely claim would have been “clearly stronger than [the] issues that counsel did present”). Although Baker’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, the Second District found at least some merit in Baker’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims, noting that “evidence presented at trial could have supported an instruction for [the lesser included offense of] aggravated assault” had counsel requested one, and that counsel had called a witness whose testimony “was not helpful to the defense.” Cf. id. at 287 (<HOLDING>). 2. Prejudice Even if Baker could show that

    ### Response:
    holding failure to raise blakely claim was not ineffective performance where appellate counsel raised several plausible arguments and did not merely assert a perennial loser such as a sufficiencyoftheevidence claim quoting benning 345 fedappx at 158
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “tend to exchange prudent caution for timidity,” thereby hindering the performance of an already difficult job. Kari, 582 N.W.2d at 924 (quoting Pletan, 494 N.W.2d at 41). The same reasoning applies to government-employed ambulance crews providing emergency medical care. Fear of potential civil liability arising from their actions in an emergency situation could cause crew members to hesitate in providing treatment, thereby increasing the risk to patients. Finally, we note that the fact that a written protocol exists does not transform an otherwise discretionary act into a ministerial one. Field-level actions taken by public officials may be discretionary even when there are extensive regulations that dictate procedure. See Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657, 665 (Minn.1999) (<HOLDING>). In treating the unconscious Virginia Bailey,

    ### Response:
    holding that despite the fact that police conduct is governed by extensive regulations statutes and caselaw officers responding to dispatch or making an arrest are engaging in discretionary conduct because they are required to make splitsecond decisions based on incomplete information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shall be admitted to these programs.” KRS 533.262(2). 11 . KRS 533.262(1). This Court is unaware of any drug court diversion program, which operates separately from a pretrial diversion program authorized by KRS 533.250 — .260, that has been approved by both this Court and the Department of Corrections. 12 . Kenton Circuit Court Pretrial Diversion Program § III (emphasis in original). The rales contain a notation that ""Comments appearing in bold type are not intended to be part of the rales but may provide guidance in applying the rules."" Id. 13 . Id. at § IV(A). 14 . Id. at § IV(B) & (C). 15 . Id. at § V(A). 16 . Id. at § V(B). 17 . Id. at § VI. 18 . Kentucky Labor Cabinet v. Graham, Ky., 43 S.W.3d 247, 251 (2001). 19 . See Holbrooks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 85 S.W.3d 563, 566-7 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Ignatow v. Ryan, Ky., 40 S.W.3d 861 (2001)

    ### Response:
    holding that direct appeal from subsequent conviction is the proper context in which to seek review of trial courts ruling declaring mistrial over defendants objection at previous trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we conclude that even if it was made pre-Miranda, it was properly admitted. The Florida Supreme Court and the District Courts of Appeal in this state have routinely held that Miranda does not apply to questions designed to obtain basic booking information. In Holland v. State, 773 So.2d 1065, 1073-74 (Fla.2000), the Florida Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Holland’s motion to suppress his statements to the police. The facts are as follows. After Holland was arrested, the police obta with Holland was to ascertain his real name, not to speak with him about the case, the trial court did not err in denying Holland’s motion to suppress his statements. See also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Allred v. State, 622 So.2d 984, 987

    ### Response:
    holding that routine booking questions do not violate the constitutional protection against self incrimination as they do not constitute interrogation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    merely because it leads to a result that seems contrary to the court’s expectations.” Id. at 427. Similarly, it may be counterintuitive to allow credit against prison time for the period Anderson spent living at home wearing an electronic ankle bracelet, but this result is not so absurd as to permit us to disregard the plain language of the statute requiring that credit. See Holland, 253 Iowa at 1011, 115 N.W.2d at 164; Iowa R.App. P. 6.904(3)(to ). State courts in construing their respective state statutes have reached different conclusions as to whether sentencing credit is awarded for electronic monitoring and home supervision. Several states allow sentencing credit for electronic monitoring at home. See, e.g., State v. Guillen, 130 N.M. 803, 32 P.3d 812, 813 (N.M.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Harris v. Charles, 171 Wash.2d 455, 256 P.3d

    ### Response:
    holding as a matter of law pretrial electronic monitoring and home confinement merits sentencing credit under its statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    .4 (providing for fines and imprisonment for acting as an attorney without authority). The fourth and final factor concerns the nexus between the lack of license and the contract at issue. In the present case, there is an undeniably direct connection. The performance for which Bergantzel seeks compensation is the unauthorized practice of law, conduct that she was prohibited by law from performing. In other words, the unlicensed conduct is not a collateral matter. Weighing all the factors, we conclude that the interest in refusing to enforce the contract must prevail. The fact that Ber-gantzel has already performed and, in that sense, Mlynarik will receive a windfall, simply does not outweigh the strong public policy against the unauthorized practice of law. See Meunier, 170 So. at 578 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that the contract is

    ### Response:
    holding that adjuster who had fully performed could not recover his contractual contingent fee due to the strong public policy against the practice of law by laypersons
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been isolated for over five years, with only a few months of relief in the interim. # * * The duration of Bailey’s confinement is a necessary component in the Sandin analysis. We therefore vacate the JUDGMENT dismissing Bailey’s complaint and REMAND the case where it can be determined whether Bailey is still subject to the conditions he challenges. The court can then assess whether, in light of conditions and duration of the segregated confinement, Bailey has sufficiently alleged a state-created liberty interest in his custodial classification. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47,5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Neitzke v.

    ### Response:
    holding that an evidentiary hearing can be used in pro se cases in place of a typical requirement for a more definite statement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    execution.” Boyd, 717 So.2d at 524 (emphasis added). Therefore, even though the Affidavits of Violation of Probation were filed within the probationary period, the “probation revocation process” as defined in Boyd was not set in motion within that period, and the county court did not have jurisdiction over these revocation proceedings. See Francois v. State, 695 So.2d 695, 697 (Fla.1997) (“[W]hen a probationary period expires, the court is divested of jurisdiction over the probationer unless, prior to that time, the appropriate steps were taken to revoke or modify the probation.”). Furthermore, the mandate of Boyd and Francois cannot be avoided by construing the defendants’ violations of probation as “absconding” that would toll the probationary period. See Francois, 695 So.2d at 697 (<HOLDING>). Reversed and remanded for further consistent

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to satisfactorily meet the conditions of probation is not the legal equivalent of absconding and does not toll the probationary period
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    OPINION HUVELLE, District Judge. Before the Court is plaintiffs motion for entry of default judgment. Plaintiff, International Road Federation, and defendant, the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, entered into a Sublease Agreement (“sublease”) whereby plaintiff sublet office space at 2600 Virginia Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C. to defendant. Plaintiff brings this action for damages for breach of contract alleging that defendant failed to take possession of the premises and failed to make payments required under the sublease. Defendant is a foreign state. Underwood v. United Republic of Tanzania, 1995 WL 46383 (D.D.C. Jan.27, 1995) (<HOLDING>); Gray v. Permanent Mission of People’s

    ### Response:
    holding that as a matter of law the embassy of a sovereign nation is a foreign state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inference that appellee’s delay in compliance -with that order was not a coincidence; it was a calculation designed to delay appellant until the use became prohibited. The County’s need to delay appellant was necessitated by the inherent length of time required to process the (SMA) for the larger geographical area. It would appear that only through the comprehensive rezoning process could the County accomplish a downzoning without the property owner’s consent. We hold, therefore, that especially egregious actions of public officials in stalling the issuance of permits in order to eliminate development by downzoning may create a zoning estoppel as to particular properties. In the case at bar, the allegations as to appellee’s actions in t 2-73, 100 S.Ct. 383, 389, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48,

    ### Response:
    holding that the government could not require a landowner who improved his marina so that it fell within the definition of a navigable water to grant the public access without compensation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The plaintiffs assert that the minor damage to then-home prior to the policy period is in no way related to or evidence of hidden decay. The plaintiffs contend that the decay of the interior portion of the rear wall remained hidden until the wall collapsed in October, 1996. By its terms, the Hartford homeowners policy “applies only to loss in Section 1 ... which occurs during the policy period.” Defendants’ Exhibit B, Sections I and II- — Conditions, ¶ 1 at 17 of 18. For insurance purposes, damages “occur” when they “first manifest themselves in a way that could be ascertained by reasonable diligence.” Keystone Automated Equipment v. Reliance Insurance Company, 369 Pa.Super. 472, 535 A.2d 648, 651 (1988); D’Auria v. Zurich Insurance Company, 352 Pa.Super. 231, 507 A.2d 857, 862 (1986)(<HOLDING>). This would apply even if the damage

    ### Response:
    holding that none of the physicians insurers had a duty to provide coverage since the effects of the negligence first manifested themselves prior to the coverage periods of any of the three policies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (per curiam) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase where the lawyer had never represented a defendant in a penalty-phase proceeding before). Here, by contrast, at the time of Petitioner’s trial, defense counsel had served as a public defender for more than ten years, had tried a capital case in the past, and had earned a Level IV ranking in the public defender’s office, meaning that defense counsel was the top trial lawyer in that office. Moreover, the main defense lawyer brought in an assistant to help in both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. • There, the defense “investigation consisted of at most five interviews,” which took place shortly before jury selection began. Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1114; see also Porter, 130 S.Ct. at 453 (<HOLDING>). Here, by contrast, counsel began the

    ### Response:
    holding that counsel was deficient for failing to obtain any school medical or military records to interview any family members or otherwise to investigate the defendants mental health and background
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jenney has waived the privilege as to these matters. Neither party is entirely correct. As an initial matter, a petition for certiorari is the proper vehicle by which to review this type of discovery order. See Robichaud v. Kennedy, 711 So.2d 186, 187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“Certiorari is the appropriate avenue to challenge a trial court order directing the disclosure of communications presumptively covered by the attorney client privilege.”). The standard of review is whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in ordering disclosure, thereby causing irreparable harm to the petitioner. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Fla. Constr., Commerce & Indus. Self Insurers Fund, 720 So.2d 535, 535-36 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Turning to the substance of the . 2d DCA 1980) (<HOLDING>). Here, the employment agreement was not

    ### Response:
    holding that if documents are privileged in the hands of the client they retain that privilege when given to an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Court of Claims.”); Donovan v. Dillingham, 668 F.2d 1196, 1199 (11th Cir.1982) (finding the position of the United States to have been substantially justified because, both at the time it initially brought suit and at the time it appealed the adverse ruling by the district court, the governing law (for different reasons) was unsettled), rev’d on other grounds, 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir.1982) (en banc); Underwood v. Pierce, 547 F.Supp. 256, 261-62 (C.D.Cal.1982) (finding the position of HUD not to have been substantially justified, largely on the ground that at the time the position was taken, nine courts had rejected the argument, although the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in two related cases). But cf. Wyandotte Sav. Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 119, 120 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 75 . There is clear support in the

    ### Response:
    holding that the nlrb was substantially justified in seeking the overruling of a controlling tenyearold sixth circuit precedent which had been rejected by two other circuits reasoning that the position taken by the board was a reasonable attempt to reopen a closed question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    messages for over two years on a cell phone for which she discontinued service. Similarly, bad faith cannot be inferred because the text messages were not printed out when there is no indication that such a printout was even possible. Indeed, courts agree that HRE Rule 1004(1) is “particularly suited” to electronic evidence “[gjiven the myriad ways that electronic records may be deleted, lost as a result of system malfunctions, purged as a result of routine electronic records management software (such as the automatic deletion of e-mail after a set time period) or otherwise unavailable....” Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 580 (D.Md.2007). See also King v. Kirkland’s Stores, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-1055-MEF, 2006 WL 2239203, at *5 (D.Ala. Aug. 4, 2006) (unpublished decision) (<HOLDING>); Bidbay.com, Inc. v. Spry, No. B160126, 2003

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs testimony regarding the content of an email from defendant was admissible although plaintiff argued only that a copy of the email as opposed to the original or sole copy was in the possession of the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    including an error in converting sales in Euros in a way that undervalued the United States sales. See Memo in Support (Anson) at 14. We conclude that these miscalculations would in the ordinary case go to weight and not admissibility. But we note that the traditional means of addressing such errors, i.e., cross-examining the expert at trial, would not work in this case because, for reasons stated above, Louis Vuitton has produced the wrong expert to testify on the regression analysis. Indeed, this is another reason why Torres and not Anson should have been produced — otherwise errors in computation that traditionally go to weight should probably be treated as going to admissibility. Given the many other reasons for excluding Anson's testimony as to the regression analysis Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 172 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs statistical analysis failed oh its own to support an inference of discriminatory treatment sufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion because the analysis did not account for any other causes for the fact that older workers were more likely to be terminated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    acres of residential property contained “in a sea of hundreds and hundreds of acres of industrially zoned land” had no viable value because a single family home had already been constructed, the fifteen acres were abutted on at least two sides by residentially-zoned property, and three units per acre could be developed under its present classification); Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 724, 376 A.2d 483 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067, 98 S.Ct. 1245, 55 L.Ed.2d 769 (1978) (“[Ojnly that permissible densities ... have been significantly decreased; that showing is ... insufficient to demonstrate a confiscatory exercise____”); Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 437, 370 A.2d 1102 (1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 117, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Stratakis v. Beauchamp, 268 Md. 643, 654, 304

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute that prohibited producers and refiners from directly operating retail service stations did not constitute a taking because they were not deprived of all beneficial uses of their property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could arise if the public construction project was “unreasonably prolonged.” Truck Terminal, 486 Pa. at 23 n. 8, 403 A.2d at 989 n. 8. In the temporary-obstruction scenario, therefore, the essential difficulty lies in ascertaining when the infringement upon reasonable access becomes unduly prolonged, or is otherwise accomplished in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. Clearly, if the governmental entity arbitrarily obstructs access to the subject property in the sense that the interference is unnecessary and the project could have been completed just as conveniently without substantial harm to any property owner, the situation would come within the exception to the Truck Terminal rule for arbitrary deprivations. Cf. L-M-S Inc. v. Blackwell, 149 Tex. 348, 233 S.W.2d 286, 289-90 (1950) (<HOLDING>). Presently, however, although Ap- pellees

    ### Response:
    holding that a restaurant owner could only recover lost profits resulting from temporary street obstructions upon showing that placement of the obstructions was unreasonable or unnecessary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    asserted against the state defendants, explaining why none was legally viable. Count I against Officer Sanchez for negligently classifying Mr. Lymon for kitchen work, and Count II against Cap-' tain Hernandez for negligently denying access to the formal grievance process and thereby insulating Sanchez and Aramark from legal, accountability, failed because the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA) did not waive governmental immunity for the alleged conduct. Specifically, N.M. Stat. § 41-4-6, which waives immunity for “operation or maintenance of any building,” concerns unsafe conditions on government property and does not apply to the administrative functions involved here. Lymon, 728 F.Supp.2d at 1266-68 (relying primarily on Archibeque v. Moya, 116 N.M. 616, 866 P.2d 344, 347 (1993) (<HOLDING>)). And N.M. Stat. § 41-4-12, which waives

    ### Response:
    holding prisons negligent classification of prisoner fell outside waiver of immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the signatures of Gary and Dale Kahl. 3 Because of this ruling, no determination was made as to when the partnership was formed and which assets were acquired after that date. 4 Gary and Dale Kahl d/b/a Kahl Farms, and Receiver Justice Burgweger are the named respondents. The partnership's other creditors, Bank of New Glarus, Badgerland Harvestore Systems, Inc., John Deere Company, United Bank in Sun Prairie, Mt. Horeb Farmers Co-op, Production Credit Association, and Susan Kahl, were joined as intervenor-respondents. 5 The parties cite two cases from other jurisdictions which are factually very similar to the case at hand: In Re Taylorville Eisner Agency, Inc., 445 F.Supp. 665 (S.D. Ill 1977), and Citizens Sav. Bank v. Sac City State Bank, 315 N.W.2d 20 (Iow F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>). (Several of these cases predate the 1972

    ### Response:
    holding a filing under john and mayella lintz insufficient to identify the debtor corporation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    thus the claims against them were properly dismissed. V. Dismissal of the Malicious Prosecution Claim The District Court dismissed the malicious prosecution claim because the allegedly malicious prosecution had not terminated in McGee’s favor, as required by New York law. We agree. The prosecution against McGee terminated when, pursuant to N.Y. CPL § 170.30(l)(a), the accusatory instrument was dismissed as facially insufficient to state a claim for witness tampering. A55-56. We have held that a dismissal under CPL § 170.30 for facial insufficiency is “not a decision on the merits, an essential element of a cause of action for malicious prosecution.” Breen v. Garrison, 169 F.3d 152, 153 (2d Cir.1999); see also MacFawn v. Kresler, 88 N.Y.2d 859, 644 N.Y.S.2d 486, 666 N.E.2d 1359 (1996) (<HOLDING>). McGee relies upon Smithy-Hunter v. Harvey in

    ### Response:
    holding that action could not form the basis of a malicious prosecution claim where criminal information was dismissed as insufficient to support the charges without prejudice and the prosecutors did not amend or refile
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the complaint. The complaint references an AOS employee requesting a LoadTec motor from FS, but the complaint does not state whether FS ever provided such a motor. (Compl. ¶ 19). 6 . The court notes that both parties are unclear as to how the court’s findings on summary judgment relate to a judgment on the pleadings. To the extent the evidentiary issues resolved by the court on summary judgment influence this court’s order, the defendant's motion will be treated as a request for summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claim, as both parties have had a reasonable opportunity to present all material relevant to summary judgment and the motion itself clearly anticipates a summary judgment ruling. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f); cf. In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d 288, 295 (2nd Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>) The court finds this perfectly acceptable,

    ### Response:
    holding that the essential inquiry in conversion of a rule 12b6 motion to a rule 56 motion is whether the appellant should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted into one for summary judgment or was taken by surprise and deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the pleadings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decision does not specifically require a defendant to file verified affidavits or sworn testimony to satisfy Ms burden of makmg a preliminary substantial showing that the affiant recklessly or mtentionally made false statements in the warrant affidavit. The UMted States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cirernt has not specifically addressed the issue of whether the defendant must file verified support for Ms allegations of falsity to mandate an evidentiary hearing under Franks. However, several other eir-cMts of the UMted States Court of Appeals have held that the defendant’s motion and allegations must be supported with affidavits or other sworn testimony in order to meet the “offer of proof’ requirement of Franks. The First CircMt has held that it is not error for a di (7th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). In regard to the sufficiency of the

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant must do more than produce a selfserving statement which refutes the warrant affidavit to overcome the warrants presumption of validity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    362, 389 (Del.2011) (citing Manley v. State, 709 A.2d, 643, 655 (Del.1998)). 75 . App. to Opening Br. A-1549-50, A-1552. 76 . Id. at A-1557-58 (first omission in original). 77 . Ploof III, 2012 WL 1413483, at *11 (Del.Super. Jan. 30, 2012). 78 . Ploof also stated that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the striking of prospective juror Susan Smith for cause, however, the record reflects that the State immediately used a peremptory challenge on Smith after the trial judge denied the challenge for cause. App. to Opening Br. A-1593-94. Accordingly, Ploof's claim regarding Smith fails on prejudice grounds, because the trial judge denied the challenge for cause. 79 . Id. at A-1545. 80 . Id. at A-1566-67. 81 . See Keith v. Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 677-78 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d 626, 633 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In reaching its conclusion here, the majority

    ### Response:
    holding manufacturing exception to pennsylvanias capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    matter, then, the Appellate Division’s decision rests on an interpretation of the Federal Rules, which requires us to conduct plenary review. See L-3 Commc’ns Corp. v. OSI Sys., Inc., 607 F.3d 24, 27-28 (2d Cir. 2010) (plenary standard of review applies to “a district court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure”); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 459 (3d Cir. 2000) (same, regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Miller, 624 F.2d at 1200-02 (exercising plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of one of its local rules insofar as the rule simply incorporated state law, interpretations of which are subject to plenary review); cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568, 97 S. Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1977) (<HOLDING>). IV. Discussion The Appellate Division

    ### Response:
    holding that the supreme court may review statecourt judgments that rest on state law when the state court felt compelled by what it understood to be federal constitutional considerations to construe and apply its own law in the manner it did
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    - C - Police interrogated defendant three different times on October 28 before he confessed to the West Windsor crimes. When the police brought defendant to the station at 8:30 a.m., they informed him of his Miranda rights, and he signed a waiver. Defendant ate lunch at around 3:00 p.m. The first interrogation began at 3:37 p.m. At this first interrogation session, the police again read defendant his rights, and he signed another rights form. The interrogation lasted a little over an hour, at which point defendant started to cry and asked for a half-hour “to think.” The interrogation ceased, and the police returned defendant to his cell. By requesting “time to think,” defendant was not invoking his right to silence. See State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 138-40, 548 A.2d 887 (1988) (Bey II) (<HOLDING>). Although the police granted defendant the

    ### Response:
    holding defendants request to lay down and think about what happened did not constitute invocation of right to silence as not every break in questioning compels renewed administration of the miranda warnings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    quotation marks omitted). IV. Conclusion For the reasons discussed herein, the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is AFFIRMED. 1 . The other defendants named in Karl’s complaint have either been dismissed from the case or have not appealed. Likewise, no other claims alleged in Karl’s complaint are before the court. 2 . We have previously declined to decide whether a public employee’s testimony is per se a matter of public concern regardless of its content or the type of proceeding in which it is offered. See Clairmont, 632 F.3d at 1103; Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 926 n. 6 (9th Cir.2004). We again decline to decide this question because in this case, as in our previous ones, the content th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Far from creating a circuit split regarding

    ### Response:
    holding that a police officers deposition testimony in another individuals wrongful death suit was not protected speech where the testimony merely parroted the contents of an accident report generated in the normal course of his duties as an accident investigator
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization. In addition, while due process requires that a guilty plea be made with knowledge of its direct consequences, In re Personal Restraint of Peters, 50 Wn. App. 702, 704, 750 P.2d 643 (1988), a deportation proceeding that occurs subsequent to the entry of a guilty plea is a collateral consequence of that plea. In re Personal Restraint of Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 588, 989 P.2d 512 (1999) (citing State v. Ward, 123 Wn.2d 488, 512-13, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994)). As such, Jamison need not have been advised, on due process as opposed to statutory grounds, of the immigration consequences of the plea. See Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 588 (citing Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 512). See also State v. Holley, 75 Wn. App. 191, 198, 876 P.2d 973 (1994) (<HOLDING>). But Jamison claims that the 1996 amendments

    ### Response:
    holding that rcw 1040200 does not create a constitutional right to be advised of immigration consequences therefore failure to comply with statute does not create constitutional harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mutual Casualty Co., 285 N.C. 313, 204 S.E.2d 829 (1974), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the insured’s right to recover UM benefits from the insurer is derivative and conditional and that any defense that would have been available to the uninsured motorist is available to the insurer. The court explained: “In our view it would indeed constitute ‘antics with semantics’ to say that litigation with a stale tort claim, one against which the applicable statute of limitations has been specifically pleaded, remains ‘legally entitled to recover’ when his remedy has been taken away! To be ‘legally entitled to recover damages’ a plaintiff must not on aim seeking UM benefits “is actually one for the tort allegedly committed by the uninsured motorist.” Id. Inste 2d 16, 18-19 (1962) (<HOLDING>). The Alabama Supreme Court has stated that the

    ### Response:
    holding that an insurer may  assert as defenses the nonnegligence of the uninsured the contributory negligence of the insured and the lack of resulting damage all being matters of substantive law and legal defenses of the uninsured but it does not  succeed  to the rights of the uninsured motorist to interpose the latters procedural defense of statute of limitations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the plaintiffs employment severely enough to support a hostile work environment claim. Id. Other courts have also noted the severe impact of the use of the word. See Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 927 (N.D.Ill.1984). “The use of the word ‘niggeP automatically separates the person addressed from every non-black person; this is discrimination per se.” Id. In addition, in the present case, it is undisputed that Vasilopulos not only used the word “nigger” in the exchange with Tutman but Vasilopulos also threatened to kill Tutman. This added physical threat makes the present case distinguishable from cases in which the Seventh Circuit has held that there was no hostile work environment as a matter of law. See McKenzie v. Illinois Dep’t of Transportation, 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 134

    ### Response:
    holding that three sexually suggestive comments over a three month period were not frequent enough nor severe enough to be unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs work environment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in an actuarially sound manner in the future and maintain solvency.”). In addition, over 85,000 class members accounting for more than 10 percent of the class have already responded to and taken advantage of the settlement. Tr. 9. Moreove agreement whereby an insured was to receive payment from the insurance company or have premiums reduced in consideration for services provided, or to be provided to the insurance company, did not constitute a rebate if there was a legitimate obligation to perform services of value to the company....”). More specifically, insurance premium discounts given in the context of a lawsuit settlement have been treated as legal and proper under such statutes. See e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Nello L. Teer Co., 179 F. Supp. 538 (M.D.N.C. 1960) (<HOLDING>); Cox v. Department of Insurance, 823 P.2d 177,

    ### Response:
    holding that payment under settlement agreement between insurer and insureds concerning disputed premium claims was a compromise that did not violate antirebate statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    49, 444 A.2d 659, 661 (1982), which will be given its commonly accepted and plain meaning, J.K. Willison, Jr. v. Consol Coal Co., 536 Pa. 49, 54, 637 A.2d 979, 982 (1994). Additionally, in determining the intent of the contracting parties, all provisions in the agreement will be construed together and each will be given effect. Murphy v. Duquesne Univ., 565 Pa. 571, 591, 777 A.2d 418, 429 (2001). Thus, we will not interpret one provision of a contract in a manner which results in another portion being annulled. Capek, at 274, 767 A.2d at 1050. Our Court has previously concluded that a party to a franchise agreement has an obligation to conduct itself with good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. See Atlantic Richfield v. Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 378, 390 A.2d 736, 742 (Pa.1978) (<HOLDING>); cf. 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 1201(20) (defining good

    ### Response:
    holding franchisor could not arbitrarily terminate franchise agreement as it would be a disregard of franchisees interests under the agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    drawn, and all facts are viewed, in the government’s favor. United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1236 (11th Cir.2001). “At least where some corroborative evidence of guilt exists for the charged offense ... and the defendant takes the stand in his own defense, the defendant’s testimony, denying guilt, may establish, by itself, elements of the offense.” United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314-15 (11th Cir.1995). To convict Moghaddam under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Moghaddam (1) knowingly and voluntarily entered into an agreement with another person to export paddlefísh without the required permits and (2) the agreement was manifested by an overt act. 18 U.S.C. § 371; see United States v. Lafaurie, 833 F.2d 1468, 1470 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). In order to convict Moghaddam under 16 U.S.C.

    ### Response:
    holding that a conspiracy is an agreement to commit an illegal act into which the defendant knowingly and voluntary enters and which is manifested by an overt act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    offers testimony “material to the crucial issue of intent” must be admitted. (See PL’s Opp’n at 42) (citing Wright v. United States Postal Serv., 183 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed.Cir.1999); Jones v. Dep’t of Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 398, 405-07 (1995); Burge v. Dep’t of Air Force, 82 M.S.P.R. 75, 92 (1999).) However, these cases are fact specific; they certainly do not stand for the proposition that all witnesses who may add some additional detail need be allowed to testify. On the contrary, just as district courts enjoy broad discretion to exclude evidence, the probative value of which is substantially outweighed by “considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence,” Fed.R.Evid. 403; see also United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1410 (D.C.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>), the MSPB also enjoys substantial discretion

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to Batoon — is without merit. Nor does Alcantera’s sentence violate Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). A. Minor Role Reduction In United States v. Haut, 107 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir.1997), we held that we must sustain the District Court’s factual findings as to a § 3B1.2 minimal or minor role adjustment unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See id. (“We review under a clearly erroneous standard the district court’s factual determinations, such as whether a defendant receives a reduced or increased offense level based on his role in the offense.”); United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1207 (3d Cir.1994); United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 220-21 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>)). A decision is clearly erroneous if the

    ### Response:
    holding that role in the offense is a factual determination albeit complex a district courts decision not to apply an adjustment based on such a determination is reversed only for clear error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    successive petition restrictions). Alternatively, the statute of limitations may be a non-issue because the administrative decision to confine a prisoner to IAS is usually not a discrete one-time act, but a continuing administrative process subject to regular and periodic review. In this case, the Court can pretermit the issue because the petitioner is not entitled to habeas review, regardless of the applicability of the statute of limitations. 3 . For instance, as discussed at the close of this order, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has concluded that a pet r.1996) (post-AEDPA decision holding its presumption-of-correctness principles apply to prison administrative body imposing disciplinary penalties); Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93, 96 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Hundley v. McBride, 908 F.Supp. 601, 602

    ### Response:
    holding  1983 suit seeking restoration of sentence credits properly construed as  2254 petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    four claims against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities, including one constitutional claim and three statutory claims under Title II of the ADA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Insofar as Plaintiff requests prospective injunctive relief, all of these claims fit squarely within the Ex parte Young exception and are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Ex parte Young doctrine ensures the protection of individuals’ federal rights by allowing suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacity. It is beyond dispute that Ex parte Young actions may be maintained for violations of Title II of the ADA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Dube v. State Univ. of New York, 900 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that title ii ada suits and rehabilitation act suits for prospective injunctive relief may be brought under ex parte young against state officers in their official capacities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of pollutants. Id. at § 1362(16). “Discharge” of a pollutant or pollutants means “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from a point source.” Id. at § 1362(12). The USFS asserts that the plain meaning of “discharge” is limited to a point source or a nonpoint source with a conveyance. Defendant-intervenors claim that “discharge” is limited to point sources only, interpreting the phrase “without, qualification” in the discharge definition as allowing some types of nonpoint source activity to fall within the statutory definition of point source. These arguments contradict the plain meaning of the term “discharge.” The term “including” in the discharge definition permits additional, unstated meanings. National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 172 (D.C.Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Exxon Corp. v. Lujan, 730 F.Supp. 1535, 1545

    ### Response:
    holding that the term includes in the cwa allows for additional unstated meanings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of one or more of the entities in which the Debtor held an ownership interest. In such circumstances, this Court expected the Debtor to seek approval from bankruptcy courts to retain Mr. Kaplan to perform accounting services on behalf of his estate. The fact that Mr. Kaplan was performing such services for free or on behalf of one or all of the entities that the Debtor controls did not suspend this requirement. The Debtor’s failure to submit an application for retention of Mr. Kaplan prevented this Court from testing whether his services would benefit the interests of the estate and whether Mr. Kaplan may suffer from a conflict of interest that would otherwise prevent his employment by the Debtor’s estate. See, e.g., In re Liebfried Aviation, Inc., 445 B.R. 30, 34 (Bankr.D.Mass.2011) (<HOLDING>). VI. The Debtor’s Animus for his Creditors’

    ### Response:
    recognizing that debtors failure to submit application for employ ment prevented the court from evaluating accountants purported disinterestedness and lack of a material adverse interest as regards the debtor and the bankruptcy estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are echoed by defendants and amici in their briefs on these cross-motions. First, these courts conclude that, viewed subjectively and objectively, notification statutes are “remedial” laws that are not motivated by “punitive, penal purposes.” W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F.Supp. at 1214; see also, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 404 (“legislative intent [behind Megan’s Law] ... is clearly and totally remedial”). These courts rely heavily on their conclusion that these laws serve “significant remedial goals,” including as the “primary focus ... the protection of children and others from previously-convicted sex offenders, near them in the community, who have been found to have a moderate or high risk of re-offense.” W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F.Supp. at 1214; accord Stearns v. Gregoire, slip op. at 13 (<HOLDING>). Second, these courts also conclude that the

    ### Response:
    holding on motion for preliminary injunction that balance of hardships tipped in favor of public
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    upon the relationship, if any, between the two debts. Additionally, the July 2000 notice of this debt was sent before the Secretary had taken any action with regard to Mrs. Edwards’ May 2000 submissions. Nevertheless, the Secretary treated the $2,366 and $12,347 overpay-ments as separate matters throughout the proceedings. In this case, whether Mrs. Edwards’ May 2000 submissions could be considered a waiver request of both debts becomes relevant if, and only if, the May 2000 submissions, individually or collectively, are deemed to be a request for waiver. Thus, this issue is interrelated with the matter being remanded. Under these circumstances, the matter will be remanded for consideration by the Board in the first instance. See Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1377-78 (Fed.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). III. REMAND On remand, Mrs. Edwards may

    ### Response:
    holding that the court has discretion to hear or to remand legal arguments raised for the first time on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 8C-1, Rule 403. In State v. Scott, 331 N.C. 39, 413 S.E.2d 787 (1992), the Supreme Court stated in requiring the exclusion of evidence otherwise admissible pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403, that: [W]here the probative value of such evidence depends upon defendant’s having in fact committed the prior alleged offense, his acquittal of the offense in an earlier trial so divests the evidence of probative value that, as a matter of law, it cannot outweigh the tendency of such evidence unfairly to prejudice the defendant. Such evidence is thus barred by N.C. R dence tending to show that Defendant possessed various prescription drugs which he was acquitted of possessing. State v. Allen, 144 N.C. App. 386, 388, 548 S.E.2d 554, 555 (2001) (<HOLDING>). After careful review of the evidence and the

    ### Response:
    holding that the dismissal of criminal charges for evidentiary insufficiency is an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    428, 429 n. 1, 343 S.E.2d 45, 46 n. 1 (Ct.App.1986). 2. Separation Agreements Prior to 1983, the law in South Carolina was unclear as to what specific words were necessary to render a separation agreement enforceable in the family court. In Kelly v. Edwards, 276 S.C. 368, 278 S.E.2d 773 (1981), the supreme court held that an agreement incorporated but not merged in a divorce decree was enforceable only as a contract and that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce it. Thereafter, in Brooks v. Brooks, 277 S.C. 322, 326, 286 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1982), the supreme court concluded the family court properly held a party in contempt for violating a separation agreement that was not merged in the final decree. See also Bryant v. Varat, 278 S.C. 77, 292 S.E.2d 298 (1982) (<HOLDING>). In 1983, however, the South Carolina Supreme

    ### Response:
    holding that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hold a party in contempt where the separation agreement was incorporated but not merged into a divorce decree
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    gave no consideration to lesser restraints and made no adequate findings that forcing Messrs. Pursley and Wardell to wear a stun belt ... was necessary.”). We uphold the district court’s stun-belt order. While a defendant enjoys the “right to appear before the jury unfettered from physical restraints,” this right is not unqualified. United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir.1986). Freedom from restraint helps to preserve, among other constitutional guarantees, “the due process right to a fair and impartial trial.” United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 430-31 (10th Cir.1988). A district court, however, retains the discretion to take measures to maintain order and security within its courtroom. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 632, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Hack, 782 F.2d at 867 (acknowledging the

    ### Response:
    recognizing the need to give trial courts latitude in making individualized security determinations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    direct evidence of discrimination or relied solely on circumstantial evidence. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270-78, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the direct evidence model); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (describing the circumstantial evidence model). Like the parties, we apply the distinction drawn by these cases. As the Supreme Court has recently reemphasized, however, the McDonnell Douglas framework is a “flexible evidentiary, standard” whose requirements “vary depending on the context”; it is a method for proving cases rather than the definition of a cause of action. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 997, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (<HOLDING>). A. Direct Evidence It is generally to an

    ### Response:
    holding that a title vii plaintiff need not plead the elements of a mcdonnell douglas prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Here, the Parish, the Levee District, and the Corps of Engineers undoubtedly formed an agreement to indemnify. See, e.g., Pizani, 12-1084, pp. 9-10, 125 So.3d at 553. The Corps of Engineers agreed to “identify and pay” affected landowners. The proper parties to this suit, however, remain the Parish and the Levee District. | ga“An indemnitor is not liable under an indemnity agreement until the indemnitee actually makes payment or sustains loss.” Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 04-1459, p. 17 (La.4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 51 (internal quotations omitted). “An action for indemnity is a separate substantive cause of action, arising at a different time, independent of the underlying” action. Reggio, 07-1433, p. 5, 15 So.3d at 955, but see Pizani, 12-1084, p. 13, 125 So.3d at 555 (<HOLDING>). Here, Borgnemouth’s suit against the Parish

    ### Response:
    holding that thirdparty indemnity claims are not premature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    principles of federalism and the Commerce Clause. Specifically, they contend that Act No. 26 may affect essential terms of insurance agreements entered in other states. To the extent that Act No. 26 is not limited to South Carolina, they claim the General Assembly improperly imposed its “public policy objections to the application of traditional occurrence definitions to construction cases involving faulty workmanship, on sister states.” We find several procedural barriers prevent the Amici from presenting this argument. The Amici lack standing to assert their challenge, and their claim is not ripe for review as they posit a hypothetical scenario, which Petitioner does not raise and which may not come to fruition. See James v. Anne's Inc., 390 S.C. 188, 193, 701 S.E.2d 730, 732 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Justice BEATTY (concurring in part and

    ### Response:
    recognizing that justiciability encompasses several doctrines including ripeness mootness and standing and precluding amici from raising an issue not raised by the named party under rule 213 scacr
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or of nude women in sexually provocative poses would not be insulated from Title VII claims simply because the photos were observable by all office employees, White and Black, male and female.” 192 F.3d at 320 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority in Brennan found it unnecessary to reach this common-exposure issue to resolve that particular case, see id. at 319, but we now adopt Judge Newman’s reasoning and that of the Fourth Circuit in rejecting Bell Atlantic’s argument that the common exposure of male and female workers to sexually offensive material necessarily precludes a woman from relying on such evidence to establish a hostile work environment based on sex. See also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1486, 1522-23 (M.D.Fla.1991) (<HOLDING>). In sum, although all Bell Atlantic employees

    ### Response:
    holding that sexually provocative pictures of nude and partially nude women which were put up before any female employees joined the workplace had a disproportionately demeaning impact on female employees and as such conveyed the message that women do not belong
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prong of the Central Hudson test. Rather, their dispute centers around the remaining three prongs. 2. Governmental Interest The defendants argue that the governmental interest behind § 189.635 is to protect accident victims’ privacy and safety by keeping the personal information contained in such reports out of the hands of the general public. We are persuaded that such an interest is substantial, as evidenced by the fact that a number of other courts that have considered similar statutes have reached the same conclusion. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995); Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir.1994); Speer v. Miller, 864 F.Supp. 1294 (N.D.Ga.1994); cf. Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United Reporting Publishing Corp. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that disclosure of information contained in undercover officers personnel files violated the officers privacy interest in preserving their lives and personal security
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    committee carries its burden, “[t]he plaintiff must . . . provide evidence of an objective, reasonable belief that his statements were true. See Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 49-52, 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073, 124 S. Ct. 2422, 158 L. Ed. 2d 983 (2004).” The plaintiff has no burden to carry until the committee presents clear and convincing evidence of the violation. Here, after the plaintiff provides evidence that he had an objective, reasonable belief that his statements were true, the burden shifts back to the committee to rebut that evidence and, ultimately, to carry its burden of persuasion and to convince the finder of fact of the truth of the claimed violation. See, e.g., Somers v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 245 Conn. 277, 296-98, 715 A.2d 712 (1998) (<HOLDING>). At this point, I depart from the majority’s

    ### Response:
    holding that committee failed to carry its ultimate burden
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    required to review the substance of the constitutional challenge to the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance which Fisher now pursues and, thus, the review was not independent of federal law. We disagree. In Mu’min v. Pruett, 125 F.3d 192 (4th Cir.1997), we rejected a similar claim that the Virginia Supreme Court implicitly considered and rejected a habeas applicant’s constitutional claims during its mandatory review of the applicant’s death sentence because the mandatory review procedures only required the Virginia Supreme Court to determine “whether the imposition of the death penalty was influenced by improper considerations,” and not to “examine the record for constitutional errors not specified on appeal.” Id. at 197; see Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1362-63 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336,

    ### Response:
    holding that south carolinas prior practice of in favorem vitae review did not preserve otherwise defaulted claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of sale statute, however, specifically authorizes “the mortgagee or ... his or their agent or attorney [to] sell the mortgaged premises ... by a public sale.” 33 M.R.S. § 501-A. , . [¶34] Even accepting Oceanic’s argument that Cummings violáted the plain language of the auctioneering licensing statute by conducting the auction, there is no support for the remedy Oceanic seeks— the licensing statutes próvidé for civil and criminal penalties for a violation of the statute, but do not provide for a private cause of action to invalidate a sale conducted by an unlicensed auctioneer. 10 M.R.S. § 8003 — C(3)-(5) (2015). As the trial' court noted, courts in other jurisdictidiis have reached the samé conclusion. ’ See Assocs. Discount Carp. v. Lunsford, 204 Va. 1, 128 S.E.2d 924, 924-25 (1963) (<HOLDING>); Gorman v. Berg, 141 A. 179, 179-80 (R.I.1928)

    ### Response:
    holding that an auction sale by a creditors employee who was unlicensed as an auctioneer did not bar a deficiency judgment and noting that where a person sells at action without a license the question is one between the state and the auctioneer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the taxing authority to perform its public functions could be brought to a standstill by mass appeals. The potential harm of such a rule is intolerable to government.'' Id. at 109-10, 351 A.2d 156. 11 . When the taxpayer paid under threat of immediate harm or duress to person or property, the taxpayer usually could recover the taxes in an action at law, since such a payment was considered involuntary. See City of Baltimore v. Lefferman, 4 Gill 425 (1846) (""We consider, therefore, the doctrine as established, that a payment is not to be regarded as compulsory, unless made to emancipate the person or property, from an actual and existing duress, imposed upon it by the party, to whom the money is paid”); see also Martin G. Imbach Inc. v. Deegan, 208 Md. 115, 117 A.2d 864 (1955) (<HOLDING>). 12 . Code 1939 Art. 81, § 162 leads us to

    ### Response:
    holding that appellants payment of poundage fees was not voluntary when appellant paid the fee to prevent a sheriff from attaching and taking away equipment belonging to appellants business in satisfaction of a prior judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    intend the Bankruptcy Code to extend to Puerto Rico”); cf. Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221-22, 118 S.Ct. 1212 (explaining that the Code is not to be construed ""to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure”); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1939, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (describing the Code’s expansion of power given to courts adjudicating bankruptcy cases). Even so, this omission and others in the Code's early years led to at least some ambiguity about the Code's applicability to Puerto Rico. See Lubben, 88 Am. Bankr.L.J. at 572-73 & n. 125 (explaining this was because both the definition of ""State” and that of ""United States” were absent in the original 1978 Code); see also In re Segarra, 14 B.R. at 872-73 (<HOLDING>). In addition to the general ambiguity about

    ### Response:
    holding that the code applied to puerto rico under 48 usc  734
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    September 12, 1986 Notice of appeal filed October 2, 1986 Case refiled January 27, 1987 Case dismissed February 19, 1987 Case refiled 2nd time Appellant argues that the state cannot use the savings clause again for their second refiling, February 19, 1987. Nothing in the statute, however, forbids it so long as it is accomplished within the six-month time frame triggered by the initial dismissal without prejudice. And so it was here. The state apparently elected to forego the appeal inasmuch as the time extension to refile was running and not tolled by the appeal, and there was danger that the A.R.S. § 13-107(F) time limits would run before adjudication of the appeal. See State v. Million, 120 Ariz. 10, 583 P.2d 897 (1978). See also Litak v. Scott, 138 Ariz. 599, 676 P.2d 631 (1984), (<HOLDING>). The A.R.S. § 13-107(F) six-month extension to

    ### Response:
    holding that another complaint may be filed after conclusion of appeal if refiling is still allowable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at trial by the State was far more than Reynolds accepts. In addition to the evidence Reynolds has noted, the State also introduced expert testimony from a medical examiner demonstrating that the injury to Reynolds’ hand was inconsistent with his explanation of the injury; testimony from a neighbor of the victims who saw Danny Privett sitting on Reynolds’ car, which was parked at the victims’ residence the night the crimes were committed; microscopic and DNA analysis of a pubic hair found at the crime scene matched a hair sample taken from Reynolds; Reynolds’ admission during an interview with law officers that he had a heated argument with Danny Privett; eyewitness testimony corroborating the circumstances surrounding the argument between Reynolds and Danny Privett; evidence that ) (<HOLDING>). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that

    ### Response:
    holding that case involving evidence such as eyewitness testimony placing the defendant at the scene acknowledgment by the defendant of a dispute with the victim and theft of the victims purse and dna evidence suggesting that the defendant had engaged in sexual relations with the victim could not be deemed entirely circumstantial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dec. 21, 2007) (McCurn, S.J.); see also Tavarez v. Reno, 54 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir.1995). These claims are likewise precluded by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), where the Court held that: [I]n order to recover from damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Id.; see also Tavarez, 54 F.3d at 110 (<HOLDING>). In the case at bar, Feldman was arrested,

    ### Response:
    holding that heck applies to bivens claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discussed, Plaintiffs theory of fraud does not hold up under Michigan law. More detailed descriptions of the time and place the alleged statements were made would not cure its defects. C. Promissory Estoppel Plaintiffs third claim invokes the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Under Michigan law, courts will enforce a clear and definite promise under this doctrine if the promisee or a third party reasonably relied on the promise and injustice can only be avoided by its enforcement. State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 442 Mich. 76, 500 N.W.2d 104, 107 (1993) (“Curry”) (citing the Restatement Second of Contracts, § 90.) As the Michigan Supreme Court explained, “the sine qua non of the theory of promissory estoppel is that the promise be clear and definite.” Id. at 108; see.id. at 109-10 (<HOLDING>). The court additionally emphasized that “the

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of the material terms of a promised loan was required to meet the clear and definite standard for promissory estoppel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of contra proferentem to resolve the ambiguities in the insurance contract. E.g., Lee v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 10 F.3d 1547, 1551 (11th Cir.1994). “Application of this rule requires us to construe ambiguities against the drafter.... ” Id. In doing so, we must conclude that Billings’s organically based OCD does not fall within the policy’s mental illness limitation. See Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir.1995) (explaining that “[b]ecause of the rule that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the insured, if either a cause or a symptom of the disease were physical and caused the disability in whole or in part, then” the disease does not fall within the mental illness limitation); Phillips, 978 F.2d at 310-11, 314 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that upon applying the doctrine of contra proferentem the insureds organically based illness does not fall within the mental illness limitation as a matter of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    237 F.Supp.2d 795, 801 (E.D.Mich.2003) (collecting cases). Thus, a consent to search that is obtained in violation of Miranda, that is, when it results from conversations initiated by the police after a suspect invokes his right to counsel or right to silence, is not necessarily violative of the Constitution. See ibid, (noting that “a consent to search obtained following a Miranda violation is not automatically tainted”). The Sixth Circuit has held that “where police simply fail to administer Miranda warnings, the admissibility of non-testimonial physical evidence derived from the uncounseled statements should turn of a statement mirror those used to assess the voluntariness of a consent to search. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Guerra, 237 F.Supp.2d at 803. In this case,

    ### Response:
    holding that whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion express or implied is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issue “went to gambling, alcohol, and drugs. I lost all the money earned and had no money to pay the taxes. I hoped [I] could win money to pay the taxes, but I lost all the money.” (Def.’s Ex. 16, answer to interrogatory 6.) At trial, however, Long testified that he was not aware until 2005 that he did not pay his taxes, and that he thought Magida was filing his returns and paying his taxes for him. (Tr. at pp. 15, 28.) Finally, Long also testified at trial — inconsistently—that he thought the taxes for at least 2001 were being paid out of the proceeds of the sale of his McDonald’s franchise. (Id. at pp. 14, 29.) Long further testified at trial that he had never received prepared returns from Magida, though he later admitted that at least some of the returns Magida prepared, and 005) (<HOLDING>). Long’s failure to file his 1999, 2000, and

    ### Response:
    holding the conduct element satisfied where debtor earned income during the tax years at issue but did not make any estimated tax payments had inadequate or no withholdings and latefiled his tax returns
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    incident — reflecting conduct that is not pervasive or frequent — may be sufficiently severe to constitute sexual harassment, it must be “extremely serious” in order to “amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’ ” Id. (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275). As this court recently noted, “[t]he determination of whether alleged conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive is not an exact science, but this [cjourt’s decisions on this issue provide guidance.” Gibson v. Potter, 264 Fed.Appx. 397, 400 (5th Cir.2008). The type of non-consensual physical touching alleged by Paul was held to be actionable under Title VII only in cases where it was chronic and frequent. See McKinnis v. Crescent Guardian, Inc., 189 Fed.Appx. 307, 310 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Harvill, 433 F.3d at 435-36 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that chronic unwanted touching including touching on the breasts and thigh over a yearlong period repeated demands for hugs and kisses and other inappropriate behavior resulting in plaintiffs resignation supported a hostile work environment claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    I find this argument unavailing as well. The language of the condition precedent does not apply to claims that Carrón could or could not make at any given time. Rather, the condition applies to those “claims” that Carrón might make. Brentwood’s subjective belief concerning the likelihood of Carrón filing a lawsuit is irrelevant under the plain language of the condition precedent. As other courts have noted, this language instructs the court to first look at the insured’s subjective knowledge “and then the objective understanding of a reasonable attorney with that knowledge.” Coregis Ins. Co. v. Baratta & Fenerty, Ltd., 264 F.3d 302, 306 (3rd Cir.2001) (emphasis added); see also Wittner, Poger, Rosenblum & Spewak, P.C. v. Bar Plan Mutual Ins. Co., 969 S.W.2d 749, 754 (Mo.1998) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Brentwood also argues that the exclusion

    ### Response:
    holding that regardless of the subjective belief of the insured the record established a basis to believe that the insured had committed an act that could give rise to a claim under the policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    environment claim because Roddy had not demonstrated an instance of harassment or abusive conduct within the five-year statute of limitations applicable to Roddy’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Drake v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 553 F.2d 1185, 1188 (8th Cir.1977) (applying Missouri five-year statute of limitations to a cause of action under § 1981). According to the trial court, the last act of harassment directed at Roddy was the kicking incident in April 1991, and the statute of limitations ran back only to March 1992. Although Roddy agrees that conduct prior to March 1992 is not actionable, Roddy contends that the record as a whole shows the existence of a pattern of harassment more recently than March 1992. See Van Steenburgh v. Rival Co., 171 F.3d 1155, 1159 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). However, even assuming that Roddy suffered

    ### Response:
    holding a hostile work environment claim viable when the cumulative effects of a prolonged pattern of harassment extended into the limitations period
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    abandoned their common law fraud claim, they continue to pursue all of their other claims for compensatory damages, treble damages (a remedy akin to the punitive damage claim plaintiffs elected to forego when they abandoned their fraud claim), attorneys’ fees and costs, and a judgment enjoining defendants from continuing their allegedly unlawful combination or conspiracy. This is not a case where the class representatives are pursuing relatively insignificant claims while jeopardizing the ability of class members to pursue far more substantial, meaningful claims. Rather, here the named plaintiffs simply decided to pursue certain claims while abandoning a fraud claim that probably was not certifiable. See, e.g., Gunnells v. Healthplan Servcs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 434 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Sandwich Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Nat’l

    ### Response:
    holding the district court committed reversible error by certifying a class with respect to fraud claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    544(b), however, puts the trustee in the creditor’s shoes, and allows him to assert claims that only they could assert outside bankruptcy. The claims inherited from the creditors are not arbitrable for the reasons explained in Allegaert Id. at 206-07 (citations omitted). Allegaert, Hays and Hagerstown all involved fraudulent transfer claims. Specifically addressing the arbitrability of preferential transfer claims brought under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, the court in OHC Liquidation, 2005 WL 670310, at *4, ruled that it was “entirely appropriate” to equate preferential transfers with fraudulent transfers as core proceedings belonging to the trustee and not derivative of the debtor. See also Pardo v. Pacificare of Tex., Inc. (In re APF Co.), 264 B.R. 344, 363 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (<HOLDING>). The Hays court’s reasoning that “there is no

    ### Response:
    holding that preferential transfer claims brought under section 547 are not arbitrable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stressed that an employer can be vicariously liable for conduct of an employee that was (1) done in furtherance of the employer’s business or at least partly motivated by an intention to serve the employer; (2) of the kind that the employee was employed to perform; (8) substantially within the authorized “time and space” limits of the employment; or (4) expectable in view of the employee’s duties. Booker v. GTE.net LLC, 350 F.3d 515, 518-19 (6th Cir.2003) (applying Kentucky law). As an initial matter, I note that RWT is not necessarily relieved of vicarious liability for malicious prosecution solely because it is an intentional tort. There are numerous decisions finding employers vicariously liable for the intentional torts of their employees. See, e.g., Patterson, 172 S.W.3d at 363 (<HOLDING>); Frederick v. Collins, 378 S.W.2d 617

    ### Response:
    holding that a car dealership could be held vicariously liable for the intentional tort of its employee who shot out the tires of the plaintiffs truck during a repossession attempt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supreme court. That court should decide if the subsequent case law in this area would cause a re-evaluation of the conclusion reached in 1985. See Valerio v. Bayer, Case No. 98-99033 [2000 WL 425016] (9th Cir. April 19, 2000) (a Nevada case in which the court upheld the Nevada Supreme Court’s ability to limit the unconstitutional depravity instruction and affirm the sentence). Moreover, since this court has already upheld an aggravating factor, it is not necessary for it to reach the ultimate conclusion on this issue. The court notes, however, that all of the evidence related to torture and Cir.1989), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Angelone v. Deutscher, 500 U.S. 901, 111 S.Ct. 1678, 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991) (same); see also McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483, 1487-90 (9th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). The Nevada Supreme Court’s holding, on

    ### Response:
    holding a similar nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague under godfrey
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The West court fundamentally altered products liability law in Florida by creating a new products liability tort action — strict liability in tort — out of the prior breach of implied warranty cases which had done away with privity of contract. In so doing, West necessarily swept away such no-privity, breach of implied warranty cases in favor of the new action of strict liability in tort. Stated differently, the doctrine of strict liability in tort supplants all no-privity, breach of implied warranty cases, because it was, in effect, created out of these cases. This ground-breaking holding, however, did not result in the demise of the contract action of breach of implied warranty, as that action remains, said the West court, where privity of contract is shown. Id. at 692 (<HOLDING>). The Florida Supreme Court later affirmatively

    ### Response:
    holding that breach of implied warranty action exists solely as a contract remedy which of necessity requires a privity of contract showing as an essential element of the action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assembly is not a motor vehicle under Chapter 601. Applying the common usage of the term and the definition in Chapter 601, we conclude that physical contact with a detached axle and tandem wheels is not actual physical contact with a motor vehicle under the unidentified motor vehicle provision. Elchehimi also argues that this collision involved a legally recognized substitute for the statute’s actual physical contact requirement. In Latham v. Mountain States Mutua of contact with parts of the vehicle itself, rather than simply cargo, has concluded that such contact is also not enough to satisfy this strict requirement. See Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 04-02-00646-CV, 2003 WL 21391534, at *1, 2003 Tex.App. LEXIS 5056, at *6-8 (Tex.App.-San Antonio June 18, 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). We agree that a collision with a separated

    ### Response:
    holding that collision between loading ramp that detached from trailer and insureds vehicle was not actual physical contact with a motor vehicle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was error not to have allowed it. Judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversed, and case remanded to that court with instructions to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and remand the case for a new trial. Costs to be paid by Montgomery County. 1 . With respect to a few offenses, the Legislature has resolved the matter by statute. See Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol., 1980 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 616. 2 . The Turberville court found it proper for a defense counsel in that case to argue in his closing presentation, that one of the several defendants should be convicted of a lesser offense than that charged. Turberville, supra at 404, 303 F.2d at 411. Compare Roberts, supra, and Turberville with People v. Flanders, 183 Colo. 268, 516 P.2d 418 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Rodowsky, J., concurring in part and

    ### Response:
    holding but offering no authority for the position that the defense counsel could neither argue nor receive an instruction distinguishing the crime charged from a lesserunincluded offense not charged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clause of the United States and Texas Constitutions. The State counters that Sony failed to preserve this issue for appeal because Sony did not assert in the trial court that the statute was facially void or void as applied to him. When challenging the constitutionality of a statute for vagueness, there are two types of challenges: (1) an “as applied” challenge, involving whether a statute is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant’s particular conduct, and (2) a “facial” challenge, involving whether a statute is unconstitutional on its face. Fluellen v. State, 104 S.W.3d 152, 167 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.). Texas law is clear that an “as applied” challenge cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (<HOLDING>); Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 846, 861

    ### Response:
    holding appellant waived his challenge to statute as vague as applied because he did not specifically object at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a reasonable worker from whistleblowing. And while Defendants muster a couple of easily distinguishable cases to support their argument to the contrary, none of those mandates a holding that reassignments that increase commute time and costs and decrease pay are insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a retaliation claim. We hold that Smith has successfully pled retaliation under Section 3730(h). The district court thus erred when it granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss that claim. V. In sum, we hold that the district court erred when it dismissed Counts I, II, and IV of Smith’s complaint with prejudice. In light of this holding, the district court’s award of costs to Defendants is also improper. Cf. Kollsman, a Div. of Sequa Corp. v. Cohen, 996 F.2d 702, 706 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Fed.R.Civ.P. 54 (“Unless a fed eral statute,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant was a prevailing party eligible to receive costs where there had been a dismissal with prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motion.”). 4 . United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 331 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted) 5 . United States v. Bowen, 818 F.3d 179, 186 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted). 6 . Id. (quotation marks omitted). 7 . Delgado, 672 F.3d at 332; see also United States v. Grant, 683 F.3d 639, 642 (5th Cir. 2012) (""The jury retains the sole authority to weigh any conflicting evidence and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.”) (quotation marks omitted). 8 . Bowen, 818 F.3d at 188. 9 . United States v. Parada-Talamantes, 32 F.3d 168, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. McCall, 553 F.3d 821, 825-27 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that the prosecution had introduce Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (table) (<HOLDING>). Because Covarrubia was issued before January

    ### Response:
    holding that admission of a summary chart was harmless because it was clear that the summary did not mislead the jury and the evidence introduced at trial was more than sufficient to prove the elements as to each defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and received interline shipments to and from Texas and sent sales people to Texas to develop business, negotiate contracts and service national accounts: Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 1994)(""Even if [the defendant's] contacts with Texas via his short-lived malpractice insurance arrangement through a Texas law firm and his multi-year pro bono association with the historical society were arguably continuous, we hold that they were not substantial enough to warrant the imposition of general personal jurisdiction over him.”); Access Telecom, 197 F.3d at 717 (in order to confer general jurisdiction it is not sufficient that a corporation do business in Texas; it must have a business presence in Texas); Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 218 (5th Cir. 2000)(<HOLDING>). Johnston, 523 F.3d at 610-12 (concluding that

    ### Response:
    holding that general jurisdiction did not exist where the defendant occasionally sold products to entities in texas that used the defendants products for projects in texas and the defendants employees made field visits to texas between december 1992 and december 1993
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    859 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Because appellant in the instant case entered a non-bargained for, “straight up” plea, without expressly waiving his right to a later appeal premised on a double jeopardy issue, his plea did not amount to a waiver. See Novaton, 634 So.2d at 609; see also Williamson, 859 So.2d at 554-55. Concerning the issue of double jeopardy, settled precedent establishes that an appellant may not be charged with two separate offenses premised on his possession of the same contraband found in differing packages in the same location when the contraband is seized as part of the same search. § 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (2005); Jackson v. State, 418 So.2d 456, 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Gibbs v. State, 676 So.2d 1001, 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>); Lundy v. State, 596 So.2d 1167, 1168 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants conviction for two possession of marijuana counts could not be supported by his possession of two marijuana cigarettes dropped from his hand and again for his possession of several packets of marijuana found in a nearby jacket during the same search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Guidelines Manual § 4B 1.2(a) (2004). Other sections have yet another definition. See, e.g., Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2 Cmt., Application Note l(B)(iii) (2004). 7 .The difference is that, in the definition of ""crinie of violence,” the use of force can be against another’s property; on the other hand, in the ACCA, property is not mentioned. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) with id. § 924(e)(l)(B)(i). 8 . In United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir.1995), the Seventh Circuit provided an additional reason for this conclusion. Examining the term ""crime of violence"" in § 4B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (which is almost identical to the ACCA), the court found that the first prong requires a specific intent. Id. at 372-374. It further reasoned that 5 (4th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>). But see Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.4

    ### Response:
    holding that our reasoning regarding the meaning of violent felony is relevant to determining the meaning of crime of violence  because the definitions are almost identical
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    she was required to stand “at some points” but “not all day” while substitute teaching. (Id. at 15). In sum, the evidence of record demonstrates that Plaintiff may have a diminished tolerance for a normal daily activity, but the record does not demonstrate that Plaintiffs condition substantially limits her major life activity of standing. See Chanda, 234 F.3d at 1222. The Court now turns to the question of whether Plaintiffs congenital heart disease substantially limits her major life activity of lifting. In her first deposition, Plaintiff testified that she has been restricted from lifting items weighing more than thirty pounds. (First Reis Depo. at 17). Plaintiff is able to engage in basic personal activities. She can bathe herself, prepare her own , 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-Am., Inc., 85

    ### Response:
    holding as a matter of law that a permanent twentyfive pound lifting restriction does not constitute a significant restriction on ones ability to lift work or perform any other major life activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009);Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594-99, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006). Here, that task is simple. The deterrence benefit of suppressing the evidence will “ensure that an occupant’s right to privacy [in his home] is protected, and that his ... dignity [will be] preserved.” See United States v. Thompson, 667 F.Supp.2d 758, 768 (S.D. Ohio 2009). These twin concerns will grow more important, not less, as immigration plays an increasingly central and vitriolic role in our public discourse. The Court, therefore, finds great deterrence benefit in ensuring that law-enforcement officers know the bounds of their authority under the Fourth Amendment and federal immigration law. See United States v. Toledo, 615 F.Supp.2d 453, 464 n.5 (S.D.W. Va. 2009) (<HOLDING>). Suppressing the tainted evidence in this case

    ### Response:
    holding that deterrence benefits are clear in criminal cases involving immigration law given congressionally mandated restrictions on lawenforcement power
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    injury, were the result of the December fall, an occurrence which is not a subject of the claims before us. As to the hip, Dr. Paff attributed one-third of her disability to the preexisting condition, one-third to the June, 1992 fall, and one-third to the December fall. Dr. Hufft testified that Claimant had no shoulder or sacroiliac joint injuries, and that her knee problem was caused by the problem in her hip. He concluded that the condition of Claimant’s hip was not caused by the falls, and that she sustained no permanent partial disability as a result of them. Claimant argues that the aggravation of a preexisting condition may result in a compen-sable condition. We do not dispute the validity of this general premise. See Miller v. Wefelmeyer, 890 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Mo.App. E.D.1994) (<HOLDING>). While Claimant presented the testimony of Dr.

    ### Response:
    holding that a preexisting but nondisabling condition does not bar recovery of compensation if a jobrelated injury causes the condition to escalate to the level of disability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or commentary which restricts application of § 3C1.1 only to situations in which the defendant directly threatens a witness or communicates the threat to a third party with the likelihood that it will in turn be communicated to the witness.”); United States v. Bradford, 277 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (11th Cir.2002) (expressly rejecting the holding in Brooks and concluding that communicating a threat directly to a witness is not required to support application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement); United States v. Jackson, 974 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir.1992) (“Where a defendant’s statements can be reasonably construed as a threat, even if they are not made directly to the threatened person, the defendant has obstructed justice.”); United States v. Capps, 952 F.2d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Shoulberg, 895 F.2d 882,

    ### Response:
    holding that because  3c11 applies to attempts to obstruct justice it is not essential that the threat be communicated to the target
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by an attorney in the family court, as were these parties) who is dissatisfied with the outcome of a child custody battle knows that there is very little likelihood that a family court will change its decision when reminded of its obligation to make specific findings, and few will pursue that route if not required to do so before seeking appellate review. Instead, this opinion permits a litigant who loses in the trial court to simply appeal and try to secure a more favorable outcome before a different judge when the child custody determination is inevitably vacated and the case remanded. At a time when the Arizona Supreme Court has recently limited the use of this type of litigation tactic in criminal cases, see State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005) (<HOLDING>), we should not expand its use in civil cases.

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant who fails to object to trial error forfeits his right to appellate review unless he can establish fundamental error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    174 P.3d 706 (2008), the Washington Court of Appeals considered whether the forensic search of a computer which extended beyond ten days was unconstitutional. The officers obtained a search warrant on March 5 to search Grenning’s residence for his computer. On March 6 the officers entered Gren-ning’s residence and seized his computer. The officers conducted continuing forensic examinations of the computer for more than ten days after the date the search warrant had been issued. The court noted that, because computer searches usually occur at different locations than where the computer is seized and involve more preparation and expertise than an ordinary search, delays in the forensic examination of computers are expected and reasonable. Id., at 713-14. The court he 481 (D.P.R.2002) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Kaupp, 453 Mass. 102, 899

    ### Response:
    holding the search of defendants home took place within the time designated in the warrant and later examination of computer disks seized did not make the search unconstitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    risk of equine activities, as defined in § 6 — 5—337(b)(6). Estes does not dispute that the horse became startled, and he did not argue before the trial court that Croxton’s failure to assess A.G.E.’s riding ability was a cause of the accident. Estes’s contention is that the defendants are not entitled to immunity under the Equine Act because the defendants “made no attempt to assess what type of rider the minor child was, let alone whether she should have even been on the horse in the first place. Without the defendants fulfilling their obligations, i.e., inquiring to a rider’s ability and handling the horse in accordance with such abilities, the defendants are not entitled to the protection of the Act. See Willeck ex tel. Willeck v. Mrotek, Inc., 616 N.W.2d 526 (Wis.App.2000) (<HOLDING>).” In support of this argument, Estes cites

    ### Response:
    holding equine activities liability act immunity inapplicable because the sponsor did not find out riders actual ability before matching horse with rider
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the shooting which resulted in Mendez’s death. {32} Defendant is liable for the crime of first-degree depraved-mind murder whether or not he fired the fatal shot. It appears that in this case the jury rejected Defendant’s version of the incident, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury. We hold that sufficient evidence exists, to affirm Defendant’s conviction of first-degree depraved-mind murder on either a principal or accessory liability theory. V. {33} Defendant was charged and convicted of conspiracy to commit a first-degree depraved-mind murder. The State concedes that this conviction must be vacated because this Court has explicitly held that this is not a cognizable crime in New Mexico. We agree. See Baca, 1997-NMSC-059, ¶ 51, 124 N.M. 333, 950 P.2d 776 (<HOLDING>); cf. State v. Varela, 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 42, 128

    ### Response:
    holding that a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree depravedmind murder could not stand under current case law because conspiracy requires both intent to agree and intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy and depravedmind murder is an unintentional killing resulting from highly reckless behavior
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has “expressly retained” submerged lands. Reinforcing this reading of the Act is the fact that the Act’s terms reach lands governed by the equal footing doctrine as well as lands beneath the territorial sea. Under the terms of the statute, equal footing lands, like those beneath the territorial sea, pass to a State unless the United States “expressly retained” them. In passing the Act, Congress would have legislated against the backdrop of our early equal footing cases. See Montana, 450 U. S., at 552, n. 2. There is no indication that, in formulating the “expressly retained” standard, Congress intended to upset settled doctrine and to impose on the Federal Government a more or less demanding standard than the one reflected in those cases, see, e. g., Holt State Bank, supra, at 55 (<HOLDING>), and carried forward in Montana and Utah Div.

    ### Response:
    holding that intent to defeat state title to submerged lands must be definitely declared or otherwise made very plain
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Greaves, 121 B.R. at 235 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). Miller & Custom fail to note, however, that the 4 (9th Cir. BAP 1994), aff'd, 56 F.3d 70 (9th Cir.1995). “When it is found that there has been defective service of process, the judgment is void: ‘A person is not bound by a judgment in litigation to which rica, AFL-CIO, 491 F.2d 245, 249 (4th Cir.1974) (“It is axiomatic that a federal court cannot acquire in personam jurisdiction over a defendant who does not voluntarily appear unless he is served with process in a manner authorized by federal statute or rule.”); Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. Donnelly, 402 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>). The only exception to this principle arises

    ### Response:
    holding that absent valid service of process proceedings are void from the outset
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    part of the legislative process; and (2) whether the actions were legislative “in substance” and “bore newing their motion with respect to the applicability of the doctrine of legislative immunity after sufficient discovery and development of the record. II. Contracts Clause Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ federal claims for impairment of contract. Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from passing any law “impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” While the language of the Contracts Clause is absolute on its face, “[i]t does not trump the police power of a state to protect the general welfare of its citizens, a power which is ‘paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.’ ” Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 367 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that courts must accommodate the contracts clause with the inherent police power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of its people
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judg ment.” Parker v. Conway, 581 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir.2009). In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because he has failed to prove actual, compensable injury, “the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566. Section 1997e(d)(2) of the PLRA has been consistently interpreted by our Court and others to cap attorney’s fee awards in prisoner litigation to 150 percent of the judgment, which, in this case, would be $1.50. While we have not previously faced a challenge to this fee cap in the context of a nominal damages case, we have elsewhere considered whether it violates equal protection and, in that context, have confirmed that § 1997e(d)(2) imposes such a cap. See Parker, 581 F.3d at 204 (<HOLDING>). See also Collins v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of

    ### Response:
    holding that the cap does not violate equal protection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ciba. As a result, its employees’ positions were essentially unaltered because they performed the same work under the same conditions for almost all of the same supervisors. Therefore, there was substantial continuity between the Brown & Root and Brown-Eagle operations. Second, but for its discriminatory hiring practices, as found by the NLRB based on substantial evidence, Brown-Eagle applicants would have constituted a majority of the Brown & Root workforce in this department, which would have satisfied the second prong of the successorship doctrine. Because it cannot benefit from its unlawful practices, we must uphold the NLRB’s finding that Brown & Root was a successor employer and had a duty to bargain with the Union. In re Galloway, 321 NLRB 1422, 1425, 1996 WL 514510 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In addition, because of its discriminatory

    ### Response:
    holding that a section 8a3 violation is sufficient to find that the new employer would have employed a sufficient number of predecessor employees to be a successor employer had it acted lawfully
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (1) The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. In Ohio, there is no right to recover court costs or statutory interest except for when a court enters a lawful judgment in an action validly commenced under law. See Ohio Rev.Code § 2335.19. Any debt collector’s attempt to recover court costs in the absence of a valid judgment constitutes a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. See Shula v. Lawent, 359 F.3d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 2004); Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 873-74 (8th

    ### Response:
    holding that debt collector violated fdcpa when it held debtor liable for court costs that had not yet been awarded
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    temporary, lasting only from May 4, 1995 to August 10, 1995. Defendant reasons that even if the plaintiff suffered from bipolar disorder, that disorder could not substantially interfere with a major life activity because it lasted only four months. Plaintiff has a well-documented history of bipolar disorder since 1989. (Pl.’s Stmt. Ex. 2.) Defendant’s view of plaintiffs disability ignores the teaching of Sutton, where the Supreme Court acknowledged that medication may partially, but not wholly, relieve an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, and expressly rejected the notion that partial amelioration of a disabling condition renders the individual ineligible for protection under the ADA. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488, 119 S.Ct. 2139; accord Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544 (<HOLDING>). In addition, contrary to the defendant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the periodic characteristic disabling manifestation is part of the underlying recognized disability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Used Auto Parts, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that an employee, who had chosen a suit at law for recovery under the statute, but had been unsuccessful in that suit, was not barred from seeking compensation through a traditional workers’ compensation claim under the statute. Id. at 102-03, 181 S.E.2d at 613-14. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided in Delp v. Berry that an employee who has been unsuccessful in collecting an award through a workers’ compensation claim is not barred from resorting to a civil action to recover damages from the employer. 213 Va. 786, 789, 195 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1973). However, if the employee obtains a full recovery under one of the two avenues of relief afforded in Code § 65.2-805, they are not entitled to pursue the other avenue. See id. (<HOLDING>). In its analysis, the Virginia Used Auto Parts

    ### Response:
    holding that an injured employee is only entitled to one full recovery but where an employee does not receive the full satisfaction of payment for their injury they may pursue the other avenue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    22] Francis argues that she must have access to State court remedies because the PHA was the only defendant in her Tribal Court litigation and because a jury trial, attorney fees, punitive damages, and the capacity to seek relief pursuant to the Maine Civil Rights Act (MCRA) were not available to her in Tribal Court. If such were the case, any claim involving an internal tribal matter could be shifted to State court by the simple device of pleading an entitlement to a remedy not available in Tribal Court. [¶ 23] The important policies of the law to support tribal self-government over internal tribal matters limits claims involving such matters where, as here, some remedy and a forum to assert entitlement to the remedy is available within the Tribe. See Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 707, 713 (<HOLDING>); see also Akins, 130 F.3d at 485, 486 n. 5.

    ### Response:
    holding that the nations decision to terminate fellencers employment was an internal tribal matter within the meaning of section 62061 over which state courts lacked jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that its decision foreclosed fellencers ability to pursue a claim under the maine human rights act over which like mcra claims maine superior courts have exclusive jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    harassment); Hensler v. O’Sullivan Corp., VLW 095-3-290 (W.D.Va.1995) (Crigler, Mag. J.) (same); Christine Wright, Constructive Discharge Supports Bowman Suit, Virginia Lawyers Weekly, Nov. 20, 1995, at *1. In contrast, a Virginia Circuit Court for the City of Virginia Beach recently concluded: “Even if the Plaintiff could present facts which establish a case of constructive discharge, no Virginia court has extended the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy to include such a scenario.” Jones v. Professional Hospitality Resources, Inc., 35 Va.Cir. 458, 460 (1995). In addition, at least two federal courts have reached conclusions which are consistent with Jones. See Hairston v. Multi-Channel TV Cable Co., No. 95-2363, 1996 WL 119916, at *3 (4th Cir. March 19, 1996) (<HOLDING>). The Court concludes as a matter of law that a

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court correctly dismissed a constructive discharge claim under virginia law because that cause of action had not been recognized by virginias courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. Tex.R. Civ. P. 39(a); g that it was error for the trial court not to join non-party lessors who had a financial interest in the leases and pooling agreement); Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 183 (<HOLDING>); Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the energy company defendants lessors the owners of royalty interests in the property at issue and the owners of the mineral estate in unleased part of the 9200 acres should be joined as parties if feasible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reading [of the Act]_This remedial statute reaches beyond “claims” which might be legally enforced, to all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money. Id. at 232-33, 88 S.Ct. 959 (quotations and footnote omitted). Here, the Relator has alleged in Counts II, IV, and VI that Parke-Davis has caused the submission of numerous off-label prescription for Neurontin to the Medicaid program through both its fraudulent statements about the safety and efficacy of Neurontin and its system of unlawful financial incentives and kickbacks to doctors who prescribe Neurontin. Defendant does not dispute that an off-label prescription submitted for reimbursement by Medicaid is a false claim within the meaning of the FCA. Cf Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 52 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Peterson v. Mathews,

    ### Response:
    holding that knowing submission of medicare claims for services that are not covered and payable under the medicare act is a violation of the fca
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contends that if we uphold the award of guardianship as a permanent plan, “then respondent’s compliance with OCDSS and court demands becomes irrelevant to whether or not reunification efforts would be futile.” Respondent-father counters that OCDSS’s argument is circular; we believe it is more properly characterized as backwards, probably because OCDSS has changed its position in this appeal from its position in the trial court. On appeal, OCDSS now supports the trial court’s decision to cease reunification efforts. At the hearing, OCDSS recommended that reunification efforts continue. In some instances, parties may be judicially estopped from taking inconsistent positions at different points in the same litigation. See In re Maynard, 116 N.C. App. 616, 621, 448 S.E.2d 871, 874 (1994) (<HOLDING>), disc. rev. denied, 339 N.C. 613, 454 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that dss was estopped to argue that the respondent mother was competent to surrender her children when dss had previously argued that she was so mentally ill that she could not care for her children
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Olaf Peter Juda, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s judgment dismissing his Bivens action alleging due process and Eighth Amendment violations. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir.2001). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Juda’s action because he conceded in his First Amended Complaint that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001); see also Wyatt v. Terhune, 305 F.3d 1033, 1045-46 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). To the extent Juda contends that he did

    ### Response:
    recognizing that dismissal may be proper where plaintiff concedes the failure to exhaust
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in trade, not unfair practices in general. Apart from claims of unfair competition, a plaintiff must allege some sort of transaction between the parties for liability to attach under sections two and eleven. See Cash Energy, 768 F.Supp. at 894; see also Reisman v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 965 F.Supp. 165, 175, n. 14 (D.Mass.1997) (noting that plaintiff and defendant must be engaged in business relationship for claim to lie under Chapter 93A § 11); John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F.Supp. 435, 440 (D.Mass.1991) (noting that Supreme Judicial Court “has stressed the existence of some contractual or business relationship between the parties as a precursor to liability under Chapter 93A”); Standard Register Co. v. Bolton-Emerson, Inc., 38 Mass.App.Ct. 545, 551, 649 N.E.2d 791 (1995) (<HOLDING>) This is the “common thread” of 93A cases. Cash

    ### Response:
    holding that to maintain claim for fraud under chapter 93a  11 parties need not be in privity of contract so long as they are engaged in more than a minor or insignificant business relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sanction when a plaintiff tries to deceive the district court by falsifying an IFP application. Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306-07; Mathis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 546, 547 (7th Cir.1998). Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, and courts depend on the plaintiffs honesty in assessing her ability to pay. Abusing this privilege warrants dismissal with prejudice as a sanction for lying, and we therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Greviskes v. Univs. Research Ass’n, Inc., 417 F.3d 752, 754-59 (7th Cir.2005) (upholding dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff had assumed identity of former coworker and faxed to former employer a fraudulent request for coworker’s payroll records); Dotson v. Bravo, 321 F.3d 663, 668-69 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306-07 (upholding

    ### Response:
    recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A.2d 243,1 find that Miller & Gallagher’s representation of Atlantic City in 2006 and 2007 was substantially related to the representation of taxpayers adverse to the City in 2009. The fact that the matters are not identical is outweighed by the fact that all matters deal with tax assessments in which the issue is the value of real estate. The fact that different experts will be defending Atlantic City in 2009 from those who defended Atlantic City in 2007 and 2006 is outweighed by the fact that the assessor is the same person and the Mayor and Council are performing the same functions, defending Atlantic City’s assessments, as the prior Mayors and Councils of Atlantic City. The likelihood that Miller & Gallagher was privy to relevant confidences of the Ass 2ffd 861, 870 (D.N.J.2001) (<HOLDING>); 3 Gray v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 191

    ### Response:
    holding that a law firms representation of a corporation in a suit relating to enforcement of a severance agreement with the companys former ceo was substantially related to the firms prior consultations with the ceo about the matter that led to his termination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    957 F.2d 353, 354 (7th Cir.1992) (citations omitted). To state a viable claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that he was “deprived of an interest secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and the deprivation was visited upon him by a person or persons acting under color of state law.” Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos. Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1249 (7th Cir.1994) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638-40, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923-24, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980)). However, “[i]n evaluating constitutional claims of prisoners, we must balance the need to protect prisoners’ procedural rights against the need for prison safety and security.” Pardo v. Hosier, 946 F.2d 1278, 1280 (7th Cir.1991); see also Woods v. O’Leary, 890 F.2d 883 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). In 1972, the United States Supreme Court

    ### Response:
    holding that regulations may impinge constitutional rights if the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Appellant Mickey Thomas entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Thomas conditioned his guilty plea on his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements that were the product of an allegedly unlawful arrest. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge entered a thorough report with extensive factual findings. It concluded that the police had adequate cause, first to detain Thomas and then to arrest him at the scene. See United States v. RojasMillan, 234 F.3d 464, 468-69 (9th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Valencia Amezcua, 278 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that reasonable suspicion justifies an investigatory detention
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    used “unlawful and unreasonable” force against her while acting under color of state law. See Moore v. Indehar, 514 F.3d 756, 759 (8th Cir.2008) (“The right to be free from excessive force is a clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person ... [and] [a] section 1983 action is supported when a [state actor] violates this constitutional right.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We further construe the complaint as alleging a violation of Henley’s right to be free from gender-based discrimination inasmuch as she is asserting defendants, as state actors, intentionally discriminated against and sexually harassed her because of her gender. See Ottman v. City of Independence, Mo., 341 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Moring v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 243 F.3d 452,

    ### Response:
    holding intentional gender discrimination in public employment by persons acting under color of state law violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and is actionable under section 1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Housewares and Bekem agreed to remove an underground storage tank from the Lexington site. Housewares claims that this order “established, at most, General Housewares’ liability for part of the cost of removing the underground storage tank.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. We agree. Housewares, by agreeing to a cleanup of the Lexington site, assumed partial liability. This establishes, prima facie, that Housewares actually knew that it had incurred some liability at this site prior to the inception of the first National policy. On July 19, 1993, the EPA notified Housewares that it was a potentially responsible party (PRP) with regard to the Antrim site. The receipt of this notice does not establish actual liability. See Montrose, supra, 10 Cal.4th 645, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 324, 913 P.2d at 904 (<HOLDING>). As its name suggests, this letter merely

    ### Response:
    holding that receipt of a prp letter was insufficient to defeat coverage under the lossinprogress rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    him, claiming his termination was without just cause, i.e., in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Under the Railway Labor Act (""RLA”), American’s decision to terminate Perry qualifies as a ""minor dispute” over which the Adjustment Board has exclusive jurisdiction. See 45 U.S.C. § 151 (defining ""minor dispute” as disputes ""growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.”). Under the RLA, minor disputes must be submitted to the Adjustment Board for binding arbitration; judicial review of these decisions is only available in certain circumstances, none of which is present here. See id.; Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 253, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994) (<HOLDING>); United Transp. Union v. South Carolina Public

    ### Response:
    holding that adjustment boards have exclusive jurisdiction over minor disputes under rla
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    guided” by the jury verdict on the common law false arrest claims. Thus, the court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the § 1983 false arrest claims. We hold that the district court erred by considering the jury verdict from the common law false arrest claims in its qualified immunity analysis. Hi * * The Supreme Court has held that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Courts have emphasized that whether a § 1983

    ### Response:
    holding that qualified immunity turns upon the objective legal reasonableness of the officers action assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken internal quotation marks and citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that a grant of a plaintiffs request for a temporary restraining order may be sufficient grounds to grant attorney’s fees to the plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). See, e.g., LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Christopher P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 804-05 (2d Cir.1990)). In so suggesting, however, we have explicitly rejected claims for attorney’s fees where the temporary restraining order merely maintained the status quo. See, e.g., Christopher P., 915 F.2d at 805 (“[T]he procurement of a [temporary restraining order] in which the court does not address the merits of the case but simply preserves the status quo to avoid irreparable harm to the plaintiff is not by itself sufficient to give a plaintiff prevailing party status.”); cf. Vacchio, 404 F.3d at 673 (<HOLDING>); LaRouche, 20 F.3d at 74-75 (holding that “a

    ### Response:
    holding that prevailing party status may be conferred by interim judicial relief that alters the parties legal relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and warranties, such as its technical requirements pertaining to internal management and accounting, could only occur intentionally. In the absence of contextual evidence of the meaning of the term “wilful” as used in the Agreement, it is too early in this litigation for a finding as to its meaning. Extrinsic evidence — that is, “evidence relating to a contract but not appearing on the face of the contract because it comes from other sources, such as statements between the parties or the circumstances surrounding the agreement” — is admissible to explain the meaning of an ambiguous term. Simon Prop. Group, L.P. v. Michigan Sporting Goods Distrib., Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1058, 1071 & n. 10 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); see also Univ. of S. Ind. Found. v. Baker, 843 N.E.2d 528, 535 (Ind.2006) (<HOLDING>). Discovery in this case has not yet been had.

    ### Response:
    holding that where an instrument is ambiguous all relevant extrinsic evidence may properly be considered in resolving the ambiguity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issue of fact that the denial of ice demonstrated “deliberate ind ed by the refusal to give him ice. He claims that he suffered severe dehydration; an unrelenting pounding in his head brought on by migraine headaches; and a burning sensation in his throat, chest, and stomach. Thus, Plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court erred by granting summary judgment to Defendants on this claim. B. Retaliation. Plaintiff failed to introduce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was sanctioned for exercising his constitutional rights to file an administrative complaint. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806-07 (9th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). The administrative complaint that Plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding that to prevail on a  1983 retaliation claim a prisoner must submit evidence establishing a link between the prisoners exercise of constitutional rights and the alleged retaliatory action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. The State appeals the trial court’s order withholding adjudication on Andrew Joseph Foster’s first-degree felony conviction. The withhold of adjudication was entered after Foster entered an open no-contest plea to the sale or possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell within 1000 feet of a school or child care facility. See § 402.302, Fla. Stat. (2010). Commendably, Foster concedes error, based upon the plain language of section 775.08435(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2012), which prohibits a court from withholding an adjudication of guilt upon a defendant who commits a first-degree felony, and State v. Joseph, 995 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>). See also State v. Ketchum, 111 So.3d 197

    ### Response:
    recognizing that section 77508435la prohibits trial courts from withholding an adjudication of guilt on a defendant convicted of a firstdegree felony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must be regarded as complete until the time the petition for review is denied. Florida Star at 289. “Moreover, the denial of review ... did not operate to deprive this Court of its subject-matter jurisdiction retroactively, but merely constituted the point in time at which jurisdiction, for whatever reason, had ended.” Id. at 289. Because of the nature of our opinion in Mullins’ direct appeal (a PCA with citation to a case pending supreme court review), the Florida Supreme Court had subject-matter jurisdiction and Mullins could appropriately petition the court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. While the Florida Su s not whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction, which it does, but whether it chooses to exercise it. Cf. Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418 (Fla.1981) (<HOLDING>); Harrison v. Hyster, Co., 502 So.2d 100 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court of appeal opinion which cites as controlling authority a decision that is either pending review in or has been reversed by the court constitutes prima facie express conflict and allows the court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    failure to make a showing that is “sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” will mandate the entry of summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, must set forth specific facts which demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The rule requires the non-moving party to introduce “evidence of evidentiary quality” demonstrating the existence of a material fact. Bailey v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 106 F.3d 135, 145 (6th Cir.1997); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (<HOLDING>). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment,

    ### Response:
    holding that the nonmoving party must produce more than a scintilla of evidence to survive summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    first issue, the size of the disparity between those with the status alleged to be the basis of the alleged disparate impact versus those without the status must be at least twenty percent. See Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d at 1222 (noting that the EEOC “guidelines provide that a disparity of 20% or more in selection rate will be considered evidence of adverse impact in a disparate impact claim” and that “[although not controlling on courts, this guideline is persuasive”). As to the'statistical significance of the disparity, the Tenth Circuit has noted that “ ‘[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that a disparity of more than two or three standard deviations in a large sample makes ‘suspect’ the contention that the differential occurs randomly.’ ” Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d at 1223 (<HOLDING>)(quoting Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d at

    ### Response:
    holding that ms tabors evidence was statistically significant at 2777 standard errors as to which the plaintiffs expert concluded the probability is less than 0006 that a disparity at least as large as this could occur solely as the result of chance factors if promotions were unrelated to sex
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in them from a standpoint of predisposition. The extensive Planning Board transcripts show that the chairman refereed an exhaustive, highly contentious Planning Board process that extended over a period of sixteen months. Although he often had difficulty keeping control over a very outspoken group of town residents opposed to the project, he nevertheless moved the process forward while following the presentations, questioning witnesses, and fairly discussing the evidence. See 5 M.R.S. § 9062(3)(C) (2007) (stating that presiding officers have the authority to “[rjegulate the course of the hearing”); Gorham, 625 A.2d at 902-03, On this record, his actions cannot be said to be the result of bias. Cf. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Finally, while the chairman’s statements to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that expressions of impatience dissatisfaction annoyance and even anger by a judge do not constitute bias or prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    . The new language states in relevant part, ""The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under col- or of State law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c). This language creates a right, but not a remedy, and therefore shows no Congressional intent to overrule Jett. See Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir.2000) (""[T]he section creates a right that private or state actors may violate but does not itself create a remedy for that violation.”). 7 . We may affirm a district court for any reason, including a reason not considered by the district court. Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 677 (6th Cir.2005). 8 . Jones v. Bock overruled Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 574 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that the prisoner has the burden of demonstrating he has exhausted his administrative remedies in his complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir.1972); but see Note, Intracorporate Conspiracies Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c), 92 Harv.L.Rev. 470 (1978). But this reasoning does not apply at all to a partnership. A corporation is a distinct and fictional legal entity; a partnership is not distinct from its members at all. We decline, therefore, to find that the dictum to the contrary in Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 409 F.Supp. 1274, 1279 (N.D. 111.1976), makes the allegation of conspiracy here frivolous. Moreover, it would be anomalous in any case to permit an entity which was established for the very purpose of engaging in a discriminatory act to be insulated, and to insulate its members, from liability as conspirators, by virtue of its establishment. See Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d at 196 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the State’s pleading that Mrs.

    ### Response:
    recognizing a similar exception to its rule with respect to corporations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 173-74 (explaining the District Court retains subject matter jurisdiction to rule on such motions because they are a continuation of the criminal case); see also id. at 173 n. 11 (emphasizing that appeals of § 2255 dispositions are governed by the civil rules). However, we did not need to decide which part of Fed. R. A pp. P. 4 applied because the Thomas notice of appeal, which was filed ten days after the relevant order was entered, was timely either way. Other cases discussing miscellaneous criminal post-judgment motions like the one here yield no clear direction. Compare United States v. Davis, 532 F.2d 752, 752 (4th Cir.1976) (per curiam) (suggesting that a post-judgment transcript request was a criminal matter), with United States v. Miramontez, 995 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In any event, we will consider the merits of

    ### Response:
    holding that postjudgment postcollateralrelief request for grandjury transcripts was civil in nature and governed by rule 4a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of.. . expenses and attorney’s fee. On application of the employer, the court shall allow as a first lien against the amount of the judgment for damages or settlement proceeds, the amount of the employer’s expenditure for compensation, less his share of such expenses and attorney’s fee. If the action is prosecuted both by the employee and the employer ... [a]fter the payment of ... expenses and attorneys’ fees there shall be applied out of the amount of the judgment for damages, or settlement proceeds an amount sufficient to reimburse the employer for the amount of his expenditure for compensation and any excess shall be paid to the injured employee or other person entitled thereto. (Emphasis added); cf. Shimabuku v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 79 Hawai'i 352, 361, 903 P.2d 48, 57 (1995) (<HOLDING>). 3. All of the Case Authority Cited by the

    ### Response:
    holding inter alia that pursuant to hrs  3868 employer entitled to reimbursement from portion of employees settlement with thirdparty tortfeasor properly allocable to employees tort claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    attack from another forum.”). Similarly, avoidance of transfers is specifically defined by statute as part of the core jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court and a matter over which the court holds exclusive jurisdiction. In this proceeding, avoidance is sought solely under a provision of the Bankruptcy Code and is a cause of action that may only exist within a bankruptcy case. As such this cause of action is within this court’s exclusive jurisdiction. See Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass’n v. Mathis (In re Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass’n), 185 B.R. 844, 847 (Bankr.D.Colo.1995) (finding that an action under Section 549 was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court); General Instrument Corp. v. Financial & Business Services, Inc. (In re Finley), 62 B.R. 361, 368 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1986) (<HOLDING>). As to the cause of action asserted for breach

    ### Response:
    holding that bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over recovery of preferences and fraudulent conveyances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Covenant Coal Corp., 977 F.2d 895, 897 (4th Cir.1992) (“The majority of courts to address the issue have refused to construe section 301 in such a way as to allow [tortious interference claims against non-signatories.]”); Carpenters Local Union No. 1816 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 501 (5th Cir.1982) (“[CJourts have almost unanimously held that a section 301 suit may be brought for violation of a labor contract only against those who are parties to the contract at issue.”). Although there are some variations in phrasing, the circuits are almost unanimous in rejecting LMRA jurisdiction over a claim such as Granite Rock’s claim against IBT. See Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561, 572 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Covenant Coal, 977 F.2d at 897 (declining to

    ### Response:
    holding that at a minimum the defendant must have breached some duty created by a labor contract to be liable for a violation under section 301a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this is a distinction without a difference. The DOT clearly argued to the jury that the evidence of such consideration defined the amount of any business losses. 3 Although the DOT argues that other evidence in the record could have supported the jury’s verdict, there is no way to determine what effect the irrelevant evidence regarding the Assignment may have played in its deliberations based on the DOT’s arguments in the case. Additionally, we find that the trial court made another evidentiary error, as addressed below, which may have improperly affected the parties’ presentation of evidence and argument at trial. 4 “Admissions in judicio apply only to facts in litigation in a particular case.” Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Diamond, 231 Ga. 321, 323 (III) (201 SE2d 400) (1973) (<HOLDING>). 5 That Lovein made this affirmative agreement

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys statement in prior litigation that if his client won that case she would make no further claims on estate at issue were not admissions in judicio
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it returns a special verdict.” Williams v. Warden, 422 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.2005) (quoting Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1031 (9th Cir.2003)). 6 . Under Nevada law, in cases imposing the death penalty the jury must return a ""written verdict.” Nev.Rev.Stat. § 175.554(4) (""If a jury imposes a sentence of death, the jury shall render a written verdict signed by the foreman.”). 7 . The parties may poll the jury in order ""to ascertain for a certainty that each of the jurors approves of the verdict as returned.” Humphries v. Dist. of Columbia, 174 U.S. 190, 194, 19 S.Ct. 637, 43 L.Ed. 944 (1899). Such a poll exists primarily to dispel uncertainty about the jury's verdict. See, e.g., Nelson, 692 F.2d at 84-85; United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 746 (9th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). 8 . If the sentence is death, however, the

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting multiple polls of jury where none of the jurors expressed uncertainty or disagreement about the verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    621-622 (Tex. 1993). To be extreme and outrageous, conduct must be “ ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ” Mattix-Hill v. Reck, 923 S.W.2d 596, 597 (Tex.1996) (quoting Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 621). Distress is considered severe only if it is so severe “that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Benavides v. Moore, 848 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied). Severe emotional distress does not include mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Regan v. Lee, 879 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). See also GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 612 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous and

    ### Response:
    recognizing that texas courts narrowly construe the intentional infliction of emotional distress doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the JOC procurement in order to maintain its viability in Italy.” PL’s Mot. 30. Mr. Hagner explained that BBSSI’s exclusion from the JOC competition has impacted its financial viability in Italy, as well as its “ability to operate elsewhere,” thereby requiring BBSSI to undertake administrative changes to ensure that it can remain competitive and can maintain oversight and control over its existing contracts. Hagner Deck ¶ 15; see also id. (noting that “there is no real prospect for alternatives for this kind of work on the market in Italy”). BBSSI’s loss of work flow and dependency upon the work encompassed by the JOC solicitation in order to maintain its viability in Italy constitute irreparable injuries. See Cardinal Maint. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 63 Fed.Cl. 98, 110 (2004) (<HOLDING>); accord PGBA, LLC v. United States, 57 Fed.Cl.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a party suffers irreparable injury when it loses the opportunity to compete on a level playing field with other bidders wjhen a plaintiff shows that it was excluded from the bidding process perhaps solely because of the governments improper conduct the plaintiff has satisfied requirement for irreparable injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    violence. 7 . As an alternative to our holding in Sutton that the principal on the facts alleged could not be liable for his “direct participation in enhancing the danger” to the child, we held the principal could be liable on those same facts for his inaction in failing “to adequately train school employees or adopt or implement a policy to prevent sexual assaults like those against [the child].” Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1238-39. This approach to the principal's accountability might well have succeeded under a theory of supervisory liability, if the mother first was able to establish an underlying constitutional violation on the part of the teacher's aide or other state actor. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Morris v. Lanpher, 563 F.3d 399, 403 (8th

    ### Response:
    holding that if a police officer inflicted no constitutional injury on a suspect it is inconceivable that the police commissioners could be liable to the suspect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    565 F.2d at 621; Columbus and G. Ry., 153 F.2d at 196. 19 .See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line, 275 U.S. at 257, 48 S.Ct. at 107; Merchants Fast Motor Lines v. ICC, 5 F.3d 911 (5th Cir.1993); Roberts, 921 F.2d at 804; California Trucking, 900 F.2d at 208; Middlewest, 867 F.2d at 458; Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d at 1546; Swift Textiles, 799 F.2d at 697; Baird v. Wagoner Transp. Co., 425 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1970); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil, 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1969); Long Beach Banana Distributors v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 407 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir.1969); Shew v. Southland Corp., 370 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1966); Johnsen, 889 P.2d at 853. 20 . For example, in Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Texas, 204 U.S. 403, 27 S.Ct. 360, 51 L.Ed. 540 (1907), the Supreme Cour .1948) (<HOLDING>); Georgia Textile, 556 S.E.2d at 850 (""Delivery

    ### Response:
    holding that interstate shipments to a warehousedistribution point through to samestate retail outlets retained their interstate character where the warehouse was merely a convenient instrumentality for the division of the shipments coming to it and the continuation of the movement of each part to the retail stores
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court’s jurisdiction to sit as an appellate court is very limited. For instance, the circuit court has true appellate jurisdiction to review state administrative agency determinations, see Code §§ 2.2-4026 and 17.1-513, and, arguably, a conviction of summary contempt in a district court. See Gilman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 222, 657 S.E.2d 474 (2008). However, in criminal cases, the General Assembly has not provided any authorization that would permit a circuit court to review a district court’s discretionary decision ending a prosecution. Without such an express grant, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether the district court’s decision constituted an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Nicely v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 327, 333-34, 477 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we conclude that Wright was not

    ### Response:
    holding that the circuit courts have no appellate jurisdiction over a general district courts review of an administrative license suspension in the absence of any statutory authority vesting them with such jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Opinion by: STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice. Charles Anthony Allen, Jr. appeals the order dismissing his case for failure to plead a case within the jurisdictional limits of the district court. We reverse and remand. BACKGROUND Allen is an inmate housed in the Dalhart Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDJC”). Allen filed suit against Kimberly Nunez, FNU Garza, and George Barrera, employees of TDJC pp.-Tyler 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). This court has not previously ruled on this

    ### Response:
    holding that despite 1985 amendments minimum jurisdictional amount remains 50000
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice. Actual malice means knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, the falsify of a statement. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 706 (1964). Lawyers who make derogatory remarks about judges are similarly protected from civil or criminal liability unless actual malice is shown. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125, 132 (1964). However, these principles only offer immunity from a civil suit for damages, not from other forms of discipline. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128, 142 (1976). The First Amendment does not afford protection to the utterer for all statements made. See e.g. Spivey, 345 N.C. at 414-15, 480 S.E.2d at 698-99 (<HOLDING>). Judge Hobgood’s order contained the following

    ### Response:
    holding that the first amendment does not protect the use of racial invective by a public official against a member of the public in a bar
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because the pistol found in his apartment was inoperable. Irving contends that because it was inoperable, the gun was relevant only to show propensity, which is impermissible. Alternatively, Irving contends that any probative value was outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. The government argues that the gun, although inoperable, tended to show that Irving was willing and intended to execute the plan to kill Watson. In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the pistol into evidence. Irving's possession of the pistol tended to establish that he thought he was able to carry out the plan to kill Watson, and therefore that he intended to conspire to kill Watson and obstruct justice. See Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 710, 712 (D.C.1977) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the gun turned out to be

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants prior possession of the physical means of committing the crime is some evidence of the probability of his guilt and is therefore admissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See, e.g., Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). We must determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact such that a trial is necessary, and whether the district court properly applied the substantive law. See id. While we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, a mere scintilla of evidence or some “metaphysical doubt as to material facts” will not suffice to defeat summary judgment. See Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir.1995). Finally, we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of Scribner’s summary judgment motion as well as its grant of summary judgment to World-Com. See, e.g., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs. Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 693-94 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). B. The Meaning of the Word “Cause” We must

    ### Response:
    holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We find merit in one of Gary’s claims and reverse as to it. We affirm the trial court’s order in all other respects without comment. Gary asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instruction on attempted burglary, which Gary contends was “ambiguous, vague and unconstitutional.” Specifically, Gary asserts that the instruction combined an attempted burglary instruction with an attempt to commit a crime instruction and produced a hybrid instruction of attempt to commit attempted burglary. He contends that this hybrid instruction confused the jury and shifted the burden of persuasion onto him for some of the elements of the crime. We find this to be a facially sufficient claim for relief. See Yarbrough v. State, 599 So.2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (<HOLDING>). The trial court denied' relief on the basis

    ### Response:
    holding appellant made facially sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where he asserted counsel failed to object to jury instructions which improperly combined elements of separate offenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or bigamy, shall be deemed infamous, and shall forever thereafter be rendered incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit, of voting at any election, of serving as a juror, and of giving testimony in this Territory. The Statute Laws of the Territory of Iowa, Code of Criminal Jurisprudence, Tenth Div., § 109, at 182 (1839). The 1839 statute provides us with a limited window into some specific understanding of the meaning of “infamous crimefs]” of the day. Of course, like Iowa Code section 39.3(8) (2013) today, this statute is not a constitutional test. See Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 780 (concluding an 1843 Indiana statute enumerating nine infamous crimes was not a present-day constitutional test); see also Green v. City of Cascade, 231 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Iowa 1975) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the judgment captured by the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that while we give respectful consideration to the legislatures understanding of constitutional language we are the final arbiter of the meaning of the iowa constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a Section 15(d) violation based on Section 104 of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the test for aiding and abettor liability for Section 10(b) violations); Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1000 (D.C.Cir.2000) (identifying three principal elements to establish liability for aiding and abetting a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation as “(1) that a principal committed a primary violation; (2) that the aider and abettor provided substantial assistance to the primary violator; and (3) that the aider and abettor had the necessary ‘scienter’ .... ”); accord SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir.1979) (recognizing aiding and abetting liability under Sections 10(b), 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 310, 316 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (<HOLDING>). The first prong of the aider and abettor test

    ### Response:
    holding corporate director liable for aiding and abetting violations of exchange act sections 14a 13a and rules 13al and 13a13 because he provided assistance and encouragement to conduct patently in violation of the securities laws
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the charged offense.” Id. at 593. The functional equivalence test is “synonymous with the concepts of ‘necessary inclusion’ or ‘subsumption of elements.’ ” Id. at 588 n. 15 (quoting Evans v. State, 299 S.W.3d 138, 143 (Tex.Crim.App.2009)); see Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 535 (stating that “the elements of the lesser offense do not have to be pleaded [in the indictment] if they can be deduced from the facts alleged in the indictment”). In applying the “functional-equivalence” concept to the offenses of burglary and trespass, this Court has previously held that a burglary indictment’s failure to plead that a defendant had notice that entry into a habitation was forbidden did not preclude him from being entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction on criminal trespass. Day, 532 S.W.2d at 306 (<HOLDING>). In Day, this Court explained that, even

    ### Response:
    holding that the offense of criminal trespass is a lesserincluded offense of all three types of burglary and stating generally that the elements of criminal trespass including notice could be established by proof of the same facts necessary to prove the offense of burglary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a party from prosecuting two actions for the same cause and against the same party, is tantamount to making the defendant with a compulsory counterclaim in the first action a ‘plaintiff in that action (for purposes of § 6-5-440) as of the time of its commencement. See, e.g., Ex parte Parsons & Whittemore Alabama Pine Constr. Corp., 658 So.2d 414 (Ala.1995); Penick v. Cado Systems of Cent. Alabama, Inc., 628 So.2d 598 (Ala.1993); Ex parte Canal Ins. Co., 534 So.2d 582 (Ala.1988). Thus, the defendant subject to the counterclaim rule who commences another action has violated the prohibition in § 6-5-440 against maintaining two actions for the same cause.” Ex parte Breman Lake View Resort, L.P., 729 So.2d 849, 851 (Ala.1999). See also University of South Alabama Found., 788 So.2d at 165 (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Parsons & Whittemore Alabama Pine

    ### Response:
    holding that a party in an action pending in a federal court was subject to the counterclaim rule and thus violated  65440 by commencing another action in a state court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case law interpreting that section. Section § 16(b) defines as a crime of violence “any ... offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (emphasis added). Positing a hypothetical manner in which the unlawful imprisonment of a competent adult could be accomplished by deception and without the use of force thus does not necessarily exclude the unlawful imprisonment statute from the scope of § 16 — our inquiry under § 16(b) is broader and more flexible, and involves asking whether the crime is one that by its nature involves a substantial risk that force may be used. Cf. Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 175-76 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We hold that in any case in which a competent

    ### Response:
    holding that a petitioners conviction for indecent assault and battery under massachusetts law constituted a crime of violence because any offense under the state statute was by definition nonconsensual and thus any violation of the statute by its nature presents a substantial risk that force may be used to overcome the victims lack of consent and accomplish the indecent touching
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the basis of Ms. Nicastro’s apparent or ratified authority fails. C. Defendant’s Termination of the CBA Defendant contends that even if the CBA is valid and enforceable, it was termi nated by Bentz’s failure to sign the renewal assent in 1994, or, in the alternative, by Bentz’s March 1996 letter to the Funds. We find Defendant’s argument to be without merit for two reasons. First, Bentz’s actions did not constitute termination of the CBA according to its explicit terms. Second, the Third Circuit only recognizes three distinct defenses to actions by benefit funds for e h “Evergreen Clauses” requiring written notice are not terminated absent compliance with the terms of the contract. See, e.g., Local 257, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Grimm, 786 F.2d 342, 345-46 (8th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Central States, Southeast, and Southwest

    ### Response:
    holding that noncompliance with terms of agreement did not terminate agreement failure to comply with date requirement in termination procedure rendered termination ineffective and letter between nonparty and party could not terminate agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could have supported a conclusion by the finder of fact that the mother also abused cocaine during this time. Illegal drug use in violation of the court’s order in this circumstance endangered DJ.W.’s emotional well-being because it increased the risk that his relationship with his biological mother would be permanently severed. See Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 617-18. Drug use that significantly impairs a parent’s ability care for a child jeopardizes the child’s physical and emotional well-being. We hold that the evidence in this case was legally sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that the mother engaged in conduct that endangered D.J.W.’s physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam.Code ANN. § 161.001(1)(E); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346 (<HOLDING>). With respect to the mother’s

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of admitted drug use before the birth of the children missed drug tests after removal of children and a failed drug test between removal and the final hearing established legal sufficiency of evidence to show endangerment under section 1610011e
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Ormond Beach, 383 So.2d at 672, the court recognized that a transfer of powers did not occur where both entities operated separate library systems, “the County established a county-wide unified library system in which all cities then operating libraries joined, except Ormond Beach. The cities which joined lost their authority to manage the library function and to make financial decisions regarding library affairs.” Ormond Beach claimed that allowing the county to assume library function in its city, where the city “has not requested the County to assume it and therefore a county tax on city property is improper.” Id. The Fifth District recognized that the trial court, in that case, correctly held that no transfer of powers occurred. Id.; see also Barms, 390 So.2d at 1189 (Fla.1980) (<HOLDING>). Here, although County’s goal may well be to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a sheriff contracting for services with a municipality is clearly different from a municipality transferring or contracting away the authority to supervise and control its police powers to the county government
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    parole. Appellant argues that he was denied due process because the hearing was postponed twice; he was found guilty of a disciplinary violation with which he was not charged in the incident report; and the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt. The district court dismissed pursuant to Rules 1(b) and 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, on the ground that the petitioner failed to show how either conviction for a code violation not listed in the incident report or the eight day delay prejudiced him in his ability to defend the disciplinary charge. The petitioner has failed to present sufficient facts to support his claim of denial of due process. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir.1984). Appellant doe l.1987) (<HOLDING>). Nor does appellant assert that the officer’s

    ### Response:
    holding that even if the prison disciplinary committee failed to follow a state administrative regulation requiring the committee to convene within eight calendar days after commission of prison offense or its discovery the noncompliance did not of itself violate due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evaluation. While the amount respondent would receive and the appropriate evaluation criteria remained questions of fact, respondent’s right to the undetermined amount' vested as of July 1, 2002, the day after the expiration of the 2001- contract. Therefore, respondent’s 2001-2002 bonus was owing prior to his termination. As president of the company, respondent’s services contributed to appellant’s profitability, and appellant received the benefit of respondent’s work product. The record reflects that, in this instance, respondent’s bonus was nondiscretionary and actually earned at the time of his discharge. We note that other jurisdictions interpreting similar statutory language have reached the same conclusion. See Rohr v. Ted Neiters Motor Co., 758 P.2d 186, 188 (Colo.Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>); Cap Gemini Am., Inc. v. Judd, 597 N.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a bonus calculated based on a percentage of the companys profits was a wage under colorados wagepenalty statute because the bonus was vested and determinable as of the date of termination was disproportionately large in comparison to the employees salary and was owed as compensation for services performed by the employee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tests, and (3) the aggravated portion of the DWI charge should be dismissed because the breathalyzer test was taken more than an hour and a half after Defendant was driving and registered .16, the exact reading required to raise DWI to the aggravated level. The State concedes that, under the circumstances of this case, in which the officer testified that there was no way of knowing what Defendant’s blood alcohol content was at the time of driving, a rational juror could not find beyond a reasonable doubt the facts necessary to raise the DWI to an aggravated level. We agree and therefore reverse and remand for entry of judgment for simple DWI unless one of Defendant’s other issues results in reversal. See State v. Cavanaugh, 116 N.M. 826, 829-30, 867 P.2d 1208, 1211-12 (Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). We hold that Defendant’s other issues do not

    ### Response:
    holding that blood alcohol content almost 30 over the limit together with testimony of intoxication at the time of driving was sufficient to convict contrasting a case in which the blood alcohol content was just barely over the limit which was insufficient to convict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pursuing an alibi defense. The Court finds Respondent’s arguments to be without merit. The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), qualifies as “clearly established federal law” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Thus, if Petitioner can show that the Michigan courts adjudicated his failure to investigate claim in a manner contrary to Strickland, he is entitled to habeas relief. To be successful on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Strickland requires that two elements be proven. First, a petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 278 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). To prove a deficiency, a petitioner must show

    ### Response:
    holding that judicial scrutiny of attorney performance must be highly deferential
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Montana Constitution provides that “[i]n all suits and prosecutions for libel or slander the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the facts.” Mont. Const, art. II, § 7. The Knievels interpret this provision to mean that they are entitled to a jury trial because they have a “special constitutional right in a libel and slander case in Montana” that guarantees them their “fair day in court.” But Montana’s highest court, which we are bound to follow, interprets the provision differently. The Montana Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the ability of judges to dispose of defamation claims where there are no issues of fact warranting a jury trial. Hale v. City of Billings, 295 Mont. 495, 986 P.2d 413, 418 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Small v. McRae, 200 Mont. 497, 651 P.2d 982,

    ### Response:
    holding that whether a statement is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning is an issue that a court can and should rightfully determine upon a motion for summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“FmHA”) administered these loans. See Pittsburg County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of McAlester, 358 F.3d 694, 701 (10th Cir.2004) (""Pittsburg County”). Since 1994, however, the Department of Agriculture has operated this loan program, see id. at 701 n. 1, through its Rural Utilities Service. See Rural Water Dist. No. 1. Ellsworth County v. City of Wilson, 243 F.3d 1263, 1269 n. 3 (10th Cir.2001) (citing 7 C.F.R. § 1780.3). 2 . In 1987, the USDA sold the first four of these loans to Community Program Loan Trust 1987A, a special purpose Massachusetts business trust. That fact, however, does not affect the questions we certify here to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See Moongate Water Co. v. Butterfield Park Mut. Domestic Water Ass’n, 291 F.3d 1262, 1265-67 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Sequoyah County Rural Water Dist.

    ### Response:
    holding transfer of usda loans to private lenders did not extinguish a rural water districts indebted on those loans for purposes of  1926b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Individual Complaint, the cover letter was dated August 3, 2000, and the return receipt form indicated that the certified mail was received by “Katie” on August 4, 2000. The magistrate judge ruled that the handwritten date on the Notice was in all likelihood a transcription error, in light of the extrinsic evidence attesting to the Notice’s delivery on August 4 — and, moreover, that there was a presumption in favor of delivery of letters that were properly addressed, stamped, and mailed, particularly when the letter had been sent via certified mail. Slip op. at 12-13 (citing C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 343 (5th ed.1999), and Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Schaffer, 731 F.2d 1134, 1137 (4th Cir.1984)); cf. id. at 15 (citing Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 266 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>)). Here, the magistrate judge pointed out,

    ### Response:
    holding that limitations period begins to run on date notice was received at claimants residence even if claimant did not receive it until a later date
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that: All nonconforming outdoor advertising signs shall be discontinued or made conforming (amortized) within five and one-half (5lA) years from the effective date of this ordinance ([October 23, 1983]), unless explicitly prohibited by State Statute. (Emphasis added). 8 . The sixteen signs located along federal highway systems, while exempt from the removal requirement, still remained “nonconforming uses” subject to the ordinance’s other restrictions, such as the prohibitions on reconstructing damaged nonconforming signs, moving existing nonconforming signs to new locations on their lots, or building more such signs along the federal highway systems. Compare National Advertising Co. v. Bradshaw, 48 N.C.App. 10, 268 S.E.2d 816, appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 400, 273 S.E.2d 446 (1980) (<HOLDING>). 9 . A facial takings attack is a claim that

    ### Response:
    holding illegal nationals reconstruction of sign deemed nonconforming under state statute and located along federal highway system where sign was more than 50 percent destroyed by wind
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the proposition that “[statutes affecting remedies” should, be given retroactive effect. 1996 SD 98, ¶ 72, 552 N.W.2d at 608. In Tischler, we defined remedial statutes as those statutes “that describe methods for enforcing, processing, administering, or determining rights, liabilities, or status.” Id. On the other hand, “[a] law is substantive- if it creates rights, duties, and obligations.” 2 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Con struction, § 41.09 (6th Ed 2001). After reviewing the statute in question and considering the nature of liquor licenses, we believe the penalty provision at issue in this case to be substantive rather than procedural. [¶ 13.] In Rushmore State Bank v. Ku-rylas, Inc., this Court explored the status of liquor licenses in South Dakota. 424 N.W.2d 649 (S.D.1988) (<HOLDING>). In Kurylas, we concluded that “as between the

    ### Response:
    holding inter alia that a creditor may take a security interest in a licensees liquor license
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Lantzy, 558 Pa. at 228, 736 A.2d at 572-73. The order of the Superior Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for reinstatement of Appellant’s entitlement to pursue a direct appeal. 1 . The traditional requirements for relief pertaining to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel mandate that the petitioner establish actual prejudice (in terms of undermining confidence in the outcome of his trial), as well as the arguable merit of the underlying claim and an absence of some reasonable strategy on counsel’s part in terms of the act or omission resulting in the underlying claim not having been previously advanced or vindicated. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158-60, 527 A.2d 973, 975-77 (1987). 2 . On consideration of an order denying post-convictio 994) (<HOLDING>); Bonneau v. United States, 961 F.2d 17, 23

    ### Response:
    holding that prejudice should be presumed where counsel filed notice of appeal but failed to perfect the direct appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In finding DNA collection statutes constitutional, courts routinely focus on the government’s interest in creating a permanent identification record of convicted felons for law enforcement purposes. E.g., United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.2007) (concluding that “government’s important interests in monitoring and rehabilitating supervised releasees, solving crimes, and exonerating innocent individuals outweigh Weikert’s privacy interests, given his status as a supervised releasee, the relatively minimal inconvenience occasioned by a blood draw, and the coding of genetic information that, by statute, may be used only for purposes of identification”); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185

    ### Response:
    holding that georgias legitimate interest in creating a permanent identification record of convicted felons for law enforcement purposes outweighs the minor intrusion involved in taking prisoners saliva samples and storing their dna profiles given prisoners reduced expectation of privacy in their identities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the insured as of the date of the casualty and subsequent events may be significant in determining the insured’s interest.” DeBellis, 77 N.J. at 436, 390 A.2d 1171 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court found that plaintiff DeBellis had not been made whole by the redemption and that allowing the carrier to pay nothing created a windfall for the carrier. Id. at 437-38, 390 A.2d 1171. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that DeBellis’s interest in the property “was equivalent to at least the amount expended for that interest some three months before the fire” plus 20% interest plus partial refund of the premium for the period after title reverted to the redeeming Teeds. Id. at 438. See also Miller v. N.J. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 82 N.J. 594, 598-99, 414 A.2d 1322 (1980) (<HOLDING>) The Miller court reiterated: With respect to

    ### Response:
    holding that two claimants separate cases who had lost title to property through in rem tax foreclosure which properties were destroyed by fire postforeclosure retained an insurable interest in the property under their insurance contracts the claimants continued to occupy the properties ignorant of the tax foreclosures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    adjustment is warranted. Second, Defendant argues that the Court should find the fee request unreasonable in light of the amount of attorneys’ fees Plaintiff requested in his settlement letter. It is questionable if the letter is even relevant to the Court’s determination. Despite claiming that “weight of authority” allows the Court to look at the settlement letter, Defendant cited no controlling law on point. (Defendant’s Surreply, at 2.) In fact, the only case cited from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the admission of evidence of settlement negotiations for the purpose of establishing the unreasonableness of Plaintiffs counsels request for fees. See Gaffney v. Allentown, Civ. A. No. 97-445, 1998 WL 32758, *1, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 242, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Jan.7, 1998) (<HOLDING>). Second, even if the Court considers the

    ### Response:
    holding that federal rule of evidence 408 prohibits admission of such evidence for purpose of establishing unreasonableness of plaintiffs counsels request for fees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court, Randolph and Kelley sued the appellees reflected in the style of this case, and Wayne Dolcefino, KTRK Television. Inc., C C Texas Holding Co., Inc., Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., Henry Florsheim, and David Gwizdowski. The trial court granted the ap-pellees’ motion in this case for Rule 13 sanctions and struck appellants' claims in their Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amended Petitions against Jackson Walker and Bleisch, and dismissed those claims with prejudice. Thereafter, the trial court severed appellants’ claims against Jackson Walker and Bleisch into the “A” trial court cause number reflected above. That severance made the interlocutory judgment granting sanctions and dismissing claims final and appealable. See Martinez v. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>). In addition, on the same day as the

    ### Response:
    holding trial court may make a judgment final for purposes of appeal by severing the causes and parties disposed of by the judgment into a different cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contribution is an equitable remedy that has been recognized by the Arizona courts and legislature in limited circumstances, most notably in the insurance and tort contexts. See, e.g., Cal. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 208 Ariz. 416, 417-18, 422, ¶¶ 1-2, 24, 94 P.3d 616, 617-18, 622 (App.2004); Mut. Ins. Co. of Ariz. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading Pa., 189 Ariz. 22, 26, 938 P.2d 71, 75 (App.1996); Am. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading Pa., 183 Ariz. 301, 302, 903 P.2d 609, 610 (App.1995); W. Agric. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Indem. Ins. Co., 172 Ariz. 592, 595, 838 P.2d 1353, 1356 (App.1992); see also A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 to -2509 (2003) (adopting the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act). See also Fischer v. Sommer, 160 Ariz. 530, 531, 774 P.2d 834, 835 (App.1989) (<HOLDING>). However, Arizona has not previously addressed

    ### Response:
    recognizing the right of a former spouse to seek contribution for payment of community debts not allocated by the divorce decree
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the dismissal’s effect had it not been withdrawn. 6 . We rule here only that the power of the trial court to rescind an order of dismissal continues “at least” until entry of the order on the docket. That is all that is needed to dispose of this appeal. After formal entry of an order of any type, a trial court's jurisdiction over the matter and power to rescind or amend the order may be governed by application of this jurisdiction’s procedural rules and case law. See generally Clement v. District of Columbia Dep't of Human Servs., 629 A.2d 1215 (D.C. 1993). 7 . We note further that our decision today is in accord with the decisions of several other jurisdictions that have considered the present issue. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 113 Ariz. 506, 557 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1976) (en banc) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Belcher v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz.

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial court does not lose jurisdiction in a matter by ordering its dismissal before jeopardy has attached unless there is an abuse of discretion in vacating the order of dismissal and reinstating the case for trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    more, that should answer the dual-office holding question. In light of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895, I also join the majority in rejecting Petitioners’ separation of powers claim. I commend Justice Hearn for her excellent recitation of the importance of the separation of powers doctrine in our country’s founding. This Court’s jurisprudence often recognizes, in glowing terms, the sanctity of the separation of powers doctrine in our democratic republic. See State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, 278 S.C. 307, 312, 295 S.E.2d 633, 636 (1982) (observing that the separation of the branches of government “prevents the concentration of power in the hands of too few, and provides a system of checks and balances”); State ex rel. McLeod v. Yonce, 274 S.C. 81, 84, 261 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Yet, as the majority articulates, “South

    ### Response:
    holding that under separation of powers the legislative department makes the laws the executive department carries the laws into effect and the judicial department interprets and declares the laws
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim is based on Eastus’s termination. The relationship of the FMLA and emotional distress claims, therefore, is similar to the relationship between the claims in the Na-bors case. For both claims in the instant ease, the single wrong is the termination, and the various claims are simply different theories of recovery. As a result, the FMLA claim and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim are not “separate and independent claim[s] or cause[s] of action” under § 1441(e). Because § 1441(c) does not authorize the remand of state law claims unless they are separate and independent from the removed federal question claim, the district court abused its discretion by remanding this claim. See John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Found. v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 577, 130

    ### Response:
    holding that  1441c does not allow the remand of claims that are not separate and independent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in whose name Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 requires an action to be brought, and the debtor no longer has standing to pursue that cause of action. See 11 U.S.C. § 323(b); Toussaint v. Howard University, Civil Action No. 03-1395(JDB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38738, at *5-7 (D.D.C. November 8, 2005); Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004); Cain v. Hyatt, 101 B.R. 440, 442 (E.D.Pa.1989) (“[A]fter appointment of a trustee, a Chapter 7 debtor no longer has standing to pursue a cause of action which existed at the time the Chapter 7 petition was filed. Only the trustee, as representative of the estate, has the authority to prosecute and/or settle such causes of action.”); Banks v. County of Allegheny (In re Banks), 223 Fed.Appx. 149, 151 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Here, the discrimination cause of action

    ### Response:
    holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cummings grabbed her hair and touched her skin; (3) Witt screamed at her; (4) Cummings and Witt suggested she apply for the African American Leadership Council to the exclusion of other opportunities; and (5) she was demoted from “intern” to “volunteer.” The first four of these do not describe “significant changes” in Adam’s “employment status,” and thus are not adverse actions. Although all four instances can be described as impolite, none changes Adam’s “wealth” or “career prospects.” And although they might be characterized as “humiliating” or “degrading,” Adam’s allegations fail to rise to the level that the Seventh Circuit has held is necessary to demonstrate a “significant negative alteration in the workplace.” See Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Rhodes v. Ill. DOT, 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that scolding an em ployee for absence by introducing the employee by saying this is amy you probably havent met her yet because she is never here may have been offensive to the employee but was merely a petty slight that does not amount to a materially adverse action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it had ample opportunity to do so. Instead Congress must have realized that the definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” would necessarily be interpreted in the context of the statute to which it applies (18 U.S.C. § 1962). Thus, the term “pattern”, when used in this context, applies to the relationship of the acts to the enterprises, and no more. The definition of “racketeering activity” in the section and the additional definition of “pattern of racketeering activity,” taken together, results in the conclusion that the “pattern” definition states a minimum but not necessarily an exclusive definition. A main focus of Title IX was the enterprise, not only the persons committing the acts, and Congress felt that the “pattern” would be supplied by this common fact (E.D.Pa. 1977) (<HOLDING>). For purposes of deciding the present motion

    ### Response:
    holding that acceptance of four bribes over a two and onehalf year period from parents who wanted their children admitted to graduate school appeared to be a sufficient pattern to satisfy the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the First Amendment framework. There is simply no support in the affidavits for a conclusion that Liotta’s disputes involved his freedoms of belief and association, or the related right to be free from the imposition of an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit, the interests implicated under Elrod v. Burns. Accordingly, the affidavits did not raise a material issue of fact so as to preclude the granting of summary judgment. They certainly do not tend to establish that Liotta was discharged by reason of “partisan political affiliation,” the act interdicted for certain public employees in Elrod v. Burns. See Burns v. County of Cambria, 971 F.2d at 1021; Zold v. Township of Mantua, 935 F.2d at 635; cf. Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Public Ed., 968 F.2d at 401 (<HOLDING>). We recognize that Liotta testified in a

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiffs property interest claim could not be based on a conclusory allegation citing past practices
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir.2005). We review for reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, meaning that we “must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence — including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); see also United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1093 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). If the district court made no procedural

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide an indication of what facts it relied on to make a significant variance from the advisory guidelines range
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to demonstrate incompetency, a defendant could easily avoid prosecution through immature behavior. Id. The State directs this Court to Clark v. State, 47 S.W.3d 211 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2001, no pet.). We find Clark analogous to the instant case. In Clark, the trial court held a competency hearing in July of 1999, but the appellant argued that the court abused its discretion in failing to conduct a second competency hearing in November of 1999. Clark, 47 S.W.3d at 215-16. The court of appeals noted that, while the appellant’s behavior at the November 1999 pretrial hearing was “bizarre,” no new evidence was presented indicating a change in the appellant’s mental condition from the previous finding. Id. at 218, citing Miles v. State, 688 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1985, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>); O’Neil v. State, 642 S.W.2d 259, 262

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant must present some evidence of a subsequent change in competency or some new evidence in a manner analogous to newly discovered evidence in a motion for new trial to complain of a denial of a second competency hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    after the fact, the conduct for which the defendant is accountable includes all conduct relevant to determining the offense level for the underlying offense that was known, or reasonably should have been known, by the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, Application Note 10. Therefore, reading Application Note 10 in isolation would extend the reasonable-knowledge requirement to all conduct used to determine the sentence for the underlying offense, not only specific offense characteristics. Other circuits are split on how to resolve this apparent contradiction. Supporting Mrs. Lang’s position, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits allow a sentencing court to consider only those drug quantities of which the defendant knew or should have known. See United States v. Warters, 885 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Shabazz, 263 F.3d 603 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant can only be sentenced for misprision of felony based on drug quantities that he knew or should have known or foreseen  were involved in the conspiracy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    without legal citation or factual evidence does not suffice to create a disputed issue of fact as to whether Form 10 was the proper form for the spin-off. Indeed, the SEC had a factual basis for rejecting the Form 10 because there was a sale of a restricted security within two years. SeraNova’s prompt and lamb-like obeisance to the SEC’s decision to require a Form S-l is strong proof that the Form 10 was the wrong document. Moreover, SeraNova brought the same bulletin to the SEC’s attention on March 17, 2000, and the SEC responded that it disagreed with SeraNova’s interpretation of the bulletin. Thus, SeraNova is left with the tenuous argument that the SEC misinterpreted its own bulletin. Cf. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 122 S.Ct. 1899, 1903, 153 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (<HOLDING>). On the issue of whether the content of the

    ### Response:
    holding that sec interpretation of federal securities law is entitled to deference if it is reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a long string of performance problems leading up to firing. The further back in time a court goes to evaluate an employee’s performance, the more removed the evidence is from the time of the termination. As we explained in Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230 (4th Cir.1982): The rationality, hence fairness, of this inference [of unlawful discrimination] obviously decreases as the time gap between last proven satisfactory performance and challenged employment action lengthens. Here, the time lag was almost two years. As common experience in such matters teaches, and as the full record reveals the case here to have been, a great deal can happen to alter things in such a time. Id. at 244. See also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 517 U.S. 308, 116

    ### Response:
    holding that a review of an employees 1989 performance was irrelevant to a determination of whether his performance was satisfactory at the time of his termination in august of 1990
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    found “not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.”) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir.1996)). The ALJ made no specific findings regarding plaintiffs IQ. To meet the “B” criteria of section 12.05, plaintiff must have a valid verbal, performance, or full-scale IQ of 59 or below. Both Dr. Taylor, who administered the WAIS III that yielded a full-scale IQ of 58, and Dr. Soltz, the medical expert, indicated that those IQ test results were invalid due to suboptimal effort or malingering on plaintiffs part. Therefore, plaintiffs contention that he meets the “B” criteria of section 12.05 lacks merit. See Soto v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 795 F.2d 219, 222 (1st Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). To meet the “C” criteria of section 12.05,

    ### Response:
    holding that the alj is not obliged to accept an iq if there is a substantial basis in the record for believing that the claimant was feigning the results
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mineral estate, that the wells were not temporary in nature, and that they remained there for several years. Clearly, there was evidence of a physical occupation by the Government of the McKays’ property. In general, in the case of physical invasions, the Supreme Court has pointed out that “no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation.” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). Even when the physical intrusion occupied less than one and one half cubic feet of space on a landowner’s property, the Supreme Court has held that a taking was effected. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Despite this undisputed evidence of a

    ### Response:
    holding that new yorks law requiring landlords to allow television cable companies to place cable facilities in their apartment buildings constituted a taking even though the facilities occupied at most only vk cubic feet of the landlords property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    perhaps thousands of individuals have fallen victim to Qwest’s illegal practices. The Court finds that the plaintiffs have pled ascertainable damages sufficiently to petition for relief under CUTPA. Another issue raised by Qwest is the plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim for negligent supervision under CUTPA where the consumers in the present case could have reasonably avoided any injury. Qwest claims the plaintiffs were liable for contributory negligence by not implementing a preferred carrier freeze under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1190 by simply calling their local phone company and requesting it. Qwest asserts that Connecticut case law disallows CUTPA claims when contributory negligence by the plaintiff is found. A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 216 Conn. 200, 579 A.2d 69 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs point out that the victim of

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no cutpa violation when the sole basis of the claim is the defendants negligence and the jury determines that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and is not “connected with” or “directly related to” appellants’ sales to 3M and Worum. Lorix contends, however, that there must only be a “reasonably close connection” between the cause of action and the defendant’s contacts with the forum state to support a finding of specific jurisdiction. Lorix argues that the sale of rubber-processing chemicals to Minnesota corporations to manufacture products other than tires is sufficiently related to a suit alleging that downstream indirect purchasers paid a supracompetitive price for tires that contained those same rubber-processing chemicals. But for specific jurisdiction to exist, a plaintiff must show a more direct connection between his alleged injury and the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. See Marshall, 610 N.W.2d at 676 (<HOLDING>); Behm v. John Nuveen & Co., 555 N.W.2d 301,

    ### Response:
    holding entering into a contract with a minnesota resident can justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction but only where the dispute involves the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or she has not been made a party by service of process.’ ” Cossio, 163 B.R. at 154 (quoting Mason v. Genisco Technology Corp., 960 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir.1992)). Other courts have also held that a default judgment is void and should be set aside if there has been no proper service of the complaint. E.g., Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 442 (D.C.Cir.1987); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir.1985). Because a court asserts in personam jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights of a party through service of process, an in personam judgment is void where the requirements for effective service have not been satisfied. Combs, 825 F.2d at 442; see also, e.g., Hospital Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Parque Indus. Rio Canas, Inc., 653 F.2d 54, 56 (1st Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Central Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of

    ### Response:
    holding that if service is inadequate defendant never submitted to courts jurisdiction and underlying judgment is therefore a nullity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (emphasis in original). “The burden must have more than a minimal impact on religious exercise, and there must be a close n Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761-62 (7th Cir.2003) (“CLUB”) (finding that “the scarcity’ of affordable land available for development in R zones, along with the costs, procedural requirements, and inherent political aspects of the Special Use, Map Amendment, and Planned Development approval processes” did not impose substantial burden on religious institutions); Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 760 F.Supp.2d 172, 187 (D.Mass.2011) (finding that a routine application process did not violate RLUIPA), vacated in part on other grounds, 724 F.3d 78 (1st Cir.2013); Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm’n, 229 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1071 (D.Haw.2002) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, to exempt religious institutions from

    ### Response:
    holding that laws requiring special use permits did not impose a substantial burden on religious institution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wells Fargo Bank, 633 F.3d 529 (7th Cir.2011), the Seventh Circuit validated § 202.2(e)’s definition of “applicant.” The plaintiff in Davis argued that she became an ECOA “applicant” when the defendants offered her a loan modification, allegedly on racially discriminatory terms. Id. at 538. The Seventh Circuit agreed, holding that the plaintiff, “as the recipient of the defendants’ offer to modify her loan, ‘received an extension of credit’ and thus became an ‘applicant’ under 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e).” Ibid. The court could not have concluded that the plaintiff was in fact an “applicant” under the ECOA without accepting § 202.2(e) as an authoritative interpretation of that statutory term. As for Moran Foods, Davis indicated that its discussion of the term “applicant” was dicta. See ibid, (<HOLDING>). In any event, FirstMerit does not argue that

    ### Response:
    holding that moran foods found no need to resolve the threshold issue of whether a plaintiff was an applicant under the ecoa because plaintiff failed to submit sufficient evidence of discrimination under the ecoa to survive summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the victim testified that three men came to her house, kicked the door open, and put a gun to her daughter’s face. Beyond this, the victim testified that she could not remember any more details at the time of trial. As pointed out by the State, this event would qualify as “a matter about which a witness once had knowledge, but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately.” § 90.803(5), Fla. Stat. (2008). Further, the victim identified the written statement as the statement she gave to police on the day of the crime, approximately one hour after the events took place, and testified that she told the police what happened when they came to her house. Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, including that the witness swore to t 998) (<HOLDING>). These cases are based upon the language of

    ### Response:
    holding that testimony regarding outofcourt identification was inadmissible where the state failed to ask the witnesses about the identification during its direct examination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    courts, as stated above. See, e.g., Lakeside Boating & Bathing, Inc., 402 N.W.2d at 422. In Lyster, the court observed that it had “recognized the potential that substantial arbitration fees may make an arbitration agreement unconscionable.” See Lyster, 239 F.3d at 947 (citing Dobbins v. Hawk’s Enters., 198 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir.1999)). However, the court rejected the plaintiffs contention about the unconscionability of the cost and fees provision of the arbitration agreement at issue in that case, as follows: Lyster has not established on the record before us that undue harshness exists in the terms of the Agreement'in light of Missouri law governing unconscionability. See Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92, 121 S.Ct. 513, 522, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Lyster, 239 F.3d at 947. Here, however, Faber

    ### Response:
    holding the party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement because of prohibitive arbitration fees bears the burden of proof and the possibility of such party incurring prohibitive costs is too speculative to invalidate an arbitration agreement where the record reveals only that the agreement is silent on the subject of arbitration costs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find for that party. A non-moving party cannot withstand summary judgment, however, by introduction of a “mere scintilla” of evidence in its favor. See Ciminillo, 434 F.3d at 464. Before this court, the plaintiff first argues that the finding of probable cause by the state judge at the preliminary-examination stage of the criminal proceedings should not affect the federal courts’ decisions regarding the merits of his claims of wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution. He does so even though each of those later claims contains, as an element, the lack of probable cause to pursue the particular action. See, e.g., Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir.1988) (wrongful arrest) (<HOLDING>); Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that the fourth amendment requires a finding of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.2d 779, 781 (D.C.Cir.1990) (quoting Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 91-92 (1984)); see also Nation Magazine, Washington Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 894 (D.C.Cir.1995) (explaining that Exemption 7(C)’s privacy interest extends to third parties who may be mentioned in investigatory files). Accordingly, Exemption 7(C) has been applied to withhold the names of third parties, including investigators, mentioned in law enforcement files. See Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37, 41 (D.C.Cir.2011) (asserting that “privacy interests are particularly difficult to overcome when law enforcement information regarding third parties is implicated”) (quoting Martin v. Dep’t of Justice, 488 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C.Cir.2007)); see also Schrecker v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 661 (D.C.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Dorsett v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that our decisions consistently supported nondisclosure of names or other information identifying individuals appearing in law enforcement records
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    vehicle is controlling or whether the decisions will turn on the use being made of the vehicle. As for the case at hand, we hold that under the facts known to the officers at the time of the search, the motor homes were being used as automobiles, or trucks, and that the standard of reasonableness that applies to such vehicles applies here. The use of a vehicle, not its shape, should control the standard that applies. As an analogy, the extent that there may be different Fourth Amendment standards for a home and a business would not depend upon whether the business was in a building that looked like a home. The difference in standards is based on the reduced expectation of privacy in a business. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2537-38, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88

    ### Response:
    holding that expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individuals home
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “threshold requirement of any products-liability claim is that the plaintiff assert that the defendant’s product caused the plaintiffs injury.” This is known as the “product identification requirement.” Because Plaintiffs did not ingest the Brand Manufacturers’ drugs, their “misrepresentation” claims would fail if a state’s highest court would construe them as product liability claims under applicable state law. Second, even if a state’s highest court would not construe Plaintiffs’ claims as “product liability” claims, the claims were still properly dismissed if we predict that such courts would hold that the Brand Manufacturers do not owe users of generic drugs a duty that can give rise to liability. Before turning to our state-by-state Erie analysis, we note that an over th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177,

    ### Response:
    holding that brand name manufacturers cannot be held liable for injuries caused by products they did not manufacture under arkansas law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entitled to bring [an] action ... is, at the time the cause of action accrues, within the age of minority or of unsound mind, the person may bring it within the [applicable time limitation], after the disability is removed.” The plaintiff before the court was of unsound mind at the time his cause of action accrued and remained so continuously thereafter. His legal guardians commenced a tort action which the defendants claimed was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, arguing that the plaintiffs disability had been removed by the appointment of his legal guardians. Cir.1985) (assuming that Missouri would apply the general rule that the appointment of a guardian has no effect on tolling); Wayne County Reg’l Educ. Serv. Agency v. Pappas, 56 F.Supp.2d 807, 815 (E.D.Mich.1999) (<HOLDING>); Desert State Life Mgt. Servs. v. Ass’n of

    ### Response:
    holding that under michigan law it is wellsettled that an individual with a mental disability is the beneficiary of the tolling statute even where his rights have been capably handled by a guardian or an attorney
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights, feasibly creating a barricade across Maryland’s shoreline. In the words of the Thomas Court, “such [a] consequence surely ought not to be desired by anyone.” Thomas, 63 Md. at 355. This conclusion is consistent with the pronouncements in other states regarding the character of the beaches at issue in those cases. Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d 1124, 1130 (Me.1984) (applying a rebuttable presumption of permissive use to a lakefront beach, as “wild and uncultivated land”); Spiegle v. Beach Haven, 116 N.J.Super. 148, 281 A.2d 377, 382 (App.Div.1971) (noting that the ocean front beach at issue was land “in a general state of nature and left unimproved by its owner”); State ex rel. Shorett v. Blue Ridge Club, 22 Wash.2d 487, 156 P.2d 667, 670-71 (1945) (<HOLDING>). As noted, supra, “[a]s a general rule,

    ### Response:
    holding that a beach bordering on puget sound used extensively for public recreation was completely wild open vacant unoccupied and in its natural state and therefore public use was presumed to have originated by permission until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to Andrew Tagliamonte’s request, but, based on the charge of child neglect, sua sponte entered an order that he stay away from his minor son. In so doing, the trial court abused its discretion. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131(d)(2) authorizes the State to apply for modification of pretrial release conditions, but only on “showing good cause and with at least 3 hours’ notice to the attorney for the defendant.” A trial court is without authority sua sponte to modify a previously set pretrial release bond. See Cameron v. State, 127 So.3d 549, 550, 2012 WL 5349405, *1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (granting a writ of habeas corpus where trial court sua sponte “added significant and substantial conditions” to defendant’s release bond); Simmons v. State, 915 So.2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. McRay, 890 So.2d 341 (Fla. 3d DCA

    ### Response:
    holding trial court may not increase bond on grounds not raised by the state without prior notice to defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Denny’s employees ignored her requests that they do so. Gray adduced testimonial evidence that the events at issue occurred during the so called “bar rush” that followed the closing of local bars, a time when customers coming to Denny’s were frequently loud and profane. See Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 57(c), (e). Gray further adduced evidence that Denny’s internal policies recognized profane language as “work place violence.” She also submitted police reports of work place violence involving actual physical assaults occurring in the year preceding her assault. Denny’s submits that such records cannot defeat summary judgment because they are inadmissible hearsay. The argument fails only one, instance of customer assault. See Kazanoff v. United States, 945 F.2d 32, 39 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. City of New York, 183 A.D.2d 683,

    ### Response:
    holding evidence of one possible burglary before incident at issue insufficient to demonstrate prior criminal activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    over personal-injury suits before its termination, concluded that, in drafting ICCTA, Congress was “primarily concerned with transferring the resolution of commercial disputes from the ICC to the courts.” Stewart, 241 F.Supp.2d at 1221 (emphasis added) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 104-311, at 86, 87, reprinted in 1995-2 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 798-99, as indicating that the ICC was responsible for claims for the loss and damage of goods). The Stewart court stated that it was taking the Eighth Circuit’s analysis in Owner-Operator “a step further” by holding that “[sjection 14704(a)(2) creates a private right of action for damages in commercial disputes involving violations of the Motor Carrier Act and its regulations, but not for personal injury actions.” Id.; see also Owner-Operator, 192 F.3d at 785 (<HOLDING>). In Schramm, a case involving an accident

    ### Response:
    holding that section 14704a authorizes private actions for damages  to remedy at least some violations of the motor carrier act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d at 656; Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 449 (5th Cir.1994); Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d at 170; Fields v. City of South Houston, Texas, 922 F.2d at 1187; Meyers v. M/V Eugenio C, 919 F.2d at 1072; Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d at 178; and Lodge Hall Music, Inc. v. Waco Wrangler Club, Inc., 831 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir.1987). 47 . See Celotex Corp. v. Catr olding that a nonmovant cannot discharge his burden with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusoiy allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence); Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied sub nom. Forsyth v. Vines, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Resolution Trust Corporation v. Camp, 965

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmovant rests merely upon conclusory allegations improbable inferences and unsupported speculation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. (B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evi-dentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendati 69-70 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Bennett v. General Caster Serv., 976 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion to certify a district court order for interlocutory appeal is dispositive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ¶ 11 Father next argues the family court’s findings are inadequate to satisfy the requirements of A.R.S. § 25-403(B). In making a custody determination, the court must consider the factors enumerated in A.R.S. § 25-403(A) regarding the children’s best interests. Further, A.R.S. § 25-403(B) requires that, “[i]n a contested custody case, the court shall make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the child[ren].” (Emphasis added.) ¶ 12 In Diezsi, this court held that it was an abuse of discretion for the lower court to fail to make the requisite findings pursuant to § 25-403. 201 Ariz. at 526, ¶ 5, 38 P.3d at 1191. See also Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 421-22, ¶ 12, 79 P.3d 667, 670-71 (App. 2003) (<HOLDING>); Downs v. Scheffler, 206 Ariz. 496, 501, ¶ 19,

    ### Response:
    holding that the family court abused its discretion in changing the primary residential parent and altering the parenting time schedule without making the required findings on the record in a contested custody case brought under the relocation statute ars  25408
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether the DOC’s policies requiring all of the ISC’s commitments to undergo a visual strip and body cavity search comports with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches. Upon careful review of the stipulated facts and relevant policies, the Court finds those policies to be unconstitutional. Any analysis of the policies in issue necessarily begins with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States considered whether a policy requiring pretrial detainees at a federal detention facility to expose their body cavities to visual inspection after contact visits with persons outside the institution was constitutional. Id. at 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861. In holding that the policy did not (7th Cir.1983)(<HOLDING>); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th

    ### Response:
    holding unconstitutional city policy of subjecting all females arrested and detained to strip and visual body cavity searches
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    language, ... or makes an obscene gesture; d. Obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic or the use of a public facility; g. Creates á hazardous, physically offensive, or seriously alarming condition by any act that serves no legitimate purpose; or h. Engages in harassing conduct by means of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another person. In City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789, 794-95 (N.D.1989), this Court upheld a disorderly conduct conviction based on the defendant’s use of “fighting words” likely to provoke violent reaction where the jury could have reasonably found bystanders in a public place heard the defendant make threatening statements from his private property tr.2d 837, 839 (1992) (<HOLDING>); City of Dodge City v. Hadley, 262 Kan. 234,

    ### Response:
    holding limited investigative detention of defendant was justified where officer investigated a report that a panhandler at a drugstore had been creating a disturbance potentially implicating a violation of the disorderly conduct statute and defendant matched the description of the suspect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the regulation of interstate commerce in order to prevent unjust discrimination. Id. at 97, 35 S.Ct. 494. Thus, even if a carrier intentionally misrepresents its rate and a customer relies on the misrepresentation, the carrier cannot be held to the promised rate if it conflicts with the published tariff. See AT & T Co., 524 U.S. at 222, 118 S.Ct. 1956 (citing Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639, 653, 33 S.Ct. 391, 57 L.Ed. 683 (1913)). i. The filed-tariff doctrine bars courts from hearing challenges to duly filed rates In addition, and of moment in this case, the filed-tariff doctrine bars eourts from hearing any challenge to duty filed rates. See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251-52, 71 S.Ct. 692, 95 L.Ed. 912 (1951) (<HOLDING>); Fax Telecomm. Inc., 138 F.3d at 489 (by

    ### Response:
    holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    those at issue here, together with wages, remunerate employees for services rendered. — U.S. at -,---, 126 S.Ct. at 2109, 2111-2112. If the contributions at issue are in respect of employees’ services that were rendered prepetition, as here, under the plain meaning of Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(A) and the rationale of the foregoing decisions, the claim for such contributions cannot be accorded priority status under Bankruptcy Code sections 503(b)(1)(A) and 507(a)(1). McFarlin’s, 789 F.2d at 101-102. All of the authorities cited by the Trustees for a contrary reading of sections 503(b) and 507(a) are from courts outside the Second Circuit or construe a different section of the Bankruptcy Code, section 507(a)(4). See, e.g., In re Braniff, Inc., 218 B.R. 628, 631 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1998) (<HOLDING>); accord, Ivey v. Great West Life & Annuity

    ### Response:
    holding that under bankruptcy code section 507a4 the services were an insurers provision of health insurance coverage for employees during the 180day period immediately before the petition date rather than the earlier labor by the employees on which such coverage was based
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we are not compelled by either logic or existing precedent to accept that proposition. As explained below, if the jury found, as it could, that Officer Wyatt was in the passenger seat of a slowly rolling vehicle, it could conclude that he did not face an immediate threat to safety sufficient to justify the immediate use of deadly force. Our decision simply identifies a disputed issue of material fact. If, as Chief Judge Kozinski's dissent bemoans, that gives plaintiffs ""a bludgeon with which to extort a hefty settlement,” id., it will only be because the defendants are concerned that a jury might not view the evidence as the dissent does. 3 . The constitutional standard for using force less than deadly force is lower. See Gregory v. County of Maui, 523 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Because it is undisputed that Gonzalez did

    ### Response:
    holding that officers had substantial grounds for believing that some degree of force was necessary where suspect was possibly under the influence of drugs acting bizarrely trespassing and refusing repeated commands to drop a pen
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    financial aspects of drug trafficking and his professional opinion that drug traffickers keep financial records at their homes. In addition, the affidavit provided information obtained from reliable cooperating witnesses and electric company records. This information was sufficient for the issuance of the search warrant in this case. See United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 975 (6th Cir.1998) (stating that “[i]n the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live”). b. Particularity The Blairs also argue that the federal search warrant was overbroad in that it lacked particularity as to the items to be seized. Because the Blairs failed to make this argument to the district court, it is waived. See United States v. Critton, 43 F.3d 1089, 1094 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Even if the Blairs’ argument were properly

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the majority of circuits that have concluded St. Cyr does not apply to aliens who challenged their aggravated felony convictions by exercising their right to jury trial. We conclude that just as foregoing or exercising a right to jury trial can demonstrate objectively reasonable reliance, those who proceed to trial but forgo their right to appeal have suffered impermissible retroactive effects under IIRIRA § 304(b). Following the Supreme Court’s analysis in St. Cyr, the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have held that determining whether a statute has retroactive effects does not entail an inquiry into litigants’ actual subjective reliance on prior law, but rather, a review of what reasonable litigants would consider in a given situation. See, e.g., Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 396 (<HOLDING>); Thaqi v. Jenifer, 377 F.3d 500, 504 n. 2 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding in the context of a non  212c iirira retroactivity challenge that if reliance were required we would insist at most upon objectively reasonable reliance and not subjective reliance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in which we held that the BIA erred because it made “no pronouncement on the credibility of Dial-lo’s underlying testimony or of his explanations for the lack of additional corroborating evidence,” the IJ here made clear that he found Ebid’s testimony not credible because he knowingly relied on a fraudulent document that he did not reveal to be fraudulent until after a government investigation. We thus have no difficulty in reviewing the IJ’s determination with respect to Ebid’s credibility. Nor do we find error in the IJ’s dismissal of Ebid’s explanation that he submitted the fraudulent letter because a friend had told him that it was necessary to have corroboration. In contrast to circumstances in which an applicant uses a false document under duress, see, e.g., Lin, 445 F.3d at 132, (<HOLDING>), this explanation does not undermine the IJ’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the use of a fraudulent document to escape persecution does not undermine a petitioners credibility in asylum proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would not be applicable to him during the entire period w e facts is consistent with the text of the regulation, with precedent, and with the policy underlying the administration of the salary basis test of “avoiding] the imposition of massive and unanticipated overtime liability.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905. AFFIRMED. 1 . Initially, plaintiffs claimed the City had imposed a total of four improper suspensions without pay. Two of the four, however, were permissible week-long Monday-to-Friday suspensions, and are, therefore, not relevant to whether the City had a practice of improper deductions. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (1998) (""[A]n employee need not be paid for any workweek in which he performs no work.”); Childers v. City of Eugene, 120 F.3d 944, 946 n. 2 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Plaintiffs contend that their position is

    ### Response:
    holding weeklong suspensions do not violate the flsa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we must affirm the circuit court. By the Court. — Judgment affirmed. 1 Generally, a defendant who pleads guilty waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses. See County of Racine v. Smith, 122 Wis. 2d 431, 434, 362 N.W.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1984). However, Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10) (2011-12) creates an exception to this rule, allowing appellate review of an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, notwithstanding a guilty plea. Smith, 122 Wis. 2d at 434-35. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version. 2 While Scull originally filed his notice of appeal in December 2011, our decision in this case has been delayed by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), and our subsequent request tha Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a trained dogs detection of odor in a common corridor of a hotel does not contravene the fourth amendment and that the information developed from such a sniff may properly be used to support a search warrant affidavit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Marat Ginayatovich Umarov, a native and citizen of Russia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order denying his motion to reopen proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, and we review de novo questions of law, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Hernandez v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2008). We deny the petition for review. Umarov’s contention that an acquaintance whom he knew not to be a lawyer provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel is foreclosed by Hernandez, 524 F.3d at 1020 (<HOLDING>). His due process contention therefore fails.

    ### Response:
    holding that knowing reliance upon the advice of a nonattorney cannot support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in a removal proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issues, that he has ADHD and depression, for which he must be medicated, that he has speech problems requiring therapy, and that he has made several outcries of sexual assault. Given the circumstances of both Appellant and the child, and based on the applicable standard of review, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding that Appellant engaged in conduct that endangered AJ.H.’s well-being. We overrule the fourth issue and do not reach the remaining issues. We note that Appellant has not challenged the best interest finding. Having disposed of Appellant’s six issues, we affirm the trial court’s order of termination. 1 . Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405(1) (Vernon Supp.2006). 2 . Id.; see also In re D.A.R., 201 S.W.3d 229 (Tex.App., 2006, no pet. h.) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See House Comm. On Juvenile Justice and

    ### Response:
    holding that section 263405i bars this court from considering issues not appearing in a timelyfiled statement of points
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (615 SE2d 540) (2005) (noting that in the absence of a transcript, appellate court “must presume that the evidence supports the judge’s findings”); Portee v. State of Ga., 277 Ga. App. 536, 537 (1) (a) (627 SE2d 63) (2006) (“[W]hen a portion of the record which is necessary for our determination of one or more appellate issues is not before the court, the trial court’s express or implicit ruling as to those issues must be affirmed.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 11 Murray v. Hooks, 313 Ga. App. 485 (722 SE2d 82) (2012), citing Nodvin v. State Bar of Ga., 273 Ga. 559, 560 (3) (544 SE2d 142) (2001). 12 See Portee, supra at 539 (5) (assertions that lacked an evidentiary basis demonstrated no reversible error); In the Interest of F. L. S., 232 Ga. App. 100, 101 (502 SE2d 256) (1998) (<HOLDING>); Baugh v. Robinson, 179 Ga. App. 571, 572 (346

    ### Response:
    holding that partys failure to specify how his presence would have been of assistance at the hearing precluded the requisite showing of harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Valley, which the circuit court granted prior to ruling on the motion. In our review of the record, it is clear that Mr. Valley’s deposition reinforced and further supported the existence of Union Pacific's facts, and there was no contrary evidence in the record. 7 . The version of 49 C.F.R. 232.103(n) in effect in 2007, at the time of Johnson’s accident, includes the language “on a grade.” However, this phrase was later removed by an amendment in 2015. 80 Fed. Reg. 47350-01 (published August 6, 2015). While Johnson attached to his brief a copy of the later regulation omitting this phrase, our analysis rests on the version of the regulation that was in force at the time of the accident, in 2007. See Damon v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., No. 2:05CV60, 2006 WL 2699736 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 19, 2006)

    ### Response:
    holding that 49 cfr  232103n only applies to unattended equipment left on a grade
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008) (explaining that when a plan administrator both appraises and pays benefits claims, the resulting conflict of interest must be weighed in determining “whether there is an abuse of discretion”). But because this case is properly decided on a contractual time bar, whether the circuits might have differed on the merits is beside the point Affirmed. 1 . ERISA is the acronym for Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B)(2006), the federal statute comprehensively governing employee health and pension plans and providing federal remedies and a federal forum for wrongful denial of.benefits. 2 . See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Denman Tire Corp., 240 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations and quotation marks

    ### Response:
    recognizing that under illinois law parties are free to contract for a time period within which a suit may be brought  which is less than the general statute of limitation period applicable to written contracts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    LLC In its motion to dismiss, Culver challenges the sufficiency of the allegations in the corporate plaintiffs’ complaint to support a § 1981 claim. Relying on out-of-district precedent, Culver argues that their allegations lack sufficient factual specificity demonstrating that race was the reason for its actions. At the outset, the Court notes that the corporate plaintiffs who were the parties to the franchise agreements with Culver have standing to bring a § 1981 claim here. See Amber Pyramid, Inc. v. Buffington Harbor Riverboats, L.L.C., 129 Fed.Appx. 292, 294 (7th Cir.2005) (allowing corporation owned by two African-American shareholders to maintain § 1981 suit) (citing cases); see also Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Here, the corporate entities are each

    ### Response:
    holding where corporation had acquired imputed racial identity and was direct target of discrimination it had standing to pursue  1981 claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    W. Daisey petitions pro se for review of the decision of the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) that it lacks jurisdiction over Daisey’s appeal from a decision of the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”). We have jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C § 1153(a). We review de novo the NTSB’s conclusions of law. Olsen v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 14 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir.1994). We deny the petition for review. The NTSB correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Daisey’s appeal of the FAA’s revocation and non-approval of check airman authority because check airmen serve under the Administrator’s delegated authority, which the Administrator may rescind “at any time for any reason.” 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d); cf. Adams v. FAA 1 F.3d 955, 956-57 (9th Cir.1993) (per cu-riam) (<HOLDING>); Greenwood v. FAA 28 F.3d 971, 974-75 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that this court lacked jurisdiction to review the faas decision to not renew a pilot examiner designation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a claim or the day suit is filed. Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 531 (Tex.1998). However, how this rule applies to cases where damages accrue at times subsequent to either date is an issue that the Texas Supreme Court has not yet addressed. This court must predict how the Texas Supreme Court would decide this issue. In making an “Erie guess” in a diversity case, this court will “seek guidance by looking to the precedents established by intermediate state appellate courts only when the state supreme court has not spoken on an issue.” Webb v. City of Dallas, 314 F.3d 787, 795 (5th Cir.2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, 147-CV, 2001 WL 893986, at *8 (Tex.App.—Dallas Aug.9, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). These cases, however, do not factor into this

    ### Response:
    holding that prejudgment interest should not be calculated based on a paycheckbypaycheck basis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pleas court and the Superior Court, where she argued primarily that DiMarco, Troxel, and Section 324A were controlling. Appellee also did not assert that she was denied an adequate procedure in which to advance evidence or argument on the policy matters at the heart of the duty decision. In such circumstances, to the extent that Appellee attempts to do so at the present stage of the appellate litigation, those arguments are unpreserved. See In re J.M., 556 Pa. 63, 83 n. 15, 726 A.2d 1041, 1051 n. 15 (1999) (finding waiver of an issue, on the part of one who became an appellee in the Supreme Court, that was not raised before the trial court or the Superior Court where that party was the appellant); accord Commonwealth v. McMullen, 599 Pa. 435, 443 n. 2, 961 A.2d 842, 846 n. 2 (2008) (<HOLDING>). In any event, as a consequence of Appellee’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a litigant did not waive a claim because it was the appellee in the intermediate appellate court  emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 397. This Court had cited the following language from Cooter v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 344 So.2d 496, 498 (Al.1977), which we find particularly telling: The fatal weakness of the appellants’ contention for coverage lies in its failure to acknowledge one of the elements essential to recovery for negligent entrustment — the negligent operation of the motor vehicle.... The plain wording of the exclusionary provision reveals the deficien 99 Tenn.App. Lexis 440 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999) (explaining that vehicle owner’s liability for negligent entrustment did not rest on imputed negligence, but was based on his own negligence in entrusting the automobile to an incompetent driver); Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Company v. Center Mutual Insurance Company, 658 N.W.2d 363 (N.D.2003) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 17 After study, however, we conclude that

    ### Response:
    holding that because there were motor vehiclerelated acts of negligence and nonmotor vehiclerelated acts of negligence both involved in the same accident concurrent coverage under both the auto policy and the farm policy existed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    automatically renewed for successive one-year terms, unless either party gave sixty days’ notice of termination or ninety days’ notice of intent to renegotiate. The contract further provided that, during its term, the county and each city which approved the contract agreed not to contract with “any other individual or firm to provide solid waste removal from residential premises in any [cjity.” Appellees’ App. at 139. Mr. Umbehr hauled trash for six of the seven cities in the county from 1985 until the county terminated the contract in 1991. In other words, the contract was automatically renewed each year, according to its terms. Throughout this time period, Mr. Umbe 02 (6th Cir.), vacated, 882 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.1989), reinstated in pertinent part, 924 F.2d 627 (6th Cir.1991) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250, 111 S.Ct. 2889,

    ### Response:
    holding that it was not clearly established that independent contractor claiming denial of public contract because of political affiliation was protected under first amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    demonstrate cause for her trial counsel’s failure to raise her continuity of counsel claim, she has failed to make the requisite showing of prejudice. We thus affirm the denial of relief. A. Cause Harris advances two reasons why there is cause for her trial counsel’s failure to raise the continuity of counsel claim. She first argues that the lack of continuity of counsel itself supplies cause to excuse the default. Although this may explain why some of her lawyers failed to raise the claim—that is, they held appointments only for a matter of days or weeks—ultimately her assertion begs the question why Bowen and Argo, who tried the case, failed to raise the claim during the months they represented Harris (Argo for about 12 and Bowen for about 6). See Ex parte Harris, 947 So.2d at 1149 (<HOLDING>). Harris’s second, related, argument for why

    ### Response:
    holding that harris defaulted her claim because bowen and argo had at least nine months in which to consider whether the fact that harris had been represented by so many different pretrial attorneys amounted to ineffective assistance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is GRANTED IN PART. Claims 16, 22 & 24 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 3. UNO’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART. Claims 11, 16, 21, 22 & 23 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 4. The Court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Andela’s state law claims against both UM and UNC. Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 & 15 are hereby DISMISSED. 5. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to CLOSE this case. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. 1 . Because the Parties submitted extensive evidence of the administrative and state proceedings in this action, the Court converted UM and UNC's Motions to Dismiss into motions for Summary Judgment with respect to their arguments asserting res judicata. Papa John’s Intern., Inc. v. Cosentino, 916 So.2d 977, 983 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may not take judicial notice of separate legal proceedings on a motion to dismiss and defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel must be resolved through motion for summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of limitations under Lampf. “However, every circuit to have addressed the issue since Lampf has held that inquiry notice is the appropriate standard.” Id. at 703-04 (listing the various circuits that have ruled upon the issue). Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Berry court held that actual notice is the appropriate standard is patently contradicted by the opinion. Specifically, the Berry court ruled that “we need not decide whether actual discovery or inquiry notice applies, because under either standard the Forbes article did not trigger the statute of limitations.” Id. at 704. This Court joins the circuits that have ruled upon the issue and finds that inquiry notice is the appropriate standard. See Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1341 (N.D.Ga.1998) (<HOLDING>); cf. White v. Mercury Marine, 129 F.3d 1428,

    ### Response:
    holding inquiry notice to be appropriate standard under lampf
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    considered employee’s actions in foreign state in determining whether minimum contacts existed to confer jurisdiction over South Carolina bail bondsman in foreign court). 8 . Dolan v. City of Camden, 233 S.C. 1, 103 S.E.2d 328 (1958) (municipalities, which have full and complete control over streets and highways within their corporate limits, are liable for injuries caused by failure to use reasonable care to keep them in a reasonably safe condition for public travel). 9 . 24A S.C.Code Ann. Regs. 61-16 § 613 (1992) (requiring hospitals to maintain certain minimum standards and equipment to provide emer gency care and services, including around-the-clock access to x-ray and routine laboratory services and a licensed physician). 10 . See e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d at 1379-82 (<HOLDING>); Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 156 Ill.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that hospital may be held liable for negligence of emergency room physicians under apparent agency doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the absence of any allegations that the vendor payments were, in fact, bribes — that is, that they were paid by the vendors with the intent to improperly influence or corrupt Starwood’s conduct on behalf of the Blue Tree Owners — Star-wood’s alleged breach of its fiduciary duties is insufficient to establish commercial bribery. No such allegations appear in the Blue Tree Owners’ complaint, however. Improper intent on the part of the vendors might be inferred from the Blue Tree Owners’ allegation that vendors who were unwilling or unable to make the vendor payments were precluded from competing for the Hotels’ business and, as a result, the Blue Tree Owners were unable to negotiate advantageous prices and terms with such vendors. But such b., Inc., 146 F.Supp.2d 385, 397 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (<HOLDING>) with Envtl. Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1054, 1066

    ### Response:
    holding that allegation that discounts or payments passed from one business to another does not implicate bribery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    context, that courts should not “penaliz[e] diligent counsel who has employed [§ 220] ... in a deliberate and thorough manner in preparing a eom-plaint[.]” Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 n.10 (Del. 1993) (applying the “first to file” rule for derivative litigation); see also Technicorp, 2000 WL 713750, at *9 n.26 (“[A]ccept[ing] ... [Defendants’ time-bar argument would penalize, not encourage, the use of those important tools.”). But a rale that automatically forbade tolling once a party had inquiry notice would do just that. Indeed, if a shareholder has enough suspicion of wrongdoing to file a successful § 220 action, then there is some probability that the shareholder also has inqifiry notice. See, Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 567 (Del. 1997) (<HOLDING>). The District Court’s categorical exception

    ### Response:
    holding that to institute a proper  220 action to investigate fraud the plaintiff must demonstrate a credible basis to find probable wrongdoing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    against the seller’s broker. Id. at 1297. In recognizing the limits of the economic loss doctrine in Moransais, the Florida supreme court favorably cited PK Ventures and stated that the court has “declined to extend the economic loss rule to actions based on ... negligent misrepresentation.” Moransais, 744 So.2d at 981; see Perfumeria, 231 F.Supp.2d at 1223 (explaining that the Florida supreme court has refused to apply the economic loss doctrine to the category of cases involving negligent misrepresentation); Stone Throw Condo. Assoc., Inc. v. Sand Cove Apartments, Inc., 749 So.2d 520 (Fl.2d DCA 1999)(reversing trial court’s decision to dismiss negligent misrepresentation claim based upon economic loss doctrine); see also Williams v. Bear Steams & Co., 725 So.2d 397 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)(<HOLDING>); Burton v. Linotype Co., 556 So.2d 1126, 1128

    ### Response:
    holding economic loss rule did not bar negligent misrepresentation claim where parties had no contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    analysis that defendants had a “special relationship” with plaintiffs and that plaintiffs’ evidence might suffice to show negligence. This argument ignores the district court’s finding that there was no evidence presented to show that defendants had any “actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm.” Nor did plaintiffs present evidence showing that defendants could have reasonably foreseen that either Stevens or Lovick were likely to abuse the children. Plaintiffs’ failure to present such evidence means that they cannot satisfy the third prong of this test. Gloria and Terry remain entitled to immunity for the negligence claims brought against them in their official capacities. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Finally, as the district court held, Gloria

    ### Response:
    holding that barring waiver by the state the eleventh amendment precludes federal courts from hearing state claims brought against state officials in their official capacities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is also without merit. The claim based on alleged evidence of three other possible suspects also fails on the merits. The record refutes Overton’s argument that information on Hector Hernandez was not disclosed to his counsel. Overton’s counsel testified that he was given the information about Hernandez. Consistent with that testimony, Ellsworth testified that he advised Overton’s counsel about Hernandez as a suspect upon his receipt of the information. Moreover, the information was actually inculpatory rather than exculpatory. These statements from Hernandez would establish that he was at the murder scene whi reports is also insufficiently pled as Overton does not present any information as to what these pages included or how such would be exculpatory. See Gore, 846 So.2d at 466-67 (<HOLDING>). The fact that alleged missing pages were from

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant insufficiently pled the brady claim because he failed to assert how the evidence was material or how he was prejudiced by the states nondisclo sure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supplemented by regs. 3.1 and 4.1, nor (b) general constitutional principles, in the light of the Frank case, 359 U. S. 360, 367, required the code enforcement inspector to have resort to § 131 to obtain a warrant. He was free to make use either of a bill in equity or the criminal sanction of reg. 3.1. 6. The defendant does not argue that, by denying admission, he did not “wilfully impede or obstruct” the inspector. Cf. District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U. S. 1, 4, 6-7, where the Supreme Court of the United States construed a somewhat comparable District regulation (penalizing, see p. 5, “interfering with or preventing” any inspection authorized by the regulations) as not mailing it an offence merely to decline to permit health officers to inspect. Despite language of the Little case (<HOLDING>), we construe the somewhat different language

    ### Response:
    holding that the word interfere in the regulation could not p 7 fairly be interpreted to encompass the respondents failure to unlock her door and her remonstrances on constitutional grounds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    It does require a history of effort to achieve repayment .... Relevant proof may ... include a history of some payment, the propitious use of deferments and the energetic exploration of employment options.”); Sands v. United Student Aid Funds (In the Matter of Sands), 166 B.R. 299, 311-312 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1994) (""In determining the Debtor's good faith, the court must not only examine the Debtor's payments towards his student loans, but also his efforts to negotiate deferments with the applicable student loan agency .... in addition, the timing of the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing may affect the good faith analysis.”). 15 . See, e.g., In re Rifino, 245 F.3d at 1088 (examining debtor's income and the reasonableness of her expenses under the first Brun-ner prong); In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 307 (<HOLDING>); Ammirati v. Nellie Mae, Inc. (In re

    ### Response:
    holding that debtor failed the first brunner prong because she did not demonstrate that she had maximized earnings and minimized expenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Property. In order to determine whether the owner of a property is a nominee, a court may consider any of the following factors: (1) whether the taxpayer expended personal funds for the property; (2) whether inadequate or no consideration was paid by the alleged nominee; (3) whether the property was placed in the alleged nominee’s name in anticipation of a lawsuit or other liability; (4) whether the taxpayer enjoys the benefits of, retains possession of, and exercises dominion and control over the property; (5) whether a close family relationship exists between the taxpayer and the alleged nominee; (6) whether conveyances between the taxpayer and alleged nominee were recorded; and (7) whether the alleged nominee interferes with the taxpayer’s use of the property. Id. at 694-95 (<HOLDING>). Based on the factors listed above, there are

    ### Response:
    holding that owner of townhouse was nominee of relative and therefore lien on property by irs was proper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also Young Br. at 12-13 (conceding that ""the district court did not directly use the weight of the PCC in determining [Young’s] offense level,” but that the weight of PCC was used to determine the quantity of pure PCP ""supposedly capable of being produced from the PCC”). 6 . In 1991, Note 2 was an application note to § 2D1.4, which provided that ""if a defendant is convicted of a conspiracy ... to commit any offense involving a controlled substance, the offense level shall be the same as if the object of the conspiracy ... had been completed.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4. The Sentencing Commission deleted § 2D 1.4 in 1992, and moved the relevant text of Note 2 to Application Note 12 of § 2D1.1. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 447; United States v. Ynfante, 78 F.3d 677, 680-81 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The principal deficiency Young asserts is

    ### Response:
    holding that amended note 12 applies to choate as well as inchoate offenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    suppression of these items that “he left in a company truck.” Plowman argues that he did not waive this ineffective assistance of counsel claim by entering his plea. We agree. A plea waives certain defenses for purposes of direct appeal. Lacey v. State, 831 So.2d 1267, 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Boddie v. State, 328 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). However, a plea does not waive ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding counsel’s failure to raise those defenses. See Skellie v. State, 849 So.2d 1220, 1220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“Although [defendant] waived all defenses by entering the plea, he nevertheless may be entitled to 3.850 relief if he can show that counsel did not adequately investigate or pursue a viable defense.”); Robinson v. State, 972 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>). Because this ground was not legally

    ### Response:
    holding that plea did not waive claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to seek suppression
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the jury that the stock was worthless both at the time of the sale and at the time of the tender, or, in other words, that the sale was without consideration.”). See generally 17 Williston on Contracts §51:18 (4th ed.) (discussing the defense of failure of consideration for the sale of securities and noting that, “[i]f the parties are dealing at arm’s length... and neither buyer nor seller is guilty of fraud, the defense of failure of consideration will not, by the weight of authority, prevail, unless the stock or other security had neither a market value, nor an intrinsic value both on the day of the contract and on the day of tender”). 10 Coast Scopitone, 127 Ga. App. at 126 (1); see also Jones v. Dixie O’Brien Div., O’Brien Corp., 174 Ga. App. 67, 68 (1) (329 SE2d 256) (1985) (<HOLDING>); Fagala v. Morrison, 146 Ga. App. 377, 377 (1)

    ### Response:
    holding testimony that inter alia paint at issue was defective and of no value whatsoever was sufficient evidence that the consideration had totally failed punctuation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were induced to forebear from filing suit. See Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 562-63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (finding a triable issue as to the estate’s estoppel to claim the limitations defense where the decedent’s surviv- or actively misled a hospital into believing that the decedent left no estate from which to collect outstanding bills), abrogated by May v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143 (Fla.2000); Alachua County v. Cheshire, 603 So.2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (applying equitable estoppel where the federal government, by continual assurances of payment, induced the plaintiff not to sue on a lien against government-seized property within the limitations period); Jaszay v. H.B. Corp., 598 So.2d 112, 113 (Fla. 4th D 2d 846, 848 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>); Cape Cave Corp. v. Lowe, 411 So.2d 887,

    ### Response:
    holding that continuing settlement negotiations if infected with an element of deception may create an estoppel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arguments exclusively discussed the concept of unanimity, even with regard to the possible non-death sentences. For example, Instruction Number 14 stated as follows: In the event you assess the death penalty, your verdict must be unanimous. You may also return a unanimous verdict of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole or imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole. When you have reached your verdict, all of you in a body must return it into open court. There is, however, no discussion in the instructions of the effect of the jury failing to reach a unanimous verdict. This court certainly recognizes that such an instruction is required only in unusual circumstances. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381-82, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the failure to so inform the

    ### Response:
    holding eighth amendment does not require trial courts to instruct jury on consequences of failure to agree on sentence unless to fail to do so would affirmatively mislead the jury regarding its role in the sentencing process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to identify a title or rank. Section 147.55, however, provides that the short forms “may be used and are sufficient” but does not mandate the use of those forms. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 147.55. To the contrary, § 147.55 expressly states that “[t]he authorization of the forms in this section does not preclude the use of other forms.” Id. Nor does § 147.55 provide that an acknowledgment is defective merely because the notary public omits his or her official title. Because this Court does not have the authority to interpret an Ohio statute so as to add words to it, the Court declines to find within § 147.55 a rule that an acknowledgment is defective if a notary public fails to identify herself as such. Cf. Helbling v. Zabor (In re Zabor), 2009 WL 2256911 at *5 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio July 22, 2009) (<HOLDING>). It is true that courts have interpreted the

    ### Response:
    holdingin an adversary proceeding in which the issue was whether the certificate of acknowledgment must include the date of signingthat the date was not required and that the statutory short form of acknowledgment was not dispositive because while the date is indeed a part of the short form of acknowledgment authorized under ohio revcode  14755 that section does not preclude the use of other forms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. at 939 (""The Act was meant to shield debtors from abusive collection practices, but it was never intended to shift the balance of power between debtors and creditors such that a debt collector cannot work with a debtor's attorney to settle claims without exposing itself to liability.""). 9 . Wolpoff argues it is immune from liability under the TDCA because ""a lawyer is 'quali-fiedly immune' from civil liability, with respect to non-clients, for actions taken in connection with representing a client in litigation.” Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 8. To the contrary, the TDCA expressly makes actionable misleading representations made in judicial proceedings. Tex Fin.Code § 392.304(a)(8); see also Gibson v. Grupo de Ariel, LLC, No. 4:05-CV-415-BE, 2006 WL 42369, *4 (N.D.Tex. Jan.9, 2006)

    ### Response:
    holding that filing a lawsuit in the wrong court is actionable under the tdca
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ... the officer performs a discretionary act.”). Although federal law does not determine whether an officer’s actions are discretionary for purposes of state law, nonetheless an examination of federal immunity law is instructive. Under federal law, the act in question must be discretionary as a prerequisite to an extension of qualified immunity. See Streetman v. Jordan, 918 F.2d 555, 556 (5th Cir.1990) (“Qualified immunity cloaks a police officer from personal liability for discretionary acts which do not violate well-established law.”). Thus, those cases in which a federal court extends immunity to a police officer, necessarily determine that the disputed actions are discretionary. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039-40, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Swint v. City of Wadley, 5 F.3d 1435 (11th

    ### Response:
    holding officers engaged in search entitled to immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the nurses’ actions, and because Dr. Berger did not provide that opinion, plaintiffs have failed to present any expert opinion on causation to support their survival claims against Tenet. ‘ This does not necessarily mean that the plaintiffs’ survival claims fail, however. Plaintiffs also alleged that Tenet was liable for Medrano’s death because Tenet was vicariously liable for the actions of Dr. Boone in prematurely pulling on the catheter and tearing her heart muscle. When a health care liability claim involves a vicarious liability theory, either alone or in combination with other theories, and there is an expert report sufficient to support that vicarious liability theory, the entire case may proceed. Certified EMS, Inc., 392 S.W.3d at 632; TTHR Ltd. Partnership, 401 S.W.3d at 44 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we proceed to address the adequacy of

    ### Response:
    holding that because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert report adequate as to the vicarious liability claim against the hospital based on the actions of the doctors plaintiffs suit against the hospital including her claim that the hospital was vicariously hable for the actions of its nurses could proceed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the time the Agreement was recorded Hoffenberg owned both parcels of land. Because the Agreement purported to convey an easement from Hoffenberg, as both grantor and grantee, the trial court held that Hoffenberg’s attempt to create an easement over his own property was void ab initio. The trial court further held that One Harbor neither proved the establishment of an easement by prescription nor an implied easement because the equitable arguments raised were not supported by the facts, the record or the law. We agree with the trial court’s findings. APPLICATION OF SECTION 687.07, FLORIDA STATUTES In reaching its decision, the trial court applied section 689.07, Florida Statutes (1959). Section 689.07 provides: (1) Every deed or conveyance of real estate heretofore (Tex.Com.App.1928) (<HOLDING>); Bales v. Butts, 309 Mo. 142, 274 S.W. 679

    ### Response:
    recognizing that one cannot have an easement in his own land
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    concerning employment. If a court can uphold state rights without interpreting the terms of a CBA, allowing suit based on the state rights does not undermine the pur pose of section 301 preemption: guaranteeing uniform interpretation of terms in collective bargaining agreements. Therefore, “nonnegotiable state-law rights ... independent of any right established by contract” are not preempted. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213, 105 S.Ct. at 1912. A contrary rule would permit unions and employers to exempt themselves from state labor standards. Congress never intended “to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.” Id. at 212, 105 S.Ct. at 1912; see, e.g., Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, June 13, 1988. In this case,

    ### Response:
    holding that a wrongful discharge claim based on violation of a state public policy is not preempted because it is a nonnegotiable independent statelaw right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of, such person for any offense connected with the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws, or (ii) any request is made under section 6103(h)(3)(B) for the disclosure of any return or return information (within the meaning of section 6103(b)) relating to such person.” 26 U.S.C. § 7602(d)(2)(A). Agent Weinger has attested that “[a]s of the date of this declaration, there is no ‘Justice Department referral,’ as that term is described in 26 U.S.C. § 7602(d), in effect with respect to the Khans for any of the periods in issue.” (R. 30, Weinger Decl. ¶ 13.) This representation satisfies this Court that Petitioners have not been referred to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. See United States v. Ins. Consultants of Knox, Inc., 187 F.3d 755, 759 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Petitioners argue, however, that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the government can usually satisfy its burden of demonstrating the propriety of an irs summons through an affidavit of one of its agents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the private right of action made available under § 2114 was modeled after OSHA’s retaliatory discharge provision, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c). See S.Rep. No. 98-454, at 12 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4831, 4842. Under OSHA, in order for a plaintiff to establish that he was terminated in retaliation for filing a health or safety complaint, he must show that the “protected activity was a substantial reason for the action,” although it “need not be the sole consideration behind discharge.” 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6(b). In such circumstances, as under § 2114, the ultimate question is whether the discharge or other adverse action would have “taken place ‘but for’ engagement in protected activity.” Id.; see also Dole v. H.M.S. Direct Mail Serv., Inc., 752 F.Supp. 573, 580 (W.D.N.Y.1990) (<HOLDING>); Donovan v. Commercial Sewing, Inc., 562

    ### Response:
    holding that although the plaintiff was a problem employee and eventually may have been terminated for that reason the immediate cause of his termination was the osha report
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inquiring into the legitimacy of the regulatory claims would mire the bankruptcy courts in “mini-trials of purely state regulatory issues.” Id. at 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In McMullen, we cited Spookyworld in noting “the tenuousness of the arguments for engrafting such a ‘bad faith’ exception ... noting the emergent rule that bankruptcy eoui'ts should not inquire into the legitimacy of ongoing administrative enforcement proceedings in determining whether the police power exception applies to them.” 386 F.3d at 328 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, even if the Partnership pi’evailed on this claim, it is questionable whether it would be able to collect much in the way of damages. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1); Spookyworld, 346 F.3d at 7 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, any recovery likely would be

    ### Response:
    holding that a debtor that is a corporation cannot sue under  362h for a violation of the automatic stay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    brother Benjamin Culbertson, an attorney, filed a divorce action on August 5,1993 on grounds of Kristi Culbertson’s adultery. Attached to her Answer and Counterclaim, Kristi appended an affidavit stating that she was not involved in an adulterous affair. On August 23, 1993, the family court conducted a hearing regarding temporary custody of the Culbertsons’ minor daughter. At the hearing, in response to Kristi’s affidavit which was before the court and which denied adultery, Benjamin offered Thomas’s affidavit, including transcripts of telephone conversations taped by Thomas that revealed Kristi’s adulterous activity. It appears that at the time of this submission, Benjamin was aware of the statute and the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Kristi’s counsel objected to the introduction

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no spousal exception to the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Neither is this court free to reopen and replace Congress’s judgment with our own.”), and the factual similarities between Prost and the case here, Mr. Abernathy’s claims appear to be barred, see Stine v. Davis, 442 Fed.Appx. 405, 405-06 (10th Cir.2011) (“A Chambers-type argument that his prior escape convictions did not merit a career offender enhancement was available to Mr. Stine at the time of his initial § 2255 motion. The fact that Chambers itself was not decided until after Mr. Stine filed his initial § 2255 motion makes no difference. Neither does the fact that Mr. Stine may have tried and lost a Chambers-type argument in his first § 2255 motion mean that it was an inadequate and ineffective remedial vehicle for challenging his detention.”); see also Brace, 634 F.3d at 1170 (<HOLDING>). However, Mr. Abernathy presents two arguments

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant is precluded from bringing his ncmiosbased statutory interpretation argument under prost
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Biotech Corp., 178 B.R. 34, 38-39 (Bankr.D.Mass.1995), held that a certificate of deposit which states on its face ""nonnegotiable and nonlransferable” is a general intangible under Rhode Island law. Acknowledging that its holding was against the weight of authority, the court held that ""[nonnegotiable, nontransferable certificates of deposit] are not instruments because they are not transferable in the ordinary course of business.” Id. at 39. However, the court made no factual finding as to whether in commercial practice such certificates are in fact transferred, but merely stated, ""I do not agree that the 'realities of business practice' need be consulted.” Id. at 38; see also Bank IV Topeka, N.A. v. Topeka Bank & Trust Co., 15 Kan.App.2d 341, 807 P.2d 686, 691 (Kan.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Bartow

    ### Response:
    holding that a certificate of deposit labeled nontransferable is not an instrument without making any inquiry into actual business practice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the proceedings: ""We do not mean that the non-moving party must produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment."" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.E.d.2d 265 (1986). Seizing in part on this declaration, a number of federal courts have found that evidence that would be inadmissible a , 520 U.S. 781, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 188 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997); Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 195 (10th Cir.1996) (""The nonmoving party is not required to produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, but the content or substance of the evidence must be admissible."") (quotation omitted) (italies in original); Petruszi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 1224, 1284-85 n. 9 (3d Cir.19983) (<HOLDING>). We find particularly instructive the case of

    ### Response:
    holding that hearsay evidence may be considered on summary judgment if the same evidence would be admissible in another form at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their staff in the correct way to handle child abuse cases. (Amended Complaint at 63.) Local governments may be held liable for' constitutional violations caused by official custom and policy. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A municipality cannot be liable for the failure to supervise or train an officer when there is no underlying constitutional violation by the officer. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986). However, actions of city policymakers, rather than those of the individual officer whose behavior directly impacted the plaintiffs, can be the predicate for § 1983 claims against a municipality. Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1063 (3d Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 1671,

    ### Response:
    holding city policymakers rather than turnkey were the city actors whose primary liability must be shown to establish  1983 claim arising from prisoner suicide
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    counsel are precluded from doing so. Although the lower court in the present case did not address this point in detail, the court did explain that the claim was denied because we have repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to rule 4 — 3.5(d)(4). The lower court provided its rationale for denying relief on the constitutional challenge and, in doing so, sufficiently complied with rule 3.851. Accordingly, Troy is not entitled to relief as to this subclaim. 8. Caldwell Claim Troy contends that the trial court’s instruction to the jury that its role is advisory diminished its responsibility, contrary 5 (Fla.2006)). Second, Troy’s claim that the trial court’s instruction diminished the jury’s sense of responsibility is meritless. See Card v. State, 803 So.2d 613, 628 (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>). Although the instructions provided during the

    ### Response:
    holding as meritless a claim that the standard jury instructions which refer to the jury as advisory and refer to jurys verdict as a recommendation violate caldwell
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bank with fewer than 20 employees that section 24, Fifth, has been impliedly repealed by the ADEA, reasoning that they are not in conflict inasmuch as the ADEA covers only employers with 20 or more employees; stating in dictum that, “arguably,” section 24, Fifth, has been impliedly repealed by the ADEA to the extent that they are, in fact, in conflict); compare Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (6th Cir. 1987) 823 F.2d 928, 931 (per curiam) (dealing with section 4, Fifth, of the Federal Reserve Act, as amended, codified at section 341, Fifth, of title 12 of the United States Code, its common designation, which, in line with the model of section 2 , 809 P.2d at pages 1301-1303 (same); compare Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, supra, 835 F.Supp. at pages 752-753 (<HOLDING>); Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,

    ### Response:
    holding to the effect that section 341 fifth as impliedly amended by title vii preempts state law to the extent but only to the extent that it conflicts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the mere ipse dixit of a credentialed witness.’ ” Id. at 232 (emphasis added) (quoting Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex.1999)). If an expert “brfings] to court little more than his credentials and a subjective opinion,” his testimony will not support a judgment. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex.1997) (substitution in original). We later observed that an expert’s testimony is conclusory as a matter of law if he “simply state[s] a conclusion without any explanation.” Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990-A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 389 (Tex.2008). And testimony is speculative if it is based on guesswork or conjecture. Although Coastal involved expert testimony, its holding is not necessarily limited to experts. See Coastal, 136 S.W.3d at 233 (<HOLDING>). We held that “[o]pinion testimony that is

    ### Response:
    holding that bare conclusions  even if unobjected to  cannot constitute probative evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the pending Motion to Strike, specifying Plaintiffs failure to seek leave to file the amendment as grounds to strike. [Doc. # 13 (Mot.Strike) at 2.] Additionally, Defendants argued that assuming the Court allowed Plaintiff to submit an untimely Motion to Amend Complaint, any motion should be denied because of a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff has not filed a response to Defendants’ Motion, timely or otherwise. DISCUSSION I. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Third Amended Complaint for Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) (Doc. # 13) A. Legal Standard Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may amend a pleading “once as a matter of course at any time before a r 96, 699 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). B. Analysis The Court recognizes that

    ### Response:
    holding that especially in civil rights claims a court has a duty to ensure that pro se litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the merits  due to ignorance of technical procedural requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Court is required to presume that all the factual allegations concerning the Defendants' purported deliberate indifference as to Candelaria's medical needs are true. Indeed, the Moving Defendants have proffered no facts overlooked by this Court nor have they provided medical records or affidavits concerning the medical care received by Candelaria during his tenure at Green Haven supporting their claim for supervisory immunity, accordingly, this Court need not, and indeed cannot, delve into the question of the prison officials’ subjective ""intent” as required by contemporary Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See Farmer v. Brennan, -U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1978-1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324-25, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (<HOLDING>). It is also persuasive to note that Candelaria

    ### Response:
    holding a subjective inquiry into a prison officials state of mind is mandated when it is claimed that the official has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (citation omitted). Additionally, courts within this circuit have adopted the majority position. See In re Clarkson, 168 B.R. 93, 94 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1994) (“Actions by creditors to collect a debt from the debtor, which are taken after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, are void ab initio and of no legal effect.”) (citation omitted); In re Lampkin, 116 B.R. 450, 453 (Bankr.D.Md.1990) (“This court will adhere to the general rule that violations of the stay are void.”); In re Burns, 112 B.R. 763, 765 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1990) (“Bankruptcy Courts have generally held that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void, and this Court finds no reason to disregard the general rule here.”); but see Blue Ridge Bank v. Boswell (In re Boswell), 206 B.R. 421, 423 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1997) (<HOLDING>). In the view of this Court, the clear weight

    ### Response:
    holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an appropriate degree of care to protect hotel guests from criminal victimization. Nor can it be said that the duty of anticipation extends only to crimes similar in nature and seriousness to those that have occurred in the past. See Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. P.D.R., 402 So.2d 442 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981), (burglaries sufficient to alert hotel operator to possibility of attack); Mozlak v. Ettinger, 25 Ill.App.3d 706, 323 N.E.2d 796 (1975); (attempted break-ins at women’s residence indicated possibility of assault); Jenness v. Sheraton-Cadillac Properties, Inc., 48 Mich.App. 723, 211 N.W.2d 106 (1973), (in which hotel employees allowed a prostitute to loiter and she assaulted a guest who refused her solicitations); Morgan v. Bucks Associates, 428 F.Supp. 546 (E.D.Pa., 1977), (<HOLDING>). In Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., supra, 418 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that auto thefts on parking lot should alert owner to danger of assaults citing restatement second of torts  281 comment j 1965
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Similarly, the Council argues that the Rules must rise or fall as a single regulatory scheme. ¶ 49 Our courts have repeatedly held that if part of a legislative act is unconstitutional, it alone should be severed if the balance of the act remains workable. Randolph v. Groscost, 195 Ariz. 423, 427, ¶ 13, 989 P.2d 751, 755 (1999); Long v. Napolitano, 203 Ariz. 247, 266, ¶ 70, 53 P.3d 172, 191 (App. 2002). The Rules have “the same effect and force as a law.” Goodman v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 201, 203, 665 P.2d 83, 85 (1983). Consequently, no reason appears, and neither the Cooperatives nor the Council suggest any, why we cannot similarly sever R14r-2-1611(A) from the Rules if the remaining regulatory framework is workable. See Burbridge v. Sampson, 74 F.Supp.2d 940, 954 (C.D.Cal.1999) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 50 We will sever R14-2-1611(A) and leave

    ### Response:
    holding boards unconstitutional regulations severable from remainder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    risk inadvertently foreclosing his right to pursue certain constitutional claims by ignorantly filing a petition that excluded those claims. After McCleskey, however, this is precisely the “trap for the unwary pro se petitioner” of which Justice Blackmun warned. Since a prisoner has no right to counsel in habeas proceedings, see Coleman, — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2566, the initial habeas petition is typically filed pro se, or at best with the assistance of jailhouse lawyers who are notoriously unreliable. The absence of a right to counsel in habeas proceedings means that lack of counsel does not constitute cause under the McCleskey rule for a pro se petitioner’s failure to raise a claim in his initial habeas petition. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Maynard, 948 F.2d 684, 688 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Thus, a petitioner’s initial pro se habeas

    ### Response:
    holding petitioners pro se status did not constitute adequate cause for failure to raise claims earlier
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the law as amended at the time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere with a vested right. Whether a particular expectation rises to the level of a vested right is not capable of precise definition. In recognizing the conclusory nature of the inquiry, this court has defined a vested right as an expectation that is so far perfected that it cannot be taken away by legislation. Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 108 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (1985). Although not capable of precise definition, a vested right is a complete and unconditional demand or exemption that may be equated with a property interest. See, e.g., Sepmeyer v. Holman, 162 Ill. 2d 249 (1994) (finding that expiration of a statute of limitations creates a vested right that is beyond legislative interference); Collin, 302 Ill. at 275 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff initially argues that it has a

    ### Response:
    holding that owner of land sought to be taken for public use has a vested right to compensation pursuant to law in effect at time of filing of petition because filing of petition creates an immediate fixed and determinate right to any compensation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    party who seeks to seal an entire record faces an even heavier burden.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The rationale underlying the “good cause” standard for nondispositive orders, namely that “the public has less of a need for access to court records attached only to non-dispositive motions because those documents are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action,” does not apply to this case. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the parties seek to seal the entire record of the proceedings in the district court, including the court’s opinion. The district court properly invoked the “compelling reasons” standard in considering the sealing request. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). The only reasons provided for sealing the

    ### Response:
    holding that only the most compelling reasons can justify the total foreclosure of public and professional scrutiny to a courts basis for the adjudication
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    services they perform, its relationship with its customers, and by the fact that failure to properly perform the contract could have far-reaching or appalling consequences.” See id. at ¶ 168. Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, the Armored Car Carrier Act does not create a legal duty distinct from Defendant’s contract obligations. First, while Plaintiff cites to the Armored Car Carrier Act, it does not state what, if any, particular provision of the statute that Defendant violated. Plaintiff simply cites to the definitions section of the Act. Without an allegation that Defendant violated one or more provisions of the Armored Car Carrier Act’s provisions, Plaintiffs negligence claim must fail. See Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 139, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595, 204 N.E.2d 635 (1965) (<HOLDING>). Second, to the extent that Plaintiff is

    ### Response:
    holding that liability arises out of a statute only in limited instances where disregard of the command of the statute results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Since Irene Lifson did not have the “team laptop,” the only place she could respond to pages was at home. Therefore, a reasonable fact-finder could easily conclude that at the time of her accident, Irene was en route to the place where she and her employer expected her to, and where she in fact would have done, work for MONY. While we have some doubt as to whether a reasonable insured would understand the policy language in light of New York caselaw interpreting similar statutory phrases, we believe such law also strongly favors the Plaintiff. An employee who can show either that they were to carry out “a specific work assignment for the employer’s benefit at the end of the particular homeward trip,” or that they engage in “so regular a pattern o 2, 289 N.Y.S.2d 534, 535-36 (1968) (<HOLDING>); cf. Neacosia v. N.Y. Power Auth., 85 N.Y.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that lifeguard on call was in course of employment because she was in a position to return quickly to work and employer benefitted from her availability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    159, 842 P.2d 975, 978 (1992), affd in part, rev’d in part, 124 Wash.2d 158, 876 P.2d 435 (1994). The Restatement defines the doctrine of promissory estoppel as follows: A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action of forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1979). The doctrine of promissory estoppel is used to enforce a promise where there is a lack of consideration and as such does not apply to the facts of this ease. See Hatfield v. Columbia Federal Savings Bank, 57 Wash.App..876, 790 P.2d 1258, 1263 (1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case there is an express contract and

    ### Response:
    holding that the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not apply where promise was supported by bargained for consideration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Judge, 864 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir.1989) (stating that Bertine “does not condemn all forms of police discretion, but only ‘evidentiary discretion which is exercised on the basis of suspicion of criminal activity”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918, 110 S.Ct. 1946, 109 L.Ed.2d 309 (1990). Because that requirement is met by the MPPD inventory search policy, Andrews has not shown that Adams violated the Fourth Amendment by searching Andrews’ notebook. See United States v. Walker, 931 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (5th Cir.1991) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where “police department had an established but unwritten inventory policy,” the purpose of which “was to protect the property of the owner and to reduce the potential liability of the police department”); Gallo, 927 F.2d at 819 (<HOLDING>). Andrews also argues, however, that no

    ### Response:
    holding that inventory search could not be condemned insofar as department policy permitted opening box for the standard purposes of inventory searches
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 8(a)(3) of the Act. Finally, the record lacks substantial evidence to support a § 8(a)(5) violation. Section 8(a)(5) prohibits an employer from bypassing the union to bargain directly with employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684, 64 S.Ct. 830, 88 L.Ed. 1007 (1944); Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 48 F.3d 1360, 1368 (4th Cir.1995). However, an employer is allowed to talk with employees and to communicate its position to them. Americare Pine Lodge Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. NLRB, 164 F.3d 867 (4th Cir.1999). The limit of these communications is offering a quid pro quo that is not before the union. Id. The employer’s § 8(a)(5)-duty is to present proposals to the union before communicating them to employees. See Ameri-care, 164 F.Sd at 876-77 (<HOLDING>). There is, however, no “rule requiring

    ### Response:
    holding that an employer could only distribute its proposal to union employees when the proposal was properly before the union
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the conditions of supervision which he has been doing since he was released on bond. (Tr. 11/26/13, pp. 17-18). Having heard the argument, the court then queried the government about its “position on home confinement here.” Id. p. 18. The government responded by saying that it was asking for a sentence of imprisonment within the range. Id. As for the § 3553 sentencing factors, circuits are split as to whether a district court need consider § 3553 factors when, as here, the revocation is mandatory under § 3583. Compare, U.S. v. Thornhill, 759 F.3d 299, 311 (3d Cir.2014) (stating that, “Meaningful consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is also required in revocation proceedings.”) with U.S. v. Garza, 706 F.3d 655, 658 (5th Cir.2013); U.S. v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091, 1095 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). We need not determine where our Circuit

    ### Response:
    holding that when revocation  is mandatory under 18 usc  3583g the statute does not require consideration of  3553a factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or child support. Thus, even if the Former Wife established need, the trial court abused its discretion in accepting and adopting the magistrate’s recommended order because there is no competent, substantial evidence to support the magistrate’s determination that the Former Husband has the ability to pay. See Kearley v. Kearley, 745 So.2d 987, 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (“We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the appellee $1400 per month in alimony. According to the financial affidavit, appellant’s monthly net income is $3,380.41. After deducting his average monthly expenses from his net income, including the $1400 alimony, appellant is left with a deficiency of $818.59 per month.”); see also McCann v. Crumblish-McCann, 21 So.3d 170, 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>); Hotaling v. Hotaling, 962 So.2d 1048, 1051

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering temporary alimony that exceeded the husbands ability to pay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prior to the granting of a discharge, the reaffirmation agreement satisfies the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1). This is true even if the reaffirmation agreement is not memorial ized in a signed writing until after a discharge is granted. See In re Merritt, 366 B.R. 687 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.2007) (finding that a reaffirmation agreement is made “when all parties to the contract have objectively expressed their intention to make the bargain expressed by the contract,” and enforcing a reaffirmation agreement which was signed by the creditor post-discharge where the communications between the debtor and the creditor and the acts and circumstances surrounding those communications establish that a meeting of the minds occurred pre-discharge); In re LeBeau, 247 B.R. 537 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>). In this case, a “meeting of the minds”

    ### Response:
    holding that a reaffirmation agreement is enforceable as having been made predischarge where the parties agree to the terms of the proposed reaffirmation predischarge but the debtors do not sign a writing embodying the terms of their agreement until after entry of the discharge order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime or violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. 3 . Section 922(k) provides in relevant part: It shall be unlawful for any person ... to possess or receive any firearm which has had the importer's or manufacturer's serial number removed, obliterated, or altered and has, at any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 4 . We note additionally that even if the gun was first discovered at the scene of the arrest, the evidence in the record before us shows that a search of the glove compartment incident to defendant’s arrest would have been lawful. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 & n. 4, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864-65 & n. 4, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, given that defendant concedes the

    ### Response:
    holding that after policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile he may as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest examine the contents of any containers including glove compartments found within the passenger compartment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whose unborn child is killed”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-6703(e) (""A woman upon whom an abortion is performed shall not be prosecuted under this section....”); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 507A.010(3)(""nothing in this chapter shall apply to any acts of a pregnant woman that caused the death of her unborn child”); La. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 14:87(A)(2) (penalties for criminalized abortions not applicable to pregnant women having abortions); Minn.Stat. § 609.266 (excluding the ""pregnant woman” from liability for ""crimes against unborn children”); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-335 (providing ""[n]o civil or criminal penalty ... against the patient upon whom the abortion is performed”); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.17(I)(expressly excluding women from liability for post-viability abortions); 18 Pa. Cons. , 1224 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Hill-man v. State, 232 Ga.App. 741, 503

    ### Response:
    holding that the definition of person in the hawaii manslaughter statute did not include a fetus and thus did not apply when a woman caused the death of her fetus by smoking crystal methamphetamine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to prove the same will amount to a fatal variance and a violation of the defendant’s right to due process of law.” However, as the Supreme Court of Georgia has long held, [t]he general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements (1) that the accused shall be definitely informed as to the charges against him, so that he may be enabled to present his defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that he may be protected against another prosecution for the same offense. As the trial court’s charge on the use of a knife as a deadly weapon pointed out, whether Quiroz’s use of the knife made it a deadly weapon was for the jury to decide. But the part of the indictment unsupported by the evidence in this case (<HOLDING>) was an “unnecessary [specification] of a[

    ### Response:
    holding a knife to the drivers neck
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Purchasers in another location. These transactions allowed for the parties to cut down on transportation costs. Any diff referenced in U.C.C. § 1 — 201(b)(9) must be an antecedent or pre-existing debt. See In re Black Diamond Mining Co., 2011 WL 6202905, at *24 (stating that no pre-existing debt was due or owing by Black Diamond to Commodities at the time Commodities acquired the coal, and the transaction was thus not in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt); In re Mid-Atl. Piping Prods. of Charlotte, Inc., 24 B.R. 314, 328 (Bankr.W.D.N.C.1982) (stating that a person is not a BIOC “where a party receives goods in satisfaction of an antecedent money debt owed to that party”) (emphasis added); Kay v. City Bank & Trust Co. of Natchez, Miss., 358 F.Supp. 630, 639 (S.D.Ohio 1973) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); Fleet Capital Corp. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff was not a bioc because the plaintiffs purchase  was in partial satisfaction of a prior personal debt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 1241 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519, which vest the Attorney General, acting through the officers of the Justice Department, with plenary authority to settle litigation in which federal agencies are a party). Settlement is to be encouraged. See United States v. McInnes, 556 F.2d 436, 441 (9th Cir.1977) (“We are committed to the rule that the law favors and encourages compromise settlements.”). Indeed, if the Longliners’ position is carried to its logical conclusion, then any attempt by federal agencies to settle litigation involving a regulation would entail a return to the same rulemaking process by which the regulation was created — a proposition that contradicts the Supreme Court’s policy determination in another context. See Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 524 n. 13, 106 S.Ct. 3063 (<HOLDING>). The fact that the Federal Agencies complied

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a limit on the governments ability to enter a consent decree would make it substantially more difficult to settle title vii litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we conclude that the NTEU standard is inapplicable on these facts. 4 . Implicit in the Pickering test is a requirement that the public employer have taken some adverse employment action against the employee. See Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir.1988) (noting that Pickering and its progeny ""establish the basic framework for analyzing a claim by a public employee that his or her governmental employer made an adverse employment decision in violation of the employee’s First Amendment rights” (emphasis added)). If the action taken by the employer in response to the employee's speech is inconsequential or has only speculative consequences, there can be no basis for a First Amendment claim. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Romeis, 198 F.3d 1022, 1027-28 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue that the written reprimand

    ### Response:
    holding that written reprimands with only speculative consequences do not constitute adverse actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    investigation. Citing In re O-D-21 I. & N. Dec. 1079, 1083, 1998 WL 24904 (BIA 1998), the IJ determined that the forgery indicated a lack of credibility with respect to Ebid’s testimony in general and, in particular, with respect to the May 1999 incident. Ebid claims that the IJ erred in making an adverse credibility determination on the basis of the submission of one fraudulent document that Ebid explained was the result of a friend’s advice that he needed corroboration and the fact that he could not obtain one from his doctor in Egypt. We disagree. An asylum applicant’s knowing use of a fraudulent document that goes to the heart of his or her asylum claim, without sufficient explanation, can be substantial evidence to support an IJ’s decision. See In re O-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 1083 (<HOLDING>); accord, Borovikova v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

    ### Response:
    holding that an asylum applicants submission of false documents without an adequate explanation supported adverse credibility findings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the exercise of the particular profession. The duty imposed upon the insurance agent as well as [the lawyer, doctor, and accountant] upon whose advice the client or patient depends is that of ‘reasonable diligence' a breach of which duty results in an action in negligence.”); § 19:8.Detrimental reliance, 18 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Civil Jury Instructions § 19:8 (3d ed.) (""The basis of detrimental reliance is not the intent to be bound, since detrimental reliance is not really contractual in nature. It is based on the idea that a person should not harm another person by maldng promises that he does not keep.""). 295 . See, e.g., Rec. Doc. 1-2 at 10. 296 . See, e.g., Rec. Doc. 172 at 6. 297 . See Canal/Claiborne, Ltd. v. Stonehedge Dev., LLC, 2014-0664 (La. 12/9/14), 156 So.3d 627, 633-34. (<HOLDING>). 298 . Rec. Doc. 118-5 at 10. 299 . Rec. Doc.

    ### Response:
    holding that it is wellsettled in our jurisprudence that unjust enrichment is a quasicontract claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    James Financial Services, Inc., 2013 WL 489088 at *3, n. 2 (M.D.Fla. Feb. 8, 2013) (recognizing existence of fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine but finding that plaintiff did not properly allege all elements). The Florida Supreme Court previously held that the fraudulent concealment doctrine no longer existed, and that the only viable tolling doctrines were enumerated in Fla. Stat. § 95.051; however the court subsequently withdrew that opinion. See Fulton County Admin. v. Sullivan, 1997 WL 589312 (Fla. Sept. 25, 1997), withdrawn and superseded by 753 So.2d 549 (Fla.1999). As such, there is no definitive law on this subject in Florida, and this Court will not create new law and hold that the doctrine does not apply. Cf. Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071 (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Both Weaver and Beacon also mention in

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants may be estopped from raising defense of statute of limitations even though equitable estoppel is not listed in fla stat  95051
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for bad debt, or CMS’ interpretive guidance on this issue. The court disagrees. As discussed above, the must-bill policy is set forth in PRM §§ 310, 312 and 322 and further clarified in JSM 370. See California Hospitals Crossover Bad Debts Group Appeal PRRB Dec. No. 2000-D80 (2000 WL 33170706, *8). The must-bill policy has been consistently articulated in the final decisions of the Secretary addressing this issue. See, e.g., Hoag Mem. Hosp. Presbyterian Provider v. Blue Cross, 2002 WL 31548714 (2002); Hospital de Area de Carolina, Admin. Dec. No. 93-D23; Concourse Nursing Home, PRRB Dec. No. 83-D152; St. Joseph Hospital, PRRB Dec. No. 84-D109. Similarly, this court has already affirmed the must-bill policy. GCI Health Care Ctrs. v. Thompson, 209 F.Supp.2d 63, 74 (D.D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also, CHMP, 323 F.3d 782, 793 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that there is nothing arbitrary or capricious about the requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the District Court that Seko failed to present a prima facie case under the ADA. See Hennenfent v. Mid Dakota Clinic P.C., 164 F.3d 419, 421-22 (8th Cir.1998) (stating that one element of prima facie ADA case is that employee is qualified to perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation). Further, assuming, as did the District Court, that she established a causal connection between the decision to place her on medical leave and her prior lawsuits, she failed to present evidence showing that Boeing’s proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for placing her on such leave—her inability to return to a job requiring the use of power tools, given her medical condition—was pretextual. See Scroggins v. Univ. of Minn., 221 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We decline to address the new arguments Seko

    ### Response:
    holding that even if employee established prima facie case of retaliation he produced no evidence challenging employers reason for firing him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    type of drug was in the truck. When Sergeant Witte asked how much methamphetamine was in the truck, Shoen responded “a little bit” without additional questioning from the officers. ¶ 14 Moreover, the officers did not attempt to intimidate Shoen into remaining at the storage unit. In fact, their advice was just the opposite: They recommended that he call someone to pick him up so he could leave. Shoen agreed to speak with the officers and appeared comfortable throughout the encounter; he willingly answered the officers’ questions and allowed them to look in his truck bed. See Paynter, 955 P.2d at 73 (deeming an encounter consensual because the defendant’s liberty was not restrained and his voluntary cooperation was elicited through non-coercive questioning); Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1178 (<HOLDING>); Marujo, 192 P.3d at 1006 (noting that a

    ### Response:
    holding that an encounter was consensual where the defendant was comfortable during the encounter chose not to leave and acquiesced to the officers request to answer questions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    multiple glow plugs in the diesel engine system, leading to the clear conclusion that there are multiple “voltage signals.” As such, the intrinsic evidence makes clear to a person of ordinary skill in the art that “a voltage signals” should be construed as “voltage signals” in the context of the ’258 Patent whose claims are directed to vehicles with “one or more glow plugs.” See ’258 Patent 23:33-36. Defendants argue that because the ’258 Patent’s prosecution history does not “suggest whether the applicants intended ‘a voltage signals’ to be singular or plural,” this history dictates that the Court should not correct “a voltage signals.” However, a prosecution history that is silent on a claim term does not prevent a court from correcting a grammatical error. See Novo, 350 F.3d at 1354 (<HOLDING>). Because the Court finds that this

    ### Response:
    holding that a court can correct a patent claim for a grammatical error where the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    36. Mr. Sapp’s overtime logs include notations with various iterations of this statement in response to his overtime requests throughout 2011 and 2012. See id, at 20-86. Furthermore, on December 16, 2011, the BOP sent Mr. Sapp a memorandum clarifying that, as previously advised, he was not to go past certain areas into the prison facility, that he was not to have any inmate contact, and that this action was taken based on the investigation. See D.E. 116-6. The record demonstrates that the BOP consistently cited the ongoing investigation and corresponding restrictions as the reason for denying his overtime requests. That Ms. Burke provided Mr. Sapp with a different or alternate reason does not itself show pretext. Cf. Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>); Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d 534,

    ### Response:
    holding that employers report to state employment agency providing a reason for termination that was different than employers proffered reason did not create a genuine and material issue of fact as to pretext particularly when evidence showed the inaccurate reporting benefitted employee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judicial body that confers standing to appeal.” Merriam Webster’s Dictionary of Law, 354 (Collector Ed. 2005); see also, Walker v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, No. 09APP-748, 2010 Ohio 373 at ¶ 25 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2010). Dr. Williams could not simultaneously pursue a writ of review in the Superior Court when the District Court entered a TRO, which became a preliminary injunction, enjoining enforcement of V.I.B.M.E.’s decision to permanently revoke his license. The reason is that Rule 15(a)’s thirty-day limit only authorizes the Superior Court to consider a petition for writ of review brought by one who has been “aggrieved by the decision of an officer, board, commission, authority, or tribunal.” Cf. Hodge v. Bluebeard’s Castle, Inc., 392 Fed. Appx. 965, 977 (3d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156 (4th

    ### Response:
    holding that the phrase party aggrieved should be given a practical rather than hypertechnical meaning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it is impossible to know whether the jury’s “Yes” answer to Question 3 is a finding that the Association made a negligent misrepresentation on which the Feldmans or the Trustee — or both — justifiably relied. See In re United Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d 685, 689-90 & n. 3 (Tex.2012) (observing that the use of and/or in legal documents “inherently leads to ambiguity and confusion”). Because the jury’s ambiguous answers are not findings of liability to each plaintiff, they cannot support a judgment. See W & F Transp., 208 S.W.3d at 47 (reversing trial court’s judgment and rendering take-nothing judgment for two defendants because verdict did not establish individual liability of either defendant); J & C Drilling Co. v. Salaiz, 866 S.W.2d 632, 640-41 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ.) (<HOLDING>). The remainder of the jury charge does not

    ### Response:
    holding ambiguous finding that one or another defendant was liable did not provide a proper basis for judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was enacted in 1991 as part of the General Assembly's general revision of the Workers' Compensation Act. See ch. 219, see. 13, § 8-42-105(2)(c), 1991 Colo. Sess. Laws 219, 1805-06; see also John G. Salmon & Francine R. Salazar, 1991 Update on Workers' Compensation Law, 20 Colo. Law. 2223, 2228 (Nov.1991). Prior to the enactment of the temporary total disability benefits provision, a claimant's failure to attend an appointment with an attending physician was subject to sanctions under what is now seetion 8-48-404(8), CRS. (2007). See id. That provision of the Workers' Compensation Act governs penalties and enforcement when a claimant refuses to submit to a medical examination or evaluation. § 8-48-404(8); see Bacon v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 746 P.2d 74, 75 (Colo.App.1987) (<HOLDING>); Dziewior v. Mich. Gen. Corp., 672 P.2d 1026,

    ### Response:
    holding that a claimants benefits were rightly suspended under what is now section 8434048 when the claimant refused to cooperate with a vocational rehabilitation plan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doctrine. Maurice Turner was listed as a potential witness in the State’s proposed voir dire, and the prosecutor acknowledged in his opening statement that the jury would hear from Mitchell’s alleged cohorts Antonio Corprew and Lewis “Man-Man” Cochran. In addition, the jury heard about Wali Henderson, the driver of the Hummer, an initial suspect in the shooting, and the jury also learned of Darnell Carter and Andre Chase, the two men who led police to the shotgun. Because it is within the scope of permissible closing argument for counsel to draw inferences from the evidence admitted at trial, which includes the ability to comment on an absence of such evidence, defense counsel’s closing argument was not improper. See Eley v. State, 288 Md. 548, 553, 419 A.2d 384, 386-87 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Wise v. State, 132 Md.App. 127, 146, 751 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that defense counsel may call attention to the states failure to produce evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a cell phone incident to arrest. See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 290 Ga. 785, 723 S.E.2d 924, 926 (2012) (upheld search of text messages that was limited “as much as is reasonably practicable by the object of the search”); Commonwealth v. Phifer, 463 Mass. 790, 979 N.E.2d 210, 216 (2012) (upheld search of recent call list). On the other hand, a smaller number of courts, including one circuit court, several state supreme courts, and several district courts, have now rejected the notion that the contents of a cell phone are susceptible to search upon arrest, particularly in circumstances where the phone has been removed from the arrestee’s person by the police. See, e.g., United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2013), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 999, 187 L.Ed.2d 848 (2014) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mayo, No. 2:13-cr-48, 2013

    ### Response:
    holding that warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest should not be allowed because such searches cannot be justified by officer safety or the preservation of evidence given the privacy implications inherent in cell phone data searches
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, as it was his second motion to reopen and was filed more than six years after his December 2002 final order of removal. See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA reasonably concluded that Lin failed to establish changed country conditions such that the time and number limits on his motion to reopen should be excused. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). We find no abuse of discretion in its determination that Lin failed to point to evidence in the record establishing that the Chinese government’s current treatment of pro-democracy activists differed from their treatment at the time of his merits hearing. See In re S-Y-G, 24 I. & N. Dec 247, 253 (B.I.A.2007) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, there was no abuse of discretion in

    ### Response:
    holding that in determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening we compare the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the custodial parent with the noncustodial parent’s visitation rights does not justify a modification of a child custody order. See, e.g., Woncik v. Woncik, 82 N.C. App. 244, 248, 346 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1986). In the instant case, however, the trial court’s findings of fact reflected far more than the mere interference with defendant’s visitation rights, warranting the court’s intervention. As noted supra, the trial court characterized the child’s relationship with defendant, his father, as a good relationship and further found that the child looked forward to seeing defendant. The trial court’s findings indicate that the denial of defendant’s visitation was deceitful and more than simply an interference or frustration with his rights, as it encompassed a considerable period. See id. (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, denying the minor child

    ### Response:
    holding that where interference with visitation becomes so pervasive as to harm the childs close relationship with the noncustodial parent there can be a conclusion drawn that the actions of the custodial parent show a disregard for the best interests of the child warranting a change of custody
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a class action lawsuit based on securities fraud against several individual defendants (collectively “Defendants”) that held various positions in Red-back Networks, Inc. (“Redback”). Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. This Court reviews dismissals for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir.2008). Even assuming Plaintiffs adequately pleaded falsity for their fraudulent statement claim, Plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded loss causation. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs’ allegations that the loss was

    ### Response:
    holding loss causation not adequately pleaded when the complaint did not claim that the share price fell significantly after the truth became known
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had seeped into the groundwater and then migrated onto Easton’s. Those chemical solvents continue to contaminate Easton’s soil and groundwater and will do so for several years. Remediation efforts could take as long as thirty years. While the pollution poses no significant health risks to humans, building occupants on Easton’s property inhale vapors from the contami nated groundwater and must avoid contact with the groundwater. Easton sought damages and injunctive relief from Aramark for the prior and ongoing migration of contaminated groundwater onto his property. He asserted various common law theories (reckless or negligent endangerment/failure to warn, strict liability, trespass, private nuisance, and negligence), as well as v. Peterson, 674 So.2d 201, 205 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>), review dismissed, 687 So.2d 1305 (Fla.1997).

    ### Response:
    holding that section 3763133 creates a cause of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fetus because the power to define crimes and to establish criminal penalties is exclusively a legislative function. Santillanes v. State, 115 N.M. 215, 849 P.2d 358 (1993); see State v. Thompson, 57 N.M. 459, 465, 260 P.2d 370, 374 (1953) (stating that “[b]y the constitution of the [SJtate the [Ljegislature is invested with plenary legislative power, and the defining of crime and prescribing punishment therefor are legislative functions”); see also N.M. Const, art. Ill, § 1 (providing for division of powers of government between legislative, judicial, and executive branches). {10} Other jurisdictions with similar child abuse statutes have concluded that such statutes do not apply to an unborn fetus. See People v. Morabito, 151 Misc.2d 259, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 846-17 (N.Y.City Ct.1992) (<HOLDING>); State v. Gray, 62 Ohio St.3d 514, 584 N.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that mother could not be charged with criminal endangering the welfare of her child based upon prenatal acts of smoking cocaine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it indicated so unequivocally.” United States v. Picklesimer, 585 F.2d 1199, 1203 (3rd Cir.1978). It would violate both congressional intent and longstanding practice for us to infer quantity limitations where no such limitations are affirmatively stated. This straightforward interpretation of the provision makes sense of the language. Although the linguistic conventions of the regulation are not entirely consistent, it appears that phrases based on the effect of the substance are included in the legal description when the category is denominated by a term based on its effect on users — for example, “stimulant” or “depressant” — and not when the category is denomin ilar language was merely a description of the listed drugs); United States v. White, 560 F.2d 787, 789 (7th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nickles, 509 F.2d 810 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that cfr  130812d is a list of drugs that congress has determined to have a stimulant effect on the central nervous system
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nissan removed the appeal to the United States District Court, Central Division, which action is CIV. 05-3018. [¶ 15] In CIV. 05-1015, Billion was added as an additional plaintiff and an amended complaint was allowed. QUESTIONS OF STANDING IN APPEAL FROM ADMINISTRATIVE RULING [¶ 16] I turn now to the Central Division case, the appeal from the administrative decision. The first question to be addressed in that case is the question of “standing.” General principles will first be addressed. Standing is a threshold matter that, if absent, prevents this court from exercising jurisdiction. Arkansas Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 146 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir.1998). See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1012-13, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (<HOLDING>). The Constitution requires a party to satisfy

    ### Response:
    holding that federal courts may not consider other issues before resolving standing an article iii jurisdictional matter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Blue Shield of S.C., Inc., 349 S.C. 356, 361, 563 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2002). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact such that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), SCRCP; Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002). “In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn. from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” David v. McLeod Reg’l Med. Ctr., 367 S.C. 242, 247, 626 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006). A motion for summary judgment on the basis of the absence of a duty is a question of law for the court to determine. See Doe v. Greenville County Sch. Dist., 375 S.C. 63, 72, 651 S.E.2d 305, 309 (2007) (<HOLDING>). LAW/ANALYSIS Oblachinski contends the circuit

    ### Response:
    recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    thirty-day limit of § 3161(h)(l)(J)). The fact that pre trial motions are pending, standing alone, does not necessarily toll the speedy trial clock indefinitely; the motions must require a hearing under § 3161(h)(1)(F) if indefinite tolling is to occur. See generally United States v. Johnson, 29 F.3d 940, 942-43 (5th Cir.1994) (providing an overview of the proper interplay between §§ 3161(h)(1)(F) and (J)). It appears that we have implicitly agreed with the several circuits that have consistently interpreted § 3161(h)(7) to provide that all defendants who are joined for trial generally fall within the speedy trial computation of the latest codefendant and that the excludable delay of one codefendant may be attributed to all defendants. United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Arbelaez, 7 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the clock was tolled from the day the lastarraigned defendant appeared before a judicial officer because at that time several defendants already had filed pretrial motions and pretrial motions of some type remained pending for over two years
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and she had complaints from writing bad checks; (4) Latonya Bush— excluded because related to a murder suspect who had been arrested and worked for defense attorney; (5) Diane Saffore— excluded because disagreed with the death penalty; (6) Darlene Edwards — excluded because disagreed with the death penalty; (7) Shirley Blevins — excluded because a relative was convicted of capital murder in that county and she or one of her family members was represented by defense counsel, Burdine; (8) Joyce Ann Cox— excluded because previously arrested for shoplifting. The trial court found that the reasons proffered by the State were race-neutral. ¶ 13. We find that the reasons articulated by the State are race-neutral. This Court has previously sanctioned these reasons. See Mack, 650 So.2d at 1300 (<HOLDING>); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d at 1351 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that it is proper to exclude potential venire persons for criminal activity and based upon opinion of the death penalty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    346 Ill. at 258. The promise does not have to be for the sole benefit of the third party as long as it is for its direct or substantial benefit. Town & Country Bank of Springfield v. James M. Canfield Contract hat an agreement in which the third party was identified as the user of the building being constructed and given the authority to consult with the contractor and revise the drawings and specifications was for the direct benefit of the user); (3) Bates & Rogers, 109 Ill. 2d at 233-34 (concluding that one party to the contract intended to extend the benefit of an exculpatory clause to its engineer where the contract described the relationship between the party and the engineer and specified the responsibilities of the engineer in detail); (4) XL Disposal, 168 Ill. 2d at 360-61 (<HOLDING>); (5) East Peoria Community High School

    ### Response:
    holding that an agreement in which one party promised to make monthly payments to the other partys attorney as part of an asset sale contract was for the direct benefit of the attorney
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for detrimental reliance upon the County’s issuance of BP2005-70, occupational tax certificates, and representations by County officials. Again, we agree. Lewis cannot state a claim for detrimental reliance where, as here, the County erroneously issued the permit for a “commercial” outbuilding. The issuance of a permit was permissible only for an outbuilding, i.e., an accessory structure for secondary uses, like a garage or storage. Loretta Riggins-Hylton, planning director of the County’s planning and building department, deposed that a commercial building would not qualify as an outbuilding. Since the permit was mistakenly issued, Lewis did not have a vested right to complete the construction of his building. Enviro Pro v. Emanuel County, 265 Ga. App. 309, 312 (593 SE2d 673) (2004) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, “[w]here a permit is issued by a

    ### Response:
    holding ultra vires acts by chairperson did not vest right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assistance, by persuading the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions."" Clark, 2004 UT 25 at T6, 89 P.3d 162 (alteration, citation, and quotations omitted). Marble's bare assertion that ""[tlhere is no conceivable trial strategy to elicit and then allow that type of testimony especially when the case hinged on the vie-tim's credibility,"" does not rebut this presumption. {12 Utah courts have recognized that when viewing ""the variety of cireumstances faced by defense counsel,"" a conscious choice not to object to arguably inadmissible testimony may, at times, fall within ""the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant,"" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. See, eg., State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 7, 89 P.3d 162 (<HOLDING>); State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, ¶ ¶ 40-44, 48

    ### Response:
    holding that counsel may well have made a reasonable tactical choice to not object to arguably inadmissible testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for tortious interference of contract, it is axiomatic that there must be a breach of contract by the other party.” Jack L. Inselman & Co. v. FNB Financial Co., 41 N.Y.2d 1078, 396 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349, 364 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 (1977). Inselman was cited by the Court of Appeals with approval and its holding affirmed as late as March 26, 1996. NBT Bancorp Inc. et al. v. Fleet/Norstar Financial Group, Inc., 87 N.Y.2d 614, 620-21, 641 N.Y.S.2d 581, 584-85, n. 1, 664 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y.1996) (distinguishing between tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations and holding that the former requires that there be a breach of the contract). See also Kronos, Inc. v. AVX Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 90, 94, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 934, 612 N.E.2d 289, 292 (N.Y.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit has concurred in this

    ### Response:
    holding that to sustain a claim under the tort of interference with contractual relations the plaintiff must inter alia show that the defendant intentionally induced the third party to breach or render performance impossible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Furthermore, under the AEDPA, state-court determinations of factual issues “shall be presumed to be correct,” unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption “by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Coombs v. Maine, 202 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.2000). Chief Judge Boudin reminded us in Fortini v. Murphy that AEDPA adopts a strict standard of review by federal courts to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings. 257 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir.2001). Niland contends that the state court never addressed his constitu tional claim on the merits and therefore, the strict deferential standard of review is inapplicable. Id. (<HOLDING>). We disagree with Niland. A review of the

    ### Response:
    holding that de novo standard of review applies on federal claims never addressed by state courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an appellate court can review for plain error where the record is sufficiently developed. Id. at 10 n. 4. Similarly, in United States v. Hawkins, 249 F.3d 867, 871-72 (9th Cir.2001), although the Ninth Circuit C th Circuit colleagues refused to consider a challenge to a search warrant that was not raised to the district court. 887 F.2d 880, 885-86 (8th Cir.1989) (en banc) (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 12). The Tenth Circuit Court likewise refused to consider a defendant’s suppression argument that his detention and the search of his car were unconstitutional because he raised the argument for the first time on appeal. United States v. Dirden, 38 F.3d 1131, 1139 n. 10 (10th Cir.1994) (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3), (f)). But see United States v. Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1502 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit Court followed the waiver

    ### Response:
    holding that suppression issue was waived under rule 12 but then noting that the court did not find plain error in the district courts admission of the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in support of their motion, he insists that the Court cannot consider them, and the Privacy Policy in particular, on the ground that his claim does not depend on their contents. Pl.’s Opp’n at 13-14. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff alleges that he signed up to use Zimride but never consented to the disclosure of his personal information. But to use Zimride, Plaintiff necessarily had to agree with Zimride’s TOS and Privacy Policy, which clearly state that such information may, in fact, be disclosed. Because Plaintiffs claim necessarily depends on the application of Zimride’s policies — which relate directly to the issue of consent — the Court finds that these documents may appropriately be considered on a motion to dismiss. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Defendant Adolfo Barron-Galvan appeals his conviction for being found in the United States after having been removed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and the resulting sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment. We affirm. 1. Plain error did not occur when the government lawyer made certain statements at sentencing. See United States v. Maldonado, 215 F.3d 1046, 1051 & nn. 5-6 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The government stood by its recommendation of

    ### Response:
    holding that we review for plain error whether the government breached its plea obligations when the defendant fails to object at sentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Campbell argues that the, term “repair” as used in the limitation of liability clause encompasses diminished value. Urging that the term “repair” should not be interpreted narrowly to only cover physical repairs, Campbell states that “repair” should contemplate making the insured whole. Alternatively, Campbell argues that the language of the insurance policy is ambiguous. Campbell relies on a number of other states’ cases addressing first-party contract claims, wherein the courts have concluded |isthat coverage for diminished value is required either because of the plain meaning of the policy language or based on a finding that the language is ambiguous. Among the cases that Campbell cites are: MFA Ins. Co. v. Citizens National Bank of Hope, 260 Ark. 849, 545 S.W.2d 70 (1977), (<HOLDING>); Delledonne v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that if repairs to a firedamaged vehicle with parts of like kind and quality would not restore the vehicle to its former market value the proper measure of damages was the difference in market value before and after the loss where the policy limited liability to the cost to repair or replace the property  with other of like kind and quality less depreciation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (2007). “The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the Commission’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Id. LAW/ANALYSIS I. Injury to Lower Back First, Burnette asserts substantial evidence does not support the finding she did not injure her lower back in the June 2007 incident. We agree. An injured employee “who has a permanent physical impairment or preexisting condition” may receive benefits for a subsequent work-related disability if he establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that “the subsequent injury aggravated the preexisting condition or permanent physical impairment.” S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-35 (Supp.2011); see also Mullinax v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 318 S.C. 431, 436-37, 458 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, “an employee who suffers a

    ### Response:
    recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jordan, 356 B.R. at 660; LaBarge v. Ireland (In re Ireland), 325 B.R. 836, 838 (Bankr. E.D.Mo.2005); Katz v. Araujo (In re Araujo), 292 B.R. 19, 24 (Bankr.D.Conn. 2003). “Such a showing then imposes upon the debtor an obligation to explain [her] non-compliance.” Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Foster (In re Foster), 335 B.R. 709, 716 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.2006). Whether a violation of a court order warrants a denial of discharge is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Burgess (In re Burgess), 955 F.2d 134, 138 (1st Cir.1992) (finding that the bankruptcy judge who issues an order is in the best position to evaluate whether a delay in compliance warrants denial of discharge); Devers v. Bank of Sheridan, Montana (In re Devers), 759 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Jones, 490 F.2d 452 at 456 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that whether particular violations of its orders are so serious as to warrant a denial of discharge is a matter that is within the trial courts discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1998), rev’d on other grounds, 175 F.3d 1365 (Fed.Cir.1999). Even though the Navy recognized that the procedure listed in the RFP was unnecessary, “the Navy [was] strictly bound by its terms....” Alfa Laval, 40 Fed.Cl. at 230. The appeals court noted that “in waiving a portion of the standard for [the winning bidder], the Navy violated a clearly applicable procurement statute and regulation.” Alfa Laval Separation, Inc. v. United States, 175 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed.Cir.1999). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the Navy was obligated to “evaluate sealed bids and competitive proposals and make an award based solely on the factors specified in the solicitation” Alfa Laval, 175 F.3d at 1367 (c 3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)); see also Impresa Construzioni, 238 F.3d at 1332 (<HOLDING>); CACI, Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 if the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    theory that the district court rejected before. Gore does not point to any change in the relevant law. This is also not a case in which the district court made findings on remand th nts, or any interest therein, shall be assignable by law in an instrument in writing.”) (emphases added). However, BPV has never claimed that in 2003 it had all substantial rights to the '135 patent. BPV’s position is only that it was an exclusive licensee with the right to sue for infringement. It is well established that the grant of a license does not need to be in writing. See Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 334 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“Only assignments need be in writing under 35 U.S.C. § 261. Licenses may be oral.”); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). In any event, in 1997 there was a

    ### Response:
    holding that to be an exclusive licensee a party may rely on either an express or implied promise of exclusivity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    quotation marks omitted). Substantive reasonableness pertains to “whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of the factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. “We apply a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to a below-guideline sentence challenged by the defendant 'as unreasonably harsh.” United States v. Ray, 704 F.3d 1307, 1317 (10th Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Benoit first contends his sentence is procedurally unreasonable, but he offers scant argument to support his contention. He mentions procedural error only when vaguely referencing a district court’s discretion to vary from the Guidelines due to a categorical policy disagreement. See, e.g., Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264, 129 S.Ct. 840, 172 L.Ed.2d 596 (2009) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Benoit seems to suggest the district court

    ### Response:
    holding a district court has authority to vary from the crack cocaine guidelines based on a policy disagreement with them italics omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    abused its discretion in dismissing the case for the failure of that condition. Mulino Cafe responds that the court’s grant of leave is irrelevant and the court did not err because the case was not at issue as of the October 15 deadline, reasoning that Mulino Cafe did not make an appearance until after the deadline and UTCR 7.020(3) requires all parties to appear for a case to be at issue. Moreover, defendant argues, the trial court’s determination that the cas f that the case be at issue or in default by October 15. Yet, the court’s subsequent grant of leave to amend the complaint took the ability to comply with that condition out of plaintiffs hands. In such circumstances, the failure of the condition cannot reasonably be attributed to plaintiff alone. Cf. Lambert, 148 Or App at 376 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, we reject Mulino Cafe’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the court abused its discretion where the delay cannot not reasonably be attributed to the plaintiff alone
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    public necessarily means that they did learn about the defect.” (Dkt. No. 95 at 20.) In the SAC, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the prerelease tests that they believe Defendant should have performed remain speculative. See, e.g., Wilson, 668 F.3d at 1147 (“The allegation that HP, as the manufacturer, had ‘access to the aggregate information and data regarding the risk of overheating’ is speculative and does not suggest how any tests or information could have alerted HP to the defect.”); Tietsworth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 5:09-CV-00288 JFHRL, 2009 WL 3320486, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 13, 2009) (finding conclusory the allegation that defendants were in a “superior position to know the truth about the [product]”); Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F.Supp.2d 964, 974 (N.D.Cal.2008) (<HOLDING>); cf. Falk v. Gen. Motors Corp., 496 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs allegation that defendant had exclusive knowledge as the manufacturer did not support claim that defendant was aware of a defect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discrimination cases, by stating that: “Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same inju ry.’ ” Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982)). “This does not mean merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law,” but instead that their claims “depend upon a common contention ... of such a nature that is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. Although “for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) even a single common question will do,” id. at 2556 (internal citation an 48, 56 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). See also Californians for Disability Rights,

    ### Response:
    holding that individual factual differences among the individual litigants or groups of litigants will not preclude a finding of commonality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    area formed to combat automobile theft. On November 10, 2011, they executed a search warrant at Douglas Rathbun’s business and seized five motor vehicles. Claiming the search warrant was invalid, Mr. Rathbun brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. He sued all of the officers in their individual capacities for money damages. The officers filed a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) invoking qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion and the officers appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over this final collateral order denying the motion to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (<HOLDING>). We reverse. I. Background Mr. Rathbun owns

    ### Response:
    holding appellate courts have jurisdiction over the district courts orders rejecting as a matter of law qualified immunity raised in a motion to dismiss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence that the State could introduce only if defendant were to testify, in which case defendant’s record would have impeached his credibility. Before trial, defendant indicated by affidavit that he wished to testify but that the lack of jury bifurcation would prevent him from doing so because of the prejudicial impact of his criminal record. -As a result of the trial court’s refusal to bifurcate the jury, defendant elected not to testify in his own defense. Consequently, the trial court’s decision not to bifurcate the jury must be evaluated not only in light of the prejudicial impact of defendant’s record on the jury’s penalty-phase deliberations but also in light of defendant’s right to testify in his defense, see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed.2d 37 (1987) (<HOLDING>); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 626-28, 577

    ### Response:
    holding right to testify was federal constitutional right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Solomon, 399 F.3d 1231, 1239 (10th Cir.2005). The right to present a defense arises under the Fifth Amendment right to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. Id. We will reverse the district judge’s decision excluding evidence only if the proffered evidence is both relevant and material (i.e., its exclusion would affect a trial’s outcome). United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 519 F.3d 1236, 1238-39 (10th Cir.2008), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 162, 172 L.Ed.2d 117 (2008). Here, even assuming that the district judge erred by excluding the testimony, we conclude that the exclusion was harmless and Mr. Eastom’s right to present a defense was not violated. Mr. Murray’s testimony would not have affected the trial’s outcome. See Velarde, 214 F.3d at 1211 (<HOLDING>); Hemandez-Hemandez, 519 F.3d at 1238-39

    ### Response:
    holding that an erroneous decision to exclude evidence is considered harmless unless the error had a substantial influence on the outcome or leaves this court in grave doubt as to whether it had such an effect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Anderson-Tra-han simply by becoming embroiled in this conflict, and the existence of Mitchell’s lawsuit, regardless of whether Mitchell prevails. Hood’s claims against Judge Anderson-Trahan stand on their own, and Hood’s amended complaint does not limit his claims to mitigating any damages that he may need to pay to Mitchell. Because Judge Anderson-Trahan is not a properly impleaded party under Rule 14, she must be dismissed as a party. Therefore, we need not address whether Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute may be raised by a third party on behalf of an original defendant. Nor do we address whether a party must embrace the speech at issue in order to assert a defense under the anti-SLAPP statute. The district court also certified the question of whether it could a 54, 261 (9th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 88 (1st

    ### Response:
    holding that californias antislapp statute is applicable in federal court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and we review de novo the interpretation of purely legal questions. Id. at 1187. We deny the petition for review. Cruz admits that she was aware of an upcoming hearing, but did not contact the immigration court for eighteen years. Although Cruz contacted the government twice during the eighteen years to pursue other forms of relief, she failed to reveal her original alien registration number. The IJ properly determined that Cruz did not establish that the eighteen-year delay in filing the motion “was caused by circumstances beyond [her] control.” Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1193. As Cruz did not act with due diligence, she is not entitled to equitable tolling of her motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Cruz’s remaining contentions lack merit.

    ### Response:
    holding that this court  recognizes equitable tolling  on motions to reopen  during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception fraud or error as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    present at the scene of a recently committed crime may be permissible without violating the Fourth Amendment. Such a stop is especially deemed permissible where only a limited number of persons are present at the scene of a violent crime. Wold v. State, 430 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Minn.1988). We agree with this reasoning. Professor LaFave, in his discussion of allowing police to “freeze” a situation, certainly does not condone a “dragnet approach,” which results “in the temporary seizure of a large number of persons within the range of [a suspect’s] possible flight.” 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.4(g), at 195. But rather in this context, “selective investigative procedures” are necessary “whereby seizures are made only of those as to whom there exists a ‘reasonable possibi 7 S.W.2d 919, 920-21 (1985) (<HOLDING>). An officer's reasonable and articulable

    ### Response:
    holding officer who received a radio dispatch about a loud party disturbance at an apartment created by a person who left in brown jeep did not give officer reasonable suspicion to stop defendant in brown jeep because officer had no reason to suspect that a misdemeanor involving personal or property damage had been committed as required by ark rcrim p 31 to justify temporary detention
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    will exist whenever a defendant is served within the United States. See Lorelei Corp. v. County of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717, 719 (1st Cir.1991) (""[Sjufficient contacts exist whenever the defendant is served within the sovereign territory of the United States.”). If that is the case, proper service according to § 1132(e)(2) will always establish personal jurisdiction, because the defendant must be in the United States to be properly served under § 1132(e)(2). See Reimer Express, 230 F.3d at 941 (""The RICO and ERISA service of process provisions state that service may be made in 'any district,’ which indicates that Congress authorized service only in the judicial districts of the United States and not world-wide.”); see also Stauffacher v. Bennett, 969 F.2d 455, 460-61 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Cf. Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at 106, 108

    ### Response:
    holding that ricos nationwide service of process provision did not authorize service outside the united states
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    homestead exemption applies retroactively. See Certification at 2 n.l; cf. In re Pappas, 207 B.R. 379, 381-82 (2d Cir. BAP1997) (discussing disputed question of bankruptcy law suitable for interlocutory review). There is no showing, furthermore, that evaluation of the bankruptcy court’s decision at this time would lead to a more rapid resolution of the case, in part because the decision does not appear to be either manifestly correct or manifestly incorrect. The 2005 amendment to the C.P.L.R. is plausibly remedial within the meaning of McKinney’s Statutes § 54. See In re Little, No. 05-68281, at *21-22. Moreover, it is unlikely that the retroactive application of New York’s homestead exemption would violate the Contracts Clause. Cf. In re Seltzer, 104 F.3d 234, 235-37 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In sum, we think that prior consideration by

    ### Response:
    holding that the retroactive application of a nevada exemption did not violate the contracts clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    during the relevant time period amounted to just 0.236% of its total annual sales, they are de minimis and are insufficient to support an exercise Florida’s jurisdiction. In the instant case, A & V and Quem acted as brokers for Vos’ sale of chemicals to buyers in South America and the Caribbean. Vos did not ship a single ounce of chemicals into Florida, or through any of Florida’s ports. In TRW, strikingly similar percentages were involved; however, in that case, the defendants shipped actual goods to addresses in this state. Therefore, the connection between Vos and Florida is even more attenuated than the connection at issue in TRW, which lends further support to this Court’s conclusion. Finally, we address the evidence found by the trial court to b So.2d 657, 659 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION Because the plaintiffs’ action for

    ### Response:
    holding that the maintenance of a florida bank account even if used to collect premiums is too tenuous a contact to support an assertion of general jurisdiction over a foreign insurer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that individual’s compliance with the defendant’s directions, instructions, or terms.” United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir.1988). Here, the evidence was sufficient to show that appellant organized, supervised, or managed Thaxton, Scott, Majors, Singleton, and Duncan. The evidence established that appellant employed Thaxton as a bodyguard during appellant’s crack-selling activities at the College Street crack house. Thaxton spent six or seven hours a day at that house working with and protecting appellant. His primary job was to look out for appellant, “physically and with a little artillery if need be.” As appellant’s bodyguard, Thaxton was clearly appellant’s subordinate and subject to his supervision. See United States v. Chalkias, 971 F.2d 1206, 1214 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230,

    ### Response:
    holding that a person employed by the defendant as a bodyguard during the defendants drugrelated activities was supervised by the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Because these terms are synonymous, we will refer to this claim as intentional misrepresentation. 2 .The jury later clarified that it intended to include the $26,000 the plaintiffs had incurred in attorneys fees up until trial in its award of $75,000, leaving a pure compensatory award of $49,000. 3 . T (employee is entitled to treble damages and attorneys fees if employer disciplined or threatened to discipline or otherwise interfered with employee's right to communicate with an elected official); Tenn.Code Ann. § 46-2-41 l(Supp. 1998) (court shall award treble damages when a prevailing party proves fraud relative to a sales contract for cemetery merchandise and services); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-29-101(d) (Supp.1998) (court shall award as damages treble the face a S.E.2d 611, 616 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Ensuring that the Tennessee Consumer

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff could recover both doubled damages under the state regulation of manufacturers distributors and dealers act and punitive damages in connection with the common law claim because the act expressly allows both types of damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the later aural disclosure of the contents.”). 8 . See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035, 1043 n. 1 (9th Cir.2001) (""If a person secretes a recorder in a room and thereby records a conversation between two others, an 'acquisition' occurs at the time the recording is made.”); Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736, 740 (4th Cir.1994) (""The recording of a telephone conversation alone constitutes an 'aural * * * acquisition' of that conversation.”); United States v. Wuliger, 981 F.2d 1497, 1502-03 (6th Cir.1992) (""Noncon- sensual recordings violate the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).”); Pascale v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 898 F.Supp. 276, 279 (D.N.J.1995) (same); Lane v. Allstate Insurance Co., 114 Nev. 1176, 969 P.2d 938, 940 (199 91, 1394-95 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Sanders, 38 F.3d at 740 n. 8

    ### Response:
    holding that a recorder connected to an extension phone which was activated automatically when the extension phone handset was lifted was an interception device where there was no evidence that the recorder could have operated independently of the telephone
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    b]ut to use that leverage to project those royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent.” 379 U.S. at 33, 85 S.Ct. 176 (emphasis added). But as both Congress and the Court have come to recognize, it may not be possible to exercise any leverage at all from a patent, if that patent does not confer any market power upon its owner. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42, 126 S.Ct. 1281, 164 L.Ed.2d 26 (2006) (noting that Congress did not intend the mere existence of a patent to constitute the requisite “market power” for purposes of patent misuse and coming to the same conclusion for antitrust purposes); see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 99 S.Ct. 1096, 59 L.Ed.2d 296 (1979) (<HOLDING>). The Federal Circuit’s decision in Windsurfing

    ### Response:
    holding that it was not against public policy to enforce an agreement providing for deferred royalties on an invention whether or not a patent was ultimately granted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are not recordings of “oral communications” and shall be turned over to Plaintiffs and Defendants for purposes of this litigation. III. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) ■ Although the Court has held that the face to face recordings are not recordings of “oral communications,” the issue remains whether the interception of telephone calls by Whitacre may also be disclosed in this litigation. In Briggs, supra, the Fifth Circuit stated that a telephone conversation is a “wire communication” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). Briggs, 630 F.2d at 417. Such communications are protected against interception by electronic, mechanical, or other devices regardless of the speaker’s expectation of privacy. See id. at 417 n. 4; see also United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 349 (10th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court’s preceding

    ### Response:
    recognizing lack of requirement to prove reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to intercepted wire communications
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Moody has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED * We do not address Moody’s illegal vehicle stop claim as this claim is raised for the first time on appeal. See Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir.1993)

    ### Response:
    holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally waived absent exceptional circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 684-85 (Lewis, J. dissenting). The plaintiffs cite one state trial court decision rejecting the damages caps of Fla. Stat. § 766.118 as unconstitutional on the ground that Article I, § 26(a) guarantees claimants the right to collect the stated percentages of “all of the damages that a jury could potentially award.” Cavanaugh v. Cardiology Assoc. of Orlando, P.A., No. 06-CA-3814, Div. 40, 2007 WL 5844414 (Fla. 9th Jud. Cir.Ct. Oct. 30, 2007). Although the court has considered the trial court’s ruling in Cavanaugh, it respectfully declines to follow it, as the court’s analysis focuses on an isolated phrase in the provision rather than on the language of the section as a whole. The court also notes it is not bound by the Cavanaugh decision. See Bravo v. United States, 577 F.3d at 1326 (<HOLDING>). Absent authority from the Florida Supreme

    ### Response:
    holding federal courts are bound to follow intermediate state appellate court decisions unless there is persuasive evidence that the states highest court would rule otherwise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    following his trial. Under the circumstances presented, we see no reason to depart from the rule established in Patten. See Estelle, 420 U.S. at 542 (dismissal warranted when escaped convict is at large during ongoing appellate process); Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 140-41 (1897) (upholding state court’s dismissal of appeal of escaped prisoner and refusal to reinstate appeal against constitutional due process attack). Because the defendant elected to absent himself from the jurisdiction during the period of appeal, he forfeited the right to appellate review. See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam) (“[E]scape . . . disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims.”); cf. State v. Brenes, 151 N.H. 11, 12 (2004) (<HOLDING>). There are no “equities pertaining to the

    ### Response:
    holding destruction of trial transcript pursuant to court rule ten years after defendants escape disadvantaged defendant due to his own culpable misconduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dominion or control over the property and did not have the right to exclude others from the garage area in which the truck was parked. Because the gate was open, music was playing at a sufficient volume for the deputies to hear it, Myrick and his brother were drawing attention to their location by singing, the truck windows allowed the deputies to see inside, and the garage door was left open, Myrick did not take precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy. Further, there was no evidence that Myrick put the place to private use (there was no testimony that personal items were kept at the property), and nothing suggests a claim of privacy in this context is consistent with historical notions of privacy. See Beck v. State, 583 S.W.2d 338, 345 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (<HOLDING>). We hold that Myrick did not meet his burden

    ### Response:
    holding defendant who was employee of and had key to his fathers business  premises searched  lacked standing to challenge search of building his father owned
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the issue of claims filed beyond the bar date have reached the same conclusion as we do today — that the various guarantee associations are not liable for the late-filed claims. See Union Gesellschaft Fur Metal Industrie Co. v. Illinois Insur. Guar. Fund, 190 Ill.App.3d 696, 138 Ill.Dec. 21, 546 N.E.2d 1076, 1079 (1989) (noting that “[t]he requirement in the statute that claims be filed on or before the last date fixed for the filing of proofs of claim evidences an intent by the legislature to provide a cutoff date after which the Illinois Guaranty Fund is no longer obligated to indemnify claims,” and that the plaintiff’s ignorance of the claim was not “recognized by the statute”); Satellite Bowl, Inc. v. Michigan Prop. & Cas. Guar. Assn., 165 Mich.App. 768, 419 N.W.2d 460, 462 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Lake Hospital System, Inc. v. Ohio Ins. Guar.

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim filed after the last date fixed for the filing of claims was not a covered claim and noting that the requirement in the statute that claims be presented before the filing deadline evidences an intent on the part of the legislature to provide a cutoff date after which the association is no longer obligated to accept claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the Texas Department of Insurance. 9 . Trinity made no assertion in its motion for summary judgment that diminished value is not a direct or accidental loss or that it does not fall within the coverage afforded under Part D of the insuring agreement. 10 . Cope cites cases from several courts of appeals in this state to support this statement. E.g., Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. McClintic, 267 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1954, writ ref.'d n.r.e.); American Standard County Mut. Ins. C 6 Or. 690, 114 P.2d 1005, 1009 (1941) (stating ""it cannot be said that there has been a complete restoration of the property unless it can be said that there has been no diminution of value after repair of the car.”); Ciresi v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 187 Minn. 145, 244 N.W. 688, 690 (1932) (<HOLDING>); Edwards v. Md. Motorcar Ins. Co., 204 A.D.

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiff entitled to depreciation after repairs in determining the vehicles value at the time of the theft allowance must be made for depreciation then accrued
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court. MEYERS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 1 . Tex. Penal Code § 46.04. 2 . U.S. Const, amends. IV, V, VI, XIV; Tex. Const, art. I, § 9; Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23. 3 . The State’s objection that the proffered documents “were not on file 14 days before this date of trial as required under the Rules of Evidence” was sustained. Apparent 32 S.W.3d 853, 856, n. 22 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). 16 . U.S. Const, amend. IV. 17 . See generally Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (""Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure ... is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100

    ### Response:
    holding that bodycavity searches of prisoners are not unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ” United States v. Woolfolk, 197 F.3d 900, 905 (7th Cir.1999), quoting United States v. Kamel, 965 F.2d 484, 490 (7th Cir.1992). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained: To receive a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant must demonstrate that the evidence (1) came to their knowledge only after trial; (2) could not have been discovered sooner had due diligence been exercised; (3) is material and not merely impeaching or cumulative; and (4) would probably lead to an acquittal in the event of a retrial. Woolfolk, 197 F.3d at 905. However, when the basis for a new trial is newly discovered evidence that the trial judge has had improper contact with a juror or jurors, the test is somewhat different because “[a]ny ex 321 (4th Cir.1995)(<HOLDING>). The moving defendant must meet this burden by

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred and only if the contact is established must the government demonstrate absence of prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    preservation effort. In other words, the provision merely limits an historic district commission’s jurisdiction over structures (and portions thereof) not in public view. Thus, we conclude that the terms “structure” and “exterior architectural feature” are not to be narrowly construed in the way the newspapers contend. In a similar vein, the newspapers see guidance in some of our other cases defining the term “structure,” citing Williams v. Inspector of Bldgs. of Belmont, 341 Mass. 188 (1960), and Millbury v. Galligon, 371 Mass. 737 (1977). The newspapers draw from these cases that the term “structure” should be read akin to “building,” and therefore should not encompass a newsrack. See Inspector of Bldgs. of Falmouth v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 264 Mass. 85, 87-89 (1928) (<HOLDING>). These decisions are inapposite, for they

    ### Response:
    holding that billboard was not structure within meaning of the zoning enabling act g l c 40  25
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    April 1997 and September 1997 were submitted as samples to the district court. This court has also examined them in camera. They contain: (1) dates; (2) names of timekeepers; (3) numbers of hours worked; (4) generic descriptions of activities, e.g., review files, update database, prepare for deposition, search and retrieve files, research on summary judgment motion; (5) occasional references to legal theories that were the subject of research; (6) occasional references to the source of documents being reviewed; and (7) total fees and disbursements for the month. The billing records carry no stamped or written indication that they are work product or protected by the attorney-client privilege. 4 . BCBS also relies on Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1989) (<HOLDING>). But in that case, the subject of the report,

    ### Response:
    holding that investigative report into police chiefs conduct was protected as private personnel data
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    upon the argument that parole is a ""privilege.” 5 LaFave § 10.10(b), at 525-26. The United States Supreme Court rejected this theory two years after the Iowa Supreme Court did. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2601, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 495 (1972). The Court stated: It is hardly useful any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms of whether the parolee's liberty is a ""right” or a ""privilege.” By whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 4 . Our ultimate resolution of this case does not render the conditions of a parole agreement unenforceable. The State may ordinarily impose any reasonable condition on the grant of parole. Cf. State v. Valin, 724 N.W.2d 440, 445-46, 448-49 (Iowa 2006) (<HOLDING>). A violation of that condition can result in a

    ### Response:
    recognizing the state may impose reasonable conditions of probation but holding that a probation condition requiring a sex offender who was convicted of operating while intoxicated to be subjected to a penile plethysmograph exam for sexual arousal was unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Town of Portland v. ""Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., the court stated: [Z]oning setback and yard requirements are considered by courts to promote a variety of public purposes. They are held to relate to provision for light and air, fire protection, traffic safety, prevention of overcrowding, rest and recreation, solving drainage problems, protecting the appearance and character of a neighborhood, conserving property values, and may, in particular cases, promote a variety of aesthetic and psychological values as well as ecological and environmental interests. Id., 198 Wis.2d 775, 543 N.W.2d 559, 560-61 (App.1995) (citing 3 The Law of Zoning and Planning § 34B.02[2] (1995). See also Hanna v. American Nat’l Bank and Trust, 266 Ill.App.3d 544, 203 IlI.Dec. 507, 514, 639 N.E.2d 1326, 1333 (1994)

    ### Response:
    holding purpose of setback restriction is to create easement of unobstructed air light and vision and to insure uniformity of appearance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“[I]f a state allows petitioners to file second or subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief, federal courts should not undermine the state’s decision by refusing to toll the one-year period of limitation” while the petition is pending.). Washington permits a prisoner to file a petition based on newly discovered evidence outside the ordinary limitations period, as long as the prisoner acts with due diligence; Dictado filed his petition with due diligence after obtaining what he claimed was newly discovered evidence; Washington permitted it to be filed and considered it on the merits. Thus, the petition must be deemed “properly filed” and Dictado should be permitted to file his federal petition in district court. 1 . See, e.g., Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 147 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Patterson v. Director, Virginia Dep’t of

    ### Response:
    holding that a second or subsequent state petition for postconviction relief filed according to the procedural rules of the state constitutes a properly filed application  without regard to the merits of the petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employer who has contracted to provide services to an exempt political subdivision does not retain sufficient control over the employment relationship to engage in meaningful collective bargaining, § 2(2) deprives the Board of jurisdiction.” The Memorial Hospital decision explained that when the private employer does not have sufficient control over labor relations to engage in meaningful bargaining, the Board is without jurisdic ng Board properly exercised jurisdiction when employer fully controlled the essential employment terms, including hiring, firing, discipline, grievance procedures, and benefits, although employer’s “flexibility with regard to wages and benefits undoubtedly is hampered by budget ceilings” imposed by governmental agency); R.W. Harmon & Sons, 664 F.2d at 251 (<HOLDING>); Memorial Hospital, 624 F.2d at 185-189

    ### Response:
    holding board properly exercised jurisdiction when employer controlled the basic bargaining subjects wages seniority grievance procedures vacation insurance and retirement plans
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the grantee so described declaring the purposes of such trust, if any, declaring that the real estate is held other than for the benefit of the grantee. Accordingly, that additional language referring to the owners as trustees, did not change the nature of the transaction. Because a sale had taken place, Schiffer was entitled to the fee for his services. However Zosman should not have been held accountable for Schiffer’s attorney’s fees. The contract provided: The architect shall be entitled to recover all costs actually incurred in collecting over-due accounts. The Supreme Court has observed that the term “costs” is not generally understood as including attorney’s fees. See Wiggins v. Wiggins, 446 So.2d 1078, 1079 (Fla.1984); see also Smith v. Sitomer, 550 So.2d 461 (Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>). Here, the transcript is devoid of evidence

    ### Response:
    holding medical liability insurer with policy calling for payment of all costs taxed against insured was not obligated to pay prevailing party attorneys fees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Collins may have been eligible for an even larger penalty, as suggested by the ALJ’s application of a third-tier penalty. Fourth, Collins’s actions enabled Brown’s fraudulent actions, which targeted elderly customers considering complex financial products, with harm including withdrawal penalties of over $60,000 incurred by two of the victims. And the failures of supervision created a more general risk of wrongdoing in the office subject to Collins’s supervision. Thus, consideration of the four factors does not really help Collins’s cause. We note that Collins cites only two cases in which courts have set aside a fine for violating the Eighth Amendment, both featuring extremely large penalties contrasted with minimal harm. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (1998) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Bunk v. Birkart

    ### Response:
    holding invalid forfeiture of 357000 for failing to report exported currency affecting only  the government and in a relatively minor way
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    For instance, a real estate license, state university transcript, or driver’s license may only be obtained from a particular governmental unit. A debtor who cannot obtain her real estate license will be unable to pursue her chosen profession; a debtor who cannot obtain his transcript will be unable to apply for certain jobs or further schooling; a debtor who cannot obtain a driver’s license will be unable to commute to many jobs or school. In re Stoltz, 315 F.3d at 90; see also Toth v. Michigan State Housing Development Authority, 136 F.3d 477, 480 (6th Cir.1998) (ruling that extensions of credit do not come within the section’s reach, and that the “target of § 523(a) is government’s role as a gatekeeper in determining who may pursue certain livelihoods”); In re Watts, 876 F.2d at 1093 (<HOLDING>). Thus, [bjeyond the area of driver’s licenses,

    ### Response:
    recognizing the indicia of authority from a governmental unit to the authorized person to pursue some endeavor as common in the enumerated items
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not have proceeded to trial had he not been assured that he would receive a sentence of 121 to 151 months of imprisonment. Mackay has provided no direct evidence that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known that his sentence was not limited in this manner by his plea. Rather, the evidence in the record supports the contrary conclusion. The language of the plea agreement is clear that no representations or promises were made as to the sentence to be imposed. Additionally, he was admonished at rearraignment that sentence could be imposed from ten years to life imprisonment, and he responded negatively to the court’s specific inquiry whether anyone had made promises to him as to the sentence that would be imposed. See United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, despite vigorously pursuing a

    ### Response:
    holding there is a strong presumption of verity for solemn declarations in court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage’ ”). Whether the party asserting the claim was allowed to introduce specific evidence in support of that claim is an entirely different question, unrelated to deciding whether the same basic legal and factual matters were at issue in both cases. 3. Identity of parties The final element of claim preclusion is established by the fact that the parties to both suits are identical. Plaintiffs are the same and Hass is in privity with defendant AgriBank, his employer and principal. See Great Lakes Trucking Co., Inc. v. Black, 165 Wis.2d 162, 170, 477 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs do not deny that Hass and

    ### Response:
    holding that licensed agent is in privity with principal for purpose of establishing identity of parties record establishes classic employeremployee relationship in which corporation is vicariously liable for conduct of agent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    research is assessable as a reasonable cost of litigation. See Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 285 (3d Cir.1980). The court in Wehr relied on a theory that a court has discretion to award costs which are not specifically allowed by statute pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wehr can no longer be considered good law on this point, however, in light of the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements in Crawford Fitting and West Virginia Hospitals. The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning in Wehr and held that a court may only asses those costs which are specifically outlined in § 1920. Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 441; West Virginia Hosps., 499 U.S. at 93; see also Neyer, Tiseo & Hindo, Ltd. v. Russell, No 92-2983, 1994 WL 158917 (E.D.Pa. Apr.29, 1994) (<HOLDING>). Applying the same reasoning to plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    recognizing implicit overruling of wehr
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1129, 1132 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025, 96 S.Ct. 469, 46 L.Ed.2d 399 (1975); Douglass v. Glen E. Hinton Investments, Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 1971); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 438-39 (N.D.Cal.1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1970); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 697 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942, 88 S.Ct. 1021, 19 L.Ed.2d 1129, cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801, 89 S.Ct. 40, 21 L.Ed.2d 85 (1967); Jackson v. Bache & Co., Inc., 381 F.Supp. 71, 93-5 (D.C.1974). The Third Circuit is in accord. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884-86 (3d Cir. 1975); Thomas v. Duralite Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 577, 586 (3d Cir. 1975). Cf. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F.Supp. 879, 890-91 (D.C.Pa.1978) (<HOLDING>). The Eighth Circuit would seem to be in

    ### Response:
    holding that rochez did not foreclose respondeat superior liability for brokerdealers for the fraudulent acts of their employees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    act that causes damage to the plaintiff. We stated: We recognize that some courts have spoken of the “last overt act” of a civil rights conspiracy as the time from which the statute begins to run, but do not believe those courts meant to depart from the traditional rule in civil conspiracies that the mere fact of a conspiracy does not toll the statute of limitations with respect to earlier clear-cut violations of rights that have not been concealed from the plaintiff. Id. at 404 n. 1 (citation omitted). As the appellants do not suggest that the violations that transpired in the course of this alleged conspiracy (such as the excessive use of force and the false arrest) were concealed from them, Hernandez Jimenez controls. See United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1449 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The appellants attempt to withstand this blow

    ### Response:
    holding that in a multipanel circuit prior panel decisions generally are binding upon newlyconstituted panels
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a jurisdictional bar. Although it “protects from judgment,” immunity from liability “is not jurisdictional.” Harris County Hosp. Disk, 283 S.W.3d at 842. Assuming without deciding that Jesus properly asserted this affirmative defense at trial, asserting an affirmative defense does not convert it into a jurisdictional issue. Even assuming it was error for the trial court to determine that section 216.106 did not apply to Jesus and to enter a judgment against him, these were not jurisdictional errors. Because Jesus did not raise his affirmative defense of immunity from liability on appeal and because the issue is not jurisdictional, we cannot reach the merits of this argument and it cannot be a basis for reversing the trial court’s judgment. See Pat Baker Co., 971 S.W.2d at 450 (<HOLDING>). C. Analysis Stephen’s claim of slander per se

    ### Response:
    holding an appellate court cannot reverse a trial courts judgment absent properly assigned error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to challenge section 14-107 both facially and as applied. The defendants dispute the plaintiffs’ standing to raise a facial challenge, but argue that the plaintiffs’ claims fail in any event. As discussed below, we conclude that section 14-107 was constitutionally applied to the plaintiffs despite reservations about the constitutionality of the statute were it subject to a facial vagueness challenge. The central question presented by this appeal therefore is whether the plaintiffs are permitted to bring their void-for-vagueness challenge facially. We conclude that they are not. A. Facial and As-Applied Vagueness Challenges Facial challenges are generally disfavored. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (<HOLDING>); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 494 (2d

    ### Response:
    recognizing that courts should exercise judicial restraint in a facial challenge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The State of California is an independent sovereign, which itself possesses the authority to enact legislation and thus to regulate the placement of tobacco vending machines, unless preempted by federal law. Before the enactment of section 300-x26, Congress did not regulate the sale of tobacco to minors. Since the field was legislatively unoccupied by the federal government, the states retained the power to so regulate. Section 300x-26(a)(1), by its very terms, does not indicate any preemption of the states’ power. Rather, it indicates that Congress did not want to itself impose an age restriction on the sale and distribution of tobacco, but rather wanted the states to continue to regulate in this field. Cf. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 82 S.Ct. 327, 7 L.Ed.2d 299 (1961) (<HOLDING>). Congress’s enactment of section 300x-26,

    ### Response:
    holding that the tobacco inspection act which imposed uniform standards of classification and inspection of tobacco sold at auction preempted the field and left no room for the georgia tobacco identification act which also imposed tobacco classification regulations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Ruci, 409 Mass. 94, 96 (1991) citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, supra at 676-677. The five elements of the offense of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior appear in Instruction 5.42 of the Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court (1988). While G. L. c. 272, § 16, does not itself define “open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior,” these five elements were generated by our case law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fitta, 391 Mass. 394, 396 (1984) (defendant’s act must be committed “in such a way as to produce alarm or shock”); Commonwealth v. Adams, 389 Mass. 265, 271-272 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Catlin, 1 Mass. 8, 10 (1804)

    ### Response:
    holding that case law had made clear that masturbating in car on public road was sufficiently open
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a “special injury” under Iowa law? 3. Under the facts of this case, is the loss of financing, or interference with financing, a “special injury” under Iowa law? 4. Does Plaintiffs stress, accompanied by neck and back pain, constitute “special injury” under the facts of the case? Pursuant to our certification statute and in the exercise of our discretion, we now choose to answer these four certified questions. See Iowa Code § 684A.1 (stating we may answer a certified question where (1) it was certified by a proper court; (2) is a question of Iowa law; (3) “may be determinative of the cause ... pending in the certifying court”; and (4) it appears to the certifying court that there is no controlling Iowa precedent). But see Eley v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 500 N.W.2d 61, 63-64 (Iowa 1993) (<HOLDING>). II. The Certified Questions A. “Does the

    ### Response:
    recognizing discretion and declining to answer propounded questions because the statement of facts accompanying the certification were not specific enough
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    states, or the laws of only four states, in resolving the illegal gambling claims. (The plaintiffs contend that the court need apply only the laws of California (where Teleline’s home office was located), Illinois (where some calls were answered and a relevant AT&T facility was located), New Jersey (where a relevant AT&T office was located), and Missouri (where most of the calls were answered).) The district court unequivocally ruled that the gambling laws of all fifty states would have to be applied: ""In order to eliminate any confusion, I now conclude that the laws of each state from which a call was made ... will be used to evaluate the gambling claims in this litigation.” Appellant AT&T agrees with the district court's determination on choice of law; its only content Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Harbor Tug & Barge, Inc, v. Belcher

    ### Response:
    holding that failure of an appellee to crossappeal ordinarily precludes review where an appellee seeks to enlarge his rights or lessen those of an adversary but is not a jurisdictional bar
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    elements of the vehicles’ emission control systems. See No. 7:16CV00197 Compl. ¶ 20; No. 7:16CV00198 Compl. ¶22. Although the plaintiffs note that the installation of such devices is prohibited by the Clean Air Act, they assert that the operation of motor vehicles containing such devices is prohibited by Virginia law, namely the statutory and regulatory provisions cited above. Thus, to the extent the plaintiffs’ claims for equitable relief are based on the assertion that their vehicles are illegal to operate in Virginia, their claims could rise or fall entirely based on the interpretation of state law. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized, “a plaintiffs right to relief for a given claim necess 670, 2016 WL 3067686 (D. N.J. May 19, 2016) (<HOLDING>). To the extent Volkswagen argues that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs state statutory claim against volkswagen did not give rise to federal question jurisdiction under grable since the claim was based on alternative theories some of which had no necessary federal element
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    who did not preside over a trial announce fact findings gives rise to practical concerns that do not arise if the same judge files legal conclusions. See, e.g., Storrie v. Shaw, 96 Tex. 618, 75 S.W. 20, 21-22 (1903) (noting that it ""would be impossible for a judge who had not heard the testimony to express in the form of conclusions of fact the impression which the conflicting evidence made upon the mind of one who heard it”). We are concerned in this case only with findings of fact—which we sometimes refer to simply as ""findings”—and express n Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1976, no writ) (relying in part on rule 18 to hold that a successor to a deceased judge was allowed to file findings); Horizon Prop. Corp. v. Martinez, 513 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). 7 . While the rules create a deadline for the

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 18 granted a successor to a deceased judge the power to file findings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiff raises several other objections to the manner in which the ALJ and Appeals Council reached their decisions. First, he asserts that the ALJ improperly failed to consider Plaintiffs subjective complaints of pain. The Second Circuit has held that “the subjective element of pain is an important factor to be considered in determining disability.” Mimms v. Heckler (2d Cir.1984) 750 F.2d 180, 185. However, the Second Circuit has also held that “[t]he ALJ has discretion to evaluate the credibility of a claimant and to arrive at an independent judgment, in light of medical findings and other evidence, re garding the true extent of the pain alleged by the claimant.” Marcus v. Califano (2d Cir.1979) 615 F.2d 23, 27. See also Jordan v. Barnhart (2d Cir.2002) 29 Fed.Appx. 790, 794 (<HOLDING>). “If the Secretaries findings are supported by

    ### Response:
    holding that an alj is entitled to make a credibility determination regarding the claimants subjective complaints after specifically addressing these complaints and reviewing the medical evidence in the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). To satisfy this requirement, the party must show, among other things, that he “has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury” and that “the injury or threat of injury [is] both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 101-02, 103 S.Ct. 1660 (quotations omitted). Here, although Yanke’s home has not yet been searched, he has been assessed a surcharge of $100 per month since July 2003 because he has failed to comply with the Ordinance’s inspection requirement. The Court finds, therefore, that Yanke’s injury is concrete and immediate. Accordingly, Yanke has standing to bring a claim under the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Columbia Basin Apartment Ass’n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 797 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The Court now turns to the City’s argument

    ### Response:
    holding that tenants had standing to bring fourth amendment claim where tenants were threatened with eviction unless they consented to allegedly unreasonable warrantless searches
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    incidents, all of which predated her injury. However, these arguments are irrelevant to her workers’ compensation claim. If she wanted to pursue these arguments, she should have appealed her termination, as she had every right to do for a fee of $100. Because Mitchell knowingly failed to avail herself of that right, the agency’s stated reason for terminating her—which is entirely understandable and reasonable on its face—should not be subject to question. See Wright v. White, 693 So.2d 898, 902 (Miss.1997) (“[F]or state law purposes the statutory method of administrative appeal and judicial review provided by the state civil service statute is the exclusive remedy for grievances related to state employment....""); see also Miss. Dep’t of Corr. v. McClee, 677 So.2d 732, 736 (Miss.1996) (<HOLDING>); Miss. Dep’t of Corr. v. Smith, 883 So.2d 124,

    ### Response:
    holding that even if a state employees termination is properly appealed the employee bears the burden of persuasion that the alleged conduct did not occur
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of claim construction. 8 . The district court held claim 10 invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) of the America Invents Act (""AIA”). See Multilayer v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195, at *40. 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) replaced the earlier (pre-AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 when § 4(c) of the America Invents Act (""AIA”), Pub.L. No. 112-29, took effect on September 16, 2012. 125 Stat. 284, 296, 297 (2011). Because the '055 patent was filed in 1999, long before this effective date, pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 in fact controls. The district court’s error is harmless, as the AIA did not alter the substance of this provision. 9 . The district court also found that at least some VLDPE and ULDPE resins can also be broadly characterized as LLDPE resins. Id. at *32; see also Multilayer v. Berry, 63 F.Supp.3d at 794 (<HOLDING>). 10 . Claim 24 does not specify whether the

    ### Response:
    holding that under the district courts construction of lldpe resins within the classes of mlldpe vldpe and uldpe can also broadly be characterized as lldpe resins
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    It is evident from the state court filings that Schubert and his counsel suspected, alleged, and had , evidentiary support for this claim long before commencing federal habeas proceedings. Schubert’s ineffective assistance of counsel arguments fail because he has not raised a “substantial” claim under Martinez v. Ryan, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). Trevino v. Thaler, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013). 4. Because Schubert knew or should have known at the time of his original filing the facts and theories upon which he based his late proposal for amendment, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Schubert leave to amend his petition to add a new Fifth Amendment claim. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845-46 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend where the movant presents no new facts but only new theories and provides no satisfactory explanation for his failure to fully develop his contentions originally
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which the defendant pleaded guilty.” Freeman, 131 S.Ct. at 2697. If the plea agreement “does not indicate the parties’ intent to base the term of imprisonment on a particular Guidelines range subsequently lowered by the Commission, then § 3582(c)(2) simply does not apply.” Id. at 2699, fn. 5. It is Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman that is controlling and represents the holding of the Court. See United States v. Thompson, 682 F.3d 285, 290 (3rd Cir.2012) (“We therefore conclude, as has every other circuit to consider the question, that, because Justice Sotomayor’s opinion [in Freeman ] is narrower than Justice Kennedy’s, it expresses the holding of the Court.” (citations omitted)). See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169, n. 15, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the plea agreement in Freeman, which

    ### Response:
    holding of the court is the position taken by member who concurs in the judgment on the narrowest grounds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ground that it had inadvertently failed to apprise defendant or his attorney of its intent to impose an additional term of probation.”). 2. Information Considered Regarding Appropriate Sentence a. Breadth In assessing the. proper sentence, it has. “long [been] recognized that sentencing judges ‘exercise a wide discretion’ .in the types of evidence they may consider ... in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed.” Pepper v.. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 179 L.Ed.2d 196 (2011). “ ‘Highly relevant ... to [the] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.’” Id. (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949)) (<HOLDING>). A “sentencing judge [is] to consider every

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court may consider evidence of a defendants postsentence rehabilitation and that such evidence may support a downward variance from the federal sentencing guidelines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    However, provided that the aggregation of lost value for separate areas accurately reflects the diminution in value to all of the condemnee’s tract, it is unclear how such an approach is inherently unreliable or unfair. The Government cites no authority for its suggestion that a partial taking is assumed to affect the entirety of a condemnee’s tract on a uniform basis. To the contrary, such a notion seems artificial, particularly where, as here, the land taken is relatively small in area and fronts on a roadway while the remainder is sufficiently large that portions might have different characteristics relative to value and the taking might be expected to have less impact on more distant areas. Cf. United States v. 478.34 Acres of Land, Tract No. 400, 578 F.2d 156, 159 (6th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the drafters of the Model Eminent

    ### Response:
    holding that although the lower court had properly excluded evidence that the whole farm or a substantial portion of it could be subdivided in the near future there was sufficient evidence that the property was adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future for home site development along the road internal quotation marks and citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    essentially meaningless. The statute’s purpose of protecting employees whose benefits are threatened by their pension plan’s financial instability is best farthered by placing the functions most vital to participants’ well-being, interpreting the plan and determining benefits, with a fiduciary that is bound to act in their best interests. Taken together, the provisions of Title IV establish that, when PBGC is appointed a plan’s trustee following a decree of termination, it is subject to a fiduciary duty in all actions except those involving the function, statutorily reserved to the agency, of calculating the amount of benefits that are guaranteed under § 1322. Burstein v. Ret Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Ed. and Res. Found., 334 F.3d 365, 381-82 & n. 23 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Thus, plaintiffs may maintain their claims

    ### Response:
    holding that pbgc acts as trustee for plans subject to termination except when it calculates guaranteed amounts under  1322
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    birth to a child who could possibly be afflicted with a physical abnormality. There is sufficient evidence in the record of this case to enable a jury to make that determination. In addition, in establishing proximate cause for wrongful birth, plaintiffs must show that the resulting birth defect was reasonably foreseeable, that is, not too remote in relation to defendants’ negligence, and that had defendants not been negligent, the pregnancy would have been terminated. See, e.g., Berman, supra, 80 N.J. at 426, 404 A.2d 8 (imposing liability for wrongful birth on premise that proximate cause was met where plaintiff, once notified that her child, if born, would have been afflicted with Down’s Syndrome, would have terminated pregnancy); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880, 882 (D.C.1987) (<HOLDING>); Proffitt v. Bartolo, 162 Mich.App. 35, 412

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff must establish that had she learned of impairment during her pregnancy she would have terminated pregnancy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    op., not designated for publication) (finding legally and factually sufficient evidence that the mouth of an HIV-positive defendant was a deadly weapon when defendant bit the complainant); Najera v. State, 955 S.W.2d 698, 700-01 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, no pet.) (finding legally and factually sufficient evidence that defendant's penis and seminal fluids were capable of causing death); Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559, 561-65 (Tex.App.-East-land 1992, pet. ref’d) (finding evidence was sufficient to sustain HIV-positive defendant’s attempted murder conviction for spitting at complainant). 6 . John outcried about being anally raped before meeting with Garza, but the outcry did not entail any comment relating to the pain he felt. 7 . See Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Emphasis added. 9 . See Leday v. State,

    ### Response:
    holding that texas rule of evidence 702 does not permit an expert to give an opinion that the complainant or class of persons to which the complainant belongs is truthful
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it....” Mamlin, 17 A.2d at 409. The legislature’s decision to lower the employee threshold from twelve to six to four, but not to one, indicates the lack of unanimous opinion that every employee should be protected from sex discrimination as Employee asserts. The legislature has had the opportunity to argue the merits of exempting small employers from compliance and to decide exactly where it should establish the threshold. It explicitly chose not to extend the protections against discrimination to employees of small employers. The wisdom of this decision is not before us. Where the legislature has spoken, we will not interpret statutory provisions to advance matters of public interest. See Geary, 319 A.2d at 176 (<HOLDING>). Rather, we are bound by the terms of the PHRA

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the legislature can create statutory exceptions to atwill employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “clearly envisions that asbestos claims will be paid periodically as they accrue and as they are allowed,” since it requires courts to ensure that there will be sufficient funds available for both future demands and present claims to receive similar treatment. In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832, 842-43 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2003). Therefore, differences in the timing of distributions and other procedural variations that have a legitimate basis do not generally violate § 1123(a)(4) unless they produce a substantive difference in a claimant’s opportunity to recover. See In re New Power Co., 438 F.3d at 1122-23 (concluding that a plan provision did not violate § 1123(a)(4) in part because it was “procedural rather than substantive”); cf. In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648, 660 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Under that standard, none of the provisions

    ### Response:
    holding that a difference in the procedural protections offered to certain claimants violated  1123a4 because some claimants were accorded far more effective recovery rights than others
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motivated by something other than this litigation. Moreover, the capital infrastructure for collecting the tolls has been dismantled, hardly the behavior of a defendant that intended to return to its old ways upon dismissal of a case. In short, we have little cause to believe that the legislature repealed the tolls in order to immunize its actions from judicial review, and the voluntary cessation exception does not apply to save the mooted claims. B. Restitution Strictly speaking, the Town’s restitution claim may not be moot, unlike its claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. It is settled law that a claim for monetary relief, including restitution, may survive events that moot injunctive or declaratory relief. See N.L.R.B. v. Me. Caterers, Inc., 732 F.2d 689, 691 (1st Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Demelo v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 727

    ### Response:
    holding that claim for cost reimbursement and making employees whole is not moot despite the defendant having ceased the challenged practice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the subfreights prevented, as a matter of law, INB from validly receiving the subfreight fund, and that therefore the transfer of funds from POSCO could not have extinguished Cornish’s lien because it did not constitute legal payment of the subfreights to the charterer or its agent. Under our holding above, Cornish’s lien did not attach to the specific funds transferred by POSCO to INB; at the same time, this transfer was ineffective to extinguish Cornish's lien on POSCO's debt for subfreights. We note, in addition, that plaintiffs' argument incorrectly assumes that a Rule C arrest warrant is effective against property that comes into the possession of a garnishee after service of the warrant. See Reibor International Ltd. v. Cargo Carriers (KACZ-CO.) Ltd., 759 F.2d 262 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also Union Planters National Bank v.

    ### Response:
    holding that rule b attachment does not extend to afteracquired property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    matter designated to the trial court."" Ford v. Culp Custom Homes, Inc., 731 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trams. denied. Thus, we may affirm the trial court's denial of the Association's motion for summary judgment if it sustainable on either basis. We conclude that the denial of the Asso-clation's motion for summary judgment if it is sustainable on the basis of laches. After the Association filed its motion for summary judgment, McGlothin responded by arguing, in part, that the Association lost the right to injunctive relief through ""waiver, lashes [sic], or similar conduct."" Appellant's Appendix at 76. The trial court denied the Association's motion for summary judgment, in part, because it found that genuine issues of material fact existed d 70, 73 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>), reh'g demied. The Association makes no other

    ### Response:
    holding that the party moving for summary judgment waived its argument that the opposing partys affidavit should not be considered because the moving party never objected to the timeliness of the affidavit to the trial court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no report of any property crime, personal crime, or any weapons. The officer agreed that there was “nothing in Dispatch ... to imply that this may be a dangerous situation.” Id. Here, as in Hughes, there was no disturbance call or suspicious activity reported. The similarities end there, however. Before being ordered to stop, Mr. Charles raced up a flight of stairs. He then ran into an officer, and attempted to break the officer’s hold, pulling him down several steps at the same time. It is also a relevant consideration, though not necessarily dispositive, that the officers, upon arrival, encountered Mr. Charles along with several others at the apartment building, late at night, and in' a high-crime area. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Although Mr. Charles’s response to his

    ### Response:
    holding that the fact that an investigatory stop took place in a high crime area is pertinent to a terry analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “I hereby agree that any dispute related to my employment relationship shall be resolved exclusively through binding arbitration.” lb. Thus, this circumstance of Adler and Fred Lind Manor’s transaction does not support Adler’s claim of procedural unconscionability. 126 Nevertheless, we have cautioned that these factors should “not be applied mechanically without regard to whether in truth a meaningful choice existed.” Nelson, 127 Wn.2d at 131. Although Fred Lind Manor appears to have provided Adler with a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the agreement, and the important terms were not hidden, Adler and Fred Lind Manor offer remarkably different versions of the facts pertaining to the manner in which the contract was entered into. Cf. Luna, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, we cannot make a determination

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish procedural unconscionability since he had a reasonable opportunity to consider the agreement and the arbitration clause was clearly set forth in the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    connection test” of Rule 701 requires that the opinion or inference is one that a normal person would form on the basis of the observed facts. Carton v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 303 Ark. 568, 571-72, 798 S.W.2d 674, 675 (1990). We will not reverse a court’s decision to admit relevant evidence absent an abuse of discretion. Moore v. State, 323 Ark. 529, 549, 915 S.W.2d 284, 295 (1996). We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in permitting Dr. Doland to testify without first requiring DHS to qualify her as an expert witness. In our view, Dr. Doland’s opinion that someone would have more extensive burns if they fell into a bathtub of scalding water is an opinion that a normal person could form on the basis of the observed facts. See Carton, 303 Ark. at 572, 798 S.W.2d at 676 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, appellant cross-examined Dr. Doland

    ### Response:
    holding that opinion that fuel oil on her shoes caused her to fall is one which a normal person would form on the basis of observed facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and crashing. Id. at 1327. The court determined the persons to be stopped in the vehicle were “stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion ... to achieve that result,” when an officer fired his weapon to stop the passenger and driver, and one of those bullets struck the passenger. Id. at 1329. But, unlike Vaughan, a significant difference exists here because the instrumentality meant to stop Mr. Brooks — the bullet from Deputy Gaenzle’s gun — did not stop him, and therefore, the intended result was not achieved. We are not alone in interpreting Supreme Court precedent as requiring intentional termination of movement or acquisition of physical control in flight situations, regardless of the force applied. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 196 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403,

    ### Response:
    holding there must be either a show of authority or a use of force which must have caused the fleeing individual to stop attempting escape
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we must first address a procedural matter. It is the State’s contention that the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure rather than the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, controls the disposition of appellant’s first point of error. At the time of appellant’s guilty plea, Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 40.09 controlled the appellate process as to the record on appeal and therefore, the State contends, it should be followed in this appeal. The State asserts that Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 40.09 limits the appellate record to all matters developed at the trial, thereby precluding testimony from the evidentiary hearing ordered by the Court of Criminal Appeals pursuant to appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Farris v. State, 712 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). We disagree with the State’s assertion that

    ### Response:
    holding under code of criminal procedure record refers to all matters developed at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    may recover twice or more for some elements of damages— one from the tortfeasor who caused the harm and again from any source of benefits collateral to the tortfeasor. Such multiple recovery, however, is the by-product of the rule and not a principle of the rule itself nor a policy at the foundation of the rule.” J. Kircher, “Insurer Subrogation in Wisconsin: The Good Hands (Or A Neighbor) in Another’s Shoes,” 71 Marq. L. Rev. 33, 51-52 (1987). “The types of payments that typically come within the collateral source rule include insurance proceeds, medical benefits, and payments made by an employer pursuant to a statutory compensation scheme.” (Emphasis added.) Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 490, 572 A.2d 978 (1990); see also Apuzzo v. Seneco, 178 Conn. 230, 233, 423 A.2d 866 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 448, 378 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would have acted had it known the true facts is “one of fact requiring testimony by the insurer’s representatives” that implicates “the subjective view of what a particular insurer would or would not have deemed material if it had known the true facts.” Singer, 512 So.2d at 1129 (discussing the earlier version of section 627.409 but concluding that this determination is subjective in nature and thus requires witness testimony). Florida courts have granted summary judgment in favor of insurers where an insured’s misrepresentation on an insurance application was , “of that character which the court can say would reasonably have affected the insurer’s judgment as to the nature of the risk and amount of premium.” Id. at 1128 (citation omitted); see also Salgado, 22 So.3d at 596-97, 604 (<HOLDING>); Kieser v. Old Line Life Ins. Co. of Am., 712

    ### Response:
    holding that insureds failure to list his brother as a member of the household was a material misrepresentation that provided the insurance company with grounds to rescind the policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was a probability of reaching a verdict. Further, the district court admonished jurors to answer these two questions with a simple “yes or no.” It did not attempt to target the holdout jurors or to determine which way the votes fell. If anything, the district court was attempting to avoid this effect. Also, there were no further instructions or lectures from the judge, and despite defense counsel’s own suggestion, the judge did not place a time limit on deliberations. See State v. Nelson, 63 N.M. 428, 433, 321 P.2d 202, 205 (1958) (pointing out that the district court’s repeated reminders of what jurors said on voir dire regarding death penalty was coercive on the one holdout juror); see also Pirch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 80 N.M. 323, 326-27, 455 P.2d 189, 192-93 (Ct.App.1969) (<HOLDING>). {57} Nor is there any evidence of juror

    ### Response:
    holding that judges remarks relating to length of trial expense involved importance of case and setting time limit on deliberations was coercive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    towards the child or that the child actually be injured; rather, a child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger which the parent is aware of but disregards. In re S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d at 477. Conduct that demonstrates awareness of an endangering environment is sufficient to show endangerment. Id. (citing In re Tidwell, 35 S.W.3d 115, 119-20 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (“[I]t is not necessary for [the mother] to have had certain knowledge that one of the [sexual molestation] offenses actually occurred; it is sufficient that she was aware of the potential for danger to the children and disregarded that risk by ... leaving the children in that envi fender, who usually lived near criminals and drug addicts, and who lived a transient lifestyle. See id. (<HOLDING>); Hann v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory

    ### Response:
    holding evidence legally and factually sufficient under sections d and e to terminate mothers parental rights based in part on evidence that mother placed children with father who lived transient lifestyle with children
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Christopher Village, L.P. v. United States, 360 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed.Cir. 2004). ""In most circumstances a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that the original tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction, even if the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was not litigated in the first action”; Id. at 1329-30 (citing Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982))(explaining that principles of res judicata apply to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, and that ""[a] party that has had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject matter jurisdiction may not ... reopen that question in a collateral attack upon adverse judgment.”); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Here, res judicata applies because the

    ### Response:
    recognizing exceptions to this rule when allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of government which is not applicable in this situation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he is under arrest and handcuffed); State v. Clausen, 113 Wn. App. 657, 660-61, 56 P.3d 587 (2002) (finding custodial arrest when a detainee is told he is under arrest and will be released after booking)). In Radka, the defendant was told he was under arrest and placed in the patrol car, but without handcuffs. He was allowed to make numerous cell phone calls while he remained in the car. The court concluded that such circumstances would lead a reasonable detainee to believe that he was not under custodial arrest. Id. at 50. Consequently, although the officer had probable cause for a custodial arrest of the defendant, the lack of actual custodial arrest rendered the subsequent search of Radka’s car unconstitutional. See also State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 585, 62 P.3d 489 (2003) (<HOLDING>). ¶18 The circumstances surrounding Glenn’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a lawful custodial arrest is a prerequisite to a search since the arrest is the authority of law justifying the search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    law.” Moreover, the allocation of the burden of proof in such administrative proceedings is set forth in the director’s regulations, which provide that: “The appellant has the burden of proving that the actions appealed were arbitrary, capricious or contrary to rule or law.” Administrative Procedure P10-3-8, 4 Code Colo.Reg. 801-2 (1987). Thus, under the applicable statutory and regulatory scheme here, the burden of proof was properly placed on plaintiff to show the panel that the selection and examination process conducted for the state lottery director position was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to rule or law. Section 24-50-112(3)(a); Administrative Procedure P10-3-8, 4 Code Colo.Reg. 801-2 (1987); see Renteria v. Colorado State Department of Personnel, 811 P.2d 797 (Colo. 1991) (<HOLDING>); see also § 24-4-105(7), C.R.S. (1988

    ### Response:
    holding that similar burden of proof was properly placed on appellant in administrative appeal brought under provisions of comparable statute concerning the allocation of positions in the state personnel system
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    constitutional and other rights.” Rule 10-101(B) NMRA 2002. The purposes of the Children’s Code and the children’s court rules are similar and we see nothing to prevent the application of Rule 10-230.1(B) ninety-day limit for determining a child-initiated motion to reconsider filed pursuant to Section 32A-2-23(G). {16} Child also acknowledges that both this Court and the Supreme Court have held thirty- and ninety-day jurisdictional time limits to be reasonable. See State v. Trujillo, 117 N.M. 769, 771, 877 P.2d 575, 577 (1994); Hayes, 106 N.M. at 808, 751 P.2d at 188 (stating that as a matter of law a motion is denied if the court does not enter a final ruling on it within a reasonable time frame of ninety days); Chavez-Rey v. Miller, 99 N.M. 377, 380, 658 P.2d 452, 455 (Ct.App.1982) (<HOLDING>). Child argues that his case can be

    ### Response:
    holding court lost jurisdiction to enter its order after thirty days and the motion was denied by operation of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor: (i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or (ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due. 3 . This narrow interpretation of implied consent is not exclusive to the First Circuit; but rather has been established in several circuits. See e.g., Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Martin, 954 F.2d 353, 358 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical Attractions of

    ### Response:
    holding that implied consent is not established merely one party introduced evidence relevant to an unpleaded issue and the opposing party failed to object
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“Although there need not be the kind of hearing required if factual damages were the issue, there must, we think, be either some hearing or sufficient affidavits to give the trial judge an adequate reference base for his judgment.”) See also M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 14.04[B][l][a] (2001) (“In considering the factual basis for a statutory damages award when [a] jury trial has been waived, there need not be a hearing of the sort required for an award of actual damages or defendant’s profits. Nonetheless, even in those circumstances, the defendant should be accorded some hearing on the issue, or sufficient affidavits to give the trial judge an adequate basis for his judgment.” (Footnotes omitted)). Cf. United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Thus, as long as the parties are afforded an

    ### Response:
    holding that statutory damages under  504c could not be awarded in conjunction with a default judgment without a hearing or a demonstration by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relief from removal. Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287. “Conversely, an adverse credibility determination alone may be sufficient to support the denial of an asylum application.” Id. “[A]n adverse credibility determination, [however], does not alleviate the IJ’s duty to consider other evidence produced by an asylum applicant,” and it is not sufficient for the IJ to rely on the adverse credibility finding alone, if the applicant produces other evidence of persecution. Id. “The weaker an applicant’s testimony, ... the greater the need for corroborative evidence.” Yang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir.2005). This Court has held that an applicant’s failure to mention certain aspects of his claim before the hearing can support an adverse credibility finding. Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287 (<HOLDING>). Upon review of the record and the briefs of

    ### Response:
    holding that in light of an applicants omission of various relevant facts from his asylum application substantial evidence supported the ijs adverse credibility determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    P.2d 1275 (1991). Here LKO sued for a judicial declaration of its understanding of the agreement with Mr. Fair and TCG. ¶25 In Hizey, clients sued their attorney and alleged legal malpractice based on the lawyer’s conflict of interest. Hizey, 119 Wn.2d at 256-57. The trial judge refused to let an expert testify on rules of professional conduct and refused to instruct the jury on those rules. Id. at 257-58. The Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that a violation of ethics rules must be pursued through a disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 259. And the court held that such violations may not serve as the basis for a private cause of action. Id. at 259, 261. The court reasoned that a claim for legal malpractice focuses on the duty of care owed to the client, which is establishe 28 (1991) (<HOLDING>)). At least one legal scholar has suggested

    ### Response:
    holding contract for sale of law practice which included duty on part of selling attorney to refer clients as consideration for the sale violated rpc
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than ten years immediately preceding the date of the application for cancellation of removal; (2) has been a person of good moral character during such period; (3) has not been convicted of certain criminal offenses; and (4) can establish that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent or child, who is a permanent resident or citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l). An alien is precluded from establishing the required good moral character if he or she has “been confined, as a result of conviction, to a pen alysis applies to decisions regarding eligibility for relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. See, e.g., Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 19-20 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 948 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that a determination that precluded an alien from even applying for relief under section 1255 is a purely legal question that is reviewable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Ocwen’s reporting was “incomplete or inaccurate” regarding his personal liability for the foreclosure deficiency stated a claim under CCRAA § 1785.25. We note that unlike the company in Wang v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, which faced only the potential of the debtor raising a statute of limitations defense, Ocwen itself had made an election of remedies when it sold Kuns’s home in a non-judicial foreclosure, thereby changing the collectibility of the debt. 681 F.Supp.2d 1143 (N.D.Cal.2010). The anti-deficiency laws’ protection against post-foreclosure personal liability is complete and nonwaivable, in contrast to the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations that the debtor in Wang could raise. See DeBerard Props. v. Lim, 20 Cal.4th 659, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 292, 976 P.2d 843 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Because Kuns’ complaint stated a claim under

    ### Response:
    holding that antideficiency laws protection is nonwaivable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the balancing test first articulated in Lear. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 567 F.2d 184, 187-88 (2d Cir.1977) (licensee could litigate the validity of patent even though licensing agreement was entered into as part of a settlement-of earlier litigation); Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. U.S.M. Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 781 (6th Cir.1975) (enforcing consent decree, which recited that plaintiffs patent was valid); Kraly v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 1366, 1369 (7th Cir.1974) (concluding that a licensee was not es-topped from challenging the validity of a patent even where a consent decree incorporated an understanding that the patent would not be challenged); Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Adver. Co., 444 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1971) (<HOLDING>). The Lear balancing test has also been

    ### Response:
    holding that covenant in settlement agreement whereby defendants agreed not to contest validity of patent was unenforceable because in direct conflict with strong federal policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it appears at least four judges in the Second District would agree with the First, Fourth, and Fifth Districts if not for Second District precedent. 5 . Although not relevant to the precedential value of our decision in Mann, we note that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals later vacated Mann's sentence on other grounds. See Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1458-59 (11th Cir.1988) (en banc) (finding the jurors were misinformed as to the importance of their recommendation, contrary to Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985)). The resentencing resulted in another death sentence, which we affirmed. See Mann v. State, 603 So.2d 1141, 1144 (Fla.1992). Mann v. Dugger was subsequently overruled. See Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). PARIENTE, J., concurring. While I have

    ### Response:
    recognizing that references to and descriptions of the jurys verdict as advisory as a recommendation and of the judge as the final sentencing authority are permissible under romano v oklahoma 512 us 1 114 sct 2004 129 led2d 1 1994
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    school. Id. at 280. And the defendant noted the school district would have paid as much to another driver performing the same job. Rejecting these arguments, the Eighth Circuit held: What the School District wanted was a competent school-bus driver who was truthful and had not been convicted of a felony, and this is not what it got. The School District has been deprived of money in the very elementary sense that its money has gone to a person who would not have received it if all of the facts had been known. Id. at 280. The court concluded the school district had been deprived of its property, too, because it had a choice in how to spend its money and the defendant’s misrepresentations induced it to part with that money under false pretenses. Id.; see also Bunn, 26 Fed.Appx. at 142 (<HOLDING>); Leahy, 464 F.3d at 787 (same). The defendants

    ### Response:
    holding that where defendant made false representations to attain government contract but performed satisfactorily the government had been deprived of money or property for purposes of mail and wire fraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1) seek recovery of benefits under the plan; (2) enforce his rights as provided by the plan; or (3) obtain clarification of any possible future benefits to which he may be entitled under the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The law is clear, however, that “Section 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), expressly ‘supersedes any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan’ covered by ERISA.” Rozzell v. Security Services, Inc., 38 F.3d 819, 821 (5th Cir.1994) (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Company v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138, 111 S.Ct. 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990)) (citations omitted). Courts have held that ERISA completely preempts the specific state law claims McSperitt alleges. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 62-64, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (<HOLDING>); McNeil v. Time Insurance Company, 205 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that erisa completely preempted certain state law claims and finding that erisa preempted an employees common law tort and contract claim when the employee sought benefits under the employers disability policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the trial court did instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor's question. 17 . Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). 18 . Id.; Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (op. on reh’g), cert, denied, 526 U.S. 1070, 119 S.Ct. 1466, 143 L.Ed.2d 550 (1999). 19 . Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77; see also Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex.Crim.App.2003), cert, denied, 542 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 2837, 159 L.Ed.2d 270 (2004). 20 . Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Hamilton v. State, No. 02-04-00435-CR, 2005 WL 3008449, at *2 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2005, pet. refd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Calderon v. State, 847 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, pet. refd). 21 . See Calderon, 847 S.W.2d at 380-81 (<HOLDING>). 22 . See Orona v. State, 791 S.W.2d 125,

    ### Response:
    holding that instruction to disregard cured error from prosecutors improper comment during voir dire
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The Kiedrowski decision acknowledged that a non-habitual felony offender sentence could be made to run consecutively to a habitual felony offender sentence for felony offenses arising out of the same criminal episode, but held that such sentences violate Hale where, when combined, their length exceeds the maximum the defendant could have received under the habitual offender statute. See Kiedrowski, 876 So.2d at 694 (“Davis is silent as to whether the combined sentence of imprisonment and probation exceeded the statutory maximum allowed under the habitual felony offender statute. In the instant case the combined sentences do exceed the statutory maximum. We find this to be a critical distinction.”). But see Fuller v. State, 867 So.2d 469, 470 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). Kiedrowski distinguished, and did not

    ### Response:
    holding that the whole point in hale is that once the habitual offender sentencing scheme is utilized to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum on one or more counts arising from a single criminal episode consecutive sentencing may not be used to further lengthen the overall sentence and certifying conflict with davis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would hurt the store’s business, because of the lack of African-American customers at this location; and (ii) his purported statements at a department head meeting just before Johnson’s arrival in Wheelersburg that Johnson was not very intelligent and that the employees needed to work with him. Accepting, for the moment, that these remarks are indicative of racially discriminatory views, Newman necessarily must have made them before Johnson’s transfer to Wheelersburg in January of 1995, or nearly two years before Johnson was terminated in November of 1996. This sizable temporal gap precludes any reliance upon these alleged statements as supporting an inference of discrimination in Johnson’s eventual discharge. See Phelps v. Yale Security, Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (6th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 861, 114 S.Ct. 175,

    ### Response:
    holding that discriminatory remarks made nearly a year before the challenged employment decision could not support an inference of discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/8/09, at 4. ¶ 7 According to Y.N., the Orphans’ Court erred in applying section 2905(b), as that subsection, which pertains to supplying limited information to an adoptee about his or her natural parents, is irrelevant to the instant case since neither S.B. nor Y.N. is seeking such information. Brief for Appellant at 16. Y.N. maintains that the relevant provision is 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2905(a). Brief for Appellant at 17. We agree that the Orphans’ Court should have applied section 2905(a). ¶ 8 Section 2905(a) of title 23 provides that records relating to adoption shall be withheld from inspection “except on an order of court granted upon cause shown[.]” Id. (emphasis added); In re Adoption of B.E.W.G. and S-L.W.G., 355 Pa.Super. 554, 513 A.2d 1061, 1065 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Y.N. correctly points out that section

    ### Response:
    holding that where father who killed his wife had relinquished his children for adoption prior to his conviction the maternal grandparents of the children who had legal custody at the time of the adoption had standing to petition to unseal the adoption records this court vacated the orphans courts order that held the grandparents lacked standing and directed that on remand the orphans court determine whether the grandparents had shown cause under section 2905a to unseal the records
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    somewhat implausible. It puts the cart before the horse. The question presented is whether the statutes in question confer standing. If the answer is that they do not — which appears to be the case — the court and the parties should never reach the merits of a particular decision, particularly where the determination of the nature of that decision requires the development of a record. Plaintiff's claim also ignores the fact that prudential standing is determined on a wholesale basis, with the court called upon to determine whether categories of claimants were intended to be conferred rights under a particular statute. 22 . Indeed, this principle of prudential standing was relied upon by at least three circuits in denying government employees the right t 51 Fed.Cl. 667, 672-73 (2001) (<HOLDING>). 24 . One looking for evidence of the

    ### Response:
    holding that the awardee of a contract may not challenge the decision to terminate that contract by invoking the courts bid protest jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its interests. , Summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendant on this issue. ■ B. Plaintiffs also ask the Court to find that defendant .has, as a matter -of law, waived all defenses, other, the § 207(e)(2) regular- rate exclusion at issue in this opinion. Dkt. #87, at 22. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that defendant did not adequately raise any additional defenses in its pleadings or discovery responses, particularly identifying the Motor Carrier Act exemption (MCAE) as improperly raised. Id. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a party responding to a pleading to “state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it” and to “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense — ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(b), ( . 2004) (unpublished per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Ashland Eng’g Co., 45 F.3d 588,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants answer sufficiently encapsulated the elements of an affirmative defense to have put plaintiff on notice that defendant intended to rely on it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only did not know about SORNA, but also that this lack of knowledge contributed to his decision to evade well-known and well-established state law registration obligations. AFFIRMED. 1 . In his brief, Mr. Lawrance states that he ""left Arizona prior to the Act's effective date and was in Oklahoma prior to the Attorney General's February 28, 2007 order.” Aplt. Br. 15. 2 . See United States v. Sallee, 2007 WL 3283739 (W.D.Okla. Aug. 13, 2007) (unpublished) (declining to apply SORNA to a defendant who completed his interstate travel in 2004); United States v. Heriot, 2007 WL 2199516 (D.S.C. July 27, 2007) (unpublished) (declining to apply the Act to a defendant who completed his interstate travel in June 2006); United States v. Muzio, 2007 WL 2159462 (E.D.Mo. July 26, 2007) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Marvin Smith, 528 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding sorna inapplicable to a defendant who traveled during the gap period between enactment and issuance of the interim rule and was indicted on march 15 2007
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the bound ary lines” of a right-of-way a “street” does not control the constitutional forum analysis. Furthermore, even treating the median as “part of’ a public street, because Plaintiff seeks access only to that “part” of the street for the display of his Nativity scene, it is only that part of the venue that is determinative of the forum. “When speakers seek general access to public property, the forum encompasses that property. When speakers seek more limited access, however, we must take a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of [the relevant] forum within the confines of the government property at issue.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 801, 105 S.Ct. at 3448. See also Helms v. Zubaty, 495 F.3d 252, 256 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, even public streets as a whole may

    ### Response:
    holding that because plaintiffs speech occurred in the reception area of the judge executives office it was only the nature of that limited area and not the general public nature of fiscal court budding within which the office was located that was determinative of the forum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the [trial judge] must treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment.” Dual, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 383 Md. 151, 161, 857 A.2d 1095, 1100 (2004). If a trial judge has been presented with facts or allegations outside of those in the complaint and has not specifically excluded them from consideration, we have acted on the presumption that the additional information was considered by the trial judge. See 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 407 Md. 253, 263, 964 A.2d 662, 667 (2009) (concluding that “[b]y relying on material outside of the pleadings when granting the City’s motion to dismiss, the Circuit Court, in effect, converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment”); Smith v. Danielczyk, 400 Md. 98, 105, 928 A.2d 795, 799 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 177, 757 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that because the record does not indicate that the extraneous documents or averments were excluded by the court  we must assume that they were considered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of highly questionable credibility, and the circumstantial evidence was far less convincing than the Marshall circumstantial evidence. Hands’s case turned entirely upon which biased witnesses the jury chose to believe. Evidence that tended to erode Hands’s credibility and to prejudice the jury against him, therefore, could have had a substantial — perhaps overpowering — impact on the jury’s deliberations. See United States v. Crutchfield, 26 F.3d 1098, 1103 (11th Cir.1994) (reversing conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct where “[t]he prejudicial effect of [the] misconduct cannot be disputed, as this case turned largely on the jury’s credibility determinations of the several witnesses who testified”); see also United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 700-01

    ### Response:
    holding that the cumulative effect of several incidents of prosecutorial misconduct that undercut defendants credibility was not harmless error noting that defendant to go free needed to persuade jury that he was credible and that the prosecution witnesses who testified in exchange for leniency were not
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    alleges that CUNY’s conduct violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Compl. ¶¶ 9396. These claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Second Circuit has decisively held that CUNY and its senior colleges, like Hunter College, are “arms of the state,” which are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Clissuras, 359 F.3d at 83; see also Jackson v. City Univ. of New York, No. 05-Civ.-8712, 2006 WL 1751247, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2006) (Rakoff, J.). And neither of the aforementioned exceptions — statutory abrogation or prospective injunctive relief from a state official — applies to a direct constitutional claim brought directly against a state entity. Santiago v. New York State Dept. of Corr. Services, 945 F.2d 25, 30-32 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Garcia v. Paylock, 13-CV-2868, 2014 WL

    ### Response:
    holding that the fourteenth amendment was not an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to abrogate states immunity and reversing district courts rejection of new yorks eleventh amendment argument
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1731; Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.1987); Anderson v. Central Point Sch. Dist., 746 F.2d 505 (9th Cir.1984); and Thomas v. Carpenter, 881 F.2d 828 (9th Cir.1989) for the proposition that the law was clearly established). When Diaz acted in 2009, it was also clearly established under both Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent that “the type of sanction ... ‘need not be particularly great in order to find that rights have been violated.’” Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976)). It was also clearly established that deprivation of an employee’s salary is unconstitutional if levied in retaliation for protected speech. See Manhattan Beach, 881 F.2d at 818-19 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). That we have not decided a case in which the

    ### Response:
    holding that salary is unconstitutionally withheld if on the basis of protected activities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under section 5904(d). See Cox v. West and Scates, both supra. Third, the Court, on its own motion or the motion of either party, may review a fee agreement that a person who represents an appellant before the Court is required to file with the Court at the time that the appeal is filed. See 38 U.S.C. § 7263(c); Fritz v. West, 13 Vet.App. 190, 192 (1999); Carpenter (Angeline) v. West, 12 Vet.App. 52, 53 (1998), appeal dismissed sub nom. Carpenter (Angeline) v. Gober, 228 F.3d 1379 (Fed.Cir.2000); Shaw v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 498, 502 (1997); U.S. VET. APP. R. 46(d)(2)(B). The language of 38 U.S.C. § 7263(c) presupposes that any review under this section will be limited to fee agreements in appeals that are currently pending before the Court. See Wick Fee Agreement, 40 F.3d at 371 (<HOLDING>); In the Matter of the Fee Agreement of Bates,

    ### Response:
    holding that section 7263 authorizes this court to review fee agreements when appeal is properly before this court and when fee agreement has been filed with court at time appeal is filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also In re Kingsley, 518 F.3d 874, 878 (11th Cir.2008) (“one who has acted in bad faith, resorted to trickery and deception, or been guilty of fraud, injustice or unfairness will appeal in vain to a court of conscience”) (citation omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that “[c]ourts of equity frequently decline to interfere on behalf of a complainant whose attitude is unconscientious in respect of the matter concerning which it seeks relief.” National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331, 338, 50 S.Ct. 288, 74 L.Ed. 881 (1930). The Grayson panel gleaned from these fundamental principles a “strong presumption against the grant of dilatory equitable relief.” 491 F.3d at 1326; see also Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584-85, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Simply put, equity aids the vigilant, not

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a number of federal courts have invoked their equitable powers to dismiss suits they saw as speculative or filed too late in the day and opining that federal courts can and should protect states from dilatory or speculative suits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the information school authorities had regarding defendant’s possession of the book. Id. at 792. In People v. Joseph G, 32 Cal.App.4th 1735, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 902 (1995), review denied June 14, 1995, a high school vice-principal received information from a parent that a student was in possession of a gun. Id. 38 Cal.Rptr. at 903. The vice-principal conducted a warrant-less search of the defendant’s locker and seized a gun. Id. at 903-904. The California Court of Appeal held that the lower court properly refused to exclude the gun because the vice-principal had a reasonable suspicion to conduct the search. Id. at 905-906. See also, In the Interest of Isiah B., 176 Wis.2d 639, 500 N.W.2d 637 (1993), cert. denied Isiah B. v. Wisconsin, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. ■ 231, 126 L.Ed.2d 186 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Jeffrey Snyder, 413 Mass.

    ### Response:
    holding that random search of students locker was justified because there were shooting incidents on school grounds and school had policy allowing for searches of lockers for any reason
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when considering a motion for summary judgment, if the responding party brings forth any evidence that supports a reasonable construction of the intent of the testatrix which differs from that urged by the movant, summary judgment is inappropriate. Here, the term “my real property ... in ... Prue Road” could reasonably refer to the land alone. But, in light of the extrinsic evidence offered, it is just as reasonable to construe this phrase as that bundle of assets that comprised a long-time, ongoing family business investment. The extrinsic evidence offered here did not contradict any language in the will, nor did it refer to something outside of or independent of the words used in the will. See Najvar v. Vasek, 564 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Rather, the affidavits and historical

    ### Response:
    holding extrinsic evidence contradicting language in will inadmissible when will is unambiguous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the forged sales contract. Scott summarized the information in the sales contract to create the loan approval form for the DLC. According to NCB’s former CEO, the DLC approved the loan in reliance on Scott’s summary of the sales contract and on the understanding that NCB, through Scott, possessed the sales contract. The bond does not require the DLC itself to have actual, physical possession of the sales contract. It only requires possession by “the Insured ... or [its] authorized representative.” Cincinnati does not and could not dispute that Scott, a vice president and the loan officer in charge of the Orchard Road loan, possessed the sales contract on behalf NCB or at least as NCB’s authorized representative. See Dix v. Shadeed, 261 Ga.App. 145, 581 S.E.2d 747, 748 (2003) (<HOLDING>). As long as an NCB employee with a role in the

    ### Response:
    holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the sale agreement mentioned above or the Debtor’s reacquisition rights under the Trust—are also property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate. Carlson v. Brandt, 250 B.R. 366, 372-73 (N.D.Ill.2000) (finding that a bankruptcy lawyer’s right to a future contingency fee is a contractual right that is property of the estate). Further, to the extent the Debtor has a right to sue either the Trust or the Petitioners, that chose in action also is property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate. Cable v. Ivy Tech State College, 200 F.3d 467, 472-73 (7th Cir.1999) (“The phrase ‘legal or equitable interests ... in property’ includes choses in action and other legal claims that could be prosecuted for benefit of the estate.”); see also Peterson v. McGladrey & Pullen, LLP, 676 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); accord Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417

    ### Response:
    recognizing property of the estate to include the estates chose in action against its auditor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the jury e’s refusal to charge in this instance. IV. Public Official Kennedy next alleges the trial judge erred by not finding Goodwin was a public official and, accordingly, charging the jury on the plaintiffs burden of proving actual malice and the falsity of the alleged defamatory statement. The designation of a plaintiff as a public official is considerable in a defamation action. “In defamation actions involving a ‘public official’ or ‘public figure,’ the plaintiff must prove the statement was made with ‘actual malice,’ i.e., with either knowledge that it was false or reckless disregard for its truth.” Elder v. Gaffney Ledger, 341 S.C. 108, 113, 533 S.E.2d 899, 901 (2000). Kennedy argued Goodwin, as an assistant principal, was a public official. On that basis, Kennedy assert (<HOLDING>). We find these cases to be distinguishable.

    ### Response:
    holding a school principal seeking recovery for defamation has the burden of showing actual malice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On June 4, 1984 FTI and Houser filed their present petition, seeking attorneys’ fees in the amount of approximately $385,000. A. The threshold issue is whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider the present petition for attorneys’ fees. Section 504(c)(2) of the EAJA provides that “[a] party dissatisfied with the fee determination ... may petition ... to the court having jurisdiction to review the merits of the underlying decision of the agency____” The SEC maintains that the staff decision not to recommend that the Commission file an injunctive action is “committed to agency discretion,” 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d), and is therefore unreviewable. See Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 645 (D.C.Cir.1974). Compare Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C.Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403, 92 S.Ct. 577,

    ### Response:
    holding sec decision reviewable when commission has reviewed staff decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and diligence that is exercised by pastoral care providers. Pastoral care provider can only mean one thing. Some jurisdictions have attempted to characterize the tort of clergy malpractice as an action for breach of a fiduciary relationship. The allegation of a breach of fiduciary duty, however, is “simply an elliptical way to state a clergy malpractice claim.” Dausch, supra, 52 F.3d at 1428. Plaintiffs third count for breach of fiduciary duty is explicit that it is only in Reverend MacDonell’s capacity “as pastoral care provider and pastoral counselor to her” that he breached any fiduciary duty. The authorities cited by the Court, ante at 563-64, 696 A.2d at 703-04 concern the law of wills, trusts, and property. See Gray v. Ward, 929 S.W.2d 774, 1996 WL 364794 at *8 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). Absent such interests, analyzing and defining

    ### Response:
    holding that to establish a fiduciary relationship under restatement of torts and missouri law it must be shown that the cleric possessed or managed things of value
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appearing before the grand jury. United States v. Paige, 241 Fed.Appx. 620, 622 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the district court did not err in refusing to suppress defendant’s grand jury testimony where defendant “was not read his Miranda rights before he testified”); United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 361 (6th Cir.1997) (“The few circuits that have addressed this issue have likewise been hesitant to require as a matter of constitutional law Miranda-like warnings to suspects appearing before the grand jury.”); United States v. Gillespie, 974 F.2d 796, 804 (7th Cir.1992) (“Courts confronting this issue have uniformly suggested that any Mir randa-type warnings that may be applicable in the grand jury context are minimal at best.”); Labbe v. Berman, 621 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Here, the prosecutor warned Defendant that:

    ### Response:
    holding that miranda warnings were not required for suspect testifying at inquest when suspects lawyer had previously advised him of his privilege against selfincrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    post office box rather than his home, as both the magistrate judge and district court noted, it was reasonable to suspect evidence of such activities would be found at Defendant’s home because “Defendant cannot manufacture methamphetamine in the post office.” We acknowledge that some of the information would be stale if viewed in a vacuum. However, given the relevancy of the latest Wells’ transaction, the older information was relevant to provide context; specifically that it was likely that the recently ordered materials were for use at Defendant’s residence. Defendant also challenges the veracity of the anonymous reports about odors and traffic at his house, claiming they have no weight in the probable cause assessment because they were uncorroborated. See Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 595 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Campbell, 256 F.3d 381, 388

    ### Response:
    holding that a warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause where it was based almost exclusively on the uncorroborated testimony of an unproven informant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that there is an impediment to marriage, then the clerk may not rely on the applicant’s statement that there is no impediment. “This is true regardless of the type of impediment involved, i.e., whether the impediment is based on age, consanguinity or affinity, marital status, or same-gender status of applicants who reside and intend to continue to reside in other states.” In sum, the plaintiffs have failed to establish that (1) they, compared with others similarly situated, were selectively treated; and that (2) such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of a constitutional right, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person. Daddario v. Cape Cod Commission, 56 Mass.App.Ct. 764, 773 (2002) (<HOLDING>), citing Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906,

    ### Response:
    holding that denial of development permit to mine sand and gravel on thirtytwo acres of property did not deny owner equal protection of laws
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    charge by one vendor or billed separately by one or more vendors. Id. (emphasis added). There is no comparable Policy Statement regarding natural gas billing. Spectrum fails to articulate why it should not be required to pay tax on electricity delivery when the Commonwealth’s Department of Revenue has specifically called for electricity delivery charges to be subject to sales tax in the clear language of the Policy Statement. Although the disparate treatment of electricity and natural gas may seem illogical to Spectrum, it apparently is the scheme intended by the legislature. It is not within this Court’s power to alter this scheme and the impact of any inconsistency is more properly addressed directly to the legislature. See Martin v. Soblotney, 502 Pa. 418, 466 A.2d 1022, 1025 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Rieck Inv. Corp., 419 Pa. 52,

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may not legislate or by interpretation add to legislation matters which the legislature saw fit not to include
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. ** This

    ### Response:
    holding that motion to reopen must establish prima facie case demon strating reasonable likelihood that requirements for relief have been satisfied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of in personam jurisdiction.” Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 366, 348 S.E.2d at 786. Our courts typically look at the following factors in determining whether minimum contacts exist: (1) the quantity of the contacts, (2) the nature and quality of the contacts, (3) the source and connection of the cause of action to the contacts, (4) the interest of the forum state, and (5) the convenience to the parties. Bruggeman, 138 N.C. App. at 617, 532 S.E.2d at 219. These factors are not to be applied mechanically, but rather, the court must weigh the factors and determine what is fair and reasonable to both parties. Phoenix Am. Corp. v. Brissey, 46 N.C. App. 527, 531, 265 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1980). See also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Tire King of Greensboro, Inc., 80 N.C. App. 129, 132, 341 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Here, the precise quantity of contacts is not

    ### Response:
    holding that no single factor controls and that all factors must be weighed in light of fundamental fairness and the circumstances of the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute of limitations for actions against the United States set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). Based on our review of Punchard’s complaint, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss any other claims that may be set forth in the complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8’s short and plain statement requirements. Punchard’s argument that the district court judge had no power to grant the motion to dismiss because Punehard asked for a jury trial has no merit. Actions against the United States generally are tried to the court, not a jury. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402. In any event, a district court has the authority to hear and decide defenses raised under Rule 12(b) prior to trial, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 1462, 1466 (10th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand &

    ### Response:
    holding that seventh amendment right to jury trial not violated by courts dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to rule 12b6 because as a matter of law complaint faded to present an issue for trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.3d 1423, 1427-28 (7th Cir.1996) (noting several circuits have adopted sure course requirement), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1434, 137 L.Ed.2d 542 (1997); United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702-03 (2d Cir.1989) (noting wide variety of courts have upheld anticipatory warrants when sure course requirement was met). As one court has explained: The sure course standard functions as a proxy for the actual presence of the contraband at the locus to be searched. It offers the magistrate a trustworthy assurance that the contraband, though not yet on the site, will almost certainly be located there at the time of the search, thus fulfilling the requirement of future probable cause. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 13; see also United States v. Hendriclcs, 743 F.2d 653, 654-55 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). The ""sure course” requirement is typically

    ### Response:
    holding anticipatory warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause because at time warrant was issued the contraband was not on a sure course to the place to be searched and there was no assurance defendant would take contraband to that place
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at least one district court to conclude that the Eleventh Circuit no longer strictly requires proof of bad faith as an essential element of spoliation. See Brown v. Chertoff, 563 F.Supp.2d 1372, 1381 (S.D.Ga.2008). Other district courts have rejected this interpretation of Flury. See Managed Care Solutions, Inc. v. Essent Healthcare, Inc., 736 F.Supp.2d 1317, 1328 n. 16 (S.D.Fla.2010); Woodard v. Wal-Mart Stores East LP, 801 F.Supp.2d 1363, 1372 (M.D.Ga.2011). While the degree of bad faith necessary to impose sanctions may not be entirely clear, it is clear that simple negligence is not enough but actual malice is not required. See, e.g., Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1310 (11th Cir.2009) (noting that malice is not required for finding of bad faith); Bashir, 119 F.3d at 931 (<HOLDING>); Preferred Care Partners Holding Corp. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that more than mere negligence in losing or destroying evidence is required to sustain an inference of consciousness of a weak case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jurisdiction over Daniele. Plaintiffs assert three distinct bases of jurisdiction: that SBR paid Daniele to publish infringing material on SBR’s message board, that Daniele’s publications relate to the “sports wagering” industry in Nevada, and that Daniele’s publications were accessible in Nevada through the internet. Even accepting these assertions as true, these are not the type of contacts that give rise o Daniele must therefore fail. Third, the fact that Daniele’s publications related to sports wagering does not establish jurisdictional contacts with Nevada. Plaintiffs urge that the publications were directed at Nevada since the publications discussed sports wagering and since sports wagering is only legal in Nevada (within the United States). Bu F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256,

    ### Response:
    holding that posting of infringing copyrighted material may give rise to jurisdiction where the victiimplaintiff was a resident of the forum state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his counsel did introduce evidence in support of Mr. Escareno’s theory that the hospital records did not corroborate all of the victim’s alleged injuries, and admission of the hospital records would not have altered the result of the proceeding because there was substantial, compelling witness testimony corroborating the extent of the victim’s injuries when she was in the hospital and the day after her release, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and (b) his counsel’s performance did not so deny Mr. Escareno representation that prejudice should be presumed; and (4) the prosecutor’s closing argument comments, taken in context, were within the bounds of reasonable argumentation, see Pickens v. Gibson, 206 F.3d 988, 999 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Issuance of a COA is jurisdictional.

    ### Response:
    holding that prosecutor free to comment on defendants failure to call certain witnesses or present certain testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Vernon 1993)). The judge heard the case in the 122nd Judicial District Court, which is composed solely of Galveston County, see TexGov’t Code Ann. § 24.224(a) (Vernon 1988), and the case was pending in the 333rd Judicial District Court, which is composed of Harris County only, see TexGov't Code Ann. § 24.479(a) (Vernon 1988), so the phrase does not apply to this case. 4 . The opinion is unclear on whether the trial court actually ruled on the motions in Bowie County, or whether it ruled on them in Dallas County. See Mauzy, 899 S.W.2d at 699 (stating that the trial court ""subsequently ordered the Dallas suit abated and transferred to Travis County”). 5 . The trial court in this case did more than hear oral argument at the summaiy judg .2d 229, 232 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1992, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). In Tigner v. State, 928 S.W.2d 540, 543

    ### Response:
    holding that filing of request for lump sum settlement constituted institution of a proceeding under the texas workmans compensation act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While we agree with the statement-in Brown that “[s]ometimes it is necessary for ... the summary statement to provide a context reference” for the initiative petition, we do not find that failure to do so, where the consequences are potentially ever changing due to the political landscape, will always render the summary insufficient. See Brown, 370 S.W.3d at 654. We find that the effect that the Initiative Petitions may eventually have on the provisions of SB19 does not require the court to step in and redraft the summaries in order for them to be fair and sufficient. It is commonly understood that constitutional amendments will supersede statutes that are in contravention with the amended constitutional provision. Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC, 458 S.W.3d 319, 327 (Mo. banc 2015) (<HOLDING>); State v. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 454, 459 (Mo. banc

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute is unconstitutional if it clearly contravenes a constitutional provision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Except as outlined below, “[a] municipality may be held liable for torts arising out of the performance of proprietary functions but no recovery is allowed for injuries which result from the performance of governmental functions.” Lamar v. City of St. Louis, 746 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Mo.App.1988). “A governmental duty is one which is performed for the common good of all. A duty will be deemed proprietary if it is performed for the special benefit or profit of the municipality as a corporate entity.” Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286, 295 (Mo.App.1983). In Jones v. State Highway Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. banc 1977), the Missouri Supreme Court abrogated the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. The legislature reinstated the doctrine in a modifie 6, 774 (Mo.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). In Alexander at 542, the Missouri Supreme

    ### Response:
    holding that the negligent failure to remove debris on grounds contributed to creating a dangerous condition which resulted in death when debris was flung by lawn mower
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1381 (R.I.1994). It is well settled that a plaintiff aggrieved by a state agency’s action first must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a claim in court. Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I.1992). The exhaustion of remedies requirement serves two purposes: “(1) it aids judicial review by allowing the parties and the agency to develop the facts of the case, and (2) ‘it promotes judicial economy by avoiding needless repetition of administrative and judicial factfinding, perhaps avoiding the necessity of any judicial involvement.’ ” Id. at 117 (quoting Schwartz, Administrative Law § 8.33 at 542 (1991)). This Court has made exceptions when the exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile. See M.B.T. Construction Corp. v. Edwards, 528 A.2d 336, 338 (R.I.1987) (<HOLDING>). In this case, plaintiffs contended that they,

    ### Response:
    holding that an appeal to an agency review board would be futile because the board lacked authority to invalidate ordinance as requested
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Buckley v. Exodus Transit & Storage Corp., 744 A.2d 298, 304-305 (Pa.Super.1999) (internal citations omitted). We also note the following principles pertaining to our review of a verdict in an insurance bad faith claim. Our Supreme Court has long recognized that “the utmost fair dealing should characterize the transactions between an insurance company and the insured.” Dercoli v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 520 Pa. 471, 477, 554 A.2d 906, ,909 (1989) (quoting Fedas v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, 300 Pa. 555, 559, 151 A. 285, 286 (1930)). Moreover, the insurance company has a duty to deal with its insured “on a fair and frank basis, and at all times, to act in good faith.” Id.; Hol-lock v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 416 (Pa.Super.2004) [ (en banc) ] (<HOLDING>).... In 1990, our legislature created a

    ### Response:
    holding that an insurer has a duty to act with the utmost good faith towards its insured
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or damage the property of another.” In order to convict Mr. Ellis of home invasion, the State was required to prove: • that Mr. Ellis entered the Residence; • that the Residence was an inhabited dwelling or a structure used in whole or in part as a home or place of abode; • that Mr. Ellis was not authorized to enter the Residence; • that the Residence did not belong to Mr. Ellis; and • that Mr. Ellis acted with specific intent to use force or violence upon the person of another or to vandalize, deface, or damage the property of another. See Cheney C. Joseph, and P. Raymond Lamonica, 17 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 10.62.8 (2d ed.2011)(defining elements of home invasion offense); see also State v. Hart, 10-1614, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/2/11), 80 So.3d 25, 30 (<HOLDING>) The first two elements of the offense are

    ### Response:
    holding that to convict a defendant of home invasion pursuant to la rs 14628 the state is required to prove that he entered a dwelling owned by another without permission that the dwelling was used in whole or in part as a home that a person was present when he made the unauthorized entry and that he had the intent to use force or violence upon the person or to vandalize deface or damage the property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. The government, in turn, has submitted a declaration from petitioner’s counsel providing, inter alia, that “I very likely advised Ms. Mendoza that pleading guilty to a violation of § 1028 could result in her deportation, and I am sure that I advised her to seek the expert legal advice of an immigration attorney.” Counsel’s Decl. at ¶ 6. 8 . See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (providing that declarations made ""in open court carry a strong presumption of verity” and that ""the representations of the defendant ... [at a plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings”); Beck v. Angelone, 261 F.3d 377, 396 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). 9 .See, e.g.,

    ### Response:
    holding that absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary a defendant is bound by his representations made during a plea colloquy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for administrative and judicial relief from a wrongful zoning decision are unconstitutional. The gravamen of this claim is Greenspring’s allegation that because it might take “in excess of two years” to pursue administrative and judicial appeals, these procedures are unconstitutionally burdensome. However, Greenspring does not explain how it arrived at this two year projection, and in any event, delays of this magnitude are not unconstitutional burdens. Even when a significant delay is incurred in reversing a wrongful zoning board decision, and even when that delay causes the plaintiffs to default on their construction loans and lose everything to foreclosure, the Fourth Circuit has held that plaintiffs have not been deprived of procedural due process. Sylvia Dev., 48 F.3d at 817, 827(<HOLDING>). • Greenspring speculates that it could take

    ### Response:
    holding that 11 month delay in reversing wrongful zoning board decision did not deprive plaintiff of due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566. We make these determinations in light of the statutory purpose of ADA as a remedial statute, which should be broadly construed to effectuate its purpose of eliminating discrimination against the disabled in our society. Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F.Supp. 547, 551 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd 9 F.3d 1067 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1033, 114 S.Ct. 1545, 128 L.Ed.2d 196 (1994). The Third Circuit has not had occasion to identify the standard for determining who is a prevailing party under the ADA. It is clear, however, that the test is to be derived from jurisprudence under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Disabled In Action of Pa. v. Pierce, 789 F.2d 1016, 1018-19 (3d Cir.1986) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)) (<HOLDING>). The legislative history of the ADA reflects

    ### Response:
    holding that standards used in section 1988 cases are applicable to determine prevailing party under section 505b of the rehabilitation act of 1973
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and must uphold that ruling absent an abuse of discretion.” Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664. In reviewing the trial court’s order denying habeas corpus relief, the appellate court affords “almost total deference to the judge’s determination of the historical facts that are supported by the record, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demean- or.” Ex parte Wilson, 171 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.); see also Ex parte Mello, 355 S.W.3d 827, 832 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref'd) (“This deferential review applies even when the findings are based on affidavits rather than live testimony.”); Phuong Anh Thi Le v. State, 300 S.W.3d 324, 327 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The appellate court “will sustain the lower

    ### Response:
    holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    part: “For purposes of removal ..., the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” After removal, however, Casas replaced the fictitious defendants with Caguas and Oficentro, which were clearly identified as Puerto Rico corporations, like Casas itself. The issue is whether this substitution, which unquestionably destroyed complete diversity, also defeated federal subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that it did. Casas argues that as diversity jurisdiction was established at the commencement of the proceeding, it was not later defeated by the mere naming of the fictitious parties, who were dispensable, not indispensable. E.g., Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428, 111 S.Ct. 858, 859-60, 112 L.Ed.2d 951 (1991) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util.

    ### Response:
    holding that because there was complete diversity when the action commenced diversity jurisdiction was not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse plaintiff which was not indispensable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    context, courts examine whether the relevant files were password-protected or whether the defendant otherwise manifested an intention to restrict third-party access.” United States v. Aaron, 33 Fed.Appx. 180, 184 (6th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion); see also United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 554 (4th Cir.2007) (using a password showed that defendant affirmatively intended to exclude others from his password-protected files); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir.2001) (distinguishing joint access to the computer and its hard drive, for which co-user had authority to consent to search, from password-protected files; with respect to those files, co-user had no common authority where there was no access to the passwords); see also Conklin, 63 M.J. at 337 (<HOLDING>). But in this case, neither the computer nor

    ### Response:
    holding that where there is no evidence of shared use or common authority an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the files kept on a personally owned computer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or services. U.S. Search, LLC v. U.S. Search.com Inc., 300 F.3d 517, 523 (4th Cir.2002). For instance, “[ijmagine being forbidden to describe a Chevrolet as a ‘car’ or an ‘automobile’ because Ford or Chrysler or Volvo had trademarked these generic words.’ ” Retail Services, 364 F.3d at 538 (quoting Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir.1986)). No trademark protection can be afforded to such marks because, “if a business were permitted to appropriate a generic word as its trademark, it would be ‘difficult for competitors to market their own brands of the same product.’ ” Retail Services, 364 F.3d at 538 (quoting Blau Plumbing, Inc., 781 F.2d at 609).; see also A. & H. Transp., Inc. v. Save Way Stations, Inc., 214 Md. 325, 333, 135 A.2d 289, 293 (Md.1957) (<HOLDING>). On the opposite end of the spectrum are

    ### Response:
    recognizing that generic marks are not subject to trademark protection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    scenario.'is, the subject of Meister v. Jamison (In re Jamison), 21 B.R. 380, 381 (Bankr.D.Conn.1982). The Court in Jamison held, as the Court holds"" here, that the son was not liable for the- car payments made by, the debtor, his father, to the credit union. 5 . The same holds true for. instances in which a debtor, prepetition, depletes his assets under circumstances in which a trustee believes the' decision was unwise, such as when a debtor buys dinner for his friends or purchases an expensive prom dress for his daughter. In these scenarios, a trustee likely has no authority to judge all of the debtor’s prepetition decisions and thus likely has no remedy. However, such a scenario is not now before the Court. See, e.g. Montoya v. Campos (In re Tarin), 454 B.R. 179 (Bankr.D.N.M.2011)

    ### Response:
    holding that debtors daughter was not liable under fraudulent transfer law for the amount her parents paid for her wedding prepetition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    both Mr. Schneider and Mr. Zakaras agree that the possibility existed, at the October 25th meeting, that Mr. Zakaras would obtain another supervisory position. In fact, Mr. Zakaras knew of another United employee, who after calling someone a “stupid nigger,” was transferred from his supervisory position in Ramp Services to another supervisory position as a Zone Controller with no loss in pay. (Pl.’s SMF ¶ 98.) Consequently, at the October 25th meeting, there remained a possibility that Mr. Zakaras was going to be transferred to another department as a supervisor. The Seventh Circuit has held that transfers, with no loss in pay, are, in some instances, not considered adverse employment actions. See, e.g., Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Crady v. Liberty National Bank and Trust Co.

    ### Response:
    holding that transfer involving no reduction in pay and only a minor change in working conditions does not rise to the level of a material adverse employment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the “entire Caribbean” over CCC’s station — which in fact reached only a fraction of that area — and therefore that they did not need to advertise with CBS as well. (¶¶ 30-34) The complaint also alleges that CCC and C&W made sham technical objections to CBS’s application for a broadcast license for the purpose of defeating that application and thereby ensuring that CCC would continue to enjoy a monopoly. (¶¶ 35-40) Contrary to the arguments of C&W, such allegations do support the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. A would-be monopolist or member of a conspiracy to monopolize comes within the condemnation of the Sherman Act when it engages in “anti-competitive conduct.” See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 113 S.Ct. 884, 122 L.Ed.2d 247 (1993) (<HOLDING>). “Anticompetitive conduct” can come in too

    ### Response:
    holding elements of attempted monopolization claim under  2 of sherman act are intent anticompetitive conduct and dangerous probability of success in a relevant market
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    counsel informed him that counsel had been relieved of his responsibility. Defendants further contend that even if the AG had known that former counsel was no longer Plaintiffs’ present counsel, it could not have served the motion for modification on anyone else since the addresses of the class representatives, Taylor and Yanich, cannot be found by the Arizona Department of Corrections. 2. DUE PROCESS A fundamental and elementary requirement of due process in any proceeding is notice and opportunity to be heard. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), the Supreme Court established the standard for determining whether a party’s notice would meet due process scrutiny: An elementary and fundament d 1440, 1448-49 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). A judgment entered in a manner inconsistent

    ### Response:
    holding that oneday notice provided to creditor before entry of cash collateral order violated due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is constitutional under the circumstances presented here. That policy ensures institutional safety and keeps the traffic of prisoners between cells and other locations within the prison at a minimum. Prompt examinations of inmates in their cells is often the most practical way to provide necessary treatment and to determine if in fact more extensive examinations are needed in the infirmary or outside the institution. A policy that requires all medical examinations, of every kind, to be done at the infirmary would pose an undue burden on the already strained medical resources available. DOCS’s sick call prison policies recognize that inmates have certain rights to privacy and that these rights need to be balanced against safety and security measures. See Patient Bill of Rights #7 (<HOLDING>), and DOCS Health Care Services Policy 1.34.

    ### Response:
    recognizing right to privacy in receipt of health care services to the extent consistent with providing adequate medical care and the safety and good order of the facility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    501 U.S. 808 (1991). 76 See U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). 77 Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-09. 78 Id. 79 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled in part by Payne, 501 U.S. 808. 80 501 U.S. at 827-30. 81 Id. at 822-27. 82 Id. at 830 n.2. 83 108 Nev. 127, 136-37, 825 P.2d 600, 606 (1992). 84 See, e.g., Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1261, 946 P.2d 1017, 1031 (1997); Atkins v. State, 112 Nev. 1122, 1136, 923 P.2d 1119, 1128 (1996); McNelton v. State, 111 Nev. 900, 906 & n.4, 900 P.2d 934, 937 & n.4 (1995). 85 Floyd v. State, 118 Nev. 156, 174, 42 P.3d 249, 261 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1196 (2003); see also McNelton, 111 Nev. at 905-06, 900 P.2d at 937-38. 86 Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 370, 23 P.3d 227, 242 (2001); Rippo, 113 Ne 473, 484 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 94 See Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 1014,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that this court presumes that juries follow district courts instructions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import. It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law which it does not fairly express.” [Ibid, (quoting 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 61.01, at 77 (4th ed.1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565, 25 L.Ed 892, 894 (1880))).] Coincident with that interpretive canon is our tradition of giving “narrow range” to statutes granting immunity from tort liability because they leave “unredressed injury and loss resulting from wrongful conduct.” Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., 80 N.J. 391, 401, 403 A.2d 910 (1979) (construing strictly landowner’s immunity statute). See also Renz v. Penn Cent. Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 457-58, 435 A.2d 540 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 487-88, 267 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that speech about the use of public funds touches upon a matter of public concern.” Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 396 (8th Cir.1995). Allegations of the misuse of public funds relate directly to citizens’ interests as taxpayers, and are generally considered to address matters of public concern despite their personal pecuniary ramifications. See Kincade, 64 F.3d at 396; Casey v. City of Cabool, 12 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir.1993). Speech that criticizes a public employer in his capacity as a public official also addresses matters of public concern. “Criticism, no matter how obnoxious or offensive, of government officials and their policies clearly addresses matters of public concern.” Casey, 12 F.3d at 802.; see Barnard v. Jackson County, 43 F.3d 1218, 1225 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Heightened public interest in a particular

    ### Response:
    holding allegations of wrongdoing by public officials are on the highest order of first amendment concern
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doctor make multiple submissions to confirm compliance with the medical practice requirement before the doctor can obtain LPR status. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.18(g), (h). III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Immigrant Doctors are all medical doctors licensed to practice medicine in their respective jurisdictions in the United States. The doctors seek to adjust to LPR status based on second preference employment-based immigrant visa petitions filed by their employers in conjunction with national interest waiver requests. Though the Immigrant Doctors’ original complaint named eight doctor plaintiffs when it was filed in 2002, four doctors have since obtained LPR status, rendering their claims moot. See Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305, 1307-08 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). A. Plaintiffs 1. Dr. Stefan Schneider Dr.

    ### Response:
    holding moot appeal from revocation of visa petition where immigrant subsequently obtained lpr status
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). An individual must satisfy a three-prong test in order to establish standing. See id. First, the individual must have suffered some injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent. See id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130; MD Pharmaceutical Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 133 F.3d 8, 11 (D.C.Cir.1998) (concluding that current manufacturer had standing to seek review of actions taken by the DEA). In some cases, a plaintiff may be injured when the “discriminatory classification preventfs] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing.” Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable

    ### Response:
    holding that when the government erects a barrier in order to establish standing a group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege they would have attained the benefit but for the barrier
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of contract claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Defendant’s position is that there are no material issues of fact to try. Both sides have represented that there are no further relevant facts to present. Plaintiffs, however, did not move for summary judgment, and argued that there are triable issues, including whether the Indicative Term Sheet, rather than the two Total Return Swap Agreements, should be considered the agreement. A district judge, presented with a motion for summary judgment, is entitled to search the record and, if no genuine issues of material fact exist, to determine the motion in favor of the party entitled to summary judgment, regardless whether the party is the moving, or the responding, party. Coach Leatherware Co. v. Ann-Taylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 969

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts sua sponte grant of summary judgment to nonmoving party is an accepted method of expediting litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an essential element of r such claims. Accordingly, Sun Trading’s state law claims are hereby dismissed without prejudice to re-filing in state court. B. Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint Sun Trading moves for leave to amend its complaint to include Kenwood Japan and Art Union Records as defendants, in place of Kenwood Electronics Corp. The Court finds that amendment of the complaint at this stage would be futile. Even if Sun Trading were able to determine the proper Kenwood entities and add them as defendants, its claims against these entities would fail as a matter of law for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for leave to amend the complaint is hereby denied. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons,

    ### Response:
    holding that futility is among the reasons for denying leave to amend a complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    willfulness is the allegedly invalid NPL (invalid because it was allegedly issued in violation of the automatic stay). However, as already noted above, the NPL did not violate the automatic stay, and therefore is not void. The District Court has already found the NPL constitutes prima facie proof of the Debtor's willfulness. Furthermore, IDOR has submitted other evidence of the Debt- or’s willfulness. 34 . FAA creates, inter alia, a national recording scheme for air commerce. Most courts have held that although the FAA operates to determine whether a valid recording has occurred, in most other aspects of secured transactions it does not preempt state law. See, e.g., Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp. (In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp.), 850 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp.

    ### Response:
    holding that faa does not preempt state law when determining date of perfection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rules), practices, routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and “(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities even if the tracks are located or intended to be located, entirely in one State, “is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under federal or State law.” 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9)(A) and (B) define “transportation” as used in § 10501(b)(1) to include: “(A) a locomotive, car,' vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, , pier, dock, yard, property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to' th 4 (5th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>); Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Maine Cent.

    ### Response:
    holding that the iccta preempted claims of negligence and negligence per se with respect to railroads alleged road blockages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or not”, when used in a superior heading, is considered to modify the article descriptions in the provisions under that heading even though the phrase was not repeated in the provisions thereunder. See General Electric Co. v. United States, 83 Cust.Ct. 56, 61, C.D. 4822, 476 F.Supp. 1082 (1979). In General Electric Co, decided by this Court under the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS), the Court reasoned that “the invasive character of the ‘whether or not’ language in the superior heading would make recitation of such language in each of the indented subheadings redundant.” General Electric Co. v. United States, 83 Cust.Ct. 56, 61, C.D. 4822, 476 F.Supp. 1082 (1979). See also Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. United States, 74 Cust.Ct. 125, 130, C.D. 4596, 1975 WL 26986 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Further, Plaintiffs proposed subheading

    ### Response:
    holding that whether or not phrase in the superior heading qualifies all of the provisions subordinate to the superior heading
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to find a mother in contempt for failing to produce the child for summer visitation). II. Attorney’s Fees and Costs Because we affirm the family court’s overall contempt findings, we also affirm the award of attorney’s fees and costs. Regardless of whether the family court applied the E.D.M. factors or compensatory contempt doctrine, the family court correctly determined Father was entitled to attorney’s fees. Mother has a gross monthly income of $23,451, including her salary, alimony, and child support. She has over $5 million in savings. Mother’s payment of the attorney’s fees and costs would not affect her standard of living in any meaningful way. Accordingly, we affirm the award of attorney’s fees. See Whetstone v. Whetstone, 309 S.C. 227, 235, 420 S.E.2d 877, 881 (Ct. App. 1992) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we affirm

    ### Response:
    holding the family court properly awarded a wife attorneys fees incurred as the result of her husbands contempt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    precise method of sale is prescribed by contract or decree, some discretion is necessarily granted to the trustee ... making the sale, as to the manner in which the property will be offered. That discretion will naturally be affected by the character and location of the property and other circumstances peculiar to the case, so that it is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule[.] Jackson, 249 Md. at 16-17, 238 A.2d at 87 (quoting Webster, 176 Md. at 254-55, 4 A.2d at 438); see Waters, 165 Md. at 75, 166 A. at 432-33. For example, a trustee has the discretion to determine whether the property should be sold as a whole, or divided into separate parcels. Webster, 176 Md. at 254, 4 A.2d at 438; Gittings, 156 Md. at 577-78, 144 A. at 841; see also Fagnani, 418 Md. at 388, 15 A.3d at 292 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, a trustee has discretion to

    ### Response:
    holding that as a matter of law a trustee may foreclose on an undivided one half interest rather than the entire property citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with changes in a routine work setting. A substantial loss of ability to meet any of these basic work-related activities would severely limit the potential occupational base. This, in turn, would justify a finding of disability....” SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857 (S.S.A.), at *4. Before making a final determination according to the five step process outlined above, the ALJ is under an affirmative duty to adequately develop the medical record. See Tejada, 167 F.3d at 774; 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(d). The ALJ is thus “obligated to explore the facts by obtaining relevant medical records and asking questions ... to assist the claimant in developing her case.” Jones v. Apfel, 66 F.Supp.2d 518, 538 (S.D.N.Y.1999); see also Perez, 77 F.3d at 47 (<HOLDING>). The ALJ’s duty to assist a claimant in

    ### Response:
    holding that where there are deficiencies in the record the alj is under an affirmative obligation to develop the relevant medical history even when the claimant is represented by counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we need not reach the issue whether the challenged statement constitutes an allegation or á factual statement. As the Eskildsens point out, and as our review of the record demonstrates, Inline did not move to strike the affidavit at issue. In Ex parte Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 92 So.3d 771 (Ala.2012), our supreme court reiterated the requirements for successfully challenging the admissibility of an affidavit submitted in support of or in opposition to a motion for a summary judgment, writing: “Cases decided after Perry [v. Mobile County, 533 So.2d 602 (Ala.1988),] have not always been clear in holding that a party challenging the admissibility of an affidavit must object to the affidavit and move to strike it. See Ex parte Diversey Corp., 742 So.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Ala.1999) (<HOLDING>); Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Cato, 968 So.2d 1,

    ### Response:
    holding that the court can consider inadmissible evidence if the party against whom it is offered does not object to the evidence by moving to strike it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Because the order on appeal simply remands the petition back to the administrative law judge for further proceedings (i.e., a formal hearing), it is not a final order. Furthermore, O’Donnell’s has not established the alternative ground for review under section 120.68. Review of the final agency action would provide an adequate remedy. Consequently, we do not have jurisdiction to review it under section 120.68 and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110. APPEAL DISMISSED. SAWAYA, C.J., concurs, and concurs specially with opinion. ORFINGER, J., dissents with opinion. 1 . We considered the possibility of treating this appeal as a petition for writ of prohibition. See, e.g., Dept. of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Career Serv. Com’n, 448 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (<HOLDING>). However, prior opinions uniformly hold that

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts have power to issue writs of prohibition to administrative agencies to prevent them from exceeding their jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for Plaintiffs will redress their alleged injuries, thereby satisfying the third requirement for individual standing. Plaintiffs here seek injunctive relief to mandate that Defendants implement TCM 2. As discussed above, Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are fairly traceable to Defendants’ alleged failure to implement TCM 2. Thus, it goes without question that the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs would alleviate the alleged injuries. Even though Plaintiffs’ injuries might not be completely eliminated by the implementation of TCM 2, any increase in air quality that would result from a favorable decision, is sufficient to satisfy the “minimal requirements of Article III.” Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 73 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In short, individual members of Plaintiffs’

    ### Response:
    holding that to have standing plaintiffs must only show that the injunctive relief requested would decrease pollution not that it would return a polluted waterway to pristine condition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of any diminution of value to the Wages Tract. Additionally, in Case No. A16A0258, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Old Republic as to RM Kids’s bad-faith claim and its grant of a directed verdict in favor of Old Republic as to RM Kids’s prejudgment interest claim. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and case remanded in Case No. A16A0257. Judgment affirmed in Case No. A16A02S8. Phipps, P. J., and Peterson, J., concur. Schiff Hardin, LLP, Leah Ward Sears, John C. Amabile, Nicholas F. McDaniel; Knight Johnson, LLC, Bryan M. Knight, Sherri G. Buda, for appellee. Gilroy Bailey Trumble, LLC, MonicaK Gilroy, Tania T. Trumble, amici curiae. 1 See Horton v. Hendrix, 291 Ga. App. 416, 416 ( ., 881 FSupp.2d 1058, 1066 (III) (C) (D. Minn. 2012) (<HOLDING>); Marble Bank v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins.

    ### Response:
    holding that an insured mortgagees loss under a title insurance policy cannot be measured until the note has not been repaid and the security for the mortgage is shown to be inadequate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    applies to illegal contraband, the court found it “almost impossible to conceive of an object which may be lawfully possessed, but has no legitimate use.” Id. at 424. Therefore, the court determined that under the amended statute, “criminal instrument” is not limited to objects that can be used only for criminal purposes. Id. Having concluded that it was not bound by Universal or Fronatt, the court proceeded to reject Eodice’s interpretation of section 16.01 as well. The court believed that Eodice presented the exact type of scenario envisioned by the Legislature when it adopted section 16.01. Id. at 424-25. And, in stark contrast to Andrews, the court held that “the gravamen of the crime remains the actor’s intended use of the instrument.” Id. at 425. Contra Andrews, 814 S.W.2d at 841 (<HOLDING>). The court concluded that “the ontological

    ### Response:
    holding that the gravamen of the offense is the physical adaptation of the instrument
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    attacks. See Williams, 480 Fed.Appx. at 256 (“A prison guard is deliberately indifferent if he intentionally denies or delays access to medical care.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Walker v. Butler, 967 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.1992))). Moreover, the parties agree that Stewart’s medical condition was known by the prison guards. Our review of the summary judgment evidence indicates that Appellees also intentionally disregarded the established treatment plan for Stewart. See Chapman v. Johnson, 339 Fed.Appx. 446, 448 (5th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) (stating that a defendant is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity when the defendant knew of prisoner’s injury and treatment protocol but failed to follow it); see also Easter, 467 F.3d at 465 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court erred when it

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment was improper on qualified immunity grounds when defendant was aware of prisoners need for medical treatment but failed to provide it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a DD Form 214 is a ""source document” that “retires ... or transitions a person from the military.” Aplt.App. at 141. He also clarified that a DD Form 214 separates a person from the Army ""[rjegardless of whether the Army did all the follow-up paperwork and computer entries and so forth properly[J” Id. 3 . There is no uniformly accepted definition of the phrase ""acting as such,” and courts disagree with respect to the amount of independence required to separate an overt act from the original act of impersonation. Compare United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 652, 657 (D.C.Cir.1976) (""the act that completes a violation of Section 912(1) must be something more than merely an act in keeping with the falsely assumed character”) with United States v. Gayle, 967 F.2d 483, 488 (11th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>). This case does not require us to weigh in on

    ### Response:
    holding that an indictment under  912 need not allege additional acts beyond the general act of impersonation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    91 (D.N.J.1990). The statute of limitations will be tolled, however, where the defendant affirmatively conceals the facts that would allow plaintiff to realize that a cause of action exists. See Plain v. Flicker, 645 F.Supp. 898, 902-03 (D.N.J.1986). Active concealment tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff exercising reasonable diligence knows or should know of the fraud. See id. To determine whether an employer’s affirmative misrepresentations on monthly ERISA reports tolls the statute of limitations for a fund or trustee’s suit against the employer for deficient ERISA contributions, the Court must assess whether the deficiencies were apparent from the face of the reports. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers, Local 19 v. 2300 Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1282-83 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Connors v. Beth Energy Mines, Inc., 920 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding tolling appropriate where no aspect of reports should have alerted plaintiffs to irregularities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (applying literal test); Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus, ex rel. Richardson v. U.S. West Commc’ns, Inc., 288 F.3d 414, 417-18 (9th Cir.2002) (same); see also Sun Buick, supra, 26 F.3d at 1261-64 (criticizing functional test, but stopping short of rejecting it because administrative agency at issue “would not qualify [as a state court] under any circumstances”); Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 78 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Gen’l Elec. Co. X-Ray Dept., 170 F.Supp. 945, 949-50 (E.D.Wis.1959) (district court decision that has been characterized as the “genesis” of the functional test). The Fourth Circuit appeared to endorse the functional test in the context of the federal officer removal statute in Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia Bar, 872 F.2d 571, 576 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, subsequent decisions in this

    ### Response:
    holding that the west virginia state bar committee on legal ethics was a state court for purposes of removal and citing favorably to volkswagen de puerto rico supra 454 f2d 38
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    implicated system-wide discrimination they would have unquestionably involvedia matter of “public concern.” See Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787 (7th Cir.1993) (allowing Section 1983 claim where plaintiff was discharged following his support of other employees who had filed suit for gender discrimination); Wilson v. UT Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263, 1266 ( .2d 749 (1991). In the instant case there is no indication that the plaintiff “wanted to debate issues of sex discrimination,” that her suit sought “relief against pervasive or systemic misconduct by a public agency or public officials,” or that her suit was “part of an overall effort ... to correct allegedly unlawful practices or bring them to public attention.” Yatvin v. Madison Metro. School Dist., 840 F.2d 412, 420 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Although evidence was subsequently uncovered

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order, or proceeding or to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court.... 3 . The record discloses that Martinez served Mills with a proposal to settle several months before Mills’s proposal was served. Ironically, Martinez also filed his offer with the court in violation of the rule and statute. 4 . Other federal courts have reached similar results when considering time periods established in other statutes. See, e.g., Shenango Inc. v. Apfel, 307 F.3d 174, 193 (3d Cir.2002) (statutory deadline does not, by itself, establish that Congress intended to strip an agency's authority to act after the deadline has passed); Friends of Aquifer, Inc. v. Mineta, 150 F.Supp.2d 1297 (N.D.Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>); Bhd. of Ry. Carmen Div. v. Pena, 64 F.3d 702,

    ### Response:
    holding that group was not entitled to writ of mandamus given that it was not clear that congress intended deadlines for meeting the standards to be mandatory even though the statute provided that the secretary shall prescribe certain regulations not later than given deadlines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in bankruptcy. As of November 23, 2005, the Debtor owed the Creditor approximately $114,040. A debtor cannot claim an exemption against amounts owed on a secured debt that represents a voluntary encumbrance of property; consequently, the Debtor is not entitled to any exemption in the $114,040 owed to the Creditor. Because the Debtor’s principal residence was sold for $130,000, the Debtor’s entitlement to an exemption based on the transfer sought to be avoided was only $15,960. Assuming that all four of the requirements are met, a debtor has the right to avoid the transfer of his property to the extent that he could have exempted such property. See Compton v. Compton (In re Compton), No. 97-31367DWS, 1998 WL 372659, **4-5, 1998 Bankr.LEXIS 744, *13-14 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. June 22, 1998) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Victor Warren Properties, Inc. (In

    ### Response:
    holding that a chapter 13 debtor had standing to avoid a judgment lien to the extent of her exemption amount but not the entire judgment lien
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on December 7, 1990. Since Hodari D. was not decided by the Supreme Court until April 23, 1991, the district court did not have the benefit of its guidance in ruling on these motions. Hodari D.’s predecessors include Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-32, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415-17, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (defining and distinguishing the government’s burdens regarding reasonable suspicion and probable cause); Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1381-83, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (where a suspect was caught when stolen car he was driving at high speeds to elude pursuing police, crashed into police roadblock, holding there was not a ""stop” until the suspect crashed into a blockade); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>). 9 . See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596, 109 S.Ct. at

    ### Response:
    holding that factors that ordinarily constitute innocent behavior may provide a composite picture sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of an action is the most critical aspect of the court’s authority to act. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to deal with the kind of action in question[, and] ... is conferred upon the courts by either the North Carolina Constitution or by statute.” In re McKinney, 158 N.C. App. 441, 443, 581 S.E.2d 793, 795 (2003) (citations omitted). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-200(a) confers on the trial court exclusive, original jurisdiction “over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-200(a) (2003). “ ‘[0]nce jurisdiction of a court attaches it exists for all time until the cause is fully and completely determined.’ ” In the Matter of Arends, 88 N.C. App. 550, 554, 364 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1988) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-201 (2003). “[A] court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court had continuing jurisdiction over all subsequent custody orders once the trial court acquired jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    video surveillance, respectively), not the location of a search, which is addressed by the wording of Rule 41. This court in any case declines to legislate by reading into the statute language that Congress did not place there. a. Nature of the Rule 41 Violation A Rule 41 violation is either “technical” or “procedural,” as courts have phrased it, or constitutional. See, e.g., Adams, 2016 WL 4212079, at *6 (“The Court views a Rule 41(b) violation to be a technical or procedural violation.... ”). “[Ujnless a clear constitutional violation occurs, noncompliance with Rule 41 requires suppression of evidence only where (1) there was prejudice in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the rule had been followed, or (2) ther 515 (D.D.C. 2013) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 241 (6th Cir.

    ### Response:
    holding that a rule 41b violation constituted a jurisdictional flaw inexcusable as a technical defect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has not run as to the minor’s claim, a fortiori, it has not run against his present guardian.” Id. The import of both of these cases is that the cause of action remains personal to the plaintiff insofar as the running of the statute of limitations is concerned. That is, the statute of limitations either runs or is tolled depending upon the status of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether a legal guardian exists. If the plaintiff is under some form of legally recognized disability which tolls the statute of limitations, the statute of limitations remains tolled despite the possibility that some representative could bring the action on the plaintiff’s behalf. The majority of other state courts construing similar statutes have also concluded that the a 136, 927 P.2d 796, 801 (Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>); Mason v. Sorrell, 260 Ark. 27, 551 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the appointment of a conservator will not cease the tolling of the statute of limitations for those of unsound mind
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purpose served by obliterating a serial number on a firearm. Because a firearm with a serial number is equally effective as a firearm without one, there would appear to be no compelling reason why a law-abiding citizen would prefer an unmarked firearm. These weapons would then have value primarily for persons seeking to use them for illicit purposes. See United States v. Carter, 421 F.3d 909, 910 (9th Cir.2005) (noting that unmarked firearms have a “greater flexibility to be utilized in illicit activities” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. United States v. Tagg, 572 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir.2009) (finding no Second Amendment protection for pipe bombs because they could not be used for legitimate lawful purposes); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489-90 (1850) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, a handgun with an obliterated

    ### Response:
    holding concealed weapons could be prohibited because of their tendency to be used in violent crimes on unsuspecting victims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prison officials based on Ware’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We affirm, adding only the following comments. First, Ware has not shown that the district court erred in failing to find that defendants waived the exhaustion requirement. Defendants raised a failure-to-exhaust defense in their answer and in a renewed motion for summary judgment. Ware did not assert any prejudice, nor do we perceive any, as he was on notice of the exhaustion requirement and had ample time to oppose the renewed summary judgment motion. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the defendants’ failure-to-exhaust defense. See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 98 F.3d 664, 668 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Also, Ware has not shown that the district

    ### Response:
    holding that decision on waiver of affirmative defense normally is within district courts discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 39, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (requiring particularized showing of exigent circumstances for warrantless search of vehicle under N.M. Const, art. II, § 10); Campos v. State, 117 N.M. 155, 158-59, 870 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1994) (declining to adopt federal rule allowing warrantless arrest without exigent circumstances); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 445-47, 863 P.2d 1052, 1066-68 (1993) (rejecting good faith rationale under Fourth Amendment and the federal rationale for the exclusionary rule based on deterring police misconduct); State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 217, 784 P.2d 30, 36 (1989) (rejecting Fourth Amendment rationale for the ""totality of circumstances” test to establish probable cause); State v. Snyder, 1998-NMCA-166, VH 18-24, 126 N.M. 168, 967 P.2d 843 (<HOLDING>). 3 . We do not address the breadth of the

    ### Response:
    holding that nm const art ii  10 exclusionary rule applied to use of evidence in state court criminal proceeding when that evidence resulted from warrantless search by federal border patrol agents at checkpoint in new mexico
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is made, the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim ... and shall allow such claim in suc scretion in this case. While Porges obtained a dismissal of his bankruptcy ease and chose not to convert his petition to a proceeding under another chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, he previously had sought bankruptcy protection and initiated the adversary proceeding. Porges thus subjected himself “ ‘to all the consequences that attach to an appearance,’ ” including the determination of liability on Gruntal’s claims. In re McLaren, 3 F.3d at 966 (quoting Hillman, 296 U.S. at 242, 56 S.Ct. at 211). A party seeking relief in bankruptcy court cannot avoid an adverse judgment by subsequently abjuring bankruptcy protection. See Pepper, 308 U.S. at 305, 60 S.Ct. at 244 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the exercise of a court’s equitable

    ### Response:
    holding that where a court possesses jurisdiction over a disputed matter it may exercise its equitable powers to ensure that substance will not give way to form and that technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Thornton, 511 F.3d at 1228; Holt, 510 F.3d at 1012. Some of our sister circuits have encountered a different type of “double counting” problem in cases that involve calculations of loss under § 2Bl.l(b)(l). This version of “double counting” occurs where the same fraudulent check or stolen credit card is erroneously counted twice in estimating the total loss attributable to a defendant. Reviewing courts have found such errors to be material only where they bring the amount of loss into a different category for Guidelines purposes, such as from $900,000, which would carry a fourteen-level enhancement under § 2Bl.l(b)(l)(H), to $1.1 million, which would carry a sixteen-level enhancement under § 2Bl.l(b)(l)(I). See, e.g., United States v. Mickens, 453 F.3d 668, 671-72 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 896 (11th

    ### Response:
    holding that even if one of the governments calculation methods impermissibly counted funds obtained from the same stolen credit card towards both actual and intended loss any error was harmless because an alternate calculation method which was free of any double counting also resulted in a loss amount of between 120000 and 400000 and thus application of the same enhancement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CD because it incorporated the holder’s possession and endorsement of the CD as a precondition to payment. Aside from bearing the “nontransferable” legend, the CD also stated on its face that “It Will Pay To the Order of Michael Brier * * * On Return Of This Certificate Properly Endorsed.” (Emphasis added.) By incorporating possession and endorsement of the CD as a precondition to payment, the bank implicitly acknowledged that the CD was indeed transferable. See First National Bank in Grand Prairie v. Lone Star Life Insurance Co., 524 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex.Civ.App.1975). Otherwise, why would the bank have required Brier to return and endorse the CD upon seeking payment? “Such presentation is necessary for the bank’s protection because lack of possession wou 374 So.2d 6, 10 (Fla.1979) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, because the CD was an instrument

    ### Response:
    holding as matter of law that cds containing restrictions on transfers were nonetheless article 9 instruments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for theft by receiving.” Korelis, 273 Or at 429; Thomas, 13 Or App at 170-73. We explained, in the context of a jury trial, that giving a jury instruction that includes the phrase “having good reason to know” is erroneous because it suggests that a jury may consider whether a reasonable person would have believed that the property was stolen. Id. at 171-72. The same is true where the trier of fact is the court. See, e.g., Babler Bros. v. Pac. Intermountain, 244 Or 459, 467, 415 P2d 735 (1966) (“When the record discloses that the jury applied the wrong law to the problem, the verdict cannot stand. * * * Where an error of law is shown to have influenced the court trying a case without a jury, reversal is equally necessary.”); State v. Clum, 216 Or App 1, 7-9, 8 n 5, 171 P3d 980 (2007) (<HOLDING>). In this case, we are bound by Korelis. To be

    ### Response:
    holding that whether the trial court in a bench trial applied a correct understanding of the elements legally required to convict was reviewable on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by, a protected ground.”); see also § 1252(b)(4)(B). The crux of Thuri’s position is that she was persecuted because her father opposed institutional government corruption — which (in her view) constitutes the expression of a political opinion. By contrast, the IJ concluded, and the government contends, that the officers’ retaliatory conduct was driven by a criminal, nonpolitical motive to punish Thuri’s father for reporting the hijacking. Thuri has not identified any decisions in this circuit that support her argument for refugee status. In addition, even if the two Ninth Circuit cases on which Thuri relies were binding precedent, it is not clear that the legal standards those decisions announce would apply to Thuri’s case. See Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 & n. 3 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727-29 (9th

    ### Response:
    recognizing that purely personal retribution is of course not persecution on account of political opinion but holding that when the alleged government corruption is inextricably intertwined with governmental operation the exposure and prosecution of such an abuse of public trust is necessarily political
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    who has pled guilty in an open plea to challenge the sentence imposed is to file a direct appeal or, if the time for filing a direct appeal has run, to file an appeal under [Indiana Post-Convietion Rule] 2,"" rather than filing a post-conviction relief petition. The trial court subsequently granted Sullivan permission to pursue this belated appeal challenging his sentence. The State does not argue that Sullivan cannot invoke Blakely with respect to a sentencing hearing that was conducted in 1999. It was correct not to make such an argument. The Indiana Supreme Court's rule that precludes retroactive application of new criminal rules to collateral proceedings does not apply to direct appeals brought pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 2. Fosha v. State, 747 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Ind.2001) (<HOLDING>). ""New rules for the conduct of criminal

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants claim based on richardson v state 717 ne2d 32 ind1999 would be considered on the merits where defendant was convicted in 1993 and did not originally timely file a direct appeal but in 1999 was granted permission to file a belated appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would not have recovered anything even in the absence of a grant of derivative standing to Hyundai. Or, if the estate has additional assets and the JT & T parties have a small, secured claim that is superior to all other claims, then they will likely recover on their claim regardless of whether the adversary action brought by Hyundai is successful. In either of these scenarios, permitting Hyundai to pursue the avoidance and recovery action could hardly be said to have a negative impact on the JT & T parties’ interests as creditors. See In re The Watch Ltd., 257 Fed.Appx. at 750 (stating, in dictum, that the creditor’s injury was too speculative where he could not show a likelihood of recovering on his unsecured claim); In re Richardson Indus. Contractors, Inc., 189 Fed.Appx. at 93 (<HOLDING>); see also Fishell v. Soltow (In re Fishell),

    ### Response:
    holding that unsecured creditor could not appeal decision determining priority among secured creditors because it would not affect the payment of his claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it concluded that “neither the statutory text nor the legislative history discloses any congressional intent to categorically exclude attempt offenses from the scope of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s residual provision.” Id. We need go no further. IV. Criminal Possession of a Weapon Is a Violent Felony Lynch also argues that his 1989 conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree is not a violent felony under the ACCA. Lynch asserts that since he never admitted to having “intent to use the weapon unlawfully against another,” his conviction was based on “mere possession” and cannot constitute a violent felony. Lynch, however, pled guilty to the charge at issue in state court. Under New York law, “[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the se Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). This Court, in United States v. Danielson,

    ### Response:
    holding that possession of a shortbarreled shotgun is a violent felony under the accas residual clause because sawedoff shotguns are inherently dangerous and lack usefulness except for violent and criminal purposes internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Procedure Act unquestionably provides authority to agencies to adopt mandatory internal administrative appeals. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. Courts have routinely applied the exhaustion doctrine to bar judicial review of underlying merits determinations where a party fails to timely appeal under an agency’s internal regulations. See, e.g., Spitzer Great Lakes Ltd. v. United States EPA, 173 F.3d 412, 414 (6th Cir.1999) (“Because the Board’s order dismissing Spitzer’s administrative appeal was based solely on Spitzer’s failure to comply with the agency’s procedural deadlines, we limit our review to the question of whether the Board abused its discretion in requiring strict compliance with its regulatory deadlines.”); Glisson v. United States Forest Serv., 55 F.3d 1325, 1328 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Blevins v. United States DOL, 683 F.2d 139,

    ### Response:
    holding that partys failure to file a timely internal administrative appeal as required by regulations of the department of agriculture constituted failure to exhaust administrative remedies and precluded judicial action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM: Fahed T. Tawalbeh appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2000). In criminal cases, the defendant must file his notice of appeal within ten days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R.App. P. 4(b)(1)(A); United States v. Alvarez, 210 F.3d 309, 310 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). With or without a motion, the district court

    ### Response:
    holding that  3582 proceeding is criminal in nature and tenday appeal period applies citing united states v petty 82 f3d 809 810 8th cir1996 and united states v ono 72 f3d 101 10203 9th cir1995
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400, 402, 74 L.Ed.2d 225, 228 (1982). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Cal. Civ.Code § 52.1 claims are involved in the appeal because they, like the § 1983 claims, require finding a violation of constitutional rights. Defendants conclude that the Court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Cal. Civ.Code § 52.1 claims against Appellant Defendants. California Civil Code § 52.1 claims are not subject to qualified immunity. See e.g., Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir.2009) (“California law is ... clear that qualified immunity of the kind applied to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to actions brought under [Cal. Civil Code § 52.1].”); Venegas, 153 Cal.App.4th at 1248, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 741 (<HOLDING>). Defendants appeal the Court’s denial of

    ### Response:
    holding that qualified immunity under  1983 does not apply to actions brought under  521
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petitions for Judgments of Separate Courts. A petitioner who seeks relief from judgments of more than one state court must file a separate petition covering the judgment or judgments of each court. The amendment to the rule is purely semantic, as the change was “intended to be stylistic and no substantive change [was] intended, except [changes not affecting this provision].” Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 2, Rule 2 advisory committee’s notes on 2004 Amendments. 6 . Our holding is consistent with the principle, well-recognized as a matter of both federal and state jurisprudence, that resentencing does not affect the finality of the original judgment of conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 144 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The same rule obtains as a matter of Florida

    ### Response:
    holding resentencing does not affect the date on which the judgment  of conviction became final
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to modification may have pre-clusive effect for res judicata purposes. See, e.g., Spiker v. Spiker, 708 N.W.2d 347, 355 (Iowa 2006) (noting order granting continuing relief is “final” for res judicata purposes as long as there has been no substantial change in circumstance). And judgments are given res judicata effect during appeals. Peterson v. Eitzen, 173 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Iowa 1970) (“The judgment of the trial court is res judicata until set aside, modified or reversed.”); see also N. Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., 184 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Under Iowa law, issue preclusion may be applied to a trial court’s ruling on the merits of an issue despite the pen-dency of an appeal from that ruling.”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmts. c, f at 133, 135 (<HOLDING>). The Restatement defines “final judgment” to

    ### Response:
    recognizing preclusive effect of judgments notwithstanding pending appeal or collateral attack
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which objection is made. [The district court] may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, to obtain this de novo review of a magistrate judge’s R & R, an objecting party “must point out the specific portions of the report and recommendation to which [he] object[s].” U.S. Flour Corp. v. Certified Bakery, Inc., No. 10-CV-2522 (JS), 2012 WL 728227, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012). If a party “makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear error.” Pall Corp. v. Entegris, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 48, 51 (E.D.N.Y.2008); see also Mario v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Portions of the R & R to which a party makes

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs objection to an r  r was not specific enough to constitute an adequate objection under  fedrcivp 72b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Report or a Product Quantity Change SE Report from the company. Id. at 016, 025 (emphasis added). For new tobacco products already on the market, the FDA has said that it will not take enforcement action if the product manufacturer files the appropriate abbreviated SE Report within 30 days of the date of the issuance of the Second SE Guidance. Id, at 016, 025. Plainly, in light of the Guidance, tobacco companies are given a choice: either comply with the FDA’s interpretation of the TCA by filing the required SE report when making a label or quantity change to their product, or risk a possible “enforcement action.” But, of course, that is no real choice at all. The Guidance thus poses an immediate and significant practical hardship to Plaintiffs. See CSI Aviation Svcs., 637 F.3d at 412 (<HOLDING>) (citation and internal quotation marks

    ### Response:
    holding that the dots cease and desist letter put the company to the painful choice between costly compliance and the risk of prosecution at an uncertain point in the future and that the conundrum was  the very dilemma the supreme court has found sufficient to warrant judicial review 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had an adequate remedy at law. The gist of appellants’ counterclaims is that American is a competitor and is unlawfully attempting to restrict them ability to maintain a competing business. Appellants’ complaint fails initially because they failed to support them written motion for continuance with an affidavit as required by rule 251. Tex.R. Civ. P. 251. Generally, when a movant fails to comply with rule 251, we presume the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for continuance. Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex.1986); Sw. Country Enters., Inc. v. Lucky Lady Oil Co., 991 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied); see also TriSteel Structures, Inc. v. Baptist Found. of Tex., 166 S.W.3d 443, 448-49 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Appellants did not comply with rule 251;

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and he accompanied the officers in their search of the garage, during which the officers discovered sixty-five bundles of marihuana. • The time between the officers’ arrival at appellant’s residence and appellant’s written consent was about ten to fifteen minutes. We conclude that the totality of the circumstances, as outlined above, show appellant’s consent was not freely and voluntarily given. Rather, appellant’s consent was the result of coercive police tactics aimed at forcing appellant to consent to a search of his residence. First, the officers knew they could not obtain a warrant to search appellant’s residence solely based upon the anonymous tip because the tip, standing alone, did not establish probable cause. See State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 108 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Elardo v. State, 163 S.W.3d 760, 768

    ### Response:
    holding anonymous tip that someone at the residence was dealing drugs did not amount to anything the tip was never substantiated and none of the occupants were ever charged with drug dealing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    first argues that the district court exceeded its constitutional authority under the Sixth Amendment when it imposed “an enhancement based on facts not admitted by him and not found by a jury.” He acknowledges, however, that the line of cases beginning with Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), permits factfinding by the court regarding the nature of a prior conviction. But he wishes to preserve the issue in the event that the Supreme Court reconsiders Almendarez-Torres. By Ossa-Gallegos’s own admission, the district court’s classification of his prior sexual-assault conviction as violent does not violate his Sixth-Amendment rights under the current state of the law. See United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 555 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The 16-level enhancement under the

    ### Response:
    holding that controlling law both before and after booker counsels that a judge can make factual findings about a defendants prior convictions without implicating the sixth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fed.R.Evid. 501 applies. This rule provides, in essence, that when the claims before the court are based in state law, the state privileges apply; but when the claims are based in federal law, the common law privileges apply. In spite of the distinction made by the Fed.R.Evid. 501, it has been held that when the information made privileged by state law “is relevant for both the federal and the state claims, the movant must rely upon a privilege developed by the federal courts and not state law privileges.” Sirmans v. City of South Miami, 86 F.R.D. 492, 495 (S.D.Fl.1980); see also, Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 226 (D.Ma.1997); Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462, 467 (11th Cir.1992); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir.1982)(<HOLDING>). Such is the case here. Notwithstanding the

    ### Response:
    holding that when there are federal law claims in a case also presenting state law claims the federal rule favoring admissibility  is the controlling rule the court found this approach consistent with the rule in federal practice disfavoring privileges not constitutionally based
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ND 161, ¶ 5, 652 N.W.2d 354, and states that “[a]ny party to any proceeding heard by an administrative agency, except when the order of the administrative agency is declared final by any other statute, may appeal from the order within 30 days after notice of the order has been given as required by section 28-32-39.” An “order” is defined in N.D.C.C. § 28-32-01(7) as “any agency action of particular applicability which determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more specific persons.” Section 28-32-42(3)(a), N.D.C.C., emphasizes that “[o]nly final orders are appealable. A procedural order made by an administrative agency while a proceeding is pending before it is not a final order.” [¶ 7] The requirement o N.W.2d 249, 251 (N.D.1992) (<HOLDING>); Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863, 865

    ### Response:
    holding order partially vacating a judgment was not appealable because it does not provide the ultimate decision in the case and questions remained before the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of law better left for the court to decide.”). We reverse the district court’s order insofar as it grants the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs claim for arrest without probable cause under § 1983. In this case, the district court erred by considering the jury verdict' from the common law false arrest claims in its qualified immunity analysis. As explained above, whether a right is “clearly established” — ’that is, whether an objectively reasonable officer would have believed his conduct to be law ful, in light of clearly established law — is a question of law that must be resolved by the court, not the jury. We reverse the district court on this issue and remand for a determination of whether the defendants are entitled to 178, 183-84 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 953-54

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiffs allegations that the defendant seized him pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor are sufficient to state a  1983 malicious prosecution claim alleging a seizure that was violative of the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    petition, in contrast, seeks the very different relief of rescinding the plea agreement, and it attacks the validity of his conviction and sentence. It is settled that “[mjotions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences that are allegedly in violation of the Constitution,” Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir.2002), and a federal prisoner can seek relief under § 2241 only if the remedy provided by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Ryan’s attempt to void his plea agreement as a result of the government’s alleged breach must be brought in proceeding under § 2255. See Nichols v. Symmes, 553 F.3d 647, 649-50 (8th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Eakman, 378 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that prisoner who sought to withdraw guilty plea based on alleged breach of plea agreement due to his placement in a federal rather than a state prison facility had to bring claim under  2255 not  2241
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The record shows that the district court considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors in denying Perez’s motion for reduction. The district court was not required to expressly refer to the specific § 3553(a) factors or provide more specific reasons in support of its determination that a reduction was not warranted. See Whitebird, 55 F.3d at 1010; Henderson, 636 F.3d at 718. As for Perez’s argument that the district court should have applied the analysis in Pepper, the holding in Pepper applied to the consideration of post-sentencing reha bilitation when resentencing after a defendant’s sentence had been vacated on appeal, not on a motion to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2). See 562 U.S. at 490, 131 S.Ct. 1229; United States v. Harris, 643 Fed.Appx. 340, 341-42 (5th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the

    ### Response:
    recognizing this distinction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bank is probably prohibited from dishonoring the check that is otherwise valid. Finally, case law dealing with similar facts has addressed whether the creditor must turn over the funds, not its receipt of the property after lawful presentment of a negotiable instrument. See, e.g., In re Thomas, 311 B.R. 75, 79-80 (Bankr. W.D.Mo.2004). The Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Roete, 936 F.2d 963 (7th Cir.1991), is not instructive as the check in that case was dishonored. The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf 516 U.S. 16, 116 S.Ct. 286, 133 L.Ed.2d 258 (1995), also is not helpful because the bank froze the debtor’s account without violating the automatic stay to preserve its setoff rights, and setoff rights are not present 290 B.R. 487 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>); In re Boscia, 237 B.R. 184

    ### Response:
    holding secured creditors refusal to turn over property of debtors estate to debtor upon demand constituted an exercise of control over such property in violation of automatic stay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    authori 782 N.E.2d 275, 280-81 (2002) (detention for fifteen minutes to write out ticket while awaiting arrival of drug-sniffing dog called at outset of stop held unreasonable absent reasonable suspicion); Haas v. State, 172 S.W.3d 42, 50 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. ref’d) (citing United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1470 (5th Cir.1993)) (noting, under appropriate circumstances, extensive questioning about matters wholly unrelated to routine traffic stop may violate Fourth Amendment). 29 . Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S.Ct. at 837. 30 . Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 64; Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245 (purpose of stop for suspicion o 392 U.S. at 32-33, 88 S.Ct. at 1885-86 (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 2110, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (<HOLDING>). 46 . Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436, 111 S.Ct. at

    ### Response:
    holding reasonable suspicion not required provided police do not induce cooperation by coercive means
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the items that could be seized. The government agents responsible did not minimize intrusions on privacy, however, but instead seized papers and records beyond those the warrant authorized. See United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir.1978) (concluding that although the warrant was sufficiently particular, the executing “agents did not confine their search in good faith to the objects of the warrant, and that while purporting to execute it, they substantially exceeded any reasonable interpretation of its provisions”). Unlike cases where the magistrate judge erred in filling out the warrant but the government reasonably relied on the judge’s approval, here the magistrate judge properly authorized the warrant but the agents did not follow it. See Hurd, 499 F.3d at 969 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hitchcock, 286 F.3d 1064

    ### Response:
    holding that officers reasonably relied on the warrant though judge inadvertently failed to initial the appropriate line
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    district court concluded, however, that McVeigh had not come close to establishing a reasonable basis to believe that he would be able to satisfy the exceedingly demanding standards applicable to a fraud on the court claim. Without the requisite fraud on the court foundation, the district court concluded that it would not have jurisdiction over McVeigh’s anticipated Rule 60(b) motion. Because § 1651 does not constitute a grant of jurisdiction, but instead merely empowers federal courts to issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of respective jurisdiction, and because it would not have jurisdiction over McVeigh’s anticipated Rule 60(b) motion, the district court concluded that it must deny McVeigh’s request for a stay. See Hatch v. Oklahoma, 92 F.3d 1012, 1017 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,

    ### Response:
    holding that a stay of execution is only appropriate where the movant demonstrates substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “fully and finally affirmed,” it remained possible that attorneys’ fees could be reduced or the order reversed altogether. R. 97-1, Pg. ID 1488-89, 1508 (providing that “the Settling Parties enter[ed] into this Agreement on a conditional basis,” and that if the order was reversed on appeal the agreement “shall be deemed null and void”). And while it would have been good business practice to set the money aside, the contempt power is not meant to force businesses into good business practices. Nor is it meant to force parties to comply with contracts, where a breach of contract action would be more appropriate. Rather, the contempt power is reserved for parties that knowingly violate clear and specific commands of the court. See, e.g., Downey v. Clauder, 30 F.3d 681, 686 (6th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 261 F.2d 503,

    ### Response:
    holding that an order that did not specify a date or command the contemnor to act immediately was not definite and specific
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.1993); United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548-49 (11th Cir.1987). In determining whether such a non-owner may claim a privacy interest in a car that he is driving, courts consider two factors: whether the driver manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched; and whether that expectation of privacy is one that society would find objectively reasonable. United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 826-27 (7th Cir.2007). Courts have repeatedly recognized the right of a driver to assert a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches of a vehicle where the driver is operating that vehicle, with the permission of the owner. Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1418-19; Soto, 988 F.2d at 1553; Miller, 821 F.2d at 548-49; see also Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1197-98 (<HOLDING>). In lawfully possessing and controlling the

    ### Response:
    holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prosecution, a reasonable juror could conclude that (1) Ms. Colwell sold Carter the green Chrysler that was recovered by Officer Oliver; (2) Carter was the man Ms. Ford saw enter the Hartsville Citgo station and change into coveralls shortly before the bank robbery; (3) Carter was the man whom Ms. Cornwell saw at the carwash before the bank robbery; (4) Carter’s green car was the same car that Mr. Holder saw the robber drive away in after the robbery; (5) it was Carter who fled from both Officer Oliver and Sergeant Lanier; and (6) Carter fled because he knew he committed the robbery at the Hartsville Bank. In sum, a rational fact finder could decide that Carter was the man who robbed Hartsville Bank on October 15, 1996. See, e.g., United States v. Bond, 22 F.3d 662, 667 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 11 . The district court included the

    ### Response:
    holding that there was sufficient evidence for a robbery conviction where the getaway car a red firebird was identified by an individual who followed the vehicle and wrote down the license plate the firebird had been stolen from a gas station in a nearby city several weeks earlier the firebird had a defendants fingerprints both on its inside and outside on the drivers side a friend of one defendant testified that he had seen him driving a red firebird two or three weeks before the robbery a music tape reported missing by the owner of the firebird was found in one defendants house ammunition for handguns a spent shotgun shell and stacks of cash sorted by denomination were found in one defendants house a friend testified that the defendants confided in him about the robbery and an fbi agent testified that he overheard the defendants talking about killing a person who planned to testify against them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” In applying these standards, the Court focuses on “the substantive elements of plaintiffs’ cause of action and inquire into the proof necessary for the various elements.” Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 672 (7th Cir.1981). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that “the predominance criterion is far more demanding” than “Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 62 F.R.D. 668, 674 (D.Wyo. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, 962 F.Supp. 1162,

    ### Response:
    holding that because the tcpa claims will require extensive individual fact inquiries into whether each individual gave express consent by providing their wireless number to the creditor during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed  individual inquiries   predominate over the class action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    distinguishes work specific to Williams. (Jan. 31, 2006 Hackett Aff. 113-9.) Indeed, the affidavit explains that defense counsel excluded approximately $1 million in fees for work that could be used in this case and Kutten II. (Id. 13.) Third, Plaintiffs argue that Rule 41(d) provides only for an award of costs—not attorneys’ fees. Courts disagree on this issue. See Rogers, 230 F.3d at 874-75 (conceding that “the majority of courts find that attorney fees are available under Rule 41(d),” but nonetheless holding that the plain language of Rule 41(d) does not include attorneys’ fees). However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has awarded attorneys’ fees under Rule 41(d). See Evans v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 623 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir.1980); see also Copeland, 462 F.Supp.2d at 1022-24 (<HOLDING>). In addition, the Eighth Circuit has

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may award attorneys fees under rule 41d
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mr. Rosen “ethically would be compelled to inform other clients of [one witness's] testimony if detrimental to them.” Mr. Rosen, as noted earlier, has avoided that problem by keeping himself unacquainted with each witness’s version of the events at the Post. 12 . Counsel for appellant Rosen and Local 6 conceded at oral argument that there is no evidence in the record indicating what the witnesses think their relationship is with respect to Mr. Rosen, and furthermore that the witnesses were never asked whether they wanted this type of “representation.” 13 . The District Court has power to find criminal contempt on the part of a grand jury witness for refusing to obey a court order requiring him to testify. E. g., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 L.Ed.2d 240 (1965) (<HOLDING>). Of course, “the trial judge [should] first

    ### Response:
    holding fedrcrimp 42b applicable to such criminal contempt proceedings for refusals to testify before the grand jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the breadth of § 541 to hold that causes of action which accrued prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition are included in the bankruptcy estate). Upon the filing of a Chapter 7 petition, an interim Trustee is appointed to administer, inter alia, the property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 701. The Trustee is the sole representative of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 323(a). As such, the Trustee has the exclusive right to prosecute causes of action that are property of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 323(b); see also Jones v. Harrell, 858 F.2d 667, 669 (11th Cir.1988) (concluding that a “trustee succeeds to all causes of action held by a debtor at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed”); In re Labrum & Doak, No. CIV.A. 99-753, 1999 WL 667284, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 26, 1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 323(b)). Thus, after a

    ### Response:
    holding that the trustee alone has the capacity to sue and be sued 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the department. Section 84-917 provides that one “aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case” before an administrative agency “shall be entitled to judicial review ... .” Assuming, but not deciding, that the department has jurisdiction to pass upon the rights, if any, which Inner Harbour may have against the department under the latter’s agreement with the adoptive parents, the fact is that the matter was not before the department, and it therefore made no decision, final or otherwise, with respect thereto. That being so, there was no decision for the district court to review in that regard; it was therefore without jurisdiction to issue any orders with respect to the adoption agreement. See Bohling v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 243 Neb. 666, 501 N.W.2d 714 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the portion of the district

    ### Response:
    holding that in absence of valid final order district court lacked power to review boards action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the district court’s limitation of wrongful death damages and Kane’s subsequent choice to voluntarily abandon his attempt to seek damages for Cornish’s emotional distress left nothing further for the district court to do. We disagree. Rather, we find that Kane’s voluntary abandonment of the other “claims” in his complaint merely foreclosed the possibility of his recovering a certain type of damages. The question that will determine liability — whether the officers knocked and announced prior to entering Cornish’s apartment — is still live. Further, if this question is resolved in Kane’s favor, he will be able to recover nominal damages under § 1983 for the violation of Cornish’s constitutional rights. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (<HOLDING>). As such, a jury must resolve this factual

    ### Response:
    holding that under  1983 violations of constitutional rights are actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the presumption of immunity creates an “unusual” standard for summary judgment. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit observed, [T]he rebuttable presumption ... creates an unusual summary judgment standard that can best be expressed as follows: “Might a reasonable jury, viewing the facts in the best light for [the plaintiff], conclude that he has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendants’ actions are outside the scope of § 11112(a)?” If not, the court should grant the defendant’s motion. In a sense, the presumption language in HCQIA means that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the peer review process was not reasonable. (Citations omitted.) Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1333; see also Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 202 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We explained this standard in Goodwich: [T]he

    ### Response:
    holding that hcqias presumption of immunity creates an unusual standard for reviewing summary judgment orders as the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the professional review process was not reasonable and thus did not meet the standard for immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    practices. We have previously rejected this precise argument in FTC v. Dixie Finance Co., 695 F.2d 926, 930 (5th Cir.1983), albeit under the second prong of McCarran Act preemption test set forth in Cochran, 606 F.2d at 464. The analysis set forth in Dixie Finance is equally applicable in this case, and for the sake of brevity, we will not repeat it. 7 . The First, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits hold that if a practice is illegal under both state and federal law but federal law provides for a stronger remedy, the McCarran Act does not preempt the federal law. See Villafane-Neriz v. FDIC, 75 F.3d 727, 735-36 (1st Cir.1996) (Federal Deposit Insurance Act); Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F.3d 1486, 1492 (9th Cir.1995) (RICO); NAACP, 978 F.2d at 295-97 (<HOLDING>); Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419,

    ### Response:
    holding that mccarran act did not preempt application of fair housing act against redlining by insurance companies where state law outlawed the practice but provided no private remedy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    explicitly state whether it provides the exclusive means for removing a tow company from the list, and it contains no “explicitly mandatory language” limiting the police departments’ discretion to “maintain” the tow-rotation lists. See Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 735-36. In sum, for our interlocutory review of the denial of a preliminary injunction, the ordinances do not limit discretion sufficiently to confer a property interest in remaining on the tow-rotation list; the ordinances do not contain the requisite mandatory language. This is especially true in the light of our policy of construing ambiguities in defendants’ favor where a purported property interest is not “unequivocally granted in clear and explicit terms”. Batterton v. Tex. Gen. Land Office, 783 F.2d 1220, 1223 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Mills v. Brown, 159 Tex. 110, 316

    ### Response:
    holding in deciding whether texas law confers a property interest that purported legislative grants of property rights or privileges must be construed in favor of the state  and whatever is not unequivocally granted in clear and explicit terms is withheld quoting texas v standard 414 sw2d 148 153 tex1967
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law defamation claim. See Big Bear Lodging Ass’n v. Snow Summit, Inc., 182 F.3d 1096, 1106 n. 9 (9th Cir.1999). The district court erred as a matter of law in holding that Rivera’s defamation claim was preempted by FELA. See Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 556, 114 S.Ct. 2396. A claim for defamation does not result in a physical impact and is therefore not the type of claim that FELA was designed to encompass. See id. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 2396; see also Smith v. Union Pacific Railroad, 236 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting plaintiffs emotional distress claim under FELA because there was no physical impact causing the disorder); Grown v. Union Pacific Railroad, 162 F.3d 984, 985-86 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Rivera should therefore be permitted to

    ### Response:
    holding that employee could not state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under fela without a showing of physical impact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and filed an opinion on January 20, 1994, in which he ruled that, in light of claimant’s inconsistent reports of his accident to doctors, he failed to prove an injury by accident. The commission reversed the deputy commissioner’s ruling and awarded claimant benefits beginning November 17,1992. The commission further stated that it could not rely on history relayed by a claimant to determine how an accident occurred. II. CONSIDERATION OF MEDICAL HISTORIES As the Supreme Court of Virginia has stated, “injuries resulting from repetitive trauma ... as well as injuries sustained at an unknown time, are not ‘injuries by accident’ within the meaning of Code § 65.1-7.” Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 589, 385 S.E.2d 858, 865 (1989) (emphasis added). In this 9, 434 S.E.2d 904, 907 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Baker v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 11 Va.App.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that commissions rules permit hearsay evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that we should reverse our prior precedents and hold that, under Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the Fourth Amendment permits visual strip searches of all jail detainees upon being booked into a detention facility, regardless of reasonable suspicion. Second, the County argues in the alternative that the district court erred in classifying hindering apprehension as a “minor offense,” and that the nature of Ms. Jimenez’s offense therefore justified the search regardless of the lack of individualized reasonable suspicion. For the following reasons, we disagree. A t a policy of strip searching every arrestee booked into a jail or detention facility does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 112-13 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding that mandatory visual strip search policy at correctional institution intake center was unconstitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    research and development tasks was erroneous, because it was inaccurate and contrary to OHA precedent determining “research and development support” to be an acceptable justification for the NAICS Code 541712 designation. Pl. Mot. JAR at 22-23 (citing NAICS Appeal of DCS Corp., SBA No. NAICS-4874 (2007); see also NAICS Appeal of Davis-Paige Mgmt. Sys., LLC, SBA No. NAICS-5055 (2009)). Although some of the May 15, 2012 Solicitation’s research and development activities “envision direct performance on the part of the contractor,” the designation of NAICS Code 541712 also would be proper when “the work is an integral part of the research and development that will be conducted.” Pl. Mot.. JAR at 23 (citing NAICS Appeal of Information Ventures, Inc., SBA No. NAICS-4945, at 6-7 (2008) (<HOLDING>)). In sum, OHA’s decision was contrary to

    ### Response:
    holding that work by the contractor that did not itself entail physical research nonetheless was an integral part of physical research to be performed by the agency and thus supported the designation of naics code 541712
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to review by the courts.” Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir.2001); see also Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 447 (3d Cir.2005) (“[A] claim is ‘available as of right’ if, at the very least, (1) the alien’s claim was within the jurisdiction of the BIA to consider and implicated agency expertise, and (2) the agency was capable of granting the remedy sought by the alien.”). “The principle underlying this policy is that courts should not address an immigration issue until the appropriate administrative authority has had the opportunity to apply its specialized knowledge and experience to the matter.” Padilla v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1209, 1214 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); See also I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (<HOLDING>). The Government contends that this Court does

    ### Response:
    holding that except in rare circumstances an appellate court should not intrude upon the domain which congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim time-barred, and in finding that he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to surcharge and contract reformation on either his § 102(a) or § 404(a) claims. Because Osberg seeks the same relief under § 404(a) as under § 102(a), and because the timeliness of the § 404(a) claim is undisputed, we need not conclusively decide whether Osberg’s § 102(a) claim is subject to a three- or six-year statute of limitations to resolve the instant appeal. To survive summary judgment on his disclosure claims, Osberg was required to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his demand for “appropriate equitable relief’ — specifically, surcharge or reformation — under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S.Ct. at 1879-80 (<HOLDING>). We recently articulated the appropriate

    ### Response:
    recognizing surcharge and reformation as traditional equitable remedies that may allow for awarding monetary compensation based on misleading disclosures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the same or similar elements. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 90, 106 S.Ct. 433, 438, 88 L.Ed.2d 387, 395 (1985); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 317, 98 S.Ct. 1079,1082, 55 L.Ed.2d 303, 309 (1978); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136-38, 79 S.Ct. 676, 686, 3 L.Ed.2d 684, 694-95 (1959). This concept of “dual sovereignty” is premised on the principle that the states and federal government are each sovereign entities with the power to independently prosecute criminal offenses created under the laws of that sovereign by employing their own prosecutorial and adjudicative institutions for that purpose. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320, 98 S.Ct. at 1084, 55 L.Ed.2d at 310-11. This court has recognized this principle for many years. See State v. Moore, 143 Iowa 240, 121 N.W. 1052 (1909) (<HOLDING>). While conceding the force of the dual

    ### Response:
    holding federal conviction for forcibly breaking and entering post office does not bar state prosecution for burglary based on same facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this case or that the Clemtex decision is dispositive. One important difference between Advantage's policy and the policy at issue in Clemtex is that the latter did not incorporate the applicable TDI rules. The court noted this fact in holding the insurer could not supplant the contract provisions with contradictory TDI rules not even mentioned in the contract. In the instant case, the TDI rules were clearly incorporated in the contract. Therefore, Clemtex is inapposite to this case. More importantly, the insurance contract that is the subject of this dispute is not one written in the ordinary private insurance setting, as was the contract at issue in Clemtex. The Facility, although not a state agency, is essentially an arm of the State. Compare Turner Bros. Trucking, 912 S.W.2d at 391 (<HOLDING>) with American Home Assur. v. Texas Dept. of

    ### Response:
    holding the facility had certain powers despite fact that statute did not expressly confer those powers because facility does not derive power solely from statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was that, when credibility becomes the ultimate issue in a case, it is unfairly prejudicial for the fact finder to learn of any unrelated facts that might potentially affect the defendant’s credibility. This reasoning is applicable here. In this rape case, the witnesses’ credibility was the central issue for the trial judge to determine. We note that Delaware courts have been reluctant to disqualify a judge under Canon 3C(1) and the Los test. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 869 A.2d 328, 2005 WL 535007, 2005 Del. Lexis 72 (Feb. 14, 2005) (finding there was no sufficient appearance of bias when the defendant had been accused of threatening a superior court judge who later presided over the defendant’s sentencing hearing on an unrelated matter); Johnson v. State, 797 A.2d 1206 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Steigler v. State, 277 A.2d 662, 668

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no appearance of impropriety sufficient to warrant recusal when the judge learned negative facts about the defendant from a social gathering held by a prosecutor in a former case involving the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dismissed because she cannot demonstrate having suffered any apprehension of an imminent harmful bodily contact — one of the essential elements of a common law assault claim. An ‘assault’ is “an intentional placing of another person in fear of imminent harmful or offensive contact.” United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Waterfront N.Y. Realty Corp., 994 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.1993). The plaintiff must show that the defendant intended “either to inflict personal injury or to arouse apprehension of harmful or offensive bodily contact.” Rivera v. Puerto Rican Home Attendants Servs., Inc., 930 F.Supp. 124, 133 (S.D.N.Y.1996). Thus, although plaintiff need not prove actual contact, she must allege some “physical menace against [her] body.” Prince v. Ridge, 32 Misc. 666, 66 N.Y.S. 454, 455 (Sup.Ct.1900) (<HOLDING>). Chapman is correct that actions that are

    ### Response:
    holding that an effort of the defendant by words of persuasion alone to induce the plaintiff to grant him the favor of sexual intercourse was not an assault
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Second) of Torts, this Court is confident that the position most likely to be adopted by the Massachusetts courts is that a violation of well-established industry standards may indeed satisfy the improper means element of tortious interference. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ most thorough evaluation of the improper means element for tortious interference occurred in United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 406 Mass. 811, 817, 551 N.E.2d 20 (1990). In Geltman, the Court included within the ambit of “improper means” violations of a statute or a rule of common law, threats, misrepresentation, defamation, or any other improper means. Id. (emphasis added). The inclusion of the phrase “any other improper means,” makes this Court reluc o., 283 Or. 201, 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1978) (<HOLDING>) ; Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin and Creskoff

    ### Response:
    holding that im proper means may be wrongful by reason of a statute or other regulation or a recognized rule of common law or perhaps an established standard of a trade or profession
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    police standards and that there were alternative techniques available for subduing him that presented a lesser threat of death or serious injury. Smith offered an expert declaration on the training of police dogs and police dog handlers. Discussing whether the officers' conduct comported with law enforcement standards, the expert relied upon California's Peace Officer Standards and Training, which are applicable to all state police officers and are a part of Department policy. He concluded that the officers could and should have used control holds to complete the arrest rather than to sic Quando on him onc 1994) (suggesting that the use of deadly force is objectively reasonable where a suspect points a gun at officers); Garcia v. United States, 826 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The issue presented by Smith is initially

    ### Response:
    holding that deadly force was reasonable where the plaintiff attacked a border patrol agent with a rock and stick
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 154 (“Probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant ts supporting a search warrant have become sta e search warrant for appellant’s apartment is based entirely on information received by the Pasadena Police Department from two informants, Thumann and Broderick. The affidavit does not state when Thumann filed his initial report with the Pasadena Police Department, when Officer Brinson was assigned to the case, y and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information in circumstances to be considered by magistrate in issuing search warrant). Therefore, because the affidavit was based entirely on hearsay with no substantial basis provided for crediting it, the affidavit was insufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant. See Schmidt, 659 S.W.2d at 421 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, all the information recited in the

    ### Response:
    holding affidavit insufficient when it failed to state when affiant received information from informant when informant obtained information or when described incident took place
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    these “findings” do not constitute true ""findings of fact” because they were not separately filed as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 299a. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 299a (requiring findings of fact to be separately filed and not simply recited in judgment); Casino Magic Corp. v. King, 43 S.W.3d 14, 19 n. 6 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied). Accordingly, we employ the standard of review applicable to cases where no findings have been requested or filed. Casino Magic Corp., 43 S.W.3d at 19 n. 6. In the absence of findings, we imply all necessary fact findings in support of the trial court’s order. In re Williams, 328 S.W.3d 103, 112 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2010, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); see also In re Weekley Homes, LP., 295 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Tex.2009) (orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>); In re La. Tex. Healthcare Mgmt., L.L.C., 349

    ### Response:
    recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    alleged that the acceleration clause had.anticompetitive effects. It may be that with more factual and expert discovery, . the Warner Chilcott. .Defendants can establish that there were no anticom-petitive effects, or that, on the second prong of the rule of reason analysis, the “challenged payment was justified by some precompetitive objective.” Nexium II, 42 F.Supp.3d at 262-63. But at this juncture, the Court is not prepared to hold that an acceleration clause like the one in the Watson Agreement may never be cognizable as a component of a complex settlement agreement amounting to a large and unjustified reverse payment. Accordingly, the acceleration clause may be considered, a least for the time being, as a component in the greater calculus. But see Actos, 2015 WL 5610752, at *16 (<HOLDING>). c. Promotional Deals Defendants contend that

    ### Response:
    holding that the acceleration clause was not cognizable as a large and unjustified payment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her restrictions were based on “generalizations” and that she had not examined Plaintiff in over a year show that the assessment is not supported by specific medical findings. Furthermore, Dr. Vasicek’s assessment contradicts her own medical records. In a May 2007 evaluation, Plaintiff was allowed to return to modified work on April '30, 2007. (Tr. 290). It was noted that he could perform full weight bearing activities; constantly sit, stand and walk; frequently climb stairs; occasionally bend, squat and climb ladders; and had no lifting limitations. (Tr. 290). This directly conflicts with her September 2007 assessment, and she did not even examine Plaintiff during the intervening months. (Tr. 290, 369-73). See Stanley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 39 F.3d 115, 118 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the ALJ noted that there was

    ### Response:
    holding the alj did not err in declining to refer to treating physicians opinion where he originally opined that plaintiff could perform sedentary work and then changed his opinion without providing any supporting objective medical evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    here confirm that Officer Cuellar’s first approach to Reyes to ascertain whether he could render assistance was purely a consensual encounter from which Reyes was free to walk away. However, this encounter evolved into an investigatory stop when, upon approaching Reyes, Officer Cuellar noticed that the scooter had no key and that Reyes was nervous and sweating. These observations, combined with the time of day; the fact that Reyes was coming from the direction of a scooter store; Officer Cuellar’s knowledge of recent scooter thefts in the area; and Reyes’ statements that the scooter belonged to a friend whose last name and address he did not know, all gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity might be afoot. See State v. Lennon, 963 So.2d 765, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). As we stated in Lennon, 963 So.2d at 768: In

    ### Response:
    holding that an officer  may detain a person in order to determine identity and circumstance when that officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and respect for the D.C. Court of Appeals.”). The Supreme Court held in Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991), that “a court of appeals should review de novo a district court’s determination of state law.” Id. 499 U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 1221. The D.C. Court of Appeals has not squarely addressed the question whether bad faith denial of an insurance claim constitutes an independent tort under D.C. law. The district court has considered the issue in two separate reported cases, but these cases are directly in conflict. Compare GEICO, 769 F.Supp. at 387 (“District of Columbia law does not recognize the tort of bad faith denial of an insurance claim.”) with Washington v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 585 F.Supp. 517, 520 (D.D.C.1984) (<HOLDING>). We find it unnecessary to divine whether the

    ### Response:
    holding that the district of columbia is among the many jurisdictions that have recognized a cause of action in tort for the bad faith refusal of an insurer to pay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the Department's initial brief. See Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR (“Ordinarily, no point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of the issues on appeal.”); see also Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. and Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 692 (Ct.App.2001) (issue cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief). 8 . Although a previous version of the regulations was in effect prior to March 28, 2000, it did not apply to approved JDs. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 331.1 to 331.12 (1999). 9 . In fact, even if the regulations were in effect, the preamble to the regulations states that it is the position of the federal government that ""jurisdictional determinations are not ripe for [judicial] review until a landowner who disagrees with a JD has gone through the permittin (<HOLDING>). 12 . ""Under the doctrine of collateral

    ### Response:
    holding that cwa preempted vermont nuisance law to extent that vermont law sought to impose liability on new york point source
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    payment because the unsecured debt was otherwise dischargeable. Merely being a party to the agreement did not confer standing on McClellan to appeal the bankruptcy court’s order. In addition, the substance of McClellan’s argument on appeal is that the agreement should have been approved because it satisfied the requirements of § 524(c)(6)(A) , namely, that the agreement was in the debtor’s best interest and that it did not impose any undue hardship on the debtor. In sum, McClellan’s appeal is based entirely on its assertion that the agreement benefitted the debtor’s interests and, therefore, should have been approved. While the debtor could have prosecuted this appeal based upon whether the agreement was in his best interest, McClellan cannot. See Umpqua Shopping Ctr., 111 B.R. at 305 (<HOLDING>). Standing requires that an appellant rest its

    ### Response:
    holding that a debtor cannot appeal a confirmation order on the basis that it unfairly discriminates against a class of claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    order to determine whether the comments can be considered to be harmless. Accordingly, the Government asks the Court to either conduct an evidentiary hearing or allow the parties to interview the jurors themselves concerning the nature of Judge Riley’s ex parte contact. II. APPLICABLE LAW Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that “the court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interests of justice.” Id. “Probably the most frequent basis for a Rule 33 motion-and the only one specifically mentioned in the rule-is one ‘based on the ground of newly discovered eviden preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 769 F.Supp. 1564, 1580 (C.D.Cal.1991); see also United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir.1991)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Cousins, 842 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant must show that improper communication of extrinsic information had likely occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    held that a Batson objection is waived if not made during the voir dire process, and some have specified that the objection must be made before the venire is excused. See Morning v. Zapata Protein (USA), Inc., 128 F.3d 213, 215-16 (4th Cir.1997) (upholding the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s Batson challenge because appellant raised the challenge after the venire was excused); U.S. v. Maseratti, 1 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir.1993) (“To be timely, the Batson objection must be made before the venire is dismissed and before the trial commences”); U.S. v. Parham, 16 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir.1994) (“[A] Batson objection must be made at the latest before the venire is dismissed and before the trial commences”); Government of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 806 F.2d 73, 75-76 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 948 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that because the defendant failed to make any objection at the close of voir dire he waived his batson claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and CrR 3.1(c) delineate the right to counsel prior to arraignment, (2) CrR 4.1(b) outlines the right to counsel at arraignment and throughout trial, (3) CrR 7.2(b) requires notification of the right to counsel on appeal at sentencing, and (4) CrR 7.6(b) provides for counsel at probation revocation hearings. ¶12 Moreover, the right to counsel is constitutionally guaranteed at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including sentencing, and additionally on first appeal when states provide a right of appeal. State v. Rupe, 108 Wn.2d 734, 741, 743 P.2d 210 (1987) (“Sentencing is a critical stage of the proceedings, at which a defendant is constitutionally entitled to be represented by counsel.”); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-56, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1963) (<HOLDING>). ¶13 In only one area have we applied the

    ### Response:
    holding on equal protection grounds that meaningful first appeal requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the period specified by the executive officers. The regulations deny courts this power. Basic principles of administrative law, including the Chevron doctrine, also require us to deny Zazueta-Carrillo’s petition. The BIA has interpreted immigration law to mean that voluntary departure periods begin on the date the BIA enters its order. Here, the BIA specified that Zazueta-Carrillo had to depart “within 30 days ,/toto the date of this order.” (emphasis added). The BIA later determined that Zazueta-Carrillo’s failure to depart within that thirty-day period violated the order. The BIA’s interpretations and applications of the immigration laws are entitled to deference when Congress’s intent is unclear. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations

    ### Response:
    holding that the bia should be accorded chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms concrete meaning through a process of casebycase adjudication
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F.Supp.2d 104, 112 (D.Conn.1998) (noting that “the courts have repeatedly held that jurisdiction may not be manufactured by the conduct of others”); Elbex Video Kabushiki Kaisha v. Taiwan Regular Elec. Co., No. 93 Civ. 6160(KMW), 1995 WL 224774, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1995) (finding no personal jurisdiction where plaintiff arranged for former employee to make purchase from defendant for purpose of creating jurisdiction); see also Claras Transphase Scientific, Inc. v. Q- 4 F.Supp.2d 1284, 1287 (D.N.M.1998) (“Courts have held repeatedly that a defendant’s responses to the unilateral acts of a plaintiff are not contacts with the forum state sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.”); DeSantis v. Hafner Creations, Inc., 949 F.Supp. 419, 424 (E.D.Va.1996) (<HOLDING>); Network Profis., Inc. v. Network Int’l Ltd.,

    ### Response:
    holding that personal jurisdiction was lacking when the only contact by defendant with forum state was initiated by plaintiffs counsels paralegal for the sole purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Because GOL § 5-335 is Preempted by the Medicare Act In addition to their core claim for a declaratory judgment regarding the effect of GOL § 5-335 on MA organization reimbursement rights, Plaintiffs also bring a claim for deceptive business practices under New York General Business Law § 349, seeking compensatory damages, enhancement of damages, and attorney’s fees. There is a colorable argument that the exhaustion requirement does not apply to these claims. Courts have held that state tort law claims — even those that “relate to a denial of benefits” — -may not “arise under” the Medicare Act, “especially when th[o]se claims do not seek reimbursement or provision of Medicare benefits.” Kelly v. Advantage Health, Inc., No. CIV A 99-0362, 1999 WL 294796, at *4 (E.D.La. May 11, 1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Ardary v. Aetna Health Plans of

    ### Response:
    holding that tort law claim for injuries allegedly sustained because of negligently improper denial of coverage did not arise under act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (3) plaintiff was terminated; and (4) the employer assigned, at least temporarily, a younger person with no better credentials to do the same work. Hagtof v. Northwest Rehabilitation, Inc., 910 F.2d 492, 493 (8th Cir.1990). See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Once the plaintiff proves her prima facie case, the employer must come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the dismissal. If the employer does so, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts which show that the employer's stated reason is merely a pretext for intentional discrimination. Texas Dep 't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). 11 .See Biggins, - U.S. at -, 113 S:Ct. at 1706 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). 12 . Schibursky makes

    ### Response:
    holding that when the employers decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears this is true even if the motivating factor is correlated with age as pension status typically is
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    here, the private actor possesses considerably more information and has the opportunity for a greater degree of reflection, it is not unreasonable to expect more careful consideration on the part of the private citizen of the appropriateness of the assistance that he is furnishing. In all cases, however, the private citizen’s belief is unreasonable when the assistance he furnishes to a law enforcement official is a patently abusive misuse of police authority. Finally, an assisting private person who materially deviates from the directions given to him by law enforcement cannot reasonably expect that his unsupervised actions will be shielded from liability. This principle is, again, consistent with the common law basis for recognizing qualified immunity. See Firestone, 38 N.W. at 886-87 (<HOLDING>); Edger, 54 A. at 989 (holding private

    ### Response:
    holding that private person requested to assist known police officer in making arrest is not liable if in his acts he confines himself to the order and direction of the sheriff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    B.R. 1005, 1007 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1987). Rule 45(b) also may apply in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of execution of judgment. See Bankr.R. 7069(a) (providing that in supplementary proceedings, judgment creditor may obtain discovery by either Federal Rules or state practice). Finally, even where a subpoena is served to compel attendance at a rule 2004 examination, the reasonableness consideration of rule 45(b) applies. See id. 2004 (providing that non-debtor entity's attendance for examination and production of documents may be compelled by manner provided by rule 9016); id. 9016 (incorporating rule 45(b)’s provision of quashing or modifying unreasonable and oppressive subpoena duces tecum), see also In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 123 B.R. 702, 712 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1991) (<HOLDING>); In re Fearn, 96 B.R. 135, 137, 138

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 2004 requires court to balance competing interests weighing necessity of information sought
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in overbearing or coercive activity in making requests or conveys the message that compliance with requests is required). The officers did not have the squad car lights on or guns drawn; they simply approached on foot, and asked two questions. Cf. United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 276-81 (6th Cir.2005) (finding no Fourth Amendment seizure when two officers knocked on the suspect’s back door, told the suspect they wanted to talk to him, and asked him to come outside); United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 581-84 (6th Cir.2004) (finding no seizure where three uniformed officers approached the suspect as he was emerging from a parked vehicle with the engine running, and asked the suspect his name, what he was doing, and whether he had identification); Waldon, 206 F.3d at 602-04 (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Mitchell’s suggestion, the

    ### Response:
    holding that no seizure occurred where officer approached the suspect at the bus stop mentioned that he was investigating a bank robbery asked the suspect what he was doing in the area and for his identification and otherwise gave no indication that the suspect was not free to leave or to refuse to respond to questioning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for juror interviews after counsel violated the rules prohibiting contact with jurors in gathering facts to support an allegation of misconduct. There is no indication of improper contact by counsel with jurors in this case. Although the defense in this case did not present evidence of any apparent outward manifestation of intoxication, the use of crack cocaine may not be readily apparent. Additionally, crack cocaine is highly addictive. It is troubling that we are affirming this death case without obtaining an answer to the question of whether the forewoman of the jury used crack cocaine during the trial and in deliberations. Certainly, the use of crack cocaine by a juror in a capital case, if true, would require a new trial. Cf. Gamble v. State, 44 Fla. 429, 33 So. 471, 473 (1902) (<HOLDING>). Thus, given the seriousness of this

    ### Response:
    holding that if intoxicants have been used by a juror a presumption arises in favor of the convicted defendant that it resulted injuriously to him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Government and the defendant “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate'disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply (such a recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement).” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)(C). Banks’s plea agreement contains no such provision. More fundamentally, in Tyler and Freeman, the plea agreements at issue were “based on” § 2D1.1. See Tyler, 2012 WL 1396550, at *4; Freeman, 131 S.Ct. at 2699, 2700 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In contrast, here Banks’s sentence as it stands today is based, not on § 2D1.1, but on § 4B1.1. As such, Tyler, and Freeman, are inapposite. See Warner, 565 Fed.Appx. at 313 (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons,

    ### Response:
    holding that freeman is inapplicable to defendants sentenced under  4b11 seeking a sentence reduction based on amendments to the guidelines for crack cocaine offenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that an omission of an element from a jury instruction that is harmless, under the standard set forth in Neder, does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights for purposes of plain error review. United States v. Tuyet Thi-Bach Nguyen, 565 F.3d 668, 677 (9th’ Cir.2009). We must “conduct a thorough examination” of all the evidence in the record and ask whether the omitted element was supported by sufficient evidence. Neder, 527 U.S. at 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827. Cases that have upheld convictions rendered on incomplete or erroneous jury instructions have relied on “strong and convincing evidence” that the prosecution has adequately proved the missing element of the crime. United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Smith, 282 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Tuyet Thi-Bach Nguyen, 565 F.3d at 677

    ### Response:
    holding that the omission of an element from jury in structions was not plain error where the underlying fact supporting the element was undisputed based on the uncontradicted testimony of a government witness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    preempted under § 502. As such, it is proper for this court to exercise removal jurisdiction because claims preempted under § 502 fall within the complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. D. ERISA-Speciftc Pleading Requirements Beca th Cir.2000) (finding exhaustion was required when it was clearly required under the plan at issue); Schleeper v. Purina Benefits Ass’n, 170 F.3d 1157, 1157 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and rejecting the plaintiffs argument that exhaustion would have been futile); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Beckham, 138 F.3d 325, 332 & n. 4 (8th Cir.1998) (recognizing the futility exception to the exhaustion requirement under ERISA); Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1252 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Policy considerations supporting the

    ### Response:
    holding that a claimants claim is barred when administrative remedies that are clearly required under an erisa plan are not exhausted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because Plaintiffs claims are not based on the Agreements, that its theory based on the earlier promises would not modify the Agreements (even if-they are integrated), and that the Court should admit parol evidence to interpret the terms of the Agreement. As a threshold matter, Plaintiff contends that Defendants cannot raise an argument based on the integration clause because they are not parties to the Agreements. Opp’n at 8-9. The Court rejects this argument. Plaintiff is suing Defendants based on the Agreements, and Plaintiffs authority does not support its position that non-parties cannot invoke the parol evidence rule or integrated contracts when the contracts are central to the issue at hand. See Thomson v. Canyon, 198 Cal.App.4th 594, 609, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 525 (Cal.Ct.App.2011) (<HOLDING>). Defendants’ cases, however, support the

    ### Response:
    holding the parol evidence rule applicable where contractual obligations are at issue but noting that in some cases it is unclear whether third parties can rely on the rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when I get out is find you. I know where you live, or, I see you all the time in town. You’re mine.” Later, Wise was heard to say, “I’m going to stab that fucking cop.” The trial judge found that Wise’s testimony was “not credible” and that this evidence proved Wise meant he “was going to have [the officer] killed.” The First Amendment is not implicated in this case because Wise made a threat of bodily harm within the meaning of the statute. This was not a situation involving hyperbole analogous to Watts and the context does not otherwise indicate Wise was making a political statement. The trial judge found the evidence, in context, proved Wise intended to intimidate the officer by threatening physical harm. See Selph v. Commonwealth, 48 Va.App. 426, 433-35, 632 S.E.2d 24, 27-28 (2006) (<HOLDING>). See also Crawley v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App.

    ### Response:
    holding intent to intimidate or threaten may be proved by circumstantial evidence such as ones conduct or statements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relations cases are allowed to file separate common law contract actions to recover attorney fees, however, they can file actions against their former clients as long as 10 years after the domestic relations matters were resolved. (See 735 ILCS 5/13 — 206 (West 1992).) Plainly, if attorneys are allowed to file separate common law contract actions to recover attorney fees, it thwarts the purpose and intent of section 508 to have all issues involving attorney fees in domestic relations cases decided promptly. We must also bear in mind that before section 508 was enacted, generally an attorney could not seek or obtain a judgment for attorney fees against her own client in a pending domestic relations case. (Cf. Seniuta v. Seniuta (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 329, 331, 364 N.E.2d 327, 328 (<HOLDING>).) Section 508 made an utter change. Section

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorney could obtain a judgment for attorney fees against his own client in the divorce division of the circuit court of cook county where there was no objection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    instructed payroll to stop, but despite my instructions some payroll continued.” Ibid. The IRS denied this claim as well, “because [the plaintiff] previously filed a Claim for Refund, Form 843, and the claim was denied on April 29, 2005.” Def.’s Mot., Ex., Decl. of Joann Rogers, Ex. E. The accompanying explanatory letter stated that the plaintiff must file suit within two years of the April 29, 2005 disallowance. Ibid. However, the plaintiff did not file the complaint until June 11, 2007. The go 12 (N.D.Ohio 1955) (stating that the section of the Internal Revenue Code limiting time for commencement of action for recovery of internal revenue tax paid is jurisdictional, and where claim is barred, action must be dismissed.); Schmitt v. Kavanagh, 91 F.Supp. 659, 662 (E.D.Mich.1950) (<HOLDING>). The parties agree that the complaint was

    ### Response:
    holding that the time within which suit may be brought after disallowance of a claim by irs is not controlled by a statute of limitation as generally understood but on conditions under which the united states has consented to be sued
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its services in commerce. See OBH, 86 F.Supp.2d at 186; Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313 at *3. The court considers each of Plaintiffs assertions in turn. 1. Hyperlinks The use of a plaintiffs trademark as the domain name for a website satisfies the “commercial use” requirement if the website contains a hyperlink that connects users to another of a defendant’s websites if it operates for “commercial purposes.” See OBH, 86 F.Supp.2d at 185-86. However, where a “website contain[s] no commercial links, but rather contain[s] links to a [website], which in turn contain[s] advertising” or has a commercial purpose, this does not satisfy the “commercial use requirement of the statute.” See Bosley Medical, 403 F.3d at 678; see also TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 435, 438 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the commercial use requirement is not satisfied where defendants site itself had no outside links
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    991 F.2d at 1384 (citing Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511 (D.C.Cir. 1988)). This language seems to mean that in order for the second clause to apply, the facts establishing all elements of the plaintiffs claim must have occurred within the United States. Contrary to BP’s assertion, Sopo’s activities within the United States are not sufficient to establish a cause of action. All that Sopo allegedly did in the United States was disclose BP’s trade secrets to the United States vendors. This act if proved would not itself establish a trade secret misappropriation. For BP to prevail on a misappropriation theory, it would also have to show that Sopo acquired the information in an unlawful manner. E.g. BP Chemicals, Ltd. v. Baloun, No. 4.-98CV932 RWS (E.D.Mo. Oct. 11, 2000) (<HOLDING>); Restatement of Torts § 757(a) (1939) (stating

    ### Response:
    holding that a misappropriation under morevstat  417450ba requires both an improper acquisition and ultimate disclosure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and users. Id. at 123, 129. Similarly, in Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-1941 CA-06, 1999 WL 1204353 (Fla.Cir.Ct. Dec. 13, 1999), the Mayor of Miami-Dade County brought an action against gun manufacturers, a gun distributor, and three trade associations, asserting various negligence claims and seeking to recover the costs incurred in providing police, fire, emergency, court, prison and other related services as a result of various homicidal, suicidal and accidental shootings in the county. Id. at *1. The court held that the county lacked standing because the damages were purely deriva tive of damages suffered by third parties and too remote to be recoverable. Id. at *2; see also Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F.Supp.2d 245, 257-58 (D.N.J.2000) (<HOLDING>); District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that county lacked constitutional standing to assert against gun manufacturers negligence claims seeking compensation for manufacturers alleged reckless and negligent handgun marketing and distribution because its theory of causation involved a great number of links in the causal chain and county would have been required to show that causation was not severed by distributor retailer or purchaser illegal conduct or gun theft
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the company5’); Alfus v. Pyramid Technology Corp., 764 F.Supp. 598, 603 (N.D.Cal.1991) (finding that a company may be liable for not correcting analysts’ forecasts where it undertakes to provide information regarding and pass on the analysts’ forecasts, but finding no liability where a company officer merely examines and comments upon an analyst’s report); In re Aldus Sec. Litig., [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH ¶ 97,376 at 95,984-85) (W.D.Wash.1993) (finding plaintiffs’ claim sufficiently alleged that defendants placed their imprimatur on analysts’ reports, but employing a lower Rule 9(b) pleading requirement than is applied in this circuit); In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,060 at 94,698 (N.D.Cal. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Appellants argue that we should adopt the

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs need only allege that defendants provided information to the securities analysts upon which the reports were based
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of 1989, which expressly abolished common law offenses and statutorily specified the conduct necessary to support a criminal prosecution in Tennessee. Id. at 728. We emphasized in Hill that “an indictment need not conform to traditionally strict pleading requirements.” Id. at 727. Since common law offenses no longer exist, “we now approach ‘attacks upon indictments, especially of this kind, from the broad and enlightened standpoint of common sense and right reason rather than from the narrow standpoint of petty preciosity, pettifogging, technicality or hair splitting fault finding.’ ” Hill, 954 S.W.2d at 728 (quoting United States v. Purvis, 580 F.2d 853, 857 (5th Cir.1978)). In many decisions since Hill discussing the sufficiency of indictments, we have repeate writing for the Court) (<HOLDING>). Another even more recent decision further

    ### Response:
    holding that an indictment which cites the pertinent statute and uses its language will be sufficient to support a conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.3d 448 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Recognizing that the EEOC is vested with

    ### Response:
    holding that a private arbitration agreement does not affect the scope of the eeocs federal court suit at all
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    custody and control over another. Estate of Brennan v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., 832 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1377-78 (M.D.Fla.2011). For example, aduty to prevent suicide exists where a patient is committed to a psychological institution, Kelley, 68 So.3d at 957, or where a child is under the supervision of a school, see Wyke v. Polk Cnty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 571 (11th Cir.1997). Alternatively, some Florida courts have determined that professionals, such' as psychiatrists, have a duty to treat patients in accordance with professional standards and may be liable if negligent care'results in a patient’s suicide. See Granicz v. Chirillo, 147 So.3d 544, 548-49 (Fla. 2d DCA); review granted, 168 So.3d 224 (Fla.2014). But see Lawlor v. Orlando, 795 So.2d 147, 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). A legal duty requires more than just

    ### Response:
    holding a psychotherapist had no duty for the suicide of a patient in a noncustodial setting
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1139 (1972). More recently, we have required a “clear expression” of legislative intent before installing a private right of action in a statute otherwise silent on the matter. State v. Moldovan, 842 P.2d 220, 227 (Colo. 1992) (discussing Quintano, 495 P.2d at 1138-39 and Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Moreland, 764 P.2d 812, 818-19 (Colo. 1988)). 2. The Samelmplied-Private-Right-of-Action Analysis Applies to Governmental and Non-governmental Defendants ¶ 23 We have expressed the same concerns no matter the legal theory and no matter the defendant. Although our implied-private-right-of-action cases typically concern torts, e.g., Moldovan, 842 P.2d at 226-27, we have analyzed other implied statutory claims as well, e.g., Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Pfeifer, 190 Colo. 275, 546 P.2d 946, 948-49 (1976) (<HOLDING>). We similarly hesitate to imply a private

    ### Response:
    holding statute did not create claim to set aside improper conveyance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    It was not until July 2, 2001, eleven months later still, that Baylor filed his motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing his conviction and his sentence were unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, which had been decided on June 26, 2000. In order to be timely, Bay 1998) (“the court’s equitable power to toll the statute of limitations will be exercised only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances”). Counsel is under an obligation to check with reasonable frequency on the status of a pending case, a duty the discharge of which in Baylor’s case was never more than a phone call away, and which now may be discharged over the Internet as well. Cf. Fox v. American Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Baylor’s petition for rehearing was filed on

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys are obligated to monitor the courts docket and the failure to do so will not excuse the lack of a timely filing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the circumstances of which Cott-rill was aware, and compared to the facts in other cases in which we have rejected hostile work environment claims, we hold that Cottrill has not established a question of máterial fact as to whether the alleged harassment was so severe and pervasive as to constitute a hostile work environment at MFA’s Albany retail facility in violation of Title VII. See LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Human Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1100-03 (8th Cir.2005) (finding no objectively hostile work environment created by defendant’s unwelcome sexual advances on three separate occasions over a nine-month period, including asking the employee to watch pornographic movies with him, hugging and kissing, and grabbing the employee’s buttocks and thigh); Tug-gle, 348 F.3d at 720 (<HOLDING>); Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928,

    ### Response:
    holding no actionable hostile work environment based on defendants inappropriate sexual comments taking a photograph of plaintiffs rear end and giving plaintiff undesirable work assignments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    violation of Title VII “[gjiven the magistrate judge’s opportunity to view the demeanor of the witnesses at trial and the inconsistencies in [the employer’s] version of the events surrounding [the plaintiffs] departure from [the company].”); Duchon v. Cajon Co., 791 F.2d 43, 46 (6th Cir.1986) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment to employer because plaintiffs allegations made in her affidavit that “ ‘she had never been warned or disciplined about her performance’ ... directly contradicted] [her supervisor’s] stated reason that [she] was discharged in part for poor performance[ ] ... [and] raise[d] a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the reason for her discharge so as to preclude summary judgment.”); Ferguson v. Small, 225 F.Supp.2d 31, 40-41 (D.D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, to the extent that director

    ### Response:
    holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony  regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone  be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (see Docket Entries 1 and 9), and therefore there is no legal or factual basis for this claim to go to the jury. Thus, defendants’ ninth affirmative defense and third counterclaim should be dismissed to the extent it is based on the parties’ lease. There is also no basis to submit to the jury defendants’ attorneys fees claim under the Fair Housing Act. Indeed, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(e)(2), upon which defendants rely, clearly provides that “[i]n a civil action under [the Fair Housing Act], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs.” (Emphasis added). Thus, whether and to what extent defendants or plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs will be decided by the Court. Sassower, 973 F.2d 75, 79 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,

    ### Response:
    holding that feeshifting is permitted under the fair housing act where prevailing defendant shows that suit is frivolous unreasonable or without foundation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    district] plan at issue — The parties’ dispute as to this Court’s jurisdiction centers [instead] on whether the Wilmington .plan is a ‘governmental plan’ within the meaning of ERISA and therefore is.exempt....”). For example, in Weiner, the Sixth Circuit examined whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction over an ERISA appeal involving the Portage County Benefit Plan and the City of Barberton Health Benefit Plan. Weiner, 108 F.3d at 88-89. There, the court agreed that these governmental plans qualified as “employee benefit plans” within the meaning of ERISA but nevertheless fell outside of the Act’s coverage due to the governmental plan exclusion from 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1). See id. at 89-90.& n.3 (“[A] plan may be an ‘employee benefit plan’ and th F.Supp.2d 443, 445-47 (D.Vt.1999) (<HOLDING>); Garvey v. Ruch Prudential HMO, Inc., No. 96 C

    ### Response:
    holding that healthcare plan established by the state of vermont for eligible employees qualified for governmental plan exclusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay of “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The “automatic stay pertains only to actions involving the debt- or or property of the estate.” In re Priestley, 93 B.R. 253, 261 (Bankr.D.N.M.1988). In turn, the Bankruptcy Code defines “property of the estate” as “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). A directors and officers liability insurance policy is considered “property of the estate” if it increases the debtor’s worth or diminish its liabilities. In re Zenith Labs., 104 B.R. 659, 665 (D.N.J.1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Minoco Group of Cos., Ltd., 799 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding directors and officers liability policy was not property of the estate because it did not increase or decrease the worth of the bankruptcy estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argues that Dean and Lockwood are distinguishable because those cases involved the failure to install guardrails and did not involve wedge curbs. Nevertheless, the injuries suffered by Smith, like the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs in Dean and Lockwood, result from the motor vehicle traveling off the portion of the roadway intended for travel. Smith does not allege that his injuries were caused by the condition of any portion of Crucible Street that is intended for travel. The wedge curb cannot be said to be any more of a dangerous condition resulting in a reasonably foreseeable injury to Smith than the failure to install guardrails in Dean and Lockwood were dangerous conditions resulting in reasonably foreseeable injury. See also Snyder v. Harmon, 522 Pa. 424, 562 A.2d 307 (1989) (<HOLDING>). There is no merit in Smith’s contention that

    ### Response:
    holding that permitting a strip mine within the department of transportations rightofway without warning the public providing lighting or erecting a guardrail did not create a dangerous condition within the meaning of the real property exception to sovereign immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his motion for a new venire. During voir dire, the defense counsel asked the judge for a sidebar, during which he orally moved to dismiss the venire. The defense counsel stated that there were only 3 or 4 black members on the 44-person venire. Stating that there were also ""other Eurasian people in the voir dire panel,” the judge denied the defense counsel’s motion. The judge began the proceedings the next day by citing People v. Peeples (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 422, 616 N.E.2d 294, in support of his ruling the day before. At this time, the defense counsel complained that the only black jury member was one whom the parties had selected as a potential alternate juror, but the judge did not change his ruling. There is no written motion for a new venire in the record, althou 1 N.E.2d 1263 (<HOLDING>). Even if we were to review the merits of the

    ### Response:
    holding that an oral challenge to the venire is insufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    217, 219 (3d Cir.1994). 36 . Id. at 219. 37 . Id. at 224-225. See also Elrod Holdings Corp., 426 B.R. 106, 111. 38 . In re Forklift LP Corp., 340 B.R. 735, 738-39 (D.Del.2006) (citing In re Parkline Corp., 185 B.R. 164, 169 (Bankr.D.N.J.1994)). 39 . Morris v. Sampson Travel Agency, Inc. (In re U.S. Interactive, Inc.), 321 B.R. 388, 392-93 (Bankr.D.Del.2005). 40 . Big Wheel Holding Co., Inc. v. Fed. Wholesale Co. (In re Big Wheel Holding Co.), 223 B.R. 669, 674 (Bankr.D.Del.1998). To the extent the ordinary course of business exception applies, the Court does not need to determine whether the third prong of § 547(c) is satisfied since the amended 2005 Code, as amended in 2005, requires only a showing that a transfer orp. (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 200 B.R. 114, 117 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1996) (<HOLDING>). 42 . Molded Acoustical, 18 F.3d at 225. 43 .

    ### Response:
    holding that a 16 month relationship was not of sufficient length
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    debtors, which are specified as “Other Necessary Expenses” on Form B22C, a category for which the IRS does not set out specific dollar allowances. Rather, § 707(b)(2)(a)(ii)(I) allows debtors to deduct their actual expenses under this category. 45. Line 37 of Form B22C limits telecommunication expenses to those of the debtors or their dependents. Because Form B22C specifically so limits the deduction for telecommunication expenses, the debtors bear the burden of demonstrating that these expenses are actual, reasonable, and necessary expenses for themselves (rather than for a household of ten people). See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (indicating that disposable income is calculated by deducting “reasonably necessary” expenses from the debtor’s current monthly income); see also Edmunds at 645 (<HOLDING>). The debtors have failed to meet that burden.

    ### Response:
    holding that debtors have the burden of proving that other necessary expenses on form b22c are actual reasonable and necessary expenses and that these expenses should be considered in light of schedule j and other relevant evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the debtor lacked a good-faith statutory basis for claiming the exemption. In Peterson, the Eighth Circuit found that the debtors had a good-faith statutory basis for seeking to exempt their interest in the house. The trustee’s counsel asserts, in his brief, that the Debtors’ claim of exemption lacks a good-faith statutory basis because “a comprehensive review of existing case law reveals that the Debtors may not claim an exemption in an ERISA-qualified pension plan under RSMo (sic) Section 513.-430(10)(e) ... [because a] majority of the courts ... have held that ERISA preempts a state’s attempt to make a debtor’s interest in these plans exempt.” Trustee’s Memorandum of Law, at 2 (cites omitted). As the trustee concedes, only a majority of courts have held that ERISA preem .Mo.1990) (<HOLDING>) aff'd by 126 B.R. 348 (W.D.Mo.1990) (currently

    ### Response:
    holding that erisa does not preempt revstatmo  51343010e because it is entirely consistent with both erisa and the bankruptcy code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The High Court has explicitly affirmed that voir dire is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding, during which the defendant has a constitutional right to be present. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (citing Lewis, supra at 374,13 S.Ct. 136). The determination that voir dire is a critical stage of trial flows directly from the recognition that a defendant’s “life or liberty may depend upon the aid which, by his personal presence, he may give to counsel and to the court and triers in the selection of jurors.” Lewis, supra at 373, 13 S.Ct. 136. However, certain decisions regarding the conduct of voir dire are properly made by counsel alone. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 128 S.Ct. 1765, 170 L.Ed.2d 616 (2009[2008]) (<HOLDING>). The High Court has also stated: The mere

    ### Response:
    holding that defense counsel may decide whether to consent to voir dire proceedings before a federal magistrate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Va. 571, 9 S.E.2d 454, 458 (1940). The Virginia Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide this question, and as a result, this court must interpret Virginia law. (a) Background While the precise issue in this case has arisen recently in a number of Virginia state courts, no judicial consensus has emerged. The plaintiff’s argument carr GV96001893 (Charlottesville Gen. Dist. Ct.1996) (same); Babb v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:95cv630 (E.D.Va. March 7, 1996) (permitting plaintiff to recover only the discounted medical fees paid by her health insurers). Analogous issues have been decided in bankruptcy cases where personal injury plaintiffs sought to recover medical expenses subsequently discharged in bankruptcy. See Walker v. Long, No. LU-3591 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. Oet.20, 1993) (<HOLDING>); Morganthal v. Piper, CL 94-2496 (Va. Beach

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff could not recover medical bills that were discharged in bankruptcy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that the BIA violated his due process rights and erred in determining that he was not eligible for cancellation of removal. He also sought the opportunity to apply for protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The District Court denied Gerbier’s request for habeas relief, finding that the BIA had properly determined that Gerbier was an aggravated felon and, thus, ineligible for cancellation of removal. The District Court permitted Gerbier to apply for protection under CAT, but Gerbier subsequently declined this opportunity. This timely appeal followed. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 2287, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (<HOLDING>). We have appellate jurisdiction to review a

    ### Response:
    holding that neither the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 nor the illegal immigration reform act of 1996 repealed the district courts jurisdiction to review aliens habeas petitions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    weight of the eyewitness statements, with respect to FIRs 89, 34 and 100, Barapind offered his own compelling witness statements, in which all of the eyewitnesses upon which India relies either recant their earlier identification, or deny having made an identification in the first place. There is some confusion, however, as to whether this type of evidence is admissible in this context. The general rule is that evidence that “explains away or completely obliterates” probable cause is admissible, while evidence that “merely controverts the existence of probable cause” is not. Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1207 n. 7 (9th Cir.1999). Courts, however, have struggled with the admissibility of recantation evidence under this rule. See, e.g., In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F.Supp.2d at 994 (<HOLDING>); compare Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 511-512

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the standard is extremely difficult to apply
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a mental health worker held while Bowling was in jail, Bowling claimed that he ""had no recollection of the day of the crime.” J.A. at 54 (Pet. Br. in Dist. Ct.). 2 . We note parenthetically that this argument was adopted by two justices of the Kentucky Supreme Court on Bowling's direct appeal. Bowling I, 873 S.W.2d at 182-85 (Leibson, J., dissenting). 3 . Under current Kentucky law, Bowling has the burden of proving EED; the government is not charged with proving its absence. See Wellman v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Ky.1985). Bowling argues in his brief that the government should have had the burden of proving an absence of EED at trial. Bowling cites a recent Sixth Circuit case that granted habeas relief on such grounds. See Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 288-91 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 941, 121 S.Ct. 2577,

    ### Response:
    holding that the kentucky supreme court erroneously put the burden on the defendant to show eed when it was actually the governments obligation to prove a lack of eed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also United States v. Melecio-Rodriguez, 231 F.3d 1091, 1094 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (“An error in admitting testimony may be harmless if the testimony is corroborated by independent sources, or if it amounts to cumulative evidence on matters already before the jury.”). Special Agent Starmer’s hearsay testimony concerning the incident in Oklahoma mirrored Winfrey’s testimony. Although, like Special Agent Starmer, Winfrey acknowledged that he had no first-hand knowledge of the vehicle stop, Robinson did not object to Winfrey’s testimony as hearsay. See United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1451 (8th Cir.1993). Neither did Robinson object to Ousley’s hearsay testimony confirming the incident. Indeed, there is no indication that Robinson even disputed that the s 2 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the record is replete with other

    ### Response:
    holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse warranted reversal where the childs otherwise uncorroborated testimony was the sole basis for conviction and the hearsay augmented the childs testimony with additional detail in certain areas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fees awarded under the statute should be payable to the attorney, since a different interpretation would render the Savings Clause superfluous, noted that its decision best satisfied the purpose of the EAJA, while a decision paying fees to the plaintiff and subjecting them to administrative offset would subvert the legislature’s intent. Id. Likewise, in Richardson v. Astrue, the Western District of Missouri determined that a fee award under the EAJA must be paid to counsel, since “[cjlearly an award for attorney’s fees is intended to compensate the attorney, not generate income for the claimant so that it may be attached by other federal agencies.” No. 06-0331-CV-W-SWH, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Oct 2, 2007). See also Whatley v. Astrue, No. 2:07-cv-00117-UWC, at *3-4 (N.D.Ala. Nov. 2, 2007) (<HOLDING>) and Hagman v. Astrue, No. 5:06-cv-198-OC-GRJ

    ### Response:
    holding that the plain language of the eaja requires the fee award payable to counsel as any other reading would render the savings clause nonsensical
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doctrine survived the PSLRA); Stanley v. Safeskin Corp., 2000 WL 33115908 at *4, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14100 at *13-14 (S.D.Cal. Sept. 15, 2000) (rejecting argument that group pleading doctrine did not survive the PSLRA); Zishka v. American Pad & Paper Co., 2000 WL 1310529 at *1-2, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13300 at *6-7 (N.D. Tex. Sept 13, 2000) (rejecting the group pleading doctrine in light of the PSLRA and requiring plaintiffs to plead with particularity allegations against each defendant); In re Solv-Ex Corp. Sec. Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13113 at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000) (“The PSLRA has not abolished the use of group pleading in Section 10(b) cases.”); In re Ashworth Secs. Li-tig., 2000 WL 33176041 at *11-12, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15237 at *34-35 (S.D.Cal. July 18, 2000) (<HOLDING>); Marra v. Tel-Save Holdings, Inc., 1999 WL

    ### Response:
    holding that the group pleading doctrine did not survive the pslra because it cannot be reconciled with the pslras requirement that plaintiff state facts with particularity as to each alleged act or omission by the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    may ""take judicial notice of a document filed in another court ... to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.” Global Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 . The district court did not reach the defendants' other arguments for dismissal, including Best Buy and Speakeasy’s argument that RTI’s claim that they “assisted” in filing the California Action did not satisfy the plausibility standard for pleading, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-80, 129 S.Ct. 1937, and the Covad Defendants’ argument that they were not bound by the Agreement. Because we affirm the district court's dismissal under Lear, we do not reach these arguments. 5 . Cf. Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1374 (6th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). 6 . This case differs from MCA in that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the rationale of the consent decree cases was fully applicable where a stipulated dismissal and settlement resolved pending patent litigation and there were other licensees and alleged infringers who had an incentive to challenge the patents validity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    — Ft. Worth 1988, pet ref’d) (hands were deadly weapon in murder case); Fegurgur v. State, 734 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.App. — Austin 1987, no pet.) (knife or knuckles were deadly weapon in murder case); Cervantes v. State, 706 S.W.2d 685 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no pet.) (board was deadly weapon in aggravated assault case); see also State ex rel Esparza v. Paxson, 855 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1993, no pet.) (trial court did not have discretion to disregard affirmative finding that sock was deadly weapon in strangulation case). The category of “deadly weapons” has likewise been broadly interpreted in deciding whether the indictment provided sufficient notice that the State would seek a deadly weapon finding. See, e.g., Ex parte McKithan, 838 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>); Pena v. State, 864 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. App. —

    ### Response:
    recognizing that motor vehicle can be a deadly weapon in involuntary manslaughter case for purposes of providing notice in indictment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a burden for purposes of the UUP test. Section 5 of the Charity Act After it concluded that Theater was not a “purely public charity” under the HUP test, the trial court then decided that Theater also did not qualify for an exemption under the Charity Act. It concluded that Theater did not prove that, upon dissolution, its assets would be donated to a charity or that it renders a substantial portion of its services gratuitously. Theater challenges both conclusions as inconsistent with the uncontradicted evidence. County responds that once the trial court determined that Theater did not qualify as a “purely public charity” under the HUP test, its analysis should have ended. Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. v. Pike County Board of Assessment Appeals, 615 Pa. 463, 44 A.3d 3, 9 (2012) (<HOLDING>). County argues that this Court should remand

    ### Response:
    holding that if you do not qualify under the hup test you never get to the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the defendants’ decisions because those decisions allegedly violated the very statute that plaintiff alleges conferred state agency powers on these defendants. There thus can be no close nexus between the Commonwealth and the allegedly unlawful acts of the defendants here. We therefore find that defendants’ responsibilities under, and alleged violation of, the Pennsylvania statute do not render them state actors, regardless of which test we employ. Plaintiff has alleged nothing which would warrant a finding of state action in this matter. We note that former Chief Judge Lord and Judge Newcomer reached the same conclusion, without the guidance of the Lugar trilogy, years ago. See Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 536 F.Supp. 1065, 1091 (E.D.Pa.1982) (Lord, C.J.) (<HOLDING>); Holton v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 419

    ### Response:
    holding that ccmc and its employees were not state actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus test
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the Bureau’s own regulations indicate that it does not pay for “household work related to the individual,” which the federal regulation expressly contemplates as a component of companionship services. See Ohio Admin. Code § 4123-7-25(F) (denying compensation for household duties). We reject these arguments for two reasons. First, we find persuasive the rationale of the court in Lott, 746 F.Supp. at 1087-88, which drew on the exemption’s legislative history to hold that “domestic service employment” simply means being “employed in a private home.” Because Ms. Salyer renders her services to Mr. Salyer almost entirely within their home, she is undoubtedly engaged in domestic service employment to provide companionship services to her disabled husband. Cf. Linn, 891 F.Supp. at 578-79 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as heretofore indicated, the

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff analogous to ms salyer who did not work in private homes did not fall within the companionship services exemption
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that a defendant waives the right to confrontation by failing to enter an objection); Brown, 116 N.M. at 706, 866 P.2d at 1173 (“[0]n a doubtful or deficient record, we presume regularity and correctness in the proceedings below.”). Admission of Photographs of Victim— Garcia {49} Garcia challenges the admission of two photographs depicting Victim with his children, taken prior to his death, and three photographs of Victim’s condition after he received the fatal gunshot wound. The court admitted the former on the ground the State was entitled to humanize Victim and the latter for the purpose of showing the nature of the injury. {50} “A trial court has great discretion in balancing the prejudicial impact of a ,130 N.M. 732, 31 P.3d 1006; Pettigrew, 116 N.M. at 139, 860 P.2d at 781 (<HOLDING>); State v. Binkley, 90 N.M. 744, 748, 568 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that photos of a battered victim were relevant to depict the extent of the victims injuries and to illustrate a physicians testimony and that the admission of the photos was not an abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an “interested party” under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1); see also American Fed’n Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States, 258 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“We hold that standing under [28 U.S.C.] § 1491(b)(1) is limited to actual or prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.”). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has not addressed whether, in the context of a motion to set aside or enjoin an override of the automatic stay issued, under 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(3)(C), “prejudice” must be demonstrated to establish standing, ie., that the protestor would have a “substantial chance” of receiving the award absent the alleged error in the procu 6, 1562-63 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Int’l Bus. Machines

    ### Response:
    holding the appropriate standard is that to establish prejudice a protestor must show that had it not been for the alleged error in the procurement process there was a reasonable likelihood that the protestor would have been awarded the contract this is a refinement and clarification of the substantial chance language
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cuyahoga App. No. 80793, 2002-Ohio-7058, 2002 WL 31838501, at ¶ 24. Likewise, this court is bound by those same factual findings, and our review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s decision. {¶ 20} Moreover, we must reject Yu’s argument that resolution of the residency issue may be based on documents not identified in the magistrate’s decision. “Without a transcript, * * * neither the trial court nor a reviewing court would know whether any exhibits not identified by the magistrate were admitted, authenticated, or ever actually introduced into evidence. A review of such exhibits * * * exceeds the proper boundaries of appellate review.” Id. at ¶ 25. But see Natsis, 2002-Ohio-7058, 2002 WL 31838501, at ¶ 36 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting) (<HOLDING>). {¶ 21} Here, Yu’s reliance on the documents

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial court has a duty to examine the entire record including all physical documentary evidence in order to reach an equitable result
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 2 . Although Rabanales frames his challenge in terms of procedural and substantive reasonableness, his arguments sound primarily in substantive reasonableness. We therefore only address substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Jemigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n. 8 (11th Cir.2003)

    ### Response:
    holding that the appellant abandoned an issue to which he only made passing references
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    followed by ten years’ probation. Because the postconviction court lacked jurisdiction to reduce the sentence, we reverse. A motion to reduce or modify a sentence must be filed “within 60 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued by the court on affirmance of the judgment and/or sentence on an original appeal.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(c). Although Stewart sought collateral postcon-viction relief after our mandate issued, she did not pursue further appellate review of her judgment and sentence. Accordingly, jurisdiction returned to the trial court to hear the rule 3.800(c) motion on May 18, 2006, the date the mandate issued from this court. Stewart had sixty days from that date to seek modification of her sentence. See Joseph v. State, 835 So.2d 1221, 1221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). The motion at issue in this appeal was filed

    ### Response:
    holding that a judgment and sentence become final when direct review proceedings are concluded and jurisdiction returns to the trial court to entertain motions for postconviction relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that reason, we now hold that neither the prosecutor, defense counsel, nor the court may make any comment about the consequences of a particular verdict at any time during a criminal trial.”); State v. Okie, 987 A.2d 495, 497-500 (Me.2010); People v. Goad, 421 Mich. 20, 364 N.W.2d 584, 589-90 (1984) (not requiring the instruction because it would be impossible to fully explain the ""consequences” of an NGRI verdict because they are contingent on future events); State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 246 N.W.2d 48, 52-53 (1976); Emanuel v. State, 412 So.2d 1187, 1190 (Miss.1982); State v. Buckman, 193 Mont. 145, 630 P.2d 743, 748 (1981); State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610, 631-32 (1989); Neely, 819 P.2d at 256-57 (due process did not require a consequence instruction) d 419, 426 (1980) (<HOLDING>); State v. McDonald, 89 Wash.2d 256, 571 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a consequence instruction was properly refused
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the ACCA and, therefore, is not subject to its fifteen-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. In light of the nearly identical language and interpretation of the residual clauses of the ACCA and the sentencing guideline, the court finds the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague. The government agreed. The court’s finding is consistent with the growing list of courts that have reached the same conclusion following Johnson. See, e.g., United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir.2015) (“The concerns about judicial inconsistency that motivated the Court in Johnson lead us to conclude that the residual clause of the Guidelines is also unconstitutionally vague.”); United States v. Darden, 605 Fed.Appx. 545, 546 (6th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Cornejo-Lopez, 2015 WL 7274060, at *7 (“Just

    ### Response:
    holding a defendant could not receive an enhanced sentenced under the residual clause of  4b12a2 following johnson
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reference to the content of the regulated speech,” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (citations omitted), or serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression, it is deemed neutral, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3070, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984), even if it has an incidental effect on a particular category of speech. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 48, 106 S.Ct. at 929. The content-neutrality requirement can be met if the challenged ordinance seeks to control secondary effects related to protected expression. This conclusion emanates from the controlling holding of Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. at 584, 111 S.Ct. at 2469 (Souter, J. concurring in judgement) (<HOLDING>). See Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron,

    ### Response:
    recognizing secondary effects as sufficient basis for governmental regulation of sexually oriented businesses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a general interpretive aid to the visual record. It also provides a physical exempler of the suspect’s manner of speech at the time of arrest. A jury may use the quality of the suspect’s speech as evidence of his degree of intoxication. Ability to enunciate words clearly can be highly probative of loss of “normal use of mental or physical faculties,” which the State must prove under Art. 67011-1(a)(2)(A), V.T.C.S. Similarly, a test of ability to read aloud can be probative in the case of a literate suspect. As long as the suspect’s statements are not used for their truth but as circumstantial evidence from which the jury may infer the degree of intoxication, the attending officers could testify about the statements anyway. Miffleton v. State, 777 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (<HOLDING>) If testimony about the statements would be

    ### Response:
    holding that visual depictions of a suspects appearance soon after arrest are admissible because officers could testify to the facts depicted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    captioned case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Defendants’ brief is silent on the issue of jurisdiction. At oral argument, the parties agreed Count II is a state claim over which the district court had supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), because Counts I and II “form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” We agree. A plaintiff may not bring a state claim under the aegis of § 1983, so if Count II states a plausible claim, our jurisdiction is predicated on § 1367(a), not § 1331. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing a cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 290 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under  1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Reply at 4 (internal citation omitted). (EOF No. 79.) In contrast, Plaintiff cites to Dellaripa, which states that Van Beeck’s holding logically extends to survival actions. The Court agrees with the reasoning in Dellaripa, and this Court does not construe Dooley to supersede Dellaripa. First, the Court notes that the categories of beneficiaries established in sections 51 and 59 are identical. Accordingly, this Court would be in direct conflict with Van Beeck if it determined that the estate of a statutory beneficiary qualified as a “new” class of beneficiary. Second, other courts have reached similar conclusions about the sur-vivorship of claims where the named beneficiary dies during the pendency of the action. See, e.g., White v. United States, 543 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Finally, it would be an especially absurd and

    ### Response:
    holding that even though estates are not among the beneficiaries enumerated in the public safety officers benefits act the estate of a claimant who died before her claim had been processed could collect the statutory benefit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in which police obtained a statement from the defendant in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights that led to the discovery of the body of his murder victim. 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). The Court reversed a grant of habeas to the defendant based on the use of evidence regarding the body at trial, finding that the exclusionary rule should not bar admission of evidence related to the body. Id. at 449-50, 104 S.Ct. 2501. The Court held that the “inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule applied because a search party, conducted entirely independently of the police interrogation of the defendant, was in the area of the body and would have discovered it even without the defendant’s statement. Id. See also Murray, 487 U.S. at 542, 108 S.Ct. 2529 (<HOLDING>). This court has articulated that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the related independent source rule could potentially apply on remand despite illegal police entry into a warehouse containing marijuana where police had legitimately gained probable cause prior to entry and separately obtained a warrant for entry if the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    held that “a Rule 19 objection can even be noticed on appeal by a reviewing court sua sponte.” Pickle v. Int’l Oilfield Divers, Inc., 791 F.2d 1237, 1242 (5th Cir.1986) (citing Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 88 S.Ct. 733, 19 L.Ed.2d 936 (1968)); Kimball v. Florida Bar, 537 F.2d 1305, 1307 (5th Cir.1976); see 7 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1609 (3d ed. 2001); see also GTE Sylvania v. Consumer Product Safety, 598 F.2d 790, 798-99 (3d Cir.1979) (recognizing the power of the court to raise the issue sua sponte but declining to do so where “[the parties] could have intervened in the ... litigation without significant burden.”) (emphasis added). But see Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 495 F.2d 1095, 1096 n. 3 (3d Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). Further, “a court of appeals should, on its

    ### Response:
    holding that a court of appeals may only do so when an appeal has been raised by an existing party to the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Juvenile Procedure were designed so that issues involving children may be quickly addressed and not encumbered by the rules of more formal proceedings. See Tenn. R. Juv. P. 1(c) (2003). These Rules of Juvenile Procedure do not, however, address intervention. 7 . Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 1 provides in pertinent part: Subject to such exceptions as stated in them, these rules shall govern the procedure in the circuit and chancery courts of Tennessee and in other courts while exercising jurisdiction of the circuit or chancery courts, in all civil actions, whether at law or in equity, including civil actions appealed or otherwise transferred to those courts. 8 . See Skerrett v. Ass’n for Guidance, No. M2002-00218-COA-R3-JV, 2003 WL 21634412, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. July 11, 2003) (<HOLDING>). 9 . When a child is removed from the home,

    ### Response:
    holding that tennessee rule of civil procedure 24 is not applicable to proceedings in juvenile court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that every other Texas appellate decision concerning this issue, with the exception of the court of appeals’ opinion in this case, has interpreted it the same way. See Thrivent, 251 S.W.3d at 627; Stolhandske v. Stem, 14 S.W.3d 810, 813 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d at 331. The TAA directs us to construe its provisions so as to “make uniform the construction of other states’ law applicable to an arbitration”; we come closer to that mandate by holding that an interlocutory order that directs a rehearing may not be appealed. III. Precedent and statutory interpretation instruct us to treat an order vacating an award and directing a rehearing as the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial. The Court tak f Transp., 581 A.2d at 815 (<HOLDING>); Minn. Teamsters Pub. & Law Enforcement

    ### Response:
    holding that barring appeal from an order that vacates an arbitration award and directs a rehearing is consistent with the policy of barring an immediate appeal from the granting of a new trial in a civil case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stated above, the intervention is for the limited purpose of objecting to Judge Boyle’s decision. If the motions were denied, the Court would still have to address Liggett’s objections. Further, in an effort to avoid delaying these proceedings the putative intervenors have already filed their objections, the consideration of which are contingent upon the Court’s decision with respect to these motions. Accordingly, the Court finds that the only possible prejudice the plaintiffs might face is the added expense of answering the extra objections, a condition the Court finds an insufficient basis to deny the Rule 24 motions. (ii) Disposition of an interest which the intervenors would otherwise be unable to protect For the sake of brevity, the Court will address together both (3d Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>) (collecting cases). As the D.C. Circuit stated

    ### Response:
    recognizing intervention to assert both the attorneyclient and work product privileges
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plain language of the statute, which refers to persons “born ... of parents both of whom are citizens of the United States” and pertains only to the acquisition of citizenship “at birth.” See Marquez-Marquez v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 548, 556-57 (5th Cir.2006) (rejecting the same argument based upon a plain reading of the statute). Accordingly, we reject Colaian-ni’s contention that he acquired citizenship pursuant to former § 301(a)(3) as a result of his adoption. III. Equal Protection: Former INA §§ 320-322 We review Colaianni’s equal protection claim under a rational basis standard. See 140 L.Ed.2d 575 (1998) (“Congress obviously has a powerful interest in fostering ties with the child’s citizen parent and the United States during his or her formative years.”); Smart, 401 F.3d at 122 (<HOLDING>). For much the same reasons, the requirement of

    ### Response:
    recognizing that congress has a legitimate interest in ensuring that a child who becomes an american citizen has a real relationship with a family unit and with the united states
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1294 (D.C.Cir.1996) (agency’s “choice of a sanction” will be upheld “unless the sanction is either ‘unwarranted in law or ... without justification in fact.’ ” (quoting Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185—86, 93 S.Ct. 1455, 36 L.Ed.2d 142 (1973) (ellipsis in original and internal quotation marks omitted))). DEA offered no explanation for its decision to revoke Dr. Morall’s registration while declining to revoke the registration of any other physician in a comparable context, or even under significantly more troubling circumstances. The decision to revoke Dr. Morall’s registration, therefore, constitutes such arbitrary decisionmaking that it cannot withstand the most deferential of judicial review. See Gulf Power Co. v. FERC, 983 F.2d 1095, 1098-1100 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, an agency’s need to explain contrary

    ### Response:
    holding that the sanction the agency imposed was not rationally arrived at on this record and was wholly disproportionate to the error petitioner committed where inter alia the agency did not explain why it had not taken the same position  in similar circumstances in the past
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    upheld because it was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 1. ERISA Exhaustion Requirements Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Smith has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies will be denied because, in fact, Smith has exhausted his administrative remedies. “[C]ourts require exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to hearing an action for a denial of ERISA benefits.” Harrow v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 279 F.3d 244, 252 (3d Cir.2002). A plain-' tiff can satisfy the exhaustion requirement either by completing the appeal process under the benefit plan or by showing that the claim was “deemed denied” after the plan administrator failed to address the claim within the time frame provided by the plan. See Gritzer v. CBS, Inc., 275 F.3d 291 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The Policy provides that the insurer must

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies when his claim is deemed denied because of failure of administrator to respond in a timely manner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of that information to investors and media did not independently violate the NDA. 56 . NDA ¶ 2 (""Each party agrees that ... the disclosing party’s Evaluation Material will be kept confidential and each party and its Representatives will not disclose ... any of the other party’s Evaluation Material in any manner whatsoever....”). 57 . Italics added. 58 .Alta Berkeley VI C.V. v. Omneon, Inc., 41 A.3d 381, 385-86 (Del.2012) (citing Elliott Assoc., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 854 (Del. 1998)); GMG Capital Investments, LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 779 (Del.2012) (citing E.I. du Pont de Nem-ours and Co., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del.1985)). 59 .Italics added. 60 .Italics added. 61 . SI Mgmt. L.P. v. Wininger, 707 A.2d 37, 40 (Del. 1998) (<HOLDING>). 62 . Italics added. 63 . JDÁ ¶ 10. 64 .Cirrus

    ### Response:
    holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fair opportunity to defend while witnesses are available and the evidence is fresh in their minds. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188,199 (Tex.2003); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex.1988). Statutes of limitations also prevent fraudulent and stale claims from surprising the other party. See Pool, 124 S.W.3d at 199; Hallaway v. Thompson, 148 Tex. 471, 478, 226 S.W.2d 816, 820 (1950). However, allowing a “John Doe” petition to toll limitations would expand the period for filing claims indefinitely, discourage prompt investigation and resolution of claims, and potentially deny defendants otherwise available defenses. See Moore v. Michelin Tire Co., 603 N.W.2d 513, 523 (S.D.1999); see also Grobe v. McBryde, 105 Ariz. 577, 468 P.2d 936, 939-40 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Lunn v. American Maint. Corp., 96 Nev. 787,

    ### Response:
    recognizing potential abuse inherent in permitting the use of fictitious names to toll limitations indefinitely while the plaintiff perfects his case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judgment on the property interest claim. To the extent the defendants seek dismissal of the liberty interest claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the motion will be denied. 3.Interrogations Stultz also claims that Holcomb, Connaughton, Esposito, Thorpe, Hill, Penny, and Howard denied him due process by interrogating him on three separate occasions without advising him that he was under investigation or being considered for disciplinary action. Upon review of the amended complaint, the court concludes that Stultz has not sufficiently alleged that the interrogations deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. See Wootten v. Commonwealth, No. 6:14-CV-00013, 2016 WL 1345276, at *14 n. 8, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35949, at *43 n. 8 (W.D.Va. Mar. 23, 2015) (Moon, J.) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court will dismiss this

    ### Response:
    holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in order to ensure constitutional compliance. Rule 11 provides: “A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo con-tendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.” See Moniz, 938 A.2d at 695 (<HOLDING>); State v. Frazar, 822 A.2d 981, 935

    ### Response:
    recognizing superior court must conduct an  on the record examination to determine defendants voluntariness and knowledge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rather than automatically assumed is also consistent with federal regulations requiring a transferee to take affirmative steps to assume mortgage debt. According to 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(c), the Act's limitations on the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses do “not prohibit a lender from requiring, as a condition to an assumption, continued maintenance of mortgage insurance by the existing borrower’s successor in interest, whether by endorsement of the existing policy or by entrance into a new contract of insurance.” Id. (emphasis added). 4 . Several other state appellate courts have also permitted the trier of fact to consider extrinsic evidence in circumstances similar to those surrounding the August 2010 Agreement. See Gonzales v. Gauna, 28 N.M. 55, 206 P. 511, 513 (N.Mex.1922) (<HOLDING>); Schuster v. Snawder, 101 S.W. 1194 (Ky.1907)

    ### Response:
    holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As such, they are deemed to have abandoned this claim on appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9); Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.1987) (stating that this court will not raise and discuss legal issues that an appellant has failed to assert). In any event, Plaintiffs’ argument is without merit. It is well-settled that parole is “part of the penalty for the initial offense,” Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000), and that “once the original sentence has been imposed in a criminal case, further proceedings with respect to that sentence [have not been] subject to Sixth Amendment protections.” United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 491 (1st Cir.2005); United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114, 119 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). V. Plaintiffs also assert a number of due

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant is not entitled to a jury trial to determine whether terms of supervised release have been violated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the scope of the conflict). However, this issue may be relevant to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which we do not reach. 2 . Section 90.403 provides in relevant part: ""Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 3 . Czubak, 570 So.2d at 929 (concluding that the photographs of the victim’s body had little or no relevance because they could not establish identity, were not probative as to the cause of death, and bore little relevance to the circumstances surrounding the murder, and that any relevance was outweighed by the shocking and inflammatory nature of the photographs); Williams, 834 So.2d at 926 (<HOLDING>); Kirby, 625 So.2d at 53-54 (holding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that because the photograph of the victim was for identification purposes only and the victims military service was never discussed at trial even if the photograph did evoke sympathy from the jury it was not reversible error to admit it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim, which he purports to have raised in a second pending motion to reopen before the BIA. Indeed, the BIA may consider Zhu’s motion without this case being remanded, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), and should the BIA deny his second motion to reopen, Zhu may file a petition for review of that decision, see Durant v. INS, 393 F.3d 113, 115 (2d Cir.2004) (recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders separate from final orders of removal and that such orders require separate petitions for review). Moreover, we will not exercise any inherent authority we may possess to remand this case with instructions for the BIA to consider Zhu’s evidence of the ineffective assistance of his prior counsel. See Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 262 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In the alternative, Zhu requests that this

    ### Response:
    holding that the court will not remand if i the basis for the remand is an instruction to consider documentary evidence that was not in the record before the bia and ii the agency regulations set forth procedures to reopen a case before the bia for the taking of additional evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a[AAA] rule to a[AAA] arbitrator, that particular issue of procedure was left for the arbitrator to decide.” Opinion at 1121 (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 86,123 S.Ct. 588). Here, neither party disputes the existence nor validity of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, I concur in the majority’s decision to compel arbitration. However, I would remand all other issues to the arbitrator, including the issues of whether the arbitration provision was waived or breached, and therefore dissent to the extent the court holds otherwise. See Howsam, 537 U.S. a 43, 46 (1st Cir.2005) (considering question of waiver after the ""AAA dismissed the Tyco demand for arbitration ... for lack of written consent”); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Webster Auto Parts Inc., 128 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that a party waives its right to arbitration when it engages in protracted litigation that prejudices the opposing party emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conviction. Plaintiffs claim that the excluded evidence would have called the credibility of several of Apollo’s witnesses into question. This Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Townsend, 31 F.3d at 267. Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) states: Specific instances of the conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided by rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. By its language, Rule 608(b) clearly prevents the Plaintiffs from presenting evidence of specific instances of untruthful conduct by certain Apollo witness to show that these witnesses had a propensity for untruthfulness. 28 ChaRles Alan Weight & VictoR James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6117 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Fed.R.Evid. 403 allows the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that under the proper application of rule 608b extrinsic evidence of specific instances of bad conduct is made inadmissible when offered to prove a witnesss character for untruthfulness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    most like a prison, Judge Gleeson applied the Covino/Tumer standard. See id. This was correct. The Plaintiff was confined for an extended period of time in a prison-like environment, and it appears that he was charged with felonies, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1028. In the environment where the Plaintiff was held, the lesser reasonable suspicion standard would jeopardize prison officials’ ability to maintain security. As Judge Gleeson recognized, even if the precise standard governing intrusive searches of the Plaintiff at the MDC might not have been clearly established in 2001, it was clearly established that even the standard most favorable to prison officials required that strip and body-cavity searches be rationally related to legitimate government purposes. Cf. Hodges, 712 F.2d at 35 (<HOLDING>). The complaint alleges that the Plaintiff was

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff stated a fourth amendment claim where consecutive bodycavity searches were unnecessary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“This Court is of the view that, with the exception of extreme cases where transfer or release might be a necessary remedy, most challenges to the constitutional adequacy of medical care should proceed as civil rights claims.... ”). The First Circuit’s ruling in Brennan v. Cunningham, that a prisoner’s claim for reinstatement in a halfway house/work release program could proceed as a habeas petition, supports this position. 813 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1987). Therefore, Fox’s claim that his misclassification resulted in denial of transfer to a halfway house is more appropriately construed as a habeas petition. See Kane, 319 F.Supp.2d at 215 (treating an improperly filed habeas petition as if it were filed as a civil rights claim); see also Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 305 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 918, 117

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may construe a section 1983 complaint as a habeas petition and vice versa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    509 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1989). There is no question that the proceedings before the ISP Resentencing Panel implicate important state interests. However, there is a real question over whether there is an adequate opportunity, even if the proceedings can be considered judicial in nature, for the Plaintiff to raise constitutional challenges. This is because there is no opportunity for the Plaintiff to appeal the decisions of the ISP Panel to any New Jersey court and present his constitutional arguments to such a court. Without an opportunity to appeal to a true New Jersey state court it is likely that the Plaintiff will not be afforded an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional challenges. See Amanatullah v. Colorado Bd. of Medical Examiners, 187 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 973 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that there was adequate opportunity when state court judicial review of an administrative proceeding was available
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Interpreting all of the sections together, section 6323(b)(6)(A) provides that the federal lien is subordinated to the County’s lien; it does not render the federal lien invalid as to the property itself or any other party. See, e.g., In re Tabone, Inc., 175 B.R. 855, 859 n. 8 (Bankr.D.N.J.1994) (noting that section 6323(b)(6)(A) provides that the township’s tax liens hold priority status over the federal lien); Hinkley & Donovan, 424 F.Supp. at 1019; Amos, 287 F.Supp. at 890-91. Thus, the federal lien remained valid and survived the County’s tax sale. Because the IRS was not given notice of the County’s tax sale after the IRS had filed notice of its lien on the property, the lien attached to the property and Fox purchased the property subject to the lien. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7425(b)(1) (<HOLDING>). While the County argues that interpreting the

    ### Response:
    holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fails v. Jefferson Davis Cnty. Pub. Sch. Bd., 95 So.3d 1223, 1225 (¶ 10) (Miss.2012) (quoting Gartrell v. Gartrell, 936 So.2d 915, 916 (¶ 8) (Miss.2006)). By the time Ducks-worth filed his PCR motion, the Parole Board had acknowledged Ducksworth’s parole eligibility of August 2008, had given him a hearing in October 2009, and had denied him parole. So the circuit court’s consideration of Ducksworth’s claim that his parole-eligibility date was actually August 2008 would be of no practical benefit to Ducksworth. Had he brought the matter to the circuit court’s attention before August 2008, the circuit court could have ordered the MDOC to recalculate Ducks-worth’s parole-eligibility date. But by 2011, any controversy regarding Ducks-worth’s parole-eligibility no longer existed. See id. (<HOLDING>). ¶ 18. Because Ducksworth’s claim is moot, we

    ### Response:
    holding appellate courts have no authority to review actual controversies that have expired
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    joined the conspiracy.” Id. at 194 (citations omitted.) Even Witkin, however, notes that a defendant is not liable for the substantive offenses committed by his coconspirators prior to his joining the conspiracy. See Witkin & Epstein § 96. 18 . Appellants' multiple conspiracies arguments are focused on counts three and four. They also claim, however, that the evidence underlying their convictions on count two was simply a conglomeration of the evidence presented on counts three and four. This argument is flatly contradicted by the prosecution’s case, which involved evidence of numerous predicate conspiracies and overt acts ibel approach has been applied by at least one other Ninth Circuit panel, in another case involving the Mexican Mafia. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 985-86 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 20 . Schoenberg’s challenge to count three is

    ### Response:
    holding that jury instruction improperly defined element of rico conspiracy charge by not using language consistent with the operation or management test but concluding that the error was harmless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    individual may have a possible immigration or criminal violation in the United States. In this instance, two lookouts were placed on the name Sandy Garcia, the first being a one-day lookout based on the perceived irregularity of a Dominican citizen traveling from Buenos Aires to Dulles, as reflected in defendant’s flight itinerary. The second, more general lookout was based on the fact that a previous immigration violation included in the government's records suggested that possible imposters were using the name Sandy Garcia and his corresponding birth date and A number. 3 . This last statement obviously aroused Officer Ho’s suspicion, as it was inconsistent with defendant’s contemporaneous statement that he had been outside the United States for the past two mon 1287 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). 6 . To be sure, the unlawful reentry statute

    ### Response:
    recognizing that any party who voluntarily approaches an ins station cannot be said to have been found or discovered in the united states
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Article XVI mandates that all waivers must be in the form of a resolution, which shall be duly adopted by Defendant’s board of directors. Section D continues: The resolution shall identify the party or parties for whose benefit the waiver is granted, the transaction or transactions and the claims or classes of claim for which the waiver is granted, the property of the Corporation which may be subject to execution to satisfy any judgment which may be entered in the claim, and shall identify the court or courts in which suit against the Corporation may be brought. Any waiver shall be limited to claims arising from the acts or omissions of the Corporation, its Directors, officers, employees or agents, and shall be const ian Cmty., 138 Ariz. 378, 674 P.2d 1376, 1383 (Ariz.Ct. App.1983) (<HOLDING>); Martinez v. S. Ute Tribe, 150 Colo. 504, 374

    ### Response:
    holding that tribal corporation waived immunity due to express provision within its charter allowing it to be sued in courts of competent jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2 . Case No. 16-20042, Docket No, 32, Motion to Avoid Judicial Lien Impairing Homestead Exemption. All future references to the Docket will be to Case No. 16-20042, unless expressly stated otherwise. 3 .Any of the findings of fact herein are also deemed to be conclusions of law, and any conclusions of law herein are also deemed to be findings of fact, and they shall be equally binding as both, 4 . Docket No. 1, Chapter 13 Voluntary Petition. 5 . Docket No. 38, Order Confirming Debtors’ Chapter 13 Plan. 6 . Docket No. 2, Debtors’ Chapter 13 Plan at ¶ 6(g). 7 . Cyprus filed an unsecured proof of claim in the amount of $15,698.45 on March 29, 2016. See Case No. 16-20042, Proof of Claim No. 9-1. 8 . See Tower Loan of Miss., Inc. v. Maddox (Matter of Maddox), 15 F.3d 1347 (5th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). 9 .See Andrews v. Loheit (In re Andrews), 49

    ### Response:
    holding that the chapter 13 trustee had standing to avoid liens as impairing exemptions to prevent inequitable distribution of payments caused by debtors failure to avoid lien as impairing exemption
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The majority opinion also states without explanation that it would not have been “practical or possible” for the District to establish contacts with Mr. Allen as one of the “nearly two dozen” or “over two dozen” test takers that day. But nothing about the fact that Mr. Allen was one of the select few the District screened and scheduled to take its PAT on that day made it less foreseeable that he might get hurt or fall ill during the PAT or converts the District’s duty to care for all of the test takers into a public duty. At least in earlier cases, we have recognized that a duty of care can flow to a “class” of persons. See Turner, 532 A.2d 662 (explaining that a statutorily mandated special duty is owed to every adjudicated neglected child in the District); cf. Hines, 580 A.2d at 138 (<HOLDING>). Our apparent movement away from that

    ### Response:
    holding that liability foreclosed because there exists no class in the sense that would justify invoking the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his monthly child support obligation. We note, however, that Mother cross-petitioned and received a judgment against Father for child support arrearages. The family court did not make a specific finding of which party prevailed and such a determination is not necessary to resolve the issue here. Even assuming Father was the “prevailing party” on his petition to reduce child support, we nonetheless reject his position that AR.S. § 25-503(E) prevents the family court from awarding fees to the non-prevailing party. ¶ 8 The use of the word “may” in A.R.S. § 25-503(E) provides the family court broad discretion to decide whether to award attorney fees to the prevailing party on a request to modify child support. See Alejandro v. Harrison, 223 Ariz. 21, 24, ¶ 10, 219 P.3d 231, 234 (App.2009) (<HOLDING>). And, contrary to Father’s argument, the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a statutes use of may when describing the courts authority generally connotes discre tion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which the members of the Ford Court stated the constitutional prohibition on the execution of the insane. The plurality recognized society’s abhorrence of inflicting the death penalty on one whose mental illness prevents him from “comprehending” the “implications” of his punishment., Ford, 477 U.S. at 417, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (plurality opinion). There can be no doubt that the first and foremost “implication” of execution — and, in my view, the only one relevant to competency to be executed — is the prisoner’s death. Justice Powell, in concurrence, stated the constitutional rule as follows: If the defendant perceives the connection between his crime and his punishment, the retributive goal of the criminal law is satisfied. And only if the defendant is aware that his death is approaching c ) (<HOLDING>); Grammer v. Fenton (In re Grammer), 104

    ### Response:
    holding that to be competent under ford a prisoner must have a rational understanding of what it means to be executed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have applied the burden-of-proof rules used to enforce the presumption favoring arbitration to contractual jury waivers. See In re Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A., 115 S.W.3d 600, 609-10 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (applying presumption of validity to contractual jury waiver — i.e., presuming that jury waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made — based on statement in jury waiver provision itself that waiver was “knowing and voluntary”). The standards governing the enforceability of arbitration clauses are inapplicable to prelitigation contractual jury waiver provisions for several reasons. First, public policy favors arbitration, while the same cannot be said of the waiver of constitutional rights. Compare In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>) with RDO Fin. Servs. Co., 191 F. Supp.2d at

    ### Response:
    recognizingpublic policy favors arbitration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its face’ ” with respect to his retaliation claims. In re Katrina Canal, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1974); see Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164-66 (5th Cir. 1995). For similar reasons, these claims do not lack “an arguable basis in law or fact.” Berry, 192 F.3d at 507. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment in part and remand for further consideration of Burnette’s retaliation claims. Because Burnette’s brief on appeal does not address the district court’s denial of his motions for a temporary restraining order, for appointment of counsel below, for an evidentiary hearing, or for leave to amend his complaint a second time, any objections to the denial of these motions are deemed abandoned. See Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. City of Kotzebue, 627 P.2d 623, 630 n. 10 (Alaska 1981) (citing § 302B to reject a jury instruction that ""[eJvery person who, himself, is exercising ordinary care, has a right to assume that every other person will perform his duty and obey the law""). 15 . Restatement (SEconp) or Torts § 302B emt. d. 16 . Restatement (SEconp) or Torts § 302B emt. e. 17 . Id. These examples have been paraphrased. Comment e would also hold an actor liable for the crimes of a third party if the actor has a special relationship with the victim, and the Restatement gives additional examples of such relationships. But as we have discussed above, no such special relationship was present here. 18 . Restatement (SEconp) or Torts § 302B cmt. eH. 19 . See, eg., Fiala v. Rains, 519 N.W.2d 386, 389 (Iowa 1994) (<HOLDING>); Taylor v. Louis, 349 S.W.3d 729, 737

    ### Response:
    holding that it was not foreseeable that an abusive boyfriend would be waiting to attack another man that his girlfriend brought home one night
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for $10,000. See V.R.C.P. 56(e) (“When a motion for summary is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”). ¶ 30. While we may not make negative inferences from a person’s decision to plead the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, “the Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be invoked as a shield to oppose depositions while discarding it for the limited purpose of making statements to support a summary judgment motion.” Edmond v. Consumer Prot. Div., 934 F.2d 1304, 1308 (4th Cir. 1991); cf. United States v. Sixty Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency, 763 F. Supp. 909, 914 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (<HOLDING>). Confronted with evidence indicating that he

    ### Response:
    holding that because claimant had asserted fifth amendment during discovery he may not submit affidavits in opposition to governments motion for summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on Davies’ credibility and the weight to be given his trial testimony by the trial court. As this court very recently noted: [I]n order to controvert the Director’s case for revocation for a refusal, pursuant to § 577.041, requiring us to defer to the trial court with respect to its conclusions and its resolution of factual issues, including credibility determinations, the driver need only present evidence that is inconsistent with a reasonable belief of the arresting officer that the driver was DWI. There does not have to be evi dence controverting each and every indi-cia of intoxication on which the Director has introduced evidence in support of a finding of probable cause. Flaiz, 182 S.W.3d at 251. See also Howdeshell v. Dir. of Revenue, 184 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Mo.App. S.D.2006) (<HOLDING>). The Director argues that the situation here

    ### Response:
    holding that a legitimate factual dispute or credibility determination is presented by the crossexamination of a witness for the director which raises a legitimate credibility dilemma with respect to a material aspect of the directors case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985)). For example, a state court injunction available before the deprivation “of any significant property interest” constitutes an adequate pre-deprivation remedy. See id. at 36-37, 110 S.Ct. 2238 (“[t]he State may choose to provide a form of ‘predeprivation process,’ for example, by authorizing taxpayers to bring suit to- enjoin imposition of a tax prior to its payment”); see also Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 587, 115 S.Ct. 2351, 132 L.Ed.2d 509 (1995) (explaining McKesson); Harper v. Va. Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 101-02, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (applying McKesson to Virginia’s tax laws); Rex Realty Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 322 F.3d 526, 529 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552,

    ### Response:
    holding that notice of condemnation and availability of a state court injunction writ of mandamus and writ of certiorari in an eminent domain case satisfied due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301 defines “serious bodily injury” as “[bjodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” ¶ 15 In the case sub judice, Appellant punched Reverend Taylor, who was elderly, in the head and choked him. While fending off the attack, Reverend Taylor blocked his head with his arm and suffered torn ligaments to his right shoulder, for which surgery has been recommended. This was sufficient to demonstrate Appellant recklessly engaged in conduct which placed Reverend Taylor in danger of death or serious bodily injury. See Commonwealth v. Sanders, 339 Pa.Super. 373, 489 A.2d 207 (1985) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 16 Regarding Appellant’s conviction for

    ### Response:
    holding evidence sufficient for recklessly endangering another person where the appellant grabbed the victim around the neck and pulled her into a room
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    residents for the proposition that the public believed the proposed tower would be an eyesore and would diminish property values. The only written evidence pertaining to the survey is a brief description of how it was carried out and copies of numerous responses. The survey is of no value and the Court will disregard it. The Court has no basis upon which to judge the survey The Court does not know how the respondents were selected or how they were questioned. Furthermore, nothing in the record suggests that the survey has any statistical or scientific merit. The Court cannot say that the survey amounts to anything more than evidence of generalized and unfounded opposition to the proposed cell site. See BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 944 F.Supp. 923, 928 (N.D.Ga.1996) (<HOLDING>). Generalized, nonexpert objections to the

    ### Response:
    holding that an objectors generalized concerns do not constitute substantial evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    record, as counsel for the INS acknowledged at oral argument. Such misrepresentations of the record are poor advocacy and waste both the court’s and other litigants’ time. We expect better from counsel, including government counsel. Cf. Thomas v. Digital Equip. Corp., 880 F.2d 1486, 1490-91 (1st Cir.1989) (sanctioning a party that made material misrepresentations of the record in its appellate brief). In any event, Neverson’s § 2241 claims provide no basis for vacating his deporta tion order. First, Neverson has withdrawn his argument that the INS’s use of his manslaughter conviction as a ground for deportation represents an unauthorized retroactive application of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). See Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Second, to the extent Neverson’s § 2241

    ### Response:
    holding that an ij or bia decision that occurs after september 30 1996 is an action taken that triggers iiriras aggravated felony rules
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is not vague or over-broad. United States v. Kelly, 314 F.3d 908, 912-13 (7th Cir.2003) (interpreting the holding in Ashcroft to only apply to virtual pornography); United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233, 1254 n. 31 (11th Cir.2002) (same); see also Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781, 790 (Del.2003) (same); Perry v. Commonwealth, 438 Mass. 282, 780 N.E.2d 53, 56 n. 4 (2002) (stating that Ashcroft was not at issue because materials depicted actual children). Further, because pornography produced with real children is not a category of speech protected by the First Amendment, the statute’s prohibition of these materials does not violate the First Amendment. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 246, 122 S.Ct. at 1399; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3358, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Savery v. State, 819 S.W.2d 837, 838

    ### Response:
    holding that pornography depicting actual children can be prescribed whether or not the images are obscene because of the states interest in protecting the children exploited by the production process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which concerns “a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable conduct.” Shepard, 983 P.2d at 4. We therefore cannot agree with Shell’s claim of overbreadth. C. We also are unpersuaded by Shell’s assertion that the court lacks jurisdicti 0 N.E.2d 753, 756 (Ind.1986) (same). In keeping with these decisions and our mandate to regulate the practice of law in Colorado, we construe our ban on the unauthorized practice of law to include the practice of law in Colorado federal courts. It is certainly true that the Colorado federal courts can allow individuals to engage in legal practice in federal courts who would not otherwise be allowed to practice law in Colorado state courts. See Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made clear in

    ### Response:
    holding that under the supremacy clause a state court could not enforce a prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law against an individual who was permitted to practice law under the rules of a federal court located in the states jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that, because Mr. Grant refused to allow a search of his house, he knew that he could refuse consent for a search of his property. Of course, the deputies had already searched the property, thus demonstrating to Mr. Grant that they had an absolute right to search and that his “consent” to any further search was a mere formality which he could not refuse. See Gonzalez v. State, 578 So.2d 729, 733-34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Under the circumstances before us, Mr. Grant could only conclude that refusing consent would be “a futile gesture amounting to no more than ‘closing the barn door after the horse is out.’ ” United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 570 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gamez, 389 F.Supp.2d 975, 982 (S.D.Ohio 2005); see also Norman v. State, 379 So.2d 643, 648 (Fla.1980) (<HOLDING>). Norman amply supports Mr. Grant’s position.

    ### Response:
    holding consent knowing sheriff had already seen marijuana in prior illegal search was acquiescence to authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when asked whether the Plaintiff had a “severe impairment” during the relevant period, and did not bother to list the evidence he reviewed that supported his assessment. (AR at 299.) Significantly, there is no mention whatsoever of fibro-myalgia, an impairment ALJ Cohen found was present in this case. (AR at 13, 307.) The general rule regarding the written reports of medical advisors who have not personally examined a claimant is that such reports deserve little weight in the overall evaluation of disability. Vargas v. Sullivan, 898 F.2d 293, 295-96 (2d Cir.1990). This is because the advisers’ assessment of what other doctors find is hardly a basis for competent evaluation without a personal examination of the claimant. Id.; see also Hidalgo v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Havas v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 783, 786 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the testimony of a nonexamining medical advisor does not constitute evidence sufficient to override the treating physicians diagnosis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mobile home because the comprehensive terms provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-72(b) had not been met might be germane to our analysis if tort law or liability insurance coverage were implicated. But see N. C. National Bank v. Robinson, 78 N.C. App. 1, 336 S.E.2d 666 (1985) (declining to apply the MVA even where the cause of action was the tort of wrongful conversion because the dispute primarily involved, “not an automobile accident case,” but, rather, security interest and entrustment issues arising out of “a business transaction in which the policies underlying the private UCC law [were] fully implicated”). The fact that the Hayes Court expressly limited its holding to these circumstances has been emphasized by our courts on several occasions. See, e.g., id. at 9, 336 S.E.2d at 671 (<HOLDING>); Roseboro Ford, Inc. v. Bass, 77 N.C. App.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the supreme court in hayes consistently limited its holding that the mva title provisions applied instead of the ucc to cases involving tort law and liability insurance coverage 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was imposing a sentence that varied from the guidelines range based on its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. It is not clear from the record whether the district court granted a six-level variance because it determined that a sentence of seventy-eight months was appropriate notwithstanding the guidelines range, or whether, instead, the district court would have granted a six level variance from the advisory guidelines range even if the guidelines range had been lower, i.e., if the position of trust enhancement had not been applied. Under these circumstances, we hold that the application of the position of trust enhancement was error, that the error was plain, and that the error affected Evans’s substantial rights. See United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 785 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). We also conclude that the error seriously

    ### Response:
    holding that an error in guideline calculation seriously affected the defendants substantial rights because the starting point for consideration of  3553a factors was five months higher than it should have been
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    270 A.2d 702 (1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902, 91 S.Ct. 1377, 28 L.Ed.2d 643 (1971); Peoples Exp. Co., Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 10 N.J. Tax 417, 433 (Tax 1989). Such statutory deadlines may not be relaxed. F.M.C. Stores, supra, 100 N.J. at 424-25, 495 A.2d 1313; Black Whale Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 15 N.J.Tax 338, 347 (Tax 1995). “Statutes of limitation in tax statutes are strictly construed in order to provide finality and predictability of revenue to state and local government.” Bonanno v. Director, Div. Taxation, 12 N.J. Tax 552, 556 (Tax 1992). See also, F.M.C. Stores Co., supra, 100 N.J. at 424-25, 495 A.2d 1313. Cf. Commercial Refrigeration and Fixture Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 184 N.J.Super. 387, 2 N.J. Tax 415, 419, 446 A.2d 210 (Tax 1981) (<HOLDING>). As explained in Franklin Tp. v. Dep’t of

    ### Response:
    holding that after the then twoyear limitation period for the filing of a refund application had passed the state was entitled to assume that its tax revenues need not be refunded under any circumstance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.” Id. at 578, 92 S.Ct. 2701. Plaintiff argues that a general or dishonorable discharge reflecting lack of fitness for military service triggers such a stigma. The government argues no such stigma has yet occurred. The parties dispute what form of discharge is likely in the case of Major Witt. The government argues that an honorable discharge is most likely. The Court’s own research suggests that 82% of all discharges under DADT have been honorable. Certainly, the distinction of Major Witt’s career would support an honorable discharge. Involuntary separation from military service with an honorable discharge, absent something more, does not infringe upon a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Sims, 505 F.2d at 862-63 (<HOLDING>); benShalom, 489 F.Supp. at 971-972; Diliberti

    ### Response:
    holding that liberty interests are involved only when separation from the military is carried out in such a fashion as to stigmatize the separated member typically this would be a dishonorable discharge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not warrant dismissal of this claim. Sean McGuigan and Ronald Mancuso clearly would have reason to admit to less than what was actually stolen and that the criminal enterprise terminated sooner than it actually did. His assertion that the thefts continued through only September of 2004 would limit his own liability for his participation in the enterprise and would potentially lead to a shorter term of incarceration. Such admissions clearly are not binding on Plaintiff in this civil action. Further, the Court finds that these documents are not properly considered at the motion to dismiss stage because Plaintiff only makes reference to these events in two isolated instances in the complaint, in what is a clear attempt to lay a foundation for when it 232 F.Supp.2d 273, 276 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>); Madu, Edozie & Madu, P.C. v. SocketWorks Ltd.

    ### Response:
    holding that an extraneous document was not incorporated by a brief reference to it in one paragraph of the complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a perfect example of what the Supreme Court meant in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), when it said that a capital defendant has the right to present at the sentencing phase all evidence about the “circumstances of the offense.” The circumstances of the murder in this case are key. Of course, it is true that Howard did not have to be the “triggerman” to be eligible for the death penalty. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). Eligibility, however, does not mean that capital punishment must be imposed. A jury can sentence a person to death in accordance with the Eighth Amendment only after it considers all of the. mitigating evidence the defendant wishes to present. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608, 98 S.Ct. at 2966-67 (<HOLDING>); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants relatively minor participation in the crime is a mitigating factor that sentencer must consider
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    should not benefit from its own tardiness; it should not be allowed “to enlarge” the period for filing its objections. Further, Appellees state that the statutory framework does not permit the State “[to] manipulate the time period within which its own objections could be filed by delaying in filing the award with the court, despite the mandatory obligation of Section 21.048 of the Texas Property Code.” As stated, “The plain language of a statute is the surest guide to the Legislature’s intent.” Chatha, 381 S.W.3d at 507. Here, the plain language of the statutory provisions reveals that only one provision governs when objections to the commissioners’ award must be filed. That provision is section 21.018(a). See State v. Garland, 963 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Undeniably, section 21.048’s language,

    ### Response:
    holding that under plain statutory language starting point for computing deadline to file objections to commissioners award is actual filing date of the award irrespective of whether the state which filed award for commissioners had failed to timely file award pursuant to section 21048
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and M"" of section 40-11.5-102(4) ""shall be presumed prima facie evidence of an independent contractor relationship between the parties to the lease."" Section 40-11.5-102(4) further provides that this presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of an employment relationship between the parties to the lease ""considering only factors not in the lease."" Contrary to the position taken in the Panel's answer brief, we conclude that, under qualifying cireumstances, the presumption of an independent contractor relationship under section 40-11.5-102(4) could apply to the determination of the status of a worker as an employee or independent contractor for unemployment tax liability purposes. See Frank C. Klein & Co. v. Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth., 859 P.2d 323, 325-26 (Colo.App.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Ch. 296, see. 1, § 40-11.5-102, 1990

    ### Response:
    holding that provisions of section 40115102 are applicable to the determination of the status of truck drivers as employees or independent contractors under the workers compensation act and discussing legislative history indicating intent to apply these provisions both to workers compensation and unemployment compensation matters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    support for its conclusion that the firearm prohibition, found in § 5D1.3(d)(l), was a standard condition of a felon’s supervised release because “the specific condition that Defendant not possess a firearm is largely only a clarification of the more general mandatory condition that he not break the law.” Id. at 94. Despite Asuncion-Pimental’s reference to the illegality of a felon’s possessing a firearm, later cases have clarified that this was not the dispositive factor in the case. Instead, the Second Circuit has extended its holding to encompass all of the conditions of supervised release recommended in § 5D1.3(d), as long as the defendant meets the specific prerequisites enumerated by the Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 299 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); cf. id. at 154-55 (holding that a condition

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to articulate  orally that conditions  5d13d2 and 3 apply to a defendants sentence of supervised release does not create a conflict with the judgment imposing these conditions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as an “an unlawful act under subsection (a) of section 1311 of this title.” See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(1). In turn, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) provides that “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.” The term “the discharge of any pollutant” is defined as the “addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from a point source,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), while “navigable waters” is defined as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). Congress intended the latter term to be given “the broadest constitutional interpretation.” United States v. Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d 151, 154 (1st Cir.1987) (quoting Conference Report on Section 2770, reprinted in 1 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, at 178) (<HOLDING>). Yet, it is unclear whether or not a river

    ### Response:
    holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging his “three strikes” sentence for drug possession as cruel and unusual punishment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We affirm. Le contends his sentence under California’s “three strikes” law violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. We conclude that the California state courts did not unreasonably apply clearly established law in upholding Le’s sentence. See Ewing v. California, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1190, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (acknowledging broad discretion possessed by legislatures and holding that three-strikes sentence of 25 years to life for felony grand theft was not grossly disproportionate); Lockyer v. Andrade, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The district court therefore properly denied

    ### Response:
    holding that state courts affirmance of two consecutive 25yearstolife sentences for petty theft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prejudice. As Plaintiff has not meet the standard for injunctive relief on the presented claims, his claims for injunctive relief are dismissed without prejudice. 2. Americans with Disabilities Act Plaintiff additionally alleges Defendants Marino and Armstrong violated the ADA by failing “to make a reasonable accommodation for the Plaintiffs disability by providing him ... the benefit of access to video teleconference equipment for his May 29, 201[4] [PCR] hearing....” (Docket Entry 1 ¶ 62). The ADA does not create private causes of action against individuals, see Boggi v. Med. Review and Accrediting Council, 415 Fed.Appx. 411, 415 (3d Cir.2011) (individual defendants cannot be sued in their individual capacities under the ADA); Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), thus, Plaintiff may only bring an ADA claim

    ### Response:
    holding there was no individual liability under titles i ii or iii of the ada
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiff contends that the presence of the barges upon his land was grounds for a state claim of private nuisance. In New York, a private nuisance is defined as (1) an interference substantial in .nature, (2) intentional in .origin, (3) unreasonable in character, (4) with a person’s property right to use and enjoy land and, (5) caused by another’s conduct in acting or failure to act. See Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., of N.Y., Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169, 362 N.E.2d 968 (1977). As a matter of law, the presence of unsightly .objects, or eyesores, does not constitute substantial interference with a person’s property right (even if placed intentionally). See e.g. Dugway, Ltd. v. Fizzinoglia, 166 A.D.2d 836, 837, 563 N.Y.S.2d 175, 176-177 (3d Dep’t.1990) (<HOLDING>). Under the first and fourth prongs of this

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff could not pursue an action for private nuisance against an adjoining landowner who intentionally placed debris and an uninhabitable trailer in close proximity to main entrance to developers property in order to create an eyesore
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (11th Cir.1995); Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1498 n. 32 (11th Cir. 1991). The relevant inquiry is “fact specific,” Rodgers v. Horsley, 39 F.3d 308, 311 (11th Cir.1994), and a plaintiff must point to a controlling case, decided before the events at issue, that establishes a constitutional violation on “materially similar” facts. Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir.1994). As emphasized in Lassiter, “pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violated federal law in the circumstances.” Id.; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Absent a controlling and factually on-point

    ### Response:
    holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he or she is doing violates that right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    symbols.” Burkes, 953 F.Supp.2d at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted). But it is undisputed that racist symbol was not part of the action figure display that lies at the heart of Ms. Toomer’s racially hostile work environment claim. Ms. Toomer’s argument otherwise is that there is no “standard” that permits a court to determine “as a matter of law” when an African-American perceives a noose. PL’s Objs., ECF No. 99 at 14. Thus, she contends that whether or not the white cord in this case could fairly be described as a noose, she was confronted by “a horrific and frightening image,” and thus she was subjected to a hostile work environment. Id. But that line of reasoning ignores the objective component of the hostile work environment analysis. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). A reasonable observer of the

    ### Response:
    holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we must first determine whether the issues presented are ripe for review. The State contends that Trujillo’s arguments regarding pretrial bail lack merit and may also be moot because the record demonstrates that a trial date had been set prior to-this court reaching the merits of Trujillo’s arguments. In his reply brief, Trujillo responds that on November 30, 2015, Trujillo pled guilty to aggravated assault, second-degree domestic báttery, and third-degree domestic battery and is in- the custody of the Arkansas Department, of Correction. .However, Trujillo urges us to address ¡the issues presented because his petition . falls within an exception to the mootness doctrine as an issue of substantial public interest. Accordingly, we must determine whether Trujillo’s case is moo 1989) (<HOLDING>); Cain v. Carl-Lee, 171 Ark. 155, 283 S.W. 365

    ### Response:
    holding a substantial issue remained despite mootness as to whether conditions could  be imposed on a defendants release from state hospital when he was scheduled to stand trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ... — property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of the petition.” It is undisputed that within one year before filing this case, Debtor permitted the $70,000 from Roger Berman to be transferred to his live-in partner’s bank account (the “Wang Transfer”). Ling Wang used $60,000 of these funds to cure mortgage arrears owing on the home in which both she, the Debtor and their 12-year old daughter reside.. The remaining $10,000 has not been accounted for. Debtor admits to having lied to Roger Berman about the purpose of the loan and the ability to repay him and falsely testifying about the same. From these facts, the court readily infers Debtor’s intent to defraud his creditor, Roger Berman. Salomon v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser), 722 F.2d 1574, 1588 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). The Wang Transfer presents several badges of

    ### Response:
    holding that the transfer of property by the debtor to his spouse while insolvent while retaining use and enjoyment of the property is a classic badge of fraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478, 485, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2185, 2189, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). The Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), delineated the following elements as necessary for a state to acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: [I]n order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he [must] have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” International Shoe at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158. Recently, in Syl. Pt. 1, Hill by Hill v. Showa Denko, K.K., 188 W.Va. 654, 425 S.E.2d 609 (1992) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2338, 124 L.Ed.2d 249 (1993) (<HOLDING>), this Court repeated our standard for

    ### Response:
    holding that personal jurisdiction can be premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this date be used for determining his status on August 22, 1996, appears to be a disguised attempt to have this Court review the denial of Nodarse’s March 29, 1999 application by the Social Security Administration, which found that he was not a Cuban/Haitian entrant at that time or on August 22, 1996, because he had not been subject to deportation proceedings during that period. In order for this Court to hear an appeal of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, an action must be brought in district court “within sixty days after the mailing of notice of [a final] decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 478-479, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Thompson v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936, 940 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that although the requirement of filing a complaint within sixty days is a period of limitations and not jurisdictional it must be strictly construed as it is a condition on which the united states agreed to waive its sovereign immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unnecessarily, he maintains, because they knew that he was not among the troublemakers. He filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the corporation (rather than any of the guards), in Wisconsin, a little more than four years later. Although she assumed that Malone’s version of events is correct, the district court dismissed the complaint after screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, concluding that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. (The judge did not consider other potential problems, such as whether the corporation is a state actor amenable to suit under § 1983 given the lack of any allegation that Wisconsin directed or even influenced the events of which Malone complains, cf. Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (<HOLDING>), or how the corporation could be held

    ### Response:
    holding that privately operated prisons may not be sued under the bivens doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    444. Statements such as “ ‘we’re partners’ ” and “ ‘we look forward to growing together,’ ” when made by experienced negotiators in the course of a collective bargaining agreement negotiation, are not clear and unambiguous promises to renew the subject agreement. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates, & Pilots, 636 F.Supp. 384, 391 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (Weinfeld, J.); see also Media Sport & Arts s.r.l. v. Kinney Shoe Corp., No. 95 Civ. 3901, 1997 WL 473968, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.20,1997) (Leisure, J.) (finding defendant’s statements that “ ‘FIBA may proceed to act on the enclosed offer without limitation’ ” and “ ‘FL and FIBA are going to make a great team’ ” were not clear and unambiguous promises); Cohen v. Lehman Brothers Bank, 273 F.Supp.2d 524, 529-30 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, a situation where

    ### Response:
    holding defendants statement that  she would work through the issues raised by plaintiffs about the deal prior to execution of a loan mortgage agreement could not be construed as a clear and unambiguous promise citing media sport  arts srl 1997 wl 473968 at 13
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    habeas petition was untimely, it cannot satisfy the requirement of a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and we therefore deny the motion for a COA. 1 . We need not consider whether the interval tolled by the section 440.10 proceeding is the entire time from initial filing of the motion in the State trial court until denial by the Appellate Division of leave to appeal from the denial of reconsideration, or only the time during which proceedings on the section 440.10 motion were actually pending before the State trial court and the Appellate Division. Compare Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116, 119-20 (2d Cir.1999) (dictum stating that entire interval tolls AEDPA limitations period), with Robinson v. Ricks, 163 F.Supp.2d 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (<HOLDING>); see also Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255

    ### Response:
    holding only intervals in which proceeding or appeal is actually pending toll aedpa limitations period
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judge exercised discretion by declining to award the $80 claimed cost of the sneakers as too speculative and uncertain. Although it was error for the trial court to preclude defense counsel from inquiring into Pyle’s possible bias, that error did not have a “substantial and injurious” effect on the issue of the appropriate amount of restitution. Accordingly, the error was harmless. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Superior Court’s restitution judgment is affirmed. 1 . This first ruling is referred to in this Opinion as the “Marijuana Ruling."" 2 . The trial judge’s second ruling is referred to as the ""Threatening Call Ruling.” 3 . Filmore v. State, 813 A.2d 1112, 1116 (Del.2003). 4 . Jenkins v. State, 2004 WL 2743556, at *1-3, 2004 Del. Lexis 549, at *5-10 (Del. Nov. 23, 2004) (<HOLDING>). 5 . McGriff v. State, 672 A.2d 1027, 1030

    ### Response:
    holding that because the violation of probation vop hearing was neither a criminal prosecution nor a formal trial the sixth amendment does not apply
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 1983 for violating a person’s federal constitutional rights when he or she engages in activities “intimately associated with the judicia 49 (6th Cir.1975)). Prosecutors are a proceedings, a prosecutor may receive only qualified immunity when acting in a capacity that is exclusively investigatory or administrative. See, e.g., Buckley, 609 U.S. at 274 n. 5, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (stating that “[o]f course, a determination of probable cause does not guarantee a prosecutor absolute immunity from liability for all actions taken afterwards. Even after that determination, as the opinion dissenting in part, points out, a prosecutor may engage in ‘police investigative work’ that is entitled to only qualified immunity”) (citation omitted); Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 367 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that the prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity for any delays or inadequacies in their conduct of the investigation after  1983 plaintiff had been convicted but that they were absolutely immune for their posiinvestigation failure to go into court to seek guzmans release
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    look at these instruments other than as pieces of one agreement, structured to disguise a speculative, offshore transaction that posed an unreasonably large risk, and was inappropriate and possibly illegal for a regulated Korean life insurance company to enter into. The special purpose entities and intermediaries that were made parties to the contracts were not intended as the real parties in interest. The real parties in interest were KLI and Morgan, and just as KLI owed duties to pay Morgan, Morgan had duties to cooperate with KLI should it wish to mitigate its growing losses and demand an unwind, through the clause 2(e) that KLI insisted on as a precondition of its entering into the deal. See Dalton v. Educ. Testing Serv., 87 N.Y.2d 384, 639 N.Y.S.2d 977, 663 N.E.2d 289, 292 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Morgan executed the documents with clear

    ### Response:
    holding that a promisor impliedly pledges that it shall not do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the promise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    293 S.C. 8, 13-14, 358 S.E.2d 173, 176 (Ct.App.1987). Because both Settlemeyer and McCluney testified no written document existed governing conveyance of the properties between the parties, we only address the issue of part performance. At trial, McCluney denied an oral agreement existed between the parties in which she was to convey the properties to Settlemeyer. Furthermore, although Settlemeyer testified he thought such an agreement existed between the parties, he stated the parties did not orally express this agreement. Rather, he testified he trusted McCluney to act as he desired. Based on our review of the evidence contained in the record, we hold Settlemeyer did not present clear evidence of an oral agreement between the parties. See Gibson, 293 S.C. at 13, 358 S.E.2d at 176 (<HOLDING>). Without the existence of an oral agreement,

    ### Response:
    holding a court must find among other things clear evidence of the existence of an oral agreement for part performance to remove the contract from the statute of frauds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employer begins deducting premiums from the employee’s salary for that purpose the employer has a duty to use reasonable efforts to obtain health care coverage for that employee as soon as possible. Furthermore, the employer has a duty to notify the employee if his application for insurance will be treated differently than other employees. See generally City of Brunswick v. Carney, 187 Ga. App. 634 (1) (a) (371 SE2d 201) (1988). Under the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court correctly found that the employer’s decision to submit Dean’s application only to a prospective insurer and not also to the current provider of group insurance for defendant’s other employees constitutes a breach of that duty. See generally Woodman Co. v. Adair, 164 Ga. App. 603 (294 SE2d 579) (1982) (<HOLDING>); Dinnan v. Totis, 159 Ga. App. 352 (283 SE2d

    ### Response:
    holding the employer breached the duty owed to its employee by erroneously advising the employee he would continue to have coverage for 30 days following his termination of employment under the employers group policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc., 863 So.2d 201, 208 (Fla.2003); see also Merkle, 737 So.2d at 542 n. 6 (explaining that after the expiration of a repose period, “the cause of action is extinguished”); Carr v. Broward Cty., 505 So.2d 568, 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (“At the end of the [repose] period the cause of action ceases to exist.”). Although both statutes of repose and limitations operate to bar suits and claims in relation to specified time periods, they accomplish"" different purposes in doing so, A statute of limitations serves to require that a plaintiff with a known cause of action prosecute that claim diligently and within a predictable time that will allow for finality of claims prior to the-potential loss of available evidence over time. - See Statute of limitations, Black’s Law Dictio kr.D.Mass.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also First Sw. Fin. Servs., v. Pulliam,

    ### Response:
    holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proceedings ... [under] the Juvenile Court Act of the District of Columbia, not on the right to assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.” Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 245-47, 156 S.E.2d 874, 876-77 (1967). Appellant has cited no controlling legal authority providing that a juvenile defendant has a constitutional right to a transfer hearing before being treated as an adult. The cases he cites provide, at most, that juvenile proceedings, including transfer proceedings, when provided for by statute, “ ‘must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.’ ” Anderson v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 226, 229, 421 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1992) (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 562, 86 S.Ct. at 1058); see Cheeks v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 578, 583-86, 459 S.E.2d 107, 109-11 (1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Lewis v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 150,

    ### Response:
    holding that procedure for juvenile transfer appeal review in circuit court under former code  161269e was jurisdictional and that failure to provide juvenile with statutory review that complied with due process as spelled out in kent  required that juveniles convictions be vacated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Stair provided false information or failed to provide material exculpatory information to the assistant prosecutor,” the district court ruled that summary judgment in favor of the defendants was proper. Autrey now appeals from that determination. DISCUSSION We review de novo the grant of summary judgment by a district court. See Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir.2006). Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists only when, assuming the truth of the non-moving party’s evidence and construing all inferences from that evidence 010) (malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment) (<HOLDING>); Matthews v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    extend the time for filing the Bank’s expert witness designations; • designated its expert witnesses and provided the Bryce Plaintiffs a report from each; • filed an objection to the Bryce Plaintiffs’ request for a protective order to limit the distribution of information available from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); • filed a motion for in camera inspection of the OCC information to address its claims of privilege; and • filed a motion and a supporting brief requesting reconsideration of the trial court’s order requiring production of the information obtained from the OCC. Based upon the extent of the discovery conducted and this additional activity, the trial court properly concluded that the Bank had substantially invoked the judicial process. See id. at 595-96 (<HOLDING>). The Bank disagrees pointing out that it was a

    ### Response:
    holding litigation process substantially invoked where movant conducted extensive discovery about every aspect of the merits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) that the judgment or decree is void; or (5) that the judgment or decree has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment or decree upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or decree should have prospective application. The motion shall be filed within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than 1 year after the judgment, decree, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment or decree or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the powe 04 (D.C.Cir.1995); Canadian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int’l Trade 612, 615, 691 F.Supp. 364, 367 (1988) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 884 F.2d 563

    ### Response:
    holding that a statutory time period is not mandatory unless it both expressly requires an agency or public official to act within a particular time period and specifies a consequence for failure to comply with the provisions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Offender Act provides that, under certain circumstances, “the court may, without entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the defendant: (1) [djefer further proceeding and place the defendant on probation as provided by law; or (2) [sentence the defendant to a term of confinement as provided by law.” OCGA § 42-8-60 (a). Here, Kaylor was initially sentenced under the First Offender Act to fifteen years confinement, with the first four years to be served in confinement and the balance to be served on probation. Kaylor’s claim that the “explicit language of OCGA § 42-8-60 (a) allows for either probation or confinement, but not both, has already been decided adversely to [him].” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Mason u. State, 310 Ga. App. 118, 119 (1) (712 SE2d 76) (2011) (<HOLDING>). This is because the First Offender Act

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not violate the first offender act by imposing a 15year probated sentence which included as a special condition confinement in a detention center for a designated time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    portion of D-9, and would not submit an amended version, upon the lower court’s request. The defense counsel made this choice without objection. Townsend is therefore proeedurally barred from raising this issue at this point when he did not do so at trial or in his motion for new trial. Davis v. State, 660 So.2d 1228 (Miss.1995); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263 (Miss.1994); Box v. State, 610 So.2d 1148 (Miss.1992). This Court agrees with the trial court’s offer to amend the instruction, which was declined by defense counsel. This Court has found previously that “when contraband is found on premises owned by the Defendant, a presumption of constructive possession arises.” Cunningham v. State, 583 So.2d 960, 962 (Miss.1991); see also Esparaza v. State, 595 So.2d 418, 426 (Miss.1992) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Thus, this Court concludes

    ### Response:
    holding when drugs are found on premises exclusive control provides significant proof of constructive possession
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of this new judge-made rule suggests a return to the former hostility of judges to contracts to arbitrate as attempts to oust courts of their jurisdiction. 5. Engaged in settlement negotiations for years without raising the arbitration clause Finally, the majority argue that arbitration may be waived simply by taking part in settlement discussions. This may be the most insidious part of the majority’s decision on a waiver of arbitration. Allowing mere attempts to settle to have the effect of waiving arbitration is a very pernicious holding. It is also incoherent with essential law and policy. So preferred is settlement of commercial disputes that the supreme court has forcefully articulated a strong public policy encouraging it. See Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So.2d 1384 (Fla.1985) (<HOLDING>). And when parties attempt to effect a private

    ### Response:
    holding settlements are highly favored and will be enforced whenever possible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    respect to this deadline. See Head v. United States, 626 A.2d 1382, 1384 n. 3 (D.C.1993) (citing Pettaway v. United States, 390 A.2d 981, 984 (D.C.1978)). Third, the court of appeals’ method for addressing motions to recall the mandate includes an initial step in which motions deemed lacking in merit are denied with out further review, which suggests that the prompt and summary denial of Mr. Jones’ motion does not necessarily indicate procedural default. Together, these considerations suggest that the court of appeals, as likely as not, overlooked the untimeliness of Mr. Jones’ motion and simply determined that his claims lacked merit. At a minimum, this Court has “good reason” to question whether the alternative was the case. Cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 740, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (<HOLDING>); Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d at 138-39

    ### Response:
    holding that where state procedural rule was mandatory and unwaivable and where government filed motion to dismiss habeas petition based solely on noncompliance with this procedural rule which state court granted without explanation decision appeared to rest primarily on state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights_[Rather,] an accused, ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Id. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85; see also Minnick v. Mississippi 498 U.S. 146, 153, 111 S.Ct. 486, 491, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (stating “that when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney”); Savino, 82 F.3d at 599-600 (<HOLDING>). Polk, to whom Howard initially confessed, did

    ### Response:
    holding that any confession obtained by interrogation reinitiated by police in the absence of counsel is inadmissible unless the defendant reinitiates discussion with police and then confesses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual’s identification, and request consent to search his or her luggage-as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (citations omitted). In a nutshell, the rationale behind this general rule is “[t]he Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures; it does not proscribe voluntary cooperation.” Id. at 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382. However, the Supreme Court has further stated, “When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). But cf. United States v. Hawthorne, 982 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding threat to obtain a search warrant if individual does not consent to a search is just one factor in deciding whether the totality of the circumstances supports a voluntary consent finding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a patient’s counseling sessions outweighs that patient’s privacy interests.” Id., at 1357. Balancing those conflicting interests, the court observed, on the one hand, that the evidentiary need for the contents of the confidential conversations was diminished in this case because there were numerous eyewitnesses to the shooting, and, on the other hand, that Officer Redmond’s privacy interests were substantial. Id., at 1358. Based on this assessment, the court concluded that the trial court had erred by refusing to afford protection to the confidential communications between Redmond and Beyer. The United States Courts of Appeals do not uniformly agree that the federal courts should recognize a psychotherapist privilege under Rule 501. Compare In re Doe, 964 F. 2d 1325 (CA2 1992) (<HOLDING>); In re Zuniga, 714 F. 2d 632 (CA6) (same),

    ### Response:
    recognizing privilege
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    changes in [his] version of events might be forthcoming.” Id., 357 Ill.Dec. 18, 962 N.E.2d at 933. The court additionally took issue with the trial court’s restrictions on counsel during the cross-examination, noting that the trial court had sustained objections to defense counsel’s cross-examination that inhibited his ability to adequately cross-examine the witness. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the preliminary hearing testimony at trial. Id. We recognize that some jurisdictions have endorsed a complete ban on the use of preliminary hearing testimony at trial, while others have been more permissive of the inclusion of such testimony, based on the nature of the proceedings. See, e.g., People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970, 972 (Colo.2004) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); State v. Lopez, 150 N.M. 179, 258 P.3d 458,

    ### Response:
    holding preliminary hearings in colorado do not provide adequate opportunity for crossexamination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Adam's minority. As to Monica, the requirement runs until the end of the alimony term or until she obtains health insurance through employment. 3 . Monica regularly receives the child support and alimony payments required of Russell by the divorce decree. 4 . See Schedule J, dated April 4, 1996. I note that Russell’s monthly income has increased substantially over the $2,383.33 he listed on Schedule I at filing. 5 . The debts at issue here are Russell's obligations to hold Monica harmless from certain of her creditors. Such obligations as Russell himself may have to those creditors (by contract or otherwise in the absence of the divorce decree) are outside the purview of § 523(a)(5) and § 523(a)(15). See, e.g., Ianke v. Ianke (In re Ianke), 185 B.R. 297, 300 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1995) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Section 523(a)(5) provides: (a) A

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a divorce decree obligation to hold an exspouse harmless from a debt creates an obligation between the debtor and the exspouse separate from any obligation the debtor may owe to the creditor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that granting relief in its case will not have been a “futile gesture.” Boyd v. Bulala, 905 F.2d 764, 769 (4th Cir.1990). Essentially, the law “requires a proffer of evidence which would permit a finding for the [moving] party or which would establish a valid counterclaim.” Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Contracting Corp., 843 F.2d 808, 812 (4th Cir.1988). To prove a meritorious claim or defense, the movant need not show an actual likelihood of success at trial but must make allegations that, if established at trial, would constitute a valid claim or defense. See 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.24[2] (3d ed.1999). See, e.g., Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). For purposes of gauging the movant’s claim or

    ### Response:
    holding that although the movant  need not establish  an ironclad claim or defense which will guarantee success at trial it must at least establish that it possesses a potentially meritorious claim or defense which if proven will bring success in its wake
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Family Health did so, and it repeatedly certified to the government, as it was contractually obligated to do, that it had not. As discussed above, Relators have described specific incidences of the well pled “cherry picking” scheme. Therefore, their inability to provide the certifications’ dates, identification numbers, or verbatim content does not preclude them from adequately pleading a false claim. See Lusby, 570 F.3d at 854. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, a relator is unlikely to have access to the particular certifications, and therefore precluding a plaintiff from asserting a False Claims Act cause of action because the relator does not have access to the particular paperwork would excise “a big bite out of qui tarn litigation.” Id. But cf. Fowler, 496 F.3d at 742 (<HOLDING>). IY. Relators Fail to Allege that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet rule 9bs particularity requirement where they did not present any evidence at an individualized transactional level
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    our prior qualified-immunity cases have not imposed the requirement. However, we find that the lack of such a specification impairs our ability to carry out our responsibilities e some basis for distinguishing between well-reasoned conclusions arrived at after a comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors, and mere boiler-plate approval phrased in appropriate language but unsupported by evaluation of the facts or analysis of the law.” Protective Committee for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 434, 88 S.Ct. 1157, 20 L.Ed.2d 1 (1968). At least one other Circuit has encountered the same difficulty in the qualified-immunity context that motivates us to act in a supervisory capacity here. See Beck v. Schwartz, 992 F.2d 870, 871 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Our approach differs from Beck’s. We cannot

    ### Response:
    holding that it was error for the district court to overrule  appellants motion for summary judgment without reference to the qualified immunity defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also argues that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not apply to its written warranty because, it says, a mobile, or manufactured, home is not a ""consumer good” for purposes of the FAA, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1), and that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not preclude enforcement under the FAA of a binding arbitration agreement contained in a written warranty. We do not decide those issues, because we interpret the arbitration provision not to foreclose McCollough ultimately from suing Homes of Legend. Homes of Legend also challenges the partial summary judgment entered in favor of McCollough. However, that issue is not properly before this Court, because the partial summary judgment is not a final, appealable judgment. See Precision American Corp. v. Leasing Serv. Corp., 505 So.2d 380, 382 (Ala.1987) (<HOLDING>). JOHNSTONE, Justice (dissenting). The trial

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial courts rule 54b ala r civ p certification of its partial summary judgment on a single claim leaving open the amount of damages was erroneous therefore the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because there was no final judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    permitted the Village of Shiocton to enact a floodplain ordinance. with basements below the regional flood level after the Village received a FEMA exception in 1998. The Village of Shiocton is one-half mile south of the Warnings' home. ¶ 117. Thousands of buildings across the state were built in floodfringe areas before the enactment of floodplain regulations. The language in Wis. Admin. Code §NR 116.13(2) cannot be read literally without depriving counties and the DNR of the ability to deal reasonably with these ""existing lawful"" structures. Wis. Admin. Code § NR 116.03(34). If the law did not afford some reasonable means to address variances for nonconforming structures, it might not pass constitutional muster. Cf. Building Height Cases, 181 Wis. 519, 532, 195 N.W. 544 (1923) (<HOLDING>); County of Sauk v. Trager, 113 Wis. 2d 48, 56,

    ### Response:
    holding that an act of the legislature limiting the height of buildings was not applicable where substantial rights of a party had vested before the act was enacted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for factual findings in such cases is “somewhat unclear,” United States v. Grenier, 513 F.3d 632, 635-36 (6th Cir.2008) (collecting cases), but that does not matter here since Sanford does not challenge any of the district court’s factual findings. The parties do not dispute that Sanford’s domestic assault convictions under Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.81(2) qualify as crimes of “domestic violence” (emphasis added) as required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). In United States v. Castleman, 695 F.3d 582 (2012), this Court held that to categorically meet the definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” in § 921(a)(33)(A), a state crime must require “violent force, ... [force] capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Id. d. at 586-87 (quoting Johnson v. United Sta 008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10 (1st

    ### Response:
    holding that battery under wyoming law did not necessarily qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    will be denied. The hiring evidence is admissible, and Plaintiff presents circumstantial evidence of gender discrimination in the difference between his salary and Gervasoni’s salary in 2000-1. . To rebut Plaintiffs prima facie case, Defendant asserts a gender-neutral justification for Gervasoni’s salary. Defendant asserts a “market forces” defense under the “factor other than sex” exception to the Equal Pay Act. Though Defendant’s justification is directed at the Equal Pay Act claim, it is equally viable as a defense to Plaintiffs Title VII claims. “Title VII incorporates the Equal Pay Act defenses, so a defendant who proves one of the defenses cannot be held liable under either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII.” Maxwell, 803 F.2d at 446. See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168, 101 S.Ct. 2242 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, if Defendant’s justification is

    ### Response:
    holding that title vii incorporates statutory epa defenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    one of two possible definitions: (A) [an offense that] has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The first test is referred to as the elements clause, and the second test is known as the residual clause. A crime is a crime of violence if it satisfies either the elements clause or the residual clause. See id. The defendants argue that armed bank robbery does not meet requirements of the elements clause and that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. This Court finds that armed bank robbery is (3d Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Court must look at the

    ### Response:
    holding that the categorical approach applies to  924c
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    himself of training and educational opportunities offered by the Bureau of Prisons, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (directing the sentencing court to consider the need for the defendant’s sentence to provide educational and training opportunities)—was hardly compelling, particularly when juxtaposed with the district court’s reasons for denying Mial’s objection to the six-level enhancement. See Boulware, 604 F.3d at 839-40 (explaining that comparative weakness of a defendant’s argument(s) for a lower sentence is one reason to decline to remand a case for further explanation). Finally, we have little doubt that the district court considered this argument, as it was the only point advanced by counsel, and the Government specifically addressed it in its sentencing argument. See id. at 839 (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we conclude that, even

    ### Response:
    holding that even if the district court erred by not adequately explaining its reasons for rejecting boulwares argument for a belowguidelines sentence we are quite confident that the district court undertook that analysis and considered boulwares argument
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    while the federal habeas corpus petition was pending, Petitioner filed a second PCRA petition, raising a single claim based on Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), which held that execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The PCRA court dismissed Appellee’s second PCRA petition without a hearing because Appellee’s federal habeas corpus petition was pending. Appellee appealed to our Court, requesting a remand to the PCRA court on his Atkins claim. The Commonwealth did not oppose Appellee’s request. On October 21, 2003, this Court reversed the PCRA court’s order and remanded for further PCRA proceedings, citing Commonwealth v. Whitney, 572 Pa. 468, 817 A.2d 473 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Commonwealth v. Hackett, 575 Pa. 49, 834 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1 Farnsworth, supra note 19, § 4.28, at 585. 27 Deminsky, 259 Wis. 2d 587, ¶ 27; Discount Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 602 (quoting Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1976)); Leasefirst, 168 Wis. 2d at 89-90. As Professor Arthur Allen Leff described it, procedural unconscionability refers to ""bargaining naughtiness."" Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code — The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 487 (1967) (quoted in 1 White & Summers, supra note 20, § 4-3, at 213). 28 Discount Fabric House, 117 Wis. 2d at 602 (quoting Johnson, 415 F. Supp. at 268); see also Wis. Stat. § 425.107 (unconscionability factors under the Wisconsin Consumer Act). 29 See Pietroske, Inc. v. Globalcom, Inc., 2004 WI App 142, ¶ 6, 275 Wis. 2d 444, 685 N.W.2d 884 (<HOLDING>). See also 8 Lord, supra note 15, § 18.8, at 48

    ### Response:
    holding in the context of a forumselection provision that the balancing of procedural and substantive unconscionability requires courts to consider each questionable forumselection clause on a casebycase basis and precludes the development of a brightline rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or during the Daubert hearing, that Mr. Lindsey failed to test his theory. Additionally, Defendant never cross-examined Mr. Lindsey regarding whether he tested his theories. Instead, Defendant argued Mr. Lindsey’s testimony was unreliable because he failed to rule out all other possible ignition sources, because the fire destroyed substantial portions of the coffee maker, and was primarily premised on missing materials. The Court cannot now assess whether Mr. Lindsey did or did not test his theories and what effect, if any, they would have on the admissibility of Mr. Lindsey’s testimony. As the first mention of this argument was in its motion for a new trial, the Court concludes Defendant has waived this argument. See Palmerin v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409, 1413 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>) c. Precluding Evidence Regarding Dr. Zamiski’s

    ### Response:
    holding litigant preserves an issue on appeal where substance of the objection has been thoroughly explored during the hearing on the motion in limine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case has considered the precise issue posed by this case, courts in other states have recognized that liability may be imposed in the absence of a doctor-patient relationship. In Green, 910 F.2d at 296, for example, the Fifth Circuit found, between an employee and the doctor conducting an annual physical, a limited doctor-patient relationship that was sufficient to give rise to a duty of care in conducting the examination and reporting its results. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly recognized an obligation to report abnormal results obtained during a preemployment physical examination, despite the absence of a doctor-patient relationship. Daly v. United States, 946 F.2d 1467, 1468 (9th Cir.1991) (interpreting Washington law); see also Betesh, 400 F.Supp. at 245-47 (<HOLDING>); Meena v. Wilburn, 603 So.2d 866, 870

    ### Response:
    holding as a matter of maryland law that employerretained radiologists who observed abnormalities owed a duty of care and breached it by failing to notify the examinee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    action under subsection (d) of this section or section 311(b) of this title or section 1365 of this title [33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) or 1365]. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A). Under this provision of the Act, private citizens are precluded from bringing a particular civil penalty action when the EPA is diligently prosecuting an administrative penalty action for the same violations, or when a state is diligently prosecuting an action under a state law ""comparable"" to section 1319(g). Section 1319(g) deals exclusively with administrative penalties. A. Comparability: Penalties Courts have differed over whether section 1319(g)(6)(A) precludes citizen suits where the state enforcement action does not seek damages. Compare North and South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) and Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 852

    ### Response:
    holding state action comparable even though it did not seek monetary sanction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    455, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000). Because these issues have not been properly considered by the Commission, the Commission having included admittedly excluded evidence on one and having failed to make any findings whatsoever on the other, the circuit court was correct in remanding the matters to the Commission. See Baldwin v. James River Corp., 304 S.C. 485, 487, 405 S.E.2d 421, 422-23 (Ct.App.1991) (wherein the court of appeals remanded the case to the workers’ compensation commission because the commission made insufficient findings of fact so as to permit appellate review of the commission’s decision denying an award); Drake v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 241 S.C. 116, 124, 127 S.E.2d 288, 292-93 (1962), overruled on other grounds, Hunt v. Whitt, 279 S.C. 343, 306 S.E.2d 621 (1983) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the appeal in this

    ### Response:
    holding remand proper on circuit courts own motion in a workers compensation case where the commission failed to make essential findings of fact because to hold otherwise would in such cases make the determination of the rights of the parties turn upon the neglect of the commission to make essential findings of fact or require the appellate court to make the omitted findings of fact which our statute forbids
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a “coercive environment.” Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is the one whom the police suspect. See also United States v. Jones, 21 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). We hold that Defendant was not in custody

    ### Response:
    holding a defendant was not in custody for purposes of miranda after he consented to go to police headquarters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the acquisition of a new claim of homestead defeats and discharges a previously-filed claim of homestead. The court agreed with Citizens, holding that the plain language of § 2 meant that Garran’s § 1A declaration and corresponding homestead exemption was defeated and discharged by his wife’s subsequent § 1 declaration. We agree that this is the proper reading of the statutory language. Garran’s wife filed a declaration of homestead under § 1 on February 21, 2001. The declaration of homestead under § 1 is an acquisition of a homestead “for the benefit of [the] family.” Id. § 1. Therefore, by his wife’s filing of a § 1 declaration, Garran, as her spouse and member of her family, “acquired” a homestead on February 21, 2001. See In re Roberts, 280 B.R. 540, 547 (Bankr.D.Mass.2001) (<HOLDING>). Section 2 states that “the acquisition of a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a declaration filed under subsection 1 protects even the nonfiling debtor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in favor of their client. NY CLS Jud § 475. The charging lien of an attorney under § 475 comes into being at the commencement of an action or proceeding. In re Brooklyn Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Project, 31 A.D.2d 895, 297 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1st Dept. 1969). A charging lien is based upon an equitable doctrine that an attorney should be paid out of proceeds of a judgment procured by him. Theroux v. Theroux, 145 A.D.2d 625, 536 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2d Dept.1988). Section 475 of the New York Judiciary Law is enforceable by federal courts. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 448 (2d Cir.1998). An attorney is not entitled to a charging lien in cases in which he or she is discharged with cause. Artache v. Goldin, 173 A.D.2d 667, 570 N.Y.S.2d 238 (2d Dept.1991) (<HOLDING>); K.E.C. v. C.A.C., 173 Misc.2d 592, 599-600,

    ### Response:
    holding that if an attorney is discharged without cause he is entitled to a charging lien for the reasonable value of his services rendered prior to the date of the substitution of counsel where 1 his representation was entirely competent and successful up until his discharge 2 any potential conflict of interest was disclosed and the plaintiff chose to continue to be represented by the attorney and 3 the discharge of the attorney occurred solely because of a fee dispute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that “common questions will rarely, if ever, predominate [in] an unjust enrichment claim, the resolution of which turns on individualized facts” and concluding there was a commonality problem because employees who understood the commission policy “cannot claim injustice when the company follows its compensation policies as expected and understood”); Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 515 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that there was not an identifiable and definite class for the plaintiffs’ claim that they were deceived about whether Diet Coke contained saccharin, since the class of all purchasers could include many people who were not deceived); In re Actiq Sales & Mktg. Practices Litig., 307 F.R.D. 150, 169-71 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs respond that some courts have

    ### Response:
    holding that common issues of fact did not predominate because it was necessary to make an individualized inquiry into equitable circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pinson seeks is freely available to the public as she implies, “there would be no reason to invoke the FOIA to obtain access to the information.” Id. The Court thus proceeds to balance the private interest in privacy and the public interest in disclosure. Upon consideration of Pinson’s articulated public interest and its own independent evaluation, the Court concludes that the public interest in the disclosure here is likely very small. The disclosed portions of the SAMs memoran-da reveal considerable information about the operation of the SAMs program. The incremental value of revealing the identity of the affected individuals—either directly or indirectly through identifiable information—would provide only a small benefit to the public interest. Cf. Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282 (<HOLDING>). This conclusion is buttressed by reference to

    ### Response:
    holding that even if a particular privacy interest is minor nondisclosure remains justified where  the public interest in disclosure is virtually nonexistent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other hand, this assertion, without more, does not sufficiently allege that Siemens Austria is financially dependent on its parent, ie., that Siemens Austria cannot run its businesses without the financial backing of its parent. Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts to support the third factor, the “degree to which the parent corporation interferes in the selection and assignment of the subsidiary’s executive personnel and fails to observe corporate formalities.” Beech Aircraft, 751 F.2d at 120-22. Their allegation that “Siemens-Germany [and] Siemens-Austria ... fail to observe proper corporate formalities,” MC ¶ 40, is entirely con-clusory. “Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not fact[ual allegations] and cannot substitute for them.” Schenker, 2002 WL 1560788, at *2 (<HOLDING>). Further, defendant offers sworn testimony

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs conclusory allegations were insufficient to make out prima facie case for mere department status of foreign corporation defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of employment are actionable under § 1981. Id. Similarly, other courts that have interpreted § 1981(b) overwhelmingly indicate that retaliation claims are actionable under § 1981. See, e.g., Steverson v. Goldstein, 24 F.3d 666, 670 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 731, 130 L.Ed.2d 634 (1995) (affirming jury’s finding on plaintiffs § 1981 claim of retaliation for his political activities); Butts v. City of New York Dep’t of Hous. Preservation and Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1404 (2d Cir.1993) (stating that if § 1981(b) were applied retroactively, plaintiffs allegations of discrimination in promotion and in the terms and conditions of her employment would state a cause of action under § 1981); Campbell v. Grayline Air Shuttle, Inc., 930 F.Supp. 794, 803 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>); Collins v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 934

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs claim of reduction in work hours in retaliation for her filing of eeoc charge states a cause of action under  1981
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1964) (<HOLDING>); see also Hornblower v. Cobb, 932 So.2d 402

    ### Response:
    holding that when a constitutional right is vested in a party and there is a doubt as to whether that right has been waived the doubt should be resolved in the defendants favor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Id. at 32). He has no affiliations with professional organizations dealing with' GPS systems. (Id. at 34). Prior to this case, he has never served or been asked to serve as an expert in the field. (Id.) Accordingly, we find that Williams does not have the specialized knowledge required of an expert witness. B. Does the matter require scientific, technical or specialized knowledge to be understood? The second factor is whether the subject matter that the proposed expert will testify to requires scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. Here, the proposed expert is to testify about GPS coordinates and analysis. Under the caselaw, this subject matter does not require scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. United States v. Thompson, 393 Fed.Appx. 852, 858, 859 (3d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Espinal-Almeida,

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court properly allowed lay witness testimony concerning the operation of a gps device including authentication of the gpss data
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the district court committed reversible error by defining “knowingly” in Instruction No. 10. We generally review challenges to jury instructions for abuse of discretion, United States v. Rush-Richardson, 574 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir.2009), but our review is for plain error where, as here, the defendant failed to object to the offending instruction at trial, see United States v. Gianakos, 415 F.3d 912, 921 (8th Cir.2005). A person commits aggravated sexual abuse if he “knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act — by using force against that other person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1). In this case, Count I charged Robertson with attempted aggravated sexual abuse, which is a specific intent crime. Cf United States v. Kenyon (Kenyon II), 481 F.3d 1054, 1070 (8th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>). “[U]nder its usual definition, specific

    ### Response:
    holding that attempted sexual abuse is a specific intent crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the part of the lessee to do this can only be an implied one, in which instance said lessee has a reasonable time, after completion of the well, to comply with such covenant. Id. at 1012 (quoting McVicker v. Horn, Robinson and Nathan, 322 P.2d 410, 411 (Okla.1958)). Gazin held that, although the lessors would normally have the right to demand compliance with the implied covenant to market in the primary term, the acceptance of delay rental payments operated as a waiver of that right. Id. The diligence of the lessee’s efforts and the reasonable probability of success are factors to be taken into consideration when determining what is a “reasonable time.” Flag Oil Corp. v. King Resources Co., 494 P.2d 322, 325 (Okla.1972). See also Brimmer v. Union Oil Co., 81 F.2d 437 (10th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 668, 56 S.Ct. 833, 80

    ### Response:
    recognizing implied duty to market
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between medical judgment and the standard of care, our courts have often struggled in determining whether the facts of a particular case call for the application of the judgment charge. We have generally limited the application of the judgment charge to medical malpractice actions concerning misdiagnosis or the selection of one of two or more generally accepted courses of treatment. Aiello, supra, 159 N.J. at 628-29, 733 A.2d 433; see Patton v. Amblo, 314 N.J.Super. 1, 9, 713 A.2d 1051 (App.Div.1998)(finding that doctor was not entitled to “exercise of judgment” charge where alleged malpractice involved making scalpel incision too deep because alleged deviation was in manner doctor performed procedure); Adams v. Cooper Hosp., 295 N.J.Super. 5, 10-11, 684 A.2d 506 (App.Div.1996)(<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 148 N.J. 463, 690 A.2d 610

    ### Response:
    holding that court did not err by refusing to charge jury with exercise of judgment instruction where issue was whether nurse had duty to constantly monitor patient because case did not involve selection between one of two courses of treatment or two schools of thought
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if fact’s existence was “more likely than not”). That finding was supported here by evidence of Hilson’s history of drug trafficking and his possession of the money at a time when he was known to be selling crack, as evidenced by his three recent sales to the confidential informant. It was further supported by evidence refuting Hilson’s suggestions that the monies derived from various legitimate sources, such as a student grant, a girlfriend’s tax refund, Hilson’s own bank accounts, or his one-week employment at Wendy’s. With the finding that the seized money constituted drug proceeds, Hilson does not—and cannot—seriously challenge the district court’s calculation that $10,366 would be the proceeds from the sale of 326.5 grams of crack. See United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d at 175 (<HOLDING>). The district court noted that the market

    ### Response:
    holding that where seized currency appears by a preponderance of the evidence to be the proceeds of narcotics trafficking a district court may consider the market price for the drugs in which the defendant trafficked in determining the drug quantity represented by that currency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM In this appeal from a decision of the Oregon Tax Court, Gary Allan Clark (taxpayer) challenges both the Tax Court’s conclusion that he is liable for 1996 personal income taxes based on wages that he earned in that tax year and the Tax Court’s assessment of damages against him for pursuing a frivolous appeal. See ORS 305.437 (authorizing sanctions for frivolous or groundless appeals to Tax Court). The Tax Court’s rulings were correct. See Combs v. Dept. of Rev., 331 Or 245, 14 P3d 584 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Only one of taxpayer’s assertions merits

    ### Response:
    holding that wages are subject to oregons personal income tax and that a taxpayers argument to the contrary was frivolous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sets the limits placed on the compensation of chapter 7 and chapter 11 trustees, is based on “moneys disbursed.” 11 U.S.C. § 326(a). The use of the term “moneys” in § 326(a) circumscribes the word “disbursed” and suggests that disbursement means something more than monies. See, e.g., In re Lan Assocs. XI, L.P., 192 F.3d 109, 116 (3d Cir.1999) (concluding that the value of a credit bid may not be included in a trustee’s compensation base under § 326(a)); U.S. Trustee v. Tamm (In re Hokulani Square, Inc.), 460 B.R. 76 1) (concluding that payments the debtor made in connection with a transaction to refinance an existing debt, which was satisfied by the proceeds from a new loan, was a disbursement for purposes of 1930(a)(6)); In re Pars Leasing, Inc., 217 B.R. 218, 220 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1997) (<HOLDING>); In re Flatbush Assocs., 198 B.R. 75, 78

    ### Response:
    holding that disbursements for purposes of calculating the quarterly fee included payments made by third parties on the debtors behalf
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 476, 481 (1995). Although § 7722 does, by its terms, require VA to inform veterans of “all benefits and services to which they may be entitled” and to assist veterans “to the maximum extent possible ... in the preparation and presentation of claims,” the extent of such a duty will depend on the facts and law involved in a particular case. See Smith (Edward) v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 429, 432 (1992). In this case, VA adopted certain duties as described in part II.B., above, with respect to pension benefits. In carrying out these duties, the Department also satisfied its general § 7722 duties when it informed the appellant in 1979 that he was entitled to pension benefits under the improved pension program and sent him the election card. See Gold, 7 Vet.App. at 319 (<HOLDING>); Kluttz v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 304, 307-08

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence that va sent appellant an election card when combined with presumption of regularity accorded to the official acts of public officers including mailings was enough to discharge any  7722 duty assuming there was one
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. United States, 599 A.2d 1094, 1102 (D.C.1991)). Accordingly, the judgment on appeal herein with respect to R. J. is affirmed, and the judgment with respect to B.J. is reversed. So ordered. 1 . There is no petition for K.J.'s adoption involved in this case. 2 . There is also sufficient evidence to hold that the mother neglected her daughter according to another section of the D.C.Code dealing specifically with incarcerated parents. That section provides that a child is neglected if their parent ""is unable to discharge his or her responsibilities to and for the child because of incarceration....” D.C.Code § 16-2301 (9)(A)(iii). For this section to apply, there must be a nexus between the incarceration and the inability to provide care. See In re T.T.C., 855 A.2d 1117, 1119 (D.C.2004) (<HOLDING>). Here, there seems to be a similar nexus

    ### Response:
    holding an incarcerated fathers actions satisfied the standard for neglect who initially made arrangements for his children to receive adequate care but failed to provide sufficient legal protection so that the childrens drugaddicted mother could not take custody over them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jiang Yu, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence, Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 962 (9th Cir.2004), and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination based on Yu’s admitted post-entry immigration fraud. See Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Further, because the IJ had reason to

    ### Response:
    holding that history of dishonesty can support an adverse credibility finding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has also presented evidence that creates a reasonable inference that age discrimination was the determinative factor in her termination. The district court found that the firing of older employees during the reorganization period of September 1994 to October 1995 was not sufficient to create an inference of impermissible age discrimination. While we agree that timing alone does not create a presumption of age discrimination, see Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co., 75 F.3d 343, 346-47 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 813, 117 S.Ct. 61, 136 L.Ed.2d 23 (1996), it may lend force to contemporaneous evidence of age discrimination, depending on the quality of that evidence, see Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940, 112 S.Ct. 376, 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Caudill v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 919 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that infer ence cannot be based on timing alone but must take into account other evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to make substantive exclusions in the hospital’s interest. E.g., Peterson, 559 P.2d at 191(allowing exclusions based on rules that “comport[ ] with the legitimate goals of the hospital and the rights of the individual and the public”). Moreover, Arizona explicitly gives all hospitals the right to refuse to allow abortions to be performed at the hospital, Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 36-2151, and has prohibited all abortions in public university hospitals except those necessary to save the life of the woman having the abortion, Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 15-1630. Arizona itself does not have the power to prohibit any providers from performing abortions merely because it disapproves of abortion and would like to place obstacles in the way of women seeking abortions. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (<HOLDING>). Thus, Arizona may not delegate such a power

    ### Response:
    holding that laws with the purpose of placing an obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion are invalid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    after surveying California court decisions, that “courts generally presume that the fourth element of the applicable test has been established if there is sufficient evidence to prove the first three elements.” Del Amo v. Baccash, No. CV 07-663-PSG, 2008 WL 4414514, at *6 (C.D.Cal. Sept. 16, 2008) (presuming that injury was satisfied for purposes of a § 3344 claim seeking only minimum statutory damages, where plaintiff established use of non-celebrity models’ identity, appropriation of their name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, and lack of consent). Indeed, in cases involving celebrity plaintiffs, the mere allegation that the plaintiff was not compensated has been deemed sufficient to satisfy the injury prong. See, e.g., Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1090 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686,

    ### Response:
    holding that actor who was featured on the cover of an adult magazine without his consent could assert injury because the measure of damages available for misappropriation claims includes the economic value of the use of an individuals name and likeness and sjection 3344 specifically provides that a plaintiff may recover any profits from the unauthorized use in addition to actual damages or the 750 minimum statutory damage amount and punitive damages internal citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the saliva swabs and DNA evidence, which the trial court similarly overruled. After completion of the trial — which began and concluded on October 15, 2003 — the jury convicted Wyche as to all three counts of the information. On November 12, 2003, the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence as to Counts I and III, credited Wyche with 220 days time served, and ordered a five-year term of probation as to Count II. The trial court also adjudicated Wyche a habitual felony offender under section 775.04, Florida Statutes. On appeal, the First District issued a broad opinion with sweeping language, which affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and held that deception is largely if not totally irrelevant for purposes of conducting a voluntariness inquiry. See Wyche, 906 So.2d at 1144 (<HOLDING>). In my view, the decision of the First

    ### Response:
    holding without qualification that djeception does not negate consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A recent Eighth Circuit decision applying Hodari confirms this interpretation. In Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir.1993), the Eighth Circuit applied Hodari to determine when a “seizure” occurs for purposes of a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. David Cole, driving an 18-wheel tractor-trailer truck eastbound on 1-70, sped through a toll booth in Bonner Springs, Kansas, without stopping to pay the toll. Id. at 1330. Kansas and Missouri police employed numerous tactics in an effort to stop y, 962 F.2d 451, 456-57 (5th Cir.1992) (fleeing suspect not seized when police car blocked his ear’s path but only when he reversed gears and backed into another police car, thereby disabling his own car); Clark v. Nassau County, No. 89-1000-CIV-J-14, 1991 WL 350041 (M.D.Fla. Sept. 11, 1991) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 968 F.2d 23 (11th Cir.1992). Applying

    ### Response:
    holding that a fleeing suspect in a car was seized only when an officer actually shot him not when several officers previously shot his vehicles tires in an effort to stop him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Size shall be 38 mm thick by 400 mm in height by 1 meter in length, unless othenoise indicated [,]” while paragraph 2.2.2 provides that: “Precast concrete units shall have a compressive strength of no less than 17 MPa, reinforced with 150 mm by 150 mm by W1.4 WWF wire mesh, and 300 mm (height) by 1 m (length) by 40 mm (thickness) in size unless indicated.” Fort Hood Contract No. DACA63-02-C-0015, Specification Section 03100A, Paragraph 2.2 (emphases added). It is undisputed that the “unless indicated” language refers to the drawing detail. Thus, the specifications refer the contractor to the drawing detail to determine if the size of the material for the retainers is different than the size quoted in the specifications. See AD. Roe Co., Inc., A.S.B.C.A. No. 23,425, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,575 (<HOLDING>). Second, it is undisputed that the drawing

    ### Response:
    holding that unless otherwise specified language in the contracts specifications referred to the drawings and served to modify the specifications direction to only apply paint so that the instructions would also include applying a liquid glaze coating on some of the walls in accordance with the drawings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    eventually be dismissed if they fail to conform to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 after the court gives the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. See id. 2 . The plaintiffs typed the heading ""Motion for a TRO” on their pleading but crossed it out before filing the document and indicated that they would file a separate motion for a temporary restraining order on the next day. But even if the court had jurisdiction to consider the motion for a temporary restraining order and treated the original pleading as a motion for the restraining order, the court would deny the motion because the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on the merits and have not demonstrated irreparable harm. See Davenport v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 361 (D.C.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Further, it appears that the plaintiffs have

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    three counts of first-degree CSC with a minor, in violation of South Carolina Code section 16-3-655. Another statute, section 16-3-657, provides that “[t]he testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under §§ 16-3-652 through 16-3-658.” The circuit court charged the jury the above quoted language of section 16-3-657. This was reversible error. “In general, the trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina. ... A jury charge is correct if it contains the correct definition of the law when read as a whole.” Sheppard v. State, 357 S.C. 646, 665, 594 S.E.2d 462, 472 (2004) (citations omitted). Some principles of law, however, are not to be charged to a jury. See, e.g., State v. Grant, 275 S.C. 404, 408, 272 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to the majority opinion, we did not

    ### Response:
    holding that although evidence of a defendants flight is admissible as circumstantial evidence of guilt it is improper for the trial judge to instruct the jury on the law of flight because such an instruction oftentimes has the potential for creating more problems than solutions as it places undue emphasis upon that part of circumstantial evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or interests.” Johnson v. Lodge # 93 of the Fraternal Order of Police, 393 F.3d 1096, 1107 (10th Cir.2004)(citing United States v. City of Hialeah, 140 F.3d 968, 975 (11th Cir.1998)). The NMCGA has not demonstrated that the Proposed Settlement Agreement imposes any legal obligations on it or adversely affects its legal rights any more than the USFS can always do. The NMCGA contends that the Agreement adversely affects the permittees’ interest in maintaining a secure livestock grazing permit for the challenged allotments. See NMCGA’s Response at 6. Because the USFS has the discretion to modify permits as necessary to protect natural resources, the NMCGA cannot assert a legally cognizable interest in maintaining the current terms and conditions of the permits. See 43 U.S.C. § 1752(a) (<HOLDING>); 36 C.F.R. § 222.4(a) (stating that the USFS

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the usfs has the authority to cancel suspend or modify a grazing permit or lease in whole or in part pursuant to the terms and conditions thereof
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that foster parents have standing under federal law to raise foster child’s rights). We should join the growing number of our sister jurisdictions who have conferred standing to be heard to foster parents in proceedings related to children that have been in their care. Some states, such as Delaware, Nebraska, South Carolina, and West Virginia have conferred standing to foster parents via judicial decision. See In re C.M.D., 256 A.2d 266 (De.1969)(deciding that foster parents had standing to petition Family Court for custody of foster child); In re Jorius G., 249 Neb. 892, 546 N.W.2d 796 (1996)(finding that foster parents had standing to contest agency’s removal of foster child); Greenville County Department of Social Services v. Bowes, 313 S.C. 188, 437 S.E.2d 107 (1993)(<HOLDING>); In re Harley C., 203 W.Va. 594, 509 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that foster parents have standing to intervene to seek termination of parental rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Supply, plaintiff in its complaint and in its motion for summary judgment before the bankruptcy court vigorously contended that the financing statements comported with the statutory requirements and constituted the “first and best lien” on EAI of NC’s assets. Plaintiff asserted that the statutory and case law established that: {¶ 15} “[I]nadvertent omission [in plaintiffs financing statements] is not seriously misleading and does not render the Financing Statements invalid because: a) the mere omission of the words ‘of North Carolina’ when the addresses of EAI and EAI of NC are the same and the two are related companies does not result in a misleading error; and b) the coversheets specifically refer the reader to the attached Security Agreement for the signature 3 UCC Rep.Serv. 719 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 18} Plaintiff prevailed and the bankruptcy

    ### Response:
    holding to be sufficient the incorrect identification of debtor as platt fur co instead of the correct name of henry platt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have passed into the hands of bona fide creditors or purchasers for value, as long as any debts of the corporation are unpaid, the holders of the assets take them charged with a trust in favor of the creditors”); Rice v. City of Columbia, 143 S.C. 516, 141 S.E. 705, 712 (1928) (“[T]he very moment a corporation, banking or other, reaches the point of insolvency (presumptively, as a matter of course, to the knowledge of the managing agents of the corporation), certainly in the immediate prospect of dissolution and bankruptcy, its assets become impressed with a solemn trust to be distributed ratably among its creditors, subject, of course, to liens; and the managing agents become the administrators of that trust.”); see also Stewart v. Ficken, 151 S.C. 424, 149 S.E. 164, 165 (1929) (<HOLDING>); Cumberland Wood Prods., Inc. v. Bennett, 308

    ### Response:
    recognizing the right of a creditor to sue a corporate director for breach of fiduciary duty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    26, 2003), both of which are now final. Id. As for the Promissory Notes, they are not valid, because the Certificates of Assessment do not indicate that the original notes were accepted as payment. Id. at 3. Although Plaintiffs claimed to have “corrected” the Promissory Notes, correction is “neither apparent from an examination of the notes nor does it remedy their primary defect — they are not drawn on a legitimate domestic financial institution.” Id. Even if the Promissory Notes were valid, “jurisdiction prerequisites must be satisfied at the time the complaint is filed ... so [Plaintiffs’ post factum payment would not cure their failure to satisfy the full-payment rule.” Id.; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Plaintiffs’ contention that

    ### Response:
    holding that jurisdiction is determined at the time the complaint is filed and postfiling events cannot create jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court’s decision is procedurally sound, then we will consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. at 855 (quoting United States v. Braggs, 511 F.3d 808, 812 (8th Cir.2008)). The district court correctly interpreted and applied the sentencing guidelines. The guidelines provide: “Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.l(b). The district court thus properly determined the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months was the guidelines sentence, and thus the appropriate point from which to depart downward. See United States v. Auld, 321 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295,

    ### Response:
    holding where the statutory minimum sentence exceeds the guidelines sentence a substantialassistance downward departure begins at the mandatory minimum sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had the error not occurred.”); Bryant v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 488, 498 (2010) (per curiam) (“[T]he assessment of prejudice generally is case specific, demonstrated by the appellant and based on the record.”); see also Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2000) (“[A]ppellate tribunals are not appropriate fora for initial fact finding.”). Accordingly, because the Board erred by failing to provide Mrs. Reliford with the opportunity to waive substitution and prejudiced her by failing to adjudicate her accrued-benefits claim against the proper factual background, the Board decision on appeal will be set aside and remanded for adjudication of Mrs. Reliford’s claim based on the file as it existed at the time of her husband’s death. See Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 384,

    ### Response:
    holding that remand is the appropriate remedy where inter alia the board has incorrectly applied the law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in a consistent and uniform manner subject to State criteria and oversight.” N.R. § l-1801(b)(2). When the State Critical Area Program was adopted, a local jurisdiction could choose whether to adopt a local program. If it did not, the State Critical Area Commission was directed to adopt a program for that jurisdiction. In either event, the program had to comply with the criteria in N.R. § 8-1808. See N.R. §§ 8-1809 and 8-1810. Section 8-1808(d) sets forth the requirements for granting a variance from the critical area requirements. Those requirements include a finding that a failure to grant a variance would result in unwarranted hardship to the applicant. Prior to 2002, the Court of Appeals decided Belvoir Farms Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259, 734 A.2d 227 (1999) (<HOLDING>); White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 736 A.2d 1072

    ### Response:
    holding that the unwarranted hardship standard was less restrictive than the constitutional taking standard and meant the denial of the reasonable and significant use of the property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and was exceedingly reluctant to reach any agreement that the tribes considered acceptable. But the gravamen of Coyote Valley’s amended complaint is that the Davis Administration, rather than the Wilson Administration, has refused to negotiate in good faith; and it is against the Davis Administration that Coyote Valley seeks injunctive relief. On the record before us, it appears that the Davis Administration has actively negotiated with Indians tribes, including Coyote Valley, concerning class III gaming, and that it has negotiated despite the absence of any legal obligation to do so. Until Proposition 1A was ratified in March of 2000, the State had no obligation to negotiate with Coyote Valley over the types of class III games covered in the Davis Compact. See Rumsey, 64 F.3d 1250 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, at the time Coyote Valley filed its

    ### Response:
    holding that the phrase such gaming in igra does not include all class iii gaming
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Second Circuit Court of Appeals and held that a state criminal restitution order is non-dischargeable under Section 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court stated that Section 523(a)(7) “create[d] a broad exception for all penal sanctions, whether they be denominated fines, penalties, or forfeitures,” and protected traditional criminal fines sufficiently to allow restitution orders to be included within the exception. Id. at 51, 107 S.Ct. at 362, 93 L.Ed.2d at 230. In the Court’s view, federal bankruptcy proceedings should not be used to cir 1993) (concluding that order of restitution imposed as part of a criminal sentence was non-dischargeable in bankruptcy); Cabla v. State, 6 S.W.3d 543, 551 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1092, 120 S.Ct. 1730, 146 L.Ed.2d 650 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Garnett seeks to distinguish her case from

    ### Response:
    holding that the bankruptcy code does not interfere with criminal sentencing schemes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1141, 119 S.Ct. 1032, 143 L.Ed.2d 41 (1999). Federal common law deprives me of the power to grant such relief, absent the consent of the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit for Palm Beach County, Florida. As Mr. Freeman fairly argues, the relief sought by the trustee in these three counts could disadvantage the other creditors of PRSI. Thus, it will be up to the appointing court for the PRSI receiver to determine whether the relief sought by the trustee in counts five through seven should be heard in this court. Rather than dismiss those three counts at this time, however, I shall stay temporarily any determination of those three claims and grant the trustee a limited opportunity to obtain state court leave to proceed. See Matter of NNLC Corp., 136 B.R. 611 (Bankr.D.Conn.1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Matter of Linton, 136 F.3d at 545

    ### Response:
    holding that an adversary proceeding against a bank receiver is stayed pending exhaustion of administrative remedies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    like the determination that inoculation against biological or chemical attack is warranted, Minns, 155 F.3d at 451 (emphasis added), or the determination of what constitutes appropriate “defense of national borders.” Tiffany, 931 F.2d at 278. This case simply does not involve the exercise of “professional military discretion.” As the Third Circuit held in rejecting the argument that the discretionary function exception barred a negligence claim against the government for the conduct of a Navy employee: This case is not about a national security concern, but rather a mundane, administrative, garden-variety, housekeeping problem that is about as far removed from the policies applicable to the Navy’s mission as it is possible to get. Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). These words are equally applicable here. The

    ### Response:
    holding discretionary function exception is no shield to claim of negligence in failing to provide handrails or adequate lighting on footpath
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    28 U.S.C. § 2201, provides: In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. (Emphasis added). Thus, the very terms of the Act and its subsequent interpretation by the courts have made the exercise of declaratory judgment jurisdiction discretionary. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 126, 88 S.Ct. 733, 746-47, 19 L.Ed.2d 936 (1968); Public Service Comm’n, 344 U.S. at 241, 73 S.Ct. at 239; Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 804 F.2d 129, 134-35, 231 USPQ 653, 657-58 (Fed.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). The reason for giving this discretion to the

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiffs’ ordinary negligence claims because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Vanhorns were volunteers acting for a nonprofit organization within the scope of their responsibilities. A. Volunteers “Volunteer” is defined as “an individual performing services for a nonprofit organization or a governmental entity who does not receive [] compensation (other than reasonable reimbursement or allowance for expenses actually incurred) [] or [] any other thing of value in lieu of compensation, in excess of $500 per year[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 14505(6). An individual generally qualifies as a “volunteer” if he is not compensated. Segway, Inc. v. Special Olympics Conn., Inc., 2015 WL 1244509, **7-8 (Conn.Super. Feb. 23, 2015) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); McGeorge v. Town of Hamden, 2012 WL 1434904,

    ### Response:
    holding no issue of material fact as to whether defendant was volunteer because he received no compensation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Chief Justice. AltaPointe Health Systems, Inc. (“AHS”), appeals from an order entered by Judge Don Davis of the Mobile County Probate Court denying its petition for an award of expert-witness fees in civil-commitment proceedings. This case presents a matter of first impression: Whether a publicly funded organization is entitled to expert-witness fees for an employee who gives expert testimony at involuntary civil-commitment hearings. I. Facts and Procedural History The board of directors of AHS, the community mental-health agency for Mobile County and Washington County, is appointed by the governing bodies that authorize and fund it. See § 22-51-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975; Ex parte Greater Mobile-Washington Cnty. Mental Health-Mental Retardation Bd., Inc., 940 So.2d 990, 1005 (Ala.2006) (<HOLDING>). An AHS employee provides expert-witness

    ### Response:
    holding that ahs although a public corporation  21512 alacode 1975 is an independent entity rather than a state agency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute governing failure to appear. Defendant in this case was. Issue Five: Trial Court’s Finding, by a Preponderance of the Evidence, That Arizona Conviction Was a Felony Conviction Was Not Error {34} Defendant challenges the State’s proof of one of his prior convictions, contending that it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and asserting that there was insufficient evidence under any standard to show a prior felony conviction. Apprendi, by its express terms, does not apply to prior convictions. See id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (indicating that holding applies to facts “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction”); see also United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 414-15 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). {35} The standard of proof applicable to the

    ### Response:
    holding that almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 in which supreme court held it unnecessary to prove prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt is narrow exception to apprendi
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decision, however broad it may seem, is actually quite narrow in two respects. First, our decision holds only that Sheriff Arpaio lacks standing to challenge DACA and DAPA, not that those programs are categorically shielded from suit. Indeed, those programs are currently subject to challenge in a number of other circuits. See Texas, 787 F.3d at 747-55 (upholding Texas’ standing to challenge DAPA based on the costs of providing drivers licenses to DAPA beneficiaries); Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 15-15307, 81 F.3d 795, 2015 WL 300376 (9th Cir.2015) (ordering the parties, and inviting the federal government, to file briefs discussing whether DACA violates the separation of powers or the Take Care Clause of the Constitution); cf. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir.2015) (<HOLDING>). Second, today’s decision does not take issue

    ### Response:
    holding mississippi lacked standing to challenge daca because the state failed to submit   evidence that any daca eligible immigrants resided in the state or produce evidence of costs it would incur if some dacaapproved immigrants came to the state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as “the jury had sufficient information to appraise the bias and motives of the witness” and to draw inferences about the witness’s reliability. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); United States v. McCullough, 631 F.3d 783, 790 (5th Cir.2011) (“A defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights are satisfied when defense counsel is permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which the jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). To this end, we have previously held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right is satisfied even when the district court limits cross-examination to basic information concerning a witness’s prior convictions. See, e.g., McCullough, 631 F.3d at 791 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278

    ### Response:
    holding no confrontation right violation where the district court limited crossexamination to basic information about the witnesss convictions and prohibited inter alia descriptions of the witnesss conduct during the incidents leading to his convictions emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the FIS engages in international diplomatic relations, see Amended Complaint, para. 34-36. At this time, the Court believes that it is premature to determine whether the FIS actually constitutes a de facto state for the purposes of jurisdiction under the TVPA. The de facto state doctrine requires the Court to make factual findings regarding the activities of the FIS. At this stage, the record contains only the bare allegations of the Plaintiffs. To make the requisite factual findings, the Court will await the further development of the record. 3. Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Because the ATCA supplies jurisdiction in this ease, the Court will not reach the issue of whether 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 246 (<HOLDING>). D. Justiciability Defendant Haddam claims

    ### Response:
    recognizing the possibility that 28 usc  1331 supplies jurisdiction for violations of international law but not reaching the ultimate merits of the issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (determining that while the police officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, the evidence was nevertheless admissible because the defendant had abandoned the drugs prior to his seizure). A panel of this court recently determined that abandoned property is subject to lawful seizure without a warrant. Wilson v. State, 825 N.E.2d 49, 51 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). Hence, such property is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Miller v. State, 498 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), trans. denied. By the same token, if property is abandoned after a citizen is improperly detained, the evidence is not admissible Wilson, 825 N.E.2d at 51; see also State v. Pease, 531 N.E.2d 1207, 1211-12 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>). And the seizure of an individual does not

    ### Response:
    holding that because an improper frisk forced the defendant to abandon drugs that evidence was inadmissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (citations omitted). B. Here, the district court denied Oleson’s motion to amend because the motion to amend was filed after the district court denied Oleson’s underlying § 2255 motion. Apparently, the district court believed that a Rule 15(a) motion cannot, as a matter of law, be brought after a § 2255 habeas motion is denied. To date, this Circuit has not recognized that principle as a rule of law. Rather, we have emphasized that Rule 15 seeks to ensure that cases are . decided on thei because it was filed more than one year after the June 15, 1995 entry of judgment, and more than one year after the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) became effective on April 24, 1996. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see also United States v. Craycraft, 167 F.3d 451, 456 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Nor do other exceptions to the § 2255 statute

    ### Response:
    holding that the aedpa oneyear statute of limitations applies to amendments to  2255 motions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 924(c) offense. The fifth and final step in the Rybicki analysis, requires the district court to decide whether a departure, based on these appropriately classified factors, is, in fact, warranted and reasonable under the circumstances. 96 F.3d at 758; see also United States v. Terry, 142 F.3d 702, 707 (4th Cir.1998). We review the ultimate departure decision for abuse of discretion, and any factual determinations underlying this decision for clear error. Rybicki, 96 F.3d at 758. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to depart upward from a sixty-month sentence on count three to a sentence of 262 months. We agree with the district court that Scott Brooks’s culpability in the death of Lock-lear and the physical injury of Floyd is at the 3 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the extent of the departure was

    ### Response:
    holding that an increased sentence may be imposed for harms that were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendants conduct even where the defendant did not directly cause the specific harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    factual offense. For the foregoing reasons, and based upon the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that Alston was not deprived of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against Double Jeopardy. The Appellate Division’s affir-mance of Alston’s conviction on one count of first degree rape was neither an incorrect, nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court double jeopardy jurisprudence. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, petitioner Bernard Alston’s request for a writ of habeas corpus is denied and the petition is dismissed. Because petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, I decline to issue a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Lozada v. United States, 107 F.3d 1011, 1013 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . People v. Sandoval, 34

    ### Response:
    holding that under 28 usc  2253c1 certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    applied to appellant’s motion for partial summary judgment. Thus, because appellant’s negligence claims fail as a matter of law, it was proper for the court to deny appellant’s summary judgment motion, and his second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. Cooney, P.J., and McMonagle, J., concur. 1 . For at least 11 years prior to Merrill Lynch's involvement, Lesinski managed the trust as a representative of Everen Securities, Inc. In July 1999, he began working for Merrill Lynch. 2 . Appellant also commenced an arbitration proceeding against Lesinski and Merrill Lynch, pursuant to the National Association of Securities Dealers Dispute Resolution, seeking recovery for the same losses. 3 . See, e.g., Stevens v. Natl. City Bank (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 276, 281, 544 N.E.2d 612 (<HOLDING>); Natl. City Bank v. Noble, Cuyahoga App. No.

    ### Response:
    holding that a trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to distribute the risk of loss within the trust by prudent diversification limiting the proportion of the total assets which are invested in any one stock or class of securities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that they had no duty to defend against Starks’s suit. Id. at 1127. But Starks was never “acquitted,” and it is not entirely clear whether he was “exonerated” when his convictions were vacated and a retrial ordered or only when the prosecutor dismissed the charges. Northfield Insurance appears to address this question, saying that “[i]f the prosecution was abandoned for reasons of Starks’s innocence, then May 15, 2012 [when the aggravated sexual assault charges were dismissed nolle prosequi ], is the trigger date for his malicious prosecution claim.” 701 F.3d at 1131-32. By “malicious prosecution claim,” the Seventh Circuit meant Starks’s malicious prosecution, wrongful prosecution, and due process claims, which it was discussing collectively. Id. at 1130; see Brooks, 578 F.3d at 579 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug

    ### Response:
    holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rule does not dispose of the case sub judien, however, because Sherwood originally made a motion for judgment at the close of its own evidence, not at the close of its opponent’s evidence. The rationale for holding that merely ""renewing” a motion for judgment does not preserve the issue for appeal is that the original motion for judgment is withdrawn once the party making the motion presents evidence. Smith v. Carr, 189 Md. 338, 56 A.2d 151 (1947); Md. Rule 2-519(c). Because Sherwood had already presented its evidence when it initially moved for judgment, and because it is evident that the reasons for the motion were clear to the trial judge, the issue is preserved. Hartford does not contend otherwise. See Laubach v. Franklin Square Hospital, 79 Md. App. 203, 216, 556 A.2d 682 (1989) (<HOLDING>) (citing Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 283 Md. 284,

    ### Response:
    holding that reference to memorandum previously submitted to court laying out with particularity arguments in support of motion preserves issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Injuries” as a defense and presented expert witnesses who asserted: (1) the collision was one of low impact; and (2) that there was no me (1989) (finding the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of a neuropsychologist that a motorist’s behavioral changes were caused by either a combination of post-traumatic stress disorder and chronic pain syndrome or an organic affective disorder secondary to a mild brain injury — the appellate court stating the dispositive issue was whether the testimony would supply specialized knowledge that would assist the jury in determining a fact in issue). Finally, we find exclusion of the evidence was not harmless error as there was no equivalent testimony presented to this effect. Cf. Bernard v. Lott, 666 So.2d 702 (La.Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in

    ### Response:
    holding the exclusion of a neuropsychologists opinion regarding whether the plaintiff suffered a brain injury on the basis she was not a medical doctor was harmless error because additional medical experts testified about how the results of the neuropsychologists testing supported a finding of a brain injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” See Tex. Ass’n. of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. The purpose of a plea to the jurisdiction is to establish a reason why the merits of the plaintiffs claim should not be reached. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist, 34 S.W.3d at 554. However, “a court deciding a plea to the jurisdiction is not required to look solely to the pleadings but may consider evidence and must do so wh of immunity from liability by the defendant, and thus fails to state a cause of action upon which the relief sought can be granted, and his claim cannot be repled to state a cause of action, the trial court should not permit repleading but should dismiss the suit. See Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 378 (Tex.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Brantley, 365 S.W.3d at 94 (stating

    ### Response:
    holding that where plaintiff reata failed to demonstrate waiver of citys immunity from liability under tort claims act plaintiffs claims were properly dismissed and plaintiff was not entitled to replead
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were not alleged in the indictment, whether he was an organizer or leader should not have been submitted to the jury. Because the jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Soreide was an organizer or leader, and because Soreide was sentenced to 236 months imprisonment, which was below the statutory maximum of 20 years imprisonment, the district court did not unconstitutionally amend the indictment by enhancing Soreide’s sentence based on his role as an organizer or leader. As to Soreide’s argument that the district court failed to make the necessary findings under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we have held that a sentencing court is not obligated to specifically address and analyze on the record every factor set forth in § 3553(a). United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We find that the district court adequately

    ### Response:
    holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court’s] jurisprudence” and that a “burden of production” is placed on the party seeking to rebut the presumption of regularity). Moreover, under settled Virginia law, “[p]rior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence.” Perez v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 724, 730, 652 S.E.2d 95, 98 (2007) (emphasis added) (citing Palmer v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 203, 207, 609 S.E.2d 308, 310 (2005)); see also Wilson v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 250, 254, 578 S.E.2d 831, 833 (2003). Evidence is competent for purposes of proving a prior conviction when that evidence requires “[n]o conjecture or surmise ... to reach [the] conclusion” that the defendant had indeed been convicted of the predicate offense or offenses. Perez, 274 Va. at 730, 652 S.E.2d at 98; cf. Palmer, 269 Va. at 207, 609 S.E.2d at 310 (<HOLDING>); Overbey v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 231, 234,

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may not engage in conjecture or surmise in determining the offense for which a defendant was convicted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the aims of issue preclusion: to promote finality and judicial economy and to prevent inconsistent judicial decisions and endless litigation. Defendants next argue that our reasoning in Scherzinger II does not control here because this case involves the board’s authority to investigate dismissals, while Scherzinger II involved only the board’s authority to order the Scherzinger II custodians’ reinstatement. That distinction misses the point of issue preclusion. Issue preclusion not only prevents a tribunal from deciding an issue that has already been decided, it also prevents a party, and those in privity with that party, from relitigating an issue that was already decided. See Skeen v. Dept. of Human Resources, 171 Or App 557, 560, 17 P3d 526 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 316 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that a prior administrative decision actually decided ultimate factual issues that are essential to plaintiffs present claims and that issue preclusion therefore bars the relitigation of those issues
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d at 863. Thus, our concern when presented with a search-and-seizure claim in the context of contractual consent is that the consent promised under the contract be voluntary. Cf. id. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047-48, 36 L.Ed.2d at 862-63. Generally, contract terms are considered to be consensual or voluntary for the same basic reason that courts normally enforce contracts. Conceptually, courts enforce contracts because they are a product of the free will of the parties who, within limits, are permitted to def 82, 738 P.2d 336, 341 (1987) (“A probationer, unlike a parolee, consents to the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term.”); People v. Mason, 5 Cal.3d 759, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630, 634 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Allen v. State, 258 Ga. 424, 369 S.E.2d 909,

    ### Response:
    holding probationer may waive claims to privacy by agreeing in advance to permit searches at any time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    540 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1345 (N.D.Ga.2007). [ 49 Thus, we must review the facts underlying each of CDC's remaining claims to determine the extent to which each claim is based on misappropriation of information. A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 150 The trial court rejected CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim on the ground that CDC failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Carsey owed CDC a fiduciary duty. The trial court did not address the issue of whether CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by the UTSA. However, Carsey argued below, and continues to argue on appeal, that CDC's breach of fiduciary claim is preempted by the UTSA. ""[An appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any l 4, 904 A.2d 652, 668 (2006) (<HOLDING>). 1153 We therefore affirm the trial court's

    ### Response:
    holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because the factual allegations supporting that claim involved only the misappropriation of  information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    750, 752 (2d Cir. 1949). There is elaboration and analysis of this point in Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 165-169 (1983). 7 The equipment is spoken of as a “mogul,” possibly using that term in a sense derived from a dictionary meaning of a mogul as a locomotive used for hauling heavy trains. 8 Such a case as Hamilton Die Cast, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 508 F.2d 417, 419-420 (7th Cir. 1975), cited by Continental, turning on “property damage,” requires discriminating reading because the term was defined differently in the policy there at bar. A more-or-less standardized form of 1966 was succeeded by a form of 1973. Tinker, supra at 218, 232-235; 1 Long, supra at §§ 11.01, 11.10. See Guerin Contractors, Inc. v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 5 Ark. App. 229, 236 (1982) (<HOLDING>). 9 “Occurrence” was defined in the policy as

    ### Response:
    recognizing the increased breadth of the definition of property damage introduced in the more recent form of policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appellant’s counsel affirmatively stated that she had no objection to the amendment and that appellant waived the ten-day notice afforded at the defendant’s request under article 28.10 of the code of criminal procedure. See Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 28.10(a) (Vernon 1989). An indictment may not be amended on the day of trial. See State v. Murk, 815 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). But in order to preserve the error for appeal, a defendant must object; otherwise, the error is forfeited. Id.; Hoitt v. State, 30 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. refd); Briones v. State, No. 2-04-00250-CR, 2005 WL 1120018, at *2 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth May 12, 2005, no pet.) (mem.op.) (not designated for publication); see also Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 768, 772 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Garrett v. State, 161 S.W.3d 664, 669

    ### Response:
    recognizing that article 2810c provides that indictment or information may not be amended over defendants objection as to form or substance if indictment or information charges defendant with additional or different offense or if substantial rights of defendant are prejudiced
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of retaliation Bell must first present evidence establishing a prima facie case — she has failed to do so. Specifically, Bell has not, and cannot demonstrate that she was terminated because of the EEOC claim she filed. Bell contends that the fact that her termination came seven months after her EEOC claim provides evidence of the causal connection. Mere timing alone is insufficient in this instance to satisfy the causation element of the prima facie case. B Even were a prima facie case established, Bell has failed to adequately refute the Bank’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Bank of America contends that it eliminated Bell and Barnhart’s positions due to restructuring in the corporation. See E.E.O.C. v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1181 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Thus it falls to Bell to demonstrate that

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an employers decision to eliminate a position is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a position or employee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    D.C.Code Ann. § 32-505 (providing medical review committee records a qualified privilege from discovery); Fla.Stat.ch. 766.101(5) & 395.0191(8) (1993) (stating that ""the investigations, proceedings, and records of the [medical review committee] shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence”); Ga.Code Ann. § 31-7-143 (1998) (""the proceedings and records of medical review committees shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action”); Ill.Comp.Stat.Ann. § 5/8— 2101 (West 1992) (stating records of medical committees intended to reduce morbidity and mortality are privileged); Md.Health Occ. CodeAnn § 14-501 (1991 & 1994 Supp.) (providing that records of medical review committees are not discoverable); Tenn Code Ann. § 63-6-219 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Tex Health & Safety Code Ann. § 161.032(a)

    ### Response:
    recognizing confidentiality essential to function of medical peer review committees and to improvement of health care and protecting the records of such committees from discovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relief, because it was filed almost five years after Dearman pled guilty. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015) (a motion for post-conviction relief must be filed within three years after the entry of a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea). The court also noted that the underlying statute of limitations issue was discussed on the record at Dearman’s plea hearing. At her plea hearing, Dear-man’s attorney acknowledged that the prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitations because a warrant was issued for her arrest within about six weeks of the offense. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-1-7 (Rev. 2015) (“A prosecution may be commenced, within the meaning of Section 99-1-5 by the issuance of a warrant .... ”); see also Conerly v. State, 607 So.2d 1153, 1158 (Miss. 1992) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 3. The circuit court correctly ruled that

    ### Response:
    holding that a valid guilty plea waives a statute of limitations defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court may not dismiss the Plaintiff’s Complaint absent a showing of exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Herbstein, 743 F.Supp. at 188 (finding Argentine case was at preliminary stage where formal investigation into possible misappropriation had just begun and there had not yet been any determination of actual wrongdoing). The Defendant by the Swiss District Court regarding Pablo’s liability on Ms. Madanes’ contractual claim would not dispose of the RICO claims in this action. For example, determining that Pablo is guilty on the contractual claim does not answer the question of whether he managed an international conspiracy; nor does a finding of innocence necessarily mean that no such conspiracy existed, especially among the other Defendants. See id.; Herbstein, 743 F.Supp. at 188 (<HOLDING>). The principal cases upon which the Defendants

    ### Response:
    holding that claim of misappropriation was distinguishable from claim of fraudulent inducement even though underlying facts were same
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indicates “[a] deliberate- and contumacious disregard of the court’s authority[,] ... bad faith, or a willful disregard or gross indifference to an order of the court, or conduct which evinces deliberate callousness.” Mercer, 443 So.2d at 946 (citations omitted). In the instant cause, the trial court dismissed Bonilla’s first lawsuit with prejudice because Bonilla failed to attend several court-ordered depositions. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the record in this case does not contain sufficient evidence to indicate that Bonilla exhibited the sort of wilful disregard for the court’s orders which would support the sanction of dismissal, either with or without prejudice. In addition, throughout the time that Bonilla was unavailable for deposition, Apollo had been able DCA 1979) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, because the record supports

    ### Response:
    holding that dismissal is not warranted where the plaintiff was unable to attend courtordered depositions because the military would not grant him leave time to comply with the courts orders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    addressed only Dr. Keszler’s conduct and did not mention SADI or implicate its behavior. Id. at 671. The supreme court rejected this argument, holding that “[w]hen a party’s alleged health care liability is purely vicarious, a report that adequately implicates the actions of that party’s agents or employees is sufficient.” Id. at 671-72. Although Gardner involved a corporation rather than a professional association, we conclude that its reasoning is equally applicable here. Therefore, we reject OGA’s assertion, at least concerning “purely vicarious” liability claims, that Dr. Brewer’s expert reports concerning Drs. Jacobs and Gunn did not sufficiently implicate OGA. See id.; Ctr. for Neurological Disorders, P.A. v. George, 261 S.W.3d 285, 295 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Here, OGA did not object to Dr. Brewer’s

    ### Response:
    holding that expert report that sufficiently addressed certain claims against doctor employed by professional association was sufficient as to claims against professional association based on doctors negligence because the doctors negligence is imputed to the association under the professional association act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or the lodestar method in calculating fee awards. See Rawlings, 9 F.3d at 516-17; Cardizem, 218 F.R.D. at 532. However, the Sixth Circuit has observed a “trend towards adoption of a percentage of the fund method in [common fund] cases.” Rawlings, 9 F.3d at 515; In re Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 398 F.3d 778, 780 (6th Cir.2005); see also § 21D(a)(6) of the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (“Total attorneys’ fees and expenses award by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class shall not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class.”) As the court observed in Fournier v. PFS Invs., 997 F.Supp. 828 (E.D.Mich.1998): The lodestar warding 30% fee); Rio Hair, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20440 at *56, 1996 WL 780512at *18 (<HOLDING>); In re Visteon Corp. ERISA Litig., No.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the acceptable range of fee awards is 20 to 50 of the common fund
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Appeals, 677 A.2d 350 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996); City of Lancaster v. Lancaster County, 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 476, 599 A.2d 289 (1991). 33 . Although two appellee briefs were filed, one on behalf of the Pierce plaintiffs and one on behalf of the Clifton plaintiffs, we will present their arguments collectively. 34 . Although not directly addressing the contours of a facial challenge, we have addressed the differences between facial and as-applied challenges in a number of scenarios, often for procedural purposes. See, e.g., Phila. Entm't & Dev. Partners v. City of Philadelphia, 594 Pa. 468, 937 A.2d 385, 392 n. 7 (2007) (""[A]s-applied challenges require application of the ordinance to be ripe, facial challenges are different, and ripe upon mere enactment of the ordinance.”); Beattie, 907 A.2d at 527-29 (<HOLDING>); Lehman v. Pa. State Police, 576 Pa. 365, 839

    ### Response:
    holding that court can exercise equity jurisdiction over taxpayers challenge that property assessment system is unconstitutional facially or asapplied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vand.L.Rev. 265, 267-82 (1981), cited in R.A.V., — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2563 (Stevens, J., concurring in the result). Congress has passed numerous laws that proscribe threats. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 871 (threats against the president and successors to the presidency); id. § 876 (threats by mail to injure or kidnap); id. § 1513 (retaliatory threats against informants and witnesses); id. § 115 (threats to assault, kidnap, or murder federal officials). These statutes have been consistently upheld as constitutional, despite the fact that they criminalize utterances because of their expressive content. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 1400-01, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762

    ### Response:
    holding that the first amendment does not protect true threats against the president
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the corporation and hardly ever harm it.” Post at 893. But the dissent offers no support for this broad proposition, and we do not agree that this is a valid assumption. The dissent confuses the corporation’s interests with the individual interests of its majority shareholders. But a corporate officer or director’s duty is to the corporation and its shareholders collectively, not any individual shareholder or subgroup of shareholders, even if that subgroup represents a majority of the ownership. See, e.g., Redmon, 202 S.W.3d at 233; Somers, 295 S.W.3d at 11; Lindley, 349 S.W.3d at 124; Hoggett, 971 S.W.2d at 488. We do not determine the best interest of the corporation by examining only the interest of its majority shareholder^). See Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>). Refusal to pay dividends, paying majority

    ### Response:
    holding that corporate officer and majority shareholder could be held liable for acting in a manner that served his interests at the expense of the other shareholders because his interests and the corporations were not necessarily aligned
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the examination room during the questioning of Ms. Rodriguez certainly did not undermine the fairness or the validity of the trial. He was able to see and hear the entire interrogation of Carmen Rodriguez, and his attorney was present in the examination room. There is no indication in the record that the petitioner was impeded from consulting with counsel either before or after the examination. Accordingly, his exclusion from the examination room, assuming it was an error, is subject to harmless error analysis. See Feliciano, 223 F.3d at 112 (conducting portion of voir dire outside hearing of defendants subject to harmless error analysis where defendants present during entire jury selection process and were provided with opportunity to consult with counsel); Yarborough, 101 F.3d at 898 (<HOLDING>); Vilella, 49 F.Supp.2d at 238 (colloquy

    ### Response:
    holding brief hearing not part of trial proper in defendants absence subject to harmless error standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court’s holding in Reese indicates that escape is a continuing offense. A review of cases in other jurisdictions shows support for this characterization of the escape crime. Escape is considered a continuing offense by those courts — including the United States Supreme Court — that require an escapee to immediately submit to the authorities after an escape before the escapee can rely on a necessity defense to an escape charge. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413, 100 S.Ct. 624, 636, 62 L.Ed.2d 575, 592 (1980) (“[W]e think it clear beyond peradventure that escape from federal custody ... is a continuing offense and that an escapee can be held liable for failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure.”); Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346, 350 (Alaska Ct.App.1984) (<HOLDING>); Harbin v. State, 581 So.2d 1263, 1266

    ### Response:
    holding that because the necessity defense requires a defendant to turn himself in escape is a continuing offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Unlawful use of handgun in commission of crime.—Any person who shall use a handgun in the commission of any felony or any crime of violence as defined in § 441 of this article, shall be guilty of a separate misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed by virtue of commission of said felony or misdemeanor ... be sentenced to the Maryland Division of Correction[.] Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol., Supp. 1982), Art. 27, § 36B(d). It is manifest that the General Assembly intended that a separate sentence be imposed upon any person convicted of a violation of Section 36B(d), “in addition to any other sentence imposed by virtue of commission of said felony or misdemeanor.” Id.; see, e.g., Whack v. State, 288 Md. 137, 145-49, 416 A.2d 265 (1980) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 990, 101 S.Ct. 1688,

    ### Response:
    holding that separate sentences may be imposed for a violation of section 36bd and the predicate offense where both convictions were the result of the same act so long as the charges are brought in a single trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an attorney’s duty to provide adequate representation does not encompass the duty to foresee and protect a client from his own possible suicidal tendencies. Citing a string of cases which rigidly follow McPeake, common carrier defendant COLTS urges us to come to the same conclusion regarding COLTS responsibility to suicide decedent George Hudalc. Pennsylvania state courts and federal courts applying Pennsylvania law appear to have consistently relied on the McPeake decision. See Ferris v. Cleveland, Civil Action No. 3:10-1302, 2012 WL 2564782 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (granting a motion in limine that excluded testimony of a neuropsychologist to identify the causal relationship between a motor vehicle accident and the decedents suicide); Puza v. Carbon County, 586 F.Supp.2d 271 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (<HOLDING>); Cooper v. Frankford Health Care System, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that architects who designed prison were not liable for pretrial detainees suicide
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    154 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir.1998) (quotations and citations omitted). As a general rule, the grids may not be used conclusively if the claimant has nonexertional impairments that limit the ability to do the full range of work within a classification. See Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir.1993); see also 20 C.F .R. § 404.1569a(c)(2) (stating that “[i]f your impairment(s) and related symptoms, such as pain, only affect your ability to perform the nonexertional aspects of work-related activities, the [grids] do not direct factual conclusions of disabled or not disabled”). However, they may be used to direct a conclusion if the claimant’s nonexertional impairments do not significantly reduce the underlying job base. See Evans v. Chater, 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). This is because only significant

    ### Response:
    holding that the ability to perform a substantial majority of work in rfc assessment suffices for purposes of grids
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a debtor-in-possession. The Debtor has stated that he delegated to Mr. Kaplan the responsibility for preparing his financial disclosures on behalf of his estate. Transcript 8/28/2012, 54:3-56:7; Audio recording dated 10/15/2012 @ 12:47 pm, Bky. No. 12-11063MDC; Audio recording dated 10/15/2012 @ 3:14 pm, Bky. No. 12-11063MDC. Mr. Kaplan is indubitably providing accounting services necessary for the administration of the Debtor’s estate. See, e.g., In re Renaissance Residential of Countryside, LLC, 423 B.R. 848, 860-61 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2010). However, from this Court’s review of the record extant at the time of its decision to appoint a trustee, it did not appear that Mr. Kap-lan was an employee of the Debtor. See, e.g., F/S AirLease II, Inc. v. Simon, 844 F.2d 99, 108 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Rather, it appeared that Mr. Kaplan was an

    ### Response:
    recognizing  327b not applicable because party was not employed by the debtor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1997) (during a chase, officers saw passenger open vehicle door and drop a Crown Royal bag, typically used to contain illegal drugs, out of vehicle). 38 . The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that, where reasonable suspicion does' exist, ”[o]ur decisions make clear that questions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 186-88, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 2458-59, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)). ’’[I]f there are articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a criminal offense, that person may be stopped in order to identify him, to question h (Colo.2002) (<HOLDING>); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d 220, 273

    ### Response:
    holding officers request for passengers identification during stop constituted lawful consensual encounter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judge. In this medical malpractice action, Raymond Santa Lucia appeals from the cost judgment rendered after a jury verdict in his favor. He first contends the trial court abused its discretion in excluding from the cost judgment fees for Lawrence Forman and Dr. Hartley Mellish, the experts who provided testimony on the specific economic losses he incurred as a result of his injuries. The appellees properly concede Santa Lucia is entitled to recover these fees to the extent he can establish the fees were reasonable and necessary. See Payne v. Spier, 562 So.2d 440, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). Santa Lucia also argues the trial court erred

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover reasonable expert fees for a rehabilitation expert and economist
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for possession of thirty-five pounds of marijuana at an unspecified time in the past. We question whether this one-time possession charge constitutes an “extensive history” or “trafficking.” Compare NMSA 1978, § 30-31-20(A)(3) and (B) (2006) (defining trafficking as possession of “a controlled substance enumerated in Schedule I or II that is a narcotic drug; ... a controlled substance analog of a controlled substance enumerated in Schedule I or II that is a narcotic drug; or . . . methamphetamine, its salts, isomers and salts of isomers” with intent to distribute and stating that such trafficking is punishable as a first or second degree felony), with § 30-31-22(A)(1)(a) and (b) (defining possession with intent to distribute marijuana in an amount less than one hundred 6th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). {24} The State cites to State v. Lara, 110

    ### Response:
    holding that officers were not justified in conducting a protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest despite the defendants alleged involvement with narcotics and possession of weapons because the defendant did not resist and there was no noise or other evidence suggesting anyone else was present in the house
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or none at all."" Id. at 110, 69 S.Ct. 463 (citing Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157, 160, 33 S.Ct. 66, 57 L.Ed. 164 (1912)). 52 . In support of this conclusion, the Court referenced the following precedent: (1) Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) (reaffirming prior holdings that local governments may enact legislation intended to maintain the character and aesthetics of a municipality.); (2) Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974) (upholding an ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings on the grounds that a city's police powers encompass maintaining esthetics and societal values.); (3) Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (<HOLDING>) 53 . (Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ.

    ### Response:
    holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    affairs that did not include the regulatory scheme, and therefore, Defendant cannot claim any adverse impact to his investment expectations. Loveladies Harbor Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed.Cir.1994). With respect to the final factor concerning the “character of the government action,” the Court concludes that this factor weighs against a conclusion that the Government’s regulation in this case amounts to a taking. In considering the character of the government action, courts consider (1) the extent to which the action is retroactive, and (2) whether the action targets a particular individual. In this case, the Act is not being applied retroactively, and Defendant has not demonstrated that he is being singled out for application of the Act. See Brace, 72 Fed.Cl. at 356 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court concludes that

    ### Response:
    recognizing that act and wetlands regulations are generally applicable to all similarly situated property owners and cannot be viewed as being directed solely at the plaintiffs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issues relating to denial of due process because of prosecutorial misconduct and a Sixth Amendment violation of being denied counsel during pre-trial proceedings were not properly raised below); White v. State, 324 Md. 626, 640, 598 A.2d 187, 194 (1991) (citing Md. Rule 8-131(a) in holding that a claim that the defendants were deprived of their constitutional right to present witnesses in their defense was not properly before the Court because the argument was not made to the trial court); In re John H., 293 Md. 295, 303, 443 A.2d 594, 598 (1982) (citing Rule 885, a predecessor of Md. Rule 8-131(a), not reaching the issue of whether a statute was constitutional because the issue of constitutionality of the statute was not argued to the trial judge n. 2, 772 A.2d 1260, 1266 n. 2 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Rule 8-131(a) states: “RULE 8-131. SCOPE OF

    ### Response:
    recognizing in dicta the court of special appeals howell holding that double jeopardy claims may not be raised for the first time on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement constitutes inadmissible hearsay). Therefore, the district court was under no obligation to independently evaluate the articles and studies upon which Mr. Firstenberg’s experts relied in reaching their conclusions. See Wilde v. Westland Dev. Co., 2010-NMCA-085, ¶ 28, 148 N.M. 627, 241 P.3d 628 (stating that the district court may not consider inadmissible hearsay in deciding a summary judgment motion). {29} Rather, to the extent that Mr. Firstenberg wished to rely upon the contents of the articles and studies to demonstrate general causation, it was incumbent upon him to establish, via his experts, that the articles constituted reliable scientific authority. See Baerwald v. Flores, 1997-NMCA-002, ¶ 18, 122 N.M. 679, 930 P.2d 816 (<HOLDING>); see also Andrews, 2011-NMCA-032, ¶ 9

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an expert may rely on an article because it is the expert who determines based on study and experience whether the article is reliable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    179, 183, 86 P.3d 139 (2004), our Supreme Court held that the 2002 amendments to the SRA require that sentencing courts include previously “washed out” prior convictions in calculating a defendant’s offender score at sentencing for crimes committed on or after June 13, 2002. Since Winings committed his crime on March 24, 2003, the sentencing court properly included his previously “washed out” convictions. ¶43 A majority of the panel having determined that the following portion of the opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. ¶44 Affirmed. Quinn-Brintnall, C.J., and Houghton, J., concur. 1 The minute orders (one minute order pertains to the first degree burglary counts P.3d 269 (2001) (<HOLDING>). And in State v. Royse, 66 Wn.2d 552, 555-57,

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to identify the defendant in the information is an omission of an essential element because the primary purpose of the charging document is to inform the defendant of the nature of the accusations brought against him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the same reasons set forth in the District Court’s opinion, we reject Bailey-El’s contention that personal jurisdiction exists with respect to the USP Lee defendants. As the District Court correctly noted, there is no provision for nationwide sendee of process under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and none of the USP Lee defendants has sufficient “minimum contacts” with New Jersey to confer personal jurisdiction. The District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Bailey-El’s complaint against Harrell Watts, the National Inmate Appeals Administrator for the BOP, holding that Watts enjoyed quasi-judicial immunity. Bailey-El argues that the Dis trict Court should have conducted a qualified immunity analysis under Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 206-07, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (<HOLDING>). We need not decide whether the doctrine of

    ### Response:
    holding that prison disciplinary hearing committee members are entitled to qualified immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the late arraignment or from any defect in the arraignment colloquy itself. Therefore, he has shown no violation of Idaho Criminal Rule 10 and no deprivation of due process in the arraignment that was conducted. Herrera also asserts that the district court erred by allowing the late filing of the amended information. His appellate argument implies that until the day of trial, he was entirely unaware that the amended information containing a persistent violator al legation had been filed by the prosecutor without leave of court. In the proceedings below, defense counsel never expressly said that he had not informed Herrera of the sentence enhancement allegation in the amended information that had been improperly filed months earlier. Herrera neverthel P.3d 397, 399-400 (Ct.App.2008) (<HOLDING>). Herrera has shown no trial prejudice

    ### Response:
    holding that reversal for late disclosure of a states witness requires trial prejudice and defendants claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the state could not prove its case without the witness does not demonstrate prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim under the ADA, we reject Russell’s disparate treatment argument vis-a-vis her sex discrimination claim under Title VII. As explained above, in accordance with facts not genuinely disputed, we cannot reasonably infer that the infractions committed by Drew and Evans were of comparable seriousness to Russell’s. C. Retaliation claim Finally, Russell argues that the District Court erred in holding that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her retaliation claim. She contends that her retaliation claim is reasonably related to, or grows out of, the substance of her allegations in the administrative charge and therefore was sufficiently exhausted. Brief for Appellant at 55-57 (citing, e.g., Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>)). In support of this argument, Russell

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a claim is administratively exhausted if it is specifically stated in grows out of or is reasonably related to the substance of the allegations in an administrative charge or complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has “jurisdiction to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting to ... a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2012). A party is an “interested party” with standing to bring suit under' 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) if the party “is an actual or prospective bidder whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract.” Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 704 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2013). A bidder has a direct economic interest if the alleged errors in the procurement caused it to suffer a competitive injury or prejudice. Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). In a post-award bid protest, the protestor

    ### Response:
    holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: James Hampton Williams, II, was convicted by a jury on several counts related to his participation in a large-scale, ten-year long conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, and was sentenced to life in prison. Specifically, Williams was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006); one count of conspiracy to launder money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006); one count of cocaine distribution, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) 27 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312

    ### Response:
    recognizing that its sixth amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rise to a recovery under state law even in the absence of the FDCA.” Id. Courts have struggled with applying the Supreme Court’s preemption rulings to cases involving the Infuse device. Though they uniformly agree that the PMA process imposes requirements on the Infuse device, both the second step of the Riegel analysis and the scope of Buckman have prompted disagreement. This Court’s view is that some of these cases have read Riegel and Buckman — especially Buck-man — too broadly, see, e.g., Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 921 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1219 (W.D.Okla.2013) (finding that fraud claims are impliedly preempted by Buckman because “even the concept of ‘off-label use’ is a creature of the FDCA”), while others have read Riegel too narrowly, see, e.g., Ramirez, 961 F.Supp.2d at 988-92 (<HOLDING>). At least one court has read Riegel and

    ### Response:
    holding that riegels shield drops if plaintiff alleges offlabel promotion and that most claims including design defect claims evade preemption
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (including changing leadership and terminating some employees) and then merged with PA’s Information Technology Infrastructure group. (Moynihan Dep. at 78-79, 130-131.). At that point, the record shows that Mr. Moynihan put Patrick Kelly, the Head of the Information Technology Infrastructure practice, in charge of implementing the RIF, see Moynihan Dep. at 130-131, and Mr. Kelly testified that he decided to include Ms. Barnett in the RIF because her trade practice did not fit with the Transportation Group’s practice. (Kelly Dep. at 223-224.). The court finds that PA has produced sufficient evidence to indicate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Ms. Barnett. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259-260, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The burden is now on Ms. Barnett to produce

    ### Response:
    holding that in producing nondiscriminatory reasons for its challenged action the employer is not obligated to support these reasons with objective evidence sufficient to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence was sufficient to support Rawlins’s convictions for first-degree aggravated rape and child abuse. However, the Superior Court committed constitutional error in permitting the People to read the prior testimony of J.J. and Melendez into the record at Rawlins’s second trial because the Superior Court erred in finding that they were unavailable for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Further, this Court cannot hold that this error was harmless since the People failed to file a brief in this case, thus failing to meet its burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we vacate the Superior Court’s January 16, 2014 judgment and remand for a new trial. 2 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004) (<HOLDING>). 3 Prior to reading JJ.’s and Melendez’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the admission of testimonial statements against a defendant is unconstitutional when the declarant does not appear at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interest that might justify contribution limits-the interest in preventing ""circumvention of contribution limits designed to combat the corrupting influence of large contributions to candidates."" 533 U.S. at 456 n. 18, 121 S.Ct. 2351; see also id. at 456, 121 S.Ct. 2351; [Federal Election Commission v.] Beaumont, 589 U.S. [146] at 155, 128 S.Ct. [2200] at 2207 [156 L.Ed.2d 179 (20083) (""[Rlecent cases have recognized that restricting contributions by various organizations hedges against their use as conduits for 'cireumvention of [valid] contribution limits. "" (quoting Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 456 & n. 18, 121 S.Ct. 2851) (second alteration in original)); Cal. Med. Ass'n [v. Federal Election Commission], 458 U.S. [182] at 197-99, 101 S.Ct. 2712 [69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981)] (<HOLDING>); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35-36, 88, 96 S.Ct. 612.

    ### Response:
    holding that limits on contributions to multicandidate committees are an appropriate means by which congress could seek to protect the integrity of the contribution restrictions upheld by this court in buckley
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jurisdiction the federal courts apply federal law as to matters of procedure”). As a result, any differences in procedural rules are irrelevant to the instant case. For this reason, we decline to consider the procedural discrepancies highlighted by appellants in our determination of whether the issues in the present appeal are identical to the issues presented in Canady I. Appellants additionally argue that there is no identity of issues because the state law claims covered a different time period than the federal law claims. We find this argument unpersuasive. The difference in time periods does not affect the underlying nature of the claims at issue, and therefore the difference in time periods is irrelevant in determining whether the issues were identical. See Xiong, 195 F.3d at 427 (<HOLDING>). Because appellants do not assert any

    ### Response:
    holding that difference in claims alleging the same violations over different time periods are immaterial in determining identity of issues for purposes of applying the relitigation exception to the antiinjunction act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as to preclude presentation of the merits of the case should not be assessed absent a party’s flagrant bad faith or counsel’s callous disregard for the responsibilities of discovery under the rules.” Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515, 87 S.Ct. 625, 628, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967), the United States Supreme Court determined that a penalty may be anything that makes the assertion of a constitutional right costly. If used properly, the privilege against self-incrimination is not a proper basis for a death-penalty sanction. The Texas Supreme Court has had occasion to revisit TransAmerican, and continues to insist that death-penalty sanctions are inappropriate absent a finding of bad faith. See Otis Elevator Co. v. Parmelee, 850 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex.1993) (<HOLDING>); Remington Arms Co., Inc. v. Caldwell, 850

    ### Response:
    holding deathpenalty sanctions inappropriate where party inadvertently failed to comply with courts order and nothing in the record  even approaches the flagrant bad faith or abuse necessary for the imposition of such sanctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    form or ceremony was necessary for dedication of land, and that title to land dedicated to public use inured to the benefit of the donee, i.e., the City of New Orleans). Similarly, Plaintiffs admit that “there is no doubt .the Beauregard Equestrian Monument is inside City Park,” R. Doc. 139-3 at 3, and there is also “no question that the property of City Park ... has always belonged to the City, of New Orleans.” See City of New Orleans v. State, 443 So.2d 562, 570 (La. 1983). Similarly, the Jefferson Davis Monument is located in the neutral ground of Jefferson Davis Parkway, which is also public property. See La. Civ. Code art. 450. Finally, State ex rel. Singelmann v. Morrison makes clear that the City has authority to remove the Monuments. 57 So.2d 238, 244 (La. Ct. App. 1952) (<HOLDING>). In all, the City owns the. property upon

    ### Response:
    holding that a private association could not erect a memorial on public property without consent of the governing authority that the location manner and design of statues is within the discretion of the governing authorities of the city of new orleans and that the city of new orleans can require removal of monuments located on public property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the confidential informant was a buyer or recipient because the enhancement applies with respect to the undercover officer who was undisputedly a buyer and recipient. JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur in full in Parts I — III of the opinion. With respect to Part TV, I would caution against deciding this case on the rationale utilized in the majority court opinion. ""While the opinion correctly states that the individual’s possession of the firearm in question need not be actually unlawful, it overlooks the fact that the defendant must have had knowledge or reason to believe that the individual to whom the firearm was transferred had certain prior convictions or is under a criminal justice sentence. See United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 639, 643-44 (11th Cir.2015) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Howard, 539 Fed.Appx. 904,

    ### Response:
    holding that the government failed to prove the defendants actions fell under the unlawful possession prong bjecause the government failed to present any evidence that the defendant knew that his conduct would result in a firearm being transferred to an individual falling under the narrow guidelines definition of an individual in unlawful possession
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    term of the probation, the trial court should be able to weigh that violation in its reevaluation of whether the defendant should be or should have been granted probation.... Once a defendant has been sentenced, the court may revoke or modify probation, upon a proper showing of a violation, at any time before the completion of the probationary period. Gardner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 398, 401 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (internal citations and footnote omitted). Pugh claims the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation because her only probation violation was drinking vodka. Courts of this state have held on numerous occasions that the use of alcohol or drugs was sufficient to support the trial court's revocation of probation. See, e.g., Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 552 (Ind.1999) (<HOLDING>), reh'g denied; Crump, 740 N.E.2d at 573

    ### Response:
    holding defendants positive urinalysis test for marijuana use was sufficient to support revocation of defendants probation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mere anxiety or annoyance. Because of our ruling in Lopez, which was well argued before the trial court in this case, I would hold that the court erred in its application of the emotional distress prong of the stalking statute to the findings in this case. 127 In reviewing the trial court's application of the second element of the stalking statute to the facts in this case, the findings support the trial court's conclusion that Bayles knew or should have known that his conduct would cause emotional distress to Bailey. However, the court did not specifically find, in support of this element, that plaintiff suffered from more than anxiety and annoyance, perhaps because plaintiff put on no objective evidence thereof. CJ Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 973-75 (Utah 1993) (<HOLDING>); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1317-18

    ### Response:
    holding that emotional distress requires a showing of either physical symptoms or mental illness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    failing to “properly investigate any avenues of defense” — other claims, such as the claim that counsel failed to move to suppress the drugs and failed to contact the owners of the building, present issues upon which the District Court could have proceeded. Furthermore, some of Mercer’s other claims, such as the claim that the prosecution had bribed Yians and Hart, are not the type of claims that Mercer could realistically support at this stage of the proceedings; while Mercer may well fail to meet his burden of proof on these claims, he alleged sufficient facts to withstand summary dismissal. Therefore, we believe that the District Court should consider anew the various grounds for relief, and dismiss only those grounds that are truly vague and conclusory. See Thomas, 221 F.3d at 437 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we will summarily vacate the

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing all 26 grounds in a  2255 motion where only certain claims were vague and conclusory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as to whether there was contact between the bus and Requester’s vehicle, the adjuster nonetheless reviewed them as part of the noncriminal investigation into Requester’s claim against the Authority. The plain language of the noncriminal investigation exemption is also instructive. As Section 708(b)(17)(ii) of the RTKL provides, a record is exempt when it relates to a noncriminal investigation and includes “investigative materials.” The noncriminal investigation at issue (1) commenced when Requester filed a property damage claim with the Authority involving one of its buses; (2) was conducted pursuant to the Authority’s self-insurance right and power; and (3) was tantamount to a systematic or searching inquiry and/or a detailed examination. Dep’t of Health, 4 A.3d at 810-811 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the recordings, which the

    ### Response:
    holding that an investigation means a systematic or searching inquiry a detailed examination or an official probe
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could constitute objective indicia of Israel’s knowledge of the underlying felony that the State was alleging that he committed. At best, the record reveals that Israel suspected that the underlying felony alleged was Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree and made arguments based on that suspicion in his motion to dismiss; such suspicion does not rise to the lev ulars was supplied by the State and there is nothing in the record to suggest that any materials provided in response to Israel’s discovery requests identified the underlying felony alleged as part of the HRS § 134-6(a) charge. Moreover, the State cannot rely on the mere possibility that the underlying felony might have been revealed by a bill of particulars or via discovery. Cf. Robins, 66 Haw. at 316, 660 P.2d at 42 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we hold that the State failed to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the facts that a bill of particulars is discretionary with the judge pursuant to hrpp rule 7a and that other discovery rules are limited in scope might prevent a defendant from discovering the states position
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rationale that an em ployer’s duty to provide a safe work place is inseparable from its general duties as an employer. See, e.g., Royster v. Montanez, 134 Cal. App.3d 362, 184 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1982); Holzworth v. Fuller, 122 N.H. 643, 448 A.2d 394 (1982); Gore v. Amoco Production Co., 616 S.W.2d 289 (Tex.Civ.App.1981); Stone v. United States Steel Corp., 384 So.2d 17 (Ala.1980). We conclude that this case falls within the latter category of cases, where application of the doctrine would undermine the policy sought to be achieved by the Workers’ Compensation Law. Therefore, we refuse to apply the doctrine here and affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of Atlantic Federal on the wrongful death claims. See Doe v. St. Michael’s Medical Center, 184 N.J. Super. 1, 445 A.2d 40 (1982) (<HOLDING>); see also Katchis v. Miami Heart Institute,

    ### Response:
    holding that workers compensation statute barred suit of medical technologist who was allegedly raped and robbed in dormitory room which she rented from the hospital at which she was employed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of any position at the Inco plant, let alone those that were vacant or otherwise available to Plaintiff at the limited time in question. Kentucky law simply does not require the placement of a disabled worker in a job where he poses a hazard to himself or others as a form of reasonable accommodation. Blanton’s primary argument on appeal is that there still remain material issues of fact that preclude summary judgment. We are not persuaded. First, although Blanton was not estopped from pursuing his claim by reason of his representations of total disability to the Workers’ Compensation Commission and the Social Security Administration, what he related about his inability to work at the pertinent time was an important factor in the grant of summary judgment. See Blanton, 123 F.3d at 917 (<HOLDING>). Blanton had been a long-time faithful,

    ### Response:
    holding that previous sworn statements made by a plaintiff in his request for disability benefits is a material factor for the court to consider in determining whether he is entitled to ada relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. See id. In addition, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993). Rather, t d injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision of this court. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992); Tozzi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301 (D.C.Cir.2001) (recognizing that upgrade classification change from “reasonably anticipated” to “known” carcinogen caused some economic injury that could be redressed by reversing the classification). An organization has standing only if it meets a separate three-prong test. See Truckers United for Safety v. Mead, 251 F.3d 183 (D.C.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Such standing exists where the organization’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a motor carriers association has standing to sue on behalf of its members for department of transportations alleged abuses of agency authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    318, 66 S.Ct. 154; see Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (“Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.”). ¶ 15 International Shoe and the cases immediately following it addressed only in personam jurisdiction. Thus, the sole constitutional issue when a state sought to exercise either in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction continued to be the one posed by Pennoyer: Was the relevant property within the jurisdiction of the state? See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958) (<HOLDING>). The hoary doe trine of Harris v. Balk, 198

    ### Response:
    holding that the basis of in rem jurisdiction is the presence of the subject property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is also off the mark, for the accounting use of supervisory goodwill to meet the reserve requirements under 12 CFR § 563.13 was “critical to make the transaction possible in the first place.” 518 U.S. at 850, 116 S.Ct. 2432. A contract was formed as it was in Winstar. Mola’s H-(e)3 application, the negotiations, the issuance of the certificate of “supervisory case,” and the various confirming documents, verified the contractual arrangement. See, e.g., Fifth Third Bank, 402 F.3d at 1235 (“The totality of. the evidence and the circumstances demonstrate that the parties intend to and did create contractual obligations which included the utilization of supervisory goodwill as an accounting treatment for capital compliance.”); La Van v. United States, 382 F.3d 1340, 1346-47 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); LaSalle Talman Bank, F.S.B. v. United States,

    ### Response:
    holding that an impliedinfact contract was established between the government and the acquiring thrift as evidenced by an internal memorandum the treatment of goodwill was at the epicenter of the conversion process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assertion of jurisdiction over all co-conspirators, residents and nonresidents, based upon their involvement in a conspiracy which occurred within the forum. Under the conspiracy theory, the plaintiff must: (1) make a prima facie factual showing of a conspiracy (i.e., point to evidence showing the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant’s knowing participation in that conspiracy); (2) allege specific facts warranting the inference that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy; and (3) show that the defendant’s co-conspirator committed a tor-tious act pursuant to the conspiracy in the forum. Kohler Co. v. Kohler International, Ltd., 196 F.Supp.2d 690 (N.D.III.2002). See also American Land Program, Inc. v. Bo-naventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, N.V., 710 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Plaintiff alleges as a “fourth

    ### Response:
    recognizing requirement that defendant conspired to commit an overt act in state in furtherance of the conspiracy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    298 S.W.3d at 638 (citations omitted). 34 . Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557. 35 . Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2795, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). 36 . Nichols, 379 S.W.3d at 381-82 (citations omitted). 37 . Sw. Country Enters., Inc. v. Lucky Lady Oil Co., 991 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied). 38 . Id. 39 . Id. 40 . Id. 41 . Id. at 493-94; see also Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(B), 33.2; Tex.R. Evid. 103(a)(2). 42 . Sw. Country Enters., 991 S.W.2d at 494. 43 . Enbridge Pipelines (E.Tex.j LP. v. Avinger Timber, LLC, 386 S.W.3d 256, 262 (Tex.2012) (citing Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 558; Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.19 W.2d 147, 150 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 54 . See Gen. Motors v. Burry, 203 S.W.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court properly excluded doctors testimony that some of plaintiffs symptoms could be associated with alcoholism or alcohol withdrawal when no competent evidence indicated plaintiff was alcoholic or suffered from alcohol withdrawal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    property to the seller. Consequently, buyers argue that the February 24, 2013 transfer by the seller to Scenic View Farms, a de facto partnership, was not only unnecessary, but in fact transferred title to the property to Albert Misciagna and Peter Martin, and acted to frustrate, if not prevent, the transfer of good and marketable title to the property by seller to buyers as required by the agreement. In reviewing this history, we agree with the buyers’ assessment of the law, but disagree that seller acted in bad faith, finding instead that seller’s reliance on the advice of counsel was in good faith, albeit in error. “A deed that purports to convey real estate to a nonexistent corporation has no effect.” Borough of Elizabeth v. Aim Sher Corporation, 462 A.2d 811, 812 (Pa. Super. 1983) (<HOLDING>)', see also Lester Associates v. Commonwealth,

    ### Response:
    holding that where an owner of property deeded the property to a corporation which had not been incorporated no articles of incorporation having been filed and which did not have any de facto existence before the filing of articles of incorporation over a year later the transfer was void ab initio
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    238 (stating that ""the argument by a trial counsel must be viewed within the context of the entire court-martial. The focus of our inquiry should not be on words in isolation, but on the argument as 'viewed in context.’ ”) (citations omitted). 16 . United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 179 (C.A.A.F.2005) (citations omitted). 17 . See Carter, 61 M.J. at 33; see, e.g., Gilley, 56 M.J. at 120-21 (citing Robinson, 485 U.S. at 32, 108 S.Ct. 864). 18 . See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (stating that ""[¡Inappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone, [do] not justify a reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding”). 19 . See United States v. Carpenter, 51 M.J. 393, 396 (C.A.A.F.1999) (<HOLDING>). 20 . Appellant also alleged various claims of

    ### Response:
    holding that in light of the appellants failure to object to the prosecutions rebuttal argument against him any error in the prosecutions argument was harmless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    passed over for promotions. See Dkt. No. 6 at ¶ 11. Although Plaintiff does not expressly provide the allegations contained in this internal discrimination complaint, it is clear that he was alleging that he was passed over in retaliation for his advocacy in opposition to the Roman Catholic Church’s handling of sexual abuse cases and in support of sexual abuse victims. Moreover, a second possible “protected activity” occurred on April 6, 2011 when he reported to Defendant OASAS’ Affirmative Action manager and Human Resources that Defendant Felter subjected Mm “to harassment and public ridicule” in front of co-workers. See id. at ¶ 14. Although Plaintiff may have felt that he •was the subject of retaliation, the amended complaint makes clear that Pl 11 F.Supp.2d 481, 488 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that

    ### Response:
    holding that complaints regarding violation of employer policies unrelated to impermissible discrimination do not fall within the scope of title vii and therefore do not qualify for protection under the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    take much to establish probable cause”). Given everything that Raisbeck knew at the time of the arrest, it was reasonable for him to believe that Miller had sold 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (same). The phone calls that Detective Raisbeck had overheard and the surveillance of the restaurant provided even more corroboration. Although the detectives had not witnessed Miller do or say anything overtly incriminating on the day of the controlled buy, his actions were suspicious when considered in context. For example, Miller entered the restaurant with no apparent legitimate purpose only moments after Nicole had told him she “needed a hundred,” a phrase Raisbeck interpreted as a request to purchase $100 worth of crack cocaine. See United States v. Burnside, 588 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Funches, 327 F.3d 582, 586

    ### Response:
    recognizing that officers are entitled to rely on training and experience in forming belief that drug transaction has occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was not a deadly weapon, its context in appellant’s brief demonstrates that it is being asserted only to support the contention that the complainant did not suffer a serious bodily injury. 4 . See, e.g., Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). This is true even if the trial judge failed to give a reason or gave a wrong reason for the ruling. See id. 5 . Appellant’s expert made no assessment of the extent or magnitude of the injuries to the complainant’s mouth. Therefore, even if the relevant injury were confined to that solely resulting from the impact of the bottle, the expert provided no evidence that the complainant had not suffered serious injury in the form of disfigurement or impairment. 6 . See also Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>); Riddle v. State, 888 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Tex.Crim.

    ### Response:
    holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After reviewing the transcript of the suppression hearing, we conclude that the record amply supports the district court’s finding that this encounter between Cunningham and the officers was a consensual police-citizen encounter that does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See id. at 310 (listing factors appropriate for consideration in reviewing whether a seizure has occurred). Cunningham also challenges the district court’s finding that he voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle. We conclude, however, that the facts of the encounter between Cunningham and the officers confirm that Cunningham consented to the search of the vehicle and that such consent was voluntarily given. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650

    ### Response:
    recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    part; DISMISSED in part. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3. 1 . See Lara-Chacon v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir.2003) (stating that we review de novo ""whether a conviction under state law is a deportable offense”); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (stating that an alien is removable if he ""has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law ... relating to a controlled substance ..., other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana”). 2 . See 21 U.S.C. § 802(6), § 812 sched. 111(a)(3) (providing that methamphetamine is a controlled substance). 3 . See United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 852-53 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). 4 . See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)

    ### Response:
    holding that in conjunction an information with a narrow charge and an abstract of judgment indicating that a defendant pled guilty to that charge prove the precise elements of the offense to which the defendant pled guilty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    274, 280 (1969). 2 . Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(e) specifically requires an advisement of the defendant’s right to compel the attendance of witnesses. 3 . SDCL 23A-27-6 provides: The report of a presentence investigation shall contain any prior criminal record of the defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial condition, and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and such other information as may be required by the court. 4 . It is important to note that this is not a case where a defendant sought to contest the factual allegations contained in a presentence report. See Hansen v. Kjellsen, 2002 SD 1, ¶ 11, 638 N.W.2d 548, 552 (<HOLDING>); State v. Jensen, 1998 SD 52, ¶ 58, 579 N.W.2d

    ### Response:
    recognizing the defense has a right to comment on the presentence report and may introduce evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The defendant argued that the victim consented to the beating because the two had an agreement that if the victim “consumed any alcoholic beverages (and/or became intoxicated), [defendant] would punish her by physically assaulting her.” Id. Appropriately, the court held unequivocally that “no one has the right to beat another[,] even though that person may ask for it.” Id. at 31. Accordingly, we hold that consent is not a defense to a charge of assault with significa Dec. 221, 623 N.E.2d 811, 814 (1993) (""[W]e are inclined to agree with the commentators and a number of our sister States who found consent not to be a defense to a battery based on injurious touching.”). 5 . Helton v. State, 624 N.E.2d 499, 514-15 (Ind.Ct.App.1993); see also Jaske v. State, 539 N.E.2d 14, 18 (Ind.1989) (<HOLDING>); cf. Durr v. State, 722 So.2d 134, 135

    ### Response:
    holding that consent to participate in the initiation into a prison gang is not a defense to the charge of battery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583 (Tex.2001), an inmate was treated for nausea and severe headaches by the administration of various medications and other treatments before he was diagnosed with meningitis and died of that illness. Id. at 585. His widow claimed that his death was caused by the misuse of tangible property because the staff improperly administered medication and misused certain medical equipment. Id. The supreme court noted: There cannot be waiver of sovereign immunity in every ease in which medical treatment is provided by a public facility. Doctors in state medical facilities use some form of tangible personal property nearly every time they treat a patient. If there is waiver in all of those cases, the waiver of im 77, 380-82 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Ward, 280 S.W.3d at 356 (holding that alleged

    ### Response:
    holding that allegations that injuries were caused by misuse of ekg machine did not fall within waiver provisions of ttca because plaintiff had not made affirmative allegation that ekg machine was incorrectly used or that its results were erroneous and reasoning that misuse of information produced by ekg machine caused injuries rather than device itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    immediate vesting of such rights in the donee.”). Until the donor has absolutely and irrevocably divested herself of the title, dominion, and control of the subject of the gift, she has the power to revoke the gift. Edwards, 38 S.W.3d at 197; see also Troxel, 201 S.W.3d at 296 (“All dominion and control over the property must be released by the owner.”). The donee does not have ownership of the subject of the gift until complete ownership has been transferred from the donor to the donee. Edwards, 38 S.W.3d at 197. An inter vivos gift must be absolute and not open for future reconsideration. Soto v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB San Antonio, 868 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, writ ref'd); see also Dorman v. Arnold, 932 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Woodworth v. Cortez, 660 S.W.2d 561, 564

    ### Response:
    holding that as matter of law present donative intent not shown because donor intended for property to remain his until his death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    state provide him with a free transcript of the separate trial of a codefendant, the defendant must show that that transcript will be valuable to him. “In the present case, defendant did not show in the trial court and does not show on appeal how the transcript of the Audison trial would have assisted in trial preparation or impeaching witnesses. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for the production of portions of the Audison trial transcript. 126 Mich.App. at 766-69, 337 N.W.2d at 917-18. Thus, where a defendant requested a transcript of a proceeding involving a codefendant, to which he was not a party, a number of jurisdictions have required a showing of particularized need. See People v. Russell, 7 Ill.App. 3d 850, 289 N.E.2d 106 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526,

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant was entitled to a transcript of the trial of codefendants who were tried together and convicted where one of the convictions was reversed on the ground of reasonable doubt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc., 64 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1164 (M.D.Ala.1999) (finding that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover $115.00 in actual damages for correspondence and travel and finding genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs suffered actual damages in the amount of time taken away from work to prepare correspondence and travel to pick up registered mail); John-stone v. Bank of America, N.A, 173 F.Supp.2d 809, 816 (N.D.Ill.2001) (finding that plaintiff could recover for loss of time and inconvenience provided that she could establish actual pecuniary loss); Cortez v. Keystone Bank, Inc., No. 98-2457, 2000 WL 536666, *12 (E.D.Pa. May 2, 2000) (acknowledging that if the loan servicer failed to make appropriate corrections within 60 days after receiving a 2d 809, 815 (N.D.Ill.2001) (<HOLDING>); Wright v. Litton Loan Servicing LP., No.

    ### Response:
    holding that actual damages under respa included emotional damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “look[ed] into this Court’s computer.” Id. at 5-6. To prevail under Rule 60(b)(2), “the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the newly discovered evidence is of facts that existed at the time of trial or other disposi tive proceeding; (2) the party seeking relief was justifiably ignorant of the evidence despite due diligence; (3) the evidence is admissible and is of such importance that it probably would have changed the outcome; and (4) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching.” Duckworth v. U.S. ex rel. Locke, 808 F.Supp.2d 210, 216 (D.D.C.2011). Here, Walsh argues that his allegations have been confirmed by Edward Snowden. However, information that merely confirms Walsh’s assertions is not new information for the purposes of Rule 60(b)(2). See Duckworth, 808 F.Supp.2d at 216 (<HOLDING>). Rule 60(b) is not “a vehicle for presenting

    ### Response:
    holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [¶ 19] When potential destruction of evidence is the alleged exigent circumstance, officers must provide some particularized basis for their suspicion. See Herrick I, 1997 ND 155, ¶ 23, 567 N.W.2d 336 (stating no evidence was presented, other than the possible existence of drugs and an explained belief defendant would dispose of evidence if forewarned); cf. State v. Jones, 358 N.J.Super. 420, 818 A.2d 392 (2003) (observing “[pjolice must articulate some reason that the destruction of evidence is more than a hypothetical possibility”). In Richards, the United States Supreme Court held, “[when] police could know the drugs being searched for were of a type or in a location that made them impossible to destroy quickly ... asserted governmental interest in pr , 629 N.W.2d 613, 623 (2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Johnson, 267 F.3d 498, 501

    ### Response:
    holding exigent circumstances demonstrated because officers knew defendant stored drugs in room across from the bathroom making destruction particularly easy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    There was no further communication between the parties until Ryerson filed this lawsuit on June 10, 2009. Meanwhile, the EMC action settled pursuant to a 2002 agreement that provided EMC with an 8.5 million dollar “post-closing price adjustment to the Stock Purchase Agreement ... reflecting a change in the purchase price paid by EMC to Ryerson for the purchase and sale of IEMC.” The settlement was later reported in Ryerson’s 2003 Form 10-K as a “selling price adjustment to the 1998 sale of [IEMC].” FIC moves for summary judgment, citing Seventh Circuit precedent, arguing that the 8.5 million dollar “price adjustment” was restitution for ill-gotten gains and therefore not an insurable “loss” under Illinois law. Level 3 Comms. v. Federal Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 908, 910-11 (7th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>)(citing cases). In response to FIC’s motion,

    ### Response:
    holding that a policyholder does not incur an insurable loss when it is compelled to return allegedly illgotten gains in connection with the purchase or sale of a company
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his left arm to the bar on the right side of his body. (Pelayo Dep. Tr. at 204-05, 207.) 2 . The PA defendants have not relied on the numerous cases that have found some administrative intrusions to be reasonable where the Government sought to prevent hazardous conditions. See Bd. of Ed. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002) (quoting Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667-68, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) (upholding brief stops at a sobriety checkpoint); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The alleged liability of the PA is based

    ### Response:
    holding that stops for brief questioning about immigration status at the border rou tinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the fourth amendment and need not be authorized by warrant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of two deliberately high hurdles by showing either (i) “newly discovered evidence that ... establishes] by clear and convincing evidence” that the defendant was not guilty, or (ii) a ""new rule of constitutional law” from the Supreme Court to be applied retroactively that invalidates the criminal conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 2 . Because we hold that Harris is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for his counsel’s failure on habeas to raise the alleged constitutional failures of his appellate counsel, we decline to reach the merits of his ineffective appellate assistance claim or of his claim that the district court erred in 1994 when it calculated his prison sentence. 3 . Rodwell v. Pepe, 324 F.3d 66, 70-71 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 224, 157 L.Ed.2d 134 (2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200,

    ### Response:
    holding that a rule 60b motion to reopen a habeas denial is barred when its factual predicate deals primarily with the constitutionality of the underlying state conviction or sentence but is permissible when it deals primarily with some irregularity or procedural defect of the habeas proceeding itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    against an unreasonably excessive use of deadly force in the form of Quando, a police canine. Even excluding the question of whether the police dog constituted deadly force, a jury well could find that, given the circumstances, the totality of force used— four blasts of pepper spray, slamming Smith down onto the porch, dragging him off the porch face down, ordering the ca nine to attack him three times, and the resultant dog bites and physical assaults on his body — was unreasonable. We have indeed held on past occasions that the use of lesser force could be unreasonable in the particular circumstances. See Santos, 287 F.3d at 853-54 (shoving can amount to excessive force when it is unreasonable); Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1130-31 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087,

    ### Response:
    holding that the use of pepper spray on nonviolent protestors was excessive force
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as the best or most efficient way to perform its duties under the Act. * . It is thus largely irrelevant that, as asserted by the insurers, “[f]ive of the 15 states adopting the 1995 Model UPA in some form have also recently enacted DMF legislation,” explicitly imposing a duty to search that database. A similar enactment in West Virginia, as made evident by our holding today, would unnecessarily tread upon the insurers’ prerogative to decide how they will comply ■with the Act. The insurers, however, persuaded the circuit court to surmise' that “[s]uch legislation would be redundant or unnecessary if a duty to search already existed in the UPAs adopted by these states.” Cf. United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Commw., Dep’t of Ins., No. 2013-CA-000612-MR, 2014 WL 3973160 (Ky.Ct.App. Aug. 15, 2014) (<HOLDING>).. Were we to assume, however, that the

    ### Response:
    holding that duty to  search dmf imposed by new model legislation applied only to policies issued after statutes effective date of january 1 2013
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by a criminal defendant or by his counsel for the sole propose of aiding the accused and his counsel in the preparation of his defense”). Appropriately, the attorney-client privilege “extends to interpreters, and to clerks and agents employed by the attorney ... in the business committed to his [or her] charge . . . .” Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 175 (1859); see id., 175-76 (while recognizing privilege extends to certain court personnel and agents of attorney, court refused to extend privilege to protect communication overheard by attorney’s son, where son was “in no way connected with the case or with the parties” and had “no interest in, or connection with, the professional business of the attorney”); see also Pagano v. Ippoliti, 245 Conn. 640, 650 n.12, 716 A.2d 848 (1998) (<HOLDING>). B In the present case, the parties do not

    ### Response:
    recognizing that statements made by agent on behalf of principal to principals attorney may be protected by principals attorneyclient privilege
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    marginal value to Perry of his participation in the instant case; perhaps as in Fusco, it was offered to undermine any insinuation that Perry had received funds for his participation in this case alone; or finally, perhaps the prosecution wanted to counter defense counsel’s specific insinuation that Perry would benefit merely by accusing people. We simply do not know. Given these possibilities, the ambiguity in the case law, and the context of the present testimony, we cannot say that admission of the evidence constituted plain error. We conclude by emphasizing that, to satisfy the plain error standard, Smith must show that the alleged error “affected] substantial rights,” that is, “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, “‘[t]he plain error exception to

    ### Response:
    holding that the substantial rights inquiry of federal rule of criminal procedure 52b mirrors rule 52as harmless error inquiry except that the burden in the former falls on the defendant to show prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an appropriate sanction. 4 . This Court may not exercise sua sponte review when the Commission on Judicial Conduct recommends censure alone. R. Comm’n Judicial Conduct 29(a) (""A recommendation of censure shall be final unless the judge or disciplinary counsel files a petition to modify or reject the recommendation as provided in paragraph (c). ”). This Court does have the authority to review ”[a]ll other recommendations for formal sanctions” on its own motion. Id. In addition to censure, the Commission recommended that Judge MeVay pay a fine, which it viewed as a formal sanction under Rule 18(e). We therefore exercise sua sponte review of the entire recommendation, as the reviewable sanction is insepa-rabie from censure. Cf. In re Bemis, 189 Ariz. 119, 122, 938 P.2d 1120, 1123 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Rule 5 provides in part the following:

    ### Response:
    holding in an attorney discipline case that because a probation order a normally nonreviewable sanction was recommended in conjunction with a censure a reviewable sanction this court could review both sanctions as they were inseparable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and assistance to be provided to claimants by VA, are not retroactively applicable to proceedings that were complete before VA and were on appeal to this Court or the Federal Circuit when the VCAA was enacted.” Stephens v. Principi, 16 Vet.App. 191, 193 (2002) (per curiam order) (citing Bernklau, 291 F.3d at 803-06). Here, the VCAA was enacted after the September 14, 2000, BVA decision on appeal but during the 120-day period within which the appellant could file a timely NOA, see 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a). Because, as of the November 9, 2000, enactment of the VCAA, the 120-day judicial-appeal period had not yet expired and the appellant had not filed an NOA, the claims denied by the September 2000 BVA decision were still pending before VA. See Teten v. West, 13 Vet.App. 560, 563 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the proceedings were not “complete

    ### Response:
    holding that veterans claim had remained pending before va at time of his death because 120day judicialappeal period had not yet expired and he had not filed noa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    operates a CTH I facility, the kind of setting DDSN has determined would constitute the least restrictive environment for Doe. We therefore affirm, but on different grounds, the district court’s dismissal of Doe’s freedom of choice claim. See Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220, 222 (4th Cir.2002) (observing that we “can affirm on any basis fairly supported by the record”). C. Because Doe’s freedom of choice claim fails as matter of law, we do not find it necessary to decide whether § 1396a(a)(23) confers a private right on individuals that may be enforced under § 1983. Even assuming Doe may proceed under § 1983 to enforce § 1396a(a)(23), Appellees are entitled to summary judgment on Doe’s claim. Cf. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 475-76, 99 S.Ct. 1831, 60 L.Ed.2d 404 (1979) (<HOLDING>). IV. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the

    ### Response:
    holding that the question whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction and therefore may be assumed without being decided
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim on June 21, 2012, the claim was effectively denied on August 28, 2008, when the administrator failed to act on the claim within three months after presentment. See 15 V.I.C. § 421 (directing the executor or administrator to make distributions in three-month intervals). Therefore, Ottley’s claim had ripened by the time the Superior Court dismissed it. The Superior Court’s dismissal of the action on the claim for reimbursement after it had ripened was pointless as Ottley could have promptly refiled the action. Rohn v. People, 57 V.I. 637, 642 n.4 (V.I. 2012) (observing that “subsequent events may ripen a prematurely filed appeal” (quoting Harvey v. Christopher, 55 V.I. 565, 571 (2009)); see Alejandro-Ortiz v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 872 F. Supp. 2d 133, 136 (D.P.R. 2012) (<HOLDING>). Because Ottley could have immediately refiled

    ### Response:
    holding that courts decision to dismiss the action because it was prematurely filed was pointless because the matter automatically ripened after 90 days and plaintiff could just refile complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the members considered in finding the appellant’s conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline and service discrediting constituted the aggravating factors that took this case out of the wholly private setting envisioned in Lawrence. “[W]here, as here, the predicate sexual conduct is criminal because of some additional factor (in this case, the violation of clauses 1 and 2 of Article 134, UCMJ), the burden of demonstrating that such conduct should nonetheless be constitutionally protected rests with the defense at trial.” Goings, 72 M.J. at 207 (citation omitted). The appellant’s argument that the military judge was required to instruct on the Mar-cum factors pursuant to United States v. Castellano also fails under the circumstances of this case. 72 M.J. 217, 221 (C.A.A.F.2013) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Howard, 72 M.J. 406

    ### Response:
    holding in cases where but for the presence of a marcum factor the act of consensual sodomy would not be subject to criminal sanction the trier of fact must determine whether a marcum factor exists
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Miles court did note with respect to the Jones Act that it “sailed in occupied waters ... and was not free to expand remedies at will simply because it might work to the benefit of seamen and those dependent upon them”, id., 498 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 327. As defendants here correctly point out, however, the impact of the considered and settled decision in Miles is to render it anomalous to award the nondependent survivor of a nonseaman a recovery which is patently denied to the nondependent beneficiary of a well-deserving seaman. In effect, to allow plaintiffs to recover wrongful death damages here simply because their son was not a Jones Act seaman would ironically, and improperly, leave the relatives of seamen as a less-favored class under admiralty. Cf. Truehart, supra at 937 (<HOLDING>); cf. also Whittaker, supra at 773. Finally,

    ### Response:
    holding that because the general maritime law is its most generous to seamen the wards of admiralty it would refuse to craft for nonseamens survivors a remedy not available to seamens survivors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    years was not disqualifying and the Board’s recommendation that the applicant be re-admitted to the Bar); Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re Papy, 901 So.2d 870, 872 (Fla.2005) (approving the Board’s recommendation that the applicant be denied re-admission to the Bar in part because of his failure to timely file and pay income taxes); Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re M.A.R., 755 So.2d 89, 92-93 (Fla.2000) (approving the Board’s recommendation that the applicant be denied admission to the Bar in part because of his failure to timely file and pay income taxes); Florida Bar v. Nedick, 603 So.2d 502, 503 (Fla.1992) (ordering disbarment for evading or defeating tax in violation of federal law and conviction of tax evasion); Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs in re H.H.S., 373 So.2d 890, 892 (Fla.1979) (<HOLDING>). Compliance with the requirements of all tax

    ### Response:
    holding that a failure to file tax returns may properly be considered in determining whether the applicant has met the standards of conduct and fitness required under the rules
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    complies with the § 1315(d) notice provision of publication in the Federal Register, Heraeus could receive a windfall because the lower ... rate would apply to the [post-revocation] merchandise even though Heraeus knew of Customs’ change in classification three years earlier.”). Nevertheless, Jewelpak contends that it need not show actual prejudice by reason of the failure to publish because § 1315(d) requires only that it show “prejudice to the importing public in general, and destruction of the uniformity that section recognizes.” We disagree, for such a position is without support in the statute and plainly flouts the rule in Heraeus-Amersil, as well as analogous precedents from this and other courts of appeal. See id. at 1582; cf., e.g., Splane v. West, 216 F.3d 1058 (Fed.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323,

    ### Response:
    holding that a legal opinion issued by the general counsel for the department of veterans affairs was not defective as applied to petitioner for faffing to comply with the publication requirement of foia because petitioner had actual notice of the opinion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    false promise is a fraudulent misrepresentation which can be actionable as fraud_ ... Plaintiff argued to the jury that Capital City ... never intended to allow plaintiff to abide by the terms of the agreement, but intended to foreclose on the property from .the beginning. The 'Court finds that this theory fits comfortably within the law regarding promissory fraud. Capital .City contends that D.C. law recognizes a cause of action for promissory misrepresentation only when the promise is neither memorialized as an explicit contract term (e.g., an undertaking to provide $42,000 on a date certain) nor implied by law in the contract (e.g., the obligation to act with good faith); in other words, the misrepresentation must be a collateral statement of d 1251, 1253-54, 1259 (D.C.Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Some time ago, we observed in a footnote that

    ### Response:
    holding that breach of collateral promise was actionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Marchal v. Webb, 859 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). Once the movant has established a right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant. Marchal, 859 S.W.2d at 412. The nonmov-ant must respond to the motion for summary judgment and present to the trial court any issues that would preclude summary judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979); Marchal, 859 S.W.2d at 412. In reviewing the summary judgment, we must indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolve any doubts in its favor, and we will assume all the evidence favorable to the nonm tract principles. Vanguard Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Smith derwriting Ass’n., 73 A.D.2d 605, 422 N.Y.S.2d 123, 123 (N.Y.App.Div.1979) (<HOLDING>). Because we find Perrot-ta breached the terms

    ### Response:
    holding insureds failure to comply with terms of policy requiring him to sign and return an euo was a material breach
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the statute as a whole. The government’s argument that simple assault applies only to the “assault prong” of § 111(a)(1) makes little sense when considering § 111(a)(2), which punishes one who “assaults or intimidates” a former federal officer. If simple assault did not apply to the remainder of § 111(a)(1), we would be left with two unavailing alternatives before us: either simple assault does not apply to § 111(a)(2) at all; or that the simple assault provision applies only to the word “assault” of §§ 111(a)(1) and (a)(2). The former does little to carry out the purpose of the statute because it would afford greater protection to those without pr ontext of § 111, the definition of simple assault is conduct in violation of § 111(a) ....”) (emphasis added); Ramirez, 233 F.3d at 322 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). Of the remaining cases

    ### Response:
    holding statutory definition of all other cases assault to be any physical contact which by which a person forcibly assaults resists impedes intimidates or interferes with 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a fixed meaning of the term seaman. The regulations emphasize flexibility, indicating that the term’s meaning is governed by the context in which it is used and the purpose of the statute in which it is found. Id. § 783.29(c). Similarly, we must evaluate an employee’s duties based upon the character of the work he actually performs and not on what it is called or the place where it is performed. Id. § 783.33. As we have recognized, the FLSA as a whole is pervaded by the idea that what each employee actually does determines its application to him. Walling v. W.D. Haden Co., 153 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir.1946). Accordingly, the application of the seaman exemption generally depends on the facts in each case. See McLaughlin v. Bos. Harbor Cruise Lines, Inc., 419 F.3d 47, 51-52 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). III. With this framework guiding us, we will

    ### Response:
    recognizing that application of the seaman exemption is a factintensive question that can be answered in many cases only after a trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an express preemption provision, implied preemption principles should not be used to decide the preemptive scope of a statute in which Congress provided an express preemption provision. Cipollone, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2618. See also Freightliner, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1488. Second, Smith is factually distinguishable from the instant case because it considered the preemptive scope of the MDA’s Class II regulations on a state regulatory statute. Smith, 651 F.2d at 1022 (citing Fla.Stat. §§ 468.135(7); 468.136(l)-(2)). Third and most importantly, the result in Smith relies on the fact “that the Florida statute does not relate ‘to a matter included in a federal requirement applicable to a device.’ ” Smith, 651 F.2d at 1025 (quoting 21 U.S.C.A. § 360k(a)(2)). See also id. at 1024 (<HOLDING>). In other words, Smith found that the state

    ### Response:
    holding that  4681357 is not preempted because it addresses a different concern than does the mda
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    presented for summary judgment purposes.” Id. at 1020. Additionally, our conclusion resulted from construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff-Appellant. Id. at 1020-21. “We review the district court’s refusal to take judicial notice of proffered materials for an abuse of discretion.” Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642, 649 (7th Cir.2011). Here, we easily conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to take judicial notice of the HPL contract. The district court correctly concluded that Plaintiff-Appellant’s legal argument was not the proper kind of fact that may be judicially noticed under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b). See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (citation and quotation marks omitted). HPL’s

    ### Response:
    holding that in order for a fact to be judicially noticed indisputability is a prerequisite
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another, and an overt act that results in damages.” Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 844 (1st Cir.1988)(quoting Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir.1979)) (internal quotations omitted). While plaintiffs are correct that “conspiracy is a matter of inference,” summary judgment may still be appropriate on a conspiracy claim where the nonmoving party rests merely on conclusory allegations. Here plaintiffs have presented no evidence, either direct or circumstantial of an agreement among defendants from which a reasonable jury could have inferred a conspiracy among them to inflict harm upon the plaintiffs. Earle, 850 F.2d at 845; see also Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir.1977)(<HOLDING>). Summary judgment was thus proper on this

    ### Response:
    holding that complaint alleging a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights cannot survive motion to dismiss based on conclusory allegations of conspiracy which are not supported by references to material facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “considered the factors listed in U.S.C. 3553(a)” and imposed a fourteen-month sentence. Parker contends that the district court procedurally erred by not adequately explaining the reasons for the fourteen-month sentence. We review a district court’s revocation sentence using the same standards applied to initial sentencing decisions. United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 915-16 (8th Cir. 2009). We first review to ensure that the district court did not commit a significant procedural error. United States v. Dace, 660 F.3d 1011, 1013 (8th Cir. 2011). We then evaluate the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Timberlake, 6 e substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm. 1 . The Honorable

    ### Response:
    holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supra, at page 64. Since there is not one rule or principle of law that can dispose of the issue in all cases, J. B. Henriques, Inc. v. United States, supra, each ease, when you come down to it, must stand on its own particular facts. The applicable law under paragraph 1558 is clear. “To constitute an article 'manufactured’ it is not necessary that the article be converted into a new and different article, having a distinctive name, character or use different from that of the original article (such would be the requirement to constitute an article a ‘manufacture’), but only that the article be so processed that it be removed from its crude or primary state, though it remain a variety of the original material. * * Chas. H. Demarest, Inc. v. United States, supra, 44 CCPA at page 137 (<HOLDING>) The facts here are not in dispute. The

    ### Response:
    holding that where palmyra fibers were trimmed to advance the merchandise towards its intended use the fibers were manufactured under paragraph 1558
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    helpful to the jury’s determination of facts at issue.” Ariz. R. Evid. 702 cmt. (2012). But the comment also observes that “[t]he trial court’s gatekeeping function is not intended to replace the adversary system.” Id. Rather, “[c]ross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Id.; cf. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786. ¶ 12 Daubert left unclear whether the particular application of a generally reli oach of leaving challenges to an expert’s application of a methodology exclusively to the jury. Such challenges are instead a proper subject of the trial court’s gatekeeping inquiry. But cf. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 563 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14 But not all errors in the application of

    ### Response:
    holding under earlier version of federal rule 702 that in general criticisms touching on whether the lab made mistakes in arriving at its results are for the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16(d). If a party wishes to challenge the clerk’s findings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16(d), the party must appeal to the judge of the district or superior court having jurisdiction within 10 days. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16(d)(1). The trial court’s review of the clerk’s findings is de novo, id., and the trial court is limited on appeal to determining whether the six criteria of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16(d) have been satisfied, In re Foreclosure of Godwin, 121 N.C. App. 703, 704, 468 S.E.2d 811, 812 (1996). The trial court is prohibited from reviewing any issue or argument that was not raised before the clerk in connection with the clerk’s N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16(d) analysis. See In re David A. Simpson, P.C., _ N.C. App. _, _, 711 S.E.2d 165, 170 (2011) (<HOLDING>); Mosler v. Druid Hills Land Co., 199 N.C. App.

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to consider debtors claim of rescission as an equitable defense to the foreclosure action where that defense was not raised before the clerk
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    advances. Moreover, this assertion is supported by Kin-man’s statement that the notion of being gay was so upsetting to her that it led her to attempt suicide. If Kinman’s opposition to the idea of being gay was as strong as she alleges, it is possible that any advances by a member of her own sex would have indeed been unwelcome. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court noted in Meritor Savings Bank, the relevant question is not whether Kinman voluntarily participated in sexual relations, but rather whether the advances were unwelcome. 477 U.S. at 68, 106 S.Ct. at 2406. To distinguish between an actual desire for a relationship on one hand, and a mere acquiescence to tendered sexual advances on the other, it is necessary to consider the power disparity be 830 F.Supp. 1288, 1297 (N.D.Cal.1993) (<HOLDING>) and Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. School District,

    ### Response:
    holding school district hable for teachers sexual harassment of student only upon knowing failure to act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    while testifying.” Id. at 603. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for mistrial ubject of expert testimony where a law enforcement agent’s opinion is based on specialized knowledge derived from training or experience and beyond the understanding or experience of the average juror. See § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2010) (allowing expert testimony on evidence at trial “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue”); United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1167-69 (9th Cir.2000) (involving the testimony of a law enforcement expert who opined, in part, that “gangs enforce a code of silence among their members”); People v. Martinez, 113 Cal.App.4th 400, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 49, 59 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Edge v. State, 275 Ga. 311, 567 S.E.2d 1, 3

    ### Response:
    holding that a gang expert could testify on what it meant to be a rat in gang culture because it was relevant to help understand discrepancies between some of the wit nesses statements to the police and their testimony at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Anacleto Pacheco-Medina filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, seeking relief from his Oregon state court conviction for delivery of a controlled substance. The district court denied relief because Pacheco-Medina was not in custody at the time he filed his petition, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The facts are known to the parties and will not be repeated herein except as necessary. I Pacheco-Medina’s suspended sentence completely expired in January 2000, and he filed his habeas petition in federal district court in November 2001. Accordingly, Pacheco-Medina was not in custody under the conviction and sentence he now seeks to attack. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The fact he is now subject to an INS

    ### Response:
    holding that a habeas petitioner must be in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from strategic decisions of the defendant’s trial counsel under the guise of an “arbitrary fact” for the purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3)’s statutory review). Commonwealth v. Diamond, — Pa.-, 83 A.3d 119, 136 (2013) (footnote omitted). Moreover, the prosecutor here was simply relaying facts. The expression that the “cloak of innocence has been removed” is simply another way of saying that Appellant has been convicted of first-degree murder. Thus, Appellant’s suggestions of unfair prejudice are unfounded. Indeed, Appellant fully disregards the salient fact that the trial judge provided the jury with a full and correct instruction, and the presumption remains that the jury faithfully followed the judge’s instructions. See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 580 Pa. 303, 860 A.2d 102, 111 (2004) (<HOLDING>). In fact, the record reveals nothing more than

    ### Response:
    holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nursing staff failed to exercise professional judgment); Brown v. Tift County Hosp. Auth., 280 Ga.App. 847, 635 S.E.2d 184, 186-87 (2006) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant and finding plaintiffs claim — that the therapist who left her unattended in the shower after plaintiff twice complained she was slipping — sounded in ordinary negligence); Self v. Executive Comm. of the Ga. Baptist Convention Ga., Inc., 245 Ga. 548, 266 S.E.2d 168, 169 (1980) (finding the plaintiffs action was for ordinary negligence, not medical malpractice, based on her allegation that the decedent’s injury was caused by the hospital’s negligence in failing to properly repair a leaking bathroom fixture, of which it had notice); Landes v. Women’s Christian Ass’n, 504 N.W.2d 139, 141 (Iowa Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>); Kastler, 193 N.W.2d at 102 (holding that a

    ### Response:
    holding that the hospitals taking the plaintiff to the bathroom was nonmedical or routine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a provision that appeared in the certificate of incorporation. Stroud v. Milliken Enters., 585 A.2d 1306, 1308 (Del.Ch.1988), appeal dismissed, 552 A.2d 476 (Del.1989). In light of the three procedural means for ending a director’s term in Section 141(b), I do not believe a bylaw could impose a requirement that would disqualify a director and terminate his service. Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., 2000 WL 1038190, at *12 (Del.Ch. July 21, 2000). Section 141(b)’s recognition of the bylaws as a locus for director qualifications instead contemplates reasonable qualifications to be applied at the front end, before a director’s term commences, when the director is “elected and qualified.” 8 Del. C. § 141(b); see Triplex Shoe Co. v. Rice & Hutchins, Inc., 152 A. 342, 351 (Del.1930) (<HOLDING>). The concept of a bylaw that would end a

    ### Response:
    holding that bylaw requiring a director to be a stockholder mandated stock ownership pri or to entering office
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    49, 51 (9th Cir.1994); Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir.1989), or where disruption in the courtroom is likely in the absence of shackles, see Wilson, 770 F.2d at 1485; see also Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir.1988) (shackling was supported by evidence of prior escapes from immediate physical custody of law enforcement officers, once while handcuffed, and by defendant’s disruptive behavior during trial), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1016, 109 S.Ct. 1737, 104 L.Ed.2d 175 (1989). It is improper, however, where a compelling need is not established, less restrictive alternatives are not pursued, or where the harms were not assessed. See Rhoden v. Rowland, 10 F.3d 1457, 1459 (9th Cir.1993) (“Rhoden I ”); see, e.g., Packer v. Hill, 291 F.3d 569, 583 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that state trial judge erred by placing defendant in leg brace where the only evidence of security risk was unsworn testimony that potential witness planned to do stuff while in town to testify although error did not prejudice defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims on direct appeal. This court affirmed Mr. Blandin’s conviction and sentence without a written opinion. Blandin v. State, 27 So.3d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (table). Mr. Blandin filed a timely motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising in Ground I the ineffective assistance of counsel claims that were previously raised in his amended motion for new trial. In summarily denying these claims, the postconviction court erroneously found them to be barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In Corzo v. State, 806 So.2d 642, 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), this court held that when an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct appeal and the appellant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed witho DCA 1984) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Blandin’s case cannot be distinguished on

    ### Response:
    holding that the postconviction court erred in finding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim proeedurally barred because the courts opinion did not comment specifically on the ineffective counsel argument and the overall holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jurys verdict could not be viewed as an adjudication on the merits of the ineffective assistance claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been constitutional under the 1870 Constitution. Since the 1970 Constitution is also silent on the subject, a recall statute would likely be constitutional. The 1970 Constitution gives home rule units broad legislative powers and states that those powers are to be construed liberally. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6.) Consequently, a home rule unit could enact a valid recall ordinance. Non-home rule units such as the city of Northlake do not have such power. The issue before this court, however, is not whether a recall procedure can be enacted by ordinance. The question is whether recall can be adopted by municipal referendum. In this respect, the powers of municipalities, whether home-ruled or not, are identical. (See Pechous v. Slawko (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 576, 582-83, 357 N.E.2d 1144 (<HOLDING>).) We find that article VII of the Illinois

    ### Response:
    holding that the referendum powers of home rule units and nonhome rule units are the same
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    535 U.S. 162, 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (""As a general matter, a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,' ... We have spared the defendant the need of showing probable effect upon the outcome, and have simply presumed such effect, where assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding. When that has occurred, the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary.”) (citing Strickland after the Erst sentence and Cronic after the last sentence). 43 . See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 277 n.2, 109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624 (1989) (<HOLDING>). See also Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.25, 104

    ### Response:
    recognizing some lower court cases that found a sixth amendment violation under geders v united states 425 us 80 96 sct 1330 47 led2d 592 1976one of the cases cited along with herring in cronicas footnoteto be harmless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of justice.” Davis v. Superior Court (Hannah), 25 Ariz.App. 402, 403, 544 P.2d 226, 227 (1976); see also Rashidi v. Albright, 818 F.Supp. 1354, 1355-56 (D.Nev.1993) (“Failure to ‘otherwise defend’ presumes the absence of some affirmative action on the part of a defendant [that] would operate as bar to the satisfaction of the moving party’s claim.”). A defendant in a cause of action who moves for summary judgment contests a plaintiffs claim and argues that it presents “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A summary judgment in a defendant’s favor bars satisfaction of the plaintiffs claim and necessarily defeats it. ¶ 15 Other jurisdictions that have cons 3d 34, 962 N.E.2d 322, 324 (2011) (<HOLDING>); M & A Const. Corp. v. Akzo Nobel Coatings,

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Palladino have not shown that on the face of Plaintiffs’ Complaint their alleged misconduct was distinct from the kinds of behavior clearly established as unconstitutional sexual harassment. See, e.g., Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 530-31 (4th Cir.1994) (acknowledging that sexual harassment is a question of fact but holding in affirming a denial of qualified immunity, that “[n]o male officer could reasonably have thought in 1992 that it was not sexual harassment to announce that it was his turn to make out with a women who was subject to his command”). Defendants Dorrance and Palladino are, therefore, not entitled to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Plaintiffs’ sexual harassment claims on the basis of a qualified immunity defense. See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 406 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In regard to the qualified immunity claims of

    ### Response:
    holding a rule 12b6 dismissal inappropriate where defendants have done nothing more than offer their bald assertions that they are entitled to qualified immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, our sole task here is to determine whether the facts have so changed that the principal duties of probation and parole officers now fall within one of the three relevant categories of principal duties of law enforcement officers enumerated in Section 41-4-3(D) of the TCA. {12} As to the first category, “making arrests for crime,” Plaintiff points to no change in the law and admits that probation and parole officers do not devote the majority of their time to making arrests. See Vigil, 1992-NMCA-033, ¶ 19. Consequently, there is no basis for concluding that making arrests for crimes is the principal duty of probation and parole officers. See Dunn v. State ex rel. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1993-NMCA-059, ¶ 11, 116 N.M. 1, 859 P.2d 469 (<HOLDING>). {13} As to the second category, Plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding that the director of the new mexico motor v ehicle department who has statutory authority to make arrests was not a law enforcement officer because the vast majority of his time and effort are involved in administrative matters internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Eatinger v. Johnson, 269 Mont. 99, 887 P.2d 231, 234 (1994) (citation omitted). The Bergers' images and sounds are intangible, and intangible property interests have not traditionally been subject to conversion. See Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts § 15 (5th ed.1985); Melville B. Nimmer & David Nim-mer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.01[B](1)(i) (1995) (“The torts of conversion and trespass relate to interference with tangible rather than intangible property....”). Although the common law rule has been relaxed somewhat, and the tort may now reach the misappropriation of intangible rights customarily merged in or identified with some document, it has not yet been extended further. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 242 and comments; Hurst v. Dezer/Reyes Corp., 82 F.3d 232, 236 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that even under the expanded definition of the tort under new york law the business concept and appearance of a diner could not be converted since the claimed property rights were not rights customarily merged in a document
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in alcohol possession cases, on the present record, the State introduced no evidence of the contents of the bottle possessed by appellant, nor did appellant admit or stipulate to the contents of the container. Cf. J.B. v. State, 705 So.2d 1376, 1379 (Fla.1998) (<HOLDING>); A.A. v. State, 461 So.2d 165, 166 (Fla. 3d

    ### Response:
    holding juveniles admission that he possessed beer is sufficient to make a prima facie showing that the substance was alcoholic in nature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In Turner, the fundamental right was the right to marry, not the right to inmate marriage. 482 U.S. at 94—96, 107 S.Ct. 2254. In Zablocki, the fundamental right was the right to marry, not the right of people owing child support to marry. 434 U.S. at 383-86, 98 S.Ct. 673. 6 . In addition, immutability is not an absolute prerequisite to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to groups whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977) (rejecting immutability requirements in treating group of resident aliens as suspect class despite their ability to opt out of class voluntarily); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 431, 118 S.Ct. 1428, 140 L.Ed.2d 575 (1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Mew Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that because a child born out of wedlock may be legitimated by father strictly speaking illegitimacy is not an immutable characteristic
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    five-year statute of limitations was retroactively applied to him in violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Clearly established federal law holds that a State law enacted after the expiration of a previously-applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 619, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 2454, 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003). But that rule does not apply to unexpired statutes of limitations. Stogner, 539 U.S. at 618, 123 S.Ct. 2446. Thus application of a statute of limitations extended before the original limitations period has expired, as here, does not violate the ex post facto clause. See United States v. Taliaferro, 979 F.2d 1399, 1402 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The Tenth Circuit explained that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the application of an extended statute of limitations to offenses occurring prior to the legislative extension where the prior and shorter statute of limitations has not run as of the date of such extension does not violate the ex post facto clause citing united states v powers 307 us 214 21718 59 sct 805 807 83 led 1245 rehg denied 308 us 631 60 sct 66 84 led 526 1939
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his understanding of the charges and proceedings against him. At the hearing, the District Court stated that it had reviewed “in detail” a report prepared by a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) psychologist that concluded, among other things, that (1) Fox possessed a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him; (2) Fox had a capacity to assist legal counsel in his defense; and (3) Fox could rationally make decisions regarding legal strategy. Relying on that report, as well as Fox’s own testimony, the District Court found that Fox was indeed “competent to stand trial.” Appellant’s App’x at 47-48. As the trier of fact, the District Court was well within its province to give weight to the BOP psychologist’s opinion, see United States v. Zhou, 428 F.3d 361, 380 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>), and did not clearly err in relying as well on

    ### Response:
    holding that a court evaluating competency may reasonably rely on the expertise of a forensic psychologist associated with the bop who is presumably familiar with patients similarly situated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defendants ordering more than 70 Towncars, or more than $2 million in automobiles, from plaintiffs dealership in Kansas. Defendants have been doing business with plaintiff in the same manner for at least ten years. According to Danny Zeck’s affidavit, defendants would place orders for Towncars with plaintiff in Kansas by mail and by facsimile. The court does not find persuasive defendants’ argument that jurisdiction cannot exist because plaintiff initiated contact with defendants in California and defendants never entered Kansas. It is clear that when a party chooses to enter into a contract with a Kansas corporation, the subsequent contacts cannot be said to be “random, fortuitous, or attenuated.” Marketing Group, Inc. v. Success Dev. Int’l, Inc., 41 F.Supp.2d 1241, 1244 (D.Kan.1999)(<HOLDING>); World Paper Res., Inc. v. Buckeye Cellulose

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant had minimum contacts with kansas because it chose to enter into a contract with the plaintiff that was to be performed at least in part in kansas and then the defendant continued to be in contact with the plaintiff regarding the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 10 (same); Nev. Const, art. 15, § 10 (same); Okla. Const, art. VI, § 13 (same); Pa Const, art. IV, § 8 (providing various methods of making appointments depending on office involved and time of vacancy); R.I. Const, art. IX, § 5 (same as Indiana); Tenn. Const, art. VII, § 4 (granting legislature power to establish method of filling vacancies); Vt. Const, art. II, § 20 (appointment power limited by constitution and law passed by legislature); Wis. Const, art. XIII § 9 (same). ""Several state courts have held that such provisions have the effect of authorizing the legislature to vest itself with the power to make certain administrative appointments, and that no violation of separation of powers inheres in doing so. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128, 142-43 (1876) (<HOLDING>); Richardson v. Young, 122 Tenn. 471, 125 S.W.

    ### Response:
    recognizing authority of legislature to choose officers of municipal corporations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the inference that Harris County has a policy that condones the use of excessive and deadly force against fleeing suspects both before and after the shooting death of Luis Escobar.” We have held that for purposes of her section 1988 claim, Escobar’s evidence raised a fact issue as to whether Deputy Goodney violated Luis’s constitutional right to be free from seizure by excessive force. But the fact that the disciplinary committee had before it the same evidence entails only that the committee faced the same fact issues that would confront a jury; it is not evidence that shows the committee was acting out an unwritten policy of allowing officers to use deadly force whenever they feel their safety is threatened. See Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1279 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Escobar offered no other evidence of the

    ### Response:
    holding that section 1983 plaintiffs presented nothing but conjecture when they alleged that city officials must have known that officer was lying
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purged when only an hour had passed between the illegal seizure and the time the defendant gave his consent to search, id. at 356. The Buchanan Court also emphasized that the defendant did not move from his location of initial detention and “did not consult with an attorney prior to consenting to the search,” the latter of which forms a “crucial factor” in the attenuation analysis. Id. (quotation omitted). Because “[dissipation of the taint resulting from an illegal [seizure] ordinarily involves showing that there was some significant intervening time, space, or event,” and none was present here, the first two factors from Brown weigh in favor of suppression. See Lopez-Arias, 344 F.3d at 630 (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Griffith, 193 Fed.Appx. 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Turning to the third factor—the purpose and

    ### Response:
    holding that consent was the fruit of defendants arrest and that there were no intervening circumstances that would break that chain of causation under analogous facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has only one reasonable interpretation. The Farmworkers assert that the phrase means the home villages from which the workers traveled to Monterrey. Indeed, “[t]he place from which the worker has come to work” can reasonably be read to mean the home village of the worker. Alternatively, the Growers contend that the place from which the worker has come to work is Monterrey, as that was the place where the workers gathered, where they were selected to be employees, and from where they traveled collectively to the farms in Florida. This reading of the language is equally reasonable. As both interpretations provide reasonable constructions, the phrase is clearly ambiguous. See Royal Am. Realty, Inc. v. Bank of Palm Beach and Trust Co., 215 So.2d 336, 338 (Fla.4th Dist.Ct.App.1968) (<HOLDING>). In finding that the phrase clearly and

    ### Response:
    holding that contract language is ambiguous where it is in fact reasonably or fairly susceptible to the different constructions being advocated by the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also revealed that Cabral erroneously informed the FBI that Seda traveled to Saudi Arabia for a Hajj in 2000. Draft interview summaries revealed additional inconsistencies. For example, one draft summary of an interview with Richard contained the statement that “[Richard] Cabral did not recall Sedaghaty discussing the topic of Kosovo or supporting mujahedin there” while another draft of the summary excluded that same statement. Another early draft revealed a conflict about the amount of the supposed payments that were collected at the end of the Hajj. Without the suppressed materials, Seda’s counsel was severely limited on cross examination, unable to explore, let alone establish, grounds for Cabral’s possible bias. See United States v. Schoneberg, 396 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Taken together with the substantive issues

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the defense must be given the opportunity to crossexamine a witness and explore any motive to falsely testify in order to assist government
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    624, 627 (relying on NRC’s post-trial report to support position); ante at 175-176, 699 A.2d at 624 (citing post-trial cases to support general acceptance of polymarker testing). Despite the majority’s acceptance of de novo review, the majority carefully circumscribes such review to exclude all of the evi dence that does not support its ruling. See, e.g., ante at 180, 699 A.2d at 626 (noting that “the record does not reveal whether dot-intensity analysis can be performed on a DQ Alpha test,” but ignoring evidence that it can be); ante at 181-182, 699 A.2d at 626-627 (acknowledging that the HBGG result obtained for the mixed sample is unexplainable by dot-intensity analysis, but refusing to explore inconsistency until post-conviction-relief proceedings); ante at 183-184, 699 A.2d at 628 (<HOLDING>); ante at 193, 699 A.2d at 633 (“It is too late

    ### Response:
    recognizing that dotintensity analysis provides an opening for crossexamination and contradictory expert testimony but refusing to remand the case for a hearing to develop such evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of, Mr. Voss provided to Mr. Spartin was marked with AUSA Valder’s handwritten notation ""GJX#4.” Mr.- Spartin testified at the criminal trial that he did’not notice the mark nor was he was unaware that the statements provided to him had been presented to the grand jury. See Crim. Trial Tr. at 2610-13, 2737-38, 2754. 63 . Even Mr. Spartin concluded, based on his review of the four interview sümmaries, that - “I’m not á lawyer but Jesus, there’s enough there to seem to me to hang REI from the yardarm.” PL’s Ex. 226 at 28 (Spartin Polygraph Tr.). 64 . Lack of probable cause is an element of the both the plaintiff's Bivens claim for retaliatory inducement to prosecution and FTCA claim for malicious prosecution. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Moore-II, 213 F.3d at 709-10 (listing as an

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff was required to plead and prove the absence of probable cause to support his bivens claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the presentence investigation report. Without holding a hearing, or making findings of fact, the district court imposed the obstruction enhancement. The two-point enhancement increased McKnight’s offense level to 43, mandating that the district court impose a life sentence on McKnight. Because of the life sentence in this case, and the absence of findings to support the obstruction enhancement, we carefully review the record and McKnight’s contentions on appeal. II. Discussion The appellant McKnight first asserts error by the district court in refusing to allow McKnight to withdraw his guilty plea. We reject this claim. The record shows no abuse of discretion by the district court in rejecting this contention. See United States v. Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292, 1295, 1298-99 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The evidence indicates that McKnight freely

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw guilty plea filed three weeks after entering the plea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not obtain legal title to the Property until after November 27, 2002, and most likely not until December 2, 2002. 5 . When constructive fraud in the conduct of the proceedings is alleged, such a judgment may only be entertained by the court if the motion to reopen was filed within one year of the date of the judgment. TP § 14-845(a). 6 . In Mr. Bailey’s affidavit and in the City’s brief, there is language suggesting that, once the City acquired title to the Property by condemnation, any taxes owed were automatically abated or forgiven, or taken as paid. The City has not cited any case or statute to support that assertion, nor have we found any. Indeed, United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Prince George’s County, Md., 40 F.Supp. 436 (D.Md. 1941), supports a contrary assertion (<HOLDING>). Here, the City, a local municipalily, was

    ### Response:
    holding that when federal government acquires property through condemnation it must account for state and local property taxes interest and penalties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    County Mun. Util. Dist. No. 9, 866 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (citing McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.1993)). An appel late court cannot consider as grounds for reversal, issues the non-movant did not expressly present to the trial court by written response to the summary judgment motion. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Autk, 589 S.W.2d 671, 676 (Tex.1979). If the non-movant does not expressly present grounds that would defeat the movant’s right to a summary judgment by filing a written answer or response, he is limited to arguing on appeal that the movant’s motion was legally insufficient. Id. These requirements apply equally to constitutional claims. See Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. 1993) (<HOLDING>). We have reviewed Fry’s responses to the

    ### Response:
    holding that claims including constitutional claims must be asserted in trial court to be raised on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    what he was charged with doing, the maximum penalty he faced and the possibility of restitution and court costs being ordered as part of any sentence imposed. Whitepipe indicated that he was ready to enter his plea and proceeded to plead guilty to the rape charge. The court then questioned Whi-tepipe to determine whether his plea was voluntary: THE COURT: Did anyone force you to enter that plea? THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: Did anyone tell you, other than this plea agreement, that I would give you special treatment if you just came in today and pled guilty? THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: And you are doing this under your own free will? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent. See Parke, 506 U.S. at 28, 29, 113 S.Ct. 517 (<HOLDING>). Because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of

    ### Response:
    holding that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary and must be a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action available to a defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    296,194 S.E. at 21 (emphasis added). Stated another way, a purchaser who has demonstrated the prima facie intent to comply with the earnest deposit may deposit this sum with the court no later than by the end of the day of sale at 5:00 p.m. Where the party is on notice of a set time when compliance must be made, on the other hand, he is effectively estopped from denying the efficacy of the mandate. See Hudson v. Inman, 179 S.C. 399, 404, 184 S.E. 102, 104 (1936) (“[A] bidder not complying with the terms of the decree and the advertisement will not be heard to complain that he was lulled into security in not being required publicly to comply with the terms of the decree and advertisement of the sale of the property.”); see also Ex parte Floyd, 145 S.C. 364, 379, 142 S.E. 805, 810 (1928) (<HOLDING>). Delving further, we note Keller is merely

    ### Response:
    holding that since the decree required the purchaser to deposit his earnest money before 4 oclock on the day of sale then it was equally necessary that the purchaser at the second sale at 4 oclock make the required deposit immediately otherwise it was wholly unnecessary to have a resale for the manifest purpose of requiring the deposit and providing for the resale was to have in hand the deposit before 4 oclock or immediately thereafter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    965 (2008); State v. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d 582, 587, 590-91,141 P.3d 49 (2006); In re Pers. Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wn.2d 294, 297-98, 88 P.3d 390 (2004). 11 In fact, St. Pierre explicitly stated that “some errors which result in per se prejudice on direct review will also be per se prejudicial on collateral attack ....” St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d at 329. 12 I note the majority’s attempt to distance itself from this position. Majority at 598 n.3. The majority is correct to do that. As discussed below, however, the majority’s analysis could be used to conflate harmless error review of constitutional issues with harmless error review of nonconstitutional issues. 13 See generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-11, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (<HOLDING>). 14 Accord. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,

    ### Response:
    holding admission of coerced confession to he a classic trial error similar in both degree and kind to the erroneous admission of other types of evidence and thus reviewable for harmlessness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is a “facility” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9); (2) a “release” or “threatened release” of any “hazardous substance” from the facility has occurred; and (3) such “release” or “threatened release” ' has caused the plaintiff to incur response costs. Ascon Properties v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.1989). See also United States v. Bliss, 667 F.Supp. 1298, 1310 (E.D.Mo.1987); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F.Supp. 1283, 1289 (D.R.I.1986). In this case, it is undisputed that there has been a “release” or a “threatened release” from a facility and that the release triggered the incurrence of response costs by Acme. Therefore, the only issues for resolution are (1) whether the defendant dumped its waste at the Fadrowski site and (2) whether th . 1361, 1405- 06 (D.N.H.1986) (<HOLDING>). However, the plaintiff must establish some

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no requirement that plaintiffs show that defendants waste caused environmental harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Board as an aid to Board deliberation. Id. at 177, 95 S.Ct. 1491. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the reports had not been adopted or incorporated by the Board, as “the evidence utterly fails to support the conclusion that the reasoning in the reports is adopted by the Board as its reasoning, even when it agrees with the conclusion of a report....” Id. at 184, 95 S.Ct. 1491. Certainly, in situations like Grumman, where an agency, having reviewed a subordinate’s non-binding recommendation, makes a “yes or no” determination without providing any reasoning at all, a court may not infer that the agency is relying on the reasoning contained in the subordinate’s report. See Casad v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 301 F.3d 1247, 1252-53 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1143

    ### Response:
    holding that a report relied upon by agency in determining whether or not to award a grant had not been adopted as there is no indication in the record that in funding the  grant the agency expressly adopted the reasoning of the report
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Supreme Court has stressed that a warrantless entry into a home may be “legal when there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (emphasis added). For purposes of the Fourth Amendment analysis in this case, it makes no difference that the officers did not enter Fisher’s apartment to take physical custody of him. We have long recognized that “it is the location of the arrested person, and not the arresting agents, that determines whether an arrest occurs within a home.” United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir.1980), aff'd on other grounds, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982); see also United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). With these basic Fourth Amendment principles

    ### Response:
    holding that because defendant only emerged under circumstances of extreme coercion the arrest occurred while he was still inside his trailer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fees. In short, all of Plaintiffs’ substantive claims are examples of bootstrapping. The Court must finally address Plaintiffs claim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. This count of the complaint fails to state a claim because after dismissal of the substantive claims there is no underlying legal action upon which to Plaintiff may receive declaratory or injunctive relief. It is well settled that an injunction is a remedy. A claim for injunctive relief does not stand alone, but requires a viable underlying legal claim. The same is true for declaratory relief, the source of which in federal court is the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. See Collin County, Texas v. Homeowners Assoc. for Values Essential to Neighborhoods, 915 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). B. The Motion for Severance and Motion to

    ### Response:
    holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The Supreme Court has stated: “[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). In United States v. Reeves the Tenth Circuit established that “[o]pening the door to one’s home is not voluntary if ordered to do so under color of authority.” 524 F.3d 1161, 1167 (10th Cir.2008). The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly held that absent exigent circumstances, any warrant-less seizure from officials acting under the color of authority may not seize a person inside their home, or effect a seizure by ordering a person inside a home to come to the door. See United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1446 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222,

    ### Response:
    holding that a seizure as a violation of the fourth amendment when police surrounded an individuals house for three hours planning an arrest and ordering the individual out of his home under drawn firearms believing he was a suspect in a bank robbery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tort law; d.) the moral aspects of the defendant’s conduct; and e.) the prevention and punishment aspects of liability. See W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 4, at 20-26 (5th ed.1984). Larson was deprived of his parental rights for seven years in clear violation of the custody decree. Similarly, Jessica was denied the right to a relationship with her father during a critical stage in her development. Although this precious lost time can never be regained, some form of redress undoubtedly is in order. Tort law long has protected “relational” interests, such as between family members, from interference. Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 124, at 915; see, e.g., In re Parks, 267 Minn. 468, 127 N.W.2d 548 (1964); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949) (<HOLDING>). In 1978, however, our legislature abolished

    ### Response:
    holding child could bring action for enticement of parent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    loss suffered by Huffy was the direct result of the tumultuous economic environment during the class period and non-fraudulent bad news that was occurring simultaneously. Although that argument, supported by proper evidence, may demonstrate that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue, should this lawsuit proceed to that stage, it does not cause this Court to conclude that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead the element of loss causation. On the contrary, they have set forth their theory of loss causation in detail, and that theory is based on more than the bare assertion that the Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations merely caused the value of Huffy’s stock to become inflated. Accord Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 501 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1118-19 (S.D.Ohio 2007) (<HOLDING>). It bears emphasis, that, in ruling on a

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs allegations of loss causation complied with dura because they asserted that defendants misrepresentations had caused the value of the shares of stock to become inflated after which the disclosure of the true state of affairs caused the plaintiffs to lose millions of dollars
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S.C. § 1326(a), enhanced by (b)(2). Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), counsel for Gonsalez-Palomino has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, and a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. Gonsalez-Palomino has not filed a pro se supplemental brief and the government has not filed an answering brief. We have conducted an independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and we dismiss in light of the valid appeal waiver. See United States v. Nguyen, 235 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that an appeal waiver is valid when it is entered into knowingly and voluntarily); see also United States v. Cardenas, 405 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

    ### Response:
    holding that the changes in sentencing law imposed by united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not render waiver of appeal involuntary and unknowing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    given effect. These cases allow for each employee or retiree individually to decide whether to consent to arbitration of his or her own claims. Pryner further indicates that where the employee/retiree and employer/former employer agree to arbitration, “there is nothing to prevent a binding arbitration.” Id.; see also Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d at 283 (finding “there is no real danger that Cooper would have to relitigate the same issues with individual retirees that will have already been arbitrated with the Union”); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Assocs., 266 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir.2001) (stating that dispute resolved by arbitrators was closed to further litigation by res judicata and collateral estoppel); cf. Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1280 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the arbitrator’s decision would

    ### Response:
    holding that former employees lawsuit was not barred by res judicata by unions prior suit where employee was not a party to the prior suit as a former union member was not in privity with the union and never authorized the union to represent his interest in prior suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of widely recognized authorities on endocarditis, but rather as a reluctance to accept as authoritative the materials in their entirety and to accept one particular source as the exclusive authority on endocarditis. A trial judge’s decision to admit expert testimony will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. E.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.1985). In this case, the trial judge did not abuse his wide discretion in allowing Dr. Bennett to testify as an expert in the field of cardiology. Moreover, the plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Bennett relied on a particularly objectionable or unconventional scientific theory or methodology. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796-97, 126 L.Ed.2d 469, 485 (1993). (<HOLDING>). Because the district court did not abuse its

    ### Response:
    holding that expert scientific testimony must be grounded in the methods and procedures of science and based on more than a subjective belief or unsupported speculation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    placed in a situation that may endanger the child’s life or health[.]” § 30-6-KD). A child is defined as “a person who is less than eighteen years of age.” § 30-6-l(A)(l). Review of the criminal code, NMSA 1978, Sections 30-1-1 to 30-28-3 (1963, as amended through 2005) defines a “person” as “any human being or legal entity[.]” § 30-1-12(E). {7} When the Legislature defined a “person” as a human being or legal entity, it did not include fetuses within the meaning of a “human being.” State 956 (1996) (dismissing charge of second-degree criminal mistreatment of a child, holding that a fetus was not a child within the meaning of criminal mistreatment statute where mother continued to ingest cocaine while pregnant); State v. Deborah J.Z., 228 Wis.2d 468, 596 N.W.2d 490, 496 (Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). C. Due Process {11} Accepting the State’s

    ### Response:
    holding that fetus was not a human being for purposes of attempted firstdegree intentional homicide and firstdegree reckless injury statutes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    patients that physicians were independent contractors and provided patients with consent forms that informed patients of physicians’ independent-contractor status); Peter v. Vullo, 234 N.C.App. 150, 162, 758 S.E.2d 431, 439 (2014) (noting that hospital expressly gave notice via consent form that ■physician was an independent contractor); Cantrell v. Northeast Georgia Med. Ctr., 235 Ga.App. 365, 366, 508 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1998) (noting that hospital posted sign over registration desk and gave patients treatment-consent forms advising patients that physicians were not hospital employees); and Holmes v. University Health Sery., Inc., 205 Ga.App. 602, 603, 423 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1992) (noting that forms plaintiff encouraged the Bains to think that Dr. 38, 735 P.2d 460 (Ct. App. 1987) (<HOLDING>); and Gilbert, 156 Ill.2d at 526, 622 N.E.2d at

    ### Response:
    holding issue of vicarious liability was for jury where patient did not have opportunity to choose physician who was provided by hospital
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    If the trial court concludes that the agreement is procedurally unconscionable, the trial court must also determine whether the agreement is substantively unconscionable on the basis that it limits discovery and noneconomic damages. See, e.g., Prieto v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of Am., 919 So.2d 531, 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“The agreement herein deprives the nursing home resident of significant remedies provided for by the statutes. Specifically, it limits non-economic [sic] damages, bars punitive damages and attorney’s fees, and restricts access to discovery necessary to prove statutory violations. For these reasons, we conclude that the agreement is substantively unconscionable.” (footnote omitted)); Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So.2d 59, 62-63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Woebse, 977 So.2d at 634-35

    ### Response:
    holding agreement was substantively unconscionable because it prevented arbiter from awarding punitive damages and attorneys fees awards that were intended by the legislature to be awardable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    there was no support in the text or history of § 1252 for such a construction. 533 U.S. at 351, 121 S.Ct. 2268. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s holdings that it lacked jurisdiction over a petition for direct review, and that § 1252 did not preclude the petitioners from pursuing habeas relief in the district court under § 2241. Id. at 349-50, 352, 121 S.Ct. 2268. Thus, we disagree with the government’s argument that Mr. Latu could have raised all the issues in his habeas corpus petition in a petition for direct review. We conclude that Mr. Latu properly filed a timely habeas petition to bring his constitutional claims that were not reviewable on direct review under § `1252(a)(2)(C). See Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1145-47 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). B. Jurisdiction to review discretionary

    ### Response:
    holding that review under  2241 is still available ndtwithstanding language in  1252a2c barring review by any court of final orders of removal for aliens deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense and distinguishing between direct and collateral review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    parole is not a consequence of a plea of guilty, but a matter of legislative grace or a consequence of the withholding of legislative grace [, and t]here is no co SE2d 609) (2008) (same). 6 See Rice, 277 Ga. 649; Williams, 301 Ga. App. at 850-51 (1). 7 Earley v. State, 310 Ga. App. 110, 112 (712 SE2d 565) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted). 8 Murray v. State, 307 Ga. App. 621, 623-24 (705 SE2d 726) (2011) (footnote and punctuation omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 9 Rios v. State, 281 Ga. 181, 181 (2) (637 SE2d 20) (2006) (punctuation omitted). 10 Murray, 307 Ga. App. at 624 (punctuation omitted). 11 Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581 (1) (513 SE2d 212) (1999) (citations and punctuation omitted). 12 See id. at 582 (1)

    ### Response:
    holding that counsels failure to advise the defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea cannot rise to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    satisfy the duly of fair representation implied by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. 7 . The relevant portion of Section 160(b) with which the Cannon court was concerned stated as follows: “No complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made ...” See 832 F.2d at 304 n. 2 (emphasis supplied). 8 . See Winkels v. George A. Hormel & Co., 874 F.2d 567, 569 (8th Cir.1989) (disagreeing with Cannon majority and ruling that there is no requirement that federal procedural rules be imposed when a hybrid case is initiated in state court); Gorwin v. Local 282, I.B.T., 838 F.Supp. 116, 123 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (<HOLDING>); Juliano v. Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc., 734

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs hybrid  301fair representation action was not time barred where plaintiff commenced timely action in state court under new york civil rules
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is not available as a defense to claims alleging medical malpractice in providing subsequent treatment. In Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 236 Neb. 1, 15, 459 N.W.2d 178, 186-87 (1990), where a patient failed to follow the instructions of his doctor to lose weight, and his weight problem was causally related to a pulmonary embolism for which he obtained negligent treatment, the defense of contributory negligence was held inapplicable in a medical malpractice case “when a patient’s conduct provides the occasion for medical attention, care, or treatment ... or when the patient’s conduct contributes to an illness or condition for which the patient seeks the medical attention, care, or treatment on which a subsequent medical malpractice claim is based.” Likewi ist.Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>); Matthews v. Williford, 318 So.2d 480, 483

    ### Response:
    holding that conduct by the plaintiff contributing to his illness or medical condition and furnishing the occasion for medical treatment is not a defense to medical malpractice where a doctor negligently treated a man who had attempted to commit suicide
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Appendix at 200. On the other hand, if the arbitrator determines that the March 2002 claim qualifies as a “controver sy or claim arising out of or relating to services ... hereafter provided by us to you or at your request,” resolution of the claim is governed by the ADR provision. Id. In the event that the mediation required under the ADR provision is unsuccessful and the parties proceed with arbitration, the arbitrator will be required to rule upon Parkevich’s claims related to the March 2002 sale of the property. In doing so, the arbitrator would have to rule upon Parkevich’s claims, if they are presented, that the Engagement Letter violated the Ind. Rules of Professional Conduct and is against public policy. See, e.g., Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 n. 4 (Ind. 1997) (<HOLDING>); W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759,

    ### Response:
    holding that an agreement in violation of explicit judicial declarations of indiana public policy in the rules of professional conduct are akin to contravening a statute and such agreements are unenforceable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the initiation of criminal proceedings against him, and seizing Colon-Andino’s property — e.g. his weapons permit and gun — without probable cause. Each one of these factual allegations alone clearly constitutes a plausible Fourth Amendment violation. Together the claims allege malicious prosecution on the part of defendants against Colon-Andino. The First Circuit Court of Appeals has “assumed without deciding that malicious prosecution can, under some circumstances, embody a violation of the Fourth Amendment and thus ground a cause of action under section 1983.” Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256 (1st Cir.1996)); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275-76, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994)(<HOLDING>). To establish malicious prosecution under

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hr"" (Att, 4 at unnumbered page 4). According to Dr. Mash, the combined effects of PCP intoxication and Smith's low intellectual functioning and organic brain ' damage together impaired his higher order reasoning and judgment abilities such that ""he could not adequately comprehend his Miranda rights or assess the ramifications of a waiver of those rights"" (Att. 4 at unnumbered page 2). 1 24 We find that this proffered evidence is insufficient to show that trial counsel was ineffective. Specifically, we are convinced that expert testimony such as that contained in these two reports would not have changed the district court's decision on the voluntariness of Smith's waiver or our opinion on direct appeal affirming that decision. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S.Ct. at 2067-68 (<HOLDING>). 125 In finding that Smith voluntarily waived

    ### Response:
    holding that to establish prejudice sufficient to warrant finding of ineffective assistance the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other disputed items should be included in the property distribution. III. Inclusion of Property that Sue Disposed of Prior to the Dissolution. The parties disagree with respect to whether other assets should be included as part of the property awarded to Sue: (1) the Blazer sold or given to Jami; (2) the cash value received by Sue when she canceled the policy on David’s life; and (3) the funds from the liquidated mutual fund that were not attributable to Sue’s inheritance. We begin our consideration of this issue with the observation that a spouse’s disposal of assets that would otherwise be subject to division in the dissolution may properly be considered in making an equitable distribution of the parties’ property. See In re Marriage of Cerven, 335 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Iowa 1983) (<HOLDING>). A. The Blazer. The evidence shows that the

    ### Response:
    holding that property transferred by a spouse to avoid support obligation may be considered on the issue of property distribution as well as alimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the total cost of the items ordered and the type of delivery the customer selected. The specific charges were identified based on the two. variables. As is apparent from J.C. Penney’s disclosures, the cost of the delivery charge as a percentage- of the amount of the order declined as the amount of the order increased, thereby serving as an incentive for consumers to purchase additional items to save on delivery charges. Nowhere in the website did J.C. Penney claim that its shipping and handling charges were based upon “actual cost.” Indeed, the matrix chart provided by J.C. Penney plainly demonstrated that the key variables were not weight or size but cost of the item and the chosen method of delivery. See Zuckerman v. BMG Direct Mktg., Inc., 290 A.D.2d 330, 737 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Ciser v. Nestle Waters N. Am. Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that billing consumers for shipping and handling an amount exceeding the sellers actual costs cannot be deceptive as a matter of law when the amounts are fully disclosed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the victim was killed in the parking lot and that he staged her death to look like a sexual assault, the grass which was clutched in the victim’s hand tells another tale — one where she was still struggling for life at the edge of the pond after being sexually assaulted. The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of twelve to zero. The trial court found such a punishment was appropriate after considering all the evidence and properly weighing the aggravators against the miti-gators. Specifically, the court found four aggravating factors, one statutory miti-gator, and numerous nonstatutory miti-gators. Upon review, we find that the circumstances of this case are similar to other cases in which we have upheld the death penalty. See Orme v. State, 677 So.2d 258, 263 (Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>); Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d 3, 7 (Fla.1994)

    ### Response:
    holding the death sentence proportional for the sexual battery beating and strangulation of victim where there were three statutory aggravators hac pecuniary gain and sexual battery and both statutory mental mitigators
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fair trial.”), if Ms. Battles had obtained the information upon which she presently grounds her Brady claim before the trial commenced (or, indeed, sometime before the trial ended), she would have been obliged to voice her concerns about that potentially suppressed information then. Compare United States v. Warhop, 732 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir.1984) (“While we strongly disapprove of delayed disclosure of Brady materials, that alone is not always grounds for reversal. ‘As long as ultimate disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant] to make use of any benefits of the evidence, Due Process is satisfied.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 291 (7th Cir.1979))), with United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1376 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In such a circumstance, Ms. Battles’s failure

    ### Response:
    holding that revelation of exculpatory material just prior to the end of trial which led the defense to move  to dismiss the case  for violating brady did not warrant reversal when following the recess defense counsel extensively crossexamined the witness possessing the purportedly exculpatory information regarding the tardilydisclosed evidence  and used the exculpatory material to strong effect in his closing argument
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that City bears the burden of demonstrating that the City Council’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. (See City Motion at 13; AirTouch Opp’n at 18.) The Court accepts that stipulation, and accordingly will assign the burden of proof in § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) on the City. c. Analysis AirTouch argues that as a matter of law there was no substantial evidence to support the City’s decision because the record consists primarily of the “substantiated” testimony of residents whose testimony was based on their experiences with Nex-tel. There is a split in authority, and no Ninth Circuit authority, on whether a telecommunications zoning decision can be based on constituent testimony alone. Compare AT & T Wireless PCS v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); with Cellular Telephone Co. v. Town of Oyster

    ### Response:
    holding that it is proper for a legislature and its members to consider constituent testimony as particularly compelling forms of evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    P.2d 934 (Alaska 1994); Maricopa Cnty., 136 Ariz. 528, 667 P.2d 228 (App.1983); In re Interest of Bird Head, 213 Neb. 741, 331 N.W.2d 785 (1983). I would hold that good cause exists to deviate from the adoptive placement preferences of section 1915(a). Baby Girl has resided with Appellant rated a desire and willingness to introduce Baby Girl to her Indian culture. Section 1917 permits an adopted Indian child to receive information on his or her “tribal affiliation ... and ... such other information as may be necessary to protect any rights flowing from the individual’s tribal relationship” upon reaching the age of eighteen. 25 U.S.C. § 1917. Thus, I am persuaded that Baby Girl will have a knowledge of and appreciation for her cultural heritage. See In re Robert T., 246 Cal.Rptr. at 176 (<HOLDING>). In light of the totality of the evidence,

    ### Response:
    holding that the native american childs best interests were to remain with his adoptive parents since they have bonded well and have encouraged him to learn about and visit his cultural roots
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was pursuant to a settlement agreement, not an IEP team decision. Outside of settlement, AACPS maintains, it has no authority to place students in non-approved schools. The parents refute all of these contentions. Although the ALJ did not reach this issue, we note that the weight of the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, supports AACPS’s contentions, as does the caselaw and the statute itself. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(10)(B) (providing that when public agencies place children in private schools, “the State educational agency shall determine whether such schools and facilities meet standards that apply to State educational agencies”); Carter v. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four, 950 F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir.1991), aff'd, 510 U.S. 7, 14, 114 S.Ct. 361, 126 L.Ed.2d 284 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the record fully supports the ALJ’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the unilateral placement of a student by the parents in an unapproved school is not by itself a bar to tuition reimbursement but public schools may not place students in unapproved schools
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In this case, Dr. Sklaroffs report concluded: “[H]ad [Sanders] been provided episodic follow-up gastroscopic evaluations, the lesion would have been detected at an earlier moment in its natural history ... when it would have been amenable to surgical cure.” The district court noted that it is unclear whether by stating that “the lesion would have been detected” (emphasis added), Dr. Sklaroff was suggesting that the 2003 mass did not itself become cancerous. But even assuming, as the Estate urges, that the mass detected in 2003 later became cancerous, Dr. Sklaroffs assertion that the lesion “would have been amenable to surgical cure” does not establish the probability of a better outcome nor take that probability out of the realm of conjecture. See Estate of Gibson, 91 So.3d at 625 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); Hubbard, 954 So.2d at 964;

    ### Response:
    holding that testimony taken as a whole must establish reasonable medical certainty that the negligence caused the injuries at issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    likely to do so than the Act. By contrast, the Act allows firearm counseling to continue, so it is not directly regulating medical conduct or declaring a certain form of treatment bad medicine. At the same time, the Act directly bans asking irrelevant questioning about firearms — even, indeed especially, those questions having nothing to do with medical conduct. The Act thus directly targets questioning and only incidentally advances whatever medical interests might be served by a law eliminating irrelevant questions about firearms from the doctor’s office. The burden on speech is direct. The benefit to medical care is, at best, incidental and indirect. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that States cannot advance their interests in this way. See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2670 (<HOLDING>). In an attempt to salvage its claim that the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the first amendment prohibits laws where the state seeks to achieve its policy objectives through the indirect means of restraining certain speech by certain speakers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any court in a civil, criminal, or other matter without the consent of the defendant.”). 9 . KRS 533.256(1). 10 . The provisions permit programs that are ""authorized by the Kentucky Supreme Court and providing for the pretrial diversion of misdemeanants,” KRS 533.262(2), e.g., those implemented in district court pursuant to CR 8.04. The statute also contains ""grandfather” language permitting pretrial diversion programs in place as of July 15, 1998 to “continue for the purpose of supervising persons granted pretrial diversion prior to July 15, 1998, however no new pers ding that Court of Appeals properly denied petition for writ directing trial court to exclude certain evidence because ""evidentiary errors may be corrected on appeal.”); St. Clair v. Roark, Ky., 10 S.W.3d 482, 485 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Cavender v. Miller, Ky., 984 S.W.2d 848, 849

    ### Response:
    holding that although double jeopardy is an appropriate subject for a writ of prohibition the court in which the petition is filed may in its discretion  decline to address the merits of the petition on grounds that there is an adequate remedy by appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would leave the district court judge with unfettered discretion to set interest rates on judgments, which was most likely not the intent of the legislature, and which is at variance with the common law. At common law, no interest was allowed, and it is only permissible when authorized by statute. See Paradise Homes v. Central Surety, 84 Nev. 109, 116, 437 P.2d 78, 83 (1968); see also Wilson v. Pacific Maxon, Inc., 100 Nev. 479, 483, 686 P.2d 235, 237 (1984) (“As we have explained, the statutory interest rate was seven percent (7%). The judgment entered below, therefore, must be modified to provide for prejudgment interest at the rate of seven percent (7%) instead of twelve percent (12%).”). Statutes in derogation of the common ng Fiberglass Corporation, 616 So. 2d 645, 647 (La. 1993) (<HOLDING>). We reject this argument based on a plain

    ### Response:
    holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Illinois and Florida to his declaration of intent to reside in Florida indefinitely, the court will need to determine what weight to give to the declaration. See Prakash v. American University et al., 727 F.2d 1174, 1181 (D.C.Cir.1984). This determination, as it depends upon the credibility of the declaration and Hicks’s credibility as a witness, is difficult to make solely on the basis of a paper record. See Sapperstein, 188 F.3d at 856 (questioning credibility determinations based solely on affidavits in determining subject matter jurisdiction); see also Mendiola v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 598 n. 4 (7th Cir.2000) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (noting that credibility assessments from a paper record are unreliable); Medeco Security Locks, Inc. v. Swiderek, 680 F.2d 37, 38 (7th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207, 1214

    ### Response:
    holding that a hearing must be held to determine credibility in preliminary injunction cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    may permit a doctor to exercise judgment in choosing among several courses of treatment. “The error-of-judgment rule . . . stems in part from the recognition that if there is more than one acceptable treatment option, then the selection of any one of them is not negligence. Thus, a doctor is not liable for untoward results if he or she used reasonable care in selecting one of those options.” Rogers v. Meridan Park Hospital, 772 P.2d 929, 930-31 (Or. 1989). In this case, the defendants assert that in the course of treating Mrs. Francoeur, Dr. Piper had multiple options from which to choose, each of which met the standard of care, and the fact that the option he chose resulted in Mrs. Francoeur’s amputation does not, standing alone, constitute negligence. The defendant argues that 995) (<HOLDING>); Deyo v. Kinley, 565 A.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Vt.

    ### Response:
    holding good faith and honest error in judgment instructions erroneously imply only badfaith and dishonest deviations actionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Waggoner received was to compensate him for traveling from Texarkana to Shreveport, It reasoned that $10 of the $50 per diem was intended to pay for his “actual travel expense” and the remaining $40 was to “compensate the employees for their travel time.” The Commission also noted that “the per diem was intended to bear a rational relationship to the actual cost of the employee’s transportation costs from Texarkana to the company’s various work sites,” The “compensated travel” concept has not been fully developed or discussed in the case law. As a general rule, however, this exception applies when an employee’s compensation covers' the time going back and forth from work or an allowance is made for the cost of transportation. Chicot Mem’l Hasp., 9 Ark. App. at 20, 652 S.W.2d at 632 (<HOLDING>). The compensated-travel exception has also

    ### Response:
    holding where the employer supplies less than the actual expense of travel exception would apply only if the reimbursement bore a reasonable relation to the actual expense of travel or was for a substantial part of it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    courts have typically focused upon the right of the employer to control its annual budgetary and discretionary functions as well as the absence of an employee’s right to the continued existence of a particular means or method of compensation. In Keeling v. City of Grand Junction, 689 P.2d 679 (Colo.App.1984), for instance, the court found that an educational incentive pay program for police officers and firefighters did not create a contractual obligation. Id. at 680. The Court held that “plaintiffs do not have a vested contractual right in the continuance of a particular rate or method of compensation” and observed that “succeeding city councils are not bound by the legislative acts of their predecessors....” Id.; see also Schulz v. City of Longmont, 465 F.3d 433, 443 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Colo. Springs Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of

    ### Response:
    holding that promises city made to pay annual step increases did not result in contractual obligation and municipalities retain ability to change compensation and benefits provided to employees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    experience with the state’s criminal justice system. See Garcia, 358 N.C. at 397, 597 S.E.2d at 737. When first approached by Officer Robb, defendant was told he was being detained until detectives arrived but that he was not under arrest. When he was again advised by the detectives upon their arrival that he was not under arrest, defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany them to the police station, affirmatively telling them he was “anxious” to talk with them and answer their questions. Defendant was never restrained from the time of his initial encounter with Detectives Copeland and Taylor until the door of the investigation room was locked after defendant admitted stabbing the victim. Until then, defendant was frequently left alone in the interview room with th 2d 178, 185-87 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Although defendant focuses on his inability

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant who voluntarily rode to the station with officers in a police car waited in a lobby with unlocked external doors and was told more than once he was not under arrest was not in custody
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1737 Corp. must show that the transfers were consistent with the parties’ prior practices. See Savage & Assocs. v. Mandl (In re Teligent, Inc.), 380 B.R. 324, 340 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2008). Its counsel represented at oral argument that the defendant no longer employs Insignia/ESG as its property manager, and it may be very difficult to muster the documentary and testimonial evidence needed to mount a defense after so many years. City of Yonkers, 2008 WL 5272722, at *6 (“To permit an extension of the service period now, sua sponte, more than four years after the complaint was filed, would require defendants to defend a lawsuit based on actions taken more than seven years ago.”); Rice v. Univ. of N.D. Sch. of Med. & Health Scis., No. 2:07-cv-11, 2008 WL 5145482, at *4 (D.N.D. Dec. 8, 2008) (<HOLDING>). Savage is responsible for the long delay, and

    ### Response:
    recognizing the prejudice of an extension to a defendant who would be required to litigate events that occurred more than eight years earlier
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the amended sworn notice of claim. The parties have not yet presented their case to the screening panel or conducted any discovery. Frame promptly filed the amended sworn notice of claim, within four months of the original filing. Frame has not yet sought to file a complaint for professional negligence, and the now-sworn notice provides the Hospital with a basis for a perjury action against Frame. [¶ 19] Further, permitting an amended notice of claim to cure the defect caused by the unsworn notice is consistent with the purposes of the MHSA. An amendment that cures a technical defect fulfills the statutory objectives of deciding claims on their merits and encouraging the early withdrawal of meritless claims. See 24 M.R.S. § 2851(1); see also Dutil v. Burns, 1997 ME 1, ¶ 5, 687 A.2d 639 (<HOLDING>). Permitting Frame to assert her claim under

    ### Response:
    recognizing that dismissal of claim for a failure to comply with the statutory prerequisites for maintaining an action for professional negligence  is akin to a dismissal for insufficient service of process or lack of subject matter jurisdiction and does not serve as an adjudication of the merits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.2d 306, 309 (11th Cir.1993) (rejecting the argument that the common law D’Oench doctrine is limited by a specific asset requirement). Other circuits are in agreement on this issue. See, e.g., Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir.1995) (rejecting the argument that the D’Oench doctrine is limited by an “asset” requirement, because such a requirement “would undercut an important purpose of that doctrine — allowing the FDIC to rely on a bank’s records when insuring the bank”); Brookside Assocs. v. Rifkin, 49 F.3d 490, 496 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]e hold that the common-law [D’Oench \ doctrine applies to bar suit even when the RTC does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement.”); Jackson v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 730, 734-35 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Timberland Design, Inc. v. First Serv. Bank

    ### Response:
    holding that claims that do not diminish or defeat the fdics interest in any specific asset are nevertheless doench barred in light of the established purpose of the doench  doctrine to protect the fdics reliance on the banks records
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to inquire about the proceeding; Johnson assured her things were progressing. On September 13, 2008, Neef observed that Johnson no longer appeared to work in his Newton, Iowa law office. Neef attempted to contact Johnson on numerous occasions, including visiting his former law office, calling repeatedly, and visiting Johnson’s home. When Neef left a message on Johnson’s cell phone informing him she was starting fraud charges and contacting the Iow to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) because he told Neef things were progressing when he had not even filed the bankruptcy petition, assured Neef he would file right away when reached by her, and once again failed to file. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wagner, 768 N.W.2d 279, 286-87 (Iowa 2009) (<HOLDING>). We reject the commission’s recommendation to

    ### Response:
    holding repeated claims by attorney to client that documents were forthcoming constituted misrepresentations in violation of rule 3284c when the documents were not actually ready
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    possession is sufficient.” Payton, 159 F.3d at 56. And we have explained that a defendant is subject to a two-level enhancement under § 2Dl.l(b)(l) for possession of a dangerous weapon if he “constructively possessed the weapon by having. dominion ... or control over the item itself, or dominion over the premises where the item [was] located.” United States v. Ortega, 94 F.3d 764, 768 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Pellegrini, 929 F.2d 55, 56 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam). We see no reason why, for purposes of the safety valve, possession would not similarly include constructive possession, at least where the defendant keeps the weapon under his personal dominion and control. See United States v. Bolka, 355 F.3d 909, 915-16 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). The safety valve was intended to prevent

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant was not entitled to safetyvalve relief where evidence showed that he kept three firearms in the home where he sold and manufactured methamphetamine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Saniti, 604 F.2d 603, 604 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969, 100 S.Ct. 461, 62 L.Ed.2d 384 (1979). Relevant factors for a court to consider when examining whether a marria ivilege excepts premarital events from protection. See Clark, supra (criticizing hyper-factual inquiries necessitated by sham marriage exception to privilege; employing joint-participants exception and acts-prior-to-marriage exception to affirm trial court’s finding that privilege did not apply to spouses who co-conspired to steal money from savings and loan; husband could not invoke spousal testimony privilege to avoid testifying against his wife at her criminal trial); United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091, 95 S.Ct. 684, 42 L.Ed.2d 684 (1974) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Subpoena of [Witness], supra

    ### Response:
    holding exclusion of testimony from defendants wife at defendants trial was not required under spousal testimony privilege where both spouses participated in unlawful enterprise of transporting illegal aliens and wifes testimony concerned matters prior to their marriage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    even if dispute would be futile, because the FDCPA requires that notice be given, that the debtor be informed of his or her rights to dispute and obtain validation of the debt, and a proper notice of dispute triggers the debt collector’s obligation to obtain and provide the debtor with validation, including a copy of a judgment, I cannot say that plaintiff has failed to state a claim. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 4 . Circuits are split on whether applying the unsophisticated consumer standard to collection notices and letters under the FDCPA is a matter of law for judges to decide or a question of fact better left to juries. Compare Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.1999); Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC, 518 F.3d 433, 440-41 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) with Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30,

    ### Response:
    holding it is a question of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to obtain an inheritance or a share under a partnership agreement. So defined, the factor provides clear guidance. Aggravating circumstances must provide a ‘“meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [death] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.’ ” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 883 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2764, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 392 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), the Supreme Court struck down an aggravating circumstance so vaguely worded that it failed to perform this narrowing function. See also Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 199-200, 524 A.2d 188 (<HOLDING>). We find no vagueness in the factor on its

    ### Response:
    holding c4c factor void for vagueness unless limiting construction was given
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the CHINS determinations. Thus, we remand for the trial court to make proper findings and conclusions in support of its judgment. Affirmed in part and remanded with instructions. MATHIAS, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur. 1 . The parties do not indicate, nor could we find in the Appendices, when the children were first placed with Father during the course of the CHINS proceedings. 2 . The allegation was based on a local newspaper article, which reported that Father's attorney had been named as the Logansport city attorney and the GAL had been named as the deputy city attorney. 3 . On April 11, 2007, the trial court entered its ""Order Terminating Wardship.” Appellant’s App. at 126. But that order does not render the appeal moot. See Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Mother also alleges, in passing, that the

    ### Response:
    holding an appeal from a chins determination after termination of the chins case is not moot because of the potentially devastating consequences of a chins determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assigned the claim, and the collection service sought to have the judgment registered in Missouri. In the Missouri action, Burgess filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the South Dakota judgment was only against Dako and could not have an effect against him personally. The trial court in Mis sition that he had been doing business under variations of the name of “Tri-State Seed Company” since about 1985. He admitted that he had entered into the contract, offered as part of exhibit 1, with Toulousaine. The name on the contract with Toulousaine was “Tri-State Seed & Grain.” The address of “Tri-State Seed & Grain” is Olson’s home address. He admitted that he intended to cover this seed contract by purchasing seed from Palen. The stationery he 49, 560 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Rink v. NPN, Inc., 419 N.W.2d 194 (N.D. 1988)

    ### Response:
    holding that one who deals with a business entity under an assumed name may bring an action against it under the assumed name
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a party seeking modification of a foreign child-support order must register that order in the manner prescribed by the UIFSA. The father argues that § 30-3A-613, Ala.Code 1975, applied to the 2005 action and relieved him of the duty of registering the foreign support judgment. However, § 30-3A-613(a) provides: “If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a court of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify the issuing state’s child-support order in a proceeding to register that order” (Emphasis added.) We acknowledge that the mother and the father resided in Alabama in 2005 and that the children had left Missouri so that § S0-SA-613(a) applies, see Mathews v. Mathews, 368 Ark. 252, 244 S.W.3d 660 (2006) (<HOLDING>); however, under that statute, the trial court

    ### Response:
    holding that arkansass version of the uifsa applied to registration and modification of foreign childsupport order even though father mother and child resided in state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have obtained approval from the state Public Utilities Commission to ship goods on behalf of the military at reduced rates. In the present case, on the other hand, there is nothing that Temple can do to enable it to permit the military to conduct on-campus interviews. Quite to the contrary, given the Order, Temple is barred from cooperating with the military unless and until the United States changes its employment policy with respect to homosexuals. Under these circumstances, we believe that the Commission has no more right to enforce the Ordinance against Temple than did the Town of Windsor to enforce its building permit regulations against the contractor hired to construct a top-secret federal research facility. See United States v. Town of Windsor, 765 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). C. The Commission also argues that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the town of windsor cannot enforce its buildingpermit requirements against contractor hired to build addition to nuclear facility because the impact of the local regulation would fall directly on the government and result in classified information being disclosed and a classified area being opened to town officials
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    firearms in Razzano were pursuant to a department policy rather than in connection with a court order. Razzano, 765 F.Supp.2d at 185. 7 . To the extent that the Defendants instead refer to Panzella's state-law claims, those claims cannot serve as a basis of jurisdiction, This is because the Defendants did not seek immunity from suit on those claims, and hence cannot seek an interlocutory appeal from the denial of immunity. 8 . The County also argues that its adherence to New York law regarding the treatment of the firearms did not constitute a ""policy” as required for a county to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S, 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). See Vives v. N.Y.C., 524 F.3d 346, 353-56, 358 (2d Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Leaving aside the fact that we are here

    ### Response:
    holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plaintiffs interests.” Obstfeld, 621 F.Supp.2d at 93-94 (quoting ZB Holdings, 144 F.R.D. at 45). “[A]ntagonism has generally not been found where the corporation does not, would not, or cannot express opposition to the initiation of the lawsuit.” Id. at 94 (quoting Netwolves Corp. v. Sullivan, No. 00-cv-8943 (AGS), 2001 WL 492463, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2001)); see also Net-wolves, 2001 WL 492463, at *7 (“[A] corporation that cannot act, a deadlocked corporation, is not considered ‘actively antagonistic’ to a lawsuit, within the meaning of Sperling and Swanson, because the corporation has not refused to sue, and will not clearly refuse to sue if it becomes able to render a decision.”); Cohen v. Heussinger, No. 89-cv-6941, 1994 WL 240378, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1994) (So-tomayor, J.) (<HOLDING>); Sonn, on Behalf of WLS Assocs. v. Korein, No.

    ### Response:
    holding that case did not fall within the boundaries of the sperling exception because plaintiff and defendant were coequal owners of the corporation and the proposed complaint does not allege that defendant controlled the corporation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be varied by legislative action. Id. As the Florida Supreme Court stated in Ammer-man: [T]the term may be defined in different statutes or for different purposes. See 73 C.J.S. Property s. 2, p. 152. For example, Fla. Stat., s. 421.03(12), F.S.A. defines ‘real property' for the purposes of the housing authorities law; Fla. Stat., s. 475.01(11), F.S.A. defines ‘real property’ for the purposes of the real estate license law; Fla. Stat., s. 713.01(14), F.S.A. defines ‘real property for the purposes of the mechanics lien law. These definitions vary, because the statutory definitions usually apply only to the term as used in the particular statutory provision. Id. (emphasis added). We have recognized this legal principle. Miami Country Day Sch. v. Bakst, 641 So.2d 467, 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)(<HOLDING>). Applying this principle, the brothers argue

    ### Response:
    holding that a houseboat in a fixed location connected to a dock was a dwelling house within the meaning of section 22205 of the florida statutes 1993 defining when certain homesteads located on leased properties are entitled to protection from forced sale under article x section 4a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    refers to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules of morality and duties owed between man and man, either one’s fellow man or society in general.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[F]or an offense to involve moral turpitude, it must require a reprehensible or despicable act” — one “that is inherently wrong, or malum in se, rather than conduct deemed wrong only because of a statutory proscription, malum prohibitum.” Id. at 921 (italics omitted). “A crime of moral turpitude, moreover, necessarily involves an evil intent or maliciousness in carrying out the reprehensible act.” Id. at 921-22. The BIA has long viewed prostitution-related crimes as morally turpitudinous. See, e.g., Matter of Lambert, 11 I. & N. Dec. 340, 342 (BIA 1965) (<HOLDING>); Matter of A— , 5 I. & N. Dec. 546, 549 (BIA

    ### Response:
    holding that renting rooms with knowledge that the rooms were to be used for the purpose of lewdness assignation or prostitution were for crimes involving moral turpitude
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    NRCP 8(c) does not speak directly to whether a federal law granting immunity from liability qualifies as an affirmative defense, the question then becomes whether the Act falls within NRCP 8(c)’s catchall provision. See NRCP 8(c). This court recently instructed lower courts and litigants on what defenses must be affirmatively pleaded under NRCP 8(c)’s catchall provision, stating, “Allegations must be pleaded as affirmative defenses if they raise ‘new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s . . . claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true.”’ Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Richardson Constr., 123 Nev. 382, 393, 168 P.3d 87, 94 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 350 (2d Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>)). Although CCSD and Phillips argue that

    ### Response:
    holding that erisas preemption of state contract claims in a benefitsdue action is an affirmative defense subject to waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    omitted). “[C]onclusions of law drawn from the fundings of fact are . . . reviewable de novo.” Huyck Corp. v. Town of Wake Forest, 86 N.C. App. 13, 15, 356 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1987) (citations omitted). “A law enforcement officer may stop and briefly detain a vehicle and its occupants if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Jackson, 199 N.C. App. 236, 241, 681 S.E.2d 492, 496 (2009) (citation omitted). However, an officer’s determination regarding potential criminal activity must be objectively reasonable, and an officer’s mistaken belief that a defendant has committed a traffic violation is not an objectively reasonable justification for a traffic stop. See State v. McLamb, 186 N.C. App. 124, 127-28, 649 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2007) (<HOLDING>). A passenger in a vehicle which is stopped by

    ### Response:
    holding that an officers mistaken belief that the defendant was speeding was not an objectively reasonable purpose for a traffic stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which reported a total drawdown of 639,312 tons over the three-year period 2009-2011, for an average of 213,104 annually, which is much closer to the 2010 Dynamic Report than the SEC filings. Id. ¶ 47(g). These two sets of facts are mostly ignored by defendants, who instead train their fire on what they label the “only allegation in this regard,” which is that “some unnamed ‘Henan L & R Dept Staff supposedly said that noncompliance with' Chinese mining regulations would create ‘significant risks, liabilities, and penalties.’ ” Defs.’ Mem. 9 (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 30.). Defendants argue that under the test of Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.2000), this confidential witness is insufficiently identified to support an inference of personal knowledge. See Novak, 216 F.3d at 314 (<HOLDING>). But even if defendants are correct that the

    ### Response:
    holding that confidential sources need not be named provided they are described in the complaint with sufficient particularity to support the probability that a person in the position occupied by the source would possess the information alleged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is determined by comparing the defendant’s state of mind in committing the extrinsic and charged acts. United States v. Zapata, 139 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam). Although the age of a prior offense may depreciate its probity, we have refrained from adopting a bright-line rule regarding temporal proximity, because remoteness analyses are so fact-specific “that a generally applicable litmus test would be of dubious value.” Matthews, 431 F.3d at 1311 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An appellant bears a heavy burden in establishing an abuse of the judge’s “broad discretion” in determining if a prior offense is too old to be probative. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). A district judge’s limiting instruction can

    ### Response:
    holding in a prosecution for a large cocaine deal the district judge did not abuse his discretion when he admitted evidence that the defendant had participated in small marijuana deals approximately 15 years before the charged cocaine offenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the judgment of a court of the United States rendered or filed within the state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any county and upon such filing the clerk shall docket the judgment in the same manner and with the same effect as a judgment entered in the supreme court within the county.”); N.Y. CPLR § 5402 (""The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the supreme court of this state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of the supreme court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.”). 105 . Cf. Bradford-Scott Data Corp., Inc. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 106 . See Appellant Br. at 16 (“In this, the

    ### Response:
    holding that notice of appeal of district court opinion denying arbitration stay divested district court of jurisdiction to continue proceedings until the appeal was complete
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the error was plain, and (3) that the plain error affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1174 (10th Cir.2005). “If all these conditions are met, a court reviewing the error may exercise discretion to correct it if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. ‘We conduct this analysis ‘less rigidly when reviewing a potential constitutional error.’ ” Id. (citing United States v. James, 257 F.3d 1173, 1182 (10th Cir.2001)). “It is well-established that a prosecutor may use a defendant’s pre-arrest silence to impeach the defendant’s credibility.” United States v. Chimal, 976 F.2d 608, 611 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238, 240, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (<HOLDING>)). In the present case, the prosecutor

    ### Response:
    holding that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate fifth or fourteenth amendments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    172. Le Doux’ filings qualify as purported returns because she prepared them on official Form 1040s and signed them. See Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1997; Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1988. Le Doux admits in an attachment to these filings that she intended the IRS to treat them as tax returns: “I Vera Le Doux, am submitting these as part of my ... income tax returns.” Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1997, at 3; Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1988, at 3. Le Doux failed to provide information upon which the IRS could judge the return’s correctness. Le Doux’ returns contain zeros, not the financial information the IRS needs to judge the correctness of her return. See Bradley v. United States, 817 F.2d 1400, 1403-1404 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Hoffman v. United States, 209 F.Supp.2d 1089,

    ### Response:
    holding blank return did not provide sufficient information despite taxpayers income being below the filing threshold
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    thirty years later or to the impact that a second power line within the same corridor might have on the remaining property. ¶ 24. Where — as here — a new use is consistent with the general nature of an existing easement, the burdened estate may nevertheless be entitled to compensation if it is more onerous than originally contemplated. See, e.g., Minot v. United States, 546 F.2d 378, 381 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (recognizing that, where local power agency installed higher and wider transmission towers in place of existing line within easement owned by United States, power agency could be “held to account for an inverse condemnation” in overburdening plaintiffs’ property, although there was no basis for holding United States liable); Grimes v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 96 S.E.2d 713, 714 (N.C. 1957) (<HOLDING>); City of Sweetwater v. McEntyre, 232 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that placement of additional lines and crossarms on existing power poles by second power company imposed additional burden on easement entitling landowner to compensation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim that neither of these prongs was satisfied. With regard to the first prong, the Defendants contend that the jury did not have a legally sufficient basis to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Defendants were objectively reckless. In order to support this contention, the Defendants point to both their non-infringement defense and the invalidity defense of obviousness. The existence of an objective risk of infringement is “determined by the record developed in the infringement proceeding.” Id. The objective prong is not established when the accused infringer puts forward a reasonable defense to infringement, even if the jury ultimately reaches a verdict of infringement. See Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek,

    ### Response:
    holding that the objective prong for willful infringement is generally not met where an accused infringer relies on a reasonable defense to a charge of infringement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the type of error that typically justifies remand. Id. at 1217; see Huffman, 194 F.3d at 1077-79 (defendant’s failure to file notice of removal within the thirty-day period necessitated remand upon plaintiffs motion); see also Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 686-87 (10th Cir.1981) (finding that remand was appropriate when the notice was defective because a co-defendant had not joined the notice of removal). Last, the court found that the sole objective sought by Congress when it amended the removal statutes was to force the parties to raise objections promptly so procedural defects cannot later be used to prejudice the other party in court. Yellow, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1219. The defendant in Yello elers Cas. & Surety Co. of Am., No. 05-144, 2005 WL 1653629, at *4 (D.Or. July 6, 2005) (<HOLDING>); Lorensen v. Jenney Mfg. Co., 158 F.Supp. 928,

    ### Response:
    holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have found its way to the floor as a result of the actions by"" husband appellant or wife appellant. There is no evidence from which the jury might reach a conclusion as to the cause of the presence of the grape in the aisle, and jurors may not be permitted to reach conclusion based upon guess or conjecture. Nor can we accept appellant’s argument to the effect that the display of non-packaged grapes on a counter some seven feet from the bags and across an aisle from the scale constitutes negligence in and of itself, since every reasonable effort was made to keep the passageway clean. Id., 419 Pa. at 234, 213 A.2d at 610. Similarly, in the present case, appellant has presented no evidence as to the cause of the presence of the grape on the floor. In addition, negligence is 481 (1990) (<HOLDING>); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451,

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (2008) (“There is no absolute rule by which to determine what contracts are against public policy, but each case must be determined from all the circumstances thereof, the courts declaring a contract void for such reason only where it is clearly contrary to the public interests .... ”)). In making such a determination in this case, the Court must consider competing pu 300, 319-20 (2d Cir.2009) (refusing to enforce a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement as against public policy “because to ... [enforce it] would grant [the defendant] de facto immunity from antitrust liability by removing plaintiffs’ only reasonably feasible means of recovery,” while affirming the arbitrability of antitrust claims more widely); Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 98-99 (5th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>); Fox Midwest Theatres, Inc. v. Means, 221 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Facts. On December 13, 2004, the court held a status conference. On December 23, 2004, the Government filed a Reply to DCI’s Response to the Government’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. On January 7, 2005, the parties filed a proposed Scheduling Order. The court held status conferences on January 11, 2005 and on January 18, 2005. On January 18, 2005, the court entered a Scheduling Order for fact discovery and expert discovery and established a trial date to commence on November 14, 2005. On July 29, 2005, the court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying DCFs October 7, 2004 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and denying the Government’s November 18, 2004 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. See Die Casters Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 67 Fed.Cl. 362 (Fed.Cl. 2005) (<HOLDING>). The Memorandum Opinion and Order confirmed

    ### Response:
    holding summary judgment was not warranted because material facts were in dispute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    injunction and that the injunction was not validly issued under Boys Markets, see id. at 12-13. There, injunctive relief could not be justified “on either ground — to enforce a contract or support arbitration — let alone both.” Id. at 12. That an order staying arbitration could not be in support of arbitration was self-evident. Id. The company argued that there was no contract requiring arbitration and that it could not be forced into arbitration. Id. In addition to vacating overly broad injunctive relief and injunctive relief that did not advance the arbitral process, this court has also reversed grants of Boys Markets injunctive relief for failure to meet the traditional four-part equitable test. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Teamsters Local No. 633, 511 F.2d 1097, 1100 (1st Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has

    ### Response:
    holding that the balance of relative harms to the parties showed employer did not meet its burden
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Section 2 of this article is void to the extent of the conflict.”). 10 . 29U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 11 . See generally FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61, 111 S.Ct. 403, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990) (""[E]mployee benefit plans that are insured are subject to indirect state insurance regulation. An insurance company that insures a plan remains an insurer for purposes of state laws ‘purporting to regulate insurance’ after application of the deemer clause. The insurance company is therefore not relieved from state insurance regulation. The ERISA plan is consequently bound by state insurance regulations insofar as they apply to the plan’s insurer.""). 12 . UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 376 n. 7, 119 S.Ct. 1380, 143 L.Ed.2d 462 (1999); see also id. at 372-73, 119 S.Ct. 1380

    ### Response:
    holding that a california commonlaw requirement that insurers show prejudice before they may deny coverage because of late notice regulated insurance and was saved from preemption the insurance company that issued a group disability policy as an insured employee benefit plan could not rely on the notice provisions to deny coverage unless there was prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Corp. Act Ann. art. 5.10(B)(2) (Vernon 1997); Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755, 758-59 (Tex.App.1986); see also McKee v. American Transfer & Storage, 946 F.Supp. 485, 487 (N.D.Tex.1996). But see Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex.Civ.App.1977) (noting exceptions for merger, consolidation, and fraud). 8 . See, e.g., Palmer G. Lewis Co. v. ARCO Chemical Co., 904 P.2d 1221, 1227 (Alaska 1995) (""When choice of law issues arise, we commonly refer to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts for guidance.""). 9 . See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. d (1971) (''The courts have long recognized that they are not bound to decide all issues under the local law of a single state.""); Ruiz v. Blentech Corp., 89 F.3d 320, 324 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See Black's Law Dictionary 448 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that under the second restatement test a court therefore conducts a separate choiceoflaw analysis for each issue in a case attempting to determine which state has the most significant contacts with that issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property. He claims that the words “hold as trustee” establish an express trust, that all partners are trustees for the rest of the partnership, and that a partner is therefore a fiduciary within the meaning of the act. However, under this statute, the trust arises only when the partner derives profits without consent of the partnership; it is the sort of trust ex maleficio not included within the purview of § 523(a)(4). See Davis, 293 U.S. at 333, 55 S.Ct. at 153-54; Teichman v. Teichman (In re Teichman), 774 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.1985). But see Holmes v. Kraus (In re Kraus), 37 B.R. 126, 130 (Bkcy E.D.Mich.1984) (<HOLDING>). Montana has an identical code section to

    ### Response:
    holding that partners are fiduciaries for the purpose of  523a4 relying on michigan statute with identical language
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hugo De La Cruz, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings conducted in absentia due to ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003). We deny the petition for review. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying De La Cruz’s motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel as untimely, because De La Cruz had knowledge of the alleged ineffective assistance for over a year before he filed his motion to reopen. See id. at 897-98 (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. ** This

    ### Response:
    holding that a petitioner must act with due diligence when pursuing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to benefit from equitable tolling of deadlines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    County, 839 F.2d 225, 226-27 (4th Cir.1988) (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976)). Here, the plaintiff does refer to state law, Va.Code Ann. § 2.1-116.1 et seq. (Michie 1995 & Supp.2000) (the “Law-Enforcement Officers’ Procedural Guarantees” statute), as the basis of his property interest in continued employment. While this state law provides the plaintiff with such an interest, see Kersey v. Shipley, 673 F.2d 730, 732 (4th Cir.1982), it also “provides for more process than what the Constitution would otherwise require.” Riccio v. County of Fairfax, 907 F.2d 1459, 1467 (4th Cir.1990) (emphasis in original). For this reason, the specific procedures it establishes need not be complied with fully to satisfy federal due process. See id. at 1468 (<HOLDING>) Rather, to determine whether due process has

    ### Response:
    holding in virginia county police officers  1983 action against ms department and various county officials that the departments violation of the law enforcement officers procedural guarantees does not necessarily compel a finding of a due process violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    colloquy, the colloquy is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-27 (4th Cir.2002); United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 393 (4th Cir.2002). To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show that: (1) there was an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his “substantial rights.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). A defendant’s substantial rights are affected if we determine that the error “influenced the defendant’s decision to plead guilty and impaired his ability to evaluate with eyes open the direct attendant risks of accepting criminal responsibility.” United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 402-03 (4th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Martinez, 277 F.3d at 532 (<HOLDING>). Neither counsel nor Farley identify any

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the evidence was not relevant, made no determination as to whether it was constitutionally impermissible. It was therefore incumbent on Perry, in objecting to the admission of evidence about her lack of remorse, to raise the issue of due process to the trial court in order to preserve this objection for direct appeal. AFFIRMED. HOWARD and BEATTY, JJ., concur. 1 . Because oral argument would not aid the court in resolving the issue on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 2 . Perry cites the following authorities in support of her argument: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (concerning references to a defendant’s silence after receiving Miranda warnings); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 476 S.E.2d 695 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Johnson, 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding references to a defendants lack of remorse violate the fifth eighth and fourteenth amendments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    wit: that DHS improperly denied his naturalization application, that the removal proceedings were invalid, that DHS’s arrest and detention of him were unlawful, that DHS officials retaliated against him based First Amendment protected activity, that he should be readmitted to the United States and naturalized, and that his underlying conviction is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Abiodun, 2012 WL 3844912, at *24 (describing litigation history). Indeed, the Government here has filed a motion to dismiss that restates many, if not all, of the arguments it raised in Abiodun’s prior suits. Compare, e.g., Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, at 10-11 (Heck v. Humphrey bars Abiodun’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) with Abiodun v. United States, No. 07cv1713, 2007 WL 2782542, at *1 (D.Colo. Sept. 20, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Analysis An individual’s right to access to

    ### Response:
    holding that heck v humphrey bars abioduns claims under the ftca
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.2009) (quoting Schlaifer Nance, 194 F.3d at 333). Because “ ‘the trial court [imposing sanctions] may act as accuser, fact finder and sentencing judge’ ” all in one, Schlaifer Nance, 194 F.3d at 334(quoting Mackler Prods., Inc. v. Cohen, 146 F.3d 126, 128 (2d Cir.1998)), our review of such an order is “ ‘more exacting than under the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard.’ ” Wolters Kluwer, 564 F.3d at 113-14 (quoting Perez v. Danbury Hosp., 347 F.3d 419, 423 (2d Cir.2003)). “In order to impose sanctions pursuant to its inherent power, a district court must find that: (1) the challenged claim was without a colorable basis and (2) the claim was brought in bad faith, i.e., motivated by improper purposes such as harassment or delay.” Schlaifer Nance, 194 F.3d at 336; see also id. at 337(<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted). Although both

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim is entirely without color when it lacks any legal or factual basis conversely a claim is colorable when it has some legal and factual support considered in light of the reasonable beliefs of the individual making the claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    second suit must be identical with the prior action in four respects: 1) the parties must be the same or in privity; 2) the subject matter must be identical; 3) the capacity or character of persons for or against whom the claim is made must be the same; and 4) the same cause of action must be involved in both suits. Id. Petitioner does not dispute that the above elements are met, but instead argues that an exception to res judicata is applicable in the present case. We agree. {16} Res judicata does not apply where “issues or matters are not determined or are reserved for future adjudication or litigation.” State ex rel. Bliss v. Casarez, 52 N.M. 406, 408, 200 P.2d 369, 370 (1948) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Apodaca, 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 85, 134 N.M. 77, 73 P.3d 215 (<HOLDING>). According to Petitioner, the “1999 Order was

    ### Response:
    recognizing the express reservation of the plaintiffs right to maintain a second action as an exception to the doctrine of res judicata
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (laying out a four factor test for determining reasonableness in the prison context). This is so because the constitutional rights of prisoners — limited by the fact of incarceration itself and by valid penological objectives— must be balanced against the recognition that it is prison authorities who are best equipped to make difficult decisions regarding prison administration. See Ali v. Dixon, 912 F.2d 86, 89 (4th Cir.1990). 7 . Following Blagman's request on December 30, 1998, defendant White advised him that services could be held on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, 991) (""the mere calendar recognition of a holiday would [not] have the effect of endorsing the religion.”); Florey v. Sioux Falls School District, 619 F.2d 1311, 1317 & n. 5 (8th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). 14 . See, e.g., Allegheny v. American Civil

    ### Response:
    holding that much of the art literature and music associated with traditional holidays particularly christmas has acquired a significance which is no longer confined to the religious sphere of life
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her liable for tortious interference. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts III and V are granted. Under New York law, a claim for tortious interference requires “the existence of a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party, defendant’s knowledge of the contract, defendant’s intentional procurement of the third-party’s breach of the contract without justification, actual breach of the contract, and damages resulting therefrom.” Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc. et. al., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 424, 646 N.Y.S.2d 76, 668 N.E.2d 1370 (1996). Where the defendants have an economic interest in the contract, however, alleging the above elements is insufficient. See White Plains Coat & Apron Co., Inc. v. Cintas Corp., 8 N.Y.3d 422, 426, 835 N.Y.S.2d 530, 867 N.E.2d 381 (2007) (<HOLDING>) (footnotes omitted). The plaintiff must also

    ### Response:
    holding that economic interest defense is available inter alia where defendants were significant stockholders in the breaching partys business where defendant and the breaching party had a parentsubsidiary relationship where defendant was the breaching partys creditor and where the defendant had a managerial contract with the breaching party at the time defendant induced the breach of contract with plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, ¶ 26, 136 N.M. 53, 94 P.3d 796 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In New Mexico, because we recognize a fundamental liberty interest in the right to custody of one’s child, parents have a due process right to meaningfully participate in a hearing for the termination of their parental rights. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Ruth Anne E., 1999-NMCA-035, ¶ 25, 126 N.M. 670, 974 P.2d 164. Generally, parents also have a right to receive effective notice and have an opportunity to participate at the permanency stage of an abuse and neglect adjudication involving their child. See Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, ¶ 34 (<HOLDING>). However, a parent’s right to be present at a

    ### Response:
    holding that generally parents have a due process right to participate in a permanency hearing because the opportunity to defend against charges of abuse and neglect may prevent a termination of parental rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    years leading up to the lawsuit, and that such contacts can be considered collectively). 2. Forum Selection Clause Under Florida law — which is the minority view — “a contractual choice of forum clause designating Florida as the forum cannot serve as the sole basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction over an objecting, non-resident defendant.” McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So.2d 540, 544 (Fla.1987) (emphasis added). Such a clause may, however, be considered as a factor that weighs in favor of exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where other grounds exist to exercise such jurisdiction. See Armaly v. Practice Mgmt. Assocs., 533 So.2d 920, 922 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); see also Desai Patel Sharma, Ltd v. Don Bell Indus., Inc., 729 So.2d 453, 454 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). Here, in addition to the contacts described

    ### Response:
    holding that nonresident defendants failure to make payments in florida coupled with forum selection clause sufficient for court to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is entitled to one-half of that portion ... in this case."" Id. at 488-84. 127 Wife concedes that Woodward is the controlling case in Utah regarding how retirement assets are valued and divided, but attempts to distinguish the present case factually because ""the overwhelming growth of [Husband's] retirement accounts ... [occurred] during the period of the parties' marriage."" Presumably, this is because appreciation of the accounts was greater in the later years. Wife argues that the value of Husband's accounts should be ascertained as of 1993, when the parties married, and the balance exceeding that 1993 value should then be divided between the parties. Woodward, however, made no such distinction, and treats all years of a defined benefit plan as having equal value. See id. at 488 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted)). The trial court followed

    ### Response:
    holding that a fixed system of distribution is applicable where no present value can be established
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the federal rules, recognized that it was to be “guided by court decisions interpreting these rules.” Miscellaneous Changes to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Rules, 63 Fed.Reg. at 48,084. The majority relies on TBMP § 523.04 which states that where a party “fails to file a motion to challenge the sufficiency of the response [to its discovery request], it may not thereafter be heard to complain about the sufficiency thereof.” It is far from clear whether this provision was designed to deal with the supplementation requirement, or whether it was limited to deal with the failure to provide initial responses. In any event, unlike the regulations, this section of the TBMP does not have the force and effect of law. See In re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053, 1059 (Fed.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). In the past, we have declined to follow

    ### Response:
    holding that the trademark manual of examining procedure tmep does not have the force and effect of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449-58, 84 S.Ct. 1738, 12 L.Ed.2d 953 (1964)(rejecting the plaintiffs attempt to place glass and metal containers in different relevant markets based on different characteristics). News America points to ample evidence in the record supporting its contention that the consumers of at-shelf coupon dispensers do in fact view at-shelf coupon dispensers as reasonably interchangeable with other in-store marketing vehicles, despite the fact that each in-store marketing vehicle may have its own unique advantages and features. Based on the record presented, the Court cannot accept Menasha’s definition of a relevant market limited to at-shelf coupon dispensers. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 242, 113 S.Ct. 2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168 (1993)(<HOLDING>). Because Menasha has failed to provide a

    ### Response:
    holding that when an experts opinion regarding the relevant market is not supported by sufficient facts or when the record contradicts or renders the opinion unreasonable it cannot support a jurys verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thereafter, the federal court granted Al-Challah's request and signed Al-Challah's proposed order dismissing her federal claims with prejudice and dismissing her state law elaims without prejudice. A complaint that is voluntarily dismissed is treated as if it never existed and, thus, cannot toll the statute of limitations. Kohlman, 509 N.E.2d at 232. Because Al-Challah voluntarily dismissed her federal lawsuit, her action did not ""fail"" within the meaning of the Journey's Account Statute. Therefore, the trial court did not err by finding that the Journey's Account Statute was not applicable by granting Barger's motion to dismiss Al-Challah's complaint as time barred. See, e.g., id.; cf. City of Evansville v. Moore, 563 N.E.2d 113, 115-116 (Ind.1990) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs voluntary dismissal did not bar the application of the journeys account statute where the dismissal was not unilateral but merely occurred as a professional courtesy in compliance with the defendants request and assurance that he would waive any affirmative defense under the statute of limitations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the benchmark well above the ALI’s hope that class members might receive 100 percent recovery. And the court recognized that the cy pres fund serves the goals of civil damages by ensuring AstraZeneca fairly pays for the class’s alleged losses. We asked at oral argument why AstraZeneca would be willing to pay a total sum more than the treble damages for each class member. Counsel for Plaintiff Townsend replied that the plaintiffs had insisted on AstraZeneca paying a larger sum to better represent the losses of the entire class, including those class members who would never claim their recovery. The district court’s approval reflected another important concern: facilitating a settlement in a hard-fought, complex class action. See Durrett v. Housing Auth., 896 F.2d 600, 604 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Achieving settlement in such cases is not

    ### Response:
    recognizing a policy encouraging class action settlements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defendant’s method of measuring the productivity of its sales staff singled her out and devalued her contribution. It is well-established that an employer may rely upon supervisor evaluations to assess an employee’s performance when carrying out an employment decision. Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985). As articulated by plaintiff, however, by considering the small, less time-consuming agreements the younger salesmen were able to obtain as equivalent to the those plaintiff sought, defendant intentionally undervalued plaintiffs work. As further evidence of the pretext of the methodology, plaintiff cites the following examples: that it was applied retroactively to diminish the value of her sales, th (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, plaintiff denies the

    ### Response:
    holding that based upon discrepancies in defendants articulated basis for discrimination reasonable juror could infer that these were pretextual and developed over time to counter evidence suggesting discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court, Mr. Lilly’s appeal is a criminal appeal subject to Rule 4(b) notice of appeal filing requirements. Mr. Lilly maintains that we have appellate jurisdiction because this appeal is subject to the timing requirement of Rule 4(a) for appeals in civil matters. According to Mr. Lilly, his petition for clarification was in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, which is a civil proceeding that would give rise to a civil appeal. B. It is true that a number of proceedings involving criminal matters are treated as civil for purposes of Rule 4’s filing requirements. See, e.g., Browder, 434 U.S. at 265 n. 9, 98 S.Ct. 556 (observing that habeas corpus is undeniably a civil proceeding to which the time limits of Rule 4(a) apply); United States v. Taylor, 975 F.2d 402, 403 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Craig, 907 F.2d 653, 657

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 4as timing requirements apply to an appeal from an order granting or denying a criminal defendants motion for the return of property under fedrcrimp 41e
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    activity. State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 503 (Utah 1979). “[T]he transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the agent and the defendant, and the response to the inducements of the agent” must all be evaluated. Id. Moreover, “[e]xtreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money, are examples, depending on an evaluation of circumstances in each case, of what might constitute prohibited police conduc ts of money, or large quantities of marijuana for an extremely low price. Rather, Wakefield used the market rate to determine the price of the marijuana. Furthermore, Wakefield did not make repeated requests or badger J.D.W. to buy the marijuana. Cf. Sprague, 680 P.2d at 406 (<HOLDING>). J.D.W. immediately responded positively to

    ### Response:
    holding that agent entrapped defendant by goading defendant and repeatedly requesting drugs from him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    misinformation, the analysis differs where the government affirmatively misleads an alien about the availability of relief. Cf. Holmberg v. Armbreckt, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946) (explaining that equity will toll a statute of limitations because of fraud or concealment). We did not find Copeland’s two-year delay in seeking to exhaust his administrative remedies unreasonable where he had been misinformed by the IJ. This reasoning is equally applicable to Lopez’s failure to seek judicial review in the eighteen months between his final order of deportation and his deportation. Deportation, now removal, is a civil proceeding with its own administrative procedures. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048-50, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Because it is an administrative process,

    ### Response:
    holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil deportation proceedings and noting the rules incompatibility with the streamlined administrative nature of such proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (7th Cir.2011). ANALYSIS CVR disputes both parts of the 10(j) test. It contends there is no reasonable cause to believe that it committed unfair labor practices because it is not a successor to Berry obligated to negotiate with Local 100 ULU. Second, CVR contends that injunctive relief is not “just and proper” in this case, largely because of the 16-month gap between the filing of the charge and this 10(j) petition. A. Reasonable Cause It is well settled that, under certain circumstances, a successor to an employer is subject to the predecessor’s duty to negotiate with the representatives of the appropriate employee unit, and the failure to negotiate can be an unfair labor practice. See NLRB v. Burns Int’l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 280-81, 92 S.Ct. 1571, 32 L.Ed.2d 61 (1972) (<HOLDING>). CVR contends that this successor-ship

    ### Response:
    holding that where the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent the successor employer must bargain with the incumbent union
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    them until after the petition, and the amount debtor was to pay to fund those benefits likewise was not determined or payable until after the petition was filed. At issue was whether the obligation to fund those unemployment benefits paid to the former employees was a pre-petition or post-petition claim against the debtor. The court ruled that because the event that under local law triggered the liability, i.e. the termination of the employees, occurred pre-petition, the claim was not a post-petition administrative expense. Id. at 515. 8 . See, e.g., Columbia Gas System, 146 B.R. at 118 (ruling that under local law debtor obligation to pay taxes arose not when it was assessed but ""when it owned and operated properly within the prior calendar year”); Northeastern Ohio, 126 B.R. at 515 (<HOLDING>); In re Brent Explorations, Inc., 91 B.R. 104,

    ### Response:
    holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    personally upon them. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama, 104 F.3d 1453, 1457-58 (4th Cir.1997) (opining that so long as the government has suffered an injury-in-fact, the qui tam plaintiff possesses general standing as the government’s representative); United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1212-1214 (7th Cir.1995) (stating “[o]nce we accept the premise that the United States is the real plaintiff in a qui tam action, it stands to reason that challenges to the standing of the government’s representative are beside the point____Requiring an additional showing of injury on the part of the qui tam relator would be an analytical redundancy.”); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 748 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1154 (declaring that

    ### Response:
    holding that the fca effectively assigns the governments claims to qui tam plaintiffs  who then may sue based upon an injury to the federal treasury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An employer is found liable for negligent hiring if, at the time of hiring, the employer had reason to believe that hiring this person would create an undue risk of harm to others. Connes v. Molalla Transp. System, Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Colo.1992); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 emt. d (1958). Hence, the court does not inquire into the employer’s broad reasons for choosing this particular employee for the position, but instead looks to whether the specific danger which ultimately manifested itself could have reasonably been foreseen at the time of hiring. This inquiry, even when applied to a minister employee, is so limited and factually based that it can be accomplished with no inquiry into religious beliefs. See Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320-21 (Colo.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2153, 128

    ### Response:
    holding that although courts must not become embroiled in interpreting or weighing church doctrine a claim of negligent hiring of a minister is actionable because it does not require such interpretation or weighing of religious belief but instead is merely application of a secular standard to secular conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fiduciary relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other to so act.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1). There is no manifestation by either the federal government or the State of California of an intent to create an agency relationship under the facts of this case. First, both the Supreme Court and our predecessor court, the United States Court of Claims, have held that the federal government’s conditioning a state or locality’s receipt of federal funds on the state’s taking a particular action does not make that state or locality an agent of the federal government. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, Pa., 369 U.S. 84, 89, 82 S.Ct. 531, 7 L.Ed.2d 585 (1962) (<HOLDING>); D.R. Smalley & Sons, Inc. v. United States,

    ### Response:
    holding that the county government not the federal government was liable for the taking of an air easement over plaintiffs property even though the airport was funded in part by a federal grant based on compliance with federal regulations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [] is a matter which lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.” Consol. Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Const. Co., 383 F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir.1967). Even where a defendant does not explicitly ask for default to be set aside, a brief in opposition to default judgment will be treated as a request to have default set aside, and will be analyzed under the “good cause” standard. See FDIC v. Danzig, 10 F.3d 806, 1993 WL 478842, at *2 (4th Cir.1993) (unpublished table decision) (‘Where, as here, a court is ruling upon a plaintiff’s application for a default judgment, it properly treats the defendant’s opposition as a motion to set aside the entry of default, which is assessed under Rule 55(c)’s good cause standard.”) (citing Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>)). Therefore, as stated above, Wong’s

    ### Response:
    holding that in considering the appellants opposition to the motion for a default judgment it is proper to apply the rule 55c standard for setting aside the entry of a default
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “[i]t is enough for the movant to bring up the fact that the record does not contain such an issue,” the movant must also “identify that part of the record which bears out his assertion.” City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Assoc. Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988) (emphasis added). “Once this is done, [the moving party’s] burden is discharged, and, if the record in fact bears out the claim that no genuine dispute exists on any material fact, it is then the [non-moving party’s] burden to set forth affirmative evidence, specific facts, showing that there is a genuine dispute on that issue.” Id. at 274. However, if the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, the burden is never passed to the nonmoving party. See Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1346 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). “ ‘[E]ven when the non-movant bears the

    ### Response:
    holding due to the moving partys failure to meet its initial burden the onus never passed to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial  citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the best mode. See United States Gypsum Company v. National Gypsum Company, 74 F.3d 1209, 1213 (Fed.Cir.1996) (quoting the inventor definitively stating “[a]t the time the application was filed, I considered a perlite supplied by Silbrico ... to be the best commercially available .... ”)• Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 112. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . The court agrees with Plaintiffs that its use of various terms throughout the specification to signify a theoretical win profile do not arise to the level of semantic indefiniteness as was found in Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus. Inc. 299 F.3d 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002)(<HOLDING>) 2 . For purposes of Defendants' Summary

    ### Response:
    holding that in the case where patentee was attempting to argue that parallel meant perpendicular with respect to a particular claim and a claim ended with an incomplete limitation the claims at issue were indefinite
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    causing significant change in benefits.” Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). To constitute an adverse employment action, the conduct must be ‘“materially adverse’ to the employee’s job status.” Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1213 (2003)(quoting Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d at 533). In Wells v. Colorado Dep’t of Transportation, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether a supervisor’s “poor treatment” of the employee was sufficient to establish an adverse employment action. 325 F.3d at 1214. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the supervisor undermined her authority at a work site when they had a disagreement in front of other workers. See id. In denying the plaintiffs claim that 98, 1104 (10th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>). “There is little support for the argument

    ### Response:
    holding that written warnings that impacted the probability an employee would be terminated are adverse employment actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    outlining the offenses, not the later date of indictment. Id. The appeals court disagreed, holding that denial of parole due to pending charges is not equivalent to arrest on the charges. Id. at 1043. Therefore, the defendant’s continued incarceration was for his prior conviction, rather than pretrial detention for the uncharged offense, and so the speedy trial clock began to run from the date of indictment. Id.; see also People v. Roscoe, 162 Mich.App. 710, 413 N.W.2d 483 (1987); State v. Johnson, 92 Wash.2d 598, 599 P.2d 529 (1979). Likewise, the Alaska Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that the speedy trial clock begins to run when a defendant is indicted, rather than when arrested on other offenses or for probation violations. Harmon v. State, 908 P.2d 434 (Alaska Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>); Demientieff v. State, 814 P.2d 745 (Alaska

    ### Response:
    holding that the speedy trial clock for state charges did not begin to run when the defendant was taken into custody by federal authorities on federal charges but rather when he was indicted for the state charges
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    13-3. Defendant contends that the 2010-2011 IEP does not preclude G.M. from earning a Regents diploma in the future, but that earning Carnegie credits in her mainstream classes is currently outside G.M.’s ability. See Dkt. No. 15 at 24. Under the IDEA, a student with a disability is eligible to earn a high school diploma until his or her twenty-first birthday. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 100.9(e). At the time this action was brought, G.M. was fifteen years old, thus Defendant’s contention that she still has ample time to earn a Regents diploma is correct. Given G.M.’s significant deficits, however, Defendant’s decision that G.M. would not receive Carnegie credit for her course work for 2010-2011 does not amount to a violation of the IDEA. See J.S., 586 F.Supp.2d at 86 (<HOLDING>). The record shows that G.M. struggled

    ### Response:
    holding that the districts decision that the plaintiff could only pursue an iep diploma was reasonably calculated to benefit the plaintiff and was in conformity with the requirements of the idea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.2004) (noting that “the general rule under NEPA is that in assessing cumulative effects, the [EIS] must give a sufficiently detailed catalogue of past, present, and future projects, and provide adequate analysis about how these projects, and differences between the projects, are thought to have impacted the environment”). In other words, the EIS must “provide decisionmakers with sufficiently detailed information to aid in determining whether to proceed with the action in light of its environmental consequences and to provide the public with information and an opportunity to participate in the information gathering process.” Nothwest Res. Info. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir.1995); see also Young v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 99 F.Supp.2d 59, 67 (D.D.C.2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, an agency must demonstrate in the EIS

    ### Response:
    holding that in addition to providing crucial information to the agency nepa also guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the decision making process and the implementation of that decision this larger audience includes  the public which receives the assurance that the agency has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process as well as the opportunity to comment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not abuse its discretion in admitting La Mott’s testimony. Wilson next argues that the statement was not made “in furtherance of’ the conspiracy. To be “in furtherance of’ a conspiracy, “the statements must further the common objectives of the conspiracy or set in motion transactions that are an integral part of the conspiracy.” Kearns, 61 F.3d at 1426 (quotations omitted), “mere conversation between coconspirators” does not qualify as nonhearsay. United States v. Bibbero, 749 F.2d 581, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1984) (quotations omitted). Here, Ware’s statement concerned the source of the pseudophendrine pills and it is plausible that the statement was made to convince Meier, a member of the conspiracy, that the source was loyal, consistent and reliable. See Williams, 989 F.2d at 1069 (<HOLDING>); Kearns, 61 F.3d at 1425-26 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that statements made to keep a coconspirator informed as to the groups drug supply were made in furtherance of the conspiracy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a witness, he did not receive any money for his actions. See infra, p. 587. 8 .Although the Third Circuit, in Klem, analyzed the definition of ""substantial burden” in the context of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, this test has been used interchangeably in the RFRA context. See Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 442-43. 9 . It is worth mentioning that, though not applicable to the case at hand, the test to determine the validity of a prison regulation which impinges on prisoners' constitutional rights includes as one factor “whether inmates retain alternative means of exercising the circumscribed right.” DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir.2004); see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), 10 . The Suprem (9th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943, 90 S.Ct. 956, 25

    ### Response:
    holding that a kidnappers motivation is not an element of the federal kidnapping offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the application of the Code. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 160-61, 111 S.Ct. 2197, 115 L.Ed.2d 145 (1991). This holding also applies to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See In re Thomas, 203 B.R. 64, 67 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.1996) (applying plain meaning doctrine to bankruptcy rules) (citing Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643-44, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992)). Under the plain meaning of Bankruptcy Rule 9001(5), a “controlling stockholder” may be designated by the Court. In the case at bar, Rubicon is unquestionably a controlling shareholder; it owns the most stock of any shareholder, [Finding of Fact No. 9.], and its percentage ownership (45%) constitutes control. See, e.g., Riggs Nat. Bank of Wash. D.C. v. Allbritton, 516 F.Supp. 164, 179 (D.D.C. 1981) (<HOLDING>); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (presuming control by

    ### Response:
    holding that ownership of thirtyfive percent of total outstanding shares of a stock constitutes effective control
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    first enacted section 499A.1(1), it contained the same phrases that are the subject of this litigation. Compare 1947 Iowa Acts ch. 250, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 499A.1 (1950)), with Iowa Code § 499A.1(1). A search of the 1946 Code shows the general assembly used language similar to section 499A.1Q) in other sections of the Code. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 504.1 (1946) (requiring incorporators of nonprofit corporations to be “persons of full age, a majority of whom shall be citizens of the state”), repealed by 1990 Iowa Acts ch. 1164, § 27. The use of the phrase “persons of full age” denotes that the person performing the organizing has reached the age of majority and is capable of executing a contract. See Martin v. Stewart Motor Sales, 247 Iowa 204, 207-08, 73 N.W.2d 1, 3-4 (1955) (<HOLDING>); cf. Black’s Law Dictionary 78 (3d ed. 1933)

    ### Response:
    holding an individual not of full age who misrepresents his or her age cannot invoke the defense of infancy to void a contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wife disclosed some of Husband’s emails to Cooke and BJR, who allegedly used the emails to obtain additional information about Husband’s affair, the SCA does not punish such conduct. See Cardinal Health, 582 F.Supp.2d at 976 (“While [the] SCA punishes the act of accessing a ‘facility through which an electronic communication service is provided’ in an unauthorized manner, the SCA does not punish disclosing and using the information obtained therefrom.”). Accordingly, the circuit court did not err by granting summary judgment to Wife, Cooke, and BJR. See Fischer, 207 F.Supp.2d at 926 (granting summary judgment to defendants who did not access plaintiffs email accounts); Cardinal Health, 582 F.Supp.2d at 977-79 (same); see also Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir.2003)

    ### Response:
    holding that civil liability under section 2707 does not extend to those who aid abet or conspire with a person or entity engaging in a violation of section 2702
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his motion for summary judgment, predicated upon his version of the events. Here the Court considers the issue on Nuon's motion, but on Kinney’s facts. 8 . An arrest without probable cause also establishes liability under the MCRA. The MCRA was intended to provide a state law remedy co-extensive with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, except that the MCRA also reaches private action, and requires a showing that a constitutional violation was effected “by threats, intimidation or coercion.” See Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 718, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 822-23, 473 N.E.2d 1128 (1985). An arrest without probable cause has been found to constitute coercion within the meaning of the MCRA. See Daley v. Harber, 234 F.Supp.2d 27, 31-32 (D.Mass.2002) (<HOLDING>); Zurakowski v. D’Oyley, 46 F.Supp.2d 87, 88

    ### Response:
    holding that a police officers actions in effecting arrest without probable cause constituted coercion under the mcra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in 2010. In the cases where courts have denied equitable estoppel despite fraud by a fiduciary, the parties have been informed of at least some particulars indicating suspicious or fraudulent behavior. See Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 623-24 (Tex.2011) (declining to- apply fraudulent concealment doctrine because plaintiffs were aware of numerous suspicious facts underlying their cause of action); Doe v. Henderson Indep. Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 631, 2000 WL 1701752, at *4-5 (5th Cir.2000) (unpublished) (denying equitable estoppel because plaintiffs were aware of the facts of the injury they suffered even if they did not fully appreciate its practical or legal consequences); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Housing Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 749-50 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). The case of Thomas v. Barton Lodge II, Ltd.

    ### Response:
    holding that once plaintiff knew it had suffered a large loss caused by the wrongful conduct of another and had sued its fund manager it was on inquiry notice to investigate its auditor as well
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    solely on theories of misappropriation or misuse of CDC's confidential information. In support of its breach of fiduciary duty claim, CDC avers that it provided Carsey ""with access to [CDC's] confidential business information and Trade Secrets,"" and that Carsey owed CDC several fiduciary duties, including ""a duty not to disclose CDC's Trade Secrets and confidential business information, a duty not to use CDC's Trade Secrets and confidential business information to compete un fairly with CDC, and a duty not to use CDC's Trade Secrets and confidential business information for the benefit of a new business."" Accordingly, this claim is preempted by the UTSA in its entirety. See, eg., Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Equip. & Mfg., Inc., 649 F.Supp.2d 702, 724 (N.D.Ohio 2009) (<HOLDING>); Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455, 999 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it was solely dependent upon misappropriationoftradesecret facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unnecessary.” Johnson v. Potter, 177 F.Supp.2d 961, 965 (D.Minn.2001); see also V[a.] v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 388, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 ... (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that “[i]n every culture, certain things [both “sacred” and “profane”] acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can comprehend” and discussing cross burning as an example). Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 520 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir.2008). A reasonable jury could discredit an employee’s race-neutral explanation for hanging a life-sized noose. Ibid. Here, all three plaintiffs witnessed a noose in their place of employment. Although there is evidence that the person who placed the noose did so for non-discriminatory reasons, a jury could reasonably find to the contrary. Ibid.; see also id. at 1162 (<HOLDING>). It is true that the noose by itself is not as

    ### Response:
    holding that a jury could easily find that the noose was an egregious act of discrimination calculated to intimidate africanamericans
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was proper, even though later events which developed led to remand. Amoco Petroleum, 964 F.2d at 708 (7th Cir.1992). 11 . The Seventh Circuit clarified its Amoco Petroleum reasoning in In re Shell Oil Co., 966 F.2d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir.1992) (granting mandamus in part and directing district court to explain why it remanded case). Judge Easterbrook stated as dictum in Shell Oil that the language of § 1447(c)—i.e., remand is permitted ""any time before final judgment”—does not mean that changes after removal can eliminate jurisdiction and compel remand. Rather, ""[njeither the text of the revised § 1447(c) nor its legislative history implies that Congress altered the traditional view expressed in St. Paul [Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938) (<HOLDING>) ] ... that jurisdiction present at the time a

    ### Response:
    holding events occurring subsequent to removal which reduce amount recoverable do not oust district courts jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The sentencing court, however, is not required to articulate every factor provided in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 so long as the record reflects these factors were considered in particularizing the sentence of the defendant. State v. Morgan, 428 So.2d 1215 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983), writ denied, 433 So.2d 166. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the lack of compliance with the sentencing guidelines does not necessarily require sentences be set aside if the record otherwise clearly illumines the trial court’s sentencing choice and demonstrates the sentence is not arbitrary or excessive. State v. Martin, 400 So.2d 1063, on rehearing, 400 So.2 o.2d 831 (La.1992) (requiring an “articulated justification for the near-maximum sentence”); State v. Sanders, 542 So.2d 1134 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); State v. Jones, 537 So.2d 848 (La.App. 5

    ### Response:
    holding that eighteen years for a second offender convicted of simple burglary was not excessive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argument that first-filed qui tam complaints must meet a heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b) in order to bar later-filed complaints. C. Dismissal with Prejudice Batiste argues that because Zahara’s complaint was dismissed before Batiste’s complaint was dismissed, his complaint should not have been dismissed with prejudice (implying that Batiste would like the opportunity to amend his complaint and bring this case again). Batiste, however, waived this argument. Zahara was dismissed eighteen months prior to the Batiste dismissal. During that time, Batiste never asked for leave to amend his complaint in the district court; thus, he has waived his opportunity to file a new suit on these same grounds now. See Confederate Mem’l Ass'n v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion For the reasons set forth

    ### Response:
    recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Class claims, the definition of the Class and Subclasses, the terms of the proposed settlement agreement, and the class members’ right to object or request exclusion from the settlement and the timing and manner for doing so. The Notice also informed Class Members of their opportunity to be heard at the fairness hearing and to enter an appearance through an attorney, and stated that the settlement would be binding on Class Members who did not opt out of it. Furthermore, the extent of the Plaintiffs’ efforts to notify potential Class Members is adequate. The Notice was mailed to potential Class Members individually based upon consumer information provided by Sparboe and the other Defendants. See Larson v. AT & T Mobility LLC, No. 10-1285, 2012 WL 2478376, at *9 (3d Cir. June 29, 2012) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the parties published a notice

    ### Response:
    recognizing that  individual notice to identifiable class members is not a discretionary consideration to be waived in a particular case it is rather an unambiguous requirement of rule 23 accordingly each class member who can be identified through reasonable effort must be notified  quoting eisen v carlisle  jacquelin 417 us 156 176 94 sct 2140 40 led2d 732 1974
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her new family,” the guardianship is no longer necessary. We first address Susan’s parenting petition claim because it is dispositive of her other claims at this stage of the proceedings. Susan characterizes the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of her verified parenting petition as a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Kennedy v. Titcomb, 131 N.H. 399, 402 (1989) (noting that “[a] trial court has the discretion to dismiss an action sua sponte where the allegations contained in a writ do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted”). In essence, the trial court ruled that Susan’s petition failed to state a claim on any of her asserted bases for claiming to be a parent of Madelyn. Cf. In the Matter of J.B. & J.G., 157 N.H. 577, 580 (2008) (<HOLDING>). “[I]n reviewing the trial court’s order of

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioner could maintain his action seeking parental rights and responsibilities under rsa chapter 461a notwithstanding his lack of biological relationship to the child so long as he alleges sufficient facts to establish his status as a parent by other means
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were actual corporations.”); United States v. Coffman, 94 F.3d 330, 337 (7th Cir.1996) (“[E]ven if ... [Galbraith ] were decided correctly, [it] would not carry the day for the defendants[] [because it is a case] where the fraud would have done no harm even if the defendants had not been interrupted[ ] [whereas h]ere the fraud had a real victim in its sights but was interrupted before it could do any harm.”); United States v. Falcioni, 45 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir.1995) (noting Galbraith’s “limited exception to use of the intended loss figure” and stating that “Falcioni’s plan failed to result in loss, not because his victim was a non-existent entity, but rather because [an acquaintance] notified law enforcement authorities”); cf. United States v. Sheets, 65 F.3d 752, 753-54 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In sum, rather than implicitly criticize our

    ### Response:
    holding defendant liable for intended loss created by filing false tax return for someone else even though intended victim demonstrated to irs that tax return was bogus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    over Lloyds. “As federal courts have held on many occasions, [ ] customer-initiated bank-to-bank wire transfers do not establish the ‘continuous and systematic’ purposeful presence necessary to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank.” Dtex, LLC v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A., 405 F.Supp.2d 639, 645 (D.S.C.2005) (and cases cited therein), aff'd. 214 Fed.Appx. 286 (4th Cir.2007) (affirming on basis of district court’s “comprehensive and exhaustive” opinion). The sporadic visits by Lloyds’ employees to Tennessee also do not support the exercise of jurisdiction. Again, this is not the type of “continuous and systematic conduct” required to support general jurisdiction over a defendant. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tryg Int’l Ins. Co. Ltd., 91 F.3d 790, 793-94 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander

    ### Response:
    holding that a foreign defendants participation in a reinsurance pool as well as several prior reinsurance agreements with two local companies was insufficient to establish general jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an indictment which tracks the statutory language is sufficient. Id. Here, manner and means was not included in the statute; therefore, it was not required to be included in the indictment. The indictment alleged the elements of the offense and was sufficient. See Flores, 33 S.W.3d at 919 (concluding an information was defective because while the statute set forth manner and means, the information did not). Appellant appears to argue here that the State did not sufficiently identify how he “held himself out as a lawyer,” rendering the indictment defective. We hold that the words of the statute itself are not of “indeterminate or variable meaning” and, thus, tracking the statute was sufficient. See Nix v. State, 401 S.W.3d 656, 663 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>); Cf. State v. Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d 248, 254,

    ### Response:
    holding indictment sufficient where the crux of the offense was not being a physician licensed to practice medicine in the state because defendant could reasonably prepare his case without further description of how he handled the affairs of his medical clinic
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    concealed a conspiracy, as would a letter on plain stationery meant to conceal the identity of its sender. Similarly, alleging that Defendants participated in “clandestine meetings,” (Id. ¶ 99), is not tantamount to representing to others that the meetings were valid trade association meetings when in fact they were meetings in furtherance of a conspiracy. See In re Aluminum Phosphide, 905 F.Supp. at 1470 (dismissing fraudulent concealment claim because plaintiffs failed to cite specific actions by defendants to keep meetings secret). Additionally, alleging that Defendants’ silence indicates acquiescence to a conspiracy, (see Pis.’ Second Am. Compl. ¶ 98), does not constitute an allegation of an affirmative act of concealment. See In re Aluminum Phosphide, 905 F.Supp. at 1470 (<HOLDING>). Merely claiming that “all conspiracies are

    ### Response:
    holding that silence or passive conduct is not fraudulent unless parties relationship imposes duty to disclose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judge. Ramond L. Walker, Jr., challenges the ord computer printout, that Walker was arrested on May 14, 2005, and was entitled to 1379 days of credit on count one. Thus, the court awarded him an additional 3 days’ credit on that count. However, Walker correctly alleged that he is entitled to 1380 days’ credit on that count. The relevant portion of the trial transcript shows that he was arrested on the two robberies shortly after 11:00 p.m., on May 13, 2005. The State does not dispute this information. Thus, Walker is entitled to jail credit for that day because he was in actual custody. See Bronk v. State, 25 So.3d 701, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>). On remand, the postconviction court shall

    ### Response:
    holding that the statutory entitlement to presentence jail credit starts with the initial arrest for a criminal offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    77p(f)(2). Id. § 77v(a). So understood, the Jurisdiction Provision vests the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over covered class actions asserting claims under the Securities Act (“Securities Act class actions”). As a result, if a Securities Act class action is initiated in state court, that action is not barred from removal; indeed, such action must either be removéd to federal court or dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because the instant action is a putative Securities Act class action, the New York state court was not a “court of competent jurisdiction” under the Anti-Removal Provision, and the action was therefore properly removed. In. so holding, this court joins a growing consensus among district courts in the Second Circuit. Compare Hung, 2016 WL 299034, at *4 (<HOLDING>); In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., No.

    ### Response:
    holding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over securities act class actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ins. Co., 255 A.D.2d 644, 679 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1998) (insurance agent listed parking lot owner as an additional insured on certificate of insurance on policy purchased by snow removal subcontractor; although insurance agent stated it was ""routine procedure” to send a copy of certificates to the insurance company, coverage was not amended to add parking lot owner to policy); Zurich Ins. Co. v. White, 221 A.D.2d 700, 633 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1995) (insurance agent issued certificate of insurance to state department of transportation certifying that there were no deductibles to coverage provided to painting contractor for the state; insurance company later asserted a $500 per claim deductible for property damage claims caused by pain 43 Ill.App.3d 624, 2 Ill.Dec. 148, 357 N.E.2d 125 (1976) (<HOLDING>). A similar situation occurs in the context of

    ### Response:
    holding that because exclusion was not provided to certificate holder terms of the certificate controlled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a third-party tortfeasor for injuries to the employee holds the amount due to the employer in trust so as to ensure that the employer’s right of subrogation is protected pursuant to section 287.150. Id. at 386; Schumacher v. Leslie, 360 Mo. 1238, 232 S.W.2d 913, 919 (1950). Finally, SVC argues that its ability to protect its lien interest might be impaired or impeded without intervention because Kinney might settle with one or more of the Defendants and then execute a release absolving all Defendants of any other liability. While this could conceivably occur, the other enforcement options mentioned in Doss would still be available to SVC, not to mention the remedy discussed in O’Hanlon and Everard, supra. See generally Timmermann v. Timmermann, 891 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Mo.App. E.D.1995) (<HOLDING>). For all these reasons, we conclude that SVC

    ### Response:
    holding that any remedy against the third party which may have been available to the wouldbe intervenors prior to the commencement of the plaintiffs action would still be available to them in the event of an adverse disposition which also would not in and of itself preclude a subsequent equitable action by the wouldbe intervenors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether a dispute over a side agreement that does not provide for arbitration falls within the CBA’s arbitration clause, is one that this court has not previously addressed. There is a split among the circuits that have spoken on this issue. The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits apply the “collateral” test in determining whether a dispute over a side agreement is arbitrable. Under the collateral test, courts consider the similarity of the side agreement’s subject matter to the subject matter of the CBA. If the subject matter is dissimilar, the side agreement is deemed collateral to the CBA. However, where the side agreement is “integral” to the CBA, courts permit arbitration of disputes over its provisions. See, e.g., Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2800, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829,

    ### Response:
    holding that a letter of understanding was collateral to the cba and therefore not governed by the cbas arbitration clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Morrissey’s earlier services is clearly wrong in light of the court’s other findings. They include the findings (a) that “Sr. Mon[z]on had never agreed to any specific hourly rates and clearly none that approached or exceeded $200 per hour,” 782 F.Supp. at 905; (b) that Morrissey ha .S.2d at 382, 489 N.E.2d at 1284 (same). Based on Mar Oil’s rejection of the very first bill, sent in January 1981 and asking for $75,-000, Morrissey knew that, without specificity as to time spent, Monzon would not allow the bill to be paid. Statements made by an attorney to a client in such circumstances in order to induce payment of the attorney’s bills should generally be binding on the attorney. See generally Prager v. New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Insurance Co., 245 N.Y. 1, 4, 156 N.E. 76 (1927) (<HOLDING>); Finkelstein v. Kins, 124 A.D.2d 92, 95, 511

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorneys bills are high evidence as to the maximum value of the attorneys services
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    5 The court, however, refused to abrogate the immunities that a landowner enjoys in relation to trespassers. Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 839, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975). 6 But see Johnson v. Blackburn, 227 Wis. 2d 249, 257-58, 595 N.W.2d 676 (1999)(""As a general matter, a landlord owes a tenant, as well as guests of a tenant, the duty to exercise ordinary care. A landlord's duty to trespassers, however, is to refrain from willful and intentional injury.""); Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 421, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995) (""Although individuals generally owe a duty of ordinary care to all persons, we recognize that limitations do exist with respect to the imposition of a legal duty in some cases.”). 7 Compare Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 445-46, 442 N.W.2d 24 (1989) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Pagelsdorf, 91 Wis. 2d at 745);

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the court in pagelsdorf v safeco ins co of am 91 wis 2d 734 745 284 nw2d 55 1979 imposed a duty upon landlords to  exercise ordinary care in the maintenance of the premises
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the FTCA, which only allows compensatory damages. St. John v. United States, No. CIV 97-3051 at 34 (citing FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2674); see 28 U.S.C. § 2674 n. 22 (“damages are determined by law of state where the tortious act was committed, subject to limitations that United States shall not be liable for ... punitive damages”). The district court awarded $3,000 in compensatory damages based on St. John’s discomfort and inability to sleep while in custody, even though bunks, a bathroom, and a sink were available in the cell. Id. at 35. The district court found no credible evidence of physical injuries and could not award damages for mental or emotional suffering under South Dakota law. Id. at 34 (citing Nelson v. WEB Water Development Assoc., Inc., 507 N.W.2d 691, 698-99 (S.D.1993) (<HOLDING>)). Nothing in the record suggests that St. John

    ### Response:
    holding that under south dakota law compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires manifestation of physical symptoms and intentional infliction of emotional distress requires an extreme disabling emotional response
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    EEOC and then GE waited for an opportunity to fire him.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576, 590 (6th Cir.2009) (“We explained [in Hamilton v. General Electric Co.] that because plaintiff alleged that his employer heightened its scrutiny and supervision of him following his filing of an age-discrimination charge with the EEOC to find a seemingly legitimate reason to fire him, he created a question of material fact as to pretext.... As in Hamilton, Upshaw has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ford’s proffered reasons for her termination were contrived following her many EEOC charges and the filing of this lawsuit.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397, 408 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Evans v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 286

    ### Response:
    holding that it is the very definition of pretext if the employer  waits for a legal legitimate reason to fortuitously materialize and then uses it to cover up his true longstanding motivations for firing the employee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    attack. Rule 5-802(A). Being denied the right to vote is not part of a defendant’s felony conviction and sentence. It is simply a collateral consequence of that conviction and sentence. See N.M. Const. art. VII, § 1; NMSA 1978, § 31-13-1(A) (2005). Moreover, being denied the right to vote, even if the deprivation is wrongful, does not subject a person to custody or restraint. Cummings is not alleging that his underlying conviction and sentence is illegal or that he is being denied a right that would hasten his release from custody, but only that the district court made a clerical error, which wrongly denied him the right to vote. Relief for such an error cannot be had by way of a writ of habeas corpus. Cf. Canfield v. Bradshaw, No. 3:05 CV 2343, 2007 WL 397019, at *6 (N.D.Ohio 2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we dismiss this ease and affirm

    ### Response:
    holding that a habeas corpus petition was not a valid avenue for seeking a determination that the petitioner was erroneously classified as a sexual predator
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it cannot provide a basis for express preemption under” section 360k(a). Docket Entry No. 20 at 16-17. Numerous federal courts have rejected this argument on the basis that “requirements set forth in the premarket approval for the entire device are just as applicable to the components that together form the FDA-approved device as the device itself.” Hawkins v. Medtronic, Inc., 2014 WL 346622, at *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 30, 2014); see, e.g., Eidson v. Medtronic, Inc., 981 F.Supp.2d 868, 882 n. 3, 2013 WL 5533081, at *8 n. 3 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 3, 2013) (citing cases and noting that “the preemption analysis should not be applied differently to the component parts of a medical device and the medical device that received PMA”); see also Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 508 (5th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). This Court concurs with that analysis. Once

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not err in determining that device as a whole was subject to pma approval even though some evidence indicated only certain components of the device were at issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    non-signing defendants’ consent, without more, is insufficient to satisfy the “rule of unanimity” under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). The removing defendants disagree, arguing that such a representation of consent satisfies their statutory obligation. Although no case in this district has addressed this precise issue, there is some limited support for the removing defendants’ position. See, e.g., Chrysler First Financial Services Corp. v. Greenfield, 753 F.Supp. 939, 941 (S.D.Fla.1991) (remanding the action because “[t]he other defendants ... have not joined in the United States’ petition for removal, nor has the United States indicated on the face of the removal petition whether the remaining defendants agree to removal”); Jasper v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 732 F.Supp. 104, 105 (M.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>); Mechanical Rubber & Supply Co. v. American

    ### Response:
    holding that the petition must be signed by all defendants or the signer mustallege consent of all defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rob him, and where the trial court permitted the State to call witnesses who testified that Mr. Brown was not a drug dealer. We agree. We are mindful that pursuant to section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes (2004), evidence of a victim’s character is “inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion.” In the instant case, however, the defense did not seek to introduce evidence that Mr. Brown was a drug dealer as an attack upon his character. The defense sought to elicit this testimony to corroborate the defendant’s testimony that he did not go to Mr. Brown’s home to rob him, but instead went there to purchase drugs, and while he was there, Mr. Brown attacked him after he rebuffed his sexual advances. See Villella v. State, 833 So.2d 192, 196-97 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)(<HOLDING>). Further, even if the evidence was

    ### Response:
    holding that it was error to exclude corroborative evidence where evidence was vital to defendants defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Fort Worth Zoo Master Plan and the Forest Park Master Plan. Appellant’s point of error number one is overruled. By his point of error number two, appellant contends, even if the trial court was correct in its interpretation of Chapter 26, holding that it does not apply with respect to a change in the use of public land from one park use to another, that the construction of the Diorama in Forest Park constitutes such a substantial change in park use as not to exempt such construction from the provisions of Chapter 26. Appellant states that there are no Texas cases directly on point regarding the proper uses of parkland and cites us the following foreign cases in support of his position: Fairhope Single Tax Corp. v. City of Fairhope, 281 Ala. 576, 206 So.2d 588, 590 (Ala.1968) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Thomas, 166 La. 512, 117 So. 573,

    ### Response:
    holding that a civic center building or recreational building on property dedicated to the city as park property was inconsistent with its use as a park
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if the jury again finds the defendants liable. V The judgment of the district court is reversed in part and affirmed in part. The case is remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the jury’s verdict and to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. 1 . Section 3730(b) of the False Claims Act provides that a ""private person[,]” commonly known as a “relator,” may bring a civil action for a violation of § 3729 ""in the name of the Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). Such an action is known as a ""qui tam” suit. The statute permits the government to take over the action and conduct it itself, or to decline to do so, in which case the relator has the right to conduct it. See id. The relator is entitled to different S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 947

    ### Response:
    holding that the requirement of an offense committed willfully is not met  if a taxpayer has relied in good faith on a prior decision of this court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is not automatically qualified as a business record under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law. The reason for recognizing a business record as an exception to the hearsay rule is the presumptive verity of routine recording of business transactions done on a regular basis at times close to the transactions recorded. The foundation which warrants the presumption of verity must be laid to qualify the records for admission. “Albeit it is said that a trial court possesses wide discretion in determining whether the requirements of [section] 490.680 for admission are met, the trial record should reveal evidence of compliance with each requirement of the law before any deference be accorded the ruling of the court nisi.” Id,.; see Nickels v. Nickels, 817 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Mo.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). “Ere proper admission of records under

    ### Response:
    holding the testimony of an accountant was insufficient to lay a foundation for the admission of certain tax and financial documents where inter alia there was no evidence the taxpayer prepared the supportive memoranda or notes in the regular course of his business nor did the record reflect the time of preparation of these documents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ""customers” of the bank. 15 . Va.Code § 8.3A-420(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows: The law applicable to conversion of personal property applies to instruments. An instrument is also converted if it is taken by transfer, other than a negotiation, from a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or a bank makes or obtains payment with respect to the instrument for a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or receive payment. An action for conversion of an instrument may not be brought by (i) the issuer or acceptor of the instrument or (ii) a payee or endorsee who did not receive delivery of the instrument either directly or through delivery to an agent or a co-payee. 16 .Cf. Stefano v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Virginia, 981 F.Supp. 417, 420-21 (E.D.Va.1997)

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs common law conversion claim was displaced by  83a420a where bank deposited checks payable to plaintiff in another persons account without plaintiffs endorsement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1972 Comm. Note (directing courts to ask whether the finder of fact “would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute”). Although some judges may find expert testimony helpful, see, e.g., Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 584 (9th Cir.2005) (upholding denial of a Strickland claim where eight experts testified but none addressed “prevailing legal norms”), it is within a district court’s discretion to exclude proposed expert testimony concerning a legal standard of care and to rely solely on the briefs, see LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1271 n. 8 (9th Cir.1998); see also Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 613 n. 17 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Because the district court was in the best

    ### Response:
    holding that rejection of a proposed strickland expert was not a prejudicial abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    but simply raise the correctness of a discretionary administrative decision in the facts of a single claimant’s case.”). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to review the Appeal Panel’s determination that LTCF and Film Production Capital were the same entity. B. LTCF further argues that the CSSP chose an inappropriate NAICS code. However, the determination of the appropriate NAICS code for a single entity claimant is not the type of “pressing question” that warrants district court review. See Claimant ID 100212278, 848 F.3d at 410. Rather, it is precisely the type of discretionary factual determination that we have held the district court need not review. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 641 Fed.Appx. at 410; cf. Claimant ID 100212278, 848 F.3d at 410-11 (<HOLDING>). Even assuming that the CSSP’s determination

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not abuse discretion by denying review of factual determination that claimants stores were not tourism businesses within the meaning of the settlement agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unconstitutional, should be exercised only in cases free from doubt.’” Milton Constr. Co. v. State Highway Dep’t, 568 So.2d 784, 788 (Ala.1990) (quoting 17 Am Jur.2d Contracts § 178 (1964)). “‘The courts are averse to holding contracts unenforceable on the ground of public policy unless their illegality is clear and certain.... [T]he courts will not declare an agreement void on the ground of public policy unless it clearly appears to be in violation of the public policy of the state.’ ” Id. (emphasis omitted). In Terry Cove North, Inc. v. Marr & Friedlander, P.C., 521 So.2d 22 (Ala.1988), the plaintiffs sued a law firm and its two attorneys, alleging, among other things, breaches of certain Disciplinary Rules (the predecessor to the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct). .2003) (<HOLDING>), and B.W.T. v. Haynes & Haynes, P.C., 20 So.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that a breach of the rules of professional conduct would not justify setting aside a divorce judgment and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or reopen hearing on the motion. The record is incomplete, but it appears that the trial court had not yet ruled on the initial motion to suppress. As a result, the second motion presented the trial court with the opportunity to correct the alleged error and the State was also provided the opportunity to present the allegedly material witnesses. (See People v. Terrell (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 178, 202.) Accordingly, we conclude that defendant sufficiently raised this issue at trial so as to preclude application of waiver in this instance. (See People v. Harper (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 398, 402 (recognizing error despite the absence of a timely objection in light of the “peculiar circumstances” of case which suggested constitutional infringement); see also In re J.C. (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 289 (<HOLDING>).) We turn to consider whether the State met

    ### Response:
    holding objection need not occur at suppression hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 2253(c)(1) & (B), the nature of which remains unaltered by the fact that the dismissal was on jurisdictional grounds. In sum, we hold that the district court’s dismissal of an unauthorized § 2255 motion is a “final order in a proceeding under section 2255” such that § 2253 requires petitioner to obtain a COA before he or she may appeal. In so holding, we join a number of our sister courts who have reached the same result. See Resendiz v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 456 (5th Cir.2006) (per curiam); Sveum v. Smith, 403 F.3d 447 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 944, 126 S.Ct. 442, 163 L.Ed.2d 336 (2005); Jones v. Braxton, 392 F.3d 683 (4th Cir.2004); see also Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54 (1st Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1123, 118 S.Ct. 1807, 140 L.Ed.2d 945 (1998) (<HOLDING>). With this much resolved, we must next ask

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts dismissal of  2255 motion as unauthorized is final order where petitioner disputed aedpas applicability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if such rights do not exist). They argue, correspondingly, that plaintiffs’ strident warning that Local Law 15 would require attorneys to violate their ethical duties to clients — by forcing an attorney seeking to collect a time-barred debt to inform the debtor of the running of the statute of limitations, an affirmative defense to litigation — is misplaced. But this argument misses the point. Unlike the New York City Council, the federal government is not obligated to draft its statutes so as to comport with New York law. Cf. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing the supremacy of federal law). Rather, the federal government may — and does — regulate the conduct of attorneys acting as debt collectors. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 131 L.Ed.2d 395 (1995) (<HOLDING>). New York City Council, by contrast, may only

    ### Response:
    holding that fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    our nation’s copyright laws when a defendant “authorizes” another to commit infringing acts, notwithstanding the fact that such acts are committed abroad. See Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir.1986); ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. California Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F.Supp. 854, 862 (E.D.Cal.1992), affd in part, rev’d in part, 3 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir.1993). This line of cases has been subsequently repudiated, and it is now generally accepted that there can be no liability under the Copyright Act for authorizing an act that itself could not constitute infringement of rights secured by United States law. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093-94 (9th Cir.1994); see also Fun-Damental Too, 1996 WL 724734, at *6 (<HOLDING>); PrimeTime, 24 Joint Venture, 1999 WL 163181,

    ### Response:
    holding that mere authorization and approval of copyright infringements taking place outside the united states is not a copyright violation and does not create jurisdiction over those extraterritorial acts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or desire,” which might weigh in favor of construing a waiver narrowly, but rather by the “need to avoid inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness,” which requires a general assessment of the equities associated with the state’s participation in the bankruptcy litigation. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620, 122 S.Ct. 1640. As discussed above, the balance of these equities favors a construction of the Eleventh Amendment that would permit a debtor to assert a permissive counterclaim capped by a setoff limitation against a state that has filed a proof of claim. Second, the Supreme Court developed the “narrow construction” rule as a means of interpreting a state’s “unequivocal expression” of waiver in state statutes, state constitutions, and the like. Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 34, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to receive full and fair disclosures regarding the true value of a company’s stock”. Employers-Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Anchor Capital Advisors, 498 F.3d 920, 922 n. 1 (9th Cir.2007). Thus, from this approach, as long as the investment advisor has discretion in determining what securities to buy and sell, it qualifies as a purchaser with standing to bring a securities fraud claim. See In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 101, 108 (W.D.Penn.2003) (basing its inquiry “not on the presence or absence of specific ‘attorney-in-fact’ language in the agreements, but on the level of discretion exercised by [the investment advisor] in the day-to-day purchase of securities for its clients.”); In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 299 (D.Del.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Newman v. Eagle Bldg. Technologies,

    ### Response:
    holding that investment advisors with authority to make investment decisions for their clients have standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    environment, .... 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2. The regulations further propose no fewer than nine alternate means of providing notice to the public where a proposed action will, like this one, primarily implicate local concerns. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(b)(3); see also Human Soc’y of the United States v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 98-1950, Tr. Hr’g Mot. T.R.O. at 11 (D.D.C. Jun. 23, 1998). The Court finds that FWS provided the public with insufficient information regarding the proposed action and its potential environmental impacts and insufficient time in which to comment on the Draft EA. Accordingly, the agency’s approach to public involvement and consideration of what public input it did receive do not support a finding that it took a “hard look” at the problem and alternative m 47 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); cf. Wroncy v. Bureau of Land Management, 777

    ### Response:
    holding five day public comment period on a portion of an ea insufficient remanding for further public comment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    limitations period on Plaintiffs hybrid claim. 2. Federal Tolling Principles. The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on whether mental incompetency may toll federal statutes of limitations. Indeed, in Atkins v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 685 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1982), the Court explicitly left open the question of whether a plaintiffs mental incompetency could toll the statute of limitations on the Federal Employer’s Liability Act. After finding that the Plaintiff had not established facts sufficient to support a finding that he was mentally incompetent, the Court stated, Because we find no issue of fact, we need not decide whether the plaintiffs in-competeney will ever toll the FELA statute of limitations. But see, Brooks v. Southern Pacific Co., 105 Ariz. 442, 445, 466 P.2d 736, 739 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Id. at 1148 (citation in original). The cases

    ### Response:
    holding that fela statute of limitations is tolled by incompetence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Subsection (a)(1) provides for forfeiture of “any interest” that the defendant “acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962.” 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, under (a)(1) an interest is subject to forfeiture only if and to the extent that it was acquired or maintained in violation of § 1962. Forfeiture under (a)(1) is not limited to a defendant’s interest in the RICO enterprise. It also includes a defendant’s interest in the proceeds of the RICO violation. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21-22, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983). Moreover, a “but for” test is used to determine whether the government has proven the required nexus between the interest in question and the RICO violation. United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1213 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the only evidence of any

    ### Response:
    holding that but for test applies under a1 and that forfeiture is limited to property interests that would not have been acquired or maintained but for violation of  1962
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by contrast, the Federal Rules of Evidence are inapplicable, see Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d)(3); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1084-85, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949) (endorsing the use of hearsay evidence at sentencing), and hearsay normally may be considered subject only to the modest due process requirement that it bear “some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation,” United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir.1982); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”); United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 97 (3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 553, 107

    ### Response:
    holding that the reliability analysis is not heightened by the shift from an unstructured sentencing regime to a more determinate guidelines system
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 1567-68 (explaining that expert provided “merely generalized testimony as to overall similarity” and there was “no discussion of whether or how the way” part of the triple identity test was met); Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d at 1327 (explaining that an expert’s “offhand and conclusory statements ... are not particularized evidence”). In addition, the court finds that Honeywell’s equivalence arguments were not legally insufficient. See e.g., CFMT, Inc. v. Steag Microtech, Inc., 14 F.Supp.2d at 591 (explaining that the plaintiffs expert did not “spend any time” specifically discussing the doctrine of equivalents, but instead, the plaintiff chose to focus its efforts on a theory of literal infringement); LifeScan, Inc. v. Home Diagnostics, Inc., 103 F.Supp.2d at 361 (<HOLDING>). Rather, the court finds that Honeywell

    ### Response:
    holding that the expert failed to explain how the defendants device operated in an equivalent manner to one of the patent claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not scientifically supported at any time. Thus, the FDA’s mandate directing Abbott not to provide for retesting of samples near the cutoff — the concept on which plaintiffs base their warnings claim — remained in force as part of a conscious ongoing risk-benefit analysis by the FDA in managing a public health crisis. Plaintiffs’ state law claims would directly contradict the FDA’s requirements and interfere with the FDA’s objectives, and therefore are preempted. IV. The Court’s conclusion, that plaintiffs’ state law claim is preempted by the FDA’s unique regulation of the Test based on principles of implied preemption rather than express preemption under the MDA, is not in conflict with the holdings of Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at 492-502, 116 S.Ct. at 2254-58, 135 L.Ed.2d at 720-26 (<HOLDING>), or Baird, supra, 155 N.J. 54, 713 A.2d 1019

    ### Response:
    holding the mda did not preempt plaintiffs state common law claims for defective design defective manufacture and failure to warn
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rule of. Civil Procedure 23, Gomez held Pitts was not clearly irreconcilable with Genesis Healthcare. See id. Although Genesis Healthcare “undermined some of the reasoning employed in Pitts ..,, courts have universally concluded that the Genesis discussion does not apply to class actions.” Id. at 875. “In fact, Genesis itself emphasizes that ‘Rule 23 [class] actions are fun-, damentally different from collective actions under the FLSA.’ ” Id. at 875-76 (alteration in original) (quoting Genesis Healthcare, 133 S.Ct. at 1529). Because Gomez’s holding that Pitts is not clearly irreconcilable with Genesis Healthcare is hot itself clearly irreconcilable with intervening Supreme Court authority, we are bound by Gomez. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Pitts remains the law of this

    ### Response:
    holding a threejudge panel may not reexamine normally controlling circuit precedent in the face of an intervening united states supreme court decision unless the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to comment publicly on the allegations in other similar cases. See, e.g., Jackie Willis, Bill Cosby Addresses Allegations: ""I’ve Never Seen Anything Like This,” ETOnline (May 15, 2015), http://www. etonline! com/news/164575_bill_cosby_first_ tv_interview_since_sex_scandal/; Nick Vada-la, Bill Cosby Jokes About Sexual Assault Allegations Facing Him at Second Canadian Tour Stop, Philly.com (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www. philly.com/philly/blogs/trending/Bill-Cosby-jokes-about-Sexual-assault-allegations-at-' second-Canadian-tour-stop.html. 16 . See, e.g., Damiano, 168 F.R.D. at 491-93 (finding in favor of Bob Dylan’s privacy interests, in light of plaintiff's improper commercial purpose of directly monetizing revealed material). 17 . See, e.g., Paisley Park Enters., Inc., 54 F.Supp.2d at 349 (<HOLDING>). 18 . See, e.g., Morgan, 2015 WL 3882748, at

    ### Response:
    holding that the publics interest in every imaginable detail about the life of a rock star did not outweigh princes privacy concerns
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    DOT submitted a copy of the Uniform Traffic Complaint and Summons/Voluntary Assessment (Complaint) that it had received from the state of Delaware. The Complaint, which was issued by an Aider-man’s Court in Newark, Delaware, indicated that Licensee pled guilty to violating a local ordinance relating to “D.U.I. — Alcohol.” (R.R. at 31a.) In Delaware, an Alderman’s Court is a small local court with jurisdiction over misdemeanors, municipal ordinances and traffic offenses that occur within the town limits. (Trial ct. op. at 4-5.) After considering the matter, the trial court granted Licensee’s appeal. In doing so, the trial court relied upon Tripson v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 773 A.2d 195 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 690, 796 A.2d 320 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Because the Complaint appeared to come

    ### Response:
    holding that under the compact dot has the burden of proving that it received the outofstate conviction report from the party states licensing authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of probable cause. Greene’s assertion that Houston had no personal, “first-hand” knowledge of the location of the stolen property is immaterial. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether the information in Lt. Hiller’s affidavit established a substantial basis for a finding by the magistrate that there was probable cause that the stolen property would be found at 2139/2141 Ashland. See Davidson, 936 F.2d at 859. Here, the perpetrator of the crime, under direct questioning from the affiant, stated that his partner (Arnold) disposed of the stolen property at 2139/2141 Ashland. Moreover, Lt. Hiller also averred that he had personal knowledge that stolen property was located at that dwelling. Such information is enough to support a finding of probable cause. Cf. Allen, 211 F.3d at 971-72 (<HOLDING>). Greene next argues that information from the

    ### Response:
    holding statement by unidentified confidential informant with no connection to the crime observing possession of cocaine enough to establish probable cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Second, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) includes as enumerated offenses under the IMCA “murder, manslaughter, ... [and] felony child abuse or neglect.” 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). Given that 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) discusses both manslaughter, and felony child abuse or neglect, it is difficult to say that 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) qualifies as defining both manslaughter and felony child abuse or neglect. A court should strive to give both of these words in the IMCA operative effect when interpreting the statute. See United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503-U.S. at 35, 112 S.Ct. 1011. Allowing involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) to define both manslaughter, and felony child abuse or neglect, would run contrary to this canon of construction. See United States v. Other Medicine, 596 F.3d at 680-81 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the Court declines to adopt

    ### Response:
    recognizing that 18 usc  113a5 could not serve as more than one enumerated crime under the imca specifically both an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years and felony child abuse or neglect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    981 F.2d at 259; Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d at 191 n. 1; and Mayfield v. Collins, 918 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir.1990). 101 . Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d at 281-82, quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. 102 . See Anear v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d at 468, (suggesting tha 1304-05 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied sub nom. Conley v. Eugene, 517 U.S. 1191, 116 S.Ct. 1680, 134 L.Ed.2d 782 (1996); Colle v. Brazos County, Texas, 981 F.2d at 244-45; Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 970 F.2d 82, 92 (5th Cir.1992); Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.1992); Matthias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir.19 on the face of the pleadings may turn out to he so when the pleadings are pierced at summary judgment. See Johnson immons, 77 F.3d 878, 879 (5th Cir.1996), (<HOLDING>); McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 789 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss pursuant to rule 41b for failure to comply with a court order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    left with Mr. Coates’s agreement stipulating to a twenty-year sentence. In light of this plea agreement, we hold that Mr. Coates’s sentencing challenges necessarily must fail because any error by the district court in setting the length of the sentence at twenty years was invited. See United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1055 (10th Cir.2007) (“[H]e has invited any error regarding the length of his sentence ... and his claims [raised] now for the first time on appeal are waived.”); see also United States v. Grillo, 431 Fed. Appx. 677, 680 (10th Cir.2011) (“[The appellant] received a sentence within the range she requested, so she has waived her argument that her sentence was substantively unreasonable.”); United States v. Perez-Cruz, 404 Fed.Appx. 255, 257 (10th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1831, 179

    ### Response:
    holding that because at sentencing the appellant had asked the district court to impose the same sentence he now claims is substantively unreasonable the argument he seeks to make was waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in accordance with administrative law principles.” Gailius v. INS, 147 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir.1998). Specifically, we afford Chevron deference to the BIA’s statutory interpretation, applying the agency’s interpretation unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or clearly contrary to law. Mejia-Orellana v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 13, 16 & n. 1 (1st Cir.2007); Maghsoudi v. INS, 181 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.1999). IV. ANALYSIS A. Why the Moral-Turpitude Issue Matters Let us take a step back for a moment. It is uncontested that Idy is presently removable. An adjustment of status could cure this problem, if Idy is eligible. His eligibility for a status adjustment hinges on whether his criminally sanctioned reckless conduct involved moral turpitude: if so, he cannot adjust his status; if not, B.I.A.1976) (<HOLDING>). Applying Chevron deference, our sister

    ### Response:
    holding that illinoiss reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rebate method on voluntary prepayment of the contract. The Court of Appeals based this conclusion on the statement in Milhollin that “... acceleration rebate practices need be disclosed only when they diverge from other prepayment rebate practices...” Ford Motor Co. v. Milhollin, supra, 444 U. S. at p. 569. In Milhollin, the question for decision was whether under TILA, as well as Regulation Z, the existence of an acceleration clause must be disclosed on the face of a credit agreement. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, because of conflicting resolutions of this question by various federal circuit courts of appeal. See Griffith v. Superior Ford, 577 F2d 455 (8th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Hornell v. One 1976 Chevrolet, 585 F2d 978 (10th Cir. 1978) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527

    ### Response:
    holding that the existence of an acceleration clause need never be disclosed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was valid, they were lawfully present in Legg's apartment during execution of the warrant."" Id. at 244. The Legg court further noted: ""We recognize that an officer's reasonable good faith belief in the validity of a warrant does not cause his presence in an individual's home to be any less viola-tive of the Fourth Amendment.... Nonetheless, we conclude that the rationale of Leon should apply to render an officer lawfully present for purposes of applying the plain view doctrine as long as the officer possesses a reasonable good faith belief in the validity of the warrant and the warrant was issued by a detached and neutral magistrate."" Id. at n. 2 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Morris, 904 F.2d 518 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 2. Inadvertence Frasier claims that the

    ### Response:
    holding that plain view requirement that there be a prior justification for the officers presence was met by search warrant and that even assuming that warrant was invalid good faith exception was applicable to permit admission of the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the existence of general jurisdiction. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d at 810. The Texas Instruments contract, as set forth above, was a patents cross-licensing agreement that allowed both companies to “design and sell semiconductors without dispute from each other.” Thus, it did not require performance by DENSO Japan in Texas. Moreover, the agreement contains a choice of law provision upport to U.S. Subsidiaries. Appellees argue “[DENSO Japan’s] U.S. subsidiary companies rely on [DENSO Japan] for technical, manufacturing, business, and legal support, which have impacted the Texas f 6) (concluding that there was no general jurisdiction and stating there must be an indication that defendant intended to serve the Texas market before personal jurisdiction can be found); Reid, 130 S.W.3d at 220 (<HOLDING>). We sustain DENSO Japan’s second issue.

    ### Response:
    holding there was no general jurisdiction when there was no evidence that defendants advertised or promoted their goods or services in texas solicited business in texas sold their goods or services to a texas entity established a general business office or general business presence in texas or targeted texas markets
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    company had issued a policy which stated that the company would pay on behalf of “[t]he school district ... any amount it is required or permitted to pay as indemnity to any person insured under the applicable Coverage Plan....” 783 S.W.2d at 611. The applicable Coverage Plan insured the members of the board of trustees of the school district. The company defended the trustees in a lawsuit that was brought against the school district and the trustees. When the trustees were dismissed from the suit leaving only the school district as a defendant, the company withdrew the defense and the school district sued for a declaratory judgment. The court held that the insurance policy unambiguously only insured the trustees. Id. at 612. See also St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co., 548 So.2d at 1160 (<HOLDING>). The court was not persuaded by the argument

    ### Response:
    holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are without intrinsic merit, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his habeas petition. I On December 11, 1994, a state trooper arrested Allen for committing an OUI offense. The State preferred charges against him. As directed by law, the Secretary of State (the Secretary) then suspended Allen’s driver’s license for ninety days. See 29 M.R.S.A. § 1311-A, reprinted in the appendix. It is said that every action produces an equal and opposite reaction. Having felt the lash of the administrative suspension, the petitioner moved to dismiss the pending criminal charge on double jeopardy grounds. The nisi prius court denied the motion, relying upon an opinion issued by Maine’s highest tribunal (the Law Court) two months earlier. See State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me.1995) (<HOLDING>). Instead of appealing the ruling to the Law

    ### Response:
    holding in materially identical circumstances that an administrative license suspension did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plain text of subsection (c) does not require the counterclaim to arise from the same “transaction or occurrence” as the original claim. All that is required is that the claim “be property of the estate.” USDA makes two related arguments for why Supreme Beefs setoff should be barred. First, it argues that whether claims are property of the estate turns on substantive law, in this case the FTCA. Second, it argues that the language of § 106(a)(5) — “[njothing in this section shall create any substantive cl nina Marine Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 391, 395 n. 8 (5th Cir.1998) (“A recoupment claim within the scope of Frederick need not also fall within another statutory waiver of sovereign immunity”) (citing Frederick, 386 F.2d at 488); United States v. Johnson, 853 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Second, and more important, accepting USDA’s

    ### Response:
    holding that when the government waives sovereign immunity as to matters in recoupment it does so even as to those claims that ordinarily are barred by the ftca
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    intended to clarify the scope of those registrations, not expand it”).) However, these changes amount to far more than cosmetic adjustments to various titles; they would, if valid, affect both the titles and the content of the registered works—introducing thousands of additional CardPac component files not registered in PaySys’s Initial Registrations and impermissibly expanding the scope of the Initial Registrations from eight discrete component files to the entire CardPac software package. Courts have consistently rejected such attempts to squeeze additional works into a registered copyright through the supplementary registration process. See, e.g., Muench Photography, Inc. v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ’g Co., No. 09-cv-2669 (LAP), 2012 WL 1021535, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that supplementing a registration by adding new works impermissibly changes the content of the originally registered work in violation of 17 usc  408d and 37 cfr  2015b2
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    state framework for addressing the plaintiffs’ claims. New York does have a mechanism permitting the re-opening of workers’ compensation claims before the Workers’ Compensation Board on grounds of fraud. N.Y. WORK. Comp.Law § 123 (McKinney 1993). - Under the circumstances of this case, however, the review provided by the state administrative agency is not comparable to that afforded by the federal court. The principal defendants in this case are not proper parties to workers’ compensation proceedings in New York. Furthermore, the Board cannot require a claimant to return moneys already paid. Id. § 22. The substance of the plaintiffs’ RICO claims — including, for example, the alleged existence of a “pattern” and “enterprise”, see McLaughlin v. Anderson, 962 F.2d 187, 190 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>) — cannot be adjudicated in proceedings before

    ### Response:
    holding that to prevail under civil rico plaintiff must prove that defendants participated in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 2267, 2272, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011)). “[C]ourts normally start-and stop-by looking at ‘the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.’ ” United States v. Medina-Almaguer, 559 F.3d 420, 422 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607. 602 (1990)). Sanbria-Bueno was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 846 for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Nevertheless, Sanbria-Bueno contends that the offense was not categorically a “drug trafficking offense” within the meaning of § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(i) because a generic conspiracy requires an overt act while § 846 does not. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Sanbria-Bueno would have this court apply the

    ### Response:
    holding proof of an overt act is not required to establish a violation of  846
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    termination proceeding, without relying on any findings from the proceeding in which Father did not participate. Under Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, judicially noticed facts are conclusively established in civil actions for purposes of the fact finding process and a ""party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed."" Utah R. Evid. 201(e). In addition, ""[clonsider-ations regarding a child's welfare are rarely, if ever, static. In fact, it is more likely that the child's environment is constantly evolyv-ing, thus justifying the court's continuing jurisdiction."" In re J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163 (Utah Ct.App.1994); see also In re A.S., 12 Kan.App.2d 594, 752 P.2d 705, 711 (1988) (<HOLDING>). ¶11 In this case, the juvenile court granted

    ### Response:
    holding that court must be free to examine all cireumstances evidence prior facts and orders and other relevant information in termination proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the district court erred in reaching this conclusion because 39 U.S.C. § 409 states that “[ejxcept as otherwise provided in this title, the United States district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought by or against the Postal Service.” He also points out that the language of section 3662 is permissive rather than mandatory. See 39 U.S.C. § 3662 (“Any interested person ... may lodge a complaint ... ”) (emphasis added). Mr. Foster made the same arguments before the district court, and that court found them to be unpersuasive. We also consider these arguments to be unavailing. As the district court pointed out, the legislative history of § 3662 suggests that “Congress intended a plaintiff to e LLC, 597 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Long v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the standard of review for the denial of a motion for reconsideration is governed by the law of the regional circuit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.1989). There is no finite time limitation within which the trustee must complete its pursuit of assets of the bankruptcy estate. Partial distributions of cash on hand can be made to creditors, with additional distributions made later as the assets are collected. Thus, when jurisdiction over disputed claims is placed by law in a specialized tribunal, we expect that the litigation over the trustee’s claims to recovery will be conducted in that forum. See, e.g., Hiser v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Public Welfare (In re St. Mary Hosp.), 125 B.R. 422, 431-32 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1991) (invoking primary jurisdiction doctrine to require trustee to submit claim to state Office of Hearings and Appeals for resolution); Burner v. Security State Bank (In re Burner), 109 B.R. 216, 227 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1989) (<HOLDING>). The bankruptcy court in the instant case

    ### Response:
    holding that proper forum for debtor to challenge actions of coexecutor of debtors deceased husbands estate was state probate court not bankruptcy court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with a finding of a one-day violation and a 762-day violation; to order a fine greater than $50,000, the trial court had to find facts beyond those evident from the verdict. 567 US at_ cts that the Oregon Supreme Court will reverse our decision in N. R. L. and extend the civil jury trial right to restitution determinations. She requests that we “recognize that the law is unsettled in this area and * * * consider forestalling further litigation in this case by-anticipating the [S]upreme [C]ourt’s decision in N. R. L. by reversing the trial court’s restitution order in this case.” Ultimately, defendant pins her hopes on N. R. L. being decided in her favor before we decide her appeal. Only then, under State v. Jury, 185 Or App 132, 136, 57 P3d 970 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 504 (2003) (<HOLDING>), would any error in awarding restitution

    ### Response:
    holding that whether error is apparent is determined by reference to the law as of the time the appeal is decided
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    support the trial court's conclusion that the People failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Castro spoke English well enough to voluntarily consent to a search of the vehicle in which he drove. Officer Dodge and Detective D'Amour testified that Castro spoke English well enough to respond appropriately to the officers' questions and the record detailing his responses reflects the same. Even Castro's lawyer stated that she did not need to be present at the proceedings involving the Spanish speaking officer's testimony because the hearing did not concern Castro. Officer Dodge testified that Castro gave permission for the police to search the vehicle. The record contains no evidence to indicate that Castro's consent was not voluntarily obtained. See Licea, 918 P.2d at 1113 (<HOLDING>); Drake, 785 P.2d at 1265-66 (holding that a

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants consent is not rendered involuntary by the fact that he was in custody and was not advised of his constitutional rights before the officers requested his consent to search or by the fact that he was eighteen years old chemically messed up and tired
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doctrine, holds that the Due Process Clause generally does not require pre-deprivation process if the deprivation results from the random and unauthorized act of a state officer. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). A State cannot possibly ensure hearings before its officers act randomly and without authority, and “the State cannot be required constitutionally to do the impossible by providing predeprivation process.” Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 129, 110 S.Ct. 975. Accordingly, all the process the victim of such a deprivation is due is' an effective post-deprivation state law tort remedy against the offending officer. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534-35, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (<HOLDING>). Justice' Kennedy’s concurrence in Albright v.

    ### Response:
    holding that a prison guards intentional destruction of a prisoners possessions did not give rise to a federal due process claim because state law provided an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the letter agreements do not constitute enforceable contracts as they are unenforceable for want of mutuality. As set forth above, Connecticut choice of law principles direct that the law of Singapore govern the contract claims. Under Singapore law, mutuality of obligation is necessary for a contract to be enforceable. It is generally accepted in the common law of this country that agreements that impose no specific purchase obligation on a distributor cannot obligate a manufacturer to sell to the distributor. Billings Cottonseed, Inc. v. Albany Oil Mill, Inc., 178 Ga.App. 825, 328 S.E.2d 426, 430 (1985). In such cases, mutuality of obligation is lacking, and the agreement is therefore unenforceable. Kraftco Corporation v. Kolbus, 1 Ill.App.3d 635, 274 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1971) (<HOLDING>). “An agreement that does not expressly or

    ### Response:
    holding that an alleged oral agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor lacked mutuality of obligation and was enforceable where the distributor had no obligation to sell any specific quantity and no obligation to meet any quotas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allegedly used the investor’s funds to execute physical trades for his account contrary to his instructions. Id. at 323. 9 . In a footnote in their sur-reply brief, plaintiffs suggest that the very fact that RCM sold their property — regardless of whether the sales were made on their behalf or for RCM’s own benefit — is sufficient to make them ""sell ers” under the Bimbaum rule. (P. Sur-reply Mem. 7 n. 19.) Although Caiola does make passing mention to the fact that Citibank ""purchased physical shares and options with [plaintiff's] funds,” as explained above, the Court of Appeals made explicitly clear that for purposes of Rule 10b-5 standing, the “key fact is that [plaintiff] has alleged that the purchases were made on his behalf."" 295 F.3d at 324 (emphasis added); see id. at 323 (<HOLDING>). 10 . Plaintiffs’ citation to SEC v. Zandford,

    ### Response:
    holding that purchaserseller requirement is met where plaintiff adequately alleges that the broker bought physical stock on his behalf and for his account emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provides that dealers who violate the statute are subject to civil penalties. The statute does not void transactions that violate the statute. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Shue, 134 Ind.App. 322, 327, 182 N.E.2d 796, 799 (1962) (""Failure to strictly comply with title conveyancing statutes does not affect transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle. The certificate of title is not of itself proof of ownership or legal title to the vehicle."") Although the failure to comply with Ind.Code § 9-17-8-8 may, combined with other suspicious cireumstances, raise questions about a purchaser's good faith, we find no such cireumstances here. Consequently, the Medleys were good faith purchasers for value pursuant to Ind. Code § 26-1-2-403. See, e.g., DBC Capital Fund, 551 N.E.2d at 477 (<HOLDING>). Lastly, Marlow also argues that the Medleys

    ### Response:
    holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute, “as a matter of public policy,” against the owner of a crop-dusting plane, when the plane, piloted by the owner’s partner, struck a field worker. Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481, 482-83 (5th Cir.1955). In 1957, the Iowa Supreme Court followed the Fifth Circuit and the New Hampshire Supreme Court in construing its own state statute. Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622, 625 (1957); cf. Heidemann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d 164, 166-67 (1972) (involving choice of law, assuming that Nebraska would follow Lamasters, but instead applying South Dakota statute with no imputed negligence absent a master-servant relationship); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. U.S., 504 F.2d 104, 114-15 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978, 95 S.Ct. 1979, 44 L.Ed.2d 470 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Ross v. Apple, 143 Ind. App. 357, 240 N.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a somewhat different indiana state statute imputes liability to absent owner of an aircraft
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an insolvent financial institution.”). While neither the D’Oench doctrine nor 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) prevents plaintiffs from asserting affirmative claims or defenses that do not depend on “agreements,” see Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 938 F.2d 591, 595 (5th Cir.1991) (citing Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 93-4, 108 S.Ct. 396, 402, 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987); FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir.1986)), court have interpreted the term “agreement” very broadly. Beitzell & Co. v. FDIC (In re Beitzell), 163 B.R. 637, 647 (Bankr.D.D.C. 1993); see, e.g., Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 90-93, 108 S.Ct. 396, 400-62, 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987) (interpreting “agreement” to include all conditions to the parties’ performance of the bargain); FDIC v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 58 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has noted that the term

    ### Response:
    holding that an implicit covenant of good faith and fair dealing constitutes an agreement under 12 usc  1823e
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    United States “had gained no foothold” in the country). His entitlement to a removal procedure of the sort that would trigger the provisions of section 1362 was therefore limited to what Congress and the INS saw fit to provide. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that the full protections of the Due Process Clause apply only to “ ‘persons’ within the United States”); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32, 103 S.Ct. 321, 74 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982) (noting that “an alien seeking initial admission to the United States ... has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative”); U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the applicable statutory

    ### Response:
    holding that wjhatever the procedure authorized by congress is it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 401 and 402. We fail to see the logical connection between the fact of Archer Bank’s filing of CTRs and Van Allen’s guilt or innocence. The actions of Archer Bank following Van Allen’s various deposits and withdrawals do not demonstrate anything material about Van Allen’s state of mind. At most, the filing of CTRs may have indicated something about the knowledge of officials at Archer Bank; but such knowledge would not make it more or less likely that Van Allen knew of the reporting requirements or acted to avoid them. Whether or not Van Allen actually fooled Archer Bank has no bearing on the substantive violation under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a). See Cassano, 372 F.3d at 878 (<HOLDING>). The multiple cases cited by Van Allen for the

    ### Response:
    holding that the government must show only that a defendant had knowledge of the reporting requirements and acted to avoid them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Rushen, 705 F.2d 355, 357 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting Powell v. Spalding, 679 F.2d 163, 166 (9th Cir.1982)). We are not persuaded that the trial court committed such an error. The Eighth Circuit considered a similar situation in Futrell v. Wyrick, 716 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir.1983). There, an unsuccessful habeas petitioner claimed that the introduction of police mugshots at his trial violated his due process rights. The court of appeals disagreed. “The manner in which the photographs were introduced,” the court found, “was unexceptionable. The photographs were never referred to as ‘mugshots’ and all police data was removed from them.” Id. at 1208. Thus, their introduction did not violate notions of fundamental fairness. Id.; see also United States v. Terry, 760 F.2d 939, 944 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The photographs in Reiger’s case did not

    ### Response:
    holding that introduction of mugshots containing no incriminating police data was not an abuse of the district court judges discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    depends in part on Carrington Gardens’ allegation that HUD’s declaring the 241 Loan in default was wrongful. Specifically, the reason later denials of financial requests constituted breaches of the Regulatory Agreements, according to Carring-ton Gardens, is that the denials were based on a wrongful declaration of default. To the extent that Carrington Gardens must prove that HUD wrongfully declared the 241 Loan in default in order to advance its theory of the case, Carrington Gardens’ claim is barred. Carrington Gardens attempts to avoid the statute of limitations problem by arguing that the “continuing claim” doctrine applies here. See Brown Park Estates, 127 F.3d at 1456-57; see also Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Department of the Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 606 n. 4 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Carrington Gardens emphasizes that its theory

    ### Response:
    recognizing doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    523.1 0[ I ][c], 523-71 (15th ed. rev.Mar. 1997). It is the Plaintiffs burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the dischargeability exception is warranted. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291, 111 S.Ct. 654, 661, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently addressed the nondischargeability provision under § 523(a)(4) for debts arising from defal (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1997) (noting that the traditional meaning of the term fiduciary is far too broad for bankruptcy purposes.); Ducey v. Doherty (In re Ducey), 160 B.R. 465, 469 (Bankr.D.N.H.1993) (noting that the term fiduciary in § 523(a)(4) is narrower in scope than the word as traditionally used under sate law); Hartwood Aviation, Inc. v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 147 B.R. 779, 783 (Bankr.D.Col.1992) (<HOLDING>). Fowler Bros., 91 F.3d at 1371 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding a duty of care without more insufficient to satisfy the fiduciary relationship element of  523a4 the federal courts adopting this narrow interpretation of fiduciary for purposes of the bankruptcy code gen erally hold that an express or technical trust is necessary to trigger the defalcation provision of  523a4
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are descriptive. The composite may be more than the mere sum of its parts. ... Common words in which no one may acquire a trademark because they are descriptive or generic may, when used in combination, become a valid trademark. 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11:26 (4th ed. 2016); see also id. § 11:31 (explaining that the “slight misspelling of a word will not generally turn a descriptive word into a nondescriptive mark”). Examples of such composite marks include SUGAR & SPICE, MOUSE SEED, and SEASON-ALL, all of which are non-descriptive marks imbued with secondary meaning, but which are composed of generic or descriptive terms that are not themselves eligible for trademark protection. Id. § 11:26; see also Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1097 (<HOLDING>), (a) Effect of Registration Notwithstanding

    ### Response:
    holding that although the mark duluth newstribune merits some level of protection the shorthand newstribune merits none
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    offer subject to the express condition that the Seller assent that this [p]urchase [o]rder constitutes the entire agreement between Buyer and Seller.” Purchase order, ¶ 1. In other words, the purchase order was a conditional acceptance. See Ralph Shrader, Inc. v. Diamond International Corp., 833 F.2d 1210, 1215 (6th Cir.1987) (Ralph Shrader). In Ralph Shrader, the Sixth Circuit held that, when a party limited acceptance to “[t]he terms set forth on the reverse side,” it was a conditional acceptance. Id. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that language in a contract had to mimic the “expressly made conditional” language of UCC § 2-207(1) in order to be a conditional acceptance. Id. n. 4; see also Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 101 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). To require the exact language of the UCC

    ### Response:
    holding that a conditional acceptance can be manifested merely in a partys conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to secure a continuance on the morning of the hearing is a factor relevant to the decision-maker’s consideration of the promptness and good faith of her actions. See King v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 803 A.2d 966, 970 (D.C.2002) (reversing agency’s dismissal of protest for non-appearance with the observation that the petitioner who telephoned the agency within an hour of the hearing with a plausible explanation for the inability to appear was not a classic “no-show”). Therefore, the ALJ should have addressed it. To the extent that the ALJ deemed it necessary for Frausto to substantiate her claim that she called the clerk’s office to request a continuance, the ALJ should have given her an opportunity to provide it. See Miranda v. Contreras, 754 A.2d 277, 280 (D.C.2000) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Starling, supra, 495 A.2d at 1162).

    ### Response:
    recognizing the trial courts responsibility to inquire where matters are raised which might entitle the movant to relief under rule 60b 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    act following Jorge’s initial act of fraud, and his petition makes it very clear he is complaining that appellees’ acts proximately caused him this second injury. Appellees’ allegations, by focusing solely on Jorge’s first act of malfeasance, do not respond to Roberto’s claim and therefore provide no valid grounds for summary judgment. We conclude the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on this ground. Conclusion We reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of appel-lees and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 1 . This analysis also holds true for appellees' statute of limitation arguments in response to Roberto's claims of breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and conversion. See Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex.1988) (<HOLDING>); In re Estate of Herring, 970 S.W.2d 583, 586

    ### Response:
    holding that breach of fiduciary duty justified using discovery rule to toll limitations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because she incorrectly believed that under Arizona law, the state was required to disprove Lewis’s defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-205(A) (providing that the burden is on the defendant to prove self-defense by a preponderance). The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim, reasoning that although counsel’s performance was deficient, Lewis had not shown prejudice. This state court decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.Ct. 362, 365-66, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the district court properly denied

    ### Response:
    holding that ineffective assistance of counsel occurs when there is deficient performance and prejudice which is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    skepticism about the substantive validity of this monopoly lease claim based on maintenance of a single lease by an alleged monopolist.” National Souvenir Center, supra, 728 F.2d at 513. Indeed, we noted that Appellees’ sale of the Lynch figures to other wax museum franchisees seriously undercuts appellants’ arguments that ap-pellees relied on the lease as a mechanism to discourage replacement of the figures with those of competitors during the lease term, or that leasing rather than selling significantly affected the market for figures. Id. Despite its submission of evidence of additional leases (between appellees and other museums), appellant gives us no cause to question the appropriateness of our initial skepticism. Gatlinb Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 88 S.Ct. 2224, 20 L.Ed.2d 1231 (1968) (<HOLDING>). However, United Shoe is clearly

    ### Response:
    holding that same activity violated  2 of the sherman act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    J. Although we note that the defendant, Alvin Williams, has conscientiously reported for over ten years as required by section 954.0435(14)(b) of the Florida Statutes, we find that the trial court correctly concluded that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.040, which extends a deadline where the deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, is not applicable to the reporting requirements set forth in section 954.0435(14)(b), as the reporting requirement does not require a computation of time, but instead requires the defendant to “reregister each year during the month of the sexual offender’s birthday and every third month thereafter.” See Violette v. P.A. Days, Inc., 427 F.3d 1015, 1019 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 3 F.3d 148, 151 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that the plain language of rule 6a of the federal rules of civil procedure which authorizes the extension of a deadline where the deadline expires on a saturday sunday or legal holiday is limited to situations where periods of time must be computed and therefore class settlement optout forms that were postmarked on the first business day after the courtordered saturday deadline were not timely filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    companies engaged in the same type of business as Cereva and Pirus. This court stated, “in view of [defendant’s] position at EMC and access to confidential and proprietary information relating to EMC’s product and marketing plans ... a restriction of one year is reasonable.” Id. This court further held that, ”[t]he market for open storage products in which EMC and Sun [the subsequent employer] compete is worldwide.” Id. The covenant not to compete in the Agreement at bar is likewise reasonable in geographical scope and length of time. III. Irreparable Harm Cereva has made a showing that it will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction fails to issue since it stands to lose customer good will which cannot be completely remedied through monetary damages. See Kroeger, supra, at 322 (<HOLDING>). IV. Balance of Harm This court is well aware

    ### Response:
    holding that the task of quantifying the consequences of violating a noncompetition clause is a particularly hard and elusive one
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    process disrupts the process, see e.g., Acura v. Reich, 90 F.3d 1403, 1408-09 (9th Cir.1996); Federal Trade Comm’n v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 242, 101 S.Ct. 488, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980) (stating that judicial intervention before the agency process is final “denies the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise.”), this Court holds that aliens like Petitioner still have a right to petition a district court for a writ of habeas corpus and the Court has jurisdiction to review such petitions, especially where they involve constitutional challenges to statutes. See e.g., Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir.1999); Hinojosa-Perez v. Eddy, 55 F.Supp.2d 1001, —, slip op. at 7 (D.Alaska 1999); cf. Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 120 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Henderson v. Immigration & Naturalization

    ### Response:
    holding that neither aedpa nor iirira expressly repeals the availability of habeas review of deportation or removal orders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court felt that the maximum sentence was the appropriate punishment. Judging from the record, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion by giving the maximum sentence. So long as the district court acts within the guidelines, a harsh sentence, in and of itself, does not constitute error. See United States v. Ponce, 917 F.2d 841, 842 (5th Cir.1990) (""[W]e will uphold the district court’s sentence so long as it results from a correct application of the guidelines to factual findin Cir.1995) (“The 100 to one ratio is extreme, but it is not the province of this Court to second-guess Congress’s chosen penalty. That is a discretionary legislative judgment for Congress and the Sentencing Commission to make.”); United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 928, 112 S.Ct. 1989,

    ### Response:
    holding that no unconstitutional infirmity exists in the sentencing guidelines treatment of crack visavis powder cocaine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relevant price is the price at which the government could have bought the tape from other vendors. When Coker herself relies on theory to which the government “switched,” any “switch,” if it was impermissible, was not prejudicial. III Coker also objects to the manner in which her sentence was calculated, and asserts that she suffered ineffective assistance of counsel. We decline to address the merits of either argument because she has withdrawn her ineffective assistance claim and waived her sentencing objections. A In Coker’s first brief, her trial counsel, who continues to represent her on appeal (with Coker’s apparent approval), argued that his own performance at trial was constitutionally deficient. After the government pointed out that claims of ineffective ass 94 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Fifth Circuit declared an attempt to

    ### Response:
    holding that sentencing enhancements and sentencing departures are not synonymous and that a waiver for upward departures imposed by the court does not permit the challenging of sentence enhancements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from the date on which they were taken.”). Ganesan argues he is entitled to a new trial because he “timely requested” the record and it was lost or destroyed “without appellant’s fault.” See Tex.R.App. P. 34.6(f). The Texas Supreme Court has expressly held that “[i]f a litigant has not requested the reporter to prepare a statement of the facts within three years, nor specifically requested that the notes of a proceeding be preserved beyond three years, then the litigant is not free from fault....” See Piotrowski, 873 S.W.2d at 371. Because Ganesan could have requested the reporter to prepare the record within three years of the proceeding, or at minimum requested that the record be preserved, he is not free from fault. Accordingly, he is not entitled to a new trial. See id. at 370 (<HOLDING>). Appellant argues that his request for the

    ### Response:
    holding appellant is not entitled to a new trial unless the reporters notes have been lost or destroyed without appellants fault and the parties cannot agree on a statement of facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    City had instituted a civil proceeding (this action), that it was withdrawing its request for a restitution hearing against the criminal defendants, and that it would be very difficult to determine what the appropriate amount of restitution would be. See id. at 4-5. Although Plaintiff may be able to properly rely on these documents and statements in a motion for summary judgment or at trial, they are not properly considered in the present motion to dismiss. Plaintiff did not rely on the terms and effects of these documents and statements in drafting its complaint, and Plaintiffs knowledge of their existence is insufficient for this exception to apply. See Global Network Commc’ns, Inc., 458 F.3d at 156 (quotation omitted); Williams v. Time Warner Inc., 440 Fed.Appx. 7, 9 (2d Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). In light of this conclusion, the Court finds

    ### Response:
    holding that a mere passing reference or even references however to a document outside the complaint does not on its own incorporate the document into the complaint itself citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the court, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, “reserving in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2); see also United States v. Cain, 155 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir.1998). This is a narrow exception to the ordinary rule that a defendant who pleads guilty cannot appeal his conviction. United States v. Dimitrov, 546 F.3d 409, 416 (7th Cir.2008). To preserve an issue for appeal, a conditional plea must “precisely identify which pretrial issues the defendant wishes to preserve for review.” United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1313 (7th Cir.1993). All non-jurisdictional issues not specifically preserved in the conditional plea agreement are waived. See, e.g., Dimitrov, 546 F.3d at 416 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Doherty, 17 F.3d 1056,

    ### Response:
    holding that although the defendant had preserved his objection to the constitutionality of a mental state requirement he had not preserved another constitutional objection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Error If a “[federal] court finds that the state court engaged in an unreasonable application of established law, resulting in constitutional error, it must next consider whether such error was harmless.” Howard, 406 F.3d at 122 (citations omitted). Asked must be whether the application of the law “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 115 S.Ct. 992, 994, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995) (citations omitted). “When a [federal judge in a habeas proceeding] has grave doubt about whether a trial error ... had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict, that error is not harmless. And; the petitioner must win.” Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83, 99 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). V. Plea Agreements Plea bargaining, defined

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioners videotaped statement made after he invoked his right to counsel was wrongfully admitted at trial and not harmless error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ninth Circuit reasoned that, “to survive summary judgment, a copyright infringement plaintiff seeking to recover indirect profits damages [i.e., damages for profits that have an attenuated connection to the infringement] under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) must proffer some evidence to create a triable issue regarding whether the infringement at least partially caused the profits that the infringer generated as the result of the infringement.” Id. at 911. “Because Mackie [had] failed to adduce any non-speculative evidence that would even suggest a link between the infringement and the Symphony’s supposedly enhanced revenues,” summary judgment in favor of the Symphony was appropriate. Id.; see id. at 916; see also Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.16, 2001); see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). An arbitrator’s interim ruling is not a final award if i ance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir.1991) (“[Temporary equitable orders calculated to preserve assets or performance needed to make a potential final award meaningful ... are final orders that can be review Mut. Ins. Co., No. Misc. 88-0600, 1996 WL 557513, at *3 n. 8 (E.D.Pa. Sep.30, 1996) (“Even though the arbitration panel’s award is a interim provision for pre-hear-ing security, and the panel has not reached the merits of the case, this court may rule on motions to confirm and vacate the award.”). Indeed, courts have reviewed such interim orders even when they were issued prior to a hearing on the merits. See British Ins. Co. of Cayman, 93 F.Supp.2d at 513 (<HOLDING>); Atlas Assurance Co. of Am., 1991 WL 4741, at

    ### Response:
    holding that a security award separable from the merits of the arbitration which was rendered prior to a hearing on the merits was sufficiently final to be reviewed under the faa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to use the word ""rendition” in the statute of limitations. 5 . This rule is clearly analogous to, although not identical to, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. 6 . Furthermore, under this same body of Michigan law, we must reject the defendants’ assertion that ARCO failed to timely ""commence"" the instant renewal action (and toE the statute of limitations) because of aUegedly improper service of process by someone not an ""officer” for pin-poses of the Michigan tolling statute, Mich. Comp.Laws Aim. § 600.5856(c) (West Supp. 1995). Michigan Court Rule 2.101(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 both state that an action is ""commenced"" when a complaint is filed with the court, and that rule controls insofar as it conflicts with the toEing statute. See Buscaino, 189 N.W.2d at 205-06

    ### Response:
    holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wide’s claims is the fact that each of these agreements contains a provision limiting the agreement’s scope. The Management Agreement states that ""[t]he subject of this Agreement shall be the transfer to World Wide of the right to manage, control, use and own the State-owned or controlled block of shares in [TGK].” Management Agreement ¶ 1. And the Pledge Agreement includes an integration clause stating that ”[t]his Pledge Agreement constitutes and contains the entire agreement of the parties.” Pledge Agreement ¶ 21.1. Although the Pledge Agreement grants World Wide a security interest in TGK shares and assets, id. ¶2.1, it does not itself include an agreement to repay World Wide’s loans to TGK. 15 .See Strategic Alliance Agreement ¶ 9.3 (""If any dispute or difference ar .Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>). 18 . In Count XI, World Wide asks the court

    ### Response:
    holding that a leases waiver of trial by jury for any matters whatsoever arising out of or in any way connected with this lease did not extend to a tort claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    brother was convicted and served time in prison. The State noted that J.C.’s “unique situation” would “have any prosecutor move to remove any potential juror regardless of race, under that scenario.” The State further noted that J.C. was “saddened by [her brother’s conviction] and ... can’t necessarily not refer back to it ... in this process” and that “[e]ven when she was asked if the system worked fairly in her brother’s case and she said [it] did, she hesitated and paused.” On appeal, Carridine claims that “[b]ecause a white juror [M.B.] ... had a family member involved in the criminal justice system” and was seated on the jury, the State’s fust reason for the peremptory challenge was a pretext for purposeful discrimination. See Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1362 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. The fact that M.B. was seated on

    ### Response:
    holding that pretext may be established by proving that prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to exclude africanamerican venirepersons for a given reason or reasons but then failed to apply the same reason or reasons to exclude similarly situated white venirepersons
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    government had no obligation to prove that the defendant had such knowledge. Id. at 189, 194, 118 S.Ct. 1939. Rather, the term “willfully” in that context required the government to prove only that the defendant “knew that his conduct was unlawful.” Id. at 195, 118 S.Ct. 1939. In light of these precedents, we conclude there is no basis for requiring the government to prove that a person charged with violating IEE-PA and the ITR was aware of a specific licensing requirement. While the prohibitions imposed by IEEPA and the ITR are for conduct that is not “obviously illegal,” see Henderson, 243 F.3d at 1173, the “danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct,” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194, 118 S.Ct. 1939, is no greater under IEEPA than under the st 57, 61 (D.D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). Applying these principles to the

    ### Response:
    holding that under bryan proof of willfulness under  1705c of ieepa does not require knowledge of the licensing requirements under the itr
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ended up in, than it was with someone firing from where Robert Foley was standing. Had the bullet been fired from where Robert Foley was standing, one would expect to see a shallow groove running along the wall towards the hole where the bullet gradually entered, due to the oblique angle. There was no evidence that this was the case and, consequently, the hole is consistent with someone firing from approximately where Robert Foley alleged Lynn Vaughn was standing, towards where Robert Foley alleged Rodney Vaughn was located. “Newly discovered evidence is evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 250 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Ky.2008). See also Sanders v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 427, 437 (Ky.2011) (<HOLDING>). Certainly, testimony in the form of an

    ### Response:
    holding that cr 6002 allows appeals based upon claims of error that were unknown and could not have been known to the moving party by exercise of reasonable diligence and in time to have been otherwise presented to the court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    SPD at issue in this case, including calling one or both of the federal offices listed in the SPD, would not have been aware of the one-year limitations period set forth in the Plan, and instead presumably would have relied on the general principles of law applicable to ERISA claims. Under those principles, an action seeking benefits under ERISA must comply with the “most analogous” state statute of limitations. Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990). In this case, which was brought in Utah, the most analogous state statute of limitations is Utah's three-year statute of limitations applicable to written policies or contracts of first party insurance, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(1). Lang v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, absent the one-year limitations period

    ### Response:
    holding that this statute was the most analogous state statute for purposes of erisa action filed in utah
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “the only plainly discernible purpose for Article 120 was to seek to impose an additional measure of punishment upon those who had violated the laws of the Commonwealth.” Plaintiffs point to the a transcript of the debates at the 1998 and 2000 Constitutional Conventions over the bill that ultimately became Article 120. Plaintiffs also rely on language from Acting Governor Cellucci’s proposed amendment and his statements to the public, an amendment which was not accepted. These statements include: “The time has come to tell would-be criminals in Massachusetts that committing crimes has serious consequen Facto Clause. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has stated that felon

    ### Response:
    holding preventative detention under the bail reform act was permissible because it was regulatory and preventative rather than punitive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    totality-of-the-circumstances review was infected by its misapprehension of the standard “dictated by the U. S. Supreme Court under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.” App. 1229a. Whereas the focus of §§ 205(a) and 206(a) is on the reasonableness of the rates charged, not the conduct of the contracting parties, FERC restricted its review to the contracting parties’ behavior around the time of formation. See id., at 1280a-1284a. FERC seems to have thought it was powerless to conduct just-and-reasonable review unless the contract was already subject to abrogation based on contract defenses such as fraud or duress. By including contracts within the scope of § 206(a), however, Congress must have concluded that contract defenses are insufficient to protect the public interest. But see ante, at 547 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, nothing in the FPA or this Court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the mobilesierra presumption applies in all circumstances absent traditional grounds for    abrogation or illegal action by a contracting party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has come to be so closely associated with ‘means-plus-function’ claiming that it is fair to say that the use of the term ‘means’ ... generally invokes 112(6) and that the use of a different formulation generally does not”). Intel next argues that the functional language used in the claims does not equate to means-plus-function. See Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583 (“The fact that a particular mechanism ... is defined in functional terms is not sufficient to convert a claim element containing that term into a ‘means for performing a specified function’ within the meaning of 112(6)”). Rather, because each of the three terms at issue “has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art” as the name for a structure, 112, ¶ 6 should not apply. Id.; see also Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 705 (<HOLDING>). Last, Intel contends that when a claim

    ### Response:
    holding that detector is a sufficiently definite structural term to preclude the application of 112  6 even though the detector was defined in terms of its function because the term detector refers to a wellknown structure for those knowledgeable in the art
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this language suggests is that the provisions in section 708.11(3)(b), including the provision dealing with protective orders (section 708.11(3)(b)(l)), are not elements of the offense of stalking, but rather are merely predicates to an enhanced punishment. We also note that the explanation to the 1998 amendment to section 708.11(3)(b)(l) suggests this provision is a punishment enhancement. See 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1021 (“An act relating to certain crimes against persons ... by providing for the application of enhanced stalking penalties for persons who are the subject of certain restraining or protective orders-”). We have previously indicated that predicates used only for enhancement purposes are not elements of the offense charged. See State v. Tobin, 333 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Iowa 1983) (<HOLDING>). Reviewing similarly worded stalking statutes,

    ### Response:
    holding that a recidivist provision in theft statute providing that theft of property not exceeding 500 in value by one who has before been twice convicted of theft constitutes theft in the second degree does not violate protection against double jeopardy prior convictions are predicates for enhanced punishment rather than elements of current theft charge and hence current charge is not reprosecution of prior offenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    yet the district court, like the hearing officer in Arlington County, succumbed to its temptation to inject itself into matters of professional educational judgment. 7 . For example, the ALJ stated that DB claimed the IEP goals drafted by Dr. McCarthy were the ""only appropriate ones for the Child,” and noted that Drs. McCarthy and Antell ""testified in great detail as to the inferiority of the AACPS IEP and the superiority of the special education services that the Child is receiving at the Summit School.” ALJ Op. at 24 (J.A. 29). Yet the ALJ reached a completely opposite result, holding that the IEP complied with IDEA. 8 . As discussed above, AB’s report card for his year at Millersville, ante n. 3, also supports the ALJ's findings. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 n. 28, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (<HOLDING>). 9 . Additionally, Appellees argue, relying on

    ### Response:
    recognizing that achievement of passing marks and advance ment from grade to grade are important factors in determining educational benefit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statistics but also all the surrounding facts and circumstances”); Police Officers for Equal Rights v. City of Columbus, 644 F.Supp. 393, 432 n. 13 (S.D.Ohio 1985) (stating that even if plaintiff fell short of cut-offs for statistical significance, “other evidence submitted in this case ... tends to support the inference of disparate impact suggested by plaintiffs statistical data”). The Plaintiffs bolster their evidence on statistical significance by presenting evidence that the 2005 and 2008 exams violated the four-fifths rule. As this Court has already held, “a violation of the four-fifths rule ... may demonstrate adverse impact, particularly when coupled with other statistical evidence of adverse impact.” Cotter, 193 F.Supp.2d at 348 n. 12; see also Bradley, 443 F.Supp.2d at 163 (<HOLDING>). The Court also considers the fact that if the

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs established a prima facie ease of statistical significance by using the fourfifths rule combined with a chisquare analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    so requests, the arresting government shall inform his local consular post of his arrest, and he shall be permitted to communicate with the consular officials. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77, 101. 3 . Although Gordon’s waiver of appellate rights did not encompass the sentence corresponding to his illegal reentry conviction, Gordon fails to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion. See Gall v. United States, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Gordon’s 240-month sentence for this offense was imposed concurrent to the 420-month sentence for the § 846 offense. Therefore, Gordon’s substantial rights were not affected by the 240-month concurrent term. See United States v. Ellis, 326 F.3d 593, 599-600 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Burns, 298 F.3d 523, 544-45

    ### Response:
    holding that sentence exceeding statutory maximum by twenty years did not affect substantial rights because defendant received equal or longer concurrent sentences on other counts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recommendations respecting plan administration is not indicative of fiduciary status. Toomey, 855 F.Supp. at 24; 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8(D-2). The Court concludes, therefore, that John Hancock’s performance of plan design services lacks the discretionary authority in the administration of an employee benefit plan necessary to qualify it as a fiduciary under ERISA. Turning to an analysis of the other services John Hancock provides to the Plan, the Court recognizes that urging the purchase of an insurance company’s plan services does not make that company a fiduciary with respect to those services. American Fed’n of Unions v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 841 F.2d 658, 664 (5th Cir.1988); see also Consolidated Beef Indus. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 960, 964-65 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 1670,

    ### Response:
    holding that salesman of companys financial products not fiduciary to erisa plan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issue when applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is whether the claim at issue is 'inextricably intertwined' with the state court judgment.” Abboud, 232 B.R. at 798. This is not accurate. The Rooker-Feld-man doctrine bars consideration not only of issues actually presented to and decided by a state court, but also bars consideration of claims that are ""inextricably intertwined” with issues ruled upon by the state court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303; see Facio, 929 F.2d at 543. Analysis of whether a claim is ""inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment is necessary only if the claim before the federal court was not raised in the state court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303; Facio, 929 F.2d at 543; see Kiowa Indian Tribe, 150 F.3d at 1169 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the statute of limitations

    ### Response:
    recognizing that inextricably intertwined analysis extends to issues not actually decided by the state court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    charged the following: “Name calling, insults and profanity, absent the showing of special damages is not slander.” The trial judge seemed troubled by the broad statement of law offered by defense counsel. The judge did not believe he could give the charge as proposed without some quote or further explanation. The judge was correct, and it would have been an incorrect statement of the law to have charged the jury that insults or profanity cannot be defamatory, as extrinsic facts may be proven to show the defamatory nature of the remarks. We find the charge as a whole was proper, and note that the judge did not preclude the defense from arguing that the alleged defamatory statements were mere insults or name-calling. Keaton v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 334 S.C. 488, 514 S.E.2d 570 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial

    ### Response:
    holding a jury charge which is substantially correct and covers the law does not require reversal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of disorder or lapsed mentality. Id. Contestants’ evidence surrounds the impropriety of Estha giving family stock to non-family members. Contestants point to inferences that can be drawn from Estha singling out Cook from his other two brothers and the absence of gifts to long-time friends in favor of the charities as more than a scintilla of evidence of undue influence. In spite of these assertions, excluding collateral heirs in favor of charities is not unnatural. See Naihaus v. Feigon, 244 S.W.2d 325 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (upholding testatrix’s will disposition which left bulk of estate to two synagogues and rabbi to the exclusion of surviving nieces and nephews); In Re Caruthers’ Estate, 151 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tex. Civ.App.-Beaumont 1941, writ dism’d) (<HOLDING>). Further, there is a direct connection between

    ### Response:
    recognizing that texas public policy favors charitable gifts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remedies, power to pursue equitable remedies in the context of discovery. See S.Rep. No. 89-1159 (1965), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2032, at 2466. Hoskins asks this Panel to interpret § 544(a)(2) to give a trustee all the substantive rights of the hypothetical execution lien creditor, which in California include standing to bring a claim for relief for aiding and abetting fraudulent transfers against a third party. See Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1118 (C.D.Cal.2003). Other courts within the Ninth Circuit have declined to grant a trustee standing to pursue such a claim, albeit under a different subsection of the strong arm statute. See Wyle v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs Inc. (In re Hamilton Taft & Co.), 176 B.R. 895, 902 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1995) (<HOLDING>); Ciolino v. Ryan (In re Ryan), 2008 WL 4829947

    ### Response:
    holding that the trustee did not have power to pursue an aiding and abetting claim for relief under  544b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to meet their obligations in this case. 4. Feasibility of Reorganization The Court has already concluded that Liberty Bank lacks adequate protection. Supra Part 11(C). However, the staggering size of the Danleys’ arrearage and the length of their delinquency also indicated that this case was filed in bad faith. Even with Stacy Danley’s judgment against Alabama State University, the Danleys have no reasonable prospect of confirming a plan that would allow them to keep the properties securing Liberty Bank’s mortgages. When combined with the timing of their prior bankruptcy cases and the lack of good faith in which they were prosecuted, the futility of reorganization in this case is further evidence of a scheme intended to delay or- defraud Liberty Bank. See Henderson, 395 B.R. at 904 (<HOLDING>). The Court also gave great weight to the fact

    ### Response:
    holding that the objective futility of a reorganization is grounds for a finding of bad faith and for in rem relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008), citing Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). To be a “significant change in employment status,” the adverse action “must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Ford v. General Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 553 (6th Cir.2002). Defendant contends that Plaintiffs transfer was simply an inconvenience, not an adverse employment action, because it did not involve a change in title, compensation, responsibility or working conditions. See Russell v. Drabik, 24 Fed.Appx. 408, 413 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (citing Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to constitute a materially adverse change in the terms of plaintiffs employment a transfer must include either diminished responsibilities a demotion evidenced by a change in salary title or benefits or other indices unique to the particular situation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property ... belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax. 26 U.S.C. § 6331(a); see also id. § 6331(d)(4) (enumerating information that must be included with a notice of levy). Although plaintiff argues that the Notice of Levy was deficient because it “did not have a valid OMB number on the form[,] ... did not have a court stamp or ... complete signature,” Compl. U 1, neither section 6331 nor its implementing regulations require this information, see 26 U.S.C. § 6331; 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.6331-1,-2 (2006). Moreover, courts have rejected such arguments. See, e.g., Tavano v. Comm’r, 986 F.2d 1389, 1389 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, section 6331(a) explicitly

    ### Response:
    holding that a notice of tax deficiency sent to a taxpayer by the irs need not be signed in order to be valid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 855, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 405, 101 S.Ct. 1836, 68 L.Ed.2d 248 (1981); Local 334, 452 U.S. at 627, 101 S.Ct. 2546; Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966). At the same time the Court has admonished federal courts not to engage in a “freewheeling inquiry” into what might be the most desirable rule irrespective of congressional pronouncements. Reis, 451 U.S. at 406, 101 S.Ct. 1836 (quotation omitted). Here, there is no dispute that the SEIU constitution is a “contract between labor organizations,” within the bailiwick of federal courts. See Local 334, 452 U.S. at 623, 101 S.Ct. 2546 (<HOLDING>). The SEIU constitution is an agreement between

    ### Response:
    holding that union constitutions are contracts between labor organizations within section 301a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for juror confusion about which role the lawyer is serving during trial. “A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear [to the factfinder] whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.” Rule 3.7, Comment (2). See also Chapman Engineers v. Natural Gas Sales Co., 766 FSupp. at 957 (14) (“One of the strongest rationales for this lawyer-witness rule is to prevent jury confusion over the separate roles of an advocate and a witness.”). We find, however, that concerns about possible juror confusion are not relevant to pre-trial proceedings. See Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera-Rios, 846 F2d at 100-101 (II) (<HOLDING>); Pyne v. Procacci Bros. Sales Corp. &c., 1997

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 37 does not prohibit a lawyer who will testify at trial from acting as counsel in pretrial discovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Agreement provides that is governed by New York law. Settlement Agreement at § 9.6. 3 . The Levy Claimants argue that it is unclear whether CPLR 2104 applies to settlement agreements entered into by litigants in federal court in New York. See Levy Claimants’ Brief at 13 (citing Kaczmarczyk v. Acme Contracting LLC, No. 06-CV-1005, 2009 WL 3739442, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2009)). The case they cite is distinguishable, however, as it did not involve an agreement that expressly provided that it “shall be governed, construed, and interpreted and the rights of the parties ... determined in accordance with New York law,” as does the Settlement Agreement here. Settlement Agreement at § 9.6. See also Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Sears Realty Co., Inc., 932 F.Supp. 392, 403 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>) The Court will thus apply CPLR 2104 to the

    ### Response:
    holding that new york common law must be applied to determine whether the parties formed an oral settlement agreement and state statutory law must be applied to determine whether the agreement if any is enforceable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Walton v. Petway, 833 So.2d 292, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). There is one exception to the Rivendell rule: a PTD award to a claimant who has not reached psychiatric MMI is not premature if he or she has reached physical MMI and the award is predicated solely on the physical injury. See McFarlane, Ferguson v. Whaley, 641 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), cited in Reyes v. Granite Constr. Co., 894 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). This exception does not apply here because the final order’s award of PTD is based on the JCC’s determination that a combination of physical and psychiatric conditions rendered Claimant unemployable and entitled to PTD. We REVERSE the compensation award. Claimant may seek PTD benefits again in the future. Cf. Daws Mfg. Co. v. Ostoyic, 756 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). KAHN, C.J., and THOMAS, J„ concur. * A

    ### Response:
    holding that a claimant could pursue ptd benefits on her physical condition alone as to which she had reached mmi on her psychiatric condition alone after she reached psychiatric mmi or on both again after she reached psychiatric mmi
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between the employment and the injury, while ""in the course of” refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurred. Id. The test we articulate today takes into consideration the nuances of each of these phrases. 3 . In Haugen, a police officer incurred a back injury while weight lifting at home during his off-duty hours. The injured officer was following a self-designed exercise program in order to meet the physical fitness requirements provided in the job specifications for police officers. Based on the reasoning quoted above, the court held that the officer’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur in the course of or arise from the officer’s employment. See also Meeks v. Eddy County Sheriff’s Dep't, 118 N.M. 643, 646, 884 P.2d 534, 537 (App.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 731, 885 P.2d 1325

    ### Response:
    holding that an employee was not entitled to compensation for suffering an injury from selfdirected offduty athletic activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis of the major issues.” (Emphasis supplied [by Brimmer court].) Application of these elements leads us to conclude that the first is met because both the pro-life parties and the pro-choice .parties have current, concrete rights or interests relating to this controversy. Our judgment, either allowing the initiative to be included on the ballot, or precluding its inclusion, would effectively operate upon the factual dispute between these parties. Thus, the second element is satisfied. As to the third element, our determination will have the force and effect of a final judgment upon the rights, status, or other legal relationships of the real parties in interest. See Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass’n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163 (Wyo.1982) (<HOLDING>). We also perceive this matter as one involving

    ### Response:
    holding that if a declaratory judgment will not end the controversy it is not proper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ZR 231/91, 1992 Neue Juristische Wochensehrift-Rechtsprechungsreport [NJW-RR] 1151 (F.R.G.). Schoeps has offered no contrary view of German law. Simply because Schoeps may be sued in his individual capacity, however, it does not necessarily follow that a declaratory judgment against one individual heir is an appropriate way to proceed. That question involves both an issue of law and an issue of discretion. The issue of law is whether there is an “actual controversy” for declaratory judgment purposes, ie., whether Schoeps as an individual actually has an interest adverse to that of the Museums. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (authorizing declaratory judgment remedy in cases “of actual controversy”); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, -, 127 S.Ct. 764, 771, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Schoeps argues that Webber bars him from

    ### Response:
    holding that actual controversy requirement is met where there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from seeking payment other than its authorized CJA compensation without the express permission of the district court. The district court based its decision on a misapprehension of the extent of its authority under the CJA. Nevertheless, we must affirm its judgment because, on the record before us, Mr. Shippers has not made out a case for contempt. It does not appear that Mr. Shippers’ petition is based on a violation by Mr. Cain or AFTI of any specific order of the district court. See Goluba v. School Dist. of Ripon, 45 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir.1995) (“To win a motion for civil contempt, a party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the opposing party violated a court order.” (internal quotation omitted)); D. Patrick, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F.3d 455, 460-61 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Our ruling today does not preclude Mr.

    ### Response:
    holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    held that “ ‘in a case such as this the defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek termination of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence ... suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause[.]” Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 11, 107 S.Ct. 2680 (emphasis added). Here, Appellant has successfully demonstrated that, but for the Sixth Amendment violation, he would have demanded “termi nation of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence.” Both parties, therefore, must be returned to their original position. Once Appellant and the State are returned to the status quo ante, Appellant could be subject to trial for capital murder. Compare Chaffin v. Stynehcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 35, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Bordeaux, 121 F.3d 1187

    ### Response:
    holding possibility of more severe sentence on retrial after appeal or collateral attack does not violate double jeopardy or due process protections
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    official policy, in flicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. Id. at 691-94, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (emphasis added). Here, the record does not contain any plausible allegations that the Municipality was acting in a sovereign capacity pursuant to any statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom when it terminated the contract and took over the construction site and temporarily detained OSSAM’s property. There is no allegation in the Complaint that the Municipality acted pursuant to a statute, ordinance, or regulation. The complaint did state that the Municipality implemented “customs and policies” wh sometimes lead to governmental liability for breach of contract. See United States v. Winstar Corn,, 518 U.S. 839, 897, 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 7 . We do not suggest here that a

    ### Response:
    holding that the enactment of firrea breached certain government contracts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in excuse. See Robinsion at 242-43. 4 . A closely related affirmative defense is the defense of entrapment by estoppel, an affirmative defense also grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Entrapment by estoppel provides an affirmative defense for action taken in reasonable reliance on assurances by government officials that the conduct is legal. See United States v. Howell, 37 F.3d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir.1994). We have questioned the meaningfulness of the difference between the two defenses. See United States v. Baker, 438 F.3d 749, 753 (7th Cir.2006). To the extent the distinction is meaningful, the main difference is that, in the case of the public authority defense, the defendant engages in conduct at the request of a government official t 257, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959) (<HOLDING>); Howell, 37 F.3d at 1204 (stating that the

    ### Response:
    holding that it would offend due process to permit criminal prosecution of an individual for invoking a privilege against selfincrimination in hearings before a state legislative commission after having been assured of his right to do so by the chairman members and counsel of the commission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    raised here. In Parker v. Merlino, 646 F.2d 848 (3d Cir.1981), a group of New Jersey state senators brought a § 1983 action against certain other senators alleging that their First Amendment rights had been infringed when they were not permitted to participate in debate on particular tax bills. I~ike the Senators do here, the defendants in Parker argued that maintenance of the suit in federal court constituted an attack on the sovereignty of the State of New Jersey and its legislative branch. We rejected that argument on the ground that our jurisdiction derived from § 1983, 1331 and 1343, and we proceeded to reach the merits of the case, which we decided against the plaintiff Senators. See id. at 852 (citing Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 131, 87 S.Ct. 339, 17 L.Ed.2d 235 (1966)) (<HOLDING>); see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 229, 82 S.Ct. 691

    ### Response:
    holding that the court had jurisdiction to review whether georgia house of representatives deprived one of its members of his constitutional rights when it refused to seat him on account of statements he had made criticizing the conduct of the war in vietnam
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 117 F.3d 1414 at *3 (4th Cir.1997) (“[b]y definition ... § 6972(a)(1)(B) excludes waste that no longer presents a danger.”); See also Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.1994) (finding that since plaintiff could not show soils under its house presented any threat to public health or environment, RCRA claim could not stand). In Leister, the Court found that plaintiffs failed to show imminent and substantial threat of harm to human health simply by pointing to the presence of a pollutant on their dairy farm, because drinking water from the well was the “most direct pathway of exposure,” but a filtration system had eliminated any threat. Id.; accord Two Rivers Terminal, L.P. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 96 F.Supp.2d 432, 446 (M.D.Pa.2000) (<HOLDING>). . Similarly, Defendant cites to Tilot Oil,

    ### Response:
    holding that mere presence of contaminants in groundwater could not prove imminent and substantial endangerment to human health where no one was drinking the water
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    room. [Michael T. Flannery, First, Do No Harm: The Use of Covert Video Surveillance to Detect Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy — An Unethical Means of “Preventing” Child, Abuse, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 105, 155-56 (1998).] Courts in other jurisdictions have reasoned similarly. See, e.g., Buchanan v. State, 432 So.2d 147, 148 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in emergency room of hospital); Jones v. State, 648 So.2d 669, 676-77 (Fla.1994) (observing that defendant reasonably could expect that police would not make warrantless seizure of his clothing, not found in plain view, in his hospital room), cert. denied sub nom., Jones v. Florida, 515 U.S. 1147, 115 S.Ct. 2588, 132 L.Ed.2d 836 (1995); Morris v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 331,157 S.E.2d 191, 195 (1967) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the order that resulted in

    ### Response:
    holding that warrantless seizure of defendants clothing from private hospital room was improper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was the proper party to authorize the sale, George Bailey signed the revised Consignment Agreement in his official capacity as trustee and general partner of Orchard. Based on Crabtree’s March 13, 1987, letter and the revised Consignment Agreement, Christie cannot assert that it was ignorant of the limitations on Crabtree’s authority. And, “one who deals with an agent knowing that his authority is circumscribed and that the agent’s acts transcends the agent’s powers cannot hold the agent’s principal” liable. State v. West, 796 P.2d 1178, 1180 (Okla.App.1990) (citing Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Wilhoit, 270 P.2d 645 (Okla.1954)) (relating to a claim of apparent authority) (emphasis added); see also Truscon Steele v. Cooke, 98 F.2d 905, 909 (10th Cir.1938) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>); Hartford Fire Ins. v. McAvoy, 177 Okla. 60,

    ### Response:
    holding that a principal is not hable for the actions of an agent when these actions exceed the agents authority and the thirdparty has knowledge that the agent does not have the authority asserted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    so doing, the court cited Mercer v. Cedar Rapids, 308 F.3d 840 (8th Cir.2002), for the proposition that “no liberty interest of constitutional significance is implicated when the employer has alleged merely improper or inadequate performance, neglect of duty or malfeasance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court further explained that “ ‘[describing [Brown’s] conduct as malfeasance due to its capacity to damage public confidence in the [c]ounty’s emergency response system adds little to the reputation injury Brown suffered as a result of the disclosure of the conduct itself.’” Id. “[0]ur Supreme Court has held that absent a pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court, decisions of the inferior federal courts are not binding upon Pennsyl .Supp.2d 487, 498 (M.D.Pa.2011) (<HOLDING>). Due to the weight of authority supporting the

    ### Response:
    holding that statements did not stigmatize employee because they concerned competency and job performance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hicks nor White may be held personally liable for acts occurring within the scope and course of their employment. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7(2). Accordingly, Craddock’s individual claims against the two are dismissed. However, under the MTCA, a governmental entity such as the City may be held liable for Hicks’ actions within the scope of his employment if Hicks “acted in reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of the injury.” Miss.Code Ann. § ll-46-9(l)(c). Hicks concedes that Craddock was not engaged in any criminal activity at the time of her arrest. Accordingly, the City may be held liable for her arrest if Hicks’ conduct rises to the level of reckless disregard. Maldonado v. Kelly, 768 So.2d 906, 909 (Miss.2000)(<HOLDING>). While reckless disregard is not defined by

    ### Response:
    holding that police officer did not exhibit reckless disregard for safety and wellbeing of others by negligently causing auto accident where officer looked both ways at intersection even though view was partially blocked
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    scope of that license. See Shaver, 74 F.3d at 774-76 & n. 8; Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 303-04 (7th Cir.1983). If one receives a license to reproduce and sell five copies, then he may reproduce and sell five copies, but no more. See, e.g., Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 831-33 (8th Cir.1992) (finding that promoter was authorized to reprodu f its use exceeds the scope of its license.’ ” Shaver, 74 F.3d at 775 n. 8 (quoting S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1087); see also S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1087-88 (“The critical question is not the existence but the scope of the license.”); Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 20-21 (2d Cir.1976) (noting that “[o]ne who obtains permission to use a copyrighted” work “may not exceed the specific purpo . 311, 314-19 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (<HOLDING>); In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R.

    ### Response:
    holding that nonexclusive licensees cannot transfer their licenses without prior authorization from copyright owner but that exclusive licensees can transfer licenses without authorization
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on Behalf of Bartholomew v. Foster, 115 Pa.Cmwlth. 430, 541 A.2d 393, 397 (1988), affd per curiam 522 Pa. 489, 563 A.2d 1390 (1989). We have not hesitated to effectuate the Equal Rights Amendment’s prohibition of sex discrimination by striking down statutes and common law doctrines predicated upon traditional or stereotypical roles of men and women. See Hartford, 482 A.2d at 548 (applying the Equal Rights Amendment to find that the Insurance Commissioner properly disapproved of an automobile insurer’s discriminatory sex-based rates); Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635, 639 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“Tender years doctrine” offends concept of equality of the sexes embraced in Equal Rights Amendment.); Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 347 A.2d 477

    ### Response:
    holding that the adoption acts failure to require parental consent of unwed father as well as unwed mother violates equal rights amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of G.S. 75-1.1, damages may be recovered either for the breach of contract, or for violation of G.S. 75-1.1 .. . .” Marshall v. Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530, 542, 268 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1980), modified and aff'd, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981). Colonial argues that there should be a division of the breach of contract action and the § 75-1.1 claim. However, as evidenced by the jury verdict, the breach of contract accompanied by aggravating factors is what gave rise to the § 75-1.1 claim. Moreover, the court will not allow a defendant to divide the breach of contract action and the conduct which aggravated the breach when in substance there is but one continuous transaction amounting to unfair and deceptive trade practices. See Garlock v. Henson, 112 N.C. App. 243, 435 S.E.2d 114 (1993) (<HOLDING>). C Pre-judgment interest may be awarded on

    ### Response:
    holding that where there was a breach of contract accompanied by aggravating factors that it was proper to treble the breach of contract damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    338, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953)) “[A]n unwise, or even an unconsidered decision by the union is not necessarily an irrational decision.” Air Line Pilots, supra, 499 U.S. at 78, 111 S.Ct. 1127. The arbitrariness standard has been described as “highly deferential,” id., and “quite forgiving,” Trnka v. Local Union No. 688, 30 F.3d 60, 61 (7th Cir.1994). The Sixth Circuit has stated that, “[i]n essence then, to prevail, a plaintiff has the difficult task of showing that the union’s actions were wholly irrational.” Garrison v. Cassens Tr olding that the establishment of a two-tiered seniority system which favors one group over another is insufficient to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation); Baker v. Constr. & Gen. Laborers, Local 26b, 822 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). In Forte, supra, 2000 WL 377698, *3, an

    ### Response:
    holding that unions practice in running a hiring hall that required plaintiffs to run up the stairs to receive a referral slip was demeaning but not arbitrary discriminatory or motivated by bad faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of his evidence.”). Here, at the time of the court’s involuntary dismissal of the entire petition, Former Husband had not yet finished presenting his casein-chief. Accordingly, “[b]y denying [Former Husband] the opportunity to complete [his] case-in-chief, the trial court denied [Former Husband his] due process.” A.N. v. M.F.-A., 946 So.2d 58, 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). The trial court further erred in dismissing the entire multi-count petition based solely on Former Husband’s inability to establish one of the listed grounds for modification. In actions involving numerous counts, dismissal of the entire case is proper only if the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case as to each of the counts. See Xamnad, Inc. v. Patio Cafe, Inc., 486 So.2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Sec. Abstract & Ins. Co. v. Fid.

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court reversibly erred in dismissing the multicount complaint in its entirety when the facts therein supported at least one cause of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Therefore, she argues that providing corroboration for her testimony was not reasonably possible. See id. However, while Mary alleges that Ronald threatened her in private, she does not address the lack of corroboration for her other claims. Further, Mary and Ronald did not live in isolation. Mary worked outside the home and visited family members throughout the marriage. Ronald and Mary shared their home with their two adult children and a grandchild who was in Mary’s custody. Neither of the couple’s children, who should have known of Ronald’s cruel and inhuman treatment of Mary, testified at the trial. Their children would have witnessed Ronald’s controlling behavior and the negative impact Mary claims Ronald’s behavior caused on her health. See Cochran, 912 So.2d at 1089 (¶¶ 14-15) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 15. Ronald admitted at trial that he had

    ### Response:
    holding that wife must provide corroboration for her allegations of cruel and inhuman treatment despite her claim that the parties were isolated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Iowa App. 1994) (same); Fox v. Contract Beverage Packers, Inc., 398 N.E.2d 709 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (same); Scott v. Altmar, Inc., 272 Kan. 1280, 38 P.3d 673 (2002) (same); Hoffman v. Nat’l Mach. Co., 113 Mich. App. 66, 317 N.W.2d 289 (1982) (same); Danek v. Meldrum Mfg. & Eng'g Co., 312 Minn. 404, 252 N.W.2d 255 (1977) (same); Colbert v. Mississippi Marine Corp., 755 So.2d 1116 (Miss.App.1999) (same); Daniels v. Pamida, Inc., 251 Neb. 921, 561 N.W.2d 568 2 Ill.2d 341, 45 Ill.Dec. 126, 412 N.E.2d 477 (1980) (a contract of employment between the borrowed servant and the paving company was found by the acquiescence in and acceptance of the paving company's control and instructions.); Beach v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 542 F.Supp. 1328 (N.D.Ind.1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d 407 (7th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Bright v. Bragg, 175 Kan. 404, 264 P.2d 494

    ### Response:
    holding that although plaintiff never considered himself an employee of owenscorning his acquiescence in direct supervision by owenscorning demonstrated an implied contract of service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “served by delay in taking legal action.” Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed.Cir.1995) (quoting BP Chemicals, Ltd., 4 F.3d at 977). 6 . Citizen relies primarily on the following two statements: ""The critical language here is the plurality of paths have a substantially equal path length inside the luminescence conversion element. That’s the disputed language in this case” and ""The evidence of infringement is undisputed, that everybody has homogenous white light.” (Gasser Deck, Ex. 11 at 85:17-20 and 89:12-13.) 7 .Plaintiff' also cites to OSRAM's suit in Germany against Citizen, but this is not relevant because it was filed after January 18, 2005. Reasonable apprehension must exist at the time suit was filed. See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 (<HOLDING>); Holley Performance Prods., Inc. v. Barry

    ### Response:
    holding thatjurisdiction depends on the facts existing when the complaint is filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    507-08. The statement in this case about which defendant complains is distinguishable from that made by the Harbison attorney and does not amount to ineffective assistance. Trial counsel here was pointing out to the jury that specific intent was lacking in this case and that the lack of specific intent was the only difference between second-degree and first-degree murder. Defense counsel was arguing to the jury that, without specific intent, the most serious crime for which defendant could be convicted would be second-degree murder. This situation differs substantially from Harbison, where the attorney argued, “ T think you should find him guilty of manslaughter and not first degree.’ ” Id. at 178, 337 S.E.2d at 506. See State v. Harvell, 334 N.C. 356, 361, 432 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The statement in the present case does not

    ### Response:
    holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for its adjusters to follow, (2) failed to train its employees on the specifics of Oklahoma insurance law, and (3) failed to independently investigate Plaintiffs insurance claim. As for Plaintiffs first two allegations of bad faith, we are not persuaded an insurer acts in bad faith under Oklahoma law by simply failing to adopt written standards or provide state-specific training to its employees. We see no basis in the record for a finding of bad faith with respect to Defendant’s general handling of claims and training of employees. As for Plaintiffs third bad-faith allegation, there is no evidence in the record to support a claim that Defendant’s investigation was incomplete or biased in any way. See Timberlake Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 345 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff further argues Defendant acted in

    ### Response:
    holding that under oklahoma law a bad faith claim  premised on inadequate investigation must be supported by a showing that material facts were overlooked or that a more thorough investigation would have produced relevant information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his or her own statement concerning the lawsuit, which is in the possession, custody or control of any party. Tex.R.Civ.P. 192.3(h). 8 . This was the point at which Madden entered Hilbrich's room and found him deceased. Madden’s statement does not refer to the four calls for assistance contained in Schmidt's statement. 9 . The MLIIA limits liability in any health care liability claim where final judgment is rendered against a physician or health care provider to an amount not to exceed $500,000; however, this limit is adjusted for inflation, or deflation, under a formula based on the consumer price index. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art 4590i §§ 11.02(a), 11.04 (Vernon Supp.2001). 10 . See Columbia Hosp. Corp. of Houston v. Moore, 43 S.W.3d 553, 558 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Because this case is not subject to

    ### Response:
    holding that section 1602 of the mliia which became effective september 1 1995 requires that judgments include prejudgment interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Tex. 1981); Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., 47 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000), aff'd, 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex.2001). Appellants were bound by the division orders because they accepted royalty payments based on the unit percentages under the division orders, and they did not revoke the division orders: See Tex. Nat. Res.Code Ann. § 91.402(g); Cabot Corp., 754 S.W.2d at 107-08. Section 91.402(h) of the Texas Natural Resources Code does not render obsolete the “excuse” defense or the longstanding rule that division orders are binding until revoked. Cabot Corp., 754 S.W.2d at 107 — 08; see Sun Oil Co., 626 S.W.2d at 734 (estoppel based on division orders is valid and binding until division order is revoked); Neel v. Killarn Oil Co., 88 S.W.3d 334, 341-42 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), disapproved on other grounds, Hausser v.

    ### Response:
    holding that if claimants had signed new division orders they would have waived their rights to a larger royalty payment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    acted well within its statutory authority in requiring Oncor to prepare and provide the direct-assignment study and did not exercise that authority arbitrarily and capriciously. Next, we consider Oncor’s arguments on the merits of the use of direct assignment in setting wholesale rates. The Commission responds that Oncor’s attempt to engage this Court in consideration of the merits is premature (ie., the issue is unripe) because the Commission has not yet decided to use that methodology in setting Oncor’s rates and is merely exploring the option by requesting further information in the form of the study. We agree with the Commission. See City of El Paso v. Public Util. Comm’n, 839 S.W.2d 895, 923 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992), rev’d in part on other grounds, 883 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>). The ripeness doctrine aims to conserve

    ### Response:
    holding unripe appellants issue contending that commission failed to consider excess capacity of electric generating unit that was not yet operational
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and plaintiffs believe AIG should reimburse the. United States for those payments: “AIG, et al.” is DEMANDED to REIMBURSE “the Government, Social Security Department” for “all” past paid Social Security Disability Payments made (4/28/1999-present) which [must be] Funded “out-of AIG, et al. legitimately owned Asset’s” — “AIG, et al.” is the cause in fact of said Disability (i.e„ Life-Altering Injuries) and therefore,' Responsible As A Matter of LAW. Regardless, plaintiffs may not bring a social security claim in this court. The Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under the Social Security Act. See Addams-More v. United States, 81 Fed.Cl. 312, 315, aff'd, 296 Fed.Appx. 45 (Fed.Cir.2008) (citing Marcus v. United States, 909 F.2d 1470, 1471 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>)). The statute at 42 U.S.C, § 405(g) (2012)

    ### Response:
    holding that the claims court has no jurisdiction under the tucker act over claims to social security benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it, inquired about whether he was on probation or had any warrants and if he could run a records check). For a police officer’s verbal inquiries to amount to a seizure, “something more than just asking a question, requesting information, or seeking an individual’s cooperation is required of an officer’s conduct.” State v. Backstrand, 354 Or 392, 403, 313 P3d 1084 (2013). That “something more” can be “the content or manner of questioning, or the accompanying physical acts by the officer, if those added factors would reasonably be construed as a ‘threatening or coercive’ show of authority requiring compliance with the officer’s request.” Id. (quoting Ashbaugh, 349 Or at 317); see also, e.g., State v. Zaccone, 245 Or App 560, 563-67, 261 P3d 1287 (2011), rev den, 355 Or 381 (2014) (<HOLDING>). In light of the circumstances here, Haugen’s

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of care, or proximate cause. The only expert testimony in the record concerning the standards of care applicable to the settling defendants, any breach of those standards of care, or any proximate cause is, as pointed out by Chesser, wholly conclusory and constitutes no evidence. See, e.g., Coastal Transp. Co., 136 S.W.3d at 232; Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711-12 (Tex.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1119, 118 S.Ct. 1799, 140 L.Ed.2d 939 (1998). For example, Dr. Stephen Koch, one of Chesser’s experts whose testimony Appel-lees point to as providing evidence of the settling defendants’ standard of care, breach, and causation, simply testified: Q. You render opinions as an — as an expert witness in this case that Dr. Dad-dyo — Adedokun was neg 820 (Tex.2009) (<HOLDING>); Coastal Transp. Co., 136 S.W.3d at 232;

    ### Response:
    holding evidence legally insufficient to support causation because patels opinions were conelusory and provided no evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    omitted). The listing for mental retardation sets out four distinct ways to establish disability. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.05(A)-(D). We focus here on hsting § 12.05(C): “[m]ental retardation refers to significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the developmental period: i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before age 22” and “[a] valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function.” Mr. Smith correctly argues that the ALJ did not specifically address fisting § 12.05(C). The ALJ cites to the standard for e 214 (10th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Smith believes that the ALJ failed at

    ### Response:
    holding meaningful appellate review is impossible where it would require drawing factual conclusions on al js behalf and court would not be reviewing for substantial evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 181 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). Jones, 529 U.S. at 852-54, 120 S.Ct. 1904. In contrast to Jones, the instant statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 401, 3559(a)(1), and their terms are neither ambiguous, nor are they susceptible to two potential interpretations. Thus, the principle in Jones of choosing between two viable constructions does not apply to the instant action. As in the present case, when the language of the statute is not open to another intellectually honest interpretation, the proper course of action is to adopt the plain meaning of the statute while highlighting the awkward or unwise result to Congress for it to amend the statute. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989) (<HOLDING>), superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990 Supp.)

    ### Response:
    holding the federal tort claims act did not permit exercise of pendant jurisdiction over additional parties as to which no basis for federal jurisdiction existed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). Our courts have recognized the authority of a trial court to grant a verdict in arrest of judgment to prevent entry of judgment on the insufficiency of the indictment or some other fatal defect appearing on the face of the record. Id. at 286, 337 S.E.2d at 886 (Ness, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Brown, 201 S.C. 417, 23 S.E.2d 381 (1942) (ruling that motion for arrest in judgment should have been granted where trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose sentence); State v. Cooler, 30 S.C. 105, 8 S.E. 692 (1889) (finding that the fact a juror was a member of the grand jury that indicted defendant was not grounds for arrest of judgment); State v. Jeter, 47 S.C. 2, 24 S.E. 889 (1896) (<HOLDING>); State v. Blakeney, 33 S.C. 111, 11 S.E. 637

    ### Response:
    holding trial court erred in denying defendants motion for arrest of judgment where indictment was insufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    immunity because its contract with a federal agency was not the result of lobbying, and did not involve the First Amendment right to petition the government. Because that case concerned copyright misuse, the Ninth Circuit gave this issue cursory treatment. Significantly, the Ninth Circuit has ruled, in the company of the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, that a so-called commercial exception to antitrust immunity does not exist. See In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 693 F.2d 84, 86 (9th Cir.1982); TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560, 1572 (11th Cir.1996) (rejecting as erroneous district court’s reliance on “perceived commercial exception”). See also Independent Taxicab Drivers’ Employees v. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 760 F.2d 607, 613 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted)—a circumstance not unlike

    ### Response:
    holding that noerrpennington extends to situations where the government enters into a contractual relationship with a private entity at least in situations where the government engages in a policy decision and at the same time acts as a participant in the marketplace 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    caused by Visa’s absence from this litigation. Any such harm would result from FIFA’s alleged conduct in awarding Visa sponsorship rights it could not legally give. We would be significantly broadening both Rule 19(a)(2)® and the principle discussed in Crouse-Hinds if we found that because the outcome of this case may impact a separate contract involving a different party, that finding would transform the action into “an action to set aside a lease or a contract.” Crouse-Hinds, 634 F.2d at 701 (quoting Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1325). Crouse-Hinds involved an actual .action to set aside a contract; here we have an action that could in the future impact a third party’s rights under a separate contract. We, therefore, do not find Crouse-Hinds controlling here and decline to b Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), we do not find this reasoning applicable

    ### Response:
    holding that in an action to quiet title by aggrieved tax payer against government seeking to recover automobiles sold to satisfy tax lien purchasers of automobiles were necessary parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 516.16; and (4) A symbol or letter in its records denoting that the Plaintiffs were regarded as section 7(i) exempt commissioned salespeople, as required by 29 C.F.R. § 516.16. Although the Plaintiffs may be correct that the Defendant failed to comply with the DOL’s recording requirements, such a failure would not result in a finding that the retail-service exemption is inapplicable. Rather, this Court has determined that, when an employer fails to comply with the DOL’s recording requirements, the Court should simply issue an injunction requiring the employer to comply with those requirements in the future. Reich v. Cole Enter., Inc., 901 F.Supp. 255, 260 (S.D.Ohio 1993), aff'd, 62 F.3d 775 (6th Cir.1995); see Brennan v. Valley Towing Co., Inc., 515 F.2d 100, 111-12 (9th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, even though the Defendant may

    ### Response:
    recognizing that when the employer had failed to comply with the reporting requirements of 29 cfr  5162 an order requiring prospective compliance was proper but that additional sanctions for the past violation were not necessary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the complaint. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1523; Pena, 770 F.2d at 815. Hammer contends that he first learned of the complaint approximately two years after it was filed. The bankruptcy court concluded that appellees effected service when they sent, by first class mail, a summons and complaint to Hammer at the address listed on his bankruptcy petition. Service in this fashion is expressly authorized by Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b)(9). Hammer initiated these proceedings by filing his petition, and it was his responsibility to apprise the bankruptcy court of his forwarding address. See Pena, 770 F.2d at 815 (affirming default judgment where defendant foreign corporation failed to provide correct address to state licensing authority); see also In re Muzquiz, 122 B.R. 56, 59 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>). Hammer was properly served under the

    ### Response:
    holding service not defective where debtor had failed to notify court of his new address
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the maximum allowed homestead exemption by that amount. See, e.g., In re Stanley, 2010 WL 2103441 at *1 n. 1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. May 20, 2010) (finding that a debt- or’s available wildcard exemption was limited to any available amount not claimed under a homestead exemption). 15 . As a result of the court’s amendment of Provision A to reflect a combined homestead exemption of $60,000.00, this figure is also incorrect. 16 .""The exemptions provided in The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), are not applicable to residents of [North Carolina], The exemptions provided by this Article and by other statutory or common law of this State shall apply for purposes of The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).” N.C. Gen.Stat. § lC-1601(f). See In re Connor, 419 B.R. 304, 306 (Bankr.E,D.N.C.2009) (<HOLDING>); In re Cain, 235 B.R. 812, 815

    ### Response:
    holding that a debtor is required to claim any exemptions under north carolina law because north carolina is an opt out state under 11 usc  522b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the district court erred in enhancing their sentence based upon a conviction subsequent to another conviction found in the same proceedings. The Smith court rejected the defendants’ argument that Apprendi required that the jury make specific findings as to whether the multiple counts qualified as subsequent offenses under § 924(c)(1)(C). Id. The Smith court averred that “[bjecause Ap-prendi does not apply to increases of the mandatory minimum, Harris, Deal, and McMillan preclude the Appellants’ argument.” Id. at 349; McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (upholding a statute that permitted a sentencing court to find facts that raised the mandatory minimum sentence); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (<HOLDING>). We cannot hold that Deal has been overruled

    ### Response:
    holding that the decision in mcmillan survives apprendi
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argues that, even if he was delivered to the State of California under Article 14, UCMJ, the issuance of a military discharge certificate (Form DD-214) while he was still in civilian custody vitiated the article, thereby terminating military jurisdiction over him. The cases cited by the petitioner in support of his argument are inapposite. They address the issue of jurisdiction in the context of an accused awaiting trial on pending charges before a court-martial. In this case, jurisdiction over the petitioner had already attached before issuance of his dishonorable discharge certificate; it continues through sentence and punishment. Rule for Courts-Martial 202(c)(1), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.). See also Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 24 L.Ed. 1118 (1878)(<HOLDING>). The issuance of the discharge certificate

    ### Response:
    holding that principle of continuing jurisdiction permitted execution of military sentence despite lapse of many years and appellants severance of all connection with the military
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    examining radiologist, determined that an x-ray of the claimant’s left knee was normal. (Tr. 547), that Dr. Chaplynsky stated that an x-ray of the lumbar spine showed no evidence of fracture or malalignment, and that Dr. Saluja observed that an MRI of the lumbar spine was normal. (Tr. 547). As will be explained below, the Court finds that Third Circuit precedent does not mandate substantial weight to be given to VA disability determinations, the ALJ gave sufficient consideration to Plaintiffs VA disability rating, and the weight accorded to the VA rating is supported by substantial evidence. i. VA Disability Compensation The VA disability rating process is substantively different from the social security disability determinations. See e.g., Bowyer v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 549, 552 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Hannington v. Sun Life & Health Ins. Co., 711

    ### Response:
    recognizing that there are significant differences in the definition of disability under the social security and va systems
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    435 U.S. 313, 319, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978), and Congress exercised its authority to regulate and define the government of the Virgin Islands through the Organic Act, originally passed in 1936, and substantially revised in 1954 (when it became known as the Revised Organic Act (“ROA”)). See 48 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq. The keystone of the government’s argument is that while the ROA lists the specific provisions of the United States Constitution that are applicable to the Virgin Islands, it omits any mention of the Eleventh Amendment. The United States argues that the deliberate omission of the Eleventh Amendment expresses Congress’s intent to exclude the Virgin Islands from the protections afforded by that Amendment. See Gov’t of V.I. v. Bryan, 818 F.2d 1069, 1072 (3d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The GVI counters with cases such as Harris v.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that any attributes of sovereignty the virgin islands has derive from the revised organic act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by a prosecution witness, that there was a third individual involved in the October 8 robbery — specifically, a second individual riding in the van. Notably, counsel observed that the jury had ""all the instructions on aiding and abetting,” and he did not accept the court’s invitation to comment further on the court’s proposed response. 6 . Under the Government’s theory of the case, Hopson appeared on the scene of the crime as the driver of the getaway van. 7 . We agree that the Government adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the jurisdictional element as presently interpreted by this court. For example, Sanese's owner testified that Sánese uses money from its vending machines to purchase a variety of out-of-state goods. See United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). 8 . We note that Hopson apparently failed to

    ### Response:
    holding that because the victims which were robbed of money by the defendant did substantial business in beer wine and tobacco products virtually none of which originated in the state where the victims did business the government had demonstrated a de minimis effect on interstate commerce
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to include all his arguments in one petition. Therefore, we cannot expect that he would have known that the effect of the delay, over which he had no control, would be the loss of his ability to file a petition at all. The facts of this case constitute one of the rare occasions in which equitable tolling under AEDPA is appropriate. The court chose to accommodate the government’s delay in providing King with the voir dire transcripts by issuing a modified scheduling order and in doing so equitably tolled the statute of limitations, given the circumstances of this case. See In re Maughan, 340 F.3d 337, 344 (6th Cir.2003) (ordering time to file extended until the adverse party produced missing documents); Glamer v. United States Dep’t of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Otherwise, the government could prevent any

    ### Response:
    holding that because the va failed in a legal duty to glarner by not providing him with the proper form his claim under the federal torts claim act was equitably tolled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or applying these statutes, Cable One argues classifying it as a telecommunications company under A.R.S. § 42-14401 is contrary to these authorities. We reject this argument. These authorities concern regulation, not taxation. ¶ 47 Although Congress and the FCC have imposed various regulations on VoIP providers and have preempted a variety of efforts by the states to regulate VoIP providers, neither Congress nor the FCC has taken any action to preempt state taxation of VoIP providers. See generally Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-108, 121 Stat. 1024 (excluding voice services utilizing Internet protocol for which there is a charge from moratorium barring state taxes on “Internet access”); In re Vonage Holdings Corp., 19 F.C.C.R. 22404, ¶ 1 (2004) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n. v. F.C.C.,

    ### Response:
    holding federal law preempts state regulation of voip provider but expressing no opinion on applicability of state laws generally governing such companies including laws concerning taxation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ford Motor refused. The parties thereafter appeared before the Policy Board, which affirmed the notice of termination, effective 30 days thereafter. Lanham Ford then filed suit in the Prince George’s County Circuit Court, following which the case arrived here. Lan-ham Ford complains that Ford Motor provided it with insufficient due process prior to and during the hearing before the Policy Board and asks this Court to grant it a new hearing with additional due process rights. III. In its Motion to Remand, Lanham Ford argues that Ford Motor has failed to present prima facie evidence that the amount in controversy satisfies the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold for federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also Lupo v. Human Affairs Int’l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 273-4 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). It reiterates the argument that the object of

    ### Response:
    holding that the burden is on defendant as the party invoking removal jurisdiction to establish the existence of a sufficient amount in controversy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    complaint. See also Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir.1993) (“An employer’s belief that an employee is unable to perform one task with an adequate safety margin does not establish per se that the employer regards the employee as having a substantial limitation on his ability to work in general.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1386, 128 L.Ed.2d 61 (1994); Partlow v. Runyon, 826 F.Supp. 40, 43-44 (D.N.H.1993) (quoting Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir.1986) (“ ‘An employer does not necessarily regard an employee as handicapped [under the Rehabilitation Act] simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job.’ ”)). See also, Horton v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 1993 WL 356894 *4 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 3, 1993) (<HOLDING>). B. Is Plaintiff a “Qualified Individual with

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs evidence showing that defendant refused to allow her to work as flight attendant because of her weight failed to demonstrate that defendant perceived her as substantially limited in any major life activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cannot be materially distinguished. The officers initiated the search of this automobile without consent or probable cause. Only under the proper circumstances may an automobile be validly searched as a search incident to arrest. Miller v. State, 373 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Miss.1979). This ease did not present the proper circumstances constituting a valid search incident to arrest. Without relying on hindsight, the analysis does reach the point where the officers allegedly smelled marijuana since they were unlawfully in the automobile in the first place. Townsend was away from the car when arrested, and the car was closed up for towing. He had no access whatsoever to the car at the time of the search. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864-65, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The majority has essentially looked at the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that permissive search of car compartment incident to arrest is based on the fact that compartment is within reach of the arrestee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judgment entry makes clear that what the district court did was properly, albeit belatedly, decide questions of law on the basis of undisputed facts. The interpretation of an insurance policy presents a question of law for the court, not the jury, to decide. See, e.g., Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1392 (8th Cir.1996); Marren v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 84 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir.1996). Although the district court should have recognized appellants’ right to a jury trial, the district court correctly decided that it, and not the jury, was the decision-maker on the issue of contract interpretation, even though it effected that decision by improperly declaring the jury advisory. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gerhardt Enterprises, Inc., 40 F.3d at 191-93 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Williams, 441 F.2d 637, 645

    ### Response:
    holding courts attempt to recognize actual jury verdict was improper in wake of landgraf but affirming judgment on basis of courts own findings of fact and conclusions of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the merits, and it is undisputed that he was in no way involved in the condemnation proceedings that were conducted in the state court action. The parties agree that the declaration of taking was not filed against Koschoff until July 1, 2010 — a full fifteen years after the conclusion of the other plaintiffs’ condemnation proceedings. Both claim and issue preclusion require that the parties in a prior and latter suit be identical or in privity to each other. See Chada v. Chada, 756 A.2d 39, 42-43 (Pa.Super.2000) (res judicata requires identity of persons and parties to both actions; an issue may be precluded if the party against whom it was asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case). Koschoff was n, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, the doctrine prevents “cases

    ### Response:
    holding that federal district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the decision of a district of columbia high court determining application of a local rule to the case before it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2005). 2 . This court has not prohibited the filing of successive motions under rule 3.800(b)(2) so long as the motions are filed prior to thé initial brief. Generally, we try to accommodate counsels’ efforts to resolve sentencing issues for defendants while they still have legal representation. There is a point, however, where such motions can become an abuse of the system. In this case, all of the issues raised in .the second motion could have been discovered in time to be filed with the initial motion. 3 .We note that in Conroy we stated that the period could be extended for good cause, but not after it had expired. 933 So.2d at 687. 4 . We are aware that some existing case law has reviewed similar issues under rule 3.800(b). See Yisrael v. State, 938 So.2d 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). 5 . We note that although Mr. Griffin's cost

    ### Response:
    holding a crime and time letter admissible where issue was preserved by motion under rule 3800b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inquiry, then, the Board had no reason to consider the absence of enforcement. Finally, Guardsmark argues that the Board erred, by failing to consider the chain-of-command rule’s purpose, namely “to establish a method for efficiently reporting problems and having problems resolved- [in order .to] maintain an orderly work progression and resolve problems in a prompt manner.” Guardsmark’s Opening Br. 15. Although efficient resolution of disputes - may well represent a valid business purpose, Guardsmark never argued, neither here nor before the Board, that this purpose represents a special circumstance necessary to employee discipline or company production. Cf. Stanford Hosp.; 325 F.3d at 338 (citing Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 492-93, 98 S.Ct. 2463, 57 L.Ed.2d 370 (1978)) (<HOLDING>). Nor did the company argue, as it must to

    ### Response:
    holding that in the context of solicitation rules such circumstances are required to justify restrictions on solicitation during nonworking time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a claim under § 1500, the claim pending in another court must arise from the same operative facts, and must seek the same relief.” Id. Because the claim in the district court sought ""distinctly different” relief than the claim in this court, this court was not divested of jurisdiction under § 1500. Id. at 1554. 11 . Because the court finds that plaintiffs did not have a claim “pending” in the federal district court for the District of Massachusetts when they filed in this court, the court need not address whether their “claims” are the same in both courts for the purposes of § 1500. Cases in this court that have involved later-filed district court actions have not been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under § 1500 even if both claims were the same. See Hardwick, 72 F.3d at 885 (<HOLDING>); Teegarden, 42 Fed.Cl. at 255 n. 3 (""The court

    ### Response:
    holding that the laterfiled district court action did not divest this court of jurisdiction even though the court below had found that there was no material difference in the operative facts in the two actions and were the same claims for the purposes of  1500
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    viewed with caution, considering the incentives to lie in order to avoid punishment or to shift blame to another person. Id. (citing Blake v. State, 971 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)); Cantelon, 85 S.W.3d at 460 (noting same policy served by article 38.141 regarding informants); see Burton v. State, 442 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1969) (approving instruction). When the State relies upon testimony that is required by statute to be corroborated, it is error for the trial court not to instruct the jury that the defendant cannot be convicted on such testimony unless there is other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense and that evidence showing only the commission of the offense is insufficient. See, e.g., Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (<HOLDING>); Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 690 (same);

    ### Response:
    holding failure to instruct jury as to requirement of corroboration of accomplice witness testimony was error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    property be abruptly and unexpectedly plucked from the embrace of the person, not from that person’s figurative biosphere,” and reversed a conviction where the victim’s purse was sitting on the bench beside her when it was taken. Here, Thomas argues that the jury instruction allowed the jury to convict if the property was taken from “the custody of the victim.” Thomas did not object to the instruction, however, and thus is entitled to relief only if the instruction can be said to constitute fundamental error. An erroneous instruction rises to the level of fundamental error where “the error in the instruction relate[s] to an element of the crime that is a contested issue.” Caldwell v. State, 920 So.2d 727, 731 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); see also Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 369 (Fla.2002) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Stewart v. State, 420 So.2d 862, 863

    ### Response:
    holding jury instruction that inaccurately defines element of crime is fundamental error if the inaccurately defined  element is disputed and the inaccurate definition is pertinent or material to what the jury must consider in order to convict 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rule 56 motion. Therefore, summary judgment in granted in favor of the Defendants as to the allegations of inequitable conduct. Summary judgment is denied as to the allegations of prior art and prior sales insofar as they repeat the allegations on that issue which are set forth in Court I of the Amended Complaint. 4. Count V: Defamation And Trade Libel The Plaintiffs cannot recover on their claim that the Defendants disparaged the Plaintiffs or the Plaintiffs’ products through knowingly false accusations of infringement unless the accusations of infringement were false. See El Greco Leather Prod. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 623 F.Supp. 1038, 1043-44 (E.D.N.Y.1985), rev’d on other grounds, 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 34 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, under the law of New York, the

    ### Response:
    holding that nyciv rights l  74 forbids liability for the publication of a substantially accurate report of any judicial proceeding and this provision applies to an action for product disparagement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    performance on the contract, potential errors in the work performed, and the ultimate breach of contract where MLS stopped all performance. Since the breach of contract stems from the performance or lack of performance of professional services, the proper statute of limitations is KRS 413.245. II. Gardiner’s cause of action has accrued and is time barred Cross-appellant, WHF asserts that even if the proper statute of limitations is KRS 413.245, the action is not time barred because the action against MLS has not yet accrued. In particular WHF asks this Court to hold that damages would not accrue until the damages are “fixed and nonspeculative.” Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith v. Broadbent, 882 S.W.2d 121, 126 (Ky.1994). See also Meade County Bank v. Wheatley, 910 S.W.2d 233 (Ky.1995) (<HOLDING>). Such a standard would toll the statute of

    ### Response:
    holding that damages were not fixed until a bank actually sold certain property and the deficiency between the price of the house and debt owed was apparent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    James’s wife, Kellie James, about a statement from his former wife, Glenda Kyser: “Isn’t it true ma’am that Glenda Kyser told you, warned you when you got together with Mr. James that you better watch out for any kids that you have because of sexual abuse?” ROA, Vol. I at 26 (quoting transcript from second trial). Ms. James denied having that conversation with Ms. Kyser. Id. Mr. James argued in his petition that because “Ms. Kyser was not at trial for [him] to confront or cross-examine in open court,” the prosecutor’s question violated his Confrontation Clause rights. Id. The district court determined the prosecutor’s question was not testimonial and therefore did not implicate the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (<HOLDING>). The district court concluded appellate

    ### Response:
    holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    NODs. Respondent’s Br. 16; see 38 C.F.R. § 3.109(b) (1990). Procedurally, however, the government’s main argument is that “AG in actuality challenges the June 1985 RO decision regarding the finality of the April 1983 RO decision,” Respondent’s Br. 10-11, and that AG can only challenge the 1985 decision through a CUE claim as a result of that decision’s finality. The government further states that “AG had an opportunity to directly appeal the June 1985 determination and argue the applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine ... but he did not do so and that decision also became final.” Id. at 11. Thus, according to the government, a challenge to the 1983 determination would instead have to be brought as a CUE claim. See Cook v. Pnncipi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The government is right that AG did not

    ### Response:
    holding that pursuant to 38 usc  5109a a final ro decision may be revised upon a showing of cue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (quoting DeVetter v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 516 N.W.2d 792, 794 (Iowa 1994)). The plaintiffs assert section 516A.1 evidences a public policy that all automobile insurance policies include UIM coverage unless rejected by the named insured. The public policy underlying the UIM statute is not so broad, however. As we have discussed, this court has consistently recognized that section 516A.1 requires UIM coverage only for persons “who are protected by the liability coverage.” Hornick, 511 N.W.2d at 373. Here, Scott is not protected by the liability coverage, and therefore, chapter 516A does not require that he be protected by the UIM coverage. Consequently, the public policy of chapter 516A is not thwarted by enforcement of the named driver exclusion. Cf. Lopez, 890 P.2d at 196 (<HOLDING>); Gheae v. Founders Ins. Co., 854 N.E.2d 419,

    ### Response:
    holding public policy of um statute not violated by exclusion of um coverage for passenger of vehicle driven by excluded driver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are “other than a constituent element of a ‘criminal prosecution,’ ” the Court has held that certain constitutional protections afforded in the context of a criminal prosecution (e.g., Fifth Amendment protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel, etc.) are inapplicable in proceedings before a grand jury. See id., at 49, 112 S.Ct. 1735 (citing cases). In light of those holdings, and recognizing the historical function of the grand jury as an independent investigatory body which acts as a buffer between the citizenry and government, the Court has been reluctant to measure the enforceability of grand jury subpoenas against the same standards applicable to search warrants. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346,

    ### Response:
    holding that while a grand jury subpoena for the production of books and papers may implicate the fourth amendment when presented with a challenge to such a subpoena a court need only determine whether the request is far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the experts must share the same board certification as the defendant physician to testify as to the standard of care at issue. In the present case, it is uncontested that neither expert shares the board certification with the defendant physician, Dr. Nix. Dr. Zenilman and Dr. Vaccaro are not board certified family physicians; Dr. Zenilman is a board certified infectious disease physician (internal medicine with a subspecialty board certification in infectious diseases.) Dr. Vaccaro is a board certified orthopedic neurosurgeon. Since it is uncontested that the experts do not share the same board certification as Dr. Nix, they must fall under exception (e) to qualify under the MCARE Act to provide standard of care testimony. See, Anderson v. McAfoos, 618 Pa. 478, n.5 (Pa. 2012)(<HOLDING>). At this stage in the proceedings, the court

    ### Response:
    recognizing subsection e as the sole exception to the boardcertification requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    time, is essentially moot. The whole issue of whether the Bankruptcy Court was acting without Jurisdiction in entering the Amended Final Judgment of Default hinges on the inclusion of the “execution issue” language that was included in the Amended Final Judgment of Default. The purpose of such language was to enable Appellee to enforce the judgment. However, at this time, Appellee is not in a position to execute upon or otherwise enforce its rights under the judgment because this Court, in Appeal Number 93-939-CIV-T-17B, set aside the Bankruptcy Court’s damage determination and remanded the case for an evi-dentiary hearing on damages. Such hearing has yet to take place and until is does this issue is essentially moot. See Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 16 S.Ct. 132, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1895) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION This Court has carefully reviewed

    ### Response:
    holding that an appeal is properly dismissed as moot when an appellate court lacks power to provide an effective remedy for the appellant should it find in his favor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or discrimination .... ” Id. at 49.60.215. The plain tiffs in this case argue that the “task or function” inquiry “directly or indirectly” resulted in discrimination. Pi’s Comp., docket no. 1, p. 20. Washington state courts have noted that state law relating to disability discrimination substantially parallels federal law, and courts should look to interpretations of federal anti-discrimination laws, including the ADA, when applying the WLAD. See Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1229 (E.D.Wash.2001); see MacSuga v. County of Spokane, 97 Wash.App. 435, 442, 983 P.2d 1167 (1999) (commenting in dicta that the WLAD and ADA “have the same purpose” and state courts therefore may look to federal cases for guidance); see also Kees v. Wallenstein, 161 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs did not address the issue of

    ### Response:
    holding that courts should employ the same analysis to evaluate claims under the ada and the wlad
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as respondent [sic] superior.” It is clear from Sanderson’s complaint and it can not be seriously disputed that Sander-son’s claims against the defendants are for actions taken in their official capacities. [¶ 11] For purposes of valid service of process, suing state officials solely in their official capacities, as opposed to suing them in their individual or personal capacities, is tantamount to suing the State itself. See Livingood v. Meece, 477 N.W.2d 183, 189 (N.D.1991); see also N.D.C.C. § 32-12.2-03(1) (stating an action for an injury proximately caused by alleged negligence, wrongful act, or omission of state employee occurring within the scope of the employee’s employment must be brought against the State). Cf. Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Artis v. Francis Howell North Band Booster

    ### Response:
    holding a complaint against a public official or employee must explicitly state it as being brought against the person in the persons individual capacity or else the complaint will be construed as suing the person only in the persons official capacity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    letter “affects the internal membership decisions” of HC HCEA from admitting desired members and controlling the content of its recruiting speech, but the record shows that HCEA did not adjust its recruiting methods, much less turn away willing members, in response to the Board’s letter. While we must “give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its expression,” Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 653, 120 S.Ct. 2446, we agree with the district court that “such deference has its limits.” Thus, we need not accept HCEA’s claim of impairment when it has failed to demonstrate how the Board’s letter either disrupts its ability to associate or substantially weakens its message by imposing restrictions on association. See U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, 705 F.3d 588, 600 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Because the Board’s letter did not

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a court must afford deference to a groups view of what impairs its expression yet finding that the plaintiffs failed to show how the affordable care acts individual mandate significantly burdened the groups expression
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    above the “Physician’s Signature” line. The court agrees with defendants that Dr. Eisenstein, as limited partner of the Centre, through which he delivers medical services, signed the lien in connection with a debt owed to the Centre. Therefore, this exclusion applies. Defendants also argue that the “common ownership” language in § 1692a(6)(B) excludes Dr. Eisenstein from “debt collector” status. Kang responds that this section is inapplicable because the Centre is not a limited partnership and Dr. Eisenstein is not a limited partner of a medical provider. However, Kang admits in his Rule 12M Response that Dr. Eisenstein is a partner of the Cen-tre. Courts have broadly interpreted both FDCPA exclusions. See Meads v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 686 F.Supp. 330, 331 (S.D.Ga.1988) (<HOLDING>). Based on the language of the FDCPA, many

    ### Response:
    holding that two citicorp affiliates were not debt collectors under fdcpa because they were corporate affiliates of creditors parent corporation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consistent with this opinion. 1 . West 2000. 2 . West 2000. 3 . Emphasis added. 4 . Emphasis added. 5 . Neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court addressed future costs; they are not at issue here. 6 . In re Soileau, 488 F.3d 302, 305 (5th Cir.2007) (citing In re Berryman Prods. Inc., 159 F.3d 941, 943 (5th Cir.1998)). 7 . 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). 8 . 260 F.3d 400, 403 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1133 (6th ed.1990); Black’s Law Dictionary 1153 (7th ed.1999)). 9 . See, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 565, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“When analyzing a bankruptcy statute, the Court, of course, looks to its plain language.”); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43, 107 S.Ct. 353, 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Kelly, 479 U.S. at 48 n. 9, 107 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that the starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself  quoting blue chip stamps v manor drug stores 421 us 723 756 95 sct 1917 44 led2d 539 1975 powell j concurring
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    29, 2003. In the default judgment, the court indicated that it had conducted a hearing on the motion for default judgment on December 16, and was aware of Hogan’s motions to dismiss and opposition to the motion for default judgment. Nevertheless, the court entered judgment against Hogan in the amount of $111,422.50. Hogan correctly argues that the lower court erred in entering a final default judgment against him where the complaint failed to allege any allegations against him, much less allege a cause of action. In Becerra v. Equity Imports, Inc., 551 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), the court held that the failure to state a cause of action is a fatal pleading deficiency not curable by a default judgment. See also Bd. of Regents v. Stinson-Head, Inc., 504 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>). Both of these cases contain quotes from

    ### Response:
    holding that party obtaining a default judgment is only entitled to the relief prayed for in complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the March order. The district court in fact denied Liberty’s Motion to Enforce the March order “given the non-specific language” thereof, and thus recognized that the March order, in invalidating the DPS as an offset against a dealer’s claimed retail rate, did not preclude Ford from requiring a dealer to substantiate its claimed retail rate. Slip op. at l. This court repeatedly has refused to uphold orders entered as sanctions based on conduct that did not violate a clear, specific mandate. See, e.g., Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1342, 1352 (3d Cir.1995) (reversing imposition of sanctions where decree sought to be enforced lacked “an unambiguous provision” prohibiting the conduct at issue); Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 771 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman,

    ### Response:
    holding that bjroad nonspecific language in an order does not give a party fair notice of what conduct will risk contempt and thus cannot support imposition of sanctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    declared “that privileges, in general, are not favored in the law and therefore should be strictly construed.” Moretti v. Lowe, 592 A.2d 855, 857 (R.I.1991) (citing Jordan v. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Supreme Judicial District, 701 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex.1985)). Mindful that the primary function of the judicial process indisputably is truth-seeking, we have “declared that privileges do not aid the quest for truth, the core function of the adversary process[.]” Pastore v. Samson, 900 A.2d 1067, oviding for privileges “must not be used as a shield to obstruct proper discovery of relevant information[.]” Moretti, 592 A.2d at 858 (emphasis added). A party may not hide behind confidentiality to avoid disclosure of unfavorable evidence. See State v. Guido, 698 A.2d 729, 734 (R.I.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Doe, 717 A.2d 1129, 1135

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute providing for confidentiality of medical records may not be used to shield relevant and material evidence from legal process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights in denying his motion to reopen. “The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen ... is within the discretion of the Board....” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Thus, we generally review the BIA’s denial of -.a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. See Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th Cir.2004). The Attorney General contends that we lack jurisdiction to review most Mr. Rodriguez-Reyes’s claims, and the remaining claims are without merit. We agree. A. This Court has no Jurisdiction to Review the BIA’s Removal Order First, we have no jurisdiction to review Mr. Rodriguez-Reyes’s claims related to the BIA’s order affirming the IJ’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal, because he failed to file a timely petition for review of that order. See id. at 1361 (<HOLDING>). We therefore dismiss the petition for review

    ### Response:
    holding appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review bia order affirming ijs denial of asylum because alien did not file petition for review within 30 days of bia order as required by 8 usc  1252b1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    effectively vindicate the alleged harm. On this point, the government argues that the true harm from disqualification is grounded in separation of powers. It points out that Congress has mandated that the United States Attorney for each district represent the government in all cases occurring within that district. See 28 U-S-C. § 547. Further, although not noted by the government, the Constitution grants the Executive the power to “take care that the laws are faithfully executed.” U.S. Const, art. II, § 3. Although caselaw is admittedly vague on the exact scope of this power, it is clear that this constitutional provision vests the Executive with substantial discretion in choosing when and how to prosecute cases. See, e.g., United States v. Andersen, 940 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that the constitution vests prosecutors with significant discretion in choosing when and how to prosecute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    time in their reply brief). The BIA did not violate petitioners’ due process rights. It is undisputed that the BIA mailed its decision to petitioners’ attorney of record, that he received it, and that petitioners failed to inform the BIA of their change of address. Further, the record shows that the IJ told petitioners that they were required to inform the agency if they changed their address and that he gave them the change of address form. We lack jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ remaining contentions because they arise from the agency’s underlying decision to deny cancellation of removal. Petitioners failed to seek review of that decision within the 30-day time limit prescribed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (<HOLDING>). DENIED in part, DISMISSED in part. *** This

    ### Response:
    holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regarding the Rolling Stone article (Demand No. 16). On January 12, 2016, the court held a hearing on the motion to compel. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. Discussion The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. Moreover, the discovery rules are to be accorded broad and liberal construction. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979); see also Care-First of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). If a party fails to produce requested

    ### Response:
    holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. 571, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953). Under Lauritzen, according to Hawkspere, United States law governs. B. “[W]here the parties specify in their contractual agreement which law will apply, admiralty courts will generally give effect to that choice.” Chan v. Soc’y Expeditions, Inc., 123 F.3d 1287, 1297 (9th Cir.1997) (enforcing choice-of-law clause in marine passenger ticket). “In the absence of a contractual choice-of-law clause, federal courts sitting in admiralty apply federal maritime choice-of-law principles derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Lau-ritzen ... and its progeny.” Id.; see Sundance Cruises Corp. v. The Am. Bureau of Shipping, 7 F.3d 1077, 1081 (2d Cir.1993); see also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289,

    ### Response:
    holding that courts should enforce a choiceoflaw clause when it is part of a freely negotiated private international agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of appeal, Davis learned that neither McCulley nor his sister would be able to pay for the appeal. In his motion, Davis further states that he advised McCulley in writing that he would not represent him on appeal and advised him how to file a pro se appeal. Davis notes further |sthat McCul-ley filed his own notice of appeal and indicated to him that he would pursue the appeal himself. Davis further states that he did not attempt to lodge the record and does not know how the record arrived at the clerk’s office. Nonetheless, Davis states that he does not want McCulley to lose his right to appeal and further states that if the motion for rule on clerk is granted, he intends to file a motion for leave to withdraw. The majority cites Sanders v. State, 329 Ark. 363, 952 S.W.2d 133 (1997) (<HOLDING>), for the proposition that, when an attorney

    ### Response:
    holding limited by hammon v state 347 ark 267 66 sw3d 853 2002
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See also Matter of Schultz Mfg. Fabricating Co., 956 F.2d 686, 689 (7th Cir.1992) (finding no district court jurisdiction in the absence of a timely notice of appeal from the bankruptcy court). of appeal within 10 dismissing the peti- But the order refusing to convert the Chapter 7 proceedings from New York into the Chapter 13 proceedings in Illinois was not a final order. It did not bring the Illinois Chapter 13 petition to an end; virtually the entire dispute remained, involving the same parties and the same issues. Even though the concept of finality is relaxed in the bankruptcy context, see In re Jartran, Inc., 886 F.2d 859, 861-62 (7th Cir.1989), this order was interlocutory in the purest sense of the word. See Caldwell-Baker Co. v. Parsons, 392 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). See also In re Young, 237 F.3d 1168, 1172-73

    ### Response:
    holding that where an adversary proceeding continues the order  is no more a final decision than an order denying summary judgment or denying a request for additional discovery the litigation proceeds and the issue will be reviewed if it turns out to make a difference to an order that is independently appealable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.” See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 776 So.2d 81 (Ala.2000). In that case, a copy of a garage-liability policy was attached to the complaint, and the defendant filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. This Court stated that the fact that the garage-liability policy was attached to the complaint and considered by the trial court did not require that Thompson's motion for a judgment on the pleadings be converted to a motion for a summary judgment, citing Wilson v. First Union National Bank of Georgia, 716 So.2d 722, 726 (Ala.Civ.App.1998)(<HOLDING>). JOHNSTONE, Justice (concurring in the

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial courts consideration of documents attached to the complaint whose identity and authenticity were not in dispute did not require conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for a summaiy judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    maximum. The sentences imposed by the district court were below the statutory maximum and within the range prescribed by the Guidelines for the quantity of drugs the court determined to have been involved in the appellants’ crime. Even under pre-Booker law, defendants faced the possibility of sentences anywhere within the applicable statutory range. Id. (internal citation omitted). We therefore found nothing improper in the application of Booker to cases pending on direct review and joined the First, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in so holding. See id. (collecting cases). The instant appeal raises the same issue in a slightly different context. That is, Fairclough claims that the District Court (as 005) (same); United States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107, 110-13 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Because Fairclough’s ex post facto argument

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not violate ex post facto clause in sentencing defendant above guidelines maximum where district court assumed guidelines to be advisory prebooker
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the officer to personal jurisdiction where the officer “is a ‘primary participant’ in the alleged wrongdoing” or “had ‘control of, and direct participation in the alleged activities.’ ” Matsunoki Group, Inc., 2009 WL 1033818 at *3-4 (citing Wolf Designs, Inc. v. DHR Co., 322 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1072 (C.D.Cal.2004), in turn citing Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1021 (9th Cir.1985)); see also Wyatt Technology Corp. v. Smithson, No. CV 05-1309 WMB (RZx), 2005 WL 6132329, *6 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 30, 2005) (“[I]f the agent is ... ‘actively and personally involved in the conduct giving rise to the claim,’ he may be subject to jurisdiction in the plaintiff[’]s forum state,” quoting Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Industries, Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>)); accord Balance Dynamics Corp., 204 F.3d at

    ### Response:
    holding that the court could exercise jurisdiction over corporate officers who actively and personally involved themselves in conduct violating the lanham act notwithstanding the fact that the defendants acted as agents when they did so
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the practice both parties followed previously.” Id. at 499. Moreover, in regard to the general practice in the industry regarding the time of payment, the transferee “introduced testimony ... that it is ‘common’ in the tracking industry — even when 30-day payment terms are required by contract — for payments ‘to be made over a 30-day period’ (i.e., after 30 days from the date of invoice) and that it is ‘[v]ery common’ in the industry ‘that people pass the 30 day period.’ ” Id Thus, the Eighth Circuit apparently did not require proof that particular industry members consistently paid late. See also Tolona Pizza, 3 F.3d at 1033 (finding that the evidence showed that “payment within 30 days is within the outer limits of normal industry practices”); U.S.A Inns, 9 F.3d at 684-85 (<HOLDING>). A similar approach was posited in

    ### Response:
    holding that the transferee provided sufficient evidence that its transfer comported with industry standards the transferee proved that probably eight to ten percent of its accounts were on a similar pay schedule as the debtors and that working with delinquent customers as long as some type of payment was forthcoming was common industry practice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Mfrs. & Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 330 S.C. 152, 498 S.E.2d 222, 226 n. 1 (1998). 9 . See O’Rear v. B.H., 69 So.3d 106 (Ala.2011) (doctor allegedly molested his minor patient); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. D.A.C., 710 So.2d 1274 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (teacher allegedly molested one of his minor students); see also D.B.C. v. Pierson, 2014 WL 2155017 (N.D.Ala. 2014) (adults who owned modeling agency photographed and published sexual 68 (M.D.Fla. 1989) (under Florida law, 15 year old’s intent inferred); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698 F.Supp. 815 (D.Alaska 1987) (16 year old’s intent inferred); West Virginia Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 216 W.Va. 40, 602 S.E.2d 483, 493 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Cuervo v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 76 Ohio St.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that inferred intent rule applies regardless of the age of the actor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The defendant also argues that this appeal raises an issue of first impression for the appellate courts of this state, namely, whether a court has jurisdiction over a motion for contempt after a once delinquent obligor comes into compliance before a hearing. We note, however, that this court addressed a strikingly similar argument in Rocque v. Design Land Developers of Milford, Inc., 82 Conn. App. 361,844 A.2d 882 (2004). In Rocque, the defendant had argued that “the court had no jurisdiction to consider the motion [for contempt] because the defendant, at the time [of the hearing], was in compliance. In its memorandum of decision, the [trial] court ‘emphatically’ disagreed, stating that ‘[t]he court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce its orders an onn. 725, 737, 444 A.2d 196 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Although the trial court found the

    ### Response:
    recognizing the inherent power of the court to coerce compliance with its orders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    6 Section 7 of the NLRA provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. It also broadly protects the right of employees to “ ‘engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining.’ ” Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Dep’t of Corr., 179 Wn. App. 110, 119, 317 P.3d 511 (2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157). Picketing intended to induce an emp & Joiners of Am., Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 304-05, 97 S. Ct. 1056, 51 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1977) (no federal preemption of an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress although the conduct was arguably an unfair labor practice); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61, 86 S. Ct. 657, 15 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1966) (<HOLDING>). 9 The NLRA permits the NLRB to seek a federal

    ### Response:
    holding that false statements in a labor dispute that were injurious to employers reputation were not preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see United States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 2000). We have considered Lisi’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED in part and the appeal is DISMISSED in part. 1 . Lisi also argues Aat he received ineffective assistance of counsel from Touger in connection with Ae motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because Touger failed to submit evidence that he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance on Ae part of Zelin. But any such claim would depend on the existence of such evidence, none of which appears in the present record. Accordingly, any such claim would have to be made by a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Billy-Eko v. United States, 8 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1993)

    ### Response:
    holding aat ineffective assistance claims are appropriately brought in  2255 petitions  because resolution of such claims often re quires consideration of matters outside the record on direct appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    personnel salaries by 2087, the number of working hours in a year. Def.’s Statement at 2-3. The court finds this manner of calculating an hourly rate both reasonable and appropriate. The total number of hours spent and the number of personnel used by defendant, however, were not reasonable. As outlined in this court’s previous order of sanctions, Austin’s misbehavior began with his response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 21,1994, and ended with the completion of trial on June 14,1995. Persyn, 35 Fed.Cl. at 711, 713. All fees and costs incurred by defendant before and after this time period shall be excluded from the sanction because the costs were not incurred as a direct result of Austin’s offensive pleading and misconduct. See Hendrix, 971 F.2d at 400-01 (<HOLDING>). Thus, work-hours spent by defendant outside

    ### Response:
    holding that approximating the amount of the injured partys expenses attributable to attorney misconduct using a cutoff date was not ah abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. at 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, the Hudson Court cited Bell with approval and at no point overruled Bell’s holding or analysis. Moreover, Hudson does not stand alone. It is one of a pair of opinions issued the same day on the constitutionality of cell searches. In the other case, Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 1 2 (6th Cir.1988) (ruling Hudson inapplicable in a strip search case because it “dealt with the search of a cell as opposed to the search of an individual”); Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir.1992) (stating that “prison inmates retain protected privacy rights in their bodies, although these rights do not extend to their surroundings” and citing Hudson and Bell); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.

    ### Response:
    holding that incarcerated prisoners have fourth amendmentprotected privacy interests after hudson and despite hudsons broad language
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Barman, D.O., and Richard I. Malamut, M.D.), a Crozer-Chester nurse (Nora Marden, R.N.), Joan K. Richards, the president of Crozer-Chester, and John and Jane Doe, a physician and an attorney, respectively. Because our analysis is the same for all of the defendants, we will refer to them collectively as ""defendants.” 3 . Defendants set forth many arguments for why we should dismiss Dr. Klavan’s state law claims; however, because of our determination that the defendants are not state actors and our decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Dr. Klavan s state law claims, we will not address those arguments. 4 . The Supreme Court's 1982 “Lugar trilogy” guides our “state action” inquiry. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102

    ### Response:
    holding that a creditors joint participation with the state in a prejudgment attachment transformed the creditor into a state actor for the debtors  1983 claims challenging the validity of the state statutes but not for the creditors alleged misuse of the statutes because that conduct could not be attributed to the state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    try to read into this brief footnote more than is warranted. In light of the complexity and confusion in the law on this issue, it is hard to believe that this somewhat Delphic footnote will bear the weight which Defendants place on it. 71 . It is noteworthy that cases involving the FTC’s determinations of materiality are consistent with the Court's finding here, even though such cases are brought pursuant to the FTC Act rather than the RICO statute. As a general rule, deceptive advertising or claims permit an inference ""that the deception will constitute a material factor in a purchaser’s decision to buy.” FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92, 85 S.Ct. 1035, 13 L.Ed.2d 904 (1965); see also FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 40-43 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); FTC v. Wilcox, 926 F.Supp. 1091, 1098

    ### Response:
    holding that deceptive advertising touting defendants low tar cigarettes created an inherent tendency to deceive consumers and was material
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and article I, section 8 to determine if different results might be achieved under the two constitutions because the case only concerns the relatively humble inquiry of whether an alleged grant of consent for police to conduct war-rantless, suspicionless searches pursuant to a parole agreement is voluntary in the constitutional magnitude of the word “voluntary.” Thus, our decision hinges on the meaning and spirit of consent to justify the government’s intrusion without regard to the constitution. Moreover, consent is an exception to the requirements of both the Iowa and Federal Constitutions, and it would be inconsistent with our judicial role under the circumstances to eschew our state constitution and interpret the issue under the Federal Constitution unless 2d 339, 341 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Some courts have concluded probationers do

    ### Response:
    holding defendants agreement to consentsearch provision not coerced merely because it was one of two undesirable options
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have been exhausted. By the same token, the federal habeas tolling provision should not be invoked except when a federal claim remains unexhausted in state court. Tolling is the complement of the exhaustion requirement. We hold, therefore, that a state petition for post-conviction or other collateral review must present a federally cognizable claim for it to toll the statute of limitations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Austin’s post-conviction complaint regarding the missing language of his indictment failed to satisfy this requirement. However, his second complaint in the state post-conviction proceeding, regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, does raise a federal constitutional claim. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) (<HOLDING>). But, as noted above, it was filed in the

    ### Response:
    holding the sixth amendment right to effective assistance extends to a criminal defendants first appeal as of right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. Heeding this mandate, some prevailing case law inclined to the pleading leniency Conley demanded. In securities fraud cases, despite the particularity required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) for averments constituting the circumstances of the fraud asserted and the scienter requirement Hochfelder propounded, some courts permitted generalized pleadings or relaxed specificity of the requisite fraudulent intent to survive motions to dismiss, relying for authority on the language of Rule 9(b) itself, which provides that “malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind, may be averred generally”. See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); see also Cosmas, 886 F.2d at 12 (noting that

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff may satisfy the state of mind pleading requirement simply by saying that scienter existed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to consider all three factors of volume, price, and impact.” Id. at 115 (emphasis added). Second, the report indicates that, when “determining the effect of [LTFV] imports on the domestic industry,” the Commission must ask whether the imports “are materially injuring the domestic industry!,]” id. at 116 (emphasis added), supporting the requirement of a material contribution to the overall harm by the LTFV imports themselves. The Senate Report to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 also states that the “law does not * * * contemplate that the effects from [LTFV] imports be weighed against the effects associated with other factors].]” S. Rep. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 74 (1979). See also Citrosuco Paulista v. United States, 12 CIT 1196, 1228, 704 F. Supp. 1075, 1101 (1988)(<HOLDING>); Metallverken Nederland B.V. v. United States,

    ### Response:
    holding that the commission may not weigh causes and an affirmative injury determination is warranted if ltfv imports contribute even minimally
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom. Wood v. McMackin, 479 U.S. 1036, 107 S.Ct. 889, 93 L.Ed.2d 842 (1987); Watters v. Hubbard, 725 F.2d 381, 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837, 105 S.Ct. 133, 83 L.Ed.2d 74 (1984). A. Accidental Homicide Petitioner alleges that the trial court deprived him of his rights to due process of law.and a fair trial by giving incomplete and misleading instructions on accidental homicide. Specifically, petitioner contends that the trial judge did not explain the elements of accidental homicide and removed the concept of innocence in excusable homicide by instructing on negligent, not accidental, homicide. Respondent argues that petitioner is precluded from raising this claim. The Court agrees. Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. The Michig ) (<HOLDING>). Petitioner therefore is barred from raising

    ### Response:
    holding that the cause and prejudice standard applies when a state court relies on the procedural default but also discusses the merits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court denied the motion, but did clarify that “the Lummi U & A should include nearshore waters immediately to the south of San Juan Island and Lopez Island.” The Lum-mi appealed both the district court’s original decision and its denial of their motion for reconsideration. Standard of Review The parties disagree over what standard of review we should apply in analyzing the district court’s conclusion that the law of the case holds that the Lummi U & A does not include the waters west of northern Whidbey Island. The Klallam argue that the correct standard of review is abuse of discretion, and that there are only five circumstances under which a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the ease, none of which applies here. See Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d at 452-53 (<HOLDING>). Abuse of discretion, however, is the standard

    ### Response:
    holding that application of the doctrine of law of the case is discretionary and that a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine only if 1 the first decision was clearly erroneous 2 an intervening change in the law occurred 3 the evidence on remand was substantially different 4 other changed circumstances exist or 5 a manifest injustice would otherwise result
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    good cause is not shown. See In re Madar, 218 B.R. 382, 383 n. 1 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1998); Byrd, 94 F.3d at 219. Since Madar was decided, the Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed Byrd. See Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 289 n. 10 (6th Cir.1998), amended, 243 F.3d 234 (6th Cir.2001); Leisure v. State of Ohio, No. 00-4569, 2001 WL 700866, at *1 (6th Cir. June 11, 2001). Because the latter case is unpublished, it has no precedential force. See, e.g., Salamalekis v. Commissioner of Soc. Security, 221 F.3d 828, 833 (6th Cir. 2000). As in Byrd, the Sixth Circuit in Catz simply assumed without discussion that Rule 4(m) requires a finding of good cause. Thus neither case is binding. See Madar, 218 B.R. at 383 n. 1; see also Wise v. Department of Defense, 196 F.R.D. 52, 56 (S.D.Ohio 1999) (Rice, J.) (<HOLDING>); Slenzka v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 204 F.R.D.

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 4m permits extensions in the absence of good cause and explicitly declining to follow catz or byrd
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and Recommendation, ahead of the deadline for filing objections,, and enter an order consistent with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. As officers of the Court, J.A. Besteman Company’s counsel indicated in their filings that, as of July 7, 2006, Carter’s Inc. is no longer in operation. Further-, J.A. Besteman Company states, “[i]t is unclear what action Carter’s Inc. is tak ing or will take, including bankruptcy, or as to what will happen to its assets impressed with Besteman’s PACA trust.” PL’s Br. at 2 (Docket # 14). Clearly, time is of the essence in this matter. Given the precarious situation presented in this case, the Court has conducted an expedited, yet careful, review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. See McGill v. Goff, 17 F.3d 729 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds Kansa Reins. Corp.

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts adoption of the magistrate judges report and recommendation one day after issuance did not constitute reversible error where district court conducted a meaningful review of the report and recommendation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which is a “bedrock requirement” of jurisdiction under the Constitution, Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997), citizen plaintiffs, like other plaintiffs, must satisfy all relevant Article III requirements. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.... Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct c rvs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563, 112

    ### Response:
    holding in suit under the cwa that environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened  quoting sierra club v morton 405 us at 735 92 sct 1361
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and Texas Crude’s assignees’ interests in the remaining 12.5 percent of the working interest. Defendant Burlington has also asserted a claim for indemnity against Texas Crude based on those parties’ [JOA] that may or may not become ripe, depending on final resolution of the question of law decided by this Order. 6 . The parties agree that the assignments at issue are unambiguous; they just disagree about what the assignments unambiguously mean. 7 . The 25% gas royalty provision also stated that it is ""free and clear of all production and post-production costs and expenses.” Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Hyder, 483 S.W.3d 870, 873 (Tex. 2016). But the majority in Hyder noted that ""[tjhis addition has no effect on the meaning of the provision” and may be regarded as surplusage. Id. (<HOLDING>). 8 . Burlington suggested at oral argument

    ### Response:
    holding that the pricereceived basis for payment in the lease is sufficient in itself to excuse the hyders from bearing postproduction costs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wiggins was cited to support the arguments regarding the need for a reasonable investigation for mitigation evidence. The application then stated that such “deficient performance of trial counsel raises a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different” and cited the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The general rule is that arguments not raised before the district court are waived on appeal. State Indus. Prods. Corp. v. Beta Tech., Inc., 575 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir.2009). Errant headings in briefs, though, do not waive arguments. Balentine raised a Sixth Amendment argument. Both the magistrate judge and this court ruled on it. See Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403, 409 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Balentine’s claim was for ineffective

    ### Response:
    holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it  
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    will be granted only as to those issues that respond to an issue raised in a petition for reconsideration, the scope of a cross-petition for reconsideration is limited to those issues raised in a petition for reconsideration. In the present case, Eagle Water’s cross-petition for reconsideration was not filed within twenty-one days of the IPUC order certificating certain areas to United. Therefore, Eagle Water’s cross-petition for reconsideration was not timely as a petition for reconsideration and was necessarily limited in scope to those issues raised in United’s petition for reconsideration. A party may seek judicial review of an order of IPUC in accordance with I.C. § 61-627. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Intermountain Gas Co., 100 Idaho 368, 373, 597 P.2d 1058, 1063 (1979) (<HOLDING>). I.C. § 61-627 provides: After a petition for

    ### Response:
    holding that final orders of ipuc are generally not subject to collateral attack and should be challenged either by a petition for reconsideration or appeal to this court in accordance with ic  61627
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and seven years imprisonment plus a $10,000 fine for Count Four, unauthorized possession of ammunition. He argues that the crimes of unauthorized possession of a firearm and unauthorized p mendment, no person may “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. CONST, amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to imprisonment and monetary penalties, and protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. $184,505.01 in U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1165 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). In determining whether two crimes are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes: The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the V.I. 2005) (<HOLDING>). To convict under title 14, section 2256 of

    ### Response:
    holding that whether the defendant is a member of a group specifically authorized to possess firearms is an affirmative defense rather than an element of the crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (5th Cir.1986) (same). 49 . In re Stonebridge Techs., Inc., 430 F.3d 260, 269 (5th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (“It is well-established in this circuit that letters of credit and the proceeds therefrom are not property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.”); see also In re Lockard, 884 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir.1989) (”[W]e conclude that the surety bond at issue in this case is not ‘property of the estate,’ within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541.”). 50 . 516 F.3d 301 (5th Cir.2008). 51 . Id. at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted). 52 . In re Trinity Gas Corp. (Reorganized), 242 B.R. 344, 350 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1999) (""[T]he obvious purpose of § 541(a)(7) is to include property and rights which are acq . See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 327, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that a bankruptcy court could not use jurisdictional bootstraps to exercise jurisdiction that would not otherwise exist
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence presented to the district court in support of Echo’s motion. As in Atlantic Richfield, the evidence upon which Echo relied was of a general nature; the plaintiffs’ arguments, like those that failed to persuade the Atlantic Richfield court, are entirely based on ratios derived from financial statements — ie., the Average Return on Equity and Average Return on Receivables — without any specific proof as to how the withheld amounts were deployed. Compare J.A. 2685-86 (Echo’s motion), and Aplee. Br. at 21-23; with Atlantic Richfield, 226 F.3d at 1158-59. Indeed, Echo’s own expert noted his “understanding that [HRSI] did not escrow the[ ] withheld monies and such funds were commingled with the working capital of the corporation.” J.A. 2729; cf. Atlantic Richfield, 226 F.3d at 1159 (<HOLDING>). Echo not only failed to carry its own burden

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the specific proof requirement has the effect of permitting large corporate defendants to shield themselves against claims for moratory interest simply by eomingling funds with other corporate assets
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that because the City had no control over Judge Travis in his judicial capacity, it had no power to authorize or ratify his conduct and thus could not be responsible for his acts. Plaintiffs contend Judge Travis was a city policy maker because the actions of municipal judges may constitute official municipal policy if the judge holds absolute sway over particular tasks. In Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir.1980), the court found that under Texas law, county judges have duties such as presiding over county commissioners and preparing the county budget which can constitute official county policy making. A city may be liable for a judge’s acts if those acts are in accordance with city policy. Williams v. Butler, 863 F.2d 1398, 1402-03 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906, 109 S.Ct. 3215,

    ### Response:
    holding a city liable for the unconstitutional firing of two clerks by a municipal judge when it was clear the city had delegated to him final administrative authority over employment matters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “Embedded Software” warranty. No record evidence supports Plaintiffs claim that his television’s inability to process a native 1080p signal through its HDMI ports is software-related. To the extent this claim is based on Mitsubishi’s use of the phrase “1080p” to describe Plaintiffs television, under Cal. Com.Code § 2813, it also fails. Notwithstanding counsel’s argument to the contrary, Plaintiffs television satisfies his expert’s definition of 1080p, insofar as it is ready to receive a native 1080p signal through its antenna if and when broadcasters begin transmitting in 1080p. Plaintiffs belated reliance on the television’s “Parts” warranty is unavailing, as he never invoked that warranty below. See Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029, 1031 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Harik v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 326 F.3d 1042,

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court need not comb the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment particularly where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Barnes appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of AT & T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program (Plan). We review de -17, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008) (explaining that a conflict of interest is but one “factor” that courts consider in determining the deference to afford an administrator’s decision). Barnes’s arguments as to why the court should review the Plan’s decision de novo are unpersuasive. Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 674 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Gatti v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 415

    ### Response:
    holding that the court discounts deference given to administrators decision to the extent to which it was influenced by a conflict of interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    applicable. The California court in Gionfriddo characterized the information conveyed by the defendant as “mere bits of baseball’s history.” Id. Significantly, the California court further held that the First Amendment protects “recitations of [baseball] players’ accomplishments. ‘The freedom of the press is constitutionally guaranteed, and the publication of daily news is an acceptable and necessary function in the life of the community.’ (citations omitted). ‘Certainly, the accomplishments ... of those who have achieved a marked reputation or notoriety by appearing before the public such as ... professional athletes ... may legitimately be mentioned and discussed in print or on radio and television.’ ” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 968 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the manner in which CBC uses the

    ### Response:
    holding that because the defendants parody baseball cards disseminated information the trading cards were entitled to full first amendment protection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In Beach Resorts International, there was neither a contractual agreement nor an applicable statute authorizing an award of attorney’s fees. The court noted that the mechanic’s lien statute, pursuant to which the proceedings were initiated, authorized attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party.” The court held, however, that there was no need to impose a lien to enforce the arbitrator’s award, since the defendant voluntarily paid the amount awarded, and therefore the plaintiff’s recovery was pursuant to the arbitration clause and. not the mechanic’s lien statute. Id. at 691. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for attorney’s fees. See Consolidated Labor Union Trust at 549. Compare Fitzgerald & Company, Inc. v. Roberts Electrical Contractors, Inc., 533 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). There are other cases which also reach the

    ### Response:
    holding that a subcontractor whose dispute with a contractor and a surety insurer was settled through arbitration could be awarded attorneys fees pursuant to sections 627428 and 627756 even though the arbitration award had been paid in full
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to establish their prima facie EPA claim, plaintiffs must show the employer paid male and female employees different wage rates for substantially equal work. Broadus v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 226 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir.2000). Plaintiffs offer the differing tuition remission plans afforded faculty of St. John’s and St. Ben’s to prove their disparate pay claim. The EPA’s regulations support plaintiffs’ view that a disparity in fringe benefits support an EPA claim. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.11. Defendants do not dispute that each college’s professors perform approximately equivalent work and receive comparable salaries at each institution. See Sorenson Aff., Ex. C, at 76. They do, however, challenge plaintiffs’ choice of the male comparator. See Strag v. Board of Trustees, 55 F.3d 943 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Hofmister v. Mississippi State Dept. Health,

    ### Response:
    holding that an epa plaintiff must show she has selected an appropriate comparator
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Supreme Court in Heller. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783. This Court finds further support for its conclusion in recent decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court, which has also concluded that Heller and McDonald affirm a Second Amendment right to bear arms in the home but not outside of the home. See People v. Williams, 2011 IL App (1st) 091667-B, 357 Ill.Dec. 247, 962 N.E.2d 1148, 1153-54 (Ill.App.Ct.2011) (finding that the 355 Ill.Dec. 193, 959 N.E.2d 221, 227-28 (Ill.App.Ct.2011) (same); Mimes, 352 Ill.Dec. 119, 953 N.E.2d at 77 (same); People v. Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d 931, 939-40, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011) (same); Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d at 142-50, 348 Ill.Dec. 575, 944 N.E.2d 816 (same); Dawson, 403 Ill. App.3d at 510, 343 Ill.Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d 598 (<HOLDING>). This Court concludes that the Illinois UUW

    ### Response:
    holding that us supreme court cases do not define the fundamental right to bear arms to include activity barred by the auuw statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ray’s conviction on this basis unless the instructions amounted to plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30(d) & 52(b); United States v. Douglas, 371 Fed.Appx. 562, 565 (6th Cir.2010) (citing United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 605 (6th Cir.2006)). “In the context of challenges to jury instructions, plain error requires a finding that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions were so clearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” Newsom, 452 F.3d at 605 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). Where there is evidence that the jury is confused over a central legal issue not covered by the original jury instructions, “a district court abuses its discretion by not clarifying the issue.” United States v. Nunez, 889 F.2d 1564, 1567-69 (6th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). “A district court, however, should refrain

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court was required to give a supplemental jury instruction where the original instructions did not address whether there could be a conspiracy comprised of a single defendant and an undercover officer a legal issue that was key to the jurys deliberations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would unilaterally determine the date and thus might have an incentive for manipulation. Plaintiff itself cites a number of cases holding that a party’s mail room or internal filing policies should not control the date when a letter is deemed to have been received. E.g., Kasler/Continental Heller/Fruin Colnon v. United States, 9 Cl.Ct. 187, 189 (1985); Alpine v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 802 (1990). The court’s interpretation of the term “notify” as issuance in this case rather than receipt is consistent with that of the Boards of Contract Appeals, which have found 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(2)(B) notification letters to be timely even when issued very late in the 60-day period, and not received at all within that period. See John C. Grimberg Co., (1991 ASBCA) 91-3 BCA 1124, 074, 1991 WL 128196 (<HOLDING>); Defense Systems Company, Inc., (1997 ASBCA)

    ### Response:
    holding that a notification letter issued and dated one day before the deadline was timely without reference to when it was received
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    held that if a demand for repayment of an oral loan is not made within a reasonable time analogous to the statute of limitations, the claim is barred. See DeSouza, 708 So.2d at 993. The decisions in Stoudenmire and De-Souza are in accord with the majority of other jurisdictions that have held or recognized that statutes of limitation for actions based on oral promises to pay money that do not contain provisions for the time of repayment begin to run from the date the promises were made. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins To Run Against Action Based On Unwritten Promise To Pay Money Where There Is No Condition Or Definite Time for Repayment, 14 A.L.R.4th 1385 (1982 & Supp.2001); see also In re Estate of Musgrove, 144 Ariz. 168, 696 P.2d 720 (Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Estate of Whitehead, 895 S.W.2d 129,

    ### Response:
    holding that where oral loan was silent as to the time of repayment the statute of limitations began to run at the time the contract was made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title, whichever occurs first[.] Id. § 1306(a)(1). There is a split of authority on the issue of whether life insurance proceeds acquired by a debtor more than 180 days after filing a Chapter 13 case are property of the estate. However, “[t]he overwhelming majority of courts to have addressed this issue ‘agree that § 1306 modifies the § 541 time period in Chapter 13 cases.’ ” Carroll v. Logan, 735 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir.2013) (quoting Vannordstrand v. Hamilton (In re Vannordstrand), 356 B.R. 788 (10th Cir. BAP 2007) (collecting cases)); accord Dale v. Maney (In re Dale), 505 B.R. 8, 13 (9th Cir. BAP 2014). But see In re McAllister, 510 B.R. 409, 420 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2014) (<HOLDING>); In re Key, 465 B.R. 709, 712

    ### Response:
    holding that the specific date restriction set forth in  541a5 controls and that  1306a1 does not eliminate that restriction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Roberts Assoc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307, 386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 353 N.E.2d 590 (1976). Such agreements may be justified by the employer’s need to protect itself from unfair competition by former employees. See BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 391, 690 N.Y.S.2d 854, 712 N.E.2d 1220 (1999) provide for any geographic limitations. Plaintiffs introduced no evidence to support the proposition that a covenant restricting competition of the kind at issue in this case, anywhere in the world, is reasonable in terms of scope; nor have Plaintiffs pointed to any cases in this jurisdiction that would support the Court drawing such a conclusion. Indeed, the case law suggests just the opposite. See, e.g., Silipos, Inc. v. Bickel, No. 06 Civ. 2205(RCC), 2006 WL 2265055, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (<HOLDING>); Heartland Sec. Corp. v. Gerstenblatt, No. 99

    ### Response:
    holding that a restrictive covenant with worldwide restrictions on competition is not reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    firearm in violation of § 5861(d), the court stated: “The term ‘firearm’ is not used in its conventional sense; instead it is specifically defined for purposes of the National Firearms Act.” As the Supreme Court has observed, the National Firearms Act as amended in 1968 “is a regulatory measure in the interest of public safety.” United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971); see United States v. Walsh, 791 F.2d 811, 820 (10th Cir.1986). Contrary to Dwyer’s assertion, possession of an unregistered weapon is not akin to ‘simple’ possession. Rather, the statute making possession of an unregistered weapon illegal is targeted at specific weapons deemed to be particularly dangerous. See United States v. Rivas-Palacios, 244 F.3d 396, 397 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brazeau, 237 F.3d 842, 845

    ### Response:
    holding unlawful possession of any unregistered firearm involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another will occur
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    makes, particularly when those arguments are raised only in passing.” United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.2008). In his sentencing position paper, Escalon-Velasquez did not argue that a within-Guidelines sentence would waste government resources. His counsel raised the issue only at the end of his presentation, stating cursorily that “the resources that we would expend in incarcerating him any longer than necessary for him to be — for him to be deported should also be taken into consideration.” (Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 14.) We therefore conclude that the argument was raised “only in passing,” and the court was not required to address explicitly this mitigating argument to satisfy the constitutional requirement of procedural reasonableness. Cf. Madden, 515 F.3d at 611-12 (<HOLDING>). Escalon-Velasquez’s second critique— that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not commit a  significant procedural error  by not explicitly addressing an undeveloped mitigating argument quoting gall 552 us at 50 128 sct 586
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ch. 13, § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 16 (codified at Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(c)). 3 .The Texas Supreme Court subsequently held that the statutory right to counsel in parental-rights termination cases includes the right to effective counsel. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex.2003) (""we believe that '[i]t would seem a useless gesture on the one hand to recognize the importance of counsel in termination proceedings, as evidenced by the statutory right to appointed counsel, and, on the other hand, not require that counsel perform effectively’ ”). The supreme courts of several other states have examined statutes that provide a right to counsel and have held that the right to counsel entails that such counsel be effective. See Patchette v. State, 374 N.W.2d 397, 398 (Iowa 1985) (<HOLDING>); Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 14-15 (Iowa

    ### Response:
    holding that statutory grant of postconviction applicants right to courtappointed counsel in proceeding arising out of prison disciplinary hearings necessarily implies that that counsel be effective
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    waived his opportunity to challenge the district court’s ERISA ruling when he failed to contest it in his initial appeal. See Kesselring v. F/T Arctic Hero, 95 F.3d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“Since appellant failed to raise this issue in its first appeal, it is waived.”). We previously vacated and remanded for the district court to reconsider the unrelated issue of whether Schoenfeld’s debt was dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code, and did not disturb the district court’s order as it pertained to Schoen-feld’s violations of ERISA. In addition, contrary to Schoenfeld’s contention, the satisfaction of his debt did not moot the injunctive relief designed to protect against future violations of ERISA. See F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1238 (9th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>); S.E.C. v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that injunctive relief is not moot based on voluntary cessation unless the defendant shows that it is absolutely clear his wrongful activities cannot reasonably be expected to recur
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cash flow in nine months, when the equity in the real estate is also considered, Magnolia’s interest in cash collateral is adequately protected. Debtor’s argument is flawed for several reasons. First, whether Magnolia’s interest in the hotel room revenues is characterized as personal property or as real property, Magnolia has a continuing security interest in the revenues under § 552(b)(2). Unlike other forms of cash collateral, a pre-petition security interest in hotel room revenues continues to attach to post petition revenues. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b). Under these circumstances, the offer of a replacement lien on the post-petition rents is meaningless because the creditor already has a lien on these assets. See In re Buttermilk Towne Center, LLC, 442 B.R. 558, 566 (6th Cir. BAP 2010) (<HOLDING>); In re Las Torres Dev., LLC, 413 B.R. 687,

    ### Response:
    holding that future rents do not provide adequate protection for the debtors expenditure of prior months rents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    So the statute and all the Guideline references, including the Policy Statement of the Sentencing Commission, are consistent with our construction of the statute, which is that the authority of a district court to depart from the Guidelines following a motion by the government under § 3553(e), acknowledging substantial assistance, is not limited so that a finite sentence must be imposed, rather probation is authorized. Id. at 859-60. Thus, under Wilson, there was no limit on how low the district court in this case could have departed under § 3553(e) as long as the extent of the departure was reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). This reading of Wilson is con sistent with decisional law from one of our sister circuits. Cf. United States v. Auld, 321 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). It has been suggested, and interpreted by

    ### Response:
    holding that where a defendants guideline range is 121 to 151 months and his statutory minimum sentence is 240 months and the government moves for a downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the starting point for the departure is 240 months and the court is not limited to the low end of the guideline range in determining the extent of the departure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from the Office of the State Engineer, and the hearing examiner denied their application in 2001. Applicants appealed to the district court, as provided for by NMSA 1978, § 72-7-1 (1971). The district court denied the application, and Applicants appeal from this order. Additional facts appear below as they pertain to the decision. DISCUSSION ISSUE ONE: The district court correctly interpreted and applied the Templeton doctrine. {4} Applicants argue that the district court incorrectly interpreted New Mexi co law governing ground water wells that are used to compensate for a surface water shortage. We review the question of whether the district court properly interpreted the applicable law de novo. See Gallegos v. N.M. Bd. of Educ., 1997-NMCA-040, ¶ 11, 123 N.M. 362, 940 P.2d 468 (<HOLDING>). {5} New Mexico law recognizes that an

    ### Response:
    holding that this court is not bound by the conclusions of law reached by the trial court and the applicable standard of review for such issues is de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and loss of interaction opportunities to qualify as materially adverse on their own. However, Ghori-Ahmad offers a clearer example of materially adverse action in alleging that USCIRF reduced her workload and downgraded the quality of her assignments.' Such allegations require precisely the kind of fact-bound contextual inquiry that the Supreme Court prescribed in Burlington Northern. See Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C.Cir.2007) (“Whether a particular reassignment of duties constitutes an adverse action for purposes of Title VII is generally a jury question”). Changes in job duties and responsibilities are not actionable where they cause a purely subjective harm to reputation or satisfaction, but may at a certain magnitude become materially adverse. See id. at 364-65 (<HOLDING>); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 902

    ### Response:
    recognizing possible adverse action where reassignment left plaintiff with significantly different  and diminished  supervisory and programmatic responsibilities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a personal attack in a Council meeting and not on the expressive content of the personal attack. Scroggins v. City of Topeka, Kan., 2 F.Supp.2d at 1371. On the other hand, two district court cases out of California have concluded that a very similar restriction to Section 5Ff were facially invalid viewpoint-based speech restrictions. In Baca v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 936 F.Supp. at 725, Judge Timlin struck down a policy providing that “[n]o oral or written presentation in open session shall include charges or complaints against any employee of the District, regardless of whether or not the employee is identified by name.” 936 F.Supp. at 725. Judge Timlin wrote: District’s policy clearly contains content-based prohibitions on speech, despite defendant 713 (C.D.Cal.l993)(<HOLDING>). Baca v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 936

    ### Response:
    holding that an ordinance granting greater first amendment rights to speakers who support the human services objectives of the city was impermissibly contentbased
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were available both in 1994, when the ordinance was adopted, and in 1999, when the earlier dispute was settled. 2008 WL 2079044, at *20. 4 . This does not mean that a municipality must identify the exact locations to which adult establishments may locate, ""as opposed to identifying the general areas that remain available and proving that such areas contain enough potential relocation sites that are physically and legally available to accommodate the adult establishments."" Hickerson, 146 F.3d at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 . The Court's assertion of the time, place, and manner test in Young notably omitted that test's traditional content-neutrality requirement. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Even if such a requirement applies to zoning

    ### Response:
    holding that contentneutral time place and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The movant carries the burden of demonstrating that dismissal is appropriate. Intel Corp., 496 F.Supp.2d at 408. However, Bankruptcy Rule 7009 further provides that Fed.R.Civ.P. 9 applies in adversary proceedings. While Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) provides that: “all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity,” Rule 9(b) only applies to allegations of actual fraud. Furthermore, this Court takes the view that claims of constructive fraud, i.e. fraudulent transfers, are evaluated using Rule 8(a)(2). A fraudulent transfer complaint “need only set forth the facts with sufficient particularity to apprise the defendant fairly of the charges made against him.” In re Astro-Power Liquidating Trust, 335 B.R. 309, 333 (Bankr.D.Del.2005) (<HOLDING>). Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), made applicable to this

    ### Response:
    holding that a constructive fraud count need not comply with rule 9s heightened pleading standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    explained upward deviation based primarily on Sterling’s criminal history without making an upward departure under the guidelines. This is the proper procedure when imposing a non-guideline sentence. See United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 708 (5th Cir.2006). Whether an upward departure would have been warranted is immaterial, because the court made an upward deviation outside the guidelines range, instead of an upward departure. See id. at 708 n. 3. Sterling’s assertion that the sentence imposed was unreasonable because the court imposed a non-guideline sentence instead of an upward departure story and offense conduct as found by the district court, the extent of the deviation, while large, was not unreasonable. See United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 491-93 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the

    ### Response:
    holding upward departure from 41 months of imprisonment to statutory maximum of 120 months for unrepentant conartist with long criminal history reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we will vacate and remand for new findings if the agency’s reasoning or its fact-finding process was sufficiently flawed. See Cao He Lin v. DOJ, 428 F.3d 391, 406 (2d Cir.2005). Because the IJ found that Veretelnikov was credible and the BIA did not disturb that finding, we assume his credibility. See Yan Chen, 417 F.3d at 271-72. We conclude that the BIA properly reversed the IJ’s grant of the petitioners’ application for asylum. Even assuming that Veretelnikov had established that the treatment he faced at the hands of the Uzbekistani government was on account of a protected ground, he failed to establish that “any future punishment for his failure to perform mandatory military service for which he contracted constitutes persecution.” See In re A-G- 19 I. & N. Dec. 502 (BIA 1987) (<HOLDING>). As the BIA found, “in light of the

    ### Response:
    holding that a government may require military service and may enforce that requirement using reasonable sanctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “I never thought of that. I can ask them to come.” That Lu was insufficiently prescient about the type of additional corroborating evidence the IJ would require fails to justify an inference that his roommates would have testified unfavorably or that Lu is not currently practicing Falun Gong, especially given that he offered to have them come testify as soon as the government attorney brought it up. Because none of the BIA’s proffered grounds supports its adverse credibility determination, we must take Lu’s testimony at face value. Kaur, 379 F.3d at 890. Lu testified that, as a direct result of his Falun Gong practice, he was detained, beaten, electrically shocked, dragged into a courtyard, and tied to a tree for three hours. See Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 720-21 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Because the BIA never reached the issue, we

    ### Response:
    holding that the persecution of falun gong practitioners constitutes persecution both on the basis of spiritual and religious belief and on the basis of political opinion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). See State ex rel. McMillian v. Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 285-86 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986) (in context of probation revocation, ""[d]ue process is satisfied when an opportunity is accorded to be heard in a court at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner""). 38 See State v. Beyer, 2001 WI App 167, 247 Wis. 2d 13, 633 N.W.2d 627 (Beyer's appeal regarding delay in holding the probable cause hearing for his initial commitment); cf. State ex rel. Jones v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 195 Wis. 2d 669, 674, 536 N.W.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1995) (""Due process requires that Jones have a parole revocation hearing within a reasonable time ... and prevents ... indefinite detention. . . .""). 39 Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 326; cf. Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 72 (<HOLDING>). 40 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that protective placement statute unconstitutionally deprived individuals of an automatic periodic reexamination of the need for continued protective placement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    act in rendering such services or in conducting such sports program.” This case seeks to answer whether providing bleachers and supervising spectators falls under the ambit of “sports program.” No available case law construes §85V. Nonetheless, judicial construction of the §85K of the same chapter does provide adequate guidance. §85K limits the lia bility of charitable organizations for torts committed in the course of activities conducted to directly accomplish its charitable purposes. The provision caps liability at $20,000. The Supreme Judicial Court has broadly construed the statute stating that only activities with no connection to the organization’s charitable purpose fall outside of the statute’s protection. Missett v. Cardinal Cushing High School, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 5, 11 (1997) (<HOLDING>). “[P]ainting a building ... or maintaining

    ### Response:
    holding that extracurricular activities like a high school dance are within the charitable purpose of conducting a school for learning even where the organization charged admission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    loss, as required by I.R.C. § 465. Because the Tax Court did not address those arguments, and because we agree that Crispin’s CARDS transaction fails to satisfy the economic substance doctrine, we do not address the Commissioner's other arguments. 16 . The Tax Court noted that the true net cost of the CARDS transaction to Crispin was only $72,926, primarily the structuring fee paid to Chenery and the cost of the Pullman Opinion. The ordinary loss actually reported by Murus, by comparison, was $7,641,706. 17 . With exceptions not relevant in this case, ""[t]he basis of property shall be the 7) (same), Gilman v. Comm’r, 933 F.2d 143, 151 (2d Cir.1991) (same), and Massengill v. Comm’r, 876 F.2d 616, 619-20 (8th Cir.1989) (same), with Heasley v. Comm’r, 902 F.2d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>), Gainer v. Comm'r, 893 F.2d 225, 228 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that when the irs totally disallows a deduction the underpayment is not attributable to a valuation overstatement but rather to claiming an improper deduction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stop. The agent responded, “I could see him as plainly as I can see him sitting there, actually probably a little bit closer.” This evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the person who had committed the crimes in question was indeed Robert Castaneda. III. Because we conclude that the evidence presented prior to the initial close of the prosecution’s case was sufficiently strong to identify Castaneda, we need not reach Castaneda’s second contention. The explicit identification presented after the reopening did not affect the outcome of the case, and therefore even if we were to assume that the court erred in allowing the prosecution to reopen its case, any such error was harmless. See United States v. Toles, 297 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The judgment below is AFFIRMED. * This order

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate court should review error in trial procedure to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Washington Board of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129, 113 S.Ct. 580, 121 L.Ed.2d 513 (1992). “[T]o determine whether a state law has the forbidden connection, we look both to ‘the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive,’ as well as the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.” California Div. of Labo preempts a state law wrongful death cause of action based upon an insurance company’s negligent administration of a claim. Spain, 11 F.3d at 132. “ERISA preempts Appellants’ wrongful death action because the state law in its application directly ‘relates to’ the administration'and disbursement of ERISA plan benefits.” Id. See also Kanne v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 494 (9th. Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Washington state courts have also recognized

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs state common law causes of actions for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as well as a statutory cause of action for unfair insurance practices under the california insurance code were preempted by erisa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    delegate to local school boards the responsibilities of providing educational services, “[t]here is no question but that local boards of education acts as agencies of the state when they are fulfilling the statutory duties imposed upon them pursuant to the constitutional mandate of article eighth, § 1.” Id. at 258, 438 A.2d 88. The court concludes that the torts allegedly committed by the defendants-assault, infliction of emotional distress and negligence-stem from the defendants providing special education services pursuant to a delegated state responsibility. The defendants are therefore entitled to sovereign immunity from liability on counts five, six and seven of the complaint. See Todd M. v. Richard L., 44 Conn.Supp. 527, 539-40, 696 A.2d 1063 (Conn.Super.Ct. July 14, 1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Milhomme v. Levola, No.

    ### Response:
    holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to defendants who were providing transportation services to a disabled child as part of the childs iep
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a full investigation into Acosta’s behavior. Later that month, a new federal monitor advocate was assigned to the Minnesota region. In March of 1996, Costilla was required to go to a meeting where Acosta would be present. Although she talked to her supervisor about not attending, the supervisor again told her that she could not avoid meetings that Acosta would attend. The supervisor added that Costilla needed to be strong and attend the meeting because Minnesota’s connection to the national level depended on it. Due to the state’s untimely action, Costilla brought a complaint against the state in January 1996 alleging: sexual harassment under the MHRA; intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and breach of contra age Realty Corp., 507 F.Supp. 599, 608 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (<HOLDING>); Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290

    ### Response:
    holding employer hable for requiring hotel worker to wear sexually reveahng costume that lead to harassment by public
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and creditors. Although the bankruptcy court seemed to agree with Judge Crabb that federal courts have jurisdiction to assess the validity of a lien asserted against the debtor’s estate in light of federal law, in its view she applied “the wrong federal law.” Id. According to the Ridgely court, had Judge Crabb followed cases holding that broadcasting licenses qualify as property of the estate within the meaning of section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, see id. at 377-78, she would have ackn F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1992)). Second, the fact that a license of this sort may constitute property of the estate within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code does not necessarily mean that a creditor may hold a security interest in the license. See In re Smith, 94 B.R. 220, 221-22 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1988) (<HOLDING>). Whatever the practical benefits might be to

    ### Response:
    holding that a broadcasting license was property of the estate but not subject to a security interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    equally conclusory. Moreover, both in the complaint and in Rojo’s opposition to summary judgment, the incompletely-developed argument appears in paragraphs and under headings concerning the alleged absence of consideration for the contractual amendments. The district court thus did not err by responding to conclusory statements with brief conclusions. Second, Rojo’s argument that DB violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing was waived. Rojo mentioned that claim for the first time in his memorandum of law in opposition to summary judgment. We have refused to address the merits of claims raised for the first time at that stage of the litigation. See Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 356, 361 (2d Cir.2006); Syracuse Broad. Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1956) (<HOLDING>); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.

    ### Response:
    holding that district court was justified in brushing aside further argument not alleged in complaint but raised for first time in opposition to summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contact with each other was the municipal court’s direction to him as a condition of the suspension of his 180-day jail sentence. According to Salupo, the girlfriend would not have been committing an unlawful act if she met him. {¶ 7} The state submitted a copy of Salupo’s prior conviction for telecommunications harassment and domestic violence to the trial court. The order provided, “[Salupo] is to have no contact with [his former girlfriend] as a condition of jail suspended.” The state did not present evidence of any order prohibiting the girlfriend from having contact with Salupo. Had the girlfriend met with Salupo, she could not have been charged with violating the condition of his suspended sentence. See State v. Lucas, 100 Ohio St.3d 1, 2003-Ohio-4778, 795 N.E.2d 642, at syllabus (<HOLDING>). Salupo, therefore, did not try to induce the

    ### Response:
    holding that an individual who is the protected subject of a    protection order may not be prosecuted for aiding and abetting the restrainee under the protection order in violating said order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with respect to Direct and October. Ms. Goren alleges that Direct and October knew that there was “no basis” for certain statements on Dr. Wallach’s tape (“Dead Doctors Don’t Lie”), R.21 ¶ 32, that unspecified misrepresentations regarding New Vision products appear in “free literature published and/or distributed” by Direct, R.21 ¶ 63, and that Direct and October “conducted or participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise [New Vision]” through a pattern of racketeering activity. R.21 ¶¶ 110 & 118. These conclusory allegations fail to specify the time, place and content of any of the misrepresentations attributed to these defendants and therefore fall short of the particularity demanded by Rule 9(b). See Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 1317

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs must provide more than conclusory allegations to satisfy rule 9bs requirement that circumstances of fraud be pleaded with particularity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in 2012, including his failure to successfully complete the 2012 PIP. Dr. Chawla does not claim that Ms. Garfield or Ms. Kaplan acted with discriminatory animus and does not raise a material dispute with Ms. Garfield’s assessment of his 2012 performance, including that, after May 10, 2012, he continued to “make reporting and other errors,” “to not perform work assigned to him by his leader,” “delegate[ ] tasks assigned to him by his leader,” and “communicate in a confrontational and nonproductive manner that prevents meaningful conversation.” Docket No. 37-8 at 9-11. Thus, Dr. Chawla’s attempt to cast doubt on LMC’s other stated reasons, namely, Dr. Chawla’s work performance prior to 2012, does not cast doubt on LMC’s predominant reason for termination. Cf. Bryant, 432 F.3d at 1126-27 (<HOLDING>). It is not incumbent upon the Court to

    ### Response:
    holding that because plaintiff cast doubt on the employers dominant stated reason for her termination failure to address the other less consequential reasons for her termination does not entitle farmers to summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his plea to count 35 thus fails. IV. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the factual resumes submitted in support of Hildenbrand’s and Stone’s guilty pleas are sufficient to sustain their convictions. The remaining issues appellants raise are related to their sentences. Because the defendants waived their right to appeal their sentences, we DISMISS THE APPEAL of their sentences, and AFFIRM their convictions. 1 . Count 36 alleged forfeiture of assets. 2 . See also our discussion of the similar term ""benefit” infra under § 666 relating to Stone’s conviction. 3 . That the benefit is intended ultimately to pass to the low-to-moderate-income purchaser of the program homes does not change the result. See Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 677, 120 S.Ct. 1780, 146 L.Ed.2d 707 (2000)

    ### Response:
    recognizing that there may be multiple beneficiaries of federal programs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court reserved jurisdiction to determine at a later date the appropriate amount of attorney fees and costs relating to the bank’s collection efforts, we conclude that the summary judgment was final. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greenway Enters., Inc., 23 So.3d 52, 55 (Ala.Civ.App.2009). In Liberty Mutual, the Court of Civil Appeals stated: ""Rule 58(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., states, in pertinent part, that '[tjhe entry of the judgment or order shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs.’ Hence, the failure to tax costs did not affect the finality of the summary judgment. Holman v. Bane, 698 So.2d 117, 119 (Ala. 1997). Pursuant to caselaw, the failure to award attorney fees also does not render the summary judgment nonfinal. See Gonzalez, LLC v. DiVincenti, 844 So.2d 1196, 1201 (Ala.2002) (<HOLDING>).” 7 .The Dotsons have since filed for personal

    ### Response:
    holding a summary judgment to be final although motion to assess attorney fees remained pending because award of attorney fees is collateral to judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the circumstantial evidence was not inconsistent with a passenger having placed the gun on the seat when they fled. See 724 So.2d at 1215. See also Bailey v. State, 442 So.2d 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). In Daniels v. State, 718 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), the defendant was driving a car when it was stopped by police. While the defendant was being handcuffed, a passenger was alone in the car. Police subsequently found a gun in the car that was not readily visible. This court reversed the defendant’s conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, holding that the State did not show that the defendant had actual knowledge of the gun or other circumstances from which the jury could possibly infer knowledge. See 718 So.2d at 1275. See also Green v. State, 586 So.2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, there was no evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had knowledge of firearm in close proximity to him when he was driving the car for the cars owner who was a passenger
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Amend Notice of Removal Within the thirty-day period prescribed by § 1446(b), a defendant may freely amend its notice of removal. Blakeley v. United Cable System, 105 F.Supp.2d. 574, 578 (S.D.Miss.2000). And the majority of courts—including the Fifth Circuit—recognize that even after expiration of this thirty-day period, a defendant may still amend its removal petition in order to cure defective allegations of jurisdiction. See Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 920 n. 9 (5th Cir.2001); (“[Pjrior to judgment, a party may amend its pleadings to allege omitted jurisdictional facts”); Whitmire v. Victus, Ltd., 212 F.3d 885, 888 (5th Cir.2000) (emphasizing that § 1653 should be broadly construed); D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co., 608 F.2d 145, 146 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). The authorization for such amendments derives

    ### Response:
    holding that amendment of removal petition was properly allowed to correct jurisdictional allegations in removal petition which were defective or faulty due to defendants failure to specifically allege the citizenship of the parties at the time the suit was brought and at the time the removal petition was filed missing allegation was not a fatal omission which could not be cured by amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    omnibus clause did not contain such an express limitation; it merely adopted the “corruptly, by threats or force” formula of §§ 1503 and 1505. In any event, however, the omnibus clause of § 1512 was not enacted. After the Senate had passed its version, the House debated that bill together with its own victim protection bill. A section-by-section analysis of the House bill indicates that the House Judiciary Committee was also aware that some courts were interpreting § 1503 narrowly. 128 Cong.Rec. 26,350 (1982). The analysis cites Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754 (applying the ejusdem generis rule and stating that “the manner in which the statute may be violated would ordinarily seem to be limited to intimidating actions,” id. at 757), and United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, neither the bill that passed the

    ### Response:
    holding that  1503 is not violated merely by making a false statement id at 21718
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and only reviews for abuse of that discretion. Austin v. U.S. Bank of Wash., 73 Wash.App. 293, 869 P.2d 404, 410 (1994). A trustee abuses his or her discretion only when they act “arbitrarily, in bad faith, maliciously, or fraudulently.” Id. Here, the record contains no evidence that Ms. Montague abused the considerable discretion the Trust Agreement vested in her. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Blume, 65 Wash.2d 643, 399 P.2d 76, 79 (1965) (upholding summary judgment against trust beneficiaries claiming bad faith where the trustee’s actions were “well within the bounds of reasonable judgment”). The record indicates that Ms. Montague administered the trust consis tent with the terms of the trust agreement, and Mr. Vaughn has submitted no evidence to the contrary. Id. (<HOLDING>). Mr. Vaughn contends that Ms. Montague abused

    ### Response:
    holding that the trustee did not breach its fiduciary duty when its actions were consistent with the trust instrument
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    first publication took place before the beginning of the policy period.... The policy defines “personal injury” as injury, other than ""bodily injury,"" arising out of one or more of the following offenses: d. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization’s goods, products or services; or e. Oral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy. “Advertising injury” is defined as: injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses: a. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization’s goods, products or services; b. Oral or written publication of mate 8 Pa.Super. 326, 614 A.2d 295 (1992) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The insurer’s unjustified refusal to

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys fees can be awarded only from time duty to defend arose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    lay jurors. As the trial court concluded, “[I]n my judgment he presents a specialized knowledge that the rule talks about that would assist the jury in assessing whether or not the offender— whoever the offender ... — derived sexual gratification from his actions.” (R. 78.) Cf. United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 594, 116 L.Ed.2d 618 (1991)(hold-ing testimony of expert witness could testify that pictures would be of sexual interest to pedophiles especially when “ ‘contested materials are directed at ... [such] a bizarre deviant group that the experience of the trier of fact would be plainly inadequate to judge whether the material appeals to the prurient interest.’ ”); United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir.1984)(<HOLDING>); and United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783

    ### Response:
    holding that government agents or similar persons may testify as to the general practices of criminals to establish the defendants modus operandi
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plaintiff nor the' defendants have questioned the Court’s authority here. The Court is issuing legal conclusions on a motion to dismiss; issues of fact are not considered. A review of the Court’s conclusions would thus be de novo. See Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2165, 2175, 189 L.Ed.2d 83 (2014). In the event a superi- or court determines that some or all of the causes of action here are not constitutionally core proceedings or not properly subject of this Court’s authority, the conclusions here are submitted as proposed conclusions. See Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) (addressing constitutional authority of bankruptcy court); Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2165, 189 L.Ed.2d 83 (2014) (<HOLDING>); and Galaz v. Galaz (In re Galaz), 765 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings and conclusions in a core proceeding over which the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    threat. Further, he was hitting the building with the bat, which could be a form of intimidation. (R. 47, Sent. Tr. 8, PagelD# 146). We agree with the district court that Wagoner’s conduct evidenced an intent to carry out his threat against Carey, warranting application of the 6-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(l). Wagoner told Carey, “If you do not give me my check by Friday, I will come and terminate you.” (R. 30, Notice of Factual Basis 2, Pa-gelD# 86). On Friday, Wagoner went to the SSA office with an aluminum bat and said, “If I do not get my money today someone is going to get hurt.” (Id.). Going to where Carey worked on the stated deadline with an aluminum bat establishes a nexus between Wagoner’s conduct and his threat to “terminate” Carey. See Newell, 309 F.3d at 402 (<HOLDING>). Because the district court properly applied

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants purchase of a firearm and ammunition on the same day that he made a threat demonstrates that his threats are more than mere puffery and evidences an intent to carry out the threats
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not, plead an antitrust injury causally linked to Andrx’s alleged anticom-petitive behavior. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Friedman, 83 F.Supp.2d 179, 185-87 (D.D.C.2000) (“Court cannot find that Bio-vail can establish that it has suffered ‘antitrust injury.’ ”). On February 2, 2000 Bio-vail moved for reconsideration under FRCP 60(b) and on February 4, 2000 it filed a notice of appeal (No. 00-5050). The district court subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration and Biovail noticed its appeal of that decision (No. 00-5396) on November 3, 2000. This court granted Biovail’s motion to consolidate the appeals. III. Analysis We give de novo review to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See NRA v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 126 (D.C.Cir.2000); see also Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1507 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). “The complaint should not be dismissed unless

    ### Response:
    holding that antitrust standing is question of law reviewed de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    risk of harm. The depressions in the walkway had been there since it was constructed more than eighteen years ago. Yet, there was no evidence of other falls attributable to this condition. Nor was there evidence of any complaints about this condition. Dietz argues that her own deposition testimony regarding the circumstances of her fall, while not conclusive evidence, constitutes sufficient evidence of the unreasonable risk of harm to defeat summary judgment. We disagree. Standing alone, Dietz’s testimony does no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of an unreasonable risk of harm. We conclude Dietz failed to bring forth evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a condition posing an unreasonable risk of harm. See Brinson, 228 S.W.3d at 163 (<HOLDING>). We, therefore, hold the trial court properly

    ### Response:
    holding the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the premises owner when the evidence showed no one had been injured by the condition in question and the premises owner had received no complaints about the condition in question during a tenyear period
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    elements of the crime. Second, Manuel claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of felony murder because the jury could not have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Peterson was shot “in the perpetration of’ or “in the flight from the perpetration of’ the underlying felony of attempted sale of a controlled substance. Point One Manuel complains that Instruction No. 5, the verdict director for felony murder, failed to submit all of the essential elements of the crime. The State proffered the verdict director for felony murder, and Manuel’s counsel stated that he had no objection to the instruction. Manuel' thus concedes that his allegation of error regarding the instruction is not preserved for appellate review. State v. Vaughn, 11 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Mo.App.W.D. 2000) (<HOLDING>). He nonetheless requests that we review the

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions. Id. at 321-22, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (some internal quotation marks and citations omitted). B Since St. Cyr, lower courts have split over two questions essential to this case: whether reliance must be established objectively, subjectively, or even at all, and whether petitioners who proceed to trial have suffered retroactive effects under § 304(b) of IIRIRA. Following the Third, Fourth, and Sixth ■ Circuits, we .2000) (Alien must have “actually and reasonably relied” on availability of relief for IIRIRA’s repeal of § 212(c) to have retroactive effect); Brooks v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). As discussed in Section II.C below, a

    ### Response:
    holding that the repeal of  212c was not impermissibly retroactive because unlike st cyr petitioner did not so choose to rely upon the agreed upon terms of a plea and because his case did not present the same concerns of quid pro quo benefit for an exchange between a defendant and the government
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case-by-case appraisal aimed at determining whether a particular sentence, when rendered, could fairly be said to have been based on the guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 606 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir.2010) (per curiam); United States v. Franklin, 600 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir.2010). One court of appeals, reading the language of section 3582(c)(2) broadly, has held that a district court has authority to reduce a sentence imposed pursuant to a C-type plea agreement. See United States v. Cobb, 584 F.3d 979, 985 (10th Cir.2009). We begin our analysis with the elementary proposition that a court, within wide limits, should interpret a plea agreement according to principles of contract law. United States v. Ortiz-Santiago, 211 F.3d 146, 151 (1st Cir.2000); cf. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 28 (<HOLDING>). Once a defendant knowingly and voluntarily

    ### Response:
    recognizing certain limits to this analogy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the Court of Appeals on direct review) violated ex post facto principles when it retroactively applied the remedial holding of Booker at his sentencing. We hereby reject this claim for the same reasons stated in Vaughn. In short, there was no ex post facto problem with the District Court’s application of the remedial holding of Booker at sentencing because Fairclough had fair warning that his conduct was criminal, that enhancements or upward departures could be applied to his sentence under the Guidelines based on judicial fact-findings, and that he could be sentenced as high as the statutory maximum of ten (10) years. See Vaughn, 430 F.3d at 524. We see no need to adopt a different rule in this context. See United States v. Austin, 432 F.3d 598, 2005 WL 3317773 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cross, 430 F.3d 406 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not violate ex post facto clause in applying remedial holding of booker at sentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    degradation and that Toyobo’s manufacturing process was not functioning properly); ¶ 67 (alleging that Toyobo omitted from report on Zylon degradation in extreme conditions data reflecting degradation in non-extreme conditions).) These misrepresentations tainted all of the vest manufacturers’ claims for payment from the government, as the government has alleged that “the Zylon fiber [Toyobo] sold for use in Zylon body armor was defective and degraded more quickly than Toyobo and the Zylon Vest Manufacturers represented[,]” and “[a]s a result ..., the United States paid for defective Zylon body armor.” (Id. ¶ 1.) Thus, the complaint states a § 3729(a)(1) claim under a fraudulent inducement theory. See Honeywell, 798 F.Supp.2d at 22, 2011 WL 2672624, at *6; Westrick, 685 F.Supp.2d at 137 (<HOLDING>). The government has set out in detail the

    ### Response:
    holding that government pled sufficiently an fca claim by alleging that defendants misrepresentations about zylon degradation induced the government to pay claims for payment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between the allegations of the complaint, and the focus of Sure-Snap’s plan of reorganization. Id. at 874-75. Further, all such allegations could have and should have been raised in determining the lender’s claim. By providing for the validity and amount of the lender’s claim in the plan, the debtor was barred by res judicata from relitigating the issue post-confirmation. Id.; accord, D & K Properties Crystal Lake v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 1996 WL 224517 at *3 (N.D.Ill.1996), aff'd, 112 F.3d 257, 259 (7th Cir.1997) (parties agreed that elements of res judicata had been satisfied and in the Confirmation Order, the Court found that Defendant had not acted in bad faith in proposing a plan or in resetting the interest rate); Eubanks v. F.D.I.C., 977 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Howe, 913 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir.1990)

    ### Response:
    holding that the lender liability claims of the debtor are precluded by res judicata
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    them a constitutional duty of care. See Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141-42 (2d Cir.1981); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 475-76 (6th Cir.1990); Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir.1993); Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 890-93 (10th Cir.1992); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 796 (11th Cir.1987) (en bane); see also Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 880 (5th Cir.2004) (assuming such a duty); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851-52 (7th Cir.1990) (only reaching duty to place, not duty to monitor). But see Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 871 F.2d 474, 476 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Like such children, Tron not only looked to

    ### Response:
    holding that a state had no affirmative duty to a child placed voluntarily by his parents into foster care since he was in the custody of his foster parents who were not state actors rather than in the states custody
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could conceivably have made efforts to conceal Moore’s scar, this practice might itself have undermined the reliability of the identification by artificially altering Moore’s facial features. In any event, we need not opine on the permissibility or advisability of such precautions. For present purposes, it suffices that the state court reasonably concluded that the police were not required to conceal Moore’s scar. See, e.g., United States v. Holliday, 457 F.3d 121, 126 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting challenge to photo array based on the defendant’s distinctive “skin discoloration”); United States v. Moore, 115 F.3d 1348, 1360 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that photo array was not suggestive despite the defendant’s “distinctive eyebrow”); Taylor v. Swenson, 458 F.2d 593, 596-98 (8th Cir. 1972) (<HOLDING>). Moore relies almost exclusively on United

    ### Response:
    holding that lineup was admissible even where the defendant stood out because of a facial scar and a filed down tooth
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    liberal visitation, was in the children’s best interests. Cf. Hopper v. Hopper, 113 Nev. 1138, 1143-44, recognizing that a lower court may enforce custody provisions pending appeal); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 314 S.E.2d 132, 133 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (providing that a trial court has contempt power while an appeal is pending). 15 While a contempt order is not independently appealable, see Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners, 116 Nev. 646, 5 P.3d 569 (2000), it may be challenged in the context of an otherwise substantively proper appeal. See Consolidated Generator v. Cummins Engine, 114 Nev. 1304, 1312, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998). 16 Cunningham v. District Court, 102 Nev. 551, 559-60, 729 P.2d 1328, 1333-34 (1986). 17 EDCR 5.12(a). 18 Halbrook v. Halbrook, 114 Nev. 1455, 971 P.2d 1262 (1998) (<HOLDING>); see also NRS 125.150(3) (providing that the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a district court has the authority to award attorney fees in postdivorce proceedings involving child custody
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1972, decided March 10, 1972, Pa. Commonwealth Ct., aff’d, 451 Pa. 404, 304 A. 2d 491 (1973), (regarding which tribunals in Pennsylvania enjoy jurisdiction to entertain appeals from decisions of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board regarding municipal and county employees under the Public Employe Relations Act, Act of July 23, 1970, P. L. 563, §1502, as amended, 43 P.S. §1101.1502); see also Hartman v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 409, 295 A. 2d 850 (1972), (regarding which tribunals in Pennsylvania enjoy jurisdiction to entertain appeals de novo from decisions of the Department of Transportation regarding suspension of motor vehicle inspection station licenses). However, cf. Pittsburgh v. P.U. C. and Duquesne Light Company, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 546, 284 A. 2d 808 (1971), (<HOLDING>). We reach this conclusion reluctantly not

    ### Response:
    holding that other statutory procedures incident to appeal set forth in article xi of the public utility law act of may 28 1937 p l 1053 as amended 66 ps 1101 et seq are not repealed by enactment of the aoja
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    965, 975 (3d Cir. 2010)). As we explained in Hughley, “[b]ecause it is well established that the court of last resort for a state or territory is not bound by decisions of its regional federal court of appeals or any other lower federal court — even those interpreting the United States Constitution — but need only follow the United States Supreme Court, the possibility of future review by this Court could provide a justification for the Superior Court to consider [a petitioner’s] habeas corpus petition on the merits,” even where the issues raised in the petition have already been addressed by the Appellate Division and Third Circuit in an appeal taken before this Court’s creation. Hughley, 61 V.I. at 337-38; see also Hodge v. Bluebeard’s Castle, Inc., 62 V.I. 671, 685-92 (V.I. 2015) (<HOLDING>); Hamed v. Hamed, [63 V.I. 529, 534-35 (2015)]

    ### Response:
    holding that this court is not bound by decisions of the appellate division or the third circuit even where those decisions concern the same parties and legal issues
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the contents of the conversation took place was to look for evidence. To do that, the police should have had a warrant. There was no exigency, the tape was not about to leave their possession. Furthermore, Deputy Roed's inspection of the printout's contents constituted a search regardless of whether she was lawfully in possession of the printout. Legal possession of an article does not endow law enforcement officials with any concomitant authority to also search the contents of the article. See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980) (Stevens, J. concurring), (stating that, ""[t]he fact that FBI agents were lawfully in possession of the boxes of film did not give them authority to search their contents.""); United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 959-60 (11th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). Robert Rewolinski had a legitimate

    ### Response:
    holding that an fbi agents investigation of the written contents of a notebook that was lawfully in the possession of the fbi constituted a search that violated the defendants fourth amendment rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st Cir. 1999). Neither the Rhode Island legislature nor the Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet established or recognized the existence of an independent tort for the spoliation of evidence. While both the magistrate judge and the district court judge concluded that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would not create such a tort, we see no need to delve into the unchartered waters of Rhode Island law and endeavor to prophesize whether the Rhode Island Supreme Court would adopt an independent tort for spoliation of evidence. Compare, e.g., Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 437 Mass. 544, 773 N.E.2d 420, 426 (2002) (declining to recognize an independent tort for spoliation of evidence) with Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co., 127 N.M. 729, 987 P.2d 386, 404 (1999) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the magistrate judge and the

    ### Response:
    recognizing a tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discretion. See Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n v. Paige, 462 So.2d 817 (Fla.1985). As we observed in Florida Parole Commission v. Brown, 989 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), an abuse of discretion may be established in various ways, including a showing that the Commission deviated from the legal requirements imposed upon it, such as the obligation to review the inmate’s complete record and to articulate the basis for its decision. In the petition for writ of mandamus filed in the circuit court, Thomas asserted that the Commission had not complied with rules 23-21.0155 or 23-21.0161, Florida Administrative Code, and failed to articulate the basis for its decision. We conclude that this claim stated a basis for relief. See Alday v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 58 So.3d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). Rule 23-21.0155 provides that when the

    ### Response:
    holding that the parole commission is required to state reasons for its finding that an inmate continues to be a poor candidate for parole release
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    process that determines who shall rule and govern in the county. Id. at 469-70, 73 S.Ct. 809. Defendants claim that these cases apply only where the state has provided for a direct primary, whereas New York has opted for an indirect delegate primary election followed by a convention at which those delegates vote on the nomination. This variation in the process of public choice does not release the State from its First Amendment obligations. The animating principle in Classic and Terry is that constitutional protection extends to each State-created or State-endorsed “integral part of the election machinery,” not merely to one particular kind of primary election. Classic, 313 U.S. at 318, 61 S.Ct. 1031; see also Terry, 345 U.S. at 469, 73 S.Ct. 809; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. 849 (<HOLDING>). Consistent with that view, we previously held

    ### Response:
    holding that primary election ballot filing fee violated fourteenth amendment and noting that the primary election may be more crucial than the general election in certain parts of texas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S. E. 2d 613, 615 (1966) (“[The plaintiff] must allege all the elements of a cause of action for the tort the same as would be required if there were no allegation of a conspiracy”); Lesperance v. North American Aviation, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 2d 336, 345, 31 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878 (1963) (“[Conspiracy cannot be made the subject of a civil action unless something is done which without the conspiracy would give a right of action” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Middlesex Concrete Products & Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Assn., 37 N. J. 507, 516, 181 A. 2d 774, 779 (1962) (“[A] conspiracy cannot be made the subject of a civil action unless something has been done which, absent the conspiracy, would give a right of action”); Chapman v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 769, 772 (WD Mo. 1957) (<HOLDING>); Olmsted, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 218

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff who charged the defendants with conspiring to perpetrate an unlawful purpose could not recover because the defendants committed no unlawful act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inmate's infection correctly and advising the inmate on methods to avoid spreading the infection” might suffice to satisfy PHS’s asserted duty), the present appeal also was not allowed to consider protocols for repleading. 18 . The General Assembly has undertaken to prescribe various duties through legislation. See, e.g., 40 P.S. § 1303.504 (reflecting a duty of physicians to obtain informed consent and prescribing limitations on liability for breach). 19 . Accord Program Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Dauphin Cnty. Gen. Auth., 593 Pa. 184, 192, 928 A.2d 1013, 1017-18 (2007) (""[I]t is the Legislature’s chief function to set public policy and the courts' role to enforce that policy, subject to constitutional limitations.”); Naylor v. Twp. of Hellam, 565 Pa. 397, 408, 773 A.2d 770, 111 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 894 P.2d 386,

    ### Response:
    recognizing the legislatures superior ability to examine social policy issues and determine legal standards so as to balance competing concerns
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), prohibits the state’s use of the accused’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The State asked a police detective about a statement Kemp made after his arrest. On cross-examination, Kemp’s counsel asked the police detective about other aspects of Kemp’s statement. During the redirect examination of the police detective, the prosecutor asked Detective Salgado: Q: At some point, sir, in that same conversation with Mr. Kemp, did you.actually come out and ask him questions about the apartment complex parking lot and how Hector Juarez may have gotten in the vehicle with Mr. Kemp. A: Yes, I did. Q: At that point, sir, did Mr. Kemp express reluctance to answer your question about the parking lot? Transcript of June 3,1993, at 87. Kemp’s objection to th 38,1240 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, Kemp’s motion for a mistrial was

    ### Response:
    holding that prejudice from question concerning the treatment of defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity to be cured by immediately sustaining objection and by a curative instruction to the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have clarified the issue for certiorari if the court had done so here. We hold that the court of appeals did not err in declining to hear oral argument. II., REFUSAL TO ADDRESS THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUE 120 On certiorari, Brown argues that the court of appeals erred when it refused to address the merits of the trial court's grant of summary judgment and claimed Brown had not adequately briefed the issue in her initial brief. Brown claims that the merits of the summary judgment, in particu s, 105 N.C.App. 499, 415 S.E.2d 201, 203-04 (1992) (denying appellees' motion to dismiss appellants' reply brief because new issues addressed in appellants' reply brief were in response to issues raised in appel-lees' briefs); The Doctors' Co. v. The Ins. Corp. of Am., 864 P.2d 1018, 1028 (Wyo.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 559

    ### Response:
    holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are recoverable irrespective of the NCP. Gache v. Town of Harrison, N.Y., 813 F.Supp. 1037, 1046 (S.D.N.Y.1993). Weyerhaeuser can be held liable so long as it caused defendants to incur response costs, even if no actual migration of contaminants from the Wolcott Site or Canal D to the Damen Site is shown. See Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R. Co., 78 F.3d 285, 289-90 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 763, 136 L.Ed.2d 710 (1997), (observing that “CERCLA unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facility from which there is a release or threat of release, without regard to causation.”); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1154 (1st Cir.1989) (same); United States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326 (E.D.Pa.1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Weyerhaeuser’s arguments that there is

    ### Response:
    holding that a cercla plaintiff need not directly link acts of each generator defendant to the environmental harm that prompted the cleanup
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be deduced from the high percentage of Mexican-American students attending L.C. Smith and the failure of the freedom-of-choice plan, Plaintiffs contend. Most importantly, Plaintiffs claim that the ability grouping system of RISD is itself a vestige of past discrimination: the district court’s refusal to so find is clearly erroneous. Our review here of the district court’s conclusion that “RISD has been a unitary system for a sufficient period of time that all vestiges have been erased” is controlled by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, which provides that findings of fact “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). United States v. Texas Education Agency, 647 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143, 102 S.Ct. 1002, 71 L.Ed.2d 295 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir.1975)

    ### Response:
    holding clearly erroneous the district courts finding that a 1970 plan had eliminated all vestiges of the previous dual system and created a unitary school
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    245 B.R. 672 (10th Cir. BAP 2000). 13 . See K.S.A. § 40-414; Osment v. Trout (In re Trout’s Estate), 156 Kan. 120, 123, 131 P.2d 640 (1942); see also In re Douglas, 59 B.R. 836, 837 (Bankr.D.Kan.1986); In re Chadwick, 113 B.R. 540, 545 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1990). 14 . 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) & (2) (emphasis added). 15 . 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (emphasis added). 16 . In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981). 17 . § 362(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 18 . In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540, 541 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981). 19 . ""[T]he plan may — ... (9) provide for the vesting of property of the estate, on confirmation of the plan or at a later time, in the debtor or in any other entity....” 20 . In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540, 542 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981) (emphasis added). 21 . In re Johnson, 36 B.R. 958 (Bankr.D.Utah 1983) (<HOLDING>). 22 . In re Root, 61 B.R. 984 (Bankr.D.Colo.

    ### Response:
    holding that the office of recovery services of the utah dept of social services was free to collect its postpetition debt for child support from a tax refund that was not dedicated to the plan and therefore vested in the debtors upon confirmation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Tr. 63). Dale Riley, Assistant Director of the Division of Adult Institutions, described Level I as a modern design with an observation bubble or security control area in each wing where an officer can visually observe all cell doors. The locked doors are controlled from that unit. In contrast, Level II and III are older cell units and there is no comparison with Level I in terms of providing security and observation. (Tr. 120). We are satisfied that the statute and regulations at issue contain neither “particularized substantive standards” to guide decisionmakers, Nash, 781 F.2d at 668, nor “mandatory language requiring decisionmakers to act in a certain way,” id, which would be applicable to an inmate already assigned to administrative segregation. See Williams, 852 F.2d at 378-79 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the district court did not

    ### Response:
    holding that regulations 20121010 20121040 and 20212060 did not contain substantive criteria for the committee to use when deciding whether to reclassify an inmate they merely establish procedures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    group insurance policies); Bass v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.3d 792, 797, 518 P.2d 1147, 1150, 112 Cal.Rptr. 195, 198 (1974) (“[W]e have held that the employer is the agent of the insurer in performing the duties of administering group insurance policies ... and that accordingly the insurer shares responsibility for the employer’s mistakes.”); Caldwell v. United Bus Corp., 177 Cal.App.3d 381, 383-84, 223 Cal.Rptr. 7, 8 (1986) (“The general rule in California is that the employer is merely the agent of the insurer in performing the duties of administering group health insurance policies.”). Other jurisdictions as well have adopted a similar approach to the agency question. See, e.g., Middleton v. The Russell Group, Ltd., 126 N.C.App. 1, 483 S.E.2d 727, 734 (1997) (<HOLDING>), and eases cited therein; Abbiati v. Buttura &

    ### Response:
    holding that an employer who performs administrative functions under a group insurance policy as in the instant case is deemed to be the agent of the insurer citing elfstrom
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to exhaust their tribal remedies before presenting their dispute to the district court.’ ” Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1507 (quoting Texaco Inc. v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374, 1378 (10th Cir.1993)). It is unnecessary, however, for the court to engage in a detailed comity analysis because when none of the recognized exceptions to the doctrine apply, and the dispute concerns a “reservation affair” or the dispute “arises on the reservation” “there is no discretion not to defer” to the tribal courts. Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1507 (quoting Zah, 5 F.3d at 1378). Thus, federal courts may abstain without first analyzing the comity and tribal sovereignty issues discussed in National Fanners. See Potaluck Corp. v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians, No. 99-2051, 2000 WL 1721797, at *2 (D.Kan. Aug.23, 2000)(<HOLDING>); See also Calumet Gaming Group-Kansas, 987

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff a private corporation who had a contract dispute with tribe must exhaust its remedies in the tribal court system before it may raise the same issues in federal court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the SDWA, regardless of whether it ever installs a filtration system. In essence, the water system’s compliance with the avoidance criteria makes the water safe from the EPA’s perspective — a point conceded by the United States at trial. We fail to see how accomplishment of the Act’s substantive goals is undermined by overlooking past violations of regulatory deadlines that have no bearing on the current or future purity of the water delivered to consumers. See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 310, 102 S.Ct. 1798 (noting that purpose of injunctive relief is to deter future violations, not to punish past ones) (citing Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329-30, 64 S.Ct. 587); cf. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 192, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Moreover, given that the

    ### Response:
    holding that district court had discretion under clean water act to determine which form of relief is best suited in the particular case to abate current violations and deter future ones
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    truth or falsity of the statement when a private plaintiff sues a non-media defendant on a private issue. We have held that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity in this situation. El-Khoury v. Kheir, 241 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). We have also held that the defendant bears the burden of proving the statement was substantially true in this situation. Rodriguez v. Printone Color Corp., 982 S.W.2d 69, 73 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); Vice v. Kasprzak, 318 S.W.3d 1, 17 n. 9 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 73.005 (establishing truth of statement in action for libel as a defense) (Vernon 2011); Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>). We do not need to resolve this conflict,

    ### Response:
    holding truth is affirmative defense to slander in suits between private individuals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims are subject to abandonment pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.158(a).... [T]he Secretary correctly argues that appellant’s contention is without legal merit because the abandonment pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.158(a) cannot be set aside or waived on grounds of alleged ignorance of regulatory requirements. The Supreme Court has held that everyone dealing with the Government is charged with knowledge of federal statutes and lawfully promulgated agency regulations. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-85, 68 S.Ct. 1, 3, 92 L.Ed. 10 (1947). Thus, regulations are binding on all who seek to come within their sphere, “regardless of actual knowledge of what is in the [r]egulations or o emonstrate reliance on the allegedly defective denial notices.”); Burks-Marshall, 7 F.3d at 1349 (<HOLDING>). In light of the above discussion, the Court

    ### Response:
    holding that an appellant has no standing to raise a due process issue where he has not shown that the alleged deficiency in the notice had any connection in fact with his own failure to seek review of the denial of his claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supervision, hiring, training, entrustment, and retention are subsumed in her general negligence claim against Bestway. According to Bestway, the court must grant summary judgment in Bestway’s favor as to the negligent supervision, hiring, training, entrustment, and retention claims. The Alabama Supreme Court has not addressed the issue at hand. This court must apply Alabama law to decide the issue. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Alabama recognizes the torts of negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, negligent training, and negligent retention. Bruch v. Jim Walter Corp., 470 So.2d 1141, 1143 (Ala.1985) (outlining elements of negligent entrustment), CP & B Enters., Inc. v. Mellert, 762 So.2d 356, 362 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>), Big B. Inc. v. Cottingham, 634 So.2d 999,

    ### Response:
    recognizing torts of negligent hiring supervision and retention
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exercise our discretion to address the error. The state posits only one reason why we should not correct the error: “[d]espite several opportunities to bring the alleged error to the trial court’s attention— by demurring to the indictment, excepting to the jury instructions, moving for judgment of acquittal or requesting merger at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel failed [to] alert the court below to the error defendant now claims was obvious.” Although defendant’s failure to preserve the error is an appropriate consideration, see Ailes, 312 Or at 382 n 2, we have repeatedly held that, in most circumstances, the state does not have a compelling interest in salvaging multiple convictions when only one is lawful. See, e.g., State v. Donner, 230 Or App 465, 469, 215 P3d 928 (2009) (<HOLDING>). In our view, that is the overriding factor at

    ### Response:
    holding that tgiven that our burden in reviewing and correcting the error is minimal and that sentencing defendant according to the law serves the ends of justice we elect to exercise our discretion to correct the error here
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and $100.00 in process server fees, see Bill of Costs, ECF No. 23-7. Of this total, WMATA contests only the $100.00 process server fees. Def.'s Opp'n at 5 (citing Zdunek v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 100 F.R.D. 689, 692 (D.D.C.1983); Harvey v. Mohammed, 951 F.Supp.2d 47, 73 (D.D.C.2013)). As the plaintiff rightly notes, see PL’s Reply at 10-12, however, the non-binding authority relied upon by WMATA in contesting reimbursement of these costs did not consider tins Court's local rules, which explicitly provide that ""[c]osts of service of summons and complaint” are taxable. LCvR 54.1(d)(2). Consistent with this Court’s local rules, reimbursement of these costs to the plaintiff will be ordered. Accord Law Office G.A. Lambert and Assoc. v. Davidoff, 72 F.Supp.3d 110, 120 (D.D.C.2014) (<HOLDING>); Youssef v. FBI, 762 F.Supp.2d 76, 85

    ### Response:
    holding costs of translating summons and complaint into german necessary to file this complaint and  therefore taxable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “only if the resulting error was not harmless.” United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1048 (11th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted). An error is harmless if it “had no substantial influence on the outcome and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted). Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. Presentation of cumulative evidence exists where testimony of several witnesses would be the same, and one witness’s testimony would be sufficient. See United States v. Haynes, 554 F.2d 231, 234 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Here, even assuming that the testimony of

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    principles outlined here to assess whether Cricket has proven that the class includes more than 100 members. 5 . To the extent Cricket argues that its evidence categorically proves jurisdiction because Scott did not provide any rebuttal evidence, we reject that contention. Although Dart Cherokee states that “both sides submit proof” when a plaintiff challenges removal, 135 S.Ct. at 554, we do not read that to mean that if only one party submits proof it automatically carries the day. Rather, Dart Cherokee clarifies that a motion to remand challenging the amount in controversy reopens the record allowing both parties to submit evidence. When only one party submits evidence, we accept it as uncontroverted but must still test whethe 6 U.S. 500, 515, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis

    ### Response:
    holding that jurisdictional terms are those that congress clearly states as threshold limitations on a statutes scope
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under rules that are designed to serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends they are asserted to promote ... the Constitution permits judges to exclude evidence that is repetitive ... only marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, “ ‘[t]he accused does not have an unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.’ ” Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988)); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even where a district court

    ### Response:
    holding that rules of evidence only infringe on a defendants right to present a defense where they are arbitrary or disproportionate or infringe on a weighty interest of the accused
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    due constituted an act of default. On March 1, 1985, as we have seen, the bank loan was still outstanding, the subordination agreements were in force, and the bank had not given Tri-County consent to pay Culp and Newton. Payment in those circumstances would have violated the subordination agreements. Failure to perform a prohibited act cannot be treated as an event of default. Consequently, the corporation’s failure to pay interest on March 1, 1985, afforded Culp and Newton no immediate basis to sue on the notes. Cf. P.M. Finance Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 302 F.2d 786 (3rd Cir.1962) (observing that a “complete” subordination destroys a creditor’s power to demand payment at a fixed maturity date); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Straile, 23 A.D.2d 363, 260 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1965) (<HOLDING>). Culp and Newton have argued that Tri-County

    ### Response:
    holding in the case of complete subordination that no action lies against the debtor but that a separate action may lie against a guarantor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the case doctrine applies when a defendant is granted a new trial and precludes the defendant from re-litigating the admissibility of evidence when the same issue was already raised and previously decided adversely to the defendant. Commonwealth v. McEnany, 732 A.2d 1263, 1267 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal granted, 562 Pa. 667, 753 A.2d 816 (2000), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 565 Pa. 138, 771 A.2d 1260 (2001). ¶ 9 Under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of law of the case does not have an absolute preclusive effect. Benson v. Benson, 425 Pa.Super. 215, 624 A.2d 644, 647 (1993), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 637, 639 A.2d 22 (1994). Most jurisdictions similarly hold the law of the case doctrine is not an absolute rule. See, e.g., State v. Moeck, 280 Wis.2d 277, 695 N.W.2d 783, 789 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Owen v. State, 862 So.2d 687, 694 (Fla.2003)

    ### Response:
    holding law of case doctrine is not absolute rule that must be inexorably followed in every case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    costs of defense. A jury trial was held in June 1986 to determine the reasonable costs of defense and IFF was awarded $834,913. IFF now seeks to recover its legal costs in connection with defending the declaratory judgment action brought by CU. Discussion It is well settled, under New York law, that an insured may recover the reasonable legal expenses which it incurred in defense of a declaratory judgment action brought by the insurer to free itself from its obligation to defend; however, the expenses incurred in prosecuting claims against the insurer are not recoverable. See Mighty Midgets, Inc. v. Centennial Insurance Co., 47 N.Y.2d 12, 389 N.E.2d 1080, 416 N.Y.S.2d 559 (1979); Johnson v. General Mutual Insurance Co., 24 N.Y.2d 42, 298 N.Y.S.2d 937, 939, 246 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Hurney v. Mattson, 59 A.D.2d 934, 399 N.Y.

    ### Response:
    holding that insured could recover the costs of defending a declaratory judgment action brought by the injured party to compel the insurer to defend but could not recover the costs associated with prosecuting crossclaims against the insurer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    475(c) is not categorically a forgery offense. See Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870, 877 (9th Cir.2008). Therefore, Ramirez’s crime cannot be an aggravated felony under the categorical approach. If a state statute is “categorically broader than the generic definition of a crime,” as here, we then apply the modified categorical approach. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (applying a two-step analysis, using first a categorical approach and then a modified categorical approach). However, because California Penal Code § 475(c) is missing an essential element of the generic forgery offense, we may not analyze this case under a modified categorical approach. Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1073 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, Ramirez has not

    ### Response:
    holding modified categorical approach unavailable where the statute of conviction was missing an element of the generic definition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    abridged in any way. The PCRA court’s ruling is supported by the record and is free of legal error. As noted, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 801 provides -for education and experiential qualifications for defense counsel in capital cases. At issue here are the educational requirements, which mandate “18 hours of training relevant to representation in capital cases, as approved by the Pennsylvania Continuing Legal Education Board.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 801(2)(a). Our June 4, 2004 order adopting Rule 801 utilized “phase-in” language, directing counsel to receive six credits for the time period prior to Attorney Speice’s appointment on September 2, 2005. The parties herein agree that six hours of capital case educational training were required at the tim , 193 (2010) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in

    ### Response:
    holding that a lawyers inexperience in capital cases does not render him presumptively ineffective as inexperience alone is not equivalent to ineffectiveness rather all the elements of an ineffectiveness claim must be satisfied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their allegation that the defendants were required to comply with the unsigned May 31, 2000 IEP, rather than the previous, signed February 3, 2000 IEP. At the time the plaintiffs filed this complaint, the California superior court had issued a ruling enforcing the February 3 rather than the May 31 IEP. The plaintiffs appealed that decision to the California court of appeal and at the same time filed this action. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of this action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because, at the time the plaintiffs’ complaint was filed, the district court could not find in their favor on any of their claims without determining that the California superior court’s decision enforcing the February 3 IEP was wrong. Doe v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine justified

    ### Response:
    holding that rookerfeldman doctrine bars federal determination of claim where the district court must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to sue on the contract rather than being relegated to a cause of action for quantum meruit. Vance, 677 S.W.2d at 482. The doctrine of substantial performance recognizes that the contractor has not completed construction, and therefore is in breach of the contract. Id. Under the doctrine, however, the owner cannot use the contractor’s failure to complete the work as an excuse for non-payment. Atkinson, 270 S.W. at 850. “By reason of this rule a contractor who has in good faith substantially performed a building contract is permitted to sue under the contract, substantial performance being regarded as full performance, so far as a condition precedent to a right to recover thereunder is concerned.” Id. (citing Linch v. Pans Lumber & Grain Elevator Co., 80 Tex. 23, 15 S.W. 208 (1891) (<HOLDING>)). Substantial performance is regarded as a

    ### Response:
    holding that a contractor who had substantially complied with the building specifications substantially performed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the town manager statute in the codification of laws regulating town officers. See 1917 G.L. § 3992 (“[T]he overseer of the poor shall be under the control and direction of the selectmen, and may, for cause, be removed by them.”). And the term was recognized by the courts as placing a limit on the discretion of employers to terminate employment at will. See Rutter, 89 Vt. at 26, 93 A. at 848 (stating that under city charter that requires cause for removal “there must be something which in law amounts to incapacity, negligence or bad conduct, to sustain the removal”). The Legislature continues to use the term “for cause” as a limit on an employer’s removal power, even absent use of the word “only.” See, e.g., Turnley v. Town of Vernon, 2013 VT 42, ¶¶ 13-19, 194 Vt. 42, 71 A.3d 1246 (<HOLDING>). Clearly the Legislature was cognizant of the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that 24 vsa  1931a which states that officers shall hold office during good behavior unless sooner removed for cause authorizes town to remove police chief only for cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Moreover, the fact that Manigault bent from the waist and turned after King’s bullet struck him did not make it unreasonable for Martinez to fire his weapon at a nearly simultaneous time. Thus, no genuine issues of material fact exist over whether the officers used deadly force in an objectively unreasonable manner. In addition, the Manigaults’ claim that the officers approached them son in a way that violated his Fourth Amendment rights must fail. Although the officers were trained to maintain a distance of at least 21 feet when facing a suspect carrying a knife, their abandonment of this protocol cannot form the basis for a remedy under § 1983 or deprive them of qualified immunity. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 119, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194, 104

    ### Response:
    holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the court. Mussivand, 544 N.E.2d at 270. The existence of a duty “depends upon the foreseeability of harm: if a reasonably prudent person would have on take an affirmative action to aid or protect another, unless there is a “special and definite” relationship between the parties. Id. (citing Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1319 (1997)). However, the government must exercise reasonable care in performing responsibilities it has assumed and “conform to the standards which it sets for itself.” Dreyer v. United States, 349 F.Supp. 296, 305 (N.D.Ohio 1972), aff'd sub nom. Freeman v. United States, 509 F.2d 626 (6th Cir.1975); see also Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.1967) (“It is now well es Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). In Freeman, the Sixth Circuit held that

    ### Response:
    holding that the faa controllers fully performed their duty to the plaintiffs based on what they knew and should have known about a planes lack of deicing equipment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir.1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The determination of a traditional “market rate” is especially pro blematic in the context of claims brought under the BLBA and the LHWCA, in view of their general prohibition of fee agreements between counsel and prospective claimants. See 38 U.S.C. § 928(e); 20 C.F.R. § 802.203(f); Cox, 602 F.3d at 290 (observing that “[t]he highly regulated markets governed by fee-shifting statutes are undoubtedly constrained and atypical”). However, despite such difficulties, a prevailing market rate still must be determined in BLBA and LHWCA cases before the relevant agency adjudicator may decide an attorney’s reasonable hourly rate. Cox, 602 F.3d at 290; see also Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (<HOLDING>). Although Eastern challenges the reliability

    ### Response:
    holding that reasonable fees must be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    colluding with her or providing her with false information about the incident, to use concerns about his diabetic condition as a pretext for removing him from the public-works program. Finally, Davis asserted that there were similarly situated, non-homosexual, insulin-dependant diabetic inmates who participated in the public-works program and who were allowed to continue working in the program after this incident. The combined effect of these alleged facts, taken as true at this stage of the litigation, lead us to conclude that Davis has stated a plausible claim that he was improperly removed from the public-works program based upon the defendants’ anti-gay animus. Dismissal of this claim was improper. See Johnson v. Enable, 862 F.2d 314 (table), 1988 WL 119136, at *1 (4th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The district court mistakenly relied on a

    ### Response:
    holding that a prisoner stated a valid equal protection claim when he alleged he was denied a work assignment because of his sexual orientation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    through his lawful deputy” (Doc. 26 at 9; see id. at 2), and Garcia-Contreras does not contest this {see Doc. 29 at 6-7). This is consistent with the parties' indications that service was accomplished through personal delivery. (See, e.g., Doc. 4 at 5 (referring to ""the delivery of the complaint ... to the Plaintiff”).) Because the court's resolution of this claim rests ultimately upon the timing, not the manner, of service, the manner of service is not dispositive. 16 . To the extent Defendants’ position relies upon the assumption that only communications with the consumer can constitute ""collection of the debt,” they have not provided any authority to support it and it is contrary to case law. Cf., e.g., Edeh v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 748 F.Supp.2d 1030, 1035-36 (D.Minn.2010) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, No. 10-3441, 413 Fed. Appx. 925, 2011

    ### Response:
    holding that reporting a consumers debt to a creditreporting agency constitutes collection of the debt under  1692gb
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). An employee working in a “bona fide administrative capacity” is someone: (1) Compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $455 per week ...; (2) Whose primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers; and (3) Whose primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a) (emphasis added); see also Foster v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir.2013). An employee who satisfies all three elements falls within this “administrative exemption.” See Renfro v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 497 F.3d 573, 576 (“Renfro II”) (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Although the parties do not dispute that

    ### Response:
    holding that an employer must establish all three elements of the defense with regard to its employees in order to prevail
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    revealed sufficient evidence to confirm the original allegation of [sic] Mr. Bhatt and several supervisor’s [sic] destroying or dismissing citations. This investigation found, however, insufficient evidence to prove or disprove the allegations linking Mr. Bhatt or anyone else to criminal activity in obtaining illegal monetary benefits.” Calix, the author of the report, however, testified, “[A] ticket that’s destroyed in the sense I wrote it down meaning V, 2003 WL 21750608, at *3-*6 (Tex. App.-Austin Jul. 30, 2003, pet. denied) (mem.op.) (stating there was legally insufficient evidence plaintiffs subjective belief — that the conduct she reported violated the law — was objectively reasonable); Duvall v. Tex. Dept, of Human Servs., 82 S.W.3d 474, 482-83 (TexApp.-Austin 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Terrell, 18

    ### Response:
    holding there was no evidence a reasonably prudent employee in similar circumstances would have believed facts reported by plaintiff were a violation of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    428 N.E.2d 656, 661 (Ind.Ct.App.1981)). While we do not approve of Safety's failure to acknowledge Cinergy's letters, given the facts of this case, including the fact that Safety had issued excess umbrella policies that would not be implicated until after the primary and umbrella policies, we cannot conclude that Safety's silence equated to an express denial of coverage. Therefore, we must conclude that the trial court erred by concluding that Safety waived its right to arbitrate by failing to respond to Cinergy's letters. See, eg., Protective Ins., 428 N.E.2d at 661 (noting that ""the failure of [the insurance company] to respond to the demand to defend letter is not evidence that [the insurance company] intended to waive its right to deny coverage""); see also MPACT, 802 N.E.2d at 910 (<HOLDING>). In addition, we agree that Safety did not act

    ### Response:
    holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ranged from 6 to 9.2 ounces.” WP Art. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 . Bassolino faces an additional hurdle in reaching even this contingency, as he claims to have purchased a product — chicken fingers. — -that is identified in neither the Press Release (which refers only to chicken tenders), DCA Rpt. at 2, nor the Moll Affidavit (which refers to chicken legs, chicken thighs, rotisserie chicken halves, split chicken breasts, and wing buckets), Moll Aff., Ex. A, as a product tested by the DCA. Plaintiffs' counsel conceded at argument that chicken fingers and tenders are ""different form[s] of producéis]” that are ""marketed differently.” Tr. 19-20; cf. White City Shopping Ctr., LP v. PR Restaurants LLC, 21 Mass.L.Rptr. 565, 2006 WL 3292641 (Mass.Super.Ct. Oct. 31, 2006) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs’ argument that it can be inferred

    ### Response:
    holding that tacos burritos and quesadillas are not sandwiches
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on vagueness grounds. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2320, 183 L.Ed.2d 234 (2012). It follows, therefore, that because the Guidelines are “equivalent” to regulations, which are subject to constitutional challenges such as vagueness, the Guidelines should also be subject to vagueness challenges. Indeed, the Supreme Court has resolved both constitutional challenges to the Guidelines as a whole and individual Guidelines provisions. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (upholding Guidelines as constitutional, not an excessive delegation of legislative power or a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992) (<HOLDING>). And in Stinson, the Court explained that

    ### Response:
    holding that the governments refusal to file a substantialassistance motion under ussg  5k11 is subject to judicial review for unconstitutional motive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a class be treated the same, unless the creditor who is being treated less favorably agrees to less favorable treatment.”). Thus, the Amended Plan satisfies 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122 and 1123(a). Further, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b), the Amended Plan properly preserves the Debtor’s ability to prosecute the Adversary Proceeding. See In re Tex. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 52 F.3d 1330, 1335 n. 4 (5th Cir.1995) (explaining that a debt- or may retain post-confirmation causes of action if the plan so provides). However, to the extent that the Amended Plan makes a blanket reservation of causes of action that may be pursued by the Debtor, these generic causes of action may not be preserved. See Dynasty Oil & Gas, LLC v. Citizens Bank (In re United Operating, LLC), 540 F.3d 351, 355-56 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in this particular respect, the Amended

    ### Response:
    holding that a debtor must make a specific and unequivocal reservation of claims that would effectively put its creditors on notice of any claim it wishes to pursue after confirmation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    103. Because plaintiffs simultaneously filed a request for release of lien and an administrative claim for damages, the government argues they failed to file a proper request for certificate of release “prior” to filing their administrative claim for damages. As such, the government argues plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because their administrative claim for damages did not literally include a copy of a request for a certificate of release filed in accordance with § 401.6325-1©. The standard for taxpayer compliance with the statutory and regulatory requirements is high. See Venen, 38 F.3d at 103 (failure to petition IRS correctly constitutes failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. United States, 28 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Veglia v. United States, 1996 WL 392159, *3-4

    ### Response:
    recognizing harsh result but holding that taxpayer who addressed letter to revenue officer rather than district director as required by regulation failed to petition irs correctly and thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the child’s dependence upon her.” Id. at 75-76 (citing Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal.App.3d 206, 169 Cal.Rptr. 282 (1980)). ¶ 17. As with Mississippi’s premises liability and teacher liability doctrines, California’s spousal liability is based on the foreseeability of the husband or wife’s behavior. “[WJhere a child is sexually assaulted in the defendant wife’s home by her husband, the wife’s duty of reasonable care to the injured child depends on whether the husband’s behavior was ented evidence that she had reported to her teacher that she had been slapped, scratched, and kicked by her classmates in the past, creating a jury issue of whether her teacher should have foreseen her being injured by her classmates. Summers, 759 So.2d at 1214 (¶ 48); see also Doe, 930 S.W.2d at 927 (<HOLDING>). ¶21. In contrast, Perlman had known Adkins

    ### Response:
    holding evidence granddaughter told her grandmother she was being molested by her grandfather was sufficient to raise factual issue about grandmothers knowledge of husbands sexual activities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the ordinary course of the business of the partnership.” N.Y.Ptnrship L. § 24. The liability of any partner is limited to wrongful acts occurring “while the defendant was a partner”, Halperin v. Edwards and Hanly, 430 F.Supp. 121, 125 (E.D.N.Y.1977). Thus, before a defendant may be found liable for the acts of his partners it must be found: (1) that the partner committed the acts at issue in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership and (2) that the defendant was a partner at the time the acts were committed. Because the nature of their liability is joint and several, it has been held that a partner is not an indispensible party in an action naming other partners or the partnership as parties defendant. See Cone Mills Corp. v. Hurdle, 369 F.Supp. 426, 438 (N.D.Miss.1974) (<HOLDING>). Instead, it has been held that a plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding that all partners are not indispensible parties defendant where state law provides for partners joint and several liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (observing that “[i]dentification of the source of [ballot referendum] advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected”). Citizens United only confirmed the breadth of Congress’ power in this regard. See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 915 (“Even if the ads only pertain to a commercial transaction, the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election”); see also Doe v. Reed, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2819-22, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010) (upholding disclosure requirement for petition signatories); Natn’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 70 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). C Real Truth advances several other reasons

    ### Response:
    holding that state express advocacy definition without an electioneering communication limitation was not vague
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the technical complications. The judgment, however, should have complied with the technicalities, that is, it should have been entered in the name of the actual plaintiff. 5 . Even if the law were otherwise, the right to a setoff here would be far from clear. Mr. Bozeman and General Motors were not joint tortfeasors. See D’Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So.2d 424, 435 (Fla.2001) (treating person who caused wreck and crashworthiness defendant as successive, not joint, tortfea-sors). Setoffs generally are available only with respect to joint tortfeasors. See, e.g., Ellingson v. Willis, 170 So.2d 311, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964), overruled on other grounds, Devlin v. McMannis, 231 So.2d 194 (Fla.1970); see also Gordon v. Marvin M. Rosenberg, D.D.S., P.A., 654 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>). If damages were indivisible, these defendants

    ### Response:
    holding that settlement with one defendant could not be setoff from verdict against second defendant where the claims were separate and distinct ie involving different elements of damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    who had not filed a notice of appearance as co-counsel, attended the hearing on behalf of Coutts. Nevertheless, the hearing proceeded as scheduled. When the trial court inquired of coverage counsel if he was prepared to present evidence, coverage counsel stated to the court: “This can be decided as a matter of law.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Coutts’s motion. On appeal, Coutts maintains, inter alia, that the trial court erred because it failed to afford the appellant an evidentia-ry hearing. This argument is without merit, as Coutts’s coverage counsel affirmatively advised the court that no eviden-tiary hearing was necessary and that the issue could be decided as a matter of law. See Pope v. State, 441 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.1983) (<HOLDING>); Behar v. Southeast Banks Trust Co., N.A., 374

    ### Response:
    holding that a party may not invite error and then be heard to complain of that error on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    protect its interest by “do[ing] and pay[ing] whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property and the Lender’s rights in the property ....” Nothing in these terms requires the lender to purchase the cheapest insurance or the insurance that provides the most value for the borrower. Thus, Standard Mortgage did not act on Robinson’s behalf when it force-placed insurance coverage; it acted to protect its oum interest in the mortgaged property—an interest that Robinson threatened by breaching her own contractual duty to maintain insurance coverage. So although Robinson sprinkles her complaint with the “kickback” label, the commissions and portfolio monitoring that SM Insurance provided to Standard Mortgaged were “not. ,kickback[s] in any meaningful sense.” Cohen, 735 F.3d at 611 (<HOLDING>); see also Feaz, 745 F.3d at 1111 (agreeing

    ### Response:
    holding that commission paid to mortgage lenders affiliate for forceplacing insurance was not a kickback when the lender was subject to an undivided loyalty to itself and it made this clear from the start
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days of any discrete act of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). The latest date on which Plaintiff learned definitively of her impending termination was October 5, 2005, the date of a second letter Defendant sent to Plaintiff. That letter clearly and unequivocally told Plaintiff that her position would be eliminated and that she could be re-employed by Defendant through a 60-day bidding process. The letter dated October 5, 2005, if not the earlier letter relaying the same message on September 28, 2005, was the adverse employment action that triggered the running of the 300-day statute of limitations. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The fact that Plaintiff did not have evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). With this caveat in mind and after careful review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly ruling that the plaintiffs’ claims were not frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, groundless, or brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. All defendants initially argued the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims were frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, and brought in bad faith based on the immunity provided by HCQIA and TMPA. But, not all of the plaintiffs’ claims relied upon actions allegedly taken in the context of a peer review or medical committee; therefore, any immunity under HCQIA and TMPA did not entirely shield the defendants from liability. See Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 738 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Jeung, 264 F.Supp.2d at 574 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that allegations of refusal to provide coverage and that other physicians openly attacked plaintiffdoctors before nurses and in neurosurgical group meetings cannot be brought within hcqias immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    minor changes the record shows [the trial court] signed virtually every order and judgment Joseph tendered."" Id. at 10. As noted above, we presume that the trial court is unbiased. Leo must demonstrate more than that the trial court entered rulings adverse to him because adverse rulings do not constitute bias per se. As for the alleged ex parte communication, the communication occurred in relation to an incidental issue in the case, ie., a temporary restraining order preventing Leo from canceling the health insurance of his siblings, not a determination of whether Josephine is in need of a guardian, which was the ultimate issue. Leo did not demonstrate any prejudice or actual personal bias resulting from this communication. C.J. Harrison v. Anderson, 300 F.Supp.2d 690 (S.D.Ind.2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant demonstrated actual bias where the murder victim had made allegations concerning the trial court prior to her death the trial court had a personal interest in protecting his name and the countys judiclary and the trial court made rulings calculated to remove any mention of himself or implication of his alleged wrongdoing from the defendants defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their cumulative impacts. Even if the fire-lines had only a small impact, “[cjumula-tive impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.” 40 C.F.R. 1508.7 Further, the Forest Service fails to explain how such post-fire “rehabilitation” could eliminate the effects from the construction and existence of the fire-lines. As plaintiffs expert demonstrated, and the Forest Service does not dispute, “[flirelines cause significant and persistent reductions in soil productivity via elevated erosion, compaction and the removal of all organic matter, which is critical to soil productivity.” (See AR 8772 [Rhodes Declaration] ¶ 18.) Such significant effects must be disclosed within the EIS. See City of Carmel, 123 F.3d at 1160 (<HOLDING>). The Forest Service also asserts that the

    ### Response:
    holding that eis must provide a useful analysis of the cumulative impacts of past present and future projects
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of protection for ""free citizens” from the rights accorded pretrial detainees (under the Fourteenth Amendment) and criminal convicts (under the Eighth Amendment). See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843, 118 S.Ct. at 1715. 4 . This statement has led at least one court to refer to Justice Rehnquist's reasoning, specifically his reliance on the Fourth Amendment’s text, as only adopted by a plurality. See Lamont v. Woods, 948 E.2d 825, 835 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that ""[t]o a plurality of the Court, the use of the phrase ‘the people’ suggested that the Framers of the Constitution intended the amendment to apply only to ■those persons who were part of or substan tially connected to the national community”). But it does not throw Chief Justice Rehnquist’s holding,, that only aliens 329 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087,

    ### Response:
    holding that a foreign citizen with no substantial connections to the us has no claim under the fifth amendments takings clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not state an actionable claim for a deprivation of equal protection under the ADA. See Manning v. N.M. Energy, Minerals & Natural Res. Dep’t, 2006-NMSC-027, ¶ 45, 140 N.M. 528, 144 P.3d 87 (“The ADA provides [a] remedy . . . when a state violates the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving an individual of . . . equal protection[.]”); Fofey v. Horton, 1989-NMSC-061, ¶ 8, 108 N.M. 812, 780 P.2d 638 (stating that an equal protection claim requires the plaintiff to allege or otherwise demonstrate that the at-issue conduct constituted impermissible state action). {37} Furthermore, the district court’s mere adjudication of Mr. Firstenberg’s lawsuit does not constitute “state action” within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. See King v. King, 174 P.3d 659, 671 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Insofar as the United States Supreme Court in

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a state courts adjudication  of private rights is not sufficient state action in the sense necessary to implicate constitutional protections
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, breaking of limbs, denial of food and water, and threats to rape or otherwise harm relatives. The security forces killed many of their torture victims and mutilated their bodies before returning them to the victims’ families. There are persistent reports that the families are made to pay for the costs of the execution, before the bodies are returned to them. Iraqi refugees arriving in Europe often reported instances of torture to the receiving governments and — as was the case with a group of refugees arriving in Italy in June — displayed scars and mutilations to substantiate their claims. The BIA must take this into consideration when assessing whether an applicant qualifies under the Convention. Cf. Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Al-Saher was informed that if he told anyone

    ### Response:
    holding that iraqi petitioner who failed to establish past persecution nonetheless had a wellfounded fear of future persecution because evidence of country conditions supported the conclusion that the iraqi government would persecute as traitors any evacuees who returned to iraq
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Turnover Action against the Debtor’s law firm were taken in his official capacity on behalf of the bankruptcy estate and within the scope of his statutory duties to investigate, collect assets and property of the estate, and seek turnover of materials relating to the Debtor’s financial affairs and interests. C. Conclusion The essence of GKH’s contention that the Trustee acted ultra vires or outside the scope of his authority is that the Trustee acted improperly or even wrongfully in filing the Avoidance and Turnover Actions without a reasonable legal basis. However, a showing that the Trustee’s actions were wrongful or improper “does not equate to a transgression of his authority.” Cutright, 2012 WL 1945703, at *8; see also McDaniel v. Blust, 668 F.3d 153, 157 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); Satterfield, 700 F.3d at 1236 (refusing to

    ### Response:
    holding barton applied to claims that counsel for the trustee sought court orders to obtain irrelevant personal income tax records because the actions even if wrongful were taken in the context of attempting to prove the adversary action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that just as the IJ may not rely on his or, her own speculation and conjecture, neither may the IJ rely on the speculation and conjecture of a government report. The conclusions in Agent Schultz’s report derive from his analysis of general trends and conditions in Sri Lanka, not from individualized facts about Suntharalinkam or the evi dence presented before the IJ. Moreover, the IJ must conduct an individualized credibility analysis, and it is improper to rely exclusively on a general assertion in a government report to declare an applicant not credible. See Ge, 367 F.3d at 1126 (to the extent that the IJ relied on blanket statements in the State Department report regarding detention conditions in China, the IJ’s finding was not sufficiently individualized); Shah, 220 F.3d at 1069 (<HOLDING>). Here, Schultz bases his conclusion that

    ### Response:
    holding that the ij may not rely on a factually unsupported assertion in a state department report to deem an applicant not credible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    imaginary, or frivolous.” Id. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered. Id. We will not affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment unless the evidence could not support any reason able inference in favor of the non-movant. Id. Summary judgment is seldom appropriate in employment discrimination cases because such cases inherently require the resolution of factual disputes that turn on inferences, rather than direct evidence, of discriminatory animus. Id. However, if a defendant can establish that an essential element of a discrimination claim cannot be established as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. ITT Commercial, 854 S.W.2d at 381 (<HOLDING>). Analysis Fuchs asserts three points on

    ### Response:
    holding that defending party may establish a right to summary judgment by showing that the plaintiff after an adequate period of discovery has not been able to produce and will not be able to produce evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of any one of the claimants elements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty. A statement is false if untrue when made and then known to be untrue by the person making it or causing it to be made. Govt. Sug. Jury Instr. No. 27-28 (emphasis supplied). The district court denied both of Roster’s good faith defense instructions, concluding that the “knowledge” element of the mail fraud and false statement charges encompassed any good faith defense. We agree with the district court’s conclusion. An action taken in good faith is the other side of an action taken knowingly. United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257, 265 (7th Cir.1986); cf. Brimberry, 961 F.2d at 1291 (<HOLDING>). On the mail fraud charges, the district

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts instructions requiring the jury to find that the defendant acted willfully to convict on income tax evasion necessarily encompassed the defendants theory on good faith reliance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the officer’s unlawful conduct (e.g., an unconstitutional search or arrest). The evidence must be such that it would not have been obtained but for the unlawful conduct of the investigating officer. We are of the opinion that G.S. 15A-974(2) requires, at a minimum, this sort of causal connection between violations of Chapter 15A and the evidence objected to if such evidence is to be suppressed. In so holding, we do not decide that a mere “cause in fact” or “but-for” relationship is sufficient ipso facto to require exclusion of evidence obtained as a consequence of substantial violations of Chapter 15A. In certain cases, intervening circumstances might “dissipate the taint” of unlawfulness so that such evidence would be admissible at trial. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, supra (<HOLDING>). We leave all such decisions to future cases.

    ### Response:
    holding admissible certain evidence which would not have been obtained but for violations of constitutional requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discharge claim. 2. The district court did not err by granting summary judgment to Caldwell on Sorenson’s retaliatory discharge claim, because he did not raise a triable issue of fact regarding a causal link between his involvement in a protected activity and an adverse employment action. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding a plaintiff must show the following for a prima facie case of retaliation: “(1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action and (3) a causal link between the two”). Sorenson did not allege facts showing that his age-discrimination complaint was a but-for cause of any adverse employment action. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2534, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (<HOLDING>); Hard-age v. CBS Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 1177,

    ### Response:
    holding the third element of the test requires a plaintiff to show that his or her protected activity was a butfor cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    55, 604 N.E.2d 117, 119 (1992); Kappel v. Fisher Bros., 6th Ave. Corp., 39 N.Y.2d 1039, 387 N.Y.S.2d 251, 355 N.E.2d 305, 306 (1976)). Such limitation of liability stems from “the basic common-law principle that ‘an owner or general contractor [sh]ould not be held responsible for the negligent acts of others over whom [the owner or general contractor] had no direction or con trol.’ Ross, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49, 618 N.E.2d at 88 (quoting Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Coiy., 44 NY.2d 290, 405 NY.S.2d 630, 376 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (1978)). Liability in the absence of direction or control over the worksite may attach only where the person to be charged in fact caused the defective condition giving rise to injury. See Murphy v. Columbia Univ., 4 A.D.3d 200, 773 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (N.Y.App.Div. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Here, the record demonstrates clearly that

    ### Response:
    holding that proof of control was not required where the injury arose from the condition of the work place created by or known to the contraetor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the same amount of money if Husband opts to increase his disability benefits, thereby decreasing his military retirement, (2) calls for direct payment by the Military Finance Center where the parties were not. married for ten years during Husband’s military service, and (3) provides for retained jurisdiction to supervise and enforce the payment of military retirement pay. The Trial Court denied the motion for new trial on November 20, 2002. Husband appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 5 Because a divorce action is one of equitable cognizance, a trial court has discretion to divide the marital estate. Teel v. Teel, 1988 OK 151, ¶ 7, 766 P.2d 994, 998. We will not disturb a trial court’s order dividing marital property unless we find the court abused its discretion or that its (N.M.App.2000) (<HOLDING>); and Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 894

    ### Response:
    holding that federal law does not prohibit a marital settlement agreement which provides for indemnification if husband takes voluntary action to reduce wifes share of military retirement benefits as along as the disability benefits are not specified as the source of the payments to wife
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    notified of infringement rests on the alleged infringer. To the extent that Newbridge contends that it was not put on notice of infringement, the Court likewise rejects Newbridge’s contention, as the record demonstrates otherwise. (See e.g. Tr. 1218-1219, 1487-1489, 3220-3222, 3266, PX 839). In addition to the foregoing failure to investigate and/or obtain valid opinions of counsel, the Court notes the existence of other aggravating factors against New-bridge including the prolonged nature of Newbridge’ infringement (Tr. 1487, 1816, 2967), its failure to discontinue its infringement once notified of Lucent’s law suit, and its failure to take remedial action to remedy its alleged infringement. See e.g. Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1328 (Fed.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Based on the jury’s findings of willful

    ### Response:
    holding that enhanced damages and attorneys fees are appropriate where the district court found that the infringer did not procure a patent search and continued to manufacture and sell infringing products after the law suit was filed against it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The district court denied Wade’s subsequent 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habe-as corpus petition and we affirm. 1. We assume, as does the respondent warden, that the introduction at trial of Wade’s co-defendant’s statements violated the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (“Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are ... testimonial under even a narrow standard.”). But, “[hjabeas relief on a trial error claim is appropriate only if the error results in ‘actual prejudice.’ ” Hall v. Haws, 861 F.3d 977, 991 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Davis v. Ayala, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2197, 192 L.Ed.2d 323 (2015)); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Wade has not demonstrated that the trial

    ### Response:
    holding that confrontation clause violations are subject to harmless error review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    homestead exemption, even though the title of the property is held by a revocable trust. In the case at hand, Mary is the trustee and one of the beneficiaries of the Mary D. Fitton Revocable Trust. She is also the person who formed the trust. The property in question is her principal place of residence. She was married at all times pertinent to the mortgage and conveyances at issue. Relying on the reasoning in Richardson, and case law from this court relied upon therein, we hold that, according to the facts presented, Mary Fitton was entitled to a homestead exemption even though the title to the property was held by her trust. Furthermore, the fact that the trust holds the property as a tenant in common does not affect the outcome. See Simpson v. Biffle, 63 Ark. 289, 38 S.W. 345 (1896) (<HOLDING>). As for the Bank of Little Rock’s argument

    ### Response:
    holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    while working for The District at Project Forward.” (Plaintiffs Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 7.) But Thomas’s position at Project Forward, another program in the District where Thomas was employed before the STAR Academy, is irrelevant. Moreover, by her own testimony, plaintiff knew before she even began working at the STAR Academy that plaintiff was explicitly told that he was not a supervisor at Project Forward and that he should not hold himself out to be. Plaintiff argues in the alternative that even if Thomas was not a supervisor, he “masqueraded” as one. But if plaintiff erroneously thought that Thomas had some supervisory role in relation to her, her belief was not clearly reasonable, and cannot create liability for the district. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (<HOLDING>). There is no evidence in the record from which

    ### Response:
    holding that in cases where there is a false impression that the actor was a supervisor when he in fact was not the victims mistaken conclusion must be a reasonable one
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    made some positive efforts in collecting rebates which should be commended. At this juncture, the most pertinent issue is how best to expend Federal Defendants’ limited resources to accomplish the purpose of the Court’s decrees-the enforcement of the regulatory duties. This suit comes at a time of frugal federal budgets and limited resources for federal officials. Doubtless the conservation of these resources will assist them in fulfilling their regulatory duties generally and more specifically the ones at issue in this suit. Finally, if for no other reason, compensatory sanctions are inappropriate because competent proof of the amount of losses and attorney fees have not been submitted to the Court. See O’Connor v. Midwest Pipe Fabrications, Inc., 972 F.2d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Gen. Signal Corp. v. Donallco, Inc., 787 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that monetary sanction was not supportable as a compensatory civil contempt sanction because there was no proof of the amount of loss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the blood draw was reasonable under a general Fourth Amendment balancing test outside of any exception. Finally, it argues that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless blood draw, namely, the difficulty that the law enforcement officers would have faced obtaining a warrant late at night when tasked with investigating a large-scale fatality accident. a. Whether the Texas implied-consent statute is its own exception to the warrant requirement The State argues that the Transportation Code provides its own exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have rejected the contention that a statute may create a per se exception to a warrant requirement. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561-63 (<HOLDING>); Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d at 797-800 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). a. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to convict Connelly of the false statement charge. A rational jury could have concluded that (a) E.J.R.C. was truthful when she testified that Connelly threatened her with jail if she did not perform oral.sex; (b) Connelly, an experienced police officer and former tribal prosecutor, fully understood the FBI agents’ questions; and (c) Connelly was not credible because his statements to Agent Kimball and Agent Smiedala about whether he threatened E.J.R.C. with jail were inconsistent. See, e.g., Selby, 557 F.3d at 978 (<HOLDING>). b. Moreover, we find no inconsistency between

    ### Response:
    holding a rational jury was entitled to conclude that a government officials misstatement regarding her husbands employment was not an inadvertent mistake
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of exceptional circumstances ordinarily required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(b). See, e.g., White v. General Services Administration, 652 F.2d 913, 915-16 (9th Cir.1981). Morse argues that § 706(f)(5) should not be construed to authorize reference to a magistrate when neither side wants the reference. The court disagrees. The statute calls for the judge “to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5). If the case cannot be scheduled for trial within 120 days after issue has been joined, the judge has the discretion to appoint a master. Id. Nothing in Title VII conditions this authority on the consent of the parties. See, e.g., Brown v. Wesley’s Quaker Maid, Inc., 771 F.2d 952, 954-55 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 116, 93

    ### Response:
    holding that magistrates findings following a nonconsensual reference of a title vii ease are reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    law, our review is de novo. See, e.g., State Police Ass’n of Mass. v. Comm’r, 125 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.1997). Persons subject to the federal estate tax are required to file estate tax returns within fixed time parameters. I.R.C. § 6075. If such a person fails to file an estate tax return in a timeous manner, he has the burden of showing “that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.” Id. § 6651(a)(1). In the absence of such a showing, “there shall be added to the amount required to be shown as tax on such return” a late-filing penalty. Id. Imposition of this penalty is mandatory unless the failure to file on time was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. See Comm’r v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219, 224, 64 S.Ct. 511, 88 L.Ed. 684 (1944) (<HOLDING>); Plunkett v. Comm’r, 118 F.2d 644, 649 (1st

    ### Response:
    holding latefiling penalty mandatory absent reasonable cause under a similarly worded predecessor statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is insufficient ground for diversion from the presumption set forth in Holmes. The trial court is afforded the discretion to determine whether a sufficient showing has been made to necessitate questioning by the court on whether juror exposure actually transpired. Pure conjecture that jurors might inadvertently violate admonitions not to read outside newspaper articles is insufficient to require court ex- animation of the jurors. See People v. Green, 323 Mich. 128, 35 N.W.2d 142 (1948). The Holmes presumption is sufficient to permit the trial court to deny a request to question the jury unless the court has reason to believe that such inquiry would be fruitful. See United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 686 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39, 50 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). IV The majority finds that the reasonable

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court not required to conduct a voir dire on counsels unsubstantiated suspicion where issue was whether jurors had overheard any part of a bench conversation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on which he relied is barred “from seeking relief pursuant to FDUTPA, as he acted unreasonably.” Rosa v. Amoco Oil Co., 262 F.Supp.2d 1364, 1368 (S.D.Fla.2003). Here, the terms of the reinstated contract are inconsistent with the alleged misrepresentations upon which the Buyer supposedly relied. The contract provided that TRG made no representations regarding governmental approvals and expressly re moved any references to the “Intended Use” of 218 units for the property. As such, the Buyer could not justifiably rely on any representations from TRG concerning governmental approvals and the number of units that could be built on the property. The trial court should have granted TRG’s motion for a directed verdict. See St. Joseph’s Hosp. v. Cowart, 891 So.2d 1039, 1042 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion for directed verdict should be granted if there is no evidence on which a jury could legally base a verdict for damages against the moving party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the initial inquiry, it likewise cannot be rewarded for engaging in the most cursory of investigations into this child's heritage, notwithstanding Mother’s unequivocal assertions that Father was an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation. I construe the events following that initial response from Cherokee Nation as Appellants’ good-faith reliance on the tribe’s representations that Baby Girl was not Cherokee and ICWA was not applicable. Ignoring the bonding that occurred here is simply ignoring the reality of this case. 72 . By way of supplemental citation, Father contends Mother’s preference that Baby Girl be placed with Appellants is, standing alone, insufficient to constitute good cause warranting deviation from section 1915(a). See In re T.S.W., 276 P.3d 133 (Kan.2012) (<HOLDING>). I do not disagree. Although I recognize that

    ### Response:
    holding placement preference of birth mother alone does not constitute good cause to deviate from placement preferences under icwa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “exercised some level of oversight” over a contractor’s activities. Burn Pit, 744 F.3d at 339. Instead, a court must inquire whether the military clearly “chose how to carry out these tasks,” rather than giving the contractor discretion to determine the manner in which the contractual duties would be performed. Id. (emphasis added); see also Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F.3d 458, 467 (3d Cir.2013) (stating that plenary control does not exist when the military “merely provides the contractor with general guidelines that can be satisfied at the contractor’s discretion” because “contractor actions taken within that discretion do not necessarily implicate unreviewable military decisions”); McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1359-61 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The second Taylor factor concerns whether “a

    ### Response:
    holding that a contract for aviation services in afghanistan did not manifest sufficient military control to present a political question because the contractor retained authority over the type of plane flight path and safety of the flight
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to testify, violates his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under the United States Constitution as well as his confrontation rights under the Texas Constitution. The State argues that, because Hale does not point out any distinction in the analysis we are to apply under the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and under the Texas Constitution, we should not apply a separate analysis and should overrule his second point. We agree, and we analyze Hale’s contention under the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause only. See, e.g., Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 917, 118 S.Ct. 305, 139 L.Ed.2d 235 (1997); Varnes v. State, 63 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We overrule Hale’s second point. We review de

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate court assumes appellant claims no greater protection under state constitution than that provided by federal constitution when state and federal claims not briefed separately
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ha-beas relief unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). B. Analysis Mr. Morehead argued in his § 2254 application that his conviction violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on “the suppression of evidence [Ms. Burbach’s academic records] which would have revealed perjury to the jury.” Aplt. App. at 10. He contended the suppression was contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny, which hold due .2012) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Mr. Morehead does not contest the

    ### Response:
    holding a coa applicant forfeited a claim of error in district courts failure to hold an evidentiary hearing by not seeking a hearing in his  2254 proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    development of a full factual record.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 13. Sarvis’s demand for discovery, however, misapprehends the nature of a motion to dismiss. Here, the district court properly recognized that “[t]o survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must ‘provide enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face,’ ” Sarvis, 80 F.Supp.3d at 696 (quoting Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009)), and that to reach facial plausibility, Sarvis must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). The pr rtarian Party of Ill., 591 F.2d 22, 25-27 (7th Cir. 1979) (<HOLDING>). It remains far from clear, moreover, that

    ### Response:
    holding that an illinois countys facially neutral twotiered ballot ordering system did not violate the equal protection clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    general and conclusory allegation that “Axesa’s actions and omissions undoubtedly created a hostile work environment.” In order to defeat summary judgment, Plaintiffs cannot rest on conclusory allegations. See Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2005). Moreover, in their objections, Plaintiffs did not cite to any specific record citation in support of this assertion. Thus, Plaintiffs failed to again comply with Local Rule 56(e). This Court also notes that Plaintiffs failed to object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Cintron’s comments were “too mild” to form the basis for a hostile work environment claim. Therefore, this Court need not effect a de novo review of this portion of the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning. Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons just stated, this Court finds

    ### Response:
    holding that a partys failure to raise objections to the report and recommendation waives the partys right to review in the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Opinion at 4-5. His fears are unfounded. First, the state action requirement, operating entirely apart from the standing requirement, would obviously screen out the vast majority of consumer-preference grievances, for a consumer aggrieved about the disappearance of his favorite brand would have to find a cause of action against a governmental body or face dismissal for failure to state a claim. In any event, of those claims that remain, the independent causation requirement of the standing requirement would bar the tenuous claims Judge Silberman fears from ever reaching the merits. Only those consumers who could prove that a ""substantial likelihood,” see Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 75 n. 20, 98 S.Ct. at 2631 n. 20, existed that the governmental 2232, 2241, 65 L.Ed.2d 184 (1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Autolog Corp. v. Regan, 731 F.2d 25,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs seeking to purchase lands in imperial valley had standing to to compel application of federal reclamation requirements to those lands because that measure would likely lead although not compel some landowners to sell their lands at below market value
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the district judge cannot analyze it and make his final decision in time to avert harm to the plaintiff due to delay, then the plaintiff can move for a preliminary injunction. That would be the kind of case in which a court of appeals might grant a stay of administrative action if that court was the first tier of judicial review of the agency’s action, rather than the district court. 5 U.S.C. § 705; Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C.Cir.1958); Busboom Grain Co. v. ICC, 830 F.2d [74,] 75 [(7th Cir.1987) ]. The standard is the same whether a preliminary injunction against agency action is being sought in the district court or a stay of that action is being sought in this court. Id.”); Ohio v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 812 F.2d 288, 290 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Kansas ex rel. Graves v. United States, 86

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion for a  705 stay should be judged by the same standard as a motion for a preliminary injunction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nonbreaching provisions of FIR-REA and other factors, caused its wounded bank damages. Def. Mot. at 64-65; Def. Reply at 84-88. Plaintiffs principal response as to causation is an argument that it need only show that the breach was a “substantial” causal factor, not the “sole” cause, in its wounded bank damages, and that it has made such a showing. Pl. Response at 88; see Energy Capital, 47 Fed.Cl. at 395 (“[T]he Court will require the Plaintiff to prove that the breach was a ‘substantial factor’ in causing its losses.”). The court finds that the “substantial factor” standard is appropriate. The court now considers whether plaintiff has furnished sufficient evidence to support a finding that the breach was, in fact, a substantial causal factor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (<HOLDING>). In support of its claims of $130.1 million in

    ### Response:
    holding that the nonmovant must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that “the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order being appealed from is entered.” Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Because Mr. Lilly filed his notice of appeal more than 10 days after the district court entered its order granting his petition for clarification, our appellate jurisdiction is contingent on whether this appeal is properly labeled “criminal” or “civil.” The Government continues to urge us to dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. According to the Government, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the district court lacked' jurisdiction, in the first instance, to entertain Mr. Lilly’s petition for clarification. Moreover the Government submits that, even if Mr. Lilly’s petition was properly before the dist Cir.) (<HOLDING>), amended on other grounds, 919 F.2d 57 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 4as time limits govern an appeal from a district court order granting or denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court was as follows: Q: ... Now, you were convicted of abuse of a household member in the year 2000, correct? A: Yes. Q: And the charge that you were convicted of included you hitting — was it your former girlfriend? A: Yes ma’am. Q: Okay. And so you were convicted of hitting your former girlfriend? A. Yes. 2 . Another example is that the Hawaii statute applies to all ""persons related by consanguinity,” including both ""children” and “parents,” while the federal statute applies only to one specified blood relationship — that in which the defendant is the parent of the victim. 3 . The only document in the record that suggests how Nobriga’s assault met the section 709-906(1) standard is a police report, which we are barred by Shepard from considering. See 125 S.Ct. at 1263 (<HOLDING>). 4 . Such a post hoc admission is not

    ### Response:
    holding that courts applying taylor may only look to the terms of the charging document the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual ba  sis for the plea was confirmed by the defen dant or to some comparable judicial record of this information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    individuals from discrimination on account of their sexual orientation. In 1974, a New Jersey court held that the parental visitation rights of a divorced homosexual father could not be denied or restricted based on his sexual orientation. In re J.S. & C., 129 N.J.Super. 486, 489, 324 A.2d 90 (Ch.Div.1974), aff'd per curiam, 142 N.J.Super. 499, 362 A.2d 54 (App.Div.1976). Five years later, the Appellate Division stated that the custodial rights of a mother could not be denied or impaired because she was a lesbian. M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J.Super. 425, 427, 404 A.2d 1256 (App.Div.1979). This State was one of the first in the nation to judicially recognize the right of an individual to adopt a same-sex partner’s biological child. J.M.G., supra, 267 N.J.Super. at 625, 626, 631, 632 A.2d 550 (<HOLDING>); see also In re Adoption of Two Children by

    ### Response:
    recognizing importance of the emotional benefit of formal recognition of the relationship between the nonbiological mother and the child and that there is not one correct family paradigm for creating supportive loving environment for children
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    79 N.E.2d at 423. For all of these reasons, and under our deferential standard of review of the determinations of administrative agencies, we affirm the Board’s award of worker’s compensation benefits to Payne for the subsequent shoulder injury resulting from his fall on April 18, 2009. Affirmed. FRIEDLANDER, J., and RILEY, J., concur. 1 . Citing Muncie Ind. Transit Authority v. Smith, 743 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), Moorehead claims that Payne was required to establish the causal connection between the two injuries by expert medical evidence. Appellant's Br. at 3. But the holding in that case, requiring medical evidence to establish a causal relationship between the employment and the injury, is limited to injuries not caused by “a sudden and unexpected event.” Id. at 1217

    ### Response:
    holding that the boards decision was contrary to law because it was based solely on smiths testimony and is not supported by medical evidence which shows a causal relationship between smiths employment and his carpal tunnel syndrome
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    19, are preemptive. See supra ¶¶ 19-21. T39 Contrary to the majority's view, these definitions are not preemptive because the doctrine of equitable adoption is not premised on our ability to judicially define the statutory term ""child"" or ""parent."" The version of the probate code in effect when Williams' Estates was decided provided for intestate succession by a decedent's ""child"" or ""issue."" Utax CopE § 74-4-5(1)-(2) (1958). We did not reach our holding in Williams' Estates by judicially defining these statutory terms, as the majority suggests. See supra ¶ 20. Instead, w 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule ""authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate""); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The evidence at trial established that Defendant: (1) was informed of the delivery to his property and suggested that it be done at night, (2) was also informed when the truck arrived, and (3)was informed the next day when the drivers left his lot. Defendant claims that the only evidence of affirmative conduct on this occasion was his suggestion that the unloading take place at night. This evidence, stand ing alone, Defendant argues, is insufficient to support his aiding and abetting conviction. Defendant also argues that his previous act of giving the key to his property cannot be considered as evidence here because such only aided a general scheme of possession of marijuana, not the specific offense on October 4, 1998. See United States v. Lombardi, 138 F.3d 559, 561 (5th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>). We conclude, however, that Defendant’s assent

    ### Response:
    holding that the government must show that defendant aided and abetted the specific crime not just the overall scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1415(e)(2). The only evidence outside the administrative record the plaintiff proffers is a report from Dr. Daniel Ling. See Pl.’s Resp., Exhibit 27. Thus, the court will decide the defendant’s summary judgment motion based on the administrative record and Dr. Ling’s report. 2 . Shortly after the death of the plaintiff’s mother, Mr. O'Toole began dating Ms. Fulgham. Ms. Fulgham took an active role in the plaintiff's education. In October of 1993, Mr. O’Toole and Ms. Fulgham were married. 3 . The plaintiff controverts this key fact. However, the plaintiff does not refer to anything in the record supporting her contention as required by Fed.RXiv.Pro. 56 and D.Kan. Rule 56.1 and, therefore, the fact is deemed uncontroverted. Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir.l995)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to withstand summary judgment the nonmovant must identify a genuine issue of material fact by reference to an affidavit a deposition transcript or a specific exhibit incorporated therein and that a court need not search the record to find uncited evidence which controverts a material fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and hold that 25 U.S.C. § 410 continues to protect any money accruing from the lease of Indian trust land, even after it has been distributed to a Native American and placed in a personal bank account. 1. Jurisdiction ¶14 “Where a federal statute is silent on the question of jurisdiction, state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction.” Law Offices of Vincent Vitale, PC v. Tabbytite, 942 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Alaska 1997) (citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506-08, 82 S. Ct. 519, 7 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1962)). Because 25 U.S.C. § 410 does not purport to impose exclusive federal jurisdiction, Washington courts have subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether 25 U.S.C. § 410 bars garnishment of the funds in the Harrisons’ bank accounts. See Vitale, 942 P.2d at 1147 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction

    ### Response:
    holding that alaska state courts had jurisdiction to determine application of 25 usc  410 to proceeds of condemnation action on indian trust land
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that, in addition to recruiting Hayes to prepare returns for Ellerbe, she twice hired him ■ to prepare her own returns. The first return included deductions not supported by the information Peeples had provided to Hayes, and Peeples was audited as a result. She testified that she subsequently instructed Hayes “to do my taxes, but only put the figures on my taxes of what I give you.” J.A. 564-65. The jury could reasonably infer that Peeples would not adhere to this policy for herself and yet provide Hayes with false information about her sister’s taxes. This inference is particularly strong in light of the substantial similarities connecting the misstatements in the Ellerbe return with those in other returns prepared by Hayes. Cf. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 944 (4th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). B.Counts 12 and 13: Ronald Gullette Like

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence that two halfsisters suffered similar sexual abuse tended to show that they were abused by their common parent or grandparents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the government from bringing unfounded suits or engaging in arbitrary or unjust administrative behavior. That goal is in part achieved by rectifying the ‘disparity in resources and expertise of ... individuals and their government.’ ” Oguachuba, 706 F.2d at 98-99, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4984. 6. Other District Courts Have Looked Beyond the Statutory Language of the EAJA and Held Attorneys Can Be Paid the Award of Attorney’s Fees Directly Other district courts that have engaged in analysis beyond the plain meaning of the EAJA, have held that awards of attorney’s fees under the EAJA can be paid directly to attorneys. The Northern District of Alabama determined that the Savings Clause dictates that attorney’s fees can be payable directly to the attorney because .D.F1.2007) (<HOLDING>). In addition to the district court cases

    ### Response:
    holding that payment of eaja fees directly to the attorney also is consistent with the broad purpose for enacting the eaja  if the commissioners narrow position was adopted there would be a substantial risk that counsel for a successful plaintiff might not be paid which would have a chilling effect on the willingness of attorneys to represent indigent claimants in social security cases thus thwarting the primary purpose the eaja was enacted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a complaint’s factual allegations. Id. In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir.1993). Accordingly, to determine whether a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court must examine the applicable substantive law and the facts alleged in the plaintiffs complaint. Preliminary Injunction Standard To determine whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a district court must consider: (1) the plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction; (3) whether granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and, (4) the impact of an injunction upon the public interest. Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. 78 F.3d 1111, 1123 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The essence of this standard is “whether the

    ### Response:
    holding that as in an action alleging infringement of a mark likelihood of confusion is the essence of an unfair competition claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). A fundamental miscarriage of justice is established by showing that the alleged constitutional violation “has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent” of the crime for which he has been convicted. Murray, supra, at 496,106 S.Ct. 2639. Under the circumstances of the instant case, Mercer has demonstrated cause and prejudice such that the court has jurisdiction to entertain his claim for federal habeas relief that the reasonable doubt instruction was unconstitutional. Specifically, cause is established by the novelty of the issue of whether the reasonable doubt instruction given at Mercer’s trial imper-missibly lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof. Reed, supra, at 17-20, 104 S.Ct. 2901 (<HOLDING>). Further, the previously unrecognized

    ### Response:
    holding fact that a constitutional claim is so novel that it is not reasonable for counsel to raise it until after the supreme court articulates that such claim is a basis for federal habeas relief constitutes cause for failure to raise that claim in accordance with applicable state procedures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex.1987) (“Justice demands a speedy resolution of child custody and child support issues.”). Section 153.0071 serves the first goal of peaceful resolution by providing procedures for alternate dispute resolution. However, because section 153.0071 is silent on the options available to a court when an arbitrator’s award is vacated, the second goal of a speedy resolution is not served, as is clear in this case. Nevertheless, until the Legislature amends the Family Code provisions on arbitration, we are bound by section 153.0071’s silence, this court’s decision in Koch, and the provisions of the TAA. Accordingly, the trial court did not have discretion to rule on a claim or controversy that the parties agreed to submit to binding arbitration. See Koch, 27 S.W.3d at 97 (<HOLDING>). Because the trial court was limited to

    ### Response:
    holding that because taa is silent on whether section 171089b includes right to order parties to trial when the arbitration is vacated explicit language of statute should be followed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from the scene.” Id. “As Plaintiff drove away, [Sgt. Sloan] jumped onto Plaintiff's car and fell off the vehicle as Plaintiff ultimately left the scene.” Id. Plaintiff attributed defendants’ actions on February 13, 2004 to ""retaliation for the earlier incident in which Plaintiff drove away from his home, causing Defendant Sloan to fall off of Plaintiff’s vehicle.’’ Id. ¶ 21 (emphasis in original). 2 . Because plaintiff's common law claims are dismissed as untimely, the Court need not determine whether plaintiff complied with the mandatory notice requirements of D.C.Code § 12-309. Plaintiff's compliance or lack thereof has no impact on his constitutional claims. Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1510 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1073, 105 S.Ct. 2153, 85 L.Ed.2d 509 (1985)

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs noncompliance with dccode  12309 cannot bar federal claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    49, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (“The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” (internal quotations omitted)). The Tenth Circuit has stated that whether there is a real nexus in a particular case depends on the circumstances of the case: The under color of law determination rarely depends on a single, easily identifiable fact, such as the officer’s attire, the location of the act, or whether or not the officer acts in accordance with his or her duty. Instead one must examine “the nature and circumstances of the officer’s conduct and t f Pawnee Cnty., Okla., 894 F.2d 1176, 1182-92 (10th Cir.1990)(<HOLDING>). In Jojala, v. Chavez, the plaintiff was a

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant who was an elementary school teacher on contract only from august to may who sexually abused children at a nonschoolsponsored summer camp over the summer did not act under color of state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    restitution ... is ... to mete out appropriate criminal punishment for ... conduct.”). 19 . Gonzalez, 647 F.3d at 66-67. 20 . Clay, 537 U.S. at 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072. 21 . Id.; see also Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993) (""A judgment of conviction includes both the adjudication .of guilt and the sentence.”). 22 . See, e.g., United States v. Certified Envtl. Serv., Inc., 753 F.3d 72, 99-102 (2d Cir.2014) (reviewing restitution order as part of appeal from a criminal judgment); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o) (""A sentence that imposes an order of restitution is a final judgment.”). 23 . 560 U.S. 605, 618, 130 S.Ct. 2533, 177 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010). 24 . Id. at 617-18, 130 S.Ct. 2533. 25 . 375 U.S. 169, 174-75, 84 S.Ct. 298, 11 L.Ed.2d 229 (1963) (<HOLDING>). 26 . 757 F.3d 1243, 1249-50 (11th Cir.2014).

    ### Response:
    holding that where district court committed defendant to custody but held off on imposing final sentence defendant could have appealed from initial imposition but the appeal following final order imposing full sentence was also timely
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “repeatedly told courts ... not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2084, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). We are aware of no case that would preclude a reasonable officer from believing there was probable cause to detain a person who alluded to committing suicide. Cf. Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 922 (9th Cir.2009) (granting qualified immunity where plaintiffs did not cite “a single case squarely holding that an officer cannot rely” on a particular victim’s statements in making an arrest); F.E. Trotter v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.1989) (finding that a violation could not be clearly established where no case had held so previously); see also Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1220 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). While the dissent discounts Hall’s statement

    ### Response:
    holding that a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to detain a person under section 5150 after she alluded to committing suicide despite her protest that the officer should have known the allusion was merely hyperbole
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    review conducted by the Department of Children and Family Services, Office of Administrative Hearings. Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.014(4)(a)-(b). If the parent fails to make a timely review request, the parent is deemed to have waived the right to contest the certification, and the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement must notify the United States Department of the Treasury of the past-due support owed by the parent. Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.014(4)(d). The Secretary of the Treasury is required to withhold from a tax refund “an amount equal to the past-due support.” 42 U.S.C. § 664(a)(l)-(2). The Department shall retain the intercepted tax refund “up to the amount of past-due support assigned to the department as a condition of eligibility for temp Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). The Department further claims that the trial

    ### Response:
    holding that the propriety of an order modifying child support without proper pleading notice and opportunity to be heard may be raised for the first time on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to future PIP benefits by executing the release. In so arguing, Bear River relies on language in its insurance policy with the Walls stating that the insured shall not be entitled to receive “duplicate benefits.” However, as Bear River recognizes in its brief, the duty to pay PIP benefits to the insured is governed by Utah law. Utah’s no-fault statute requires that insurance policies bought to satisfy the security requirements of Utah law contain provisions providing for minimum PIP benefits. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302(2) (1994). Therefore, an insurance policy may not limit the insured’s right to receive minimum PIP benefits as provided by Utah law, as this would violate those provisions of the Utah no-fault statute. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231, 233-36 (Utah 1985) (<HOLDING>); Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263,

    ### Response:
    holding household or family exclusion clause in automobile insurance policy contravenes statutory requirements found in utahs nofault statute as to minimum benefits which must be provided to all persons sustaining personal injuries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not err in concluding that Tenala had failed to carry its burden to show adverse possession of the disputed strip after 1984. C. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Holding that Mayo Adversely Possessed a Portion of the Northern End of Lot 5D, but Erroneously Determined the South Boundary Line of the Mayo Lot. Tenala does not dispute that the Ma-yos’ physical encroachments and use of the northern end of Lot 5D possess the requisite characteristics for acquiring a fee simple estate; Tenala argues instead that the better public policy would be to award an easement. Tenala’s arguments are contrary to the existing law, which holds that fee simple title is acquired if all of the required elements of adverse possession are met. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Curtiss, 684 P.2d 842, 849 (Alaska 1984) (<HOLDING>). The law has long recognized adverse

    ### Response:
    holding that title automatically vests in the adverse possessor at the end of the statutory period if all the requirements are met
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    therefore, our review is limited to a determination of whether the admission of this evidence amounted to “plain error.” “Plain error” has been defined as including error so grave as to deny a fundamental right of the defendant so that, absent the error, the jury would have reached a different result. State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 22, 409 S.E.2d 288, 300 (1991). The Confrontation Clause prohibits testimonial statements from an unavailable witness being presented at trial without the defendant having an opportunity to cross-examine the witness prior to trial. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-52, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 187 (2004). It is clear that Ms. Charlesworth’s report was testimonial in nature. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, — U.S. —, —, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314, 321-22 (2009) (<HOLDING>). There was no evidence that defendant had an

    ### Response:
    holding that reports of chemical analyses were testimonial in nature and subject to the confrontation clause requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1979). Accordingly, in the interest of justice, SMUD is granted 30 days to amend the June 9, 1998 Complaint to articulate the regulatory takings claim discussed in the December 16, 2002 Response at 15 and properly allege the threshold elements discussed above. The Government’s motion to dismiss as to Count IV is denied. 2. Count V — Taking Of Real Property Claim. The complaint also alleges that the Government’s breach has “forced SMUD to devote economically valuable real property to the storage of the SNF in the ISFSI. The government has taken this real property by denying SMUD its rights as owner of this property to put it to other valuable economic uses.” Compl. at ¶ 72; see also id. at ¶¶ 71-73. Real property is constitutionally protected. See Cienega Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1328-31 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, taking these allegations as true,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Koenig v. Perez, 104 N.M. 664, 665, 726 P.2d 341, 342 (1986)); Garrity v. Overland Sheeps kin Co. of Taos, 121 N.M. 710, 718, 917 P.2d 1382, 1390 (1996) (same); Tabet Lumber Co. v. Romero, 117 N.M. 429, 431, 872 P.2d 847, 849 (1994) (same). At issue in the vast majority of summary judgment eases presented to New Mexico’s appellate courts is the first prong; that is, whether there are genuine issues of material fact. See, e.g., Silva v. Town of Springer, 121 N.M. 428, 433, 912 P.2d 304, 309, (Ct.App.) (concluding that a material disputed factual issue existed precluding the grant of summary judgment), cert. denied, 121 N.M. 375, 911 P.2d 883, and cert. denied, 121 N.M. 444, 913 P.2d 251 (1996); Blauwkamp v. University of N.M. Hosp., 114 N.M. 228, 233, 836 P.2d 1249, 1254 (Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). In such cases, the rationale behind the

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs re sponse to defendants motion for summary judgment indicated the existence of material issues of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” See Hahn v. Mirda, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 748, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 (2007). Here, because Ford, as discussed above, owed plaintiffs no duty to disclose the risk that its ignition locks would fail, Ford is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claim. See Oestreieher II, 322 Fed.Appx. at 493 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs’

    ### Response:
    holding because plaintiff had not alleged defendant made a misrepresentation or that the alleged defect posed a safety risk the district court  properly dismissed plaintiffs  fraudulent concealment claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction. See NMSA 1978, § 30-2-l(A)(l); SCRA 1986, 14-201. Defendant’s conviction is AFFIRMED. IT IS SO ORDERED. MONTGOMERY and FROST, JJ., concur. 1 . Defendant raised numerous other issues in his docketing statement. These issues, however, are deemed to be waived as defendant did not brief or argue them on appeal. See State v. Clark, 108 N.M. 288, 311, 772 P.2d 322, 345, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct. 291, 107 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989). 2 . The record does not contain evidence that the State intentionally deprived defendant of the shoes. However, the State ""concede[d] that it may have breached its duty to the defendant [to preserve that evidence]."" See State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 368, 369, 600 P.2d 820, 821 (1979)

    ### Response:
    recognizing states duty to preserve relevant evidence where practical
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    population. Cf. Shryock, 342 F.3d at 986 (“[T]he district court need not define common terms that are readily understandable to the jury.”). Even accepting the debatable proposition that “ad hoc” is beyond the understanding of the average juror, we conclude that the jury would have been able to understand what type of structure a RICO enterprise must have (i.e., one that provides “a mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the entity on an on-going continuous basis”) from the remainder of the instruction. Moreover, we have previously held that a district court is not required to define terms that would normally be beyond the general knowledge of jurors if the terms have been covered extensively during the trial. United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1486 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the structure of the alleged

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court was not required to define pro forma because of extensive discussions regarding the term at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    probability that a randomly chosen person, other than the suspect, has the genetic profile of the evidence DNA?” The probability is, by the State’s expert’s own calculations, no more than one in 170. C. Even had the State used the correct figures in calculating the number of people who could have contributed to the DNA material found at the scene, the use of the unmodified product rule in making those calculations was erroneous. The use of the unmodified product rule in calculating population frequencies from DNA loci is unsupported by the scientific and legal authorities. While the product rule is clearly generally accepted as an accurate theoretical proposition, the issue is whether the product rule can be applied to individual DNA frequencies. See Cauthron, supra, 846 P.2d at 514-15 (<HOLDING>); State v. Carter, 246 Neb. 953, 524 N.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding in regard to admission of dna statistical evidence and product rule calculations that the expert must show more than the theory for the evidence to be admitted the theory must be valid in its application
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    summary judgment on all claims by all eleven transitory employees whose contracts expired on or before April 30, 2013. (Docket No. 98 at 11-12.) Because Defendant Rodríguez-Díaz did not become the HR Director until June 5, 2013, Defendants argue it is impossible that he would have participated in the non-renewals of these employees’ contracts. Id Plaintiffs admit that those employees have no claims against co- Defendant Rodriguez-Diaz. (Docket No. 106 ¶¶ 3-10, 12-15.) Rodriguez-Diaz is not personally liable for those claims. 10 . Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Article 1802 claim, arguing that because Section 1983 already covers the conduct complained of here, the tort claims under state law do not stand. See Santini Rivera v. Serv. Air, Inc., 137 D.P.R. 1 (1994) (<HOLDING>). As in their motion for judgment on the

    ### Response:
    holding article 1802 claims only survive where the conduct alleged of is based on tortious or negligent conduct different from the conduct covered by other specific labor laws involved
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (7th Cir.2001). Nor must we consider the preliminary question of whether the Superintendent should be deemed to have waived any objection to that hearing by not raising the issue on appeal. See Aeid, 296 F.3d at 64 (declining, where this Court could dispose of the case on its merits, to address the argument that the respondent had waived any objection to an evidentiary hearing by repeated failures to object to the hearing); Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir.2003) (declining to address “what steps a respondent must undertake to preserve an objection, predicated on § 2254(e)(2), to a district court decision to grant a habeas petitioner an evidentiary hearing,” where the district court had not erred in holding the hearing); cf. Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 16 . In Sparman v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 51, 52

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court has the power to raise the aedpa limitations period sua sponte because the defense implicates values beyond the interests of the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    underlying offenses were charged under different indictment numbers; and separate judgments were imposed as to each conviction. The district court also f he armed robberies occurred on different dates with different victims. Moreover, only one of those armed robberies involved an accomplice. Rather, as shown above, the gist of defendant’s argument for why these four cases are related under § 4A1.2(a)(2) is that they were consolidated for purposes of sentencing. However, the district court did not clearly err in finding that they were not so consolidated based upon the separate indictments under which the cases were charged, the trial court’s entry of separate judgments in those cases, and the lack of a consolidation order. See United States v. Carter, 283 F.3d 755, 758 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Odom, 199 F.3d at 324 (holding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that even though the state trial court rendered its judgments in the defendants prior cases on the same day with their sentences to run concurrently the district court did not clearly err in finding that those prior cases were not consolidated for sentencing due to cases separate indictments and judgments and the absence of a consolidation order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    access to firearms, “could be construed as conscience-shocking” behavior sufficient to render summary judgment inappropriate). As pled, Booker and Peagler ignored known or likely injuries and abuse to Chandler, chose not to further investigate such possible abuse, and ignored the danger posed by his continued residence in Jon Phillips’s home. See Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 920 (10th Cir.2001) (finding caseworker’s failure to investigate bruises and continued allegations of abuse, as well as responsibility for court order granting custody to caretaker, could be conscience-shocking behavior sufficient to survive dismissal). Of course, discovery may inform the context of Booker’s and Peagler’s actions such that their behavior was not conscience shocking. See Weise, 507 F.3d at 1265 (<HOLDING>). However, construing all inferences in

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the denial of qualified immunity at the dismissal stage does not preclude a renewal of that defense at summary judgment after further factual development has occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whom the estoppel is sought, and consequently changed its position to its prejudice. Id.” 758 So.2d at 555. Joe Jr. argues that the holding in Jin-right is limited to the situation in which a petitioner in bankruptcy omits a potential claim in his schedule of assets and then later sues on that claim. We do not read Jinright so narrowly, however, and we can find no indication that our supreme court, in outlining the elements that must be proved to establish judicial estoppel, confined its statements to the bankruptcy context. We hold that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable here for at least two reasons. First, Robert and Joe Jr., the parties asserting the estoppel, were not parties to the Florida divorce action. Cf. Singley v. Bentley, 782 So.2d 799 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). Second, the parties claiming the estoppel did

    ### Response:
    holding that a farmer was not estopped to recover against a harvester for underpayment on 27000 bushels of sweet potatoes by the farmers claim in filing for federal cropdisaster benefits that his crop had produced only 15000 bushels the harvester was not a party to the farmers application for benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    emphasizes, furthermore, “[T]he Lebron Court explained that while Amtrak is part of the Government for purposes of the constitutional obligations of Government — -such as the obligation to respect an artist’s First Amendment rights' — Amtrak is not part of the Government for purposes of the inherent powers and privileges of the Government.” Pl.’s Opp. & Reply at 8 (emphases in original). AAR’s due-process challenge plainly belongs in the former camp. Just as the Government is obligated to respect individuals’ First Amendment rights, see Lebron, 513 U.S. at 399, 115 S.Ct. 961, so too is it constitutionally required to respect their due-process rights. Consistent with the standard Plaintiff itself enumerates, then, Amtrak is a governmental entity in the context of this claim. See id. (<HOLDING>). Perhaps recognizing that Lebrón poses an

    ### Response:
    holding that amtrak is an agency of the government  for purposes of the constitutional obligations of government
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    find under the First or Fifth Amendments for discrimination in federal employment. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2406, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (refusing to find a cause of action under the First Amendment for a disciplined federal employee because of the remedies available from the Civil Service Commission); see also Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1483-1484 (10th Cir.1990) (applying Bush to First Amendment claim of teachers for the Bureau of Indian Affairs). Second, Mr. Belhomme’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails as a matter of law because this section applies to actions by state and local entities, not to the federal government. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 & n. 2, 83 S.Ct. 1441, 1444 & n. 2, 10 L.Ed.2d , 820 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (10th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this standard is ""much weaker” than that mandated by the patent law under 35 U.S.C. § 102. Softel, Inc., 118 F.3d at 969. In Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 380, 54 USPQ2d 1810 (2d Cir.2000), the Second Circuit held: New York law in submission-of-ideas case is governed by the following principles: Contract-based claims require only a showing that the disclosed idea was novel to the buyer in order to furnish consideration.... By contrast, misappropriation claims require that the idea at issue be original and novel in absolute terms. Id. at 380, 208 F.3d 368, 54 USPQ2d at 1817. While Nadel was an idea-submitter case, the New York courts have required an identical showing of ""novelty” to support a trade secret claim. See Softel, Inc., 118 F.3d at 969 n. 11

    ### Response:
    holding that new york law requires this same showing of novelty in a trade secret claim as in submissionofidea cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    estoppel, breach of contract, conversion, fraud and misrepresentation, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with a business relationship, and tortious interference with a contract relationship) relate to the defendants not paying plaintiff for services preformed in the plaintiffs employment capacity. Since the Agreement defines or “pertains to” the employment capacity of the plaintiff, these common law claims fall within the scope of the arbitration clause. The Agreement states that arbitration is appropriate in “any dispute arising under this Agreement to the maximum extent allowed by applicable law.” That would include plaintiffs claim for defamation in violation of state law. See McGinnis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 812 F.2d 1011, 1013 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>) In this case, the alleged defamatory

    ### Response:
    holding that a clause limiting arbitration to employment termination extends to a defamatory comment made after such termination about employees service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issues touching upon Plaintiffs’ Count II, which count the Court has yet to rule upon. The Court will not presently rule upon Plaintiffs’ reconsideration request as it respects their Count III given that a future hearing has been scheduled and not yet held regarding the same. However, the Court will now enter its decision regarding Plaintiffs’ Count II. Because the Court’s decision regarding Plaintiffs’ Count III affects the Court’s decision regarding Plaintiffs’ Count II, the Court will first say a few words regarding such Count III. The Court ruled in the I.R.S.’ favor on Count III because the Court determined, in turn, that the I.R.S. is not bound by the terms of the Plan and the Confirmation Order. The Court held that the I.R.S. is not so bound because 23, 127 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1986) (<HOLDING>)), as well as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision

    ### Response:
    holding that a government agency seeking to enforce a prior order regarding prepetition acts of a debt or is not bound by a confirmed plan a if such agency fails to participate in the confirmation of such plan b if the obligations that such agency seeks to impose upon such debtor do not constitute claims c notwithstanding that such plan purports to treat such debtors obligations to such agency and d since it thus is not a named entity within  1141a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    WL 2063555, at *5 (E.D.Mich. Mar. 28, 2008); Burdett v. Harrah’s Kansas Casino Corp., 294 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1227 (D.Kan.2003); Conboy v. AT & T Corp., 84 F.Supp.2d 492, 504 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y.2000); Dewey v. Associated Collectors Inc., 927 F.Supp. 1172, 1174 (W.D.Wis.1996); West v. Costen, 558 F.Supp. 564, 584 (W.D.Va.1983). 8 . The Brushes (but not Wells Fargo) point to two default letters that were sent in February and March 2008. (Docket Entry No. 36-2, Exs. 3, 4). The August 2009 loan modification agreement that Wells entered into with Mrs. Brush modified the original promissory note and cured the prior default. As a result, Wells Fargo was required to send the Brushes new notices after Mrs. Brush defaulted anew under the loan modification agreement. See Gatling, 2012 WL 3756581, at *11 (<HOLDING>). 9 . The Brushes allege that as a result of

    ### Response:
    holding that a mortgagee is required to send new legal notices if a debtor who had previously defaulted on a note defaults again after entering into a loan modification agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 [, 315 (1966)]; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563, 47 S.Ct. 746, 748, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [, 1204 (1927)]. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to t 7 S.Ct. 1737, 1740, 18 L.Ed.2d 943, 947 (1967) (“The agency’s particular demand for access will of course be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved”), and has relaxed the probable cause standard for searches, in others, see, e.g. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968) (<HOLDING>); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103

    ### Response:
    holding that a limited search of the outer clothing of a suspect for weapons is reasonable where the officer has a reasonable articulable basis for believing that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    forth a prima facie case of gender discrimination. IV. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 1 . Seibert’s PDA claim fares no better. Seibert alleged that she requested, but was denied, accommodation in the form of a reclining chair. Because this allegation was not asserted in Seibert’s EEOC charge, she has failed to preserve her claim and it must therefore be dismissed. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d). Seibert raised new claims in her response to Lutron’s Motion for Summary Judgment that she was ""singled out and forced to use her vacation time simply because she was having post natal problems with her twins.” Even if these claims were timely raised, they lack merit. See Piantanida v. Wyman Center, Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir.1997)

    ### Response:
    holding that postnatal childcare duties are not within the protections afforded by the pda
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1015 (1893), where a landowner, the City of Anderson, granted contractors the right to construct a sewer along one of its streets and we held: ""and if [the contractors], in the construction thereof, unlawfully entered upon appellee's property, to her injury, [the contractors] alone are answerable therefor.""). The Neals rely on decisions from other jurisdictions that impose liability on landlords when the landlord acquiesced in the tenant's creation of a nuisance. See, e.g., Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F.Supp. 355, 360 (M.D.N.C.1997) (owner who knows about contamination on his land and does nothing to remedy the situation is responsible for the migration of that contamination to another's property); Reynolds v. Pardee and Curtin Lumber Co., 172 W.Va. 804, 310 S.E.2d 870, 876-77 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Sta ples v. Hoefke, 189 Cal.App.3d 1397, 235

    ### Response:
    holding landlord jointly liable when he knew of or acquiesced in the tenants trespass
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Adversary Complaint, the Court concludes that under the law of either jurisdiction, Plaintiffs-Appellees have sufficiently alleged individual damages to state non-derivative claims. See e.g., Kramer v. Western Pacific Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del.1988) (recognizing that “the distinction between derivative and individual actions rests upon the party being directly injured by the alleged wrongdoing and holding that an individual action requires the plaintiff to allege either an injury which is separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders, or a wrong involving a contractual right of a shareholder which exists independently of any right of the corporation”); Bio-Scientific Clinical Lab., Inc. v. Todd, 149 Ill.App.3d 845, 103 Ill. Dec. 171, 501 N.E.2d 192 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Adversary Complaint

    ### Response:
    holding that shareholders claim is derivative if the alleged injury affects the shareholder indirectly in his or her capacity as a shareholder and describing the inquiry as whether the gravamen of the pleadings alleges injury to the plaintiff upon an individual claim as distinguished from an injury which directly affects the shareholders as a whole
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2354, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004). Constructive discharge occurs when the working conditions deteriorate, as a result of discrimination or retaliation, “to the point that they become ‘sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her employer.’ ” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Turner, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d at 1026). These discriminatory or retaliatory actions are best handled within the employment relationship. Poland, 494 F.3d at 1184. The employee can recover for any additional acts of harassment suffered until he resigns. See Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. -, -, 136 S.Ct. 1769, 1782, 195 L.Ed.2d 44 (2016) (<HOLDING>). The First, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and

    ### Response:
    holding the claim of constructive discharge does not accrue until an employee resigns
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and its companion, United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965), have since been extended to provide immunity to private efforts to influence courts, federal and state agencies. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972). The counterclaimants protest that this doctrine does not immunize an entire course of wrongful acts simply because Bristol requested government approval and licenses as part of its allegedly tortious scheme. They rely on Allied, Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. that the scope of antitrust protection depends on the “source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at issue.” 486 U.S. 492, 499, 108 S.Ct. 1931, 100 L.Ed.2d 497 (1988) (<HOLDING>). “An anticompetitive, private tortious scheme

    ### Response:
    holding that anticompetitive actions of private standardsetting body could not be considered either valid governmental action or incidental to a valid effort to influence government action and thus were subject to antitrust scrutiny
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 39.407(14); Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.250(b). The “in controversy” and “good cause” requirements are also included in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.360(a), which provides for mental examinations in civil actions. In a case involving a mental examination of a father in a dissolution modification action, this court explained the “in controversy” requirement under rule 1.360(a). See Williams v. Williams, 550 So.2d 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). For a parent’s mental health to be “in controversy,” “the condition must directly involve a material element of the cause of action.” Id. at 167. But see In re T.M.W., 553 So.2d 260, 262-63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (assuming the. parent’s mental condition was in controversy because custody was at issue); In re S.N., 529 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). In Gasparino v. Murphy, 352 So.2d 933 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding that the mothers mental condition was implicated in a dependency proceeding without further analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    For this reason, the DHO’s failure to produce and review the work-crew log was not prejudicial to Mitchell, and the error, if any, was harmless. B. Failure to Provide a Written Statement of Reasons Mitchell’s second claim, that the DHO failed to provide a written statement of the reasons for her finding of guilt, is contradicted by the record. The DHO filled out a form titled “Disciplinary Hearing Report.” (R. at 33.) In a section labeled “Evidence relied on for finding of Guilt,” the DHO explained that she relied on the librarian’s description of the incident and the fact that Mitchell produced no evidence to the contrary. (Id.) We have no difficulty in concluding that this written statement meets the due process requirements announced in Wolff. See, e.g., Mitchell, 80 F.3d at 1445 (<HOLDING>)-, Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 703 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding that written statement that inmate was found guilty on the basis of officers report satisfied wolff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    after that, the State offered Exhibits 4, 5, and 6, and they were admitted over Orsag’s counsel's objection. Therefore, we disagree with Orsag that no testimony was elicited concerning State’s Exhibit 4. 3 . We note that Woodling did not specifically testify she was aware of prior “convictions"" as the State asserts, but she testified she was with Orsag in 1995 when he was stopped for DWI in Harris County (Exhibit 5), and she ""knew about” Orsag’s ""DWI in Brazos County” (Exhibit 4). This, in conjunction with her confirmation that the prior judgments reflect Orsag's signature, is some evidence to support the prior convictions. See Thomas v. State, No. 2-08-125-CR, 2009 WL 2356891, at *6 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth July 30, 2009, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). 4 . As discussed below, we assume for

    ### Response:
    holding defendants brothers testimony that he knew the defendant had served time in the penitentiary for something happening at the mhmr home and his identification of his brothers photograph in a pen packet was sufficient to prove up the defen  dants prior conviction for sexual assault
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indicated that the offense was sexually motivated and that the person who committed the offense did so for sexual gratification. Simmons argues that the trial court erred in admitting Neer’s testimony into evidence because, he says, the evidence was based on scientific analysis and did not meet the Frye standard. Initially, we find it imperative to note that the evidence offered through Neer’s testimony was not “profile” testimony. “Profile” evidence attempts to link the general characteristics of serial murderers to specific characteristics of the defendant. Such evidence is of little probative value and extremely prejudicial to the defendant since he is, in a sense, being accused by a witness who was not present at any of the crimes. See Pennell v. State, 602 A.2d 48, 55 (Del.1991) (<HOLDING>). Neer’s testimony did not accuse Simmons of

    ### Response:
    holding that fbi agent was properly allowed to testify as expert on serial murders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.3d at 282; compare Tilot Oil, 907 F.Supp.2d at 967-68 (rejecting groundwater contamination as ISE per se, but finding that “a lack of ongoing remediation might allow a finding of endangerment to the environment” even without any clear showing of threat to the nearby river). Since the Wellfield’s environment shows no overt signs of stress, and mere presence of C8 is not enough to show imminent and substantial endangerment, Defendant claims it is entitled to summary judgment on any RCRA environmental endangerment claims. Plaintiff responds that the uncontrovert-ed presence of C8 in the Wellfield’s groundwater, as well as complete absence of any remediation effort, is sufficient to show imminent and substantial endangerment to the environment. See Interfaith Cmty. Org., 399 F.3d at 263 (<HOLDING>). The Interfaith Court, relying on the New

    ### Response:
    holding liability under rcra for contamination to groundwater and rivers because the ise provision imposes liability for endangerments to the environment including water in and of itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that would provide [them] with a reasonable basis for a belief that the key representations in the statements provided to investors” were not misleadin ever, does not end the inquiry. Even though Plaintiffs were not the law firms’ clients, Kutak and Stinson cannot escape liability if, during the course of their work on the Official Statements, they knowingly or recklessly omitted facts that rendered these offering documents false or misleading. Under the Ninth Circuit’s substantial participation test, Kutak and Stinson, as the primary drafters of the language in the Official Statements, had a duty to exercise reasonable care and to disclose relevant facts that undermined the statements that they actually drafted or otherwise prepared. See Homestore.com, 347 F.Supp.2d at 800 (<HOLDING>). This is so because when Kutak and Stinson

    ### Response:
    holding that the creation drafting editing or making of the statements at issue can give rise to liability under  10b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consider whether this Court erred (1) by applying the “general rule” that suicide is an unforeseeable intervening cause of death, even though there was a special relationship between a detention officer and his prisoner, who committed suicide while in custody; and (2) in reversing the denial of the officer’s motion for summary judgment. 23 Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (punctuation omitted); accord Harvey, 260 G he exception to the general rule regarding proximate cause and suicide did not apply when there was no evidence that an inmate was in a rage or frenzy or had an uncontrollable impulse at the time when he killed himself and when the inmate appeared calm, controlled, and appeared to know what he was doing); Dry Storage Corp. v. Piscopo, 249 Ga. App. 898, 900 (550 SE2d 419) (2001) (<HOLDING>). 29 See supra footnote 27. 30 Although the

    ### Response:
    holding that a suicide victim did not kill himself during a rage or frenzy or in response to an uncontrollable impulse when although his physical or psychological pain was obvious and he specifically attributed it to the alleged tortfeasors negligence he recorded a videotape just before he committed suicide in which he appeared to have control of himself and to have known exactly what he was doing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pleading, the defense was preserved and dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint was affirmed. Shotzman v. Berumen, 363 Ark. 215, 229, 213 S.W.3d 13, 20 (2005); Wallace v. Hale, 341 Ark. 898, 900, 20 S.W.3d 392, 394 (2000); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 315 Ark. 136, 140-41, 865 S.W.2d 643, 645-46 (1993). In contrast, where a party had knowledge of a pending action and did not raise the specific Rule 12(b) defenses in the responsive pleading, the defenses were waived. Posey v. St. Bernard’s Healthcare, Inc., 365 Ark. 154, 164, 226 S.W.3d 757, 764 (2006) (Defendant asserted a statute-of-limitations defense but failed to raise the defense of insufficient service of process in its responsive pleading.); Galley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 362 Ark. 568, 575, 210 S.W.3d 40, 44 (2005) (<HOLDING>); S. Transit Co., Inc. v. Collums, 333 Ark.

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant waived its impropervenue defense where its responsive pleading which asserted the defenses of failure to state facts to state a claim and failure to join a necessary party  did not assert the defense of improper venue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a separate motion. 7 . In referring to aliens entitled to voluntary departure as “favored,” we follow the same characterization as used by the Supreme Court in Dada which stated, “We must be reluctant to assume that the voluntary departure statute was designed to remove this important safeguard [motion to reopen] for the distinct class of deportable aliens most favored by the same law.” Dada, 554 U.S. at 18, 128 S.Ct. 2307. 8 . This case is distinguishable from cases where the alien filed a motion to reopen during the seven-month window, but explicitly requested a stay of the voluntary departure period pending adjudication of the motion indicating that the alien had no intention to relinquish the voluntary departure agreement. See Blackman v. Att'y Gen., 414 Fed.Appx. 415 (3d Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); see also Ramirez-Mena v. Holder, 324

    ### Response:
    holding bia did not err in determining request for stay of voluntary departure is not an implicit request for a withdrawal of voluntary departure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1998); Dixon v. Dixon, 747 P.2d 1169, 1175 n. 5 (Alaska 1987). 11 . 666 P.2d 438 (Alaska App.1983). 12 . See id. at 450. 13 . See id. 14 . Id. 15 . See id. 16 . Id. at 451; see also Jones v. State, 576 P.2d 997, 1001 (Alaska 1978) (""Having specified a particular purpose for the offer, Jones is not in a position to now claim error because the evidence might have been admissible on other grounds.""). 17 . See, e.g., Trobough v. French, 803 P.2d 384, 385 (Alaska 1990) (where a litigant failed to object to her adversary’s conduct during trial and never requested a mistrial, the trial court abused its discretion in granting the new trial because the plaintiff did not ""formally object to the questioned acts at the time they were committed""); Moss v. State, 620 P.2d 674, 677 (Alaska 1980) (<HOLDING>); Petersen v. State, 838 P.2d 812, 816 (Alaska

    ### Response:
    holding that it was incumbent upon counsel to renew his attempt to obtain the witness testimony and that by failing to do so defendant waived his request
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    process expeditiously, § 1129(e) alone attempts to govern the court’s involvement in that process. 13 . Moreover, to have denied the Motion to Extend Time on November 5th because the Debtor at that point had not been able to make the requisite showing would have been tantamount to denying it due process — the right to be heard, to have all of its evidence on the issue considered, when it had done all it could do to timely put the issues and that evidence before the Court and when the hearing on the Motion to Extend Time had already been commenced. 14 . Section 1121(e)(3)(c) requires that a court sign the an order extending the time period to obtain confirmation before the existing has expired. See In re Caring Heart Home Health Corp., 380 B.R. 908, 910 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 2008) (<HOLDING>). The Court notes that the Debtor did submit a

    ### Response:
    holding that the language of the third requirement in section 1121e3 is abundantly clear and must be read as conclusive  if no signed order exists prior to the expiration of the 45 day deadline then no extension can be granted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    planning issues.’’); December 31, 1986 letter from NRC to Edison (""The NRC is looking for strong evidence of progress at Pilgrim prior to restart.... Further, you should note that we plan to complete a SALP review prior to reaching a position regarding the restart of the Pilgrim facility.’’). SALP is an acronym for ""Sytematic Assessment of Licensee Performance.” 9 . It does mean that there is judicial review of this action. See section IV, infra. 10 . The other grounds for a mandatory hearing set forth in § 2239(a) are not relevant to this case. 11 . Because we find that no hearing was required, we need not decide whether the Commonwealth is a ""person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding"" entitled to a hearing under § 2239. Cf. Belotti v. NRC, 725 F.2d 1380 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). 12 . To the extent that the Commonwealth is

    ### Response:
    holding that the commonwealth was not such a person with respect to an earlier amendment of pilgrims license
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and other African-American students, to expel him from the school. This claim, however, is fatally flawed because the -Sixth Circuit has determined that a corporation cannot conspire with its own agents or employees. Johnson v. Hills & Dales General Hosp., 40 F.3d 837, 839-840 (6th Cir.1994); Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 509-510 (6th Cir.1991); Doherty v. American Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334, 339 (6th Cir.1984). As a result, plaintiffs § 1985(3) claim also fails as a matter of law. Furthermore, because the § 1986 claim is dependent upon establishing a § 1985(3) violation, plaintiffs’ § 1986 claim necessarily fails. Bartell, 215 F.3d at 560; Haverstick Enterprises, Inc. v. Financial Federal Credit, Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 994 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Browder, 630 F.2d at 1155 (same). The

    ### Response:
    holding that there can be no violation of  1986 without a predicate violation of  1985
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 1982) (concluding that the “point of origin has no bearing on the reasonableness of a [border] search so long as a border crossing has been established”). Here, the Government does not dispute that D.E. did not cross the border and was not in the process of crossing the border when his vehicle was searched. C. Reasonable Suspicion Was Required for the Search of D.E.’s vehicle When CBP officials seek to search an item or person on the basis of general “contact with the border area,” without evidence that the item or person has crossed the border or is in the process of crossing, reasonable suspicion is required. United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1121, 89 S.Ct. 999, 22 L.Ed.2d 126 (1969) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75, 78

    ### Response:
    holding that persons who have direct contact with a border area or whose movements are reasonably related to the border area are not subject to search absent suspicion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dismissal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Up until recently, “[t]he Fifth Circuit [had] declined to address the ‘enigmatic question of whether motions to dismiss on the basis of forum selection clauses are properly brought as motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) [or] 12(b)(3).’ ” Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 961 (5th Cir.1997). Most district courts in the Fifth Circuit followed the direction of Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc. v. MIRA M/V, 111 F.3d 33 (5th Cir.1997), in which the Fifth Circuit, without commenting on the district court’s procedural choice, affirmed a district court’s granting of a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue based on a forum selection clause See Ambraco, Inc. v. M/V CLIPPER FAITH, no. 06-9966, 2007 WL 1550960 at *1 (E.D.La., May 25, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Very recently, the Fifth Circuit shed some

    ### Response:
    holding that since the fifth circuit has accepted rule 12b3 as a proper method for seeking dismissal for improper venue based on a forum selection clause the court need not decide whether a rule 12b1 motion  is appropriate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a state treats a filing as timely and resolves it on the merits, the federal judiciary will not second-guess that action, for the grievance has served its function of alerting the state and inviting corrective action.”). Dr. Martinez also contends that even if the grievance process was unavailable during the 15-day filing period, Spada was required to exhaust his administrative remedies once he had access to grievance forms. But Dr. Martinez has provided no basis for concluding that Spada’s untimely grievance would have been accepted and resolved on the merits. Notably, there was no requirement that Spada utilize the grievance process after the 15-day period expired, which is the foundation of Dr. Martinez’s position. See, e.g., Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, some courts have held that in

    ### Response:
    holding that an administrative remedy was made unavailable after correctional officers did not respond to a grievance and there was no regulation addressing such a situation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 1871-72 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)); see also Dunham, 967 F.2d at 1124; Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487, 490 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 595, 121 L.Ed.2d 533 (1992). The district court’s conclusion below was not clearly erroneous, as we are not left with the “ ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 370, 111 S.Ct. at 1872 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). We have in the past upheld as race-neutral peremptory challenges based on the failure to attain a certain educational level. See Marin, 7 F.3d at 686-87; United States v. Tucker, 773 F.2d 136, 142 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021, 1022, 106 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding prebatson that challenge to africanamericans who had limited education was raceneutral
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an attorney in the circumstances of this case.” Nearly two years after first requesting relief from the Court of Veterans Appeals, Cox once again sought a writ from the court. This time, however, Cox’s request was more modest than the first. Cox sought a writ of mandamus only to compel the Board to issue a final decision on his petition for attorneys’ fees. The court acknowledged that pursuant to the All Writs Act (AWA), 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994), it had the power to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to issue a final decision. The court determined that such a writ would be justified “in aid of’ the court’s jurisdiction under the AWA because, absent a final decision by the Board, the court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (1994). See In re Wick, 40 F.3d at 373 (<HOLDING>). However, as before, the court declined to

    ### Response:
    holding that a board decision is required to vest the court of veterans appeals with jurisdiction over a claimants appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fear of cancer were not authorized. See id. 674 A.2d at 239-40. There are two ways to analyze the phenomenon of exposure-only causes of action. First is the monolithic view — i.e., that there is only a single cause of action based on exposure to asbestos, for which there are multiple remedies (some of which may not be available). Second is the “polylithic” view (for lack of a better word), that there are multiple causes of action for exposure to asbestos (some of which may not be available) — i.e., there is one cause of action for increased risk of cancer, one cause of action for medical monitoring costs, etc. It is largel (1989); DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604, 744 P.2d 705, 707-11 (Ct.App.1987) (same); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del. 1984) (<HOLDING>); Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that present physical injury caused by exposure to asbestos is essential element of claims for mental anguish and medical monitoring costs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Los Angeles, it also existed in or had any effect on the Malibu area. Rather, the City uncritically adopted the findings of the Los Angeles County ordinance, an ordinance that applies not only to a much broader geographic area than Malibu, but also to all forms of rental housing. Thus, the City’s position is not based on actual facts, but instead on the notion that because other courts have accepted the monopoly argument in other contexts and other geographical areas, this Court is compelled to accept it as applied to mobile home housing in Malibu. See, e.g., Pennell, 485 U.S. at 12, 108 S.Ct. at 857-58 (accepting monopoly argument where plaintiffs did not dispute it); Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal.3d 129, 160-64, 130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 488-91, 550 P.2d 1001, 1024-27 (1976) (<HOLDING>). The difficulty with the City’s position is

    ### Response:
    holding that findings made by lower courts showed rational basis for monopoly argument in the specific context of apartment rentals in alameda county
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    EEOC charges on a deferral basis, the time for filing a charge of employment discrimination is 180 days of the alleged unlawful occurrence. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). The parties agree that the 300-day rule applies in Arizona, a deferral state. 8 . As an initial matter, we doubt that the EEOC is subject to the same strict timing requirements with respect to exhaustion of remedies in Title VII as a private party before bringing a class suit. ""Title VII claimants generally establish federal court jurisdiction by first exhausting their EEOC administrative remedies.” Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir.1990). However, it makes little sense for an agency to exhaust remedies before itself. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 288, 122 S.Ct. 754, 15 -41 (9th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). 10 . The district court misconstrued EEOC v.

    ### Response:
    holding eeoc could maintain action alleging discrimination against male employees in the administration of the retirement system although original charge was filed by female alleging discrimination on the basis of her sex
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provides that a business representative is not an officer, and leaves to the District Council the option of providing the local unions with business representatives or allowing them to either elect or appoint their own representatives. Given this grant of discretionary authority to the District Council, it cannot be said that individual local unions have a vested right to elect business representatives. 944 F.2d at 614-15. It will be observed that the 2000 Constitution, providing for the appointment of business representatives by the District Council, represents the exercise by the District Council of a discretionary authority which the Ninth Circuit held the earlier version of section 31B conferred upon it. See also Lathers Local 42-L v. UBC, 73 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Local No. 267 v. UBC, 992 F.2d 1418, 1424

    ### Response:
    holding that bylaws granting exclusive control of business representatives to a district council did not violate the ubc constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    successive. See ante, at 891-92. The Washington Supreme Court reached this conclusion, however, only after reviewing the merits of the petition: This petition is both repetitive and untimely. RCW 10.73.090, .140. The only possible basis on which Mr. [Dictado] could avoid both of these procedural bars is if this petition rested on newly discovered evidence, which would constitute both an exception to the statute of limitations and good cause for failing to raise the new issue earlier.... Although Mr. Guloy did not provide his affidavit until February 5, 1997, it ... does not qualify as newly discovered evidence. Mr. Guloy did not recently recant testimony he gave against Mr. Dictado. Mr. Guloy did not testify at all at that trial, nor were any of his hearsay statements admit iz.1998) (<HOLDING>); Galindo v. Johnson, 19 F.Supp.2d 697, 698,

    ### Response:
    holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    action). Nevertheless, insofar as the PHRA can be generally analogized to a combination of actions in tort and contract, pre-Seventh Amendment common law required a jury trial in such actions. C. Wright, supra, at p. 610. A far greater aid to this Court’s Seventh Amendment inquiry, and properly the crux of any Seventh Amendment analysis, is the nature of the remedy sought by the plaintiff. Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 438 (3d Cir.1990), citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 2793, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989). As made clear in her prayer for relief in Count III, plaintiff seeks remedies that are both equitable, e.g., reinstatement, and legal, e.g., compensatory and punitive damages. Protos v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 138 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Since the plaintiff seeks a determination of

    ### Response:
    holding compensatory and punitive damages constitute legal remedies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Sales Associate acknowledges that he/she is not an employee nor a partner, but a Sales Associate with an independent contractor status, with no rights of [worker’s] compensation, salary, pension, sick leave, sick pay, or other attributes of an employee relationship. The Sales Associate will not be treated as an employee with respect to the services performed by such salesperson as a real estate agent for federal tax purposes. Finally, after the relationship ended, MacDougall could not use any remaining prospects, listings, or referrals. Nevertheless, several facts suggest that Weichert exerted substantial control over MacDougall. MacDougall worked in an office maintained by Weichert, a Weichert manager supervised MacDougall’s work, Weichert requir 1, 30, 539 A.2d 744 (App.Div.1988) (<HOLDING>); Giudice v. Drew Chem. Corp., 210 N.J.Super.

    ### Response:
    holding that discharge of employee to avoid paying commissions on future transactions did not violate clear mandate of public policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to § 1302(b)(1), which incorporates the duties specified in, among others, § 704(a)(9). These courts have held that because a trustee is required to perform certain statutory duties after conversion, other functions, such as the distribution of funds and the filing of claims objections, are a logical extension of the trustee’s authority to complete the administration of the chapter 13 estate. See In re Pegues, 266 B.R. at 334-35 (citing Hardin and Galloway). These decisions fail to distinguish between post-confirmation reporting duties and substantive administrative matters related to a chapter 13 trustee’ ude that the payments received by the Trustee are not held in trust pending distribution and that creditors have no vested interest in the funds held by the Trustee upon conversi (<HOLDING>); Calder v. Job, 973 F.2d 862, 866 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding inheritance received by debtor more than 180 days after filing but before conversion is property of chapter 7 estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    filed on June 7, 2007, we must resolve the ambiguity in favor of Anival. Vazquez, slip op. at 3 (citing Grey v. Grey, 111 Nev. 388, 892 P.2d 595, 597 (Nev. 1995) (“The testimony illustrates that the date of receipt... by the clerk’s office is, at the very least ambiguous. Accordingly, we are compelled to resolve the ambiguity in Roxanne’s favor.”)). 4 See Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 119 Haw. 1, 193 P.3d 839, 846-47 (2008); Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 868-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (noting “potentially devastating” collateral consequences for parent of expired “child in need of services” order, including impacts on future presentence investigations, in-court impeachments, and child custody determinations); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 700 N.E.2d 296, 298 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Piper v. Layman, 125 Md. App. 745, 726 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding appeal from abuse prevention order not moot due to orders expiration because of collateral consequences including effect in future proceedings and stigma
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we reach the obvious conclusion that vanity plates are an unlikely means by which to engage in meaningful “assembly and debate,” Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, or other expressive activity. Because vanity plates are physically restricted by size and shape and by the state’s interests, including that of vehicle identification, vanity plates are a highly limited and extremely constrained means of expression. The very character of license plates also suggests that they are not a designated public forum. In light of all of the circumstances described above, we hold that Vermont has not intended to designate, and has not designated, its vanity plates as a public forum. Cf. In re Denial of the Application for the Custom Plates, 170 Or.App. 542, 13 P.3d 531 (2000) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). But see Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that a vanity plate is not a public forum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    guilty of some possession crime, the jury had a choice between convicting Hernandez of possession with intent to distribute or acquitting him. It is not possible to say with confidence that the jury chose the former option because the government met its burden. The jury may have decided that given the overwhelming evidence against Hernandez, it did not want to acquit him of that charge, and so chose the only other option available to it—conviction of intent to distribute methamphetamine. Eliminating the option of finding Hernandez guilty of simple possession from the jury’s province, under the circumstances of this case, substantially influenced the verdict and was not harmless error. The error of not giving the lesser included jury instruction on simple p Cir.1974) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that possession of more than seven tons of marijuana justified the district courts refusal to provide a simple possession instruction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    devoid of any meaningful difference; for the heart of our holding in Blow was a recognition of the “deeply-rooted legal and societal principle that the coveted privacy of the home should be especially protected.” Blow, 157 Vt. at 518, 602 A.2d at 555. This heightened expectation of privacy rendered it objectively reasonable to expect that conversations in the privacy of one’s home would not be surreptitiously invaded by warrantless transmission or recording. “[W]arrantless electronic participant monitoring conducted in a home,” we held, “offends the core values of Article 11. tution to hold that “the expectation that one’s conversations will not be secretly recorded or broadcast should be recognized as reasonable”); see also Commonwealth v. Brian, 652 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Both cases recognized the risk that

    ### Response:
    holding that an individual can reasonably expect that his right to privacy will not be violated in his home through the use of any electronic surveillance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    coverage. Id. at 238 (explaining that the plan participant was not covered at the time of the alleged misrepresentation). In holding that the plaintiffs claim was not preempted by ERISA, the court stated the “provider’s state law action ... would not arise due to the patient’s coverage under an ERISA plan, but precisely because there is no ERISA plan coverage.” Id. at 246. Further, the fact that the plaintiffs damages Am., 101 F.3d 600, 606 (8th Cir.1996) (declining to extend preemption to state law claims of a third party provider because it “would not further the Congressional goal of protecting the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans”); Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Ins. of Okla., Inc., 944 F.2d 752, 756 (10th Cir.1991)(<HOLDING>). As there is no binding Fourth Circuit

    ### Response:
    holding that an action by a health care provider to recover payment from an insurance carrier is sufficiently distinct from an action by a plan participant against the insurer seeking recovery of benefits due under the terms of the insurance plan and therefore preemption in the former case would stretch the connected with or related to standard too far
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    *13-*14 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 30, 2014, pet. denied) (mem.op.).' Thus, a party is a prevailing party by “obtainfing] an award of specific enforcement of [a] settlement agreement and an end to the ongoing litigation in the case.” Id. at *14. Here, McCulley and TBW Development obtained specific performance of their settlement agreement with Palavan by having Palavan’s claims against them dismissed. McCulley and TBW Development were prevailing parties and were entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees. For the same reason, Palavan’s argument that the dismissal of his claims mooted McCulley’s and TBW Development’s breach of contract claims must fail. Dismissal of Palavan’s claims established that McCulley and TBW Development prevailed, not that their claims were mooted. See 3)

    ### Response:
    holding appellate courts cannot reverse judgment  on grounds not raised on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reading of the statute would defy the intent of the legislature in enacting the current version of section 115B.06. The purpose of the statute was to cut off liability for past actions. See Arkla, 1993 WL 61827, at *2; Werlein, 746 F.Supp. at 910. If the statute were construed to allow liability any time there is continuing migration of contaminants from one property to another after July 1, 1983, the statute would provide little protection for those whose actions occurred entirely before that date. Thus, in this context, the only reasonable interpretation of the “placed or came to be located in or on the facility” is that it refers to when Carney placed the hazardous substances or allowed the hazardous substances to be placed on the Walker site. See Arkla, 1993 WL 61827, at *2 (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed that Carney placed or put

    ### Response:
    holding the relevant event under section 115b06 is when the defendant placed the hazardous substance on the source site
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reasonable doubt “without regard” to the historical practice of juries. To the extent the district court repeated the prosecutor’s statement in sustaining the defendants’ objection, it was to illustrate that the district court’s instructions would render the prosecutor’s remark irrelevant. And, as noted above, before the jury deliberated, the district court gave the jury detailed instructions on the meaning of reasonable doubt. Even assuming some residual prejudicial effect remained, the prosecutor’s statement did not affect Ortiz’s and Rolon’s substantial rights because — in light of the substantial independent evidence of their guilt — no reasonable probability exists that this statement altered the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1097 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). As we note elsewhere in our discussion,

    ### Response:
    holding that improper prosecutorial references did not raise a reasonable probability that but for the remarks the outcome would be different due to sufficient independent evidence establishing guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    circuit court stated an incorrect reason for its denial.’ ” Long v. State, 675 So.2d 532, 533 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), quoting Swicegood v. State, 646 So.2d 159, 160 (Ala.Crim.App.1994). For the reasons that follow, we find that the circuit court was correct in summarily denying all but one of Bearden’s claims. I. Bearden contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment or to impose the sentence. He makes two arguments in this regard. First, Bearden contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because, he says, the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant for his arrest was not properly verified. Although couched in jurisdictional terms, this claim does not present a jurisdictional issue. See, e.g., Sumlin v. State, 710 So.2d 941 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we agree with the circuit court

    ### Response:
    holding that challenges to an arrest warrant are not jurisdictional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to shooting Milem. He signed the statement at 8:20 p.m. The following morning, Norris was brought before a magistrate for a probable-cause determination. At trial, Norris’s attorney moved to suppress Norris’s confession on two grounds not at issue in this appeal. The Tennessee trial court held a hearing, denied the motion, and admitted the confession. A jury convicted Norris of second-degree murder in June 1999, and he was sentenced to twenty-one years of imprisonment. After the trial, Norris’s new attorney who would also be his appellate counsel moved for a new trial. At a hearing on the motion, he argued that Norris’s confession should have been suppressed because: (1) it was the fruit of an illegal arrest under Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (<HOLDING>); and (2) Norris was held for investigative

    ### Response:
    holding that a confession obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest is not admissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is a law partnership representing financial institutions in the area of creditors rights. In this regard, this office represents the above named BANK OF AMERICA who has placed this matter, in reference to an original account with [sic] for collection and such action as necessary to protect our client. At this time, no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular circumstances of your account. However, if you fail to contact this office, our client may consider additional remedies to recover the balance due. Id. at 361. The Second Circuit concluded this disclaimer sufficiently notified the least sophisticated consumer that no attorney had yet evaluated the case. Id. at 365; see also Michael v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP, 825 F.Supp.2d 913, 921-22 (N.D.Ohio 2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court sees little distinction between the

    ### Response:
    holding the disclaimer although we are a law firm at this time no attorney has evaluated your case or made any recommendations regarding the validity of the creditors claims or personally reviewed the circumstances of your account was sufficient under the fdcpa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    component of the res judicata doctrine. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the original criminal proceedings in Krahn were insufficient to invoke collateral estoppel in the later malpractice case because the claimed error by Krahn’s criminal lawyer in plea negotiations was not “ ‘actually and necessarily litigated and determined’ in the denial of her motion to vacate the criminal judgment against her.” Krahn, 43 Ohio St.3d at 108, 538 N.E.2d 1058, quoting Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 2 OBR 732, 443 N.E.2d 978. The Supreme Court by no means suggested that collateral estoppel was completely inapplicable in the context of a criminal conviction when, as here, matters genuinely were litigated and determined. Id. at 107, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (<HOLDING>). Decisions in Ohio other than Krahn relative

    ### Response:
    holding that the facts prevent the invocation of collateral estoppel as a bar to krahns cause of action in this case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “actively endeavor[] to ensure compliance” with the FLSA. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 910 (9th Cir.2003), cert. granted on different issue, 2005 WL 405752 (2005); see also Herman, 172 F.3d at 142; Bankston v. Illinois, 60 F.3d 1249, 1255 (7th Cir.1995); Williams v. Tri-County Growers, Inc., 747 F.2d 121, 129 (3d Cir.1984). If the employer fails to show good faith, an award of liquidated damages is mandatory, even if the court finds that the employer did not act willfully. Cox v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir.1990). In Alvarez the court held that the employer’s “ex post explanations” for why it did not take affirmative steps to ensure compliance were insufficient to demonstrate good faith. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 910; see also First Citizens, 758 F.2d at 403 (<HOLDING>). In Bratt, by contrast, the employer had a

    ### Response:
    holding that the employers bald assertions that the officers thought that they were in compliance with the act did not satisfy the good faith requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and thereby rendered him ineligible for long-term disability benefits. B. Watson’s Eligibility to Sue Under ERISA § 404(a) 1. Equitable Relief Sought ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), establishes that claims for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 404(a) are for the purpose of making “good to [an employee welfare] plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach” and “to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary,” id. Thus, compensatory damages are only available to restore a plan to its uninjured condition; individuals cannot obtain compensatory or punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 87 L.Ed.2d 96 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Degnan v. Publicker Indus., Inc., 42

    ### Response:
    holding that fiduciary could not be held personally liable to plan participant or beneficiary for extracontractual compensatory or punitive damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at least $300,000 because of injury to two or more persons in any one accident or, at the option of the insurer, up to at least $300,000 in a single limit for these coverages, except for policies issued under the Assigned Risk Plan. Also, at least $5,000 for damage to property of others in any one accident. Additionally, insurers may offer higher benefit levels than those enumerated above as well as additional benefits. However, an insured may elect to purchase lower benefit levels than those enumerated above. Your signature on this notice or your payment of any renewal premium evidences your actual knowledge and understanding of the availability of these benefits and limits as well as the benefits and limits you have selected. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1791. 2 . For example, compare Hughes, at 539 (<HOLDING>), with Brethren Mutual Insurance Company v.

    ### Response:
    holding insurance application with umuim coverage designation and insureds signature was suffi cient for  1734s purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1987) (noting that ""where the employer effectively proves that a claimant's disability has been removed altogether, it is not required to prove that suitable work was available to the claimant because it can be presumed that employment is generally available to able-bodied persons."") 7 . Where the Board has not taken additional evidence, our standard of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, an error of law has been committed, or necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Haines v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Clearfield County), 146 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 437, 606 A.2d 571 (1992). 8 . See Rite Aid Corporation v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Bupp), 112 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 548, 552, 535 A.2d 763, 765 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Economy Decorators v. Workmen’s Compensation

    ### Response:
    holding that because a suspension admittedly is a concession that disability is continuing  claimant need only show that the work provided by the employer on which the suspension is based is no longer available to claimant whereupon total disability payments must be reinstated as of the date of termination of that employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to reimburse the widow for the amount she paid to satisfy the mortgage on the condominium before her husband’s death, even if she did so under the mistaken belief that she was the titleholder to the property. Reversed and remanded for proceedings in compliance herewith. 1 . The appellants argue certain of the widow’s claims are barred by res judicata. Because the claims made in the amended complaint filed by her in this action are different from those made by the appellants in Aronson I, there is no res judicata defense available to the appellants in this case. See AMEC Civil, LLC v. State Dep’t of Transp., 41 So.3d 235, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Jones v. State ex rel. City of Winter Haven, 870 So.2d 52, 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Pipkin v. Wiggins, 526 So.2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Three requirements must be satisfied for

    ### Response:
    holding res judicata did not bar current litigation when prior litigation between the parties involved one breach of obligation under a joint venture agreement and instant litigation was based upon a different cause of action from a subsequent interference with the same agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Code does not survive intermediate scrutiny, and is void on its face because the statute is overbroad, reaching a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. See Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1587. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we hold subsection 21.15(b)(1) of the Texas Penal Code is void on its face as it fails intermediate scrutiny and violates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it is over-broad. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Thompson’s application for writ of habeas corpus and remand this matter to the trial court to enter an order dismissing the prosecution, i.e. all charges against Thompson on alleged violations of section 21.15(b)(1) of the Texas Penal Code. See Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 297 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 1 . Thompson does not argue or provide

    ### Response:
    holding statutory provision is unconstitutionally vague on its face and remanding case to trial court to enter order dismissing prosecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. Similarly in Green v. Green, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in holding that unvested stock options may be considered marital property, reasoned that restricted stock option plans, like pension plans, are a form of employee compensation. 64 Md.App. 122, 494 A.2d 721, 728 (1985). The court also reasoned that the options constituted marital property because the husband acquired such options while he was married. Id. According to the court, although the options have an “unassignable, unsalable” character and no fair market value, they are nonetheless an “economic resource.” Id. Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property. See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (<HOLDING>); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780,

    ### Response:
    holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2678589, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (relating to lead paint exposure); McField v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 992 F.Supp.2d 481, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (same). 30 . McField, 992 F.Supp.2d at 487. 31 . Id. at 488 (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct. 766) (internal citations omitted). 32 . Wright, 479 U.S. at 429-30, 107 S.Ct. 766. 33 . Johnson vs. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356, 357 (5th Cir. 2006); DeCambre v. Brookline Hous. Auth., 826 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2016). 34 . Wright, 479 U.S. at 425, 107 S.Ct. 766. 35 . Id. at 419, 107 S.Ct. 766. 36 . Id. 37 . Id. at 429, 107 S.Ct. 766; see McDowell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 423 F.3d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2005) (recognizing a Section 1983 claim against a public housing authority to enforce Section 1437a). 38 . See Johnson, 442 F.3d at 361 (<HOLDING>); DeCambre, 826 F.3d at 1, 13-14 (1st Cir.

    ### Response:
    holding that congress intended to create enforceable rights in participating section 8 tenants to the same extent as it did in enacting the statute implicated in wright
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We noted that Stein’s holding was based on the “tessellated scheme” of Rule 4(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d), regarding notice of judgment. Id. at 1252 (quoting Stein, 197 F.3d at 426). Because Mackey’s appeal was untimely not for lack of notice, but because his counsel had failed to continue representing him in court — a scenario for which no rule parallel to Rule 77 exists — we concluded that the Federal Rules were not so comprehensive as to leave no room for Rule 60(b)(6). We recognized that “[a] federal habeas petitioner — who as such does not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel — is ordinarily bound by his attorney’s negligence.” Id. at 1253 (quoting Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir.2012)). However, we then reasoned from Maples, 132 S.Ct. at 923-24 (<HOLDING>), and Community Dental Services v. Tani, 282

    ### Response:
    holding that attorney abandonment constitutes an extraordinarycircumstance that allows a federal court to disregard the state procedural bar to hearing a habeas petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (citing State v. DeLuna, 110 Ariz. 497, 500, 520 P.2d 1121, 1124 (1974)). Nevertheless, an indigent defendant is not “entitled to counsel of choice, or to a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney.” Moody, 192 Ariz. at 507, ¶ 11, 968 P.2d at 580 (citing State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 591, 858 P.2d 1152, 1194 (1993)). But when there is a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict between a defendant and his appointed counsel, that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated. See id. Accordingly, this court has held that if a defendant is forced to go to trial with counsel with whom he has an irreconcilable conflict or a complete breakdown in communication, a resulting conviction must be reversed. See id. at 509, ¶ 23, 968 P.2d at 582 (<HOLDING>). ¶7 Therefore, as the court of appeals

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial courts erroneous denial of a request to change counsel deprives a defendant of his sixth amendment right to counsel which infects the entire trial process requiring automatic reversal quoting bland v cal dept of corr 20 f3d 1469 1478 9th cir1994 overruled on other grounds by schell v witek 218 f3d 1017 102425 9th cir 2000
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the work independent contractors perform for property owners. Applying this rule, the Parkers contend that the undisputed facts establish that Mr. Patel, through his deemed agent D & S Builders, created the defective condition that caused their injuries. The authority cited by the Parkers does not support adoption of such a rule. These decisions turned on the property owners’ constructive notice of the dangerous condition. See Sanders v. State, 783 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989) (noting that the State had at least constructive notice of the exposed cement that caused injury because a State employee had periodically replaced the wood chips in that area of the playground); Frazer v. Horton Automatics, No. E2006-00102-COA-R9-CV, 2006 WL 3001013, at *7 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 23, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Hamby v. State, No. W2002-00928-COA-R3-CV,

    ### Response:
    holding that the property owners duty of reasonable care included maintaining the automatic doors into the building and concluding that disputes of material fact remained as to the property owners constructive notice that the automatic doors were closing too quickly
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its Order of May 16, 2003, and, find good cause exists to issue a new Order,” entitling plaintiff to present his case and put forth all evidence before a jury. Under the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 112 Stat. 685, 746, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code § 6330 (pertaining to levies) to provide certain due process protections in connection with tax collection matters. Under § 6330(a), the IRS is required to give notice to the taxpayer before imposing a levy of his/her right to request a collection due process hearing with the IRS Appeals Office within thirty (30) days of the notice. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(a)(3)(B). Following the hearing, the IRS sends a Notice of Determination to the taxpayer that summarizes the matters raised 2 (N.D.Ohio Dec. 11, 2001) (<HOLDING>). In light of the above, the Court denies

    ### Response:
    holding that a reviewing court can only address matters raised by the taxpayer at the cdp hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    but this does not mean that he is incapable of alleging facts which would merit legal relief. In interpreting which claims can be dismissed as ""clearly baseless"" under § 1915(d), the Neitzke Court referred to a ""fantastic or delusional scenario,"" not a ""fantastic or delusional” person. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. 3 . Hudson negates the dicta in Miller, 948 F.2d at 1567, where we stated that the Wilson v. Seiter, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) deliberate indifference standard for Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement cases applies as well to nonemergency excessive force claims. 4 . Moreover, the allegations may state a claim under a substantive due process analysis. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) (<HOLDING>). See also McGill, 944 F.2d at 347-49

    ### Response:
    holding that mere neglect for prisoners safety does not amount to a substantive due process violation implying that intent to do harm would be an abuse of government power and amount to a substantive due process violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regarding the school; the implication, therefore, is that Finlay would have received his standard commission for bringing business to the MARQUES if in fact he ever brought such business from the school. The fact that the Ship’s Regulations provided that the captain was solely responsible for the safety of the ship and those on board does not make Finlay liable for the ship’s unseaworthiness, because a shipowner’s duty to provide a seaworthy ship is nondelegable. See Sieracki, 828 U.S. at 94 n. 11, 66 S.Ct. at 877 n. 11. Holding Finlay to be an owner pro hac vice because the Ship’s Regulations made him solely responsible for the safety of the ship would defeat the rule of nondelegability, for it would absolve the owners of liability for unseaworthiness. See Ramos, 423 F.2d at 917-18 (<HOLDING>). That plaintiffs’ decedents had no contact

    ### Response:
    holding that owner could not be hable for unseaworthy conditions arising after he has parted with control over his vessel under a demise charter and that a shipowner cannot escape liability by delegating partial control of his vessel to an independent contractor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a § 3.203(a)-qualifying document, but also as to the consequences, under that regulatory interpretation, of failing to submit such a document prior to the RO’s decision to seek verification from ARPER-CEN. Indeed, in a scheme where VA’s initial inquiry to ARPERCEN carries such potentially outcome-determinative consequences, the duty to notify the claimant as to what evidence she may submit would be of even greater importance. Similarly, in the context of such an interpretation, or more so, if § 3.203(a) is not applicable here, VA’s failure to inform the appellant that she should “provide any additional personal data pertaining to her husband, such as any aliases he may have used during military service”, would also be a notice error . Cf. Sarmiento v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 80, 85 (1994) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by D’Amico v.

    ### Response:
    holding that when claimant supplies new identifying information va must submit additional request to arpercen for verification of service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “have his cake and eat it too.” Id. at 282. Under basic principles of contract law, “[d]efendants must take the bitter with the sweet.” Id. at 283; see also United States v. Cianci 154 F.3d 106, 110 (3d Cir.1998) (“Under the law of this circuit, [a defendant] cannot renege on his agreement”). “When the government breaches a plea agreement, the general rule is to remand the ease to the district court for a determination whether to grant specific performance or to allow withdrawal of the plea.” United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 241 (3d Cir.1998). However, “we have allowed for an exception when the circumstances dictate that there is only one appropriate remedy for the defendant.” Williams, 510 F.3d at 427; see, e.g., United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 941 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 241

    ### Response:
    holding that permitting withdrawal of the defendants plea would be an empty remedy as he had already served much of his sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    particularity forfeits review under the “harmless error” rule. See Scarfo, 54 F.3d at 944; Linn v. Andover Newton Theological School, Inc., 874 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1989); Elwood, 815 F.2d at 175-76; New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Zermani, 200 F.2d 240, 245 (1st Cir.1952). Consequently, appellate review is lim ited to determining whether a miscarriage of justice would occur were the asserted error not corrected. -See Scarfo, 54 F.3d at 940. WorldCom can demonstrate no miscarriage of justice. First, the “fair market value” standard defined by the district court, see supra 28-29, provided the jury with a just and reasonable measure of damages under Massachusetts law in these circumstances. See Mechanics Nat’l. Bank of Worcester v. Killeen, 377 Mass. 100, 384 N.E.2d 1231, 1239 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Hall v. Paine, 224 Mass. 62, 112 N.E. 153,

    ### Response:
    holding in action for breach of contract caused by wrongful foreclosure and sale of shares of stock plaintiff was entitled to recover the fair market value of the stock at the time of its sale
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    time prior to the closing of this transaction, Buyer agrees that such filing shall constitute a material breach of the terms of both this Purchase and Sale Agreement and its lease with Seller and Seller may ... retain any and all monies paid to it by Buyer, whether in the form, of earnest money or lease payments, as liquidated damages which sum Buyer and Seller agree would be fair and reasonable liquidated damages to Seller for such breach of this Agreement.... Thus, although the amendments to RE-21 did not specifically state that making the earnest money non-refundable was an advance election of remedies, when Phillips availed himself of the earnest money, he foreclosed his ability to pursue actual damages. See, e.g., McMullin v. Shimmin, 10 Utah 2d 142, 349 P.2d 720, 720-21 (1960) (<HOLDING>). Further, the parties’ intent is supported by

    ### Response:
    holding that the sellers retention of the deposit evidenced an election of liquidated damages by the seller
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this would constitute a miscarriage of justice. The offense of loitering and prowling contains two elements: first the accused must be loitering and prowling in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens; and second, the loitering and prowling must be under circumstances that threaten the public safety. State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104 (Fla.), cert. denied, Bell v. Florida, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 455, 46 L.Ed.2d 391 (1975). With regard to the second element, “the p an open convenience store constitutes loitering and prowling in a manner unusual for law-abiding citizens, there was no evidence introduced at trial indicating that appellant’s actions were creating an imminent threat to the safety of persons or property in the area. See T.W. v. State, 675 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)(<HOLDING>); R.D.W. (holding that juvenile’s and two other

    ### Response:
    holding that juveniles presence one foot from closed pawn shop at 400 am while carrying chain saw case did not create imminent threat to the safety of persons or property in the area
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a “custom, rule, and/or procedure among international long-haul carriers [by failing] to warn, advise and/or take adequate precautions to inform passengers of the risk of DVT.” Pis.’ First Am. Compl. at ¶ 20. Many courts have recognized that failing to carry out routine procedures in the usual way can constitute an accident under the Warsaw Convention. See, e.g., Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir.1998) (applying a hot compress to relieve ear pain, which is a routine procedure, can be an accident if the water is excessively hot); Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 175 F.Supp.2d 651, 669 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (failing to divert an airplane w to warn is irrelevant to the accident inquiry. Cf. Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 181 F.Supp.2d 396, 402-03 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). The Sprayregen is inapposite; it involved an

    ### Response:
    holding that ordinary turbulence is not an accident and that the flight crews failure to knock on the lavatory door to warn the plaintiff of the turbulence was irrelevant to the accident inquiry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    True, the Ohio General Assembly has tasked the county offices with implementing the NVRA; but, as previously explained, the General Assembly also tasked the Director with the power to enforce any county transgressions of federal law. This is not an either-or proposition. The fact that some states, like Ohio, delegate the administration of public assistance programs to counties or municipalities should not mean that those states are free of all statutory obligations. See New York, 255 F.Supp.2d at 79 (“It would be plainly unreasonable to permit a mandatorily designated State agency to shed its NVRA responsibilities because it has chosen to delegate the rendering of its services to local municipal agencies.”); see also Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 286 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The federal food stamp program is

    ### Response:
    holding that new york could not avoid its obligations under the rehabilitation act by delegating authority to localities to deliver federally funded services
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decline to set a particular amount that constitutes a substantial reduction; this is a question for the trier of fact to determine, examining the totality of the circumstances. Because the commissioner did not consider whether Terry acted reasonably by leaving when faced with a reduction in pay and whether exhausting her alternatives by testing would have been futile, we remand for a new hearing. Terry requests attorney fees. RCW 50.32.160 provides that if this court overturns or modifies the commissioner’s ruling, the claimant is entitled to reasonable attorney fees. Accordingly, Terry is entitled to attorney fees upon timely filing an affidavit of attorney fees with this court. Agid and Ellington, JJ., concur. 1 Tapper v. Employment Sec. Dep’t, 122 Wn.2d 397, 406, 858 P.2d 494 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 2 Sweitzer v. Department of Empl. Sec., 43

    ### Response:
    holding that it is the commissioners findings of fact to the extent they modify or replace the administrative law judges findings that are relevant on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    these circumstances, and assuming, solely for the purpose of this argument, that Maine law requires that a power of sale foreclosure auction meet the standard of commercial reasonableness, we cannot' agree with Oceanic’s argument that a fact-finder could"" rationally conclude that the sale was commercially unreasonable. [¶33] Finally, Sloan’s Cove’s decision not to hire a licensed auctioneer does not render the sale unreasonable or require invalidation of the sale. ‘ Oceanic points to the auctioneering licensing statute, 32 M.R.S. § 285 (2015), which requires a person “who engages in the business of auc-tioneering, professes or advertises to be an auctioneer or advertises the sale of real, personal or mixed property by auction” to hold a valid auctioneer’s license. The pow per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Williston v. Morse, 51 Mass. 17, 23 (1845)

    ### Response:
    holding that an auction sale by an unlicensed auctioneer did not invalidate the sale
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the state would choose to prosecute at trial put defendant at a disadvantage as he tried to defend against the charges. That is because the state’s method of charging, combined with a late election, allows the state to present evidence of a defendant’s multiple bad acts and then to select, mid-trial, which of those will be considered as a charge for the jury to decide. That approach to charging undermines efforts by Oregon courts to prevent “other acts” evidence from being introduced in contravention of the principle in OEC 404(3) that such evidence “is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” See, e.g., State v. Leistiko, 352 Or 172, 184-85, 282 P3d 857, modified on recons, 352 Or 622, 292 P3d 522 (2012) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the trial court did not know

    ### Response:
    holding that absent a defendants stipulation the state must first introduce evidence sufficient to allow the jury to find that the charged act occurred before the trial court can admit uncharged misconduct evidence to prove intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1984) (citing Menard v. Newhall, 135 Vt. 53, 55, 373 A.2d 505, 507 (1977)); see also McCullock I, 981 F.2d at 658 n. 2 (“The Ostrowski court applied a single standard to plaintiffs claims of negligent failure to warn and strict products liability.”). So, under Vermont law, to sustain a verdict premised on a “failure to warn” theory, plaintiff must provide evidence from which a reasonable jury could find: (1) that defendant owed a duty to warn plaintiff; (2) lack of warning made the product unreasonably dangerous, hence defective; and (3) defendant’s failure to warn was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. Menard, 135 Vt. at 54, 373 A.2d at 506; see Ostrowski, 144 Vt. at 308, 479 A.2d at 127; see also Hobart v. P.J.’s Auto Village, Inc., 136 Vt. 287, 289, 388 A.2d 419, 420 (1978) (<HOLDING>); see also Scronce v. Howard Bros. Discount

    ### Response:
    holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any commercial transactions and does not offer any products or services. (Id.) The “core notion” of commercial speech is that it “does not more than propose a commercial transaction.” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60, 66, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (citations and quotations omitted); see Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184. However, the “boundary between commercial and noncommercial speech has yet to be clearly delineated.” Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184. On one end of the spectrum, an advertisement is “clearly commercial speech.” Id. at 1185; see e.g. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 409; Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097-98. On the other end of the spectrum is speech that, when viewed as a whole, expresses editorial comment on matters of interest to the public. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185 (<HOLDING>); Montana, 34 Cal.App.4th at 793-95, 40

    ### Response:
    holding that magazine article that used an altered photograph of a male celebrity to showcase a designer gown was noncommercial speech because the article did not have the sole purpose of selling a particular product complemented the magazine issues focus on hollywood part and present and combined fashion photography humor and visual and verbal editorial comment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not unconscionable); Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735 (Md. 2005) (arbitration provision in loan agreement not unconscionable, even though only the mortgagor was permitted to go to court, it prohibited class action claims, arbitration fees were not disclosed, and mortgagee was required to waive right to jury tria 85 So. 2d 990, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (arbitration provision requiring purchaser of automobile to resolve all claims in arbitration but not requiring dealer to resolve any claims in 04) (arbitration provision that provides ""a judicial forum for practically all claims"" that automobile dealer could have against purchaser but assigning any claims by the purchaser to arbitration unconscionable); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861-62 (W.Va. 1998) (<HOLDING>). See cases cited at 1 Farnsworth, supra note

    ### Response:
    holding unconscionable an arbitration provision in a consumer lending contract that binds the consumer to relinquish his or her right to a day in court and virtually all substantive rights while the lender retains the right to a judicial forum for purposes of collection and foreclosure proceedings deficiency judgments and all other procedures which the lender may pursue to acquire title to the borrowers real or personal property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    vacated on other grounds, 516 U.S. 1105, 116 S.Ct. 900, 133 L.Ed.2d 834 (1996); see also United States v. Scafe, 822 F.2d 928, 932 (10th Cir.1987) (""A defendant t.Ct.App.1994) (reversing for failure to instruct on justifiable use of nondeadly force, noting ""it is the nature of the force and not the end result that must be evaluated”); White v. Commonwealth, 333 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Ky.1960) (""[Wjhere no deadly weapons are involved and the defendant is entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter, an unintentional homicide, he is entitled to a further instruction on the theory of defense against ordinary assault and battery, against the menace of mere bodily harm as distinguished from the threat of death or great bodily harm.’’); State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn.1998) (<HOLDING>). We cannot therefore agree with the dissent

    ### Response:
    holding it error to give selfdefense instruction requiring that defendant believe his actions were necessary to avert death or great bodily harm when defendant claimed that the victims death was accidental
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    P.3d 170, 177 (Okla.2007). Stewart involved an action for damages for personal injuries caused when the driver-employee of a tractor-trailer rear-ended the Stewarts’ vehicle. 241 F.Supp.2d at 1218. Stewart, relying on Marrier, sued the driver and the commercial carrier that employed the driver, asserting a private cause of action under section 14704(a)(2). Id. at 1219. The Stewart court respectfully disagreed with the reasoning in Marrier. Finding the language in section 14704(a)(2) “ambiguous and inconsistent with other language in the statute,” the federal district court looked “to the legislative history for guidance in interpreting the statute.” Id. The Stewart court relied, in part, on Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. New Prime, Inc., 192 F.3d 778, 785 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Stewart, 241 F.Supp.2d at 1221. In

    ### Response:
    holding that section 14704a2 authorizes private action for damages and injunctive relief to remedy at least some violations of the motor carrier act and its implementing regulations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 993. B. The People next argue that the evidence discovered by the arresting officers is admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Subsection 16-3-308(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986), provides that “[ejvidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be suppressed by the trial court if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace officer, as defined in subsection 18-1-901(3)(1), C.R.S., as a result of a good faith mistake or a technical violation.” “Good faith mistake” is defined in subsection 16-3-308(2)(a) as “a reasonable judgmental error concerning the existence of facts or law which if true would be sufficient to constitute probable cause.” See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104

    ### Response:
    recognizing good faith exception to fourth amendment exclusionary rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the res judicata doctrine bars Donald’s action against him. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, “prevents the relitigation of factual issues already decided if the identical issue was determined by a prior final judgment, and the party estopped had a fair opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue in a prior proceeding.” Portland Co., 2009 ME 98, ¶22, 979 A.2d at 1287 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 19] A party to a current proceeding may assert collateral estoppel defensively to bar the opposing party from relitigating factual issues resolved against it in a prior proceeding and which were decided by a prior final judgment, even though the party asserting collateral es-toppel was not a party to the prior proceeding. See Brewer v. Hagemann, 2001 ME 27, ¶ 8, 771 A.2d 1080, 1033 (<HOLDING>); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 768

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant though not a party to the prior litigation could assert collateral estoppel defensively to preclude the plaintiff from relitigating factual issues that the plaintiff had previously litigated and lost
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the first place. If [it] prevails], the only appropriate remedy is a declaration that the [Ordinance] is invalid and an injunction forbidding its enforcement.” Ezell, 651 F.3d at 699 n. 10 (emphasis in original). Waterfront cites to no case awarding anything other than injunctive relief to a plaintiff who asserts that it was harmed by the mere enactment of a zoning law, where the plaintiff has not applied for a permit. See also Rumber v. District of Columbia, 595 F.3d 1298, 1300 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.2010) (claim for compensatory damages did not save from mootness an action to enjoin eminent domain against a property because “no property ha[d] been taken from [the] plaintiffs”); Angino v. VanWagner, No. 1:CV-05-1748, 2009 WL 2859041, at *14-15 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 3, 2009) (Vanaskie, J.) (<HOLDING>). Limiting the available remedy to an

    ### Response:
    holding that damages were not available to a plaintiff who challenged an ordinance under a due process theory because the plaintiff had not sought a permit and therefore any claim for damages was purely speculative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Span and did not take his threats seriously. For example, counsel grilled Epps about his failure to immediately report Span’s threat to the staff at the Metropolitan Correction Center where Epps was detained at the time. But Epps’s testimony about “Lil Ride” showed that he had good reason to take Span seriously. Epps knew that Span had tried to coerce “Lil Ride” into recanting, and he had reason to believe, based on Span’s plot to kill “Lil Ride”, that Span would resort to violence. This knowledge explains why Epps would have recanted his statements, and why he might have hesitated to report Span’s threat to authorities. The testimony about “Lil Ride” thus tended to rehabilitate Epps and lend plausibility to his story. See United States v. Holly, 167 F.3d 393, 394-95 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we agree with appellate coun sel

    ### Response:
    holding that district court could admit evidence under 404b that defendant in insurance fraud case had threatened and abused witnesses in order to explain why witnesses initially told investigators defendant was not involved
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court committed no error in denying Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint and add a claim for disparate impact discrimination based on Department of Education regulations promulgated under § 602. 8 . Noteworthy among the district court cases are the following. In South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 145 F.Supp.2d 505 (D.N.J.2001), the district court had issued an injunction and declaratory judgment against the commissioner of the state's environmental protection agency for issuing air permits that the court determined had a disparate impact in violation of the regulations passed pursuant to § 602 by the Environmental Protection Agency. When the Sandoval decision was issued, the district court set a briefing schedule and th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Not only are the Eleventh Circuit

    ### Response:
    holding congress must unambiguously confer federal rights on the plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ... and by any paraprofessional person employed by such ... attorney ... based on the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services other than in a case under this title: and (2) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) . The award of compensation as well as the time of the award, and the amount of such award is within the discretion of the Court. In re Land, 138 B.R. 66 (D.Neb.1992), aff'd, 994 F.2d 843 (8th Cir.1993) (Table); 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. Further, an attorney must apply to the Court for compensation or reimbursement of expenses as set forth in Rule 2016(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proc e Golden Triangle Film Labs, Inc.), 164 B.R. 670, 671-72 (M.D.Fla.1994) (<HOLDING>); Kenneth Leventhal & Co. v. Spurgeon Holding

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorney could be required to disgorge any fees already received if he failed to indicate the specific nature of any services preformed or to produce documentary evidence that he was entitled to such fee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mr. Robbins asserts that the district court erred in calculating the tax-loss amount attributable to his crimes, a determination which affects his sentence under the advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1. On guideline issues, we review legal questions de novo, factual findings for clear error, and give due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts. United States v. Wolfe, 435 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir.2006). In determining the total tax loss, “all conduct violating the tax laws should be considered as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan unless the evidence demonstrates that the conduct is clearly unrelated.” U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, cmt. n. 2. See also United States v. Hayes, 322 F.3d 792, 801-02 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The tax loss proved at trial amounted to

    ### Response:
    holding that tax loss may include amounts in returns prepared by the defendant but not included in the indictment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    executed U-4 registration agreement. ISSUES I. Does Ottman’s defamation claim fall within the scope of the U-4 registration agreement? II. Does compelling arbitration violate Ottman’s right to a jury trial? III. Is Ottman pursuing a baseless claim? ANALYSIS Whether a party has agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute is a matter of contract interpretation, which we review de novo. See Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Minn.1995) (agreement to arbitrate matter of contract interpretation); Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House, 276 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn.1979) (contract interpretation subject to de novo review). We resolve any doubts in favor of arbitration. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (<HOLDING>); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988) (codifying

    ### Response:
    holding any doubts concerning scope of arbitrable issues resolved in favor of arbitration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    objected to arbitration on numerous grounds, including that the agreement to arbitrate was unconscionable. Although the District Court found that the arbitral forum was unavailable, it neither addressed substitution of a different arbitrator under § 5 of the FAA nor reached Mr. Inetianbor’s claim of unconscionability. Mr. Inetianbor does not ask us specifically to affirm on the grounds that the agreement to arbitrate was unconscionable, but he has repeatedly maintained on appeal that the agreement was a sham. I agree and conclude Congress did not intend for the federal courts to compel arbitration in such circumstances and that we should exercise our discretion to affirm the District Court on this alternate ground. See Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire. Bridge,

    ### Response:
    holding that in reviewing a district courts decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo the decision can be affirmed on any ground that finds support in the record including an alternate ground
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    groundwater. Thus, although the PCE contamination (as Sen try now argues) was not actually known or discovered by Greenbriar until 1996 (after the expiration of the Sentry policies), it may have “manifested itself” — that is, it may have been discoverable through reasonable testing — during the effective terms of each of the Sentry policies. Even if, as Sentry urges, “manifest” could be taken also to mean “discovered,” there would be, at most, an ambiguity in the meaning of “manifest” in this case, because “discoverable,” as shown supra, is at the very least an equally plausible definition of the term. The existence of such an ambiguity requires application of well-settled rules of construction as aids in the interpretive enterprise. See, e.g., Partnership Umbrella, 530 S.E.2d at 160 (<HOLDING>); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Walton, 244 Va.

    ### Response:
    holding that rules of contract construction are to be applied where the language used is ambiguous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the first part of MCL 600.5851(7) establishes a specific time in which a person under the age of eight must file a claim, with Miller, supra at 202, which defines a statute of limitations as a statute requiring a person to bring a claim within a specified time. In other words, statutes like MCL 600.5851(1) and MCL 600.5852 contain language that “saves” a claim that may otherwise be barred, while the language within MCL 600.5851(7) “gives” two distinct periods in which this particular class of claimants may file suit. Thus, the plain language of MCL 600.5851(7) provides an alternative limitations period (the tenth-birthday rule) that, depending on the facts of a particular case, may provide a plaintiff with more time than the “general” two-year period to sue. Miller, supra at 202 (<HOLDING>). Key to this conclusion is both that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the discovery rule within mcl 6005838a2 is an alternative to the other periods of limitation and it is itself a period of limitation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment. See id. at 584, 108 S.Ct. at 1986. The Court remarked that to allow the jury to consider evidence that was materially inaccurate was error. See id. at 590,108 S.Ct. at 1989. The present case does not parallel the situation addressed in Johnson nor the vast majority of cases that have relied upon Johnson to determine whether evidence of a criminal conviction or conduct may be properly admitted at sentencing. Instead of a materially inaccurate criminal conviction, we confront purportedly materially inaccurate testimony. Notwithstanding the difference, Hernandez must still establish that Grigson’s and Erdmann’s testimonies were false and material. See Fuller v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 491, 497 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Although neither the Supreme Court nor this

    ### Response:
    holding that habeas prisoners eighth amendment claim failed because he had not adequately shown that erdmanns testimony was false or material
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bad faith while negotiating his losses: ""WHEREAS, Farmers has denied that any such promise was extended to Goodwin, but has nevertheless agreed to pay to Goodwin the sum of $50,000 . . .”. (Italics ours.) Clerk’s Papers, at 27. Likewise, the agreement cannot be said to extinguish Bacon’s liability, as it required commencement of a lawsuit against Bacon, nor did Plaintiff receive full payment, as he would receive any award beyond $50,000, whether from Bacon or Sandoz. Thus, Plaintiff remained the real party in interest, and CR 17 did not compel admission of the test uding the seven federal circuits, that have addressed FIFRA preemption since the United States Supreme Court’s explanation of express preemption analysis in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 120 L. N.Y. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Upon engaging in our own analysis of the

    ### Response:
    holding fifra preempts inadequate label claims but not claims for failure to warn through other channels
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opinion supplements and amends a letter opinion I issued on June 15, 2007 denying cross-motions for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed, see R. 4:46-2(c), and my bench opinion of September 7, 2007 in which I made certain factual findings but did not decide the merits of these appeals. This opinion is based on the certifications and documents submitted in connection with the summary judgment motions as well as the testimony and documents presented at a plenary hearing on September 7, 2007, and my evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses. 3 Under I.R.C. § 1031(a), the “taxpayer” must effect the exchange, that is, the same taxpayer must be transferor and transferee in the exchange transaction. See Chase v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 874, 1989 WL 38262 (1989) (<HOLDING>). 4 Because single member limited liability

    ### Response:
    holding that a transaction did not satisfy the requirements of  1031a when a partnership sold property and individual partners acquired the exchange property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied) (internal citation omitted); Natho v. Shelton, No. 03-11-00661-CV, 2014 WL 2522051, at *2 (Tex.App.-Austin May 30, 2014, no. pet. h.) (""When a fiduciary intentionally breaches his duty by self-dealing and thereby gaining a benefit for himself, willful and fraudulent acts are presumed.”). Thus, under Texas law, Whitting-ton’s intent is likely presumed as a matter of law. 13 . Some courts, noting that it could be difficult to ""prove a negative” — that is, to prove reliance on facts that were not disclosed— have focused their inquiry on whether the concealed information was material, that is, whether it would have affected decision-making had it been disclosed, a standard plainly met here. See Titan Grp. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>); see also Apte v. Japra (In re Apte), 96 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding in securities law context that in cases involving nondisclosure of material facts  materiality rather than reliance  becomes the decisive element of causation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Connecticut. Consequently, the court has no information on the precise content of these histories, and must base its decision solely on the records from Connecticut. See footnote 4, supra. 9 . Camara’s birth date and driver's license expiration date are not protected. In the definition of ""personal information,” section 2725(3) lists an individual's ""photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information....” 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3). Applying the interpretive doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the statute cannot be read to apply to an individual's birth date nor his driver's license expiration date. See Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 370 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Courts turn to the traditional canons of

    ### Response:
    holding that application of the doctrine of expressio unius is proper where the statute identifies a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand thus raising the inference that a similar unlisted term was deliberately excluded
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the district court will be ordered to enter a judgment of acquittal on both of those counts on remand. 1 . Inasmuch as we are vacating each of the defendants’ convictions on Counts 2 through 13, and Inge’s convictions on two counts, we need not address the claims of error that pertain to sentencing. We will, however, address certain evidentiary rulings that are challenged in this appeal as the same issues may again arise if the Defendants are retried on the tax evasion charges. 2 . The Donatos were charged in Counts 14 through 17 and McKee in Counts 18 through 21. 3 . Courts of Appeals are split on whether a constructive amendment to an indictment are per se reversible error under plain error review. Compare United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 712-13 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>) with United States v. Fletcher, 121 F.3d 187,

    ### Response:
    holding that constructive amendments which are per se reversible under harmless error analysis are also per se reversible under plain error analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the subject: Plaintiff included a copy of the 2001 EEOC Complaint with his application on June 30, 2005 — twelve days before Plaintiffs interview with Schlem-mer. {See Michael Henshaw Decl. ¶ 4, June 19, 2007) Plaintiff had earlier stated at oral argument that it was Schlemmer who first brought up the 2001 EEOC Complaint. (Mem.Op.4, Apr. 4, 2007) The only genuine issue is which party first broached the subject. For purposes of Plaintiffs prima facie case, it is sufficient that Defendant was aware of the protected activity, regardless of which party first brought up the issue. Defendant argues, however, that in Title VII retaliation cases, “generally the passage of time ... tends to negate the infer- enee of discrimination.” Price, 380 F.3d at 213; see also Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657 (<HOLDING>). Although Defendant’s argument is true,

    ### Response:
    holding that although evidence that the alleged adverse action occurred shortly after the employer became aware of the protected activity is sufficient to make a prima facie causation case the opposite is equally true  a lengthy time lapse between the employer becoming aware of the protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action  negates any inference that a causal connection exists between the two
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir. 1993) (Breyer, C.J.). Other courts of appeals have enumerated comparable requirements. See, e.g., United States v. Sloan, 505 F.3d 685, 697 (7th Cir.2007); United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 524 (2d Cir.2000); United States v. Walgren, 885 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir.1989). Beyond these generalities, the case law has been uneven. For example, several courts have indicated that something more than the stain of conviction is needed to show continuing collateral consequences. See, e.g., Fleming v. United States, 146 F.3d 88, 90-91 & n. 3 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam); United States v. Dyer, 136 F.3d 417, 429-30 & n. 33 (5th Cir.1998); Hager, 993 F.2d at 5; United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 (3d Cir.1988); see also United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 203 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Other courts have indicated that continuing

    ### Response:
    holding that continuing collateral consequences arise only in situations where the disability is unique to a criminal conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Corr., 364 Fed.Appx. 499, 500 (10th Cir.2010). On September 19, 2014, after additional state-court proceedings, Mr. Chase filed a second § 2254 application in federal district court again asserting ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his plea. He supported his argument with alleged new law—Lafler v. Cooper, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012). The district court dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction and denied a COA, determining that the application was second or successive. The court declined to transfer the application to this court because Lafler did not announce a new rule of constitutional law and therefore it would not apply retroactively to Mr. Chase’s conviction. See In re Graham, 714 F.3d 1181, 1182-83 (10th Cir.2013) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Chase now seeks a COA from us. He asserts

    ### Response:
    holding in 28 usc  2255 proceeding that lafler does not establish new rule of constitutional law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his motion to reconsider. In re Jin Di Lu, No. A97 162 780 (B.I.A. Jan. 16, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. Where, as here, an alien files a timely petition for review from the denial of a motion to reconsider, but not from the underlying decision for which reconsideration is sought, we may review only the denial of the motion to reconsider. See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 88, 89-90 (2d Cir.2001). To the extent that Lu challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider, we find that the BIA reasonably denied his motion where he failed to specify errors of fact or law in its prior decision as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). See Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for

    ### Response:
    holding that the bia does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to reconsider where the motion merely repeats arguments that the bia has previously rejected
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Criminal Appeals. The Air Force Rules of Practice and Procedure provide further guidance on the granted issue: When a case is remanded directly to the Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (hereinafter CAAP), it shall, when practical, be referred to the same numbered panel that last decided the case. A.P.C.C.A. R. 2.2(b). Nothing in the UCMJ, or rules of procedure provide Appellant the right to select a panel, or have his case considered by any particular panel. Article 66, UCMJ; A.F.C.C.A. R. 2.2(b); United States v. Vines, 15 M.J. 247, 249 (C.M.A. 1983). By law, the court may review eases en banc or in panels, and the chief judge of the court has broad authority to assign, remove and reassign judges to cases on the court’s docket. See Vines, 15 M.J. at 249 (<HOLDING>). In Vines, the accused’s case was sent to the

    ### Response:
    holding that there are no restrictionsstatutory or regulatoryon the authority of the chief judge as administrative chief of the court to assign cases to panels as he wishes in addition the power to change panel assignment once made is likewise unrestricted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deliberative process and then to discuss that information with her. The standard only requires physicians and counselors to make reasonable efforts. They need not be mind readers, as long as they reasonably attend to the circumstances of their individual patients____ The reasonably prudent patient standard thus takes into account each woman’s unique circumstances. [Kathy Seward Northern, Procreative Torts: Enhancing the Commonr-Law Protection for Reproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. Ill. L.Rev. 489, 533.] The physician’s obligation, therefore, does not “compel disclosure of every risk ... to any [pregnant] patient[,]” but rather only “material risks to a reasonable patient.” Largey, supra, 110 N.J. at 213, 540 A.2d 504. E.g., Jones v. United States, 933 F.Supp. 894, 902 (N.D.Cal.1996) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 127 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.1997), cert.

    ### Response:
    holding that military physicians did not have duty to disclose to patient that penicillin they had prescribed for her could interfere with effectiveness of her birth control pills because existence of such drug interaction was unproven and danger of interference occurring appeared to be extremely remote
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    P. 44, 47, 48(a), that the State had failed to argue accomplice liability and arguing that D.B. had not been given an opportunity to present a defense to this alternate theory. Although a post-judgment motion on an issue is not necessary if D.B. had otherwise raised the issue, a timely postjudgment motion may in some instances be used to preserve an issue not previously raised if the court considers and rules on the issues raised in a postjudgment motion. Cf. Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2009 UT 44, ¶ 23, 215 P.3d 152 ("" [OJnee trial counsel has raised an issue before the trial court, and the trial court has considered the issue, the issue is preserved for appeal. "" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 265-66 (Utah 1992) (<HOLDING>). 111 D.B.'s failure to object either at trial,

    ### Response:
    holding that issues raised and dealt with in posttrial evidentiary hearings are preserved for appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 597-98 (7th Cir.2011) (noting that the “district court’s denial of any discovery was all the more unreasonable because [the producing party] had refused to meet with [opposing counsel] to negotiate a reduction in the amount of discovery sought and ... refuse[d] • to present any evidence of the burdens that granting, [the] discovery request would impose.”). Finally, no undue burden exists because the discovery requests being compelled through this Order are sufficiently tailored. The discovery requested here is narrower than the discovery requested in In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano as Mesa Power is requesting documents that directly relate to the foreign proceeding and that date from within a reasonable time period. Compare In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano, 685 F.3d at 999 (<HOLDING>), with Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel

    ### Response:
    holding that discovery was appropriately tailored as it limited the request to information within a six year time period relating to one specific contract and the deposition of a person most knowledgeable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in light of the instruction in Sheppard that “conflict-free counsel is not necessary when the motion’s allegations are conclusively refuted by the record.” Smith v. State, 21 So.3d 72, 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). In Smith, we applied Sheppard under facts similar to those in the instant case, where the trial court struck a represented defendant’s pro se motion as a nullity. There, we conducted a de novo review to determine whether the trial court’s decision to strike the appellant’s motion would be affirmable even if reached for the wrong reason. We found that even where allegations “are sufficient to invoke the requirement to hold a limited hearing under Sheppard” a harmless error analysis would be appropriate. Id. at 76; see also Johnson v. State, 22 So.3d 840, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). Here, the transcript of the plea colloquy

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial courts failure to hold a sheppard hearing may be considered harmless if the allegations in the rule 3170z motion are conclusively refuted by the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Based on this language, Ross argues the restitution statutes must be construed as reaching only those victims affected by wire transactions alleged in the indictment and submitted to the jury. We disagree with the government’s claim that Ross cannot attack the restitution order because we affirmed it in the first appeal. Apprendi was decided after the first appeal, and announced a new (although not watershed) rule of constitutional law. See United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir.2001), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 848, 151 L.Ed.2d 725 (2002). Since Ross relies upon Apprendi, and this appeal is a direct review of Ross’s resentencing, he is not barred from attacking the restitution order. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Because Ross raised his Apprendi challenge in

    ### Response:
    holding that a new rule for conducting criminal prosecutions should be applied to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence supports a finding that Van Winkle did not suffer from disabling pain during the relevant period. To determine whether a claimant suffers from debilitating pain, the court applies the following two-part test announced in Duncan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir.1986): First, we examine whether there is objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition. If there is, we then examine: (1) whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition; or (2) whether the objectively established medical condition is of such a severity that it can reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain. See also McCormick v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 861 F.2d 998, 1002-03 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Van Winkle did not suffer from disabling pain

    ### Response:
    holding that the duncan test applies to the reform act of 1984 and to the commissioners superseding regulations on pain
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    L.Ed.2d 403 (1987); United States v. Overmyer, 899 F.2d 457, 465 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939, 111 S.Ct. 344, 112 L.Ed.2d 308 (1990). In denying Lee’s Motion to Dismiss, the district court relied on United States v. Swift, 809 F.2d 320 (6th Cir.1987), and United States v. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d 301 (4th Cir.1998). In Sivift, this court held that a false statement’s failure to lead the tribunal astray is irrelevant for 18 U.S.C. § 1623 analysis. 809 F.2d at 324. The court stated that “a false declaration satisfies the materiality requirement if a truthful statement might have assisted or influenced the grand jury in its investigation.” Id. (citing United States v. Richardson, 596 F.2d 157, 165 (6th Cir.1979)); see also United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 588 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. DeZarn, 157 F.3d 1042, 1049

    ### Response:
    holding that a statement is material if it has the natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing a decision making process showing of actual influence unnecessary to prove materiality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    details of the previous molestation and thus failed to show that the prior molestation was similar to the current offense. We also conclude that Oatts did not offer specific details of the videotape and thus failed to show that the conduct in the videotape was similar to the current offense. Oatts failed to show that either the prior molestation or videotape were similar to the current offense. Oatts also failed to show that the evidence was relevant or that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the exclusion of the evidence violated Oatts’s right to cross examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. See Grant, 75 F.Supp.2d at 217-218 (<HOLDING>); People v. Hill, 289 Ill.App.3d 859, 225 Ill.

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not commit constitutional error by excluding evidence about the pri or rape of the tenyearold victim when she was five years old because the defendant did not proffer evidence that the prior rape was similar to the current incident
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deed takes effect from the date of delivery, and the recording of a deed is not essential to its validity as between the parties or those taking with notice,”); see also Sargent v. Baxter, 673 So.2d 979, 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“A grantor’s recording of a deed ... is generally presumed equivalent to delivery”). Thus, even if the Declaration clearly creates an easement for access to the dock on Parcel A, it was not a recorded document at the time that the Davids took the property. And due to the summary nature of the proceedings below, there is no evidence in the record that the Davids took possession of Parcel A with any knowledge of the Declaration or any other indication of a possible easement for access to the dock on Parcel A. See Kirma v. Norton, 102 So.2d 653, 657 (Fla.1958) (<HOLDING>); cf. Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. v. Shoppes at

    ### Response:
    holding that generally a bona fide purchaser without notice of easements takes the property free of such easements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that a municipality may be held liable under Section 1983 for a single decision by its properly constituted legislative body, regardless of whether that body had taken similar action in the past or intended to do so again in the future, because even a single decision by such a body unquestionably constitutes an act of official government policy. Id. at 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292. Justices Stevens and O’Connor, each writing separately, agreed with this portion of the plural 520 U.S. 781, 784-88, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997); Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (plurality); Dallas I.S.D., 153 F.3d at 216-17; and Flores, 92 F.3d at 263. See also Jett v. Dallas ISD, 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989); and Gros v. City of Grand Prairie, Texas, 181 F.3d at 617 (<HOLDING>). 166 . See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786-87, 117

    ### Response:
    holding that determination as to whether an official has been delegated final policymaking authority is a question of law for the court not one of fact for the juiy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was an effort to get recklessness in, which would have changed the standard from the second circuit.”). 4 . As ove the truth of the information contained in them, but to show the lack of scienter on the part of the defendants. See Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 82 F.3d 877, 885 n. 10 (9th Cir.1996). 7 . The argument over the stop ship reports exemplifies the problem with the generalized allegations in plaintiffs' complaint. If plaint also require direct involvement. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152, 92 S.Ct. 1456, 1471, 31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972) (approving of primary liability of bank employees who made a market in securities despite bank representations that its duty was to individual clients); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 464 n. 2 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol,

    ### Response:
    holding defendants liable for their various roles in fraudulent marketing of bonds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the United States. Claims for vessel owner negligence under § 905 were delineated in Scindia, where the Court held that a vessel owner may be liable in tort for injury to an LHWCA employee if the vessel owner (1) fails to warn the repairman’s employer of a hidden danger that is known, or should have been known in the exercise of reasonable care, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622; (2) actively involves itself in repair work and negligently causes injury, id.; or (3) fails to intervene upon discovering a dangerous condition and the employer’s failure to correct it. Id. at 175-78, 101 S.Ct. at 1626-28. Contribution may be had against a person where the original plaintiff could have enforced liability against him. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 495 F.2d 911, 919 (9th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). Because, if the United States had been a

    ### Response:
    holding that contribution will lie where no statute precludes recovery from the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. AFFIRMED. DELL, C.J., and FARMER, J., concur. GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion. GLICKSTEIN, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur with the majority on the merits of the action, but disagree on the award of attorneys’ fees by the trial court. As to that, I would reverse and remand with direction to apportion appellant’s responsibility for same in accordance with the interest he received. See § 64.081, Fla.Stat. (1993); Diaz v. Security Union Title Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 649 So.2d 232 (Fla.1994) (<HOLDING>); Daugharty v. Daugharty, 441 So.2d 1160 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding that cotenants of property each possessing a onehalf interest in property are each hable for onehalf of the attorneys fees awarded
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Pinewood on the date of the judgment between Ritchie and defendants. After the judgment, defendants were granted a preliminary injunction against Ritchie and all companies in which he maintains an ownership interest “from selling, disposing of, secreting, transferring or encumbering any assets until the post-judgment collection proceedings are completed[.]” Among those entities enjoined by the lower court was Pinewood, and, by extension, the assets Pinewood holds as trustee. Pinewood was not a named defendant in the injunction. According to the complaint, neither Ritchie nor Pinewood maintain an ownership interest in those trust assets. The preliminary injunction was later vacated by this Court. Harris v. Pinewood Dev. Corp., 176 N.C. App. 704, 707-08, 627 S.E.2d 639, 642 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs allege that while that appeal was

    ### Response:
    holding that nc gen stat  1355 does not allow a preliminary injunction to be entered until either a judgment has been returned wholly or partially unsatisfied or the terms of nc gen stat  1355 are met
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    MDCR found ""probable cause” that Bassett was (1) subjected to disparate scrutiny based on her race, and (2) retaliated against because she had attempted to pursue “legitimate channels” to stop the alleged discriminatory behavior in her employment. While not determinative on the question of discrimination, the finding of probable cause demonstrates that upon distillation of all the evidence presented, reasonable minds could disagree over the material fact of retaliation and intentional discrimination. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 n. 39, 96 S.Ct. 1949, 48 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976) (prior administrative findings made in employment discrimination claim admissible at trial under Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(c)), cf. Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Bassett’s charge, cross-filed with the

    ### Response:
    recognizing admissibility of eeoc reasonable cause determination but declining to adopt per se rule of admissibility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    request for a new penalty hearing and Ellio re to state such a ground [for relief] in the [PCRA] petition shall preclude the defendant from raising that ground in any proceeding for post-conviction collateral relief’). Even if we were to assume, for purposes of argument, that Elliott preserved his Brooks claim by referencing trial counsel’s failure to meet with him prior to trial in the context of the separate issue challenging counsel’s failure to investigate evidence of Elliot’s prior bad acts, he would not be entitled to relief on the merits of the claim. It is clear that a majority of this Court in Brooks expressly required that counsel representing a defendant in a capital murder trial conduct a substantive, face-to-face consultation with the defendant prior to tri 90, 896 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Bundy, 421 A.2d at 1051

    ### Response:
    holding that to establish ineffectiveness on the basis of alleged inadequate pretrial consultation the defendant must establish that counsel inexcusably failed to raise issues that had they been proffered would have entitled him to relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statistically significant disparities in the compensation of black employees relative to white employees, are evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could determine that intentional discrimination occurred. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs generalized statistics are insufficient to support Plaintiffs claims of intentional discrimination. As the Supreme Court has noted, while statistical evidence may allow the District Court to “determine ... that the (racial) composition of defendant’s labor force is itself reflective of restrictive or exclusionary practices .... such general determinations, while helpful, may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an individualized hiring decision, particularly in the presence of an otherwise justifiable 9 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Because Plaintiff has failed to provide any

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    us would certainly fail to protect a defendant’s best interests and might leave the conviction on otherwise time-barred offenses vulnerable to collateral attack Id. at 309. We can glean at least four legal principles from court decisions involving the two distinct scenarios discussed above: First, the statute of limitations is waivable by a defendant, either expressly or through his own actions. Tucker, 459 So.2d at 306; Sturdivan v. State, 419 So.2d 300, 302 (Fla. 1982) (observing “a defendant may by his actions waive this defense.”) Second, because it is waivable, the statute of limitations necessarily cannot be considered “jurisdictional,” at least not in the sense of depriving the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Rodriguez v. State, 441 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (<HOLDING>); Farrar v. State, 42 So.3d 265, 265 (Fla. 5th

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute of limitations defense does not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent the statute of limitations may be considered in any sense a jurisdictional impediment it is one which can be waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had no reasonable strategy for such omission, Elliott has failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice by establishing what evidence a further investigation would have revealed that would have changed the outcome of the trial. Similar to our holding in Issue I, absent a proffer of information that trial counsel could have uncovered and used to impeach the bad act witnesses’ testimony, Elliott’s claim that he was prejudiced by a deficiency in his investigation or preparation fails. See Harvey, 812 A.2d at 1197 (rejecting claim that counsel was ineffective for not undertaking further investigation where appellant failed to show that doing so would have provided material evidence or would have been helpful to his defense); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292, 304 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Elliott’s contentions, the

    ### Response:
    holding conjecture that additional investigation might have yielded valuable information is insufficient to establish prejudice for ineffective assistance claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or loss of evidence qualifies as spoliation. In Milwaukee Constructors II, 177 Wis. 2d at 532, we adopted the process for evaluating the details, significance and sanctions concerning allegations of destruction of evidence set forth in Struthers Patent Corp. v. Nestle Co., 558 F. Supp. 747, 756 (D.N.J. 1981). Struthers instructs that in reviewing the conduct of the offending party, the trial court should consider not only whether the party responsible for the destruction of evidence knew, or should have known, at the time it destroyed the evidence that litigation was a distinct possibility, but also whether the offending party destroyed documents which it knew, or should have known, would constitute evidence relevant to the pending or potential litigation. See id. at 756, 765 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 16. This two-part analysis makes perfect

    ### Response:
    holding that the destruction of documents which the party knew or should have known would be relevant to a pending or potential lawsuit is sanctionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brown v. Crowe, 963 F.2d 895 (6th Cir.1992). That cannot be said to be the case here, especially in view of the fact that the “prior restraint” cases cited in the plaintiffs’ appellate briefs simply are not applicable to the facts of this case. Hence, even if the issue had been squarely presented, we could not find in the plaintiffs’ favor based on the authority submitted on appeal. There remains the equal protection question, which is raised here under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court held that the claim was non-cognizable because the Equal Protection Clause protects against inappropriate classifications of people, rather than things. This position has been adopted by several courts. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Bailey, 234 Conn. 455, 662 A.2d 1226 (1995)(<HOLDING>); California Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of

    ### Response:
    holding that a state weapons ban did not violate equal protection principles because the plaintiffs challenge related to classifications among weapons not persons
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    status under Law 100. Law 100 prohibits discrimination by an “employer” based on the protected characteristic of, among other factors, age. P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 29 § 146. The term “employer” is defined as “any natural or artificial person employing laborers, workers or employees, and the chief, official, manager, officer, managing partner, administrator, superintendent, foreman, overseer, agent or representative of such natural or artificial person.” P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 29 § 151(2). As discussed above there is no evidence in the record to support Plaintiffs’ contention that Buck had any control over PRMMPs employment practices nor that it had any employment nexus with the Plaintiffs. Therefore, Buck is not liable under law 100. See Santini-Rivera v. Serv Air, Inc., 94 JTS 121, p. 182 (<HOLDING>). C. Buck’s status under ERISA. Plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding that the legislation in question is exclusively concerned with labor matters its subject is strictly the employeremployee relationship translation ours
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (7th Cir. 2012) (“Although it is possible that the drugs found on January 18 were already in his possession as early as January 11, it is at least equally likely that they were not. For all we know, Sims sold the last of his January 11 drug supply to the officer that day and then acquired additional cocaine before his arrest on January 18.”). But Pham fails to contend, much less show, that he possessed the drugs confiscated on February 28 as early as February 12. See, e.g., Def. Br. 11 (citing Sims without tying it to this case); Reply 2 (“[U]nder these particular facts, two drug convictions, one consisting of a sale and the other of finding of the stash from that sale, warrant a finding of one criminal episode.”); see Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Pham does, however, make the more complex

    ### Response:
    holding a party waives an argument made for the first time on reply
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way. Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). See also, Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) (upholding withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) against a substantive due process challenge); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A Gray,

    ### Response:
    holding that the withdrawal liability provisions of the mppaa do not violate the taking clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On its face, ORS § 652.610(3) prohibits an employer from withholding “any portion of an employee’s wages unless ... [t]he employer is required to do so by law[.]” ORS § 652.610(3)(a) (emphasis added). Because neither the Internal Revenue Code nor its implementing regulations “require” an employer to withhold tax on estimated tips, an employer, like Starbucks, who does so pursuant to the permissive authority granted by federal law is in violation of the Oregon statute. This is precisely the type of conflict that is addressed by federal preemption. When a state law specifically prohibits an activity that is authorized by federal law, the state law must give way. See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32-34, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 1108-09, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1,

    ### Response:
    holding a federal law permitting national banks to sell insurance in towns with less than 5000 residents preempted a state statute prohibiting banks from selling most types of insurance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the need for “rehabilitation.” Appellant’s Br. at 7. Because “ ‘reasonableness’ is inherently a concept of flexible meaning,” United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 115, district courts necessarily enjoy broad discretion in imposing sentences within a statutory range. “Although the brevity or length of a sentence can exceed the bounds of ‘reasonableness,’ we anticipate encountering such circumstances infrequently.” United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d at 100. This is not such a rare case. Bethea’s sentence represented the bottom of the applicable Guidelines sentencing range determined by reference to an offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI. Contrary to Bethea’s assertions, the district judge explicitly considered the issue of rehabilitation. See Sentencing Tr. at 13 (<HOLDING>). Noting Bethea’s eleven prior convictions, the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that  3553a requires the sentencing court to consider educational and other correctional treatments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conclusory and far from artful,” Jennings v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 672 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir.1982), we construe Henley’s complaint as alleging a violation of her right to be free from the use of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment inasmuch as she is asserting that certain individual defendant 5 (8th Cir.2001) (“Intentional sexual harassment by persons acting under color of state law violates the Fourteenth Amendment and is actionable under § 1983.”). To the extent that Henley’s complaint asserts the violation of rights secured by the Constitution and committed by persons acting under color of state law, we conclude the district court erred in dismissing her section 1983 action for failure to comply with Title VIPs procedural requirements. See, e.g., Notari, 971 F.2d at 588 (<HOLDING>); cf. Jennings, 672 F.2d at 716 (concluding

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiffs allegations defendant acted under col or of state law to violate rights secured by the fourteenth amendment are sufficient to defeat summary judgment of plaintiffs section 1983 claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So.2d 812 (Miss.1972); Brennan v. Biber, 93 N.J.Super. 351, 225 A.2d 742 (Law Div.1966), aff’d, 99 N.J.Super. 247, 239 A.2d 261 (App.Div.1968); Gilbert v. Stanton Brewery, 295 N.Y. 270, 67 N.E.2d 155 (1946); Kalsow v. Grob, 61 N.D. 119, 237 N.W. 848 (1931); Quinn v. City of Pittsburgh, 243 Pa. 521, 90 A. 353 (1914); McGarr v. National Providence Worsted Mills, 24 R.I. 447, 53 A. 320 (1902). 7 . See, e.g., Smith v. Richardson, 277 Ala. 389, 171 So.2d 96, 100 (1965) ((overruling earlier suggestion in Durden v. Barnett, 7 Ala. 169, 170 (1844), that the parental claim ought to be recognized)); Baxter v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 19 Cal.3d 461, 138 Cal.Rptr. 315, 563 P.2d 871, 874 (1977); Shattuck v. Gulliver, 40 Conn.Sup. 95, 481 A.2d 1110, 1113 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Curtis v. County of Cook, 109 Ill.App.3d 400,

    ### Response:
    holding that consortium is not a part of the parentchild relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motion for summary judgment on this basis, they do not discuss those proceedings in their brief. 30 . See Stiles v. Resolution Trust Corp., 867 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex.1993) (stating the general rule that a reviewing court cannot affirm summary judgment on grounds not presented in the motion); see also Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, 15 Couch On Insurance 3d § 216:34 (2007) (indicating that settlement with an insurer does not release claims against the insurance agency or agent if claims against them are specifically reserved or if the claim against the insurer, which sounds in contract, is separate from the claim against the agency). 31 . The two-year statute of limitations applicable to the Insureds' negligence cla t *4 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 9, 2004, no pet.) (mem.op.) (<HOLDING>). 37 . However, evidence of trust and reliance

    ### Response:
    holding that an insurance agent owed no duty to explain the terms of the insurance policy to the insured or to advise him on other alternative policy coverages citing critchfield v smith 151 sw3d 225 230 texapptyler 2004 pet denied moore v whitneyvaky ins agency 966 sw2d 690 692 texappsan antonio 1998 no pet and pickens v tex farm bureau ins cos 836 sw2d 803 805 texappamarillo 1992 no writ
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argument that he ever sought promotion to any job other than the job to which he was promoted. It is certainly true that a plaintiff’s promotion does not mean he may not be a representative of a class with respect to promotions, but it is equally certain that it is a factor which may be evaluated in considering whether such a person satisfies the requirements of Rule 23. Compare Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 516 (N.D.Ill.1977) (“since plaintiff was hired, promoted, and given an opportunity to transfer, as the undisputed facts show, she cannot properly represent a class consisting of people who were allegedly denied those opportunities because of sex.”); Scott v. University of Delaware, 601 F.2d 76 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931, 100 S.Ct. 275, 62 L.Ed.2d 189 (1979) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the fact that Mr. Spears

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court erred in not decertifying the class on the basis of facts adduced at trial including the fact that scott seeks to lead a challenge against the same university hiring policies which resulted in his employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    request with a viable constitutional claim that is not procedurally barred, or (b) when the sought-after assistance would only support a meritless claim, or (c) when the sought after assistance would only supplement prior evidence. Id. (internal citation omitted; emphasis added). Gutierrez has not shown the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant additional investigative assistance. “[Gutierrez’] right under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9) to the assistance of experts where reasonably necessary to press his habeas claims does not entitle him to a federal evidentiary hearing when he has failed to ... develop his evidence in state court”. Turner v. Johnson, 106 F.3d 1178, 1184 n. 16 (5th Cir.1997) (internal citations omitted); see also Riley v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 302 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1056, 125 S.Ct. 866,

    ### Response:
    holding petitioner cannot show a substantial need for investigative assistance when the claims he seeks to pursue are procedurally barred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Agreement. For example, assume that Aviall and Cooper entered into a contract that provided only that Aviall would assume liability for Cooper’s pre-closing debt to Jones Company. If Jones Company made demand on Cooper, who in turn made demand on Aviall, who then refused to pay the debt, Cooper could presumably bring a breach of contract claim against Aviall for failing to honor its contractual obligation to assume liability for the Jones Company debt. But this right would be based on a contract that reflected that this was the parties’ objective intent. In the present case, however, the Agreement has other relevant provisions, and the contract must be interpreted as a whole. See, e.g., Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. FDIC, 16 F.Supp.2d 698, 707 (N.D.Tex.1998) (Fitzwater, J.) (Texas law) (<HOLDING>). Section 1.03 and other provisions that impose

    ### Response:
    holding that court must examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The district court and Wilson appear to have assumed that the failure to follow the requirements of the ICE Directive was sufficient to warrant suppression. Such an assumption is untenable in light of Moore and Whren. The ICE Directive that Rourke violated provided that a designated customs officer’s “[u]se of [customs] authorities without first having been coordinated and approved by the appropriate SAC is strictly prohibited.” Wilson has not suggested, however, that, as a general matter, the Fourth Amendment requires an officer to obtain supervisory authorization prior to making a vehicle stop justified by probable cause, nor are we aware of any authority that could support such a suggestion. Cf. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 744, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Instead, Wilson’s Fourth Amendment argument

    ### Response:
    holding that irs agents did not violate the fourth amendment by conducting surveillance in violation of regulations requiring prior authorization because neither the constitution nor any act of congress requires that official approval be secured before conversations are overheard or recorded by government agents with the consent of one of the eonversants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    will be deemed acquiescence in the setting of that date.” Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind.1999), reh’g denied. Where a defendant “seeks or acquiesces in any delay which results in a later trial date, the time limitations of the rule are also extended by the length of those delays.” Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 924 (Ind.1999), reh’g denied. We first address Hill’s argument regarding the seven-day delay between March 12, 2001 and March 19, 2001. The trial court offered the State its choice between the two dates, and the State chose March 19, 2001 as the trial date. However, Hill failed to object to the later trial setting. Thus, Hill acquiesced to the later trial date and waived his right to raise this issue on appeal. See, e.g., Vermillion, 719 N.E.2d at 1202-1205 (<HOLDING>). We now address Hill’s argument regarding the

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant acquiesced to the rescheduling of the trial and thus waived the right to object to the sevenday delay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and tenuous,” SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir.1997), but if that information comes from an insider and concerns actual and serious merger discussions, “a lesser level of specificity is required [to establish materiality].” Id. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “ ‘[i]nside information as regards mergers ... can become material at an earlier stage than would be the case as regards lesser- transactions-and this even though the mortality rate of mergers at such formative stages is doubtless high.’ ” Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988), quoting SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir.1976); see also Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 156 (2d Cir.1992) (same); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (2d Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). In fact, even disclosures about tender offer

    ### Response:
    holding that even though negotiations had not jelled to the point where a merger was probable information disclosed regarding those negotiations was material in light of the potential profits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the United States Code only serve as ""prima fa-cie” evidence of the law unless they are enacted as ""positive law,” in which case they too serve as legal evidence of the laws. Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Serv., 214 F.3d 179, 182 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.2000); see 1 U.S.C. § 204(a) (""[WJhenever titles of such Code [of Laws of the United States] shall have been enacted into positive law the text thereof shall be legal evidence of the laws therein contained, in all the courts of the United States.”). Title 7 has not been enacted into positive law. See 1 U.S.C.A. § 204, United States Code Titles as Positive Law. In this case, therefore, the court is not bound by the codifier’s placement of FETRA in Title 7. Cf. United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 98 n. 3, 84 S.Ct. 1082, 12 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964) (<HOLDING>). 16 . It is also unsupported by the

    ### Response:
    holding that when congress has not enacted a codification as positive law a change of arrangement by the codifier without the approval of congress which places portions of what was originally a single section in two separate sections should be given no weight
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Scott (1931) 113 Cal.App. Supp. 778, 783 [296 P. 601].) A dissolute person is one who is “ ‘indifferent to moral restraint’ ” and “ ‘given over to dissipation. . . .’ ” (People v. Jaurequi, supra, 142 Cal.App.2d 555, 560.) The terms “lewd” and “dissolute” ordinarily include conduct found “disgusting, repulsive, filthy, foul, abominable [or] loathsome” under contemporary community standards. (Silva v. Municipal Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 733, 741 [115 Cal.Rptr. 479].) This impressive list of adjectives and phrases confers no clarity upon the terms “lewd” and “dissolute” in section 647, subdivision (a). Indeed, “the veiy phrases and synonyms through which meaning is purportedly ascribed serve to obscure rather than to clarify those terms.” (State v. Kueny (Iowa 1974) 215 N.W.2d 215, 217 (<HOLDING>).) To instruct the jury that a “lewd or

    ### Response:
    holding the phrase open and gross lewdness unconstitutionally vague
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unconstitutional as violative of his right to equal protection. After careful consideration, for substantially the same reasons stated in the district court's March 13, 2003 order, we `conclude that the district court did' not err in holding that Mr. Latu suffered no prejudice from the defects in the notice. The defects were cor rected and Mr. Latu was given all the time he needed to meet the charges. We reject Mr. Latu’s argument that, because the initial notice was defective, the attorney general’s subsequent acts in effecting his removal were ultra vires. An official act does not become ultra vires if the officer was statutorily empowered to act but may have acted erroneously. See Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1229-30 (10th Cir.2002); cf. Noriega-Lopez, 335 F.3d at 883 (<HOLDING>). Mr. Latu received all the process he was due.

    ### Response:
    holding that bia acted ultra vires because statute did not give it authority to issue deportation orders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vasquez-Lopez and Barragan-Sanchez, we relied on the aliens’ previous voluntary departure agreements in rejecting their arguments for relief. Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien’s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the “specific policy” of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (“While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing ‘presence’ so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.”); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (<HOLDING>); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719

    ### Response:
    holding that because aliens two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not therefore strictly voluntary they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years continuous presence in the united states under a rule that excused absences that were brief casual and innocent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    'we need not accept extrinsic facts not pleaded nor need we accept legal conclusions in contradiction of the pleaded facts'"" See Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC, 2010 UT 29, §10, 232 P.3d 999 (quoting Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 319 (Utah 1979)). 4 . The alleged malicious intent on the part of NCR falls more appropriately within a claim of malicious prosecution, under which an actor may be liable for initiating or procuring ""criminal proceedings against another who is not guilty of the offense charged ... if (a) [the accuser] initiates or procures the proceedings without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice, and (b) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the accused."" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653 P.3d 1042 (<HOLDING>). 7 . Because statutory amendments made

    ### Response:
    holding that emotional pain and a need for counseling combined with physical pain medical bills loss of employment and a need for sexual therapy supported a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or direct that service be effected within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Good cause exists “only when some outside factor^] such as reliance on faulty advice, rather than inadvertence or negligence, prevented service.” Prisco v. Frank, 929 F.2d 603, 604 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (discussing “good cause” under the former Rule 4(j)), superseded in part by rule as stated in Horenkamp, 402 F.3d at 1132 n. 2. Even in the absence of good cause, a district court has the discretion to extend the time for service of process. Horen-kamp, 402 F.3d at 1132; see Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 663, 116 S.Ct. 1638, 1643, 134 L.Ed.2d 880 (1996) (<HOLDING>). The district court concluded that the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that in the 1993 amendments to the rules courts have been accorded the discretion to enlarge the 120day period even in the absence of showing good cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1833, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); and Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir.1995). The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, effective April 26, 1996, moved the relevant statutory provision addressing dismissal for frivolousness from former subsection (d) of Section 1915 to new subsection (e)(2)(B) and expanded the scope of that statute to expressly authorize dismissals of lawsuits as frivolous regardless of whether a filing fee or any portion thereof had been paid. See Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 136-37 (5th Cir.1996); and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)®. 89 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833; and Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d at 1434. 90 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 325, 109 S.Ct. at 1831; Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir.1997), (<HOLDING>); McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061

    ### Response:
    holding that title 42 usc  1997ee requires proof of a physical injury before a prisoner can recover for emotional or mental distress holding that verbal abuse is not actionable under section 1983 and also recognizing a de minimus standard for 8th amendment excessive force claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    instant case is analogous to Niedland, in that Plaintiffs post-trial submissions c one at issue in Marba, the size of the grant and the fact that it was issued for purely private purposes leads me to find that the Dongan grant violated the public trust doctrine. Plaintiff therefore cannot claim title to the foreshore adjacent to his property from this source. Furthermore, while the Dongan Grant to Christopher Billopp did indeed encompass lands to the low water mark, this land was later confiscated by the State after Captain Billopp’s attainder for treason during the Revolutionary War. The 1779 Act of Attainder has been found to be valid by the Second Circuit numerous times, as recently as 1992. See Robins Island Pres. Fund, Inc. v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d 409, 415 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). While Plaintiff does not dispute the validity

    ### Response:
    holding that in adjudicating property rights affected by new yorks act of attainder of 1779 neither the supreme court nor any court of new york state has ever declared the act to be invalid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.Supp.2d 640 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 345 F.3d 78 (2d Cir.2003). As Judge Spatt has already recognized in this case, the holding in the district court’s decision in Pechinski required more than the mere fact that the fee at issue was associated with the termination of the debt obligation to the lender defendant; rather, the district court also specifically relied upon the fact that the fee at issue in that case was related to a service requested by the borrower — processing fees regarding a refinancing with another lender — and would not have otherwise been required by the borrower in the lifespan of the loan. See McAnaney, 357 F.Supp.2d at 586 (“Pechinski held that the fees were not finance charges because they were not required by the creditor”); see also Pechinski, 238 F.Supp.2d at 643 (<HOLDING>). The critical inquiry in determining whether a

    ### Response:
    holding that the charged assignment fee was not includable in the finance charge where it was imposed because of plaintiffs specific request that defendant assign the mortgage to another lending institution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    N.E.2d 870, 873; Erie Cty. United Bank v. Berk (1943), 73 Ohio App. 314, 317, 28 O.O. 500, 501, 56 N.E.2d 285, 287. Where there are facts that could lead reasonable minds to conclude differently regarding whether the intervening cause broke the causal link, the question should be submitted to the jury, and summary judgment is not appropriate. Cascone, supra, at paragraph two of the syllabus. In a case based upon an intentional tort such as fraud or tortious interference, however, where the intervening act complained of is the act of the plaintiff, an analysis of intervening cause is tantamount to a comparative negligence claim, which is no defense to an intentional tort. See Hardiman v. Zep Mfg. Co. (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 222, 14 OBR 250, 470 N.E.2d 941, paragraph two of the syllabus (<HOLDING>). The evidence in the instant case showed that

    ### Response:
    holding invalid an instruction regarding intervening cause of act of plaintiff as a defense to strict liability in a case when the former contributory negligence may have been a defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the proposition that the addition of the word “black” to a race-neutral insult does not constitute race-based harassment that would support a hostile work environment claim. No. AMD 04-3422, 2006 WL 173690, at *4 (D.Md. Jan. 25, 2006). In that case, the Court found racial harassment that included the use of phrases such as “black dummy” and “black bitch” did not create a hostile work environment. While the Rose court held that those insults were not racial in nature, this Court has identified a number of other cases within the Fourth Circuit wherein the use of the word “black” as a modifier for otherwise racially-neutral insults was, in fact, considered race-based harassment. See, e.g., Finch v. Smithfield Packing Co., No. 5:99CV10-BR, 2000 WL 33682696, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 10, 2000) (<HOLDING>); Jenkins v. City of Charlotte, No. Civ. A.

    ### Response:
    holding that unequivocal examples of racial animus included instances when plaintiff was instructed to keep his black ass off the phone and was called a black son of a bitch and a black motherfucker
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that has been or may be reasonably incurred, (b) the loss of use of the land, and (c) discomfort and annoyance to him . as an occupant."" (Emphases added). Bonewitz and Dellinger presented evidence regarding the approximate value of their home absent the nuisance, as well as evidence that their home is not currently marketable. Thus, the evidence shows that the home's value has been greatly diminished by its close proximity to Parker's business. A proper measure of damages shall be calculated as the difference between the market value of the Bonewitz home if the Parker By-Products myeceli-um-drying operation ceased and its current market value with an active nuisance next door. See, e.g., Northern Ind. Public Serv. Co. v. W.J. & M.S. Vesey, 210 Ind. 338, 200 N.E. 620, 627 (1936) (<HOLDING>). Further, Bonewitz and Dellinger presented

    ### Response:
    holding measure of damages for unabated nuisance affecting greenhouse was the depreciation of the market value by reason of the continuance of a permanent nuisance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    403, 406 (9th Cir.1993)). WCSPA appeals from the denial of its motion to intervene in a case that the district court has since decided, through the Order on Remedy and the subsequent final judgment, from which neither party has appealed. Because the underlying litigation is over, we cannot grant WCSPA any “effective relief’ by allowing it to intervene now. The appeal is therefore moot. See United States v. Ford, 650 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir.1981) (dismissing as moot an appeal of a denial of a motion to intervene where the underlying litigation was voluntarily dismissed) (“Since there is no longer any action in which appellants can intervene, judicial consideration of the [intervention] question would be fruitless.”); cf. Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1109 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). The “capable of repetition, yet evading

    ### Response:
    holding that entry of judgment in the underlying litigation does not moot an appeal from a denial of a motion to intervene if one of the parties keeps the underlying litigation live by pursuing an appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the ODC. Second, the parties stipulated that Mr. Duffy’s conduct was knowing and intentional—the most culpable mental states. See In re Hernandez, 46 So.3d 1244 (La. 2010) (stating attorney knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to public, legal system, and legal profession by failing to appear in court on several occasions and failing to cooperate with ODC).- Third, we find there is ample basis to support the ODC’s finding that Mr. Duffy’s conduct caused harm. Mr. Duffy adversely affected his clients by failing to attend hearings on their behalf and failing to -respond - to his client relating to an appeal. Likewise, Mr. Duffy’s conduct toward the ODC and his criminal conduct are harmful to the public and to the legal profession. See In re Baer, 21 So.3d 941, 943 (La. 2009) (<HOLDING>). Regarding the fourth Jordan factor, we have

    ### Response:
    recognizing serious harm results when members of the legal profession engage in criminal acts which give rise to a lack of confidence by members of the public in those who are officers of the court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [the witness] had motive to fabricate her allegations against defendant”); State v. Muldrew, 229 Or App 219, 230, 210 P3d 936 (2009) (concluding that the trial court’s exclusion of defendant’s proffered impeachment evidence—the statement in the officer’s report—was not harmless because it was the “crucial piece of evidence that the jury needed in order to evaluate [the officer’s] credibility”). Thus, I would conclude that the jury had an adequate opportunity to assess the officers’ credibility absent the consideration of evidence of the use-of-force policies. In determining if exclusion of bias evidence is harmless, we are also required to consider whether the particular evidence regarding the officers’ credibility was important to the outcome of the trial. See Titus, 328 Or at 482 (<HOLDING>). The majority does not address this necessary

    ### Response:
    holding that under hubbard a trial courts error in excluding bias evidence would be harmless if either 1 despite the exclusion the jury nonetheless had an adequate opportunity to assess the witnesss credibility or 2 the witnesss credibility was not important to the outcome of the trial emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to market instability. If the large-volume purchasers chose not to opt out, their interests will presumably not be maligned with Plaintiffs. 15 . Specifically, Defendants contend that transaction prices during the relevant time period were affected by a United States Antidumping investigation and by Saskatchewan prorationing legislation. (Defs.' Mem. in Opp. to Class Cert. at 22.) Plaintiffs claim, however, that Defendant potash producers filed a petition with the United States International Trade Commission alleging Canadian potash was being ""dumped” into the United States in furtherance of their conspiracy to fix potash prices. (TAC ¶¶ 48-49.) 16 . This is an element essential to an antitrust price-fixing claim and one common to the class. The fact that some Plai (D.Mass.1981) (<HOLDING>); Hedges Enterprises, Inc. v. Continental

    ### Response:
    holding that because fact of injury was a distinct question from quantum of injury common proof could establish classwide injury even though amount of damage to each plaintiff was uncertain
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that a nonspeculative reduction in the attorney’s income would result from the implementation of a new Social Security regulation. In each of these cases it would be anomalous for the attorney to be able to bring suit to challenge the statute or regulation, instead of a person protected by the constitutional provision or law asserted as the basis for the challenge — the injured worker, the medical malpractice plaintiff, or the Social Security claimant. Of course it may be harder for such a person to bring suit than for a lawyer to bring suit, since lawyers are often better off than their potential clients, and they are after all lawyers. But it still can’t be that lawyers would generally have standing in such situations. See Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1408-09 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) Cf. Lambert v. Turner, 525 F.2d 1101, 1102-03

    ### Response:
    holding that attorney and law firm lacked prudential standing to challenge a state statute which provided that a wrongful death action could only be brought on behalf of a fetus if the fetus was born alive and noting that we can not help but wonder how the lawyer and law firm plaintiffs can seriously challenge the district courts ruling as to their lack of standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Kenner’s remaining contentions are

    ### Response:
    holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    120 S.Ct. 1362; Morales. The Supreme Court has, however, noted that the question is a matter of degree and indicated that the party challenging the law has the burden of “establishing that the measure of punishment itself has changed.” Morales, 514 U.S. at 510, n. 6, 115 S.Ct. 1597; Garner, 529 U.S. at 255, 120 S.Ct. 1362; see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (refusing to accept “speculation” that the effective punishment under a new statutory scheme would be “more onerous” than under the old one). Therefore, given the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on this issue in Morales and Garner, it is now clear that retro active changes in the laws governing parole may violate the ex post facto clause. Morales, 514 U.S. at 509, 115 S.Ct. 1597 (<HOLDING>); Garner, 529 U.S. at 256, 120 S.Ct. 1362

    ### Response:
    holding that a change in parole law violates the ex post facto clause if the change in the law created a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that when a defendant “voices a seemingly substantial complaint” about his attorney, the district court should inquire into the matter. McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir.1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[i]f the reasons are made known to the court, the court may rule without more.” Id. at 934 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the motion to withdraw and appoint substitute counsel and motion to reconsider, together with a seventeen-page handwritten letter prepared by Bliss, set forth in detail Bliss’ and his counsel’s concerns. Having thus been apprised of Bliss’ concerns, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled on the motions without hearings. See United States v. Simeonov, 252 F.3d 238, 241-42 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, by granting an extension of time

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel when reasons for defendants dissatisfaction with his attorney were made known to court through a letter and orally at sentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment.’ ” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (quoting Green, 474 U.S. at 68, 106 S.Ct. 423). Second, Ex Parte Young does not apply to suits seeking damages; it only applies to suits seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). The Court has said that suits for damages are suits against the state even if only the official is named as a defendant, because a damage remedy would require payment out of the state’s treasury. Id. Third, Ex Parte Young does not apply if the relief sought is “fully as intrusive” on a state’s sovereignty as a levy on funds in the state treasury. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 287, 117 S.Ct. 2028 (<HOLDING>). Fourth, Ex Parte Young does not apply to

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff could not use ex parte young to seek title to submerged lands
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arising out of the lessee’s failure to satisfy its financial obligations for services rendered on the leased premises. If, as appellant argues, a lessor could avoid liability simply by disclaiming liability in the lease without including such a disclaimer in the recorded short form, the purpose behind section 713.10(1) would be frustrated. Furthermore, section 713.10(2), which mandates that a notice regarding multiple leases on a parcel of land include the specific language contained in the various leases prohibiting a lessor’s liability, supports our interpretation of section 713.10(1). In other words, if a lessor desires to protect its interest from mechanics’ liens arising out of improvements made by a lessee, the document that is recorded in the clerk’ , 658 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (<HOLDING>); Budget Elec. Co. v. Strauss, 417 So.2d 1143,

    ### Response:
    holding that the appellant contractor failed to prove the existence of a lease provision requiring the lessee to make the improvements at issue which could have the effect of subjecting the lessors property to a lien
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM: William Andrew Kinsey, III, challenges the district court’s dismissal of his motion, which he had styled a “motion for clarification.” In his motion, he argued that the language of his judgment of conviction does not clearly indicate that his restitution payments are to begin while he is incarcerated. On appeal, he argues that the district court improperly dismissed his motion and characterized it as a successive motion to vacate filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Whether a district court has jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo or plenary review. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). We may review a district court’s jurisdiction

    ### Response:
    holding that a district courts determination of its jurisdiction to resentence a defendant is subject to plenary review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    damages; and (6) the risk of duplicative recoveries or complex apportionment of damages. Balaklaw, 14 F.3d at 797 n. 9 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 459 U.S. at 537-45, 103 S.Ct. 897). In the context of health care antitrust litigation, courts have observed that physicians may not be the most efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Daniel, 428 F.3d at 443-44 (concluding that physician-plaintiffs seeking to join cartel were not efficient enforcers of antitrust laws); Korshin v. Benedictine Hosp., 34 F.Supp.2d 133, 140-41 (N.D.N.Y.1999). Nevertheless, where a physician’s interest coincides with the patient’s interest, a physician may be a proper enforcer of the antitrust laws. See Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 274-75 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys.-W. Ohio, 142

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffphysician was efficient enforcer of antitrust laws
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    logic to conclude that the act of showing Spartin the other witnesses’ grand jury statements in October 1986 caused Spartin to state that the plaintiff knew of the conspiracy during his grand jury testimony in September 1987, but not during his polygraph examination in December 1986. Therefore, the plaintiffs argument that the Inspectors’ violation of the secrecy rules “tainted” Spartin’s grand jury testimony by causing him to state a “phony opinion” necessarily fails. Whatever the reason for the apparent change in Spartin’s opinion between December 1986 and September 1987, the plaintiff offers no evidence — only conclusory allegations— that the opinion Spartin offered at the grand jury hearing was swayed by the Inspectors’ violation of the secrecy rules. See Greene, 164 F.3d at 675 (<HOLDING>). Because the plaintiff has presented no

    ### Response:
    holding that unsubstantiated representations will not withstand summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as to how long it will last, a reasonable duration may be implied by the nature of the contract or from the surrounding circumstances. The law does not say specifically how long would be reasonable. That’s for you to decide. When a contract fixes no time for its duration, and none can be implied by the nature of the contract and surrounding circumstances, the contract may be terminated at the will of either party. (Appellant’s App. at 495.) Specifically, Pot-latch argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury that it could infer a reasonable duration to the oral contract. Potlatch cites several cases holding that a contract of indefinite duration may be terminated at will. See, e.g., Union Nat’l Bank v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 860 F.2d 847, 853 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Gary Braswell & Assoc. v. Piedmont Indust.,

    ### Response:
    holding that traditional commercial contract provided for termination at will under arkansas law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    subject: We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). Whatever may have been the rule in Costello, it cannot be applied in a Title VII action involving untimely fifing with the EEOC. It is because the “statutory requirement is analogous to a statute of limitations,” Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir.1996), that dismissal for failure to comply with the requirement is a judgment on the merits. See PRC Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 896-97 n. 2 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Although the result envisioned by the

    ### Response:
    holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the Insureds at the time of the late filing, balanced against the error made by Dave, was not great. The trial court agreed and determined that the damage to other insureds should Dr. Dave’s claim be allowed was “very minimal, if at all.” Given the relatively small size of Dr. Dave’s claim — “in excess of $15,000” — compared to the total of medical malpractice coverage claims in this receivership — approximately $21.8 million — we cannot say that the evidence preponderates against the conclusions of both the special master and the chancellor that allowing Dr. Dave’s claim would have no appreciable adverse impact on the rece ure to take precautions to assure that a deficiency claim was timely filed is not excusable neglect); In re Nickels Performance Sys., Inc., 169 B.R. at 652 (<HOLDING>). These decisions are consistent with our own

    ### Response:
    holding that misplacing the notice of an appealable order was not excusable neglect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is generally used there for purposes other than to describe offenses that are punishable under its provisions .... Specifically, the term ‘felony’ is primarily used in 21 U.S.C. § 802(13) to trigger statutory sentence enhancement for repeat offenders.” Id, Indeed, there is only one instance under the Controlled Substances Act where the term “felony” is used to describe a punishable offense, see 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1999) (making it unlawful to use a communication facility “in committing or causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision of this subchapter”), and case law makes clear that only a felony under federal law satisfies the felony element of this offense. See, e.g., United States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We thus find the BIA’s rationale with respect

    ### Response:
    holding there was no violation of  843b where a telephone was used to obtain possession of marijuana since possession is only a misdemeanor not a felony under 21 usc  844a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Having noted the substantially identical testimony, however, I do not find it necessary to decide whether the statement relates to this other excerpt. 51 . El-Hage argues that ""Mr. al Fadl's claim that al Qaeda sought to fight the U.S. in Somalia represented the only evidence of any violence al Qaeda contemplated against the U.S. prior to Mr. El-Hage’s return to the United States in September 1997.” As discussed, infra, this argument is entirely without merit. 52 . I note that, although the value of the actual 3500 Material is quite minimal, even this minimal value would likely require a new trial if the Government's failure to produce the statements had been truly intentional, or under circumstances justifying a presumption of intentional suppression. See Hilton, 521 F.2d at 166 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 101 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a new trial is warranted if the evidence is merely material or favorable to the defense where the government has either 1 deliberately suppressed evidence or 2 ignored evidence of such high value that it could not have escaped its attention
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    without deciding, that these requirements provide authority for the proposition that counsel has a right to know the numerical breakdown of the jury, we do not find that the district court’s decision to withhold this information amounted to fundamental error. {59} “To constitute a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, the particular proceeding or act in question must be one at which, or in connection with which, the accused’s constitutionally protected rights may be lost or adversely affected.” State v. Acuna, 78 N.M. 119, 120, 428 P.2d 658, 659 (1967). Although Defendant maintains the information was “critical knowledge” he needed to decide whether to agree to a mistrial, he does not show how he was prejudiced. Cf. Smith v. United States, 542 A.2d 823, 826 (D.C.Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>). The jury’s note did not indicate whether it

    ### Response:
    holding that whether the majority favored conviction or acquittal was a critical factor in the defendants decision whether to request a shotgun instruction since precedent prohibited the instruction in such circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    accompanied by fraud or other inequitable conduct of the remaining parties. Mullin v. Eaton, 19 A. 371, 372 (N.H. 1889) erefore, qualitatively different from an action challenging title. Compare McCormick, 37 A.3d at 298 (explaining that covenant of warranty is a promise to defend lawful claims by third persons), with Bourne, 540 A.2d at 361 (stating that reformation is limited to the original parties and their successors in title). Consequently, we hold that RSA 477:27 does not authorize attorney’s fees for an action seeking reformation of a deed. See Anderson v. Selby, 700 N.W.2d 696, 702 (N.D. 2005) (declining to award attorney’s fees under warranty deed in reformation action by grantor); see also Civic Realty, Inc. v. Development, Inc., 641 P.2d 1361, 1362-63 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (<HOLDING>). Here, the petitioners asserted that, by

    ### Response:
    recognizing distinction between attack on title by third party and complaint alleging mutual mistake in deed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1990) (<HOLDING>); Molina, 520 So.2d at 321 (“This court has

    ### Response:
    holding trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation where greater weight of evidence did not show violation was willful
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    I was coming in and out and I could feel it. I could feel every time he kicked me.... Borlawsky Dep. at 51-2. I assume that observing intimate activity of an arrestee without justification can sometimes be a Fourth Amendment violation, but the plaintiffs evidence simply does not make that case here under the circumstances of involuntary admission to a psychiatric ward on a doctor’s advice with concern for the plaintiffs risk to herself or others. See Cookish v. Powell, 945 F.2d 441, 447 (1st Cir.1991) (noting that inadvertent, occasional, casual and restricted observation of inmate’s body by an officer of opposite sex does not violate the Fourth Amendment and emergency circumstances, like harm to oneself, allows more direct observation); Ellis v. Meade, 887 F.Supp. 324, 332 (D.Me.1995) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, kicking an arrestee can amount to

    ### Response:
    holding that officers view of plaintiffs shower in light of his suicide watch did not violate the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the first.”); Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 613 (6th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (referring to the doctrine against claim-splitting as “the ‘other action pending’ facet of the res judicata doctrine”). Thus, in assessing whether the second action is duplicative of the first, we examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same. See The Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. at 124, 14 S.Ct. 992 (“There must be the same parties, or, at least, such as represent the same interests; there must be the same rights asserted and the same relief prayed for; the relief must be founded upon the same facts, and the ... essential basis, of the relief sought must be the same.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Curtis, 226 F.3d at 140 (<HOLDING>); Serlin, 3 F.3d at 223 (“[A] suit is

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing curtis ii claims arising out of the same events as those alleged in curtis i which claims would have been heard if plaintiffs had timely raised them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    crimes and crimes involving only accidental, negligent, or reckless conduct. It listed crimes which, “though dangerous, are not typically committed by those whom one normally labels ‘armed career criminals.’ ” Id. at 146-47, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (citing as examples “Ark.Code Ann. § 8-4 — 103(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2007) (reckless polluters); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (individuals who negligently introduce pollutants into the sewer system); 18 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (individuals who recklessly tamper with consumer products); [18 U.S.C.] § 1115 (seamen whose in s reckless endangerment statute is not a crime of violence under Begay)-, Gray, 535 F.3d at 131-32 (same with respect to New York reckless endangerment statute because it “does not criminalize purposeful or deliberate conduct”); Smith, 544 F.3d at 786 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 60

    ### Response:
    holding that those crimes with a mens rea of negligence or recklessness do not trigger the enhanced penalties mandated by the acca
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    603 P.2d at 525-26 (relating to RAJI 21); see also Coury Bros. Ranches, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 103 Ariz. 515, 446 P.2d 458, 463 (1968) (relating to RAJI 23). 5. The district court did not err in denying Suenos a new trial. Suenos has not established any valid grounds for a new trial, such as “(1) manifest error of law; (2) manifest error of fact; and (3) newly discovered evidence.” Brown v. Wright, 588 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir.1978) (per curiam). 6. The district court did not err in declining to strike Suenos’s motion for attorney’s fees as untimely. The time limit was not jurisdictional. See Arizona Local Rule 54.2(b)(2) (setting due date as 14 days but allowing alternative deadlines); see also Schweiger v. China Doll Rest., Inc., 138 Ariz. 183, 673 P.2d 927, 930 n. 2 (Ct.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the district court found that

    ### Response:
    holding time limitation on statement of costs is not jurisdictional and late filing is within courts discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court considers constitutionally impermissible factors in imposing a sentence. Nawaz v. State, 28 So.3d 122, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Reliance on constitutionally impermissible factors is a violation of a defendant’s due process rights. See Ritter v. State, 885 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); see also Holton v. State, 573 So.2d 284, 292 (Fla.1990). Examples of factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process include the race, religion or political affiliation of the defendant. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). “[S]imilar principles apply when a judge impermissibly takes his own religious characteristics into account in sentencing.” United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740 (4th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970,

    ### Response:
    holding that judge violated due process by stating at sentencing that those of us who do have a religion are ridiculed as being saps from moneygrubbing preachers or priests
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as we do, that public participation in preliminary hearings provides a significant and positive role on the functioning of the judiciary. Id. at 12-13, 106 S.Ct. at 2742. B. Judicial Documents [¶ 20] While not specifically. finding that the First Amendment right to access attaches to judicial documents, the United States Supreme Court has observed, ""It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records[.]"" Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 1312, 55 LEd.2d 570 (1978). Additionally, numerous federal courts have affirmed the right of public access to judicial documents pursuant to the First Amendment. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 10

    ### Response:
    holding that docket sheets enjoy a presumption of openness under the first amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rule we only consider cases involving issues in dispute; we shall not address moot, abstract, academic, or hypothetical questions.”). We also have held that “[a] case is moot if it raised a justiciable controversy at the time the complaint was filed, but events occurring after the filing have deprived the litigant of an ongoing stake in the controversy.” Seibert v. Clark, 619 A.2d 1108, 1110 (R.I.1993). See also Pelland v. State, 919 A.2d 373, 378 (R.I.2007); In re New England Gas Co., 842 A.2d 545, 554 (R.I.2004) (concluding that because the underlying labor dispute had settled, New England Gas no longer had a continuing stake in the controversy, thereby rendering the case moot); Associated Builders & Contractors of Rhode Island, Inc. v. City of Providence, 754 A.2d 89, 91 (R.I.2000) (<HOLDING>). One narrow exception to the mootness doctrine

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs claim was moot because the construction project which was the subject of the dispute had been completed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Chamberlain, 589 F.2d at 840-42. It insisted on an appropriate explanation for why the exempt documents could not reasonably be segregated from non-exempt material. See Pac. Fisheries, 539 F.3d at 1148. FOIA is not designed “as a substitute for civil discovery.” Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1103, 71 L.Ed.2d 199 (1982). The fact that the Cheungs wish to use the documents they seek in their civil tax proceeding does not make Exemptions 3 and 7(A) inapplicable. Indeed, it is precisely because of the uses to which the Cheungs might put the documents that the exemptions are applicable. The district court properly denied Shannahan’s discovery requests for information concerning the nature and origins of documents he requested. See Lane, 523 F.3d at 1134 (<HOLDING>). The Cheungs’ problem is partly of their own

    ### Response:
    holding that in foia cases discovery is limited because the underlying case revolves around the propriety of revealing certain documents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    voluntarily waived his right to counsel. For that reason, his appellate counsel’s failure to raise a Faretta argument on appeal does not meet Strickland’s prejudice prong. First, Rose was fifty-five years old at the time of sentencing, had obtained a GED and had no history of mental- or physical-health issues. See Nelson, 292 F.3d at 1301 (concluding, under § 2254, that nothing in the defendant’s history undermined the reasonableness of the state court’s determination that his waiver was valid where the defendant was fifty years old and had obtained a GED). Second, he had extensive contact with counsel prior to his decision to proceed pro se, including three court-appointed lawyers in this very case. In fact, one had represented him through a jury trial. See Stanley, 739 F.3d at 647-48 (<HOLDING>); cf. Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1066 (explaining

    ### Response:
    holding that representation by counsel until the first day of trial likely exposed the defndant to the complexity of his case and the legal process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    satisfied section XIV of Procedure 00-01-003, they still did not establish that Mr. Pavey, who could not write his own grievance and did not have access to help from his fellow inmates, did not reasonably rely on the assurance that his excessive-force allegations would be investigated. We make one final observation. Section 1997e(a) may prove to be irrelevant if further development of the record shows that prison officials rendered the established grievance procedures unavailable to Mr. Pavey by lending him no assistance in creating what would qualify as a written grievance while at the same time isolating him from other inmates who might have assisted him. Mr. Pavey always has insisted — and the defendants never have denied — that he was confined to his cell in pain co 2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants are estopped from raising nonexhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmates ability to utilize grievance procedures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    residence; awarded the wife $4,000 per month in periodic alimony and $50,000, payable in 5 annual installments of $10,000, as alimony in gross; awarded the wife one investment account valued at approximately $31,000 out of the husband’s sizable financial portfolio; and awarded the wife $42,916.37 in attorney fees. The wife appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in the award of custody to the husband, in the awards of alimony and the division of property, and in the award of attorney fees. I. Custody and Visitation The wife argues that the trial court’s award of custody to the husband is a punishment for her alleged marital indiscretions, and she argues that, as such, the award of custody is an abuse of discretion. See Etheridge v. Etheridge, 375 So.2d 474 (Ala.Civ.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). She also argues that the trial court should

    ### Response:
    holding that although adulterous conduct can be considered in determining custody adultery in and of itself does not automatically bar an award of custody to the adulterous parent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    471-72, 199 S.W.2d 146, 148-49 (1947); see also Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468, 490-91 (Tex. 2016) (recognizing that when agreement cannot be performed without violating law or public policy, it is per se void). Courts will not enforce an illegal contract, particularly when the contract involves the doing of an act prohibited by statutes that were enacted for the protection of the public health and welfare. See, e.g., Merry Homes, Inc. v. Luu, 312 S.W.3d 938, 949-50 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (affirming judgment declaring lease void when lease required use of leased premises only for purposes prohibited by ordinance because of leased premises’ proximity to school); Swor v. Tapp Furniture Co., 146 S.W.3d 778, 783-84 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Peniche v. Aeromexico, 580 S.W.2d 152, 155

    ### Response:
    holding oral agreement for finders fee void because finder was not licensed realestate broker in violation of real estate license act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    County Jail officers’ alleged unconstitutional actions, his liability must be based on something more than the theo L.Ed.2d 461 (1991). “The inquiry into causation must be a directed one, focusing on the duties and responsibilities of each ... individual defendant] whose acts or omissions are alleged to have resulted in a constitutional deprivation.” Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1381 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932, 104 S.Ct. 335, 78 L.Ed.2d 305 (1983). See also Swint v. City of Wadley, 5 F.3d 1435, 1446-47 (11th Cir.l993)(finding liability where sheriff was on notice of prior similar incident, thus inferring notice), vacated 514 U.S. 35, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995)(vacated for lack of jurisdiction); Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir.l991)(<HOLDING>); Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding supervisory liability existed where sheriff failed to establish policies regarding accurate identification of suspects and where sheriff knew of prior instances of mistaken identity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    AEP that existed when Worth filed his complaint, and Worth nowhere disputes the district court’s finding, supported by an unchallenged agency affidavit, that HUD “will not renew the AEP that was in effect when MD-714 was operative.” Worth v. Jackson, No. 02-1576, slip op. at 11 (Jan. 5, 2004); Jackson Decl. at 2, Sept. 10, 2003 (stating that the AEP “will not be renewed or reissued”); see also United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203-04, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968) (finding in the mootness context that whether “the likelihood of further violations is sufficiently remote to make injunctive relief unnecessary ... is a matter for the trial judge”). That ends the matter. See Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363-65, 107 S.Ct. 734, 93 L.Ed.2d 732 (1987) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the Supreme Court has

    ### Response:
    holding that a statutes expiration mooted any challenge to the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    officers, and “was told by all officers present that [plaintiff] was the aggressor.” 202 F.3d at 635. We also held that a charging officer at the station house was immune, because he “heard consistent versions of the events from at least three eyewitnesses,” who were all police officers, while only one account—that of the plaintiffs girlfriend— differed. Id.; see also Lee, 136 F.3d at 104 (finding arguable probable cause where officer arrested plaintiff husband for domestic abuse of his wife based upon the wife’s statement, but only after conferring with a physician who examined the wife and advised that although she seemed disoriented, intoxicated, or mentally impaired, she could accurately relate the facts about her alleged assault at the hands of her husband); Singer, 63 F.3d at 119 (<HOLDING>). By contrast, here, McGee has alleged facts

    ### Response:
    holding that officer had qualified immunity from  1983 action brought by arrestee because officer had probable cause to arrest based on statements of a witness store clerk who signed a criminal information and deposition detailing the theft and establishing each of the elements of the crime of larceny
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and Brown’s arrest.”). The problem is that Williams was not seen or heard from until fourteen months after the crime when he was arrested in Georgia. While Deputy Lucius patrolled Samspon Park looking for Williams, he did not offer any details supporting his efforts. There was no information that Williams was not at his usual haunts or had not reported for work. And there was no testimony that the police inquired of Williams’ -family and friends beyond the day after the crime. While Detective Hollis testified that he attempted to locate Williams’ friends, family members, and girlfriends, he did not give a time line or indicate that, he actually came into contact with any of these people beyond the day after the crime. Cf. Diaz-Gonzalez v. State, 932 So.2d 528, 530 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). This lack of evidence also supports the

    ### Response:
    holding that a reasonable juror could infer defendant knew of the officers investigation for a crime that occurred a few months before his arrest because the investigating officer went to the residence of the defendants exwife made ten separate visits to the defendants business during which he informed those present that he wanted to talk to the defendant about something that happened on the date of the crime and gave this information to the defendants alibi witness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    previously through the exercise of due diligence, the defendant must establish that the newly discovered evidence probably would have produced a life sentence. Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 571 (Fla.2001); see also Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991) (“[T]he newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”); Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla.1992) (“The Jones standard is also applicable where the issue is whether a life or death sentence should have been imposed.”). Because the trial court denied Van Poyck’s motion solely on the basis of the pleadings, making a legal rather than a factual determination, this Court evaluates each of these matters de novo. See State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 137 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). Timeliness and Due Diligence Apart from

    ### Response:
    holding that pure questions of law that are discernible from the record are subject to de novo review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it is not probative enough to meet Todd’s burden of production that Montoya acted with deliberate indifference. See In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 528-29 (6th Cir.1996) (“Northwest’s rewiring of the CAWS is circumstantial evidence, if only of a weak and suspect sort, that the CAWS as it existed at the time of the accident was not foolproof.”). Even if the evidence is not technically with rule 407’s scope: (i) rule 407’s underlying concerns are persuasive when evaluating the probative value of the evidence; and (ii) the circumstances of Montoya’s resignation in light of the other evidence in the record make the inference of wrongdoing one can draw from his resignation a weak one. See Gray v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 82 Fed.Appx. 639, 646-47 (10th Cir.2003) (unpublished)(<HOLDING>). It is the proverbial scintilla of evidence

    ### Response:
    recognizing that while the evidence at issue was admissible under rule 407 its probative value was minimal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    5 . DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex.1990) (quoting Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971)). 6 . Id. at 678 (quoting Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971)). 7 . Id. (""Florida has a substantial relationship to the parties and the transaction because Wackenhut's corporate offices are there, and some of the negotiations between DeSantis and George Wackenhut occurred there.”). 8 . Uniform Arbitration Act § 1 ef seq. 9 . Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 171.001 et seq. 10 . 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967). 11 . Id. at 403 olo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-22-221. 26 . Uniform Arbitration Act § 28. 27 . Compare Volt Info. Sciences v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (<HOLDING>), with Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,

    ### Response:
    holding that the faa did not preempt california law permitting court to stay arbitration pending resolution of related litigation where parties had selected california law in a standard choice of law provision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Control Officer ... may issue a citation to the owner of such animal specifying the section or sections of this chapter so violated and identifying the specific nature of the violation. Such citation shall impose upon the owner the obligation of appearance to answer the charges specified in the citation ... at the time and place indicated on the citation. LMCO § 91.073(A). If an officer decides to issue a violation notice in lieu of a citation, that notice must “stipulate a compliance date and associated fee and late fee, as well as a waiver provision providing that the person to whom the violation notice is issued waives all rights to protest such violation and waives all rights to a hearing on the issues relating to that viola tion.” LMCO § 91.073(B). LMCO § 91. 57 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the circumstances as here

    ### Response:
    holding that a parking citation provided adequate notice where it was reasonably calculated to inform the vehicle owners of the allegations against them and the procedures available to obtain a hearing to contest the allegations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (citing Sahadi v. Reynolds Chem., 636 F.2d 1116, 1117 (6th Cir. 1980)); see also Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 752 (6th Cir.1992) (“Spreading the former duties of a terminated employee among the remaining employees does not constitute replacement.”). Novotny’s reliance on this argument, therefore, is misplaced. Novotny also argues that she was treated differently than similarly situated males. Novotny’s argument in support of this statement is difficult to follow. Novotny appears to argue two distinct claims: 1) a pre-termination claim of discrimination, and 2) a claim of discrimination related to her termination. The Court reviews each of these claims. Novotny first asserts that she was discriminated against prior to her termination. Novotny claims that her calend th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Agnew v. BASF Corp., 286 F.3d 307, 310-11

    ### Response:
    holding that reassignments without salary or work changes do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions in employment discrimination claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    work on the project — including the land surveying tasks. In addition, there is substantial evidence that the construction documents produced by MLS were to be approved by either Comer or another engineer. Gregory Gardiner in his deposition even stated that he believed the services performed by MLS were engineering by nature and that the surveying services were incidental to the engineering work. While his statements are not dispositive as to the nature of the contract, they show that Gardiner believed MLS was to perform engineering services for his company. Under such circumstances, we believe that both the engineering and land surveying services encompassed by the cohtract are properly classified as professional and thus, are subject to KRS 413.245. See Vandevelde, 744 S.W.2d at 433 (<HOLDING>). It is important to note that while this

    ### Response:
    holding that since the performer of a task which could be performed by a layperson represented that he was in fact a professional engineer krs 413245 applied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    77 F.Supp.3d at 1187-88, 2014 WL 7473806, at *27. These cases all stand for the same thing: at the pleading stage, the existence of a Monell policy is a “conclusion” to be built up to, rather than a “fact” to be baldly asserted. When there is no formal written policy and the § 1983 plaintiff is relying upon a practice or custom, some courts appear to look for a specific number of prior similar incidents — often saying that two or three instances will not suffice. See Wilson v. Cook Cnty., 742 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir.2014)(“Although this court has not adopted any bright-line rules for establishing what constitutes a widespread custom or practice, it is clear that a single incident — or even three incidents — do not suffice.”); Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>); Eugene v. Alief Ind. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ” Town of Milford v. Boyd, 434 Mass. 754, 759-60 (2001), citing Gillette Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 425 Mass. 670, 674 (1997), in turn quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 393 Mass. 490, 497 (1984) (stating that “words of a statute must be construed with other statutory language and the general statutory plan”). In other words, in order to be consistent with the statutory scheme as a whole of G.L.c. 207, it is necessary that §§11 and 12 be read together 05, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that a zoning ordinance’s likely infringement of the plaintiffs First Amendment rights constituted irreparable harm where the city’s threat to enforce the ordinance operated as a prior restraint on adult bookstores); T&D Video v. City of Revere, 423 Mass. 577, 582 (1996) (<HOLDING>). See also, Wright & Miller, 11 Federal

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs necessarily demonstrated irreparable harm because they showed a substantial likelihood that their first amendment rights had been infringed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    intended to preclude separate convictions and sentences for the ongoing criminal conduct and underlying crimes used to establish such conduct. We too think the Iowa legislature sought to encourage the imposition of such cumulative sentences. B. Merger pursuant to Iowa Code section 701.9. Iowa Code section 701.9 — Iowa’s merger statute — provides: No person shall be convicted of a public offense which is necessarily included in another public offense of which the person is convicted; If the jury returns a verdict of guilty of more than one offense and such verdict conflicts with this section, thé court shall enter judgment of guilty of the greater offense only. Our resolution of Reed’s double jeopardy claim renders this section inapplicable. See Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d at 344 (<HOLDING>). IV. Corroboration of Accomplices’ Testimony.

    ### Response:
    holding that if double jeopardy clause is not violated because legislature intended double punishment section 7019 is not applicable and merger is not required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Before the February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652, 655 (4th Cir.1977); In re the Grand Jury Empaneled January 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir.1976); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir.1976); In re Investigation Before the April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 605 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1976). However, all of these cases come from an era when disqualification orders were widely presumed to be immediately appealable. See generally Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800, 804-05 (2d Cir.1974) (en banc) (collecting cases). Since then, the Supreme Court has refused to allow interlocutory appeals in every disqualification case that has come before it. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Roller, 472 U.S. 424, 430, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 270,

    ### Response:
    holding that an order disqualifying counsel in a civil case is not a final judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    likely to have had counsel at the interrogation had he been arraigned on December 12, 2003, instead of December 19, 2003. This is particularly true given that Nguyen apparently was already represented by counsel concerning the indicted charges and could have requested the presence of his counsel at the December 15 interview. This does not, however, end the Sixth Amendment analysis. Although there is no evidence that the government conspired to deprive Nguyen of counsel, the government must still bear the burden of showing, as under the Fifth Amendment analysis, (i) that he was apprised of his right to have counsel appointed and to consult with counsel and (ii) that he knowingly waived that right. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298-99, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In this regard, the evidence makes clear (i)

    ### Response:
    holding that the same waiver standard applies when assessing whether a defendant has waived his sixth amendment right to counsel during a postindictment interrogation as when assessing whether a defendant has waived his fifth amendment right to counsel preindictment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). A claimant can demonstrate pretext “by showing that the proffered reason (1) has no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the defendant’s challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct.” Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir.2000). “Regardless of which option is used, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of producing ‘sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably reject [the defendants’] explanation and infer that the defendants intentionally discriminated against him.’ ” Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir.2001) (alteration in original)). See also Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1466 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human

    ### Response:
    holding that statistical evidence presented by the plaintiff showing an employers pattern of conduct toward a protected class is relevant to a showing of pretext and can create an inference of discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and with the DPS’s position in this appeal that sections 522.102(a) and 522.103 of the transportation code apply only to a person who is driving a commercial motor vehicle at the time of his arrest. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 522.102(a), 522.103; see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Chavez, 981 S.W.2d 449, 451 (TexApp. — Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). That is, an individual stopped for DWI in a noncommercial vehicle who refuses to submit a breath specimen does not automatically lose his commercial driving privileges for one year. However, section 522.089 mandates the automatic disqualification of a person to drive a commercial motor vehicle at least for the period of time that person’s license is suspended under any law. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 522.089(a); Chavez, 981 S.W.2d at 453 (<HOLDING>). In accordance with the Code of Construction

    ### Response:
    recognizing that section 522089 applied to chavez even though he was not driving a commercial motor vehicle at the time of his arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a motion to compel arbitration filed by the Loudermilks, the trial court lacked jurisdiction; because the Loudermilks never demonstrated that their claims were within the warranty’s scope or that they satisfied the warranty’s conditions precedent to arbitration; and because the Loudermilks’ failure to file a motion to compel or to provide notice of their intent to arbitrate their claims against Appellants deprived Appellants of their right to present defenses to arbitration and to object to the court’s appointment of an arbitrator. We address these contentions in turn. A. Trial Court Jurisdiction It is clear that the trial court here had jurisdiction o ending the outcome of arbitration. Brooks v. Pep Boys Auto. Superctrs., 104 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In short, we are not aware of any authority,

    ### Response:
    recognizing the trial court possesses continuing jurisdiction pending arbitration rather than requiring the filing of an additional lawsuit concerning pending arbitration or postarbitration matters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    aimed at establishing a defendant’s propensity to commit a crime. See Tenn. R.Evid. 404(b). The State contended that it was offering evidence of prior sexual misconduct not to prove the character of the defendant but, rather, primarily to corroborate the testimony of the victim concerning the incidents alleged in the indictment as well as to show the state of intimacy between the defendant and the victim, to explain the circumstances surrounding the charged offenses and to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim. Accordingly, the State argued that the evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual misconduct was admissible under those limited circumstances. In support of its argument, the State cited several cases including State v. Lockhart, 731 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn.Crim.App.1986) (<HOLDING>), overruled by State v. Rickman, 876 S.W.2d 824

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of incest with the same victim prior to or after the offense charged is admissible to corroborate proof of the incident relied upon for conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    related sentence. (Id.) In accordance with United States Supreme Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit recognizes that when a defendant has been convicted and sentenced on mulitiplicitous charges, “[t]he conviction as well as the sentence on one of the two mulitiplicitous counts must be vacated, to ‘avoid both the punitive collateral effects of multiple convictions as well as the direct effects of multiple sentences.’ ” United States v. Alerta, 96 F.3d 1230, 1239 (9th Cir.1996), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 850 F.2d 563, 569 (9th Cir.1988) and quoting United States v. Palafox, 764 F.2d 558, 564 (9th Cir.1985)); see also Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). Here, because the

    ### Response:
    holding that a guilty verdict on a  848 charge necessarily includes a finding that the defendant also participated in a conspiracy violative of  846 conspiracy is therefore a lesser included offense  we adhere to the presumption that congress intended to authorize only one punishment accordingly one of petitioners convictions as well as its concurrent sentence is unauthorized punishment for a separate offense and must be vacated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the debtors, provides the basis for a lien even after discharge since the mortgage does not purport to affect the debtor's personal liability. The Court agrees. ""Therefore the Court finds that the law is with the plaintiff and accordingly grants relief by declaring that a valid, pre-filed lien which has not been avoided during the bankruptcy proceedings is not extinguished by the discharge of the debtors and remains enforceable in rem after the discharge even if there is no approved reaffirmation agreement. More specifically, the lien of Water-field's real estate mortgage is enforceable in rem against the real estate described in the mortgage."" 24 B.R. at 624 (emphasis supplied). See also R.L. Shirmeyer, Inc. v. Ind. Revenue Bd. (1951), 229 Ind. 586, 594, 99 N.E.2d 847, 850 (<HOLDING>) The Ruths attempt to limit the effect of this

    ### Response:
    holding that granteepurchasers who acquired real estate subject to an existing mortgage while not personally lia ble did take real estate charged with the payment of the debt and such property became the primary fund out of which said mortgage must be paid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence of alcoholism, which helped to explain the respondent’s conduct, but did not excuse it); Florida Bar v. Rodriguez, 489 So.2d 726 (Fla.1986) (disbarring attorney for the conversion of client funds and admitted commingling of clients’ moneys despite mitigating evidence relating to alcoholism and rehabilitation). Additionally, this case also involves other conduct that is extremely troubling, including the forgery of a judge’s signature on two orders, the forgery of a client’s signature on a guilty plea, and the forgery of a client’s signature on a check so Gross could deposit the funds of the check and use them for his own personal means. These acts alone can also constitute independent grounds for disbarment. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Kickliter, 559 So.2d 1123, 1124 (Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Gross attempts to distinguish this Court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that even with substantial mitigation disbarment was warranted for an attorney who had forged his chents signature on a will when the chent died without signing and then submitted this forged document into court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rests with the Commission to show that the funds in the possession of [the relief defendant] are ill-gotten.” FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F.Supp.2d 373, 392 (D.Conn.2009) (citations omitted). “The ill-gotten gains must be linked to the unlawful practices of the liable defendants.” Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F.Supp.2d at 392. Where “it would be difficult, if not impossible, to trace specific ... [fraudulently obtained funds], a freeze order need not be limited ... to funds that can be directly traced to defendant’s illegal activity [because] ... the defendant should not benefit from the fact that he commingled his illegal profits with other assets.” Byers, 2009 WL 33434, at *3 (citations omitted); see also SEC v. Aragon Capital Mgmt., LLC, 672 F.Supp.2d 421, 443 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>). If disgorgement of “fraudulently obtained

    ### Response:
    holding that tracing proceeds of illegal funds is unnecessary and where tainted funds have been commingled with potentially legitimate funds the sec is entitled to obtain disgorgement from the entire pool of funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and would not have progressed to cardiopulmonary arrest. Although Mr. Smith’s clinical condition had a mortality of about twenty percent prior to the arrest, the above-discussed failures of Dr. Bolton, Dr. Russell, Dr. Suominen, PA Dizney, McElravy, Hammonds, and Gill probably led to the arrest and the sequelae that probably ensued and in reasonable probability led to his progressive weakness, increasing renal dysfunction, and multi-system organ failure and his death. These statements, all contained within the four corners of Dr. Halkos’s report, sufficiently link Dr. Halkos’s causation opinions to the facts and adequately describe the chain of events allegedly leading to Mr. Smith’s death. See Patel v. Williams, 237 S.W.3d 901, 905-06 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The trial court acted within its discretion

    ### Response:
    holding expert report sufficiently set forth causation when it presented a chain of events beginning with a contraindicated prescription and ending with the patients death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims that the district court’s Case Management Order expressly limited discovery to the primary liability issues, namely CERCLA, the Spill Act, and breach of contract, and expressly stayed discovery on its state common law claims until after resolution of the threshold liability issues. While WCI raises a colorable claim, we nonetheless decline review of this issue, as WCI’s claim is raised for the first time on appeal and is not preserved for appellate review. See Plott v. General Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190, 1195 (6th Cir.1995) (stating that this Court generally will not review a post-judgment claim asserting a need for discovery where the non-movant failed to advance such claim before the district court); see also Vance ex rel. v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145, 1149 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). WCI’s failure to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit

    ### Response:
    recognizing that while summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery it is the nonmovants responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery by filing an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f of the federal rules of civil procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CWs credibility and his use of a gun. In light of the unrebutted fact of CWs death improperly admitted during the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, the latter issue was of particular importance, as discussed supra. In sum, given the lost opportunity to confront CW in relation to the unavailable discovery, the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony at trial violated Nofoa’s right to confrontation as guaranteed by article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution and the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. Thus, we hold that the circuit court erred in allowing admission of CWs preliminary healing testimony at trial We additionally hold that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Mundon, 121 Hawai'i 339, 368, 219 P.3d 1126, 1155 (2009) (<HOLDING>). We are unable to say the error was harmless

    ### Response:
    holding constitutional error may be harmless if court can  declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt  quoting state v napeahi 57 haw 365 373 556 p2d 569 574 1976
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fractures and a large gash on his cheek. The wall, floor, and door to the restroom were covered with blood. Next to the restroom door, the police found a metal forming stick covered in blood. 2 . Friday afternoon at 3:00 p.m. is the routine time for arraignment hearings in Peoria County Circuit Court. 3 . Herman Cornish is a retired Peoria police officer. 4 . However, Geraldine testified at trial that she felt that she had no choice but to permit the police to take her fingerprints. 5 . Like Geraldine, Laurie testified at trial that she felt that she had no choice but to permit the police to take her fingerprints. 6 . Ms. Schumann is Plaintiffs' counsel of record in this matter. 7 . See People v. McClinton, 59 Ill.App.3d 168, 174-75, 375 N.E.2d 1342, 1348, 17 Ill.Dcc. 58, 64 (1978) (<HOLDING>). 8 . See Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that photographic identification coupled with the officers knowledge that a crime had been committed provides probable cause for a warrantless arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regarding the reliability of expert evidence, as well as its decision to admit or exclude such evidence, for abuse of discretion. See Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 154 (3d Cir.2000). As we have discussed above, WARN Act liability does not turn on whether a party is a ""parent” or a ""lender,” or whether a ""lender” behaved in typical fashion. Indeed, we have already acknowledged that GECC may well have been a parent of CompTech. Thus, because we have declined to create separate standards of liability for lenders and parents, regardless of whether the District Court was correct in concluding that Myers’s affidavit was lacking in a factual basis, his opinion was ultimately not germane and no hearing was necessary. Cf. Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the District Court's

    ### Response:
    holding that in limine hearings are encouraged when courts are concerned with the factual rather than legal dimensions of the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bands and subjecting them to excessive monitoring and racially-derogatory remarks); Johnson v. Smith, 878 F.Supp. 1150 (N.D.Ill.1995) (cross burned in front yard of African-American family and brick thrown through their window); People Helpers v. City of Richmond, 789 F.Supp. 725 (E.D.Va.1992) (police “bullied” their way into and selectively searched handicapped and African-American plaintiffs’ apartments). While this Court has, as Plaintiffs note, recognized that “violence or physical coercion is not a prerequisite to a claim under § 3617,” Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F.Supp.2d 602 (D.N.J.2000), the conduct complained of must nevertheless be of sufficient magnitude to permit a finding of intimidation, coercion, threats or interference. See, e.g., Babin, 18 F.3d at 347, 348 (<HOLDING>). That said, the actions allegedly taken by

    ### Response:
    holding that actions of defendants in engaging in economic competition did not rise to the level of interference with the rights of plaintiffs and that actions of neighbors while interfering with plaintiffs negotiations were not direct enough to state a claim for violation of  3617
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mitigating circumstances in this case. We believe the testimony demonstrated Johnston to be a generally honest lawyer. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Isaacson, 565 N.W.2d 315, 317 (Iowa 1997) (“We consider a lawyer’s general character for honesty ... in applying sanctions.”). In addition, he acknowledged he violated our disciplinary rules in certain respects. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Tofflemire, 689 N.W.2d 83, 93 (Iowa 2004) (“A mitigating factor is the attorney’s recognition of some wrongdoing.”). Furthermore, the prior discipline imposed on Johnston carries little weight as an aggravating factor under the circumstances of this case. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Iowa 2002) (<HOLDING>). Johnston’s previous discipline was imposed

    ### Response:
    recognizing a previous reprimand was an aggravating circumstance warranting more severe discipline
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Commerce’s determination in the Final Results. (Pis.’ Br. on Jurisdiction 2-5.) In deciding between the appropriate bases for jurisdiction, the “ ‘mere recitation of a basis for jurisdiction, by either a party or a court, cannot be controllingt;]’ ” instead, the court “ ‘look[s] to the true nature of the action ... in determining jurisdiction.’ ” Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States, 472 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed.Cir.2006) (quoting Williams v. Sec’y of Navy, 787 F.2d 552, 557 (Fed.Cir.1986)). In this case, Plaintiffs challe t the time that the rule goes into effect because the relevant harm has already been inflicted: an interested party has lost the opportunity to alter the agency’s decision through full participation in the regulatory process. See, e.g., Wind River, 946 F.2d at 715 (<HOLDING>); Thrift Depositors of Am., Inc. v. Office of

    ### Response:
    holding that grounds for a cause of action for facial or procedural challenges to a regulation will usually be apparent to any interested citi zen within a sixyear period following promulgation of the decision and because the governments interest in finality outweighs a latecomers desire to protest the agencys action as a matter of policy or procedure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    believed that he was acting “in the usual course of his business or employment.” See United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 32 (4th Cir.1995). To qualify under the employee or agent exception to registration under § 822, the person must be employed in the “legitimate distribution chain” of the controlled substance. See United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1244 (8th Cir.1973). Any possession or distribution outside of the legitimate distribution chain is unlawful. United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1151-52 (2d Cir.1986). Thus, if the possession is not in the “usual course of the registrant’s lawful professional practice,” then it is not in the legitimate chain of possession and therefore not within the § 822(c) exception. See United States v. Hill, 589 F.2d 1344, 1350 (8th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Here, Smith was directed by his employer to

    ### Response:
    holding that mere fact that defendant was employee of company registered to possess and distribute controlled substances does not make otherwise unlawful conduct lawful
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a contract or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. Id. We have noted that actual litigation is not required for relief under our declaratory-judgment statute. Jessup v. Carmichael, 224 Ark. 230, 272 S.W.2d 438 (1954). However, the statue does require that litigation be pending or threatened. Id. We have also noted that while Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-104 recognizes a party’s right to a declaratory judgment, a justiciable controversy is required. Mastin v. Mastin, 316 Ark. 327, 871 S.W.2d 585 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The justiciability requirement was discussed

    ### Response:
    holding that the case presented no justiciable controversy and that a review of the matter would render an improper advisory opinion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rules § 303A.02(b)(v) (providing that a director is not independent if he or she ""is a current employee ... of a company that has ... received payments from, the listed company for property or services in an amount which, in any of the last three fiscal years, exceeds the greater of $1 million, or 2% of such other company’s consolidated gross revenues”). And, even if the amount paid to Stephens Cori exceeded $1 million, Byorum would still be considered independent under the NYSE rules, because that relationship is stale (i.e., she was paid over three years before the MFW transaction). 56 . Dinh Dep. 173:4-10. 57 . Id. at 14:8-15:4, 80:17-24. 58 . See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1167 (Del.1995); see also, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708 (Del.2009) (<HOLDING>). 59 . Dinh Dep. 72:5-75:21. 60 . Pis.’ Br. in

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that a defendant director was not disinterested on account of his business relationship with the company whose board he sat on because he was a man of comparatively modest means
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    language, the purpose of the statute, the evil to be corrected, the legislative history, and the pertinent case law that has applied the statute or similar enactments.” McKnight v. State, 906 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Because we base our decision on language that was not part of the 1985 statute construed in Dixon, we do not certify conflict with that opinion. Addressing another issue on appeal, we note that Hile’s in-court description of his conversation with Longval on the videotape was admissible over a hearsay objection. Longval’s statements to Hile were not hearsay under section 90.801(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2004), because they described and gave significance to ambiguous acts, her conduct on the videotape. See Stotler v. State, 834 So.2d 940, 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). Reversed and remanded. GUNTHER and HAZOURI,

    ### Response:
    holding that defense witnesss incourt recitation of defendants out of court statements which where inaudible on surveillance videotape were not hearsay because they were statements describing ambiguous acts or verbal parts of acts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the applicable substantive standard. Thus, if the substantive law required clear and convincing evidence to support an element of the claim or defense, the court might grant summary judgment if, in considering a motion for directed verdict on the same evidentiary basis, it would have concluded that the evidence presented was so “one-sided” it failed to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-56, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-14. Given this rule, in cases in which the burden is greater than a preponderance of the evidence, analytical constructs that turn on such concepts as “scintilla of the evidence” and “slightest doubt” are no longer useful. This court has already adopted Anderson’s holding in conjunction with first amendment cases. See Dombey, 150 Ariz. at 486, 724 P.2d at 572 (<HOLDING>). There are, of course, other civil cases in

    ### Response:
    holding that where the new york times clear and convincing evidence requirement applies the summary judgment inquiry will be whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either plaintiff or defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a landlord-tenant relationship, the court of appeals held that the dispute necessarily involved a dispute over title, which would require a court to determine the owner of the real estate by analyzing the contract for deed. Id. at 733-35. Consequently', on appeal,"" did not have jurisdiction to make such a determination. See Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, at *2; Geldard, 214 S.W.3d at 209. When a court’s void judgment, is appealed, we have jurisdiction tó declare the judgment void and render judgment dismissing the cáse. Kilpatrick v. Potoczniak, No. 14-13-00707-CV, 2014 WL 3778837, at *2 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 31, 2014, no pet.) (mem.op.) (per curiam). We vacate the county court’s judgment as void and dismiss the forcible detainer action for want of jurisdiction. See id. (<HOLDING>). 1 . The notice was sent on behalf of ""the

    ### Response:
    holding county courts judgment of possession was void because it was ren dered during pendency of bankruptcy stay and dismissing forcible detainer action for want of jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the form of a guaranteed minimum benefit. See IRS Rev. Rul. 2008-7, at 12 (“Ordinarily, a period of zero annual rate of accrual followed by a period of positive annual rates of accrual would result in a plan failing to satisfy the 133 1/3% rule. However, because there is no ongoing accrual under the pre-conversion formula for these participants for service after the January 1, 2002 effective date of the conversion amendment, the lump sum-based benefit formula is the only formula under the plan ... and, pursuant to the special rule of § 411 (b)( 1 )(B)(i), that formula is treated as if it were in effect for all other plan years.”). 19 . Again, although not binding, Revenue Ruling 2008-7 supports this interpretation of the statute and regulations. See IRS Rev. Rul. 2008-7, at 10-12 (<HOLDING>), 18-19 (noting that if the applicable interest

    ### Response:
    holding interest rate and conversion factor for future years constant in application of 13313 rule and applying the rule only prospectively
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must show that he is a ‘refugee’ within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act, i.e., that he has suffered past persecution on account of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,’ or that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution on these grounds.” Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). Once an asylum applicant has established eligibility for asylum, the decision whether to grant asylum rests with the discretion of the Attorney General, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1), and is generally not reviewable unless “manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D); see also Melendez v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 216-18 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The BIA originally held that application of

    ### Response:
    holding that while bias findings of fact informing decision whether applicant is eligible for asylum are reviewed for substantial evidence ultimate discretionary determination whether to grant asylum is reviewed for abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court appreciates that there is a declining market for the PRRS vaccine which may limit the duration of Boehringer’s patent. Moreover, Schering has informed the Court that Bayer Corporation and other companies now market competing vaccines which will also affect the PRRS market. Therefore, it appears that the PRRS vaccine market is more competitive now such that the ability to compensate Boehringer for its losses will be more difficult to determine. These limitations on the commercial success of Boehringer’s patent and the effective duration of its patent, even if not caused by Schering’s conduct, is an indication that Boehringer’s Patent has a shortened duration and thus, Boehringer’s need to enforce its right to exclusivity is more acute at this time. See Polymer, 103 F.3d at 975 (<HOLDING>); Bell & Howell Document Management Products

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence that the infringer was not the principal or the sole cause of the patentees lost sales does not rebut the presumption of irreparable harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for child support from May 16, 1986, to March 18, 1989. That portion of the trial court’s judgment which awards attorney fees to Lisa which were properly allocable to her attorney’s representation of Gary is REVERSED, and we REMAND this cause to the trial court for a determination of the proper amount of attorney fees. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. SMITH, J., concurs and dissents with opinion. 3 . We note that the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution has been held to be co-extensive with article 1, section 3 of the Texas Constitution. See Twiford v. Nueces County Appraisal Dist., 725 S.W.2d 325, 328 n. 5 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Burroughs v. Lyles, 142 Tex. 704, 711, 181 S.W.2d 570, 574 (1944) (<HOLDING>). We base our interpretation of section 13.42

    ### Response:
    holding that this section article 1 section 3 guaranteeing all persons equality of rights was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    violations of the law, had their applications granted in or around the same time Plaintiffs had their applications denied. Moreover, a number of the examples cited by Plaintiffs involved licensees who had been convicted of crimes unrelated to alcohol and none of the examples involved licensees who had been convicted of alcohol related crimes and who had provided false information on their application. Id. at ¶ 36A. Consequently, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for violation of their right to equal protection of the law because they have not shown that individuals similarly situated to Plaintiffs were treated differently. See, Vukadinovich v. Board of School Trustees of Michigan, 978 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 133, 126 L.Ed.2d 97 (1993) (<HOLDING>) The Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff had not stated an equal protection claim where plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant treated him differently from anyone else who both had problems with alcohol and had been arrested
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    faculty representatives. See § 23-40-104(l)(b), 7 C.R.S. (1997). 8 . We note that Tenth Circuit authority, while mirroring the three-factor analysis we adopted in Simon, recognizes this factor as most important. See Sonnenfeld v. City & County of Denver, 100 F.3d 744, 749 (10th Cir.1996); Haldeman v. State of Wyo. Farm Loan Bd., 32 F.3d 469, 473 (10th Cir.1994). 9 . Section 24-30-1517(2) excepts from coverage the University of Colorado at Boulder, Denver, and Colorado Springs and the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center. 10 . Our conclusion squares with the body of Tenth Circuit decisions which, applying a similar analysis, have consistently found state universities to be arms of the state. See, e.g., Watson v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 575, 577 (10th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>); Mascheroni v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,

    ### Response:
    recognizing general proposition and specifically finding university of utah medical center entitled to eleventh amendment immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.2d 1566,1571 (11th Cir.1990). In this case, the summary to the Revised Commentary states that the Commentary “applies and interprets the requirements of Regulation Z” and that the revisions “provide guidance” on certain issues addressed therein. 61 Fed. Reg. 14952. Moreover, for reasons discussed more specifically below, the Board’s interpretation applying TILA and Regulation Z to pawnbrokers is in accordance with the prevailing law. Therefore, the Revised Commentary applies to the case at hand unless it is demonstrably irrational. The Board’s application of TILA to pawnbrokers is not demonstrably irrational. Although few courts have addressed the issue, those which have uniformly hold that pawnbrokers are subject to TILA See Burnett v. Ala Moana Pawn Shop, 3 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Hyde v. Hutto Enterprises, Inc., 1994 WL

    ### Response:
    holding tila applies to pawnbrokers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jurisdiction over plaintiffs entire complaint. Def.’s Opp. at 3-10. The Court will decline to do so. I. Motion For Leave to File an Amended Complaint Defendant does not assert, and the Court does not find, that plaintiffs proposed amendments would trigger the Foman factors of undue delay, prejudice to defendant, or futility. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227. Plaintiff has amended her complaint only once before, and even if she is seeking to amend her complaint again solely to return to Superi- or Court, as defendants allege, this is not necessarily evidence of forbidden bad faith. If defendant’s claims are correct, here, plaintiff has simply “deleted causes of action that ERISA completely preempts].” Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, if the motions were denied, the ERISA

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff had not engaged in improper forum manipulation when she simultaneously moved to amend her complaint to drop claims that were completely preempted by erisa and to remand the case to state court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was proper. The order of the trial court is therefore, AFFIRMED. SHIVERS and JOANOS, JJ., concur. 1 . Section 440.49(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides workers’ compensation coverage ""in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” Section 440.11(1) provides that the employer’s liability for such workers’ compensation ""shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer ... to the employee.” 2 . Larson, supra, citing to Montanaro v. Guild Metal Prods., Inc., 108 R.I. 362, 275 A.2d 634 (1971). 3 . The employer did not object to this practice. See Serean v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 277 So.2d 732 (La.App.1973) cited in Larson's, supra at Section 21.60, (<HOLDING>). 4 .Whether this lobby was also used by the

    ### Response:
    holding that accident which occurred thirty minutes before work was within the course where employee customarily showed up early and employer never objected
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be given full effect and did not intend any provision to be mere sur-plusage.” Id. G.S. § 160A-48(d)(2) provides that a non-urban area may be annexed if it is “adjacent, on at least sixty percent (60%) of its external boundary, to any combination of the municipal boundary and the boundary of an area or areas developed for urban purposes as defined in subsection (c).” (emphasis added). CP&L properly notes that “[o]rdinarily, when the conjunctive ‘and’ connects words, phrases or clauses of a statutory sentence, they are to be considered jointly.” Lithium Corp., 261 N.C. at 636, 135 S.E.2d at 577. However G.S. § 160A-48(d)(2) does not use the word “and” alone; the statute also includes other words which bear on its meaning. See Builders, Inc., 302 N.C. at 556, 276 S.E.2d at 447 (<HOLDING>). Notably, the statute uses the word

    ### Response:
    holding that statutes must be read so as to give effect to all statutory language
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the progression of his kidney disease, much less prevented it. Dr. Atta’s ultimate opinion was that no matter what Nurse Jordan did or didn’t do, Mr. Clanton was going to progress to end-stage kidney disease. Dr. Atta opined that Kevin Clanton would live 29.7 years after his first kidney transplant, or until he is approximately 65 years old. Unlike Mr. Clanton’s treating physicians and expert nephrologist, Dr. Atta opined that the half-life of a transplanted kidney is twelve years, and he believes Mr. Clanton will need only one more kidney transplant. Cathlin Vinett-Mitchell Cathlin Vinett-Mitchell was retained by the Government to develop a life care plan for Kevin Clanton. She is a registered nurse with a specialty in rehabilitat DAK, 2013 WL 595766, at *1 (D. Utah Feb. 15, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Duque v. United States, Case No. 05-1417,

    ### Response:
    holding that physicians statement during the course of treating the plaintiff was admissible under rule 801d2d when offered against the government in ftca medical malpractice case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (same). In this case, as in OBert, there was no question that Rasanen’s excessive force claim had to proceed to the jury. Brown claimed that he shot Rasanen while struggling to regain control of his own gun after Rasanen had lunged at the officer and Brown felt his gun pointed against him. Such a scenario plainly demonstrated “probable cause to believe that the suspect pose[d] a threat of serious physical harm.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694; see generally Florida v. Harris, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013) (describing probable cause as “practical,” “common-sensical,” “all-things considered” standard for assessing probabilities in particular factual context); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff never contended otherwise. Instead,

    ### Response:
    recognizing probable cause as fluid standard that does not demand hard certainties but only the sort of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent men not legal technicians act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    AT’s claim for damages against OFC. Because OFC had not breached its finance lease, and had no contractual obligation to provide conforming goods, AT did not state a claim against OFC for which relief could be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see also Milledgeville Water Co. v. Fowler, 129 Ga. 111, 58 S.E. 643, 644 (1907) (“where contract relations exist, the parties assume toward each other no duties whatever besides those the contract imposes”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the district court appropriately awarded fees to OFC under the terms of the lease, which provided that “Lessee shall reimburse Lessor for all charges, costs, expenses and attorney’s fees.... ” See Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Muscogee Iron Works, 265 Ga. 790, 462 S.E.2d 367, 368 (1995) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. * This disposition is not

    ### Response:
    recognizing that under georgia law attorneys fees are allowed where authorized by statute or contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (J.A. at 179.) The district court reasoned that “[i]f the parents believed that [FBDS was] denying the hool Disk 200 v. Illinois State Bd. of Ed., 79 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir.1996) (stating that the IDEA’S authorization to courts to grant “appropriate” relief “encompasses the full range of equitable remedies and therefore empowers a court to order adult compensatory education if necessary to cure a violation”); Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir.1994) (same); Pihl v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir.1993) (same); Hall v. Knott County Bd. of Ed., 941 F.2d 402, 407 (6th Cir.1991) (same); Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853, 857-58 (11th Cir. 1988) (same); Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Compensatory education involves

    ### Response:
    recognizing appropriateness of compensatory education award and holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory education if she prevailed in her claim that she was denied a fape for several years
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.W.2d 426, 431-2 (Mo. banc 1985). “A duty may .... be imposed by the legislature or the common law based upon a relationship between the parties,” or “imposed by a court under the circumstances of a given case based upon what the tort-feasor knew or should have known.” Strickland, 849 S.W.2d at 132; See also, Hoover’s Dairy, Inc., 700 S.W.2d at 431. However, no duty is owed to persons outside “the orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance.” Krause, 787 S.W.2d at 710, quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad fireworks company personally hable for employee’s injuries where president personally held a board directly against spinning spool of fuse to prop it up, with the fuse catching fire and burning employee operating the machine); Tauchert, 849 S.W.2d at 574(<HOLDING>); Biller, 795 S.W.2d at 634(finding corporate

    ### Response:
    holding summary judgment improper against employee where supervisor had personally arranged the faulty elevator hoist system
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We addressed a similar circumstance in Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2001). In Frazier, a crime-scene investigator challenged the district court’s conclusion that his job’s essential functions included being able to run, carry a firearm, and physically restrain offenders. Frazier, 254 F.3d at 1250-51. We agreed with the district court that these were essential functions, regardless of how infrequently a crime-scene investigator may have to do them. We explained that even “assuming that an investigator may be required to perform these physical activities infrequently, the potential for physical confrontation with a suspect exists any time [the plaintiff] conducts a crime scene investigation.” Id. at 1260; see Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Trustees

    ### Response:
    recognizing the potentially dire consequences of not requiring a corrections officer to be able to run restrain violent offenders or respond to emergencies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provides that a statement made by a child is admissible only if, inter alia, “the child has at some time before the making of the statement received from the magistrate a warning that the child may remain silent and not make any statement at all and that any statement the child makes may be used in evidence against [him].” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see also § 51.095(a)(5). In Sosa v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a warning of rights made to any adult defendant that differs only slightly from the language of the statute governing the admissibility of evidence — in that case, article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure — complies with the statute as long as it conveys its exact meaning. 769 S.W.2d 909, 915-16 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Subsequent criminal cases, many unpublished

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants written statement was voluntarily made when he was read his rights three times during course of evening in accordance with miranda and article 3822 and on each occasion defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights that he wished to waive them and that he wished to talk with fbi agents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is not the test.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). III. DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 and Constitutional Claims Defendants correctly argue that plaintiffs § 1983 claim, through which he seeks vindication of a variety of constitutional rights, is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The time limitations for § 1983 claims are governed by the state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (“When Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law ... ”); Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 372, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004) (<HOLDING>). In Connecticut, the limitations period for

    ### Response:
    holding that new uniform fouryear statute of limitations in 28 usc  1658 only applies to lawsuits made possible by post1990 enactments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be “futile” because the state courts’ procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir.2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (post-conviction review is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). A state post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F,3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). This type of procedural default is known as

    ### Response:
    recognizing untimeliness under ariz rcrim p 324a as a basis for dismissal of an arizona petition for postconviction relief distinct from preclusion under rule 322a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 466 F.3d at 613-14, 615 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Nonetheless he argues that, in light of language in other opinions and the Golden dissent, we should reconsider our holding in Golden. See Chambers, 473 F.3d at 727 (in dicta) (noting that future research establishing whether failures to report or return to jail actually present a serious risk of physical injury might call into question the characterization of such crimes as violent felonies); Golden, 466 F.3d at 616-19 (Williams, J., dissenting) (reasoning that failure to report to jail does not create a serious risk of physical injury, and opining that characterizing it as such raises due process concerns); United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). But in Chambers we recently rejected a

    ### Response:
    holding that a peaceful failure to return to a halfway house is not a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a2 a provision analogous to  924e2bii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of cocaine. We review the district court’s denial of a section 2241 petition de novo, see Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1178, 120 S.Ct. 1214, 145 L.Ed.2d 1115 (2000), and we affirm. Quintero contends that the district court erred by dismissing his section 2241 petition, alleging that the Government breached the plea agreement by failing to file a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b). This contention is without merit. The district court correctly determined that Quintero’s claims were more properly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and that his inability to bring a second or successive motion under section 2255 does not render federal habeas relief ineffective or inadequate. See Moore, 185 F.3d at 1055 (<HOLDING>); Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that a petitioner may not circumvent the requirements of the aedpa by filing a section 2241 petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a train of vehicles; that is registered in Indiana and manufactured or assembled after January 1, 1956, must be equipped with at least two (2) tail lamps mounted on the rear that, when lighted, complies with this section. The trial court construed this statute as requiring “only that a motor vehicle be equipped with at least one (1) tail lamp mounted on the rear that when lighted emits a red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear.” App. p. 29. This construction of the statute apparently relies only upon subsection (a); however, subsection (c) applies to vehicles manufactured after January 1, 1956, such as Cunningham’s vehicle undisputedly was, and requires two operating tail lamps. See Freeman v. State, 904 N.E.2d 340, 342-43 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (<HOLDING>). We recently re-addressed Section 9-19-6-4 in

    ### Response:
    holding that section 91964 requires vehicles to have two constantly illuminated tail lamps that emit red light that a rearmounted brakeonly red light does not satisfy this requirement and stop of vehicle was justified where one of vehicles tail lamps was burned out
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the portion of the statute affecting Sharper Image. As appellant. argues, however, “[t]he demarcation between the favored and non-favored classifications of taxpayers in Eastern, i.e., between agricultural and fishing interests on the one hand, and airlines on the other, was not itself an unconstitutional distinction,” whereas in this casé the line separating taxable and nontaxable publications has been drawn based on unconstitutional criteria, i.e., the contents of those publications. Because appellant’s constitutional claim thus involves a content-based approach to taxation of publications, it does appear, contrary to appellee’s assertion, that appellant has standing. See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1726-27, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987) (<HOLDING>). See also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489

    ### Response:
    holding that publisher of general interest magazine had standing to challenge constitutionality of sales tax scheme which exempted sales of newspapers and religious journals even though it did not publish such newspapers or religious journals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    frauds. Mineral interests are treated as real property interests and are therefore subject to the rules relating to real property, including the statute of frauds. See Hill v. Heritage Resources, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89, 134 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997). Therefore, a lease of mineral rights for longer than one year must be in writing. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 26.01(b)(5). Thus, if the Letter Agreement here is a contract with a missing term, then it must meet the statute of frauds. If the future agreement is covered by the statute of frauds, then the agreement to make a future agreement must also meet the statute of frauds. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. C. Springs, 300, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009) (citing Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen, 221 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tex.2007) (<HOLDING>)). If the Letter of Agreement is an agreement

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute of frauds bars a breach of contract claim based on an oral agreement to enter a future employment contract that would need to meet the statute of frauds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id. {14} A statutory scheme providing for the receipt of government benefits may give rise to property interests protected by the due process clause. In Mathews, the United States Supreme Court determined that the private interest affected by state action was the claimant’s continued receipt ofbenefits, which was a source of income, pending a final decision on his claim for Social Security disability benefits. See 424 U.S. at 339-40. Similarly, a private interest affected by state action is a claimant’s continued receipt of welfare benefits. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.Ct 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (<HOLDING>); Roth, 408 U.S. at 576 (“a person receiving

    ### Response:
    holding that the pretermination hearing has one function only to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare departments grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of his benefits citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that if the appropriator does not own the land he intends to irrigate, at least rightful possession - that is, a possessory interest - is necessary to his acquisition of a valid water right. This requirement is satisfied by lawful entry and settlement on public lands or a bona fide intent to acquire title to both land and water, or by one holding lands under contract for its purchase. Also acceptable is rightful possession of land under a contract with the owner the nature of which does not appear in the record. Hutchins, at 263-64. See also In re Powder River Drainage Area, 216 Mont. 361, 702 P.2d 948 (1895) (validating stockwater rights appropriated by lessees on and for use on school trust land, even though ownership accrued to state); Sayre v. Johnson, 33 Mont. 15, 81 P. 389 (1905) (<HOLDING>); Bullerdick v. Hermsmeyer, 32 Mont 541, 81 P.

    ### Response:
    recognizing validity of water rights appropriated on public domain for use on school trust land even though appropriator did not own or intend to patent place of use
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1150, 1155 (2d Cir.1978) (an employee “only needs to demonstrate that [she] possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the job.”). Tomassi suffered an adverse employment action because her employment was terminated. See Cordoba v. Beau Deitl & Assoc., No. 02 Civ. 4951, 2003 WL 22902266, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.8, 2003). Finally, the fact that her responsibilities were taken over by a newly-hired 25-year-old is enough to warrant the inference — at the prima facie stage — that Tomassi was the victim of age discrimination. See id. (terminating an employee in the protected age group while retaining a 27 year old and 34 year old is enough to warrant the inference that the plaintiff was the victim of age discrimination); see also Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, Insignia and MetLife can rebut

    ### Response:
    holding inference is warranted when a 67 year old is replaced by a 59 year old
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this case, argued that “the sole significance of [roadlessness] is that the [roadless] parcel is potentially eligible for wilderness designation.” Id. at 1077. Because the Forest Service was not required to consider permanent protection for the areas at issue, see id. at 1074 (citing the Washington State Wilderness Act, Pub.L. No. 98-339, 98 Stat. 299 (1984)), the Forest Service maintained that “the fact that a parcel of ... land is roadless is, in itself, immaterial and need not be addressed in NEPA documents.” Id. at 1078. We rejected that argument, observing that roadlessness has environmental significance apart from permanent wilderness preservation and, as a result, “[t]hat the land has been released by Congress for nonwilderness use does not excuse the agency from comp ir.1997) (<HOLDING>). We review final agency action under §

    ### Response:
    holding that it appears wellestablished that a final eis or the rod issued thereon constitute the final agency action for purposes of the apa and collecting cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the property owner, see Systems Contractors Corp. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 148 F.3d 571, 575-76 (5th Cir.1998) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)), for “[w]hen protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount,” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). The “root requirement” of due process is “that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.” McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Dept. of Bus. Regulation of Fla., 496 U.S. 18, 37, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. 58 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, the state provides unsuccessful bidders

    ### Response:
    holding that a state court injunction was an adequate predeprivation remedy in a condemnation case where the property owner received notice 30 days before the demolition and could file an injunction that automatically halted any demolition plans by the city
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which was so inflammatory that it necessarily prevented a fair trial. Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir.1998); see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 923 (9th Cir.2006) (“Even if there are no permissible inferences the jury can draw from the evidence in question, due process is violated only if the evidence is of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has made “very few rulings regarding the admission of evidence as a violation of due process”; specifically, it has never “made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant the issuance of the writ.” Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101; see McGuire, 502 U.S. at 70, 112 S.Ct. 475 (<HOLDING>). The court of appeal was not objectively

    ### Response:
    holding that admission of relevant evidence generally not due process violation warranting habeas relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981). In this respect, she needs only to prove that she has suffered an adverse personnel action that was causally-related to her engaging in protected activity. See Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen, 843 F.2d 1395, 1423 (D.C.Cir.1988). Here we have a proposed stipulation by the defendants that the plaintiff at all times relevant to her retaliation claim engaged in protected activity. This means that at the forthcoming trial the jury should be informed generally about the plaintiffs prior allegations of sexual harassment, but not about the specific events underlying the same. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence mandates such a procedure. See Morris v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 702 F.2d 1037, 1043 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, at trial, the jury shall be informed of

    ### Response:
    holding in a retaliation case that the trial court correctly excluded testimony about the details of the plaintiffs race discrimination complaint where the defendant had stipulated to the protected nature of the plaintifps speech
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (6) whether the alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Id. In applying these factors, only the “clearest proof’ that a law is punitive in effect will overcome a legislative categorization to the contrary. Commonwealth v. Williams, 574 Pa. 487, 505, 832 A.2d 962, 973 (2003). There is not the “clearest proof’ of the seven factors that are required to demonstrate that 24 P.S. § 1 — 111(e)(1) is so punitive in either its purpose or its effect so as to negate the General Assembly’s intent that it be civil in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Regarding the first factor, while the lifelong ban from certain employment positions is hars 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898) (<HOLDING>). Regarding the third factor, the employment

    ### Response:
    holding that prohibiting felons from practicing medicine is not punishment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also could have gone forward with filling its land without a permit. The cease and desist order (or, in this case, the injunction) was the point at which the agency first asserted regulatory jurisdiction over the landowner. Up to that point, no permit was required either in Tabb Lakes or here. To the extent Boise argues that the ESA did hot give the district court the power to enjoin logging without a permit, its argument is not well taken. First, as discussed above, a takings claim before'the Court of Federal Claims cannot ask that court to review the propriety of a district court’s handling of a case. Second, as the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held, the district court did have the authority to enjoin Boise from logging. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204

    ### Response:
    holding that a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species is sufficient for issuance of an injunction under section 9 of the esa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and which did not provide any indication of the grounds on which it was based. We noted that a requirement that District Courts accompany such orders with some articulation of their reasoning would not impose a serious burden, would assist parties in crafting appellate briefs responsive to dis-positive issues, and would clearly frame appellate review. Thus, we exercised our supervisory power “to require the district courts in this circuit to accompany grants of summary judgment hereafter with an explanation sufficient to permit the parties and this court' to understand the legal premise for the court’s order.” Vadino, 903 F.2d at 259. Other situations in which we have established similar supervisory rules include, e.g., Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 295 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (citation and internal quotation marks

    ### Response:
    holding that a court entering a directed verdict pursuant to rule 50 should set forth an explanation sufficient to permit this court to understand the legal premise for the courts order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of money, funds, or other assets from the financial institution. United States v. Christo, 129 F.3d 578, 580 (11th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836, 847 (4th Cir.1994)). Any conduct charged in the indictment which may have placed the bank at a financial risk occurred prior to June 19, 1987. Once Anderson had control of the money, the scheme ended. Otherwise, under the government’s theory, the scheme could continue as long as Anderson maintained control of the money, thus defeating the purpose of criminal statutes of limitations. So long as she did not take part in any additional conduct that would have placed the bank at a separate, distinguishable risk, the statute of limitations continues to run. Cf. United States v. Meador, 138 F.3d 986, 994 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The conduct on which the government hangs its

    ### Response:
    recognizing risks in construing statutes of limitations in favor of repose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plaintiffs, the allegations do not satisfy their minimal pleading requirements. Accordingly, plaintiffs do not satisfy the requirements of prudential standing, and their Equal Protection claim is dismissed. Even if the court were to conclude that plaintiffs had standing to pursue their Equal Protection claim, it would nonetheless fail on the merits. As defendants correctly point out, any burden on the right to interstate travel here is minimal and insufficient to constitute a deprivation. They cite several cases in support of their contention that “something more than negligible or minimal impacts on the right to travel is required ...” in order to invalidate a state action allegedly discriminating against the fundamental right to travel. Kan. v. U.S., 16 F.3d 436, 442 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Barber v. State of Haw., 42 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the wright amendment an air traffic regulation restricting air traffic from love field in the dallasforth worth area did not violate the right to travel because any impact on interstate travel  even air travel to and from the dallasfort worth area  is negligible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of paternity, the party so requesting a jury has the right thereto.” 4 In the trial court, respondent argued in his memorandum opposing the department’s effort to change the trial from a jury trial to a court trial, in part: “no legislative intent is present on the face of the legislation that would indicate a retroactive application of the legislation is appropriate. Absent such clear intention, the presumption is that the legislation should not be applied to pending cases.” 5 The dissent resorts to legislative history without a determination that there is an ambiguity. The fact that two statutes appear to conflict does not amount to an ambiguity that would allow the court to rely on legislative history. See J.R. Simplot Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 321 Or 253, 262, 897 P2d 316 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Further, the dissent’s analysis is

    ### Response:
    holding that the court does not examine legislative history when the statutes text and context are not subject to more than one plausible reading
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Univ., 979 F.2d 552, 553 (7th Cir.1992). In this case, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Zakaras’ claims were filed within 300 days of the discriminatory act. The “accrual date” of a plaintiffs claim is the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir.1990). In cases of alleged discriminatory demotion (or termination), the period begins to run on the date the employee is notified that he will be demoted. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (“limitations periods commenced to run when the [adverse employment action] was made and [the employee] was notified.”); see also Murrell v. USF & G Ins., 81 F.Supp.2d 912, 921 (N.D.Ill.2000) (<HOLDING>). The pivotal question, therefore, is when did

    ### Response:
    holding that accrual date begins to run on the date the employee is notified unambiguously of the adverse employment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dismissals of Counts I (Knowingly Presenting False Claims t strict court properly dismissed Smith’s case in response to the violation. The procedural requirements of the False Claims Act, including its seal provision, “are not jurisdictional, and violation of those requirements does not per se require dismissal.” Lujan, 67 F.3d at 245. Further, “[n]o provision of the False Claims Act explicitly authorizes dismissal as a sanction for disclosures in violation of the seal requirement.” Id. Thus, the False Claims Act, on its face, neither mandates nor expressly supports dismissal with prejudice. But we recognize that every other circuit to consider this issue has read such authority into the False Claims Act. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Summers v. LHC Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 287 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Lujan, 67 F.3d 242 (9th Cir.1995) (creating a

    ### Response:
    holding that violation of the seal requirements bars qui tam plaintiffs from qui tam status
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prior perjury conviction and her acknowledgment of guilt for that offense “ ‘did not influence the [fact finder], or had but slight effect.’ ” Clay, 262 Va. at 260, 546 S.E.2d at 731 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764, 66 S.Ct. at 1248, 90 L.Ed. at 1566). Because I believe our prior holdings in Cole and Craddock compel the conclusion that the trial court’s error was not harmless, I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. Thus, I respectfully dissent. 5 . Even if Pierce had later opted to testify, our case law would support the conclusion that this decision would not render harmless the court’s knowingly erroneous admission of impeachment evidence in the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief. Cf. Purvis v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 298, 309-10, 522 S.E.2d 898, 903 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The majority asserts ""LeBray testified

    ### Response:
    holding erroneous refusal to sever offenses in bench trial is not harmless error where only fact that would render refusal harmless is defendants decision to testify and clear evidence establishes that the trial court  used the harmless error doctrine  prospectively  as a basis to disregard an established rule of law  quoting hackney v commonwealth 28 vaapp 288 296 504 se2d 385 389 1998 en banc
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that this court has consistently approved of consideration by the district court as relevant conduct pursuant to § lB1.3(a) conduct that was uncharged, that was charged in a count that was subsequently dismissed, or that was charged in a count of which the defendant was acquitted). We perceive no rational basis upon which to conclude that consideration of such relevant conduct for purposes of departure would create any greater difficul 5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (same); United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337, 341 (10th Cir.1990) (same), disapproved on other grounds, Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 198, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1118, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992); and United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 684 (2d Cir.1990) (same), with United States v. Harris, 70 F.3d 1001, 1002-04 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); and United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 927

    ### Response:
    holding that conduct from dismissed counts cannot be relied upon as a basis for departure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the time for filing them petition did not begin to run until their attorney received the BIA’s decision on September 15, 2008, and that since their petition was filed less than 30 days later, it was timely filed under section 1252(b)(1). Even if the time for filing a petition for review begins to run only when the BIA mails its decision to the petitioner’s, or petitioner’s counsel’s, address of record, Radkov v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 96, 99 (1st Cir.2004) (dicta); Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1258-59 (9th Cir.1996) (collecting cases), but see Nowak v. INS, 94 F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir.1996) (rejecting that proposition), that does not help petitioners here, who concede that the BIA mailed the decision to the correct address. See Nowak, 94 F.3d at 392; cf. Radkov, 375 F.3d at 99 (<HOLDING>). Respondent suggests that petitioners may ask

    ### Response:
    holding that even if  the mailing  somehow went awry without any fault on the part of the bia that circumstance alone would not excuse the failure to file a timeous motion to reopen
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 (87 SC 1056, 18 LE2d 62) (1967) (informant had provided information to affiant 15 or 16 times within the past year, resulting in numerous arrests and convictions); Clyatt v. State, 126 Ga. App. 779 (1), 781 (192 SE2d 417) (1972) (""within the past 90 days the informant had furnished information which resulted in the arrest of one person and the recovery of various illegal drugs”); Tomblin v. State, 128 Ga. App. 823 (1) (198 SE2d 366) (1973) (informant used ""numerous times” in past and personally known to affiant for several years). Otherwise the police would be enabled to obtain search warrants to enter private homes on the basis of assertions so vague and conclusory that they could never be challenged. Cf. Franks v. Delaware, — U. S. — (57 LE2d 667) (1978) (<HOLDING>). In summary, we find that the language used in

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant has a right to challenge the factual assertions in a search warrant upon a preliminary showing that they are untrue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is presumed when one spouse voluntarily separates from and abandons the other spouse without adequate legal reason. See Commonwealth ex rel. Udis v. Udis, 174 Pa.Super. 624, 101 A.2d 144, 145 (1953); 27 Am.Jur.2d Proof of Facts 737 § 2 (1981). Moreover, the law fails to require that the abandoned spouse, Kim in this case, be blameless. See 27 Am.Jur.2d Proof of Facts 737 § 3 (1981); see also Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, 172 A.D.2d 719, 569 N.Y.S.2d 107, 108 (N.Y.App.Div.1991). ¶ 38. A determination of whether Kim’s conduct rose to the necessary level should be based upon factual findings showing that Kim’s fault factually supported an independent ground for divorce or an independent contributory or proximate cause of the separation. See Goodwyn v. Goodwyn, 222 Va. 53, 278 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1981) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 39. The evidence in the record satisfied

    ### Response:
    holding that temporary cessation of sexual relations for less than two months prior to wifes hospitalization where wife worked and financially contributed to the family was insufficient to show wilful desertion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as lacking in plausibility, and could reasonably have found 1950) (same); Kilduff v. Kalinowski, 136 Conn. 405, 71 A.2d 593, 594-95 (1950) (same). B. The Union’s Liability 1. Standard of Proof The Union argues that the Johnsons’ suit stems from a labor dispute and that therefore its liability should be governed by the “clear proof"" requirement of the Norris-La-Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106, infra. Johnson sued his labor union for the harassment he suffered after testifying against other Union members at an arbitra tion hearing. Whether the events underlying the suit can be characterized as a labor dispute for the purposes of § 106 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is a close question. See Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145-47, 62 S.Ct. 520, 521-23, 86 L.Ed. 750 (1942) (<HOLDING>); Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the critical element in determining whether the provisions of the norrislaguardia act apply is whether the employeremployee relationship is the matrix of the controversy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    passenger gua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy"" in the car or its contents. Id.; see also State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007-08 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (finding defendant passenger did not have an expectation of privacy in the car itself where he left some personal items in the glove box). T9 Bissegger argues, however, that she has standing to challenge the search of her personal belongings left in a closed container in the car. Although Utah appellate courts have not addressed this precise issue, other jurisdictions have overwhelmingly held that a separate search of a car passenger's personal belongings left in the car gives the passenger standing to challenge the search. See, e.g., United States v. Salazar, 805 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); People v. Manke, 181 Ill.App.3d 374, 130

    ### Response:
    holding that a car passenger had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his closed brown paper bag found on the floorboard of his companions car
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    potentially actionable claim against it — patent infringement — lies exclusively in federal court. In sum, the City argues that, because there is no possibility of liability against it if suit were ever filed in state district court, the state district court, likewise, has no jurisdiction over the Rule 202 petition. Even if we were to agree that the state district court would have no jurisdiction over the City for the claims that U.S. Filter seeks to investigate, the district court would have jurisdiction over Altivia. For example, if the depositions reveal facts constituting a civil conspiracy between the City and Altivia, U.S. Filter could pursue a claim against Altivia, even if the City were immune. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 30, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186-87, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980) (<HOLDING>); B.K. v. Cox, 116 S.W.3d 351, 358-59

    ### Response:
    holding that immunity given judge under section 1983 does not inure to benefit of those accused of conspiring with him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to remain on bond pending sentencing. The court construed “exceptional” as meaning “a unique combination of circumstances giving rise to situations that are out of the ordinary.” See Lea, 360 F.3d at 403 (quoting United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir.1991)). It also favorably cited United States v. Lippold, 175 F.Supp.2d 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y.2001), which stated that “circumstances that are ‘purely personal’ do not typically rise to the level of ‘exceptional’ warranting release.” See id. The court then concluded that there was “nothing ‘exceptional’ about going to school, being employed, or being a first-time offender, either separately or in combination” that merited the defendant’s release pending sentencing. See id. at 403-04; see also Lippold, 175 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (<HOLDING>). The Court is persuaded by the reasoning of

    ### Response:
    holding that taking care of three young children one of whom suffered from a serious medical condition and being needed at work were purely personal circumstances not exceptional reasons for release
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Justice § 6-3.6 commentary at 6.39-40 (2d ed.1982 supp.) (footnotes omitted and alterations made in James I ). 12 . See James II, 739 P.2d at 1316; see also Evans v. State, 822 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Alaska App.1991). 13 . James II, 739 P.2d at 1316. 14 . Id. 15 . 663 P.2d 967 (Alaska App.1983). 16 . Id. at 970. 17 . Id. 18 . James I, 730 P.2d 811. 19 . - Id. at 814. 20 . Id. 21 . Id. at 814-15. 22 . James II, 739 P.2d at 1315. 23 . Id. 24 . Id. 25 . Id. at 1316. 26 . Kelly, 663 P.2d at 969. 27 . Id. at 970. 28 . James I, 730 P.2d at 819 (Singleton, J. dissenting). 29 . Id. at 815. 30 . James II, 739 P.2d at 1316. 31 . James I, 730 P.2d at 815 (Bryner, C.J., concurring). 32 . O'Dell v. Anchorage, 576 P.2d 104, 108 (Alaska 1978). 33 . See State v. Jones, 759 P.2d 558, 570 (Alaska App.1988) (<HOLDING>). 34 . James II, 739 P.2d at 1316; Kelly, 663

    ### Response:
    holding a defendant must either supply an affidavit from his former attorney or show why the attorney will not supply an affidavit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Corp., No. 02-681, 2007 Mass.Super. LEXIS 442, 2007 WL 3260199, *4-5 (Mass.Super.Ct. Sept. 25, 2007). But neither court held, as this Court does, that trial courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims. Indeed, in concluding that a plaintiff suing for allegedly defective Gen-3 buckles stated a cognizable claim, a Florida court noted: This case turns on a relatively simple question, at least as to damages — Is a car with defective seatbelt buckles worth less than a car with operational seatbelt buckles? Common sense indicates that it is, but, at this stage of the case, we need not decide that issue. Rather, we only determine that Collins is entitled to go forward with her case. Collins v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 894 So.2d 988, 989-90 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). The Court relies in part on Rivera v.

    ### Response:
    holding that florida consumer protection statute did not require that a defect manifest itself by failing to operate in an emergency or by causing injury  actual injury in form of insufficient product value was enough and whether allegations have merit remained to be decided
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    error affected defendant’s substantial rights requires the defendant to “show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004). If there is “evidence tending to show that a misunderstanding was inconsequential to a defendant’s decision,” there is no effect on the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 84, 124 S.Ct. 2333. To affect a defendant’s substantial rights, there must be “nothing in the record [that] indicates that the defendant independently knew or was advised of the correct” mandatory minimum sentence. United States v. Smagola, 390 Fed.Appx. 438, 442 (6th Cir.2010) (unpublished); see also United States v. Syal, 963 F.2d 900, 906 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). While the record does seem to show that

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to notify the defendant of the term of supervised release and its possible effect on his sentence was not harmless error where nothing in the record suggests that the defendant understood that his sentence would include supervised release and there was no written plea agreement by which he might have been warned
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that information.”). Rather, Beckley sought to supplement that report with relevant evidence relating to the topic of most concern to the trial court-information that was otherwise absent. 5 . While there is some contention in the brief that the motion for a continuance was not filed as quickly as it could have been because of informal discussions occurring between the State and Beckley's trial counsel relating to further psychological testing, that evidence is not contained in the record and we do not consider it here. 6 . Even if the dissent were correct in noting that the trial court “was well informed as to the detail and extent of Beckley’s perverse conduct,” infra ¶ 36, that is not the question. The question is whether Beckley was denied the statutory right to pre (S.D.1988) (<HOLDING>). Beckley's motion was filed six days prior to

    ### Response:
    holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance to allow defendant to present mitigating evidence in the form of letters and affidavits from family members when they were not requested until the day before the hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case the debtor was clearly aware of the Plaintiffs’ claim, as evidenced by the fact that the lawsuit filed by Plaintiffs led to the bankruptcy filing. Thus, equity requires the allowance of the informal proof of claim because debtor’s sole argument is that Plaintiffs failed to follow a procedural step. Defendant Schoch argues that Nikolout-sos “is distinguishable from the case at bar because the creditor in that case filed a Complaint to Determine Dischargeability and specifically told the Court that the Complaint was being filed as an informal proof of claim.” [Docket No. 51, ¶ 44, Response to Plaintiffs’ Position Statement] While that may be accurate, an informal proof of claim can come in many forms. See, e.g., In re Anderson-Walker Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); In re Pizza of Hawaii, Inc., 761 F.2d 1374,

    ### Response:
    holding that letters notifying the trustee of a debt constitute an informal proof of claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case: Equitable estoppel ... comes into play only after the statute of limitations has run and addresses itself to the circumstances in which a party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to an admittedly untimely action because his conduct has induced another into forebearing suit within the applicable limitations period. considering equitable estoppel as an avoidance of the statute of limitations involved plaintiffs that recognized the basis for the suit during the limitations period. The law in the district courts of appeal, on which we relied in both Morsani and S.A.P., has been identical. Every case that has applied the doctrine to avoid a statute of limitations defense involved plaintiffs who knew of their cause of action (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>); Salcedo v. Ass’n Cubana, Inc., 368 So.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the property appraiser was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations where the failure to bring the action within the limitations period was the direct result of the property appraisers failure to timely perform a related duty owed to plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    photographs, items of personal hygiene, or other effects of a private nature whose public disclosure could offend a student’s reasonable expectations of privacy. Here, however, the search of KP.’s bag was conducted in the privacy of the principal’s conference room. Only school officials, no students, were present. More importantly, the search was presumably limited in good faith to actions necessary to uncover a metal object like a pistol. Such a search would not include an intentional hunt for other contraband, although if discovered, such items need not be ignored. For example, such a search would not entail reading written materials, scrutinizing photographs, activating cellphones, or inspecting small pockets, crevices, wallets, containers, or purses too small to harbor a gun. U 6) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180

    ### Response:
    holding that a random visual and manual search of bags and packages carried onto the new york city subway was minimally intrusive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to “willfully and unlawfully entering] a building with the intent to commit theft” where the building was an “inhabited dwelling house [or other residential building] ... within the meaning of Penal Code section 460.” By pleading guilty, Rodriguez admitted the factual allegations in the indictment. See United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 852 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir.1995). Because Rodriguez’s conviction included the unlawful entry requirement absent in California’s statutory definition of burglary, his conviction meets the definition of “burglary of a dwelling” under Taylor and is, therefore, a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n. l(B)(iii); see also Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d at 852-52 (<HOLDING>). Rodriguez’s alternate argument, that his

    ### Response:
    holding that a california burglary conviction was burglary under a modifiedcate gorical approach because velascomedina pled guilty where the indictment alleged unlawful entry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    who received it. Finally, Mr. White’s affidavit claims Continental has spent “well over $100,000 in promotion and advertising” of its esp® product line over the past seven years, and has benefitted from the promotional efforts of its nationwide distributor, Fisher Scientific. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 15.) This evidence lacks probative value for a variety of reasons. Continental’s alleged $100,000 promotional expenditure, over a seven year period, amounts to a paltry $15,000 per year, often the cost of a single advertisement in a national publication. Continental offers no evidence as to how it put these funds to use, nor does it provide a coherent explanation as to how these expenditures contribute to secondary meaning. See Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 872 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Notably, White fails to itemize the amounts

    ### Response:
    recognizing importance of itemizing promotional expenses because not all such expenses contribute to the creation of secondary meaning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    repayment or it was convenient for him or her to do so, and the statute of limitations would begin to run at that time. Despite the evidentiary problems inherent in proving the state of the debtor's finances at various times before an action is initiated, some courts have found that this view is better aligned with the parties' intent and the general rules of contract law. See Annotation, 14 A.L.R. 4th at 1385; see also Rees v. Heyser, 404 N.E.2d 1183 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (where individual sought repayment of oral loan which did not contain a definite time of repayment, the court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on the promise until a reasonable time for performance had elapsed); Phillips & Jordan Invest. Corp. v. Ashblue Co., 86 N.C.App. 186, 357 S.E.2d 1 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Because this intermediate approach emphasizes

    ### Response:
    holding in an action on a verbal agreement which failed to specify time for repayment that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until reasonable time for repayment had passed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dispute. 342 So.2d at 106. Sunshine Associates filed various defensive pleadings including an answer with affirmative defenses. Sunshine Associates also responded to discovery requests. Id. It was only after B & H Sales moved for summary judgment that Sunshine Associates revealed that the correct name of the defendant was The Fusco Corporation, which had been doing business as Sunshine Associates. Id. at 106-07. On those facts, we concluded that applying the statute of limitations to bar the amended complaint would be “manifestly unjust” because the mistake in naming the defendant was merely a misnomer. Id. at 107. Thus, we held that the amended complaint related back to the original pleading. Id.; see also Schwartz v. Metro Limo, Inc., 683 So.2d 201, 203-04 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>); Galuppi v. Viele, 232 So.2d 408, 410-11 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding that where incorrectly named defendant filed a motion to dismiss and an answer with affirmative defenses and actively participated in discovery it led the plaintiff to believe that the correct defendant had been sued and that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to amend its complaint to correct the misnomer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cancellation. But we reject this argument because it obviates the phrase “benefits accrued.” Under Louisiana law, we should not assume that two different terms in a statute are synonymous. See Colwell v. State, 506 So.2d 941, 944 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 508 So.2d 89 (La.1987); Spragio v. Board of Trustees of the State Employees Group Benefits Program, 468 So.2d 1323, 1326 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 472 So.2d 32 (La.1985). Mrs. Gahn, on the other hand, argues that she “incurred” the expense for the treatment of her liver cancer when she was diagnosed with the disease, and she relies on prior interpretations of coverage provisions in insurance policies to support that position. See, e.g., Valladares v. Monarch Ins. Co., 282 So.2d 569, 572-73 (La.Ct.App. 4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), writs denied, 284 So.2d 603, 604 (La.1973);

    ### Response:
    holding that cost of plastic surgery to repair scarring was an expense incurred within one year of the accident even though the physician waited more than a year after the accident to perform the operation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    outcome of the plea process.” Id. At the evidentiary hearing on his motion, Movant made no assertions that his trial counsel failed to adequately explain the charges against him or failed to object to the factual basis underlying his plea. In fact, in his testimony at the evi-dentiary hearing, Movant asserted his trial counsel wrongly advised him to plead guilty because she had failed to investigate three potential witnesses and she failed to explore certain issues relating to one of the victim’s in his case. Accordingly, the issue raised in Movant’s point relied on was not presented to the motion court in his Rule 24.035 motion and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Day v. State, 208 S.W.3d 294, 295 (Mo.App.2006); see Amrine v. State, 785 S.W.2d 531, 535 (Mo. banc 1990) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, plain error review is not available

    ### Response:
    holding that claims which were not presented to the motion court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the expedited removal process, we are not persuaded. Shunaula introduced no evidence before the IJ, and makes no argument on appeal, regarding the general nature of the expedited removal system. He argues only that due process was violated in his particular expedited removal proceeding, a complaint that does not fall within § 1252(e)(3). Even if Shunaula’s complaint could be viewed as systemic, however, such a challenge can be brought only in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See supra n. 4 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)). This action did not originate there. In concluding that § 1252(a)(2)(A) bars our review of Shunaula’s claim, we join every other circuit to have considered this matter. See Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329-30 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Garcia de Rincon v. DHS, 539 F.3d 1133,

    ### Response:
    holding that under  1252a2a court lacks jurisdiction to inquire whether the expedited removal procedure to which the khans were subjected was properly invoked
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Circuit Judge. In November 2006, Domick R. Nelson defaulted on a consumer debt of $751.87. On February 25, 2015, she filed a Chapter 13 petition in bankruptcy court. Midland Credit Management, Inc., as agent for the creditor, filed a proof of claim in bankruptcy court for the amount of the debt. According to the proof of claim, Nelson made no payment on the debt after November 2006. Nelson objected to the proof of claim, arguing it was time-barred. See § 516.120(1) RSMo 2000; Discovery Grp. LLC v. Chapel Dev., LLC, 574 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). The bankruptcy court agreed, disallowing

    ### Response:
    recognizing that missouri statutes of limitations are procedural not substantive and merely suspend the remedy without extinguishing the right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was discriminatory. Pl.’s Mot. at 4, 7-8; Pl.’s Opp’n at 6-8. Where a plaintiff seeks an inference of discrimination based on “disparate treatment,” he must show that “all of the relevant aspects of [his] employment situation were ‘nearly identical’ to those” of the other employees who did not suffer similar adverse employment actions. See Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C.Cir.1995) (finding that a female plaintiff failed to demonstrate disparate treatment where comparator was both male and “lower in seniority” than the plaintiff); see also Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1345 (D.C.Cir.1999) (finding that two employees were not similarly situated where one was a GS-12 and the other a GS-13); Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 261-62 (D.C.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Here, the other employees the plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding that employees of differing seniority levels were not similarly situated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    officials); Doe v. State of La., 2 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir.1993) (concurring opinion) (noting that while “the actions of which Doe complains are egregious”, that fact alone “does not mean that he has asserted the violation of a federally protected right, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir.) (“[T]he Constitution is not a criminal or civil code to be invoked invariably for the crimes or torts of state educators who act in contravention of the very laws designed to thwart [abuse by teachers].”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 279, 112 L.Ed.2d 233 (1990). In fact, this Court has even held that a rape perpetrated by a state official was not an act under color of state law. City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>); see also Screws, 325 U.S. at 108-09, 65 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that a police officers rape of an arrestee was outside the scope of his employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the injurious instrumentality at the time of the alleged negligence.” Id. at 33, 574 P.2d at 826. ¶ 13 However, we decline to view Jackson as a departure from the rule that a claimant must identify, to a degree of probability, which of multiple defendants controlled the instrumentality that injured him. Notably, the court in Jackson did not reject, but rather reiterated, the general rule that a claimant must bring “circumstantial evidence supporting the inference that the defendant(s) probably is responsible for the harm to the plaintiff.” Id. at 32, 574 P.2d at 825. And, since Jackson, our appellate courts have repeatedly applied the exclusive-control rule without correction from the supreme court. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Otis Elevator, 146 Ariz. 98, 101, 703 P.2d 1247, 1250 (App.1985) (<HOLDING>); Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 50, 588 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding res ipsa applies to two defendants in joint control of instrumentality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trading costs for the Fund, “as the vast majority of the fixed income spreads ended up benefitting a third-party broker — East West — that provided nothing of value to the pension fund,” as Mayer put it, concluding from comparison with the actual performance of the portfolios Great Northern managed and with bond indices in the relevant period that the Fund would have earned about $300,000 on the commission dollars diverted to East West, not counting investigation costs. Berkowitz concluded that Great Northern obtained disadvantageous prices due to the criminal conspiracy involving Roach, Tringale, and Close. Great Northern challenges the admissibility of the Fund’s experts’ testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Evidence that is inadmissible because it is

    ### Response:
    holding that under fedrevid 702 expert testimony must be reliable to be admissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Article 9 provisions apply to any assignment of accounts has also been developed in case law in states whose commercial codes substantially parallel provisions of U.C.C. Article 9. See Major’s Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., Inc., 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir.1979) (stating that Article 9 governs all transactions in accounts, including both sales of accounts and secured interests in accounts, thus even an outright buyer of accounts by definition has a security interest in the accounts which it purchases); Valley Bank of Nevada v. City of Henderson, 528 F.Supp. 907 (D.C.Nev.1981) (noting that any transaction intended to create a security interest in accounts and any sale of accounts falls within the scope of Article 9); and In re Cripps, 31 B.R. 541 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1983) (<HOLDING>). The official comments to the U.C.C.,

    ### Response:
    holding that where an outright buyer of accounts receivable failed to perfect her interest in debtors account by filing a financing statement the buyer could not prevail over the bankruptcy trustee as lien creditor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the following five requirements to be entitled to reimbursement from the Section 443 Fund: (1) a supersedeas must have been requested; (2) the request for supersedeas must have been denied; (3) the request must have been made under Section 413 of the Act; (4) payments were.continued because of the order' denying supersedeas; and (5) in the final outcome of the proceedings, it was determined that such compensation was not, in fact, payable. See, e.g., H.A. Harper Sons, Inc. v. WCAB (Sweigart), 84 A.3d 363, 366 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). As will be discussed in further detail infra, there is 'no dispute among the parties that the fund established under Séction 443 does not permit reimbursement of attorney’s fees. See Universal AM-CAN, Ltd. v. WCAB (Minteer), 870 A.2d 961 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (<HOLDING>). 4 . As noted, the County's reimbursement

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys fees could notbe reimbursed from the section 443 fund
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under section 1915(d) without prejudice. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315 (5th Cir.1993). 3 . Denton v. Hernandez, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). 4 . Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1734. 5 . Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1985). These options are, of course, unnecessary in cases where the facts alleged are ""fantastic or delusional scenarios” or the legal theory upon which a complaint relies is ""indisputably meritless."" Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). 6 . Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.1983); Mitchell v. Sheriff Dept., Lubbock County, Tex., 995 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.1993). 7 . See, e.g., Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that during a postriot lockdown refusal of access to main law library is constitutional as long as access to basic law library for initial legal research is permitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the trial court re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18. In determining that the trial court reversibly erred in granting the Motion (and that the Insureds’ motion for rehearing should be granted), the majority relies on its conclusion that the trial court did not re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18. But, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, in their Motion for Rehearing, the Insureds assert that the trial court did re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18; however, the Insureds claim that they did not receive notice that the Motion had been re-set until March 18. The Insureds state that “giving notice on March 18 — the day summary judg 14-04-00064-CV, 2004 WL 2933575, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); Rios v. Texas Bank, 948 S.W.2d 30, 32-33

    ### Response:
    holding appellant waived her complaint that trial court gave her no notice of summaryjudgment hearing by not raising the objection in the trial court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been violated. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704; Realmuto v. Department of Transportation, 161 Pa.Cmwlth. 613, 637 A.2d 769 (1994); Swoyer v. Department of Transportation, 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 1, 626 A.2d 1247 (1991), appeal dismissed, 533 Pa. 318, 623 A.2d 321 (1993). 4 . Unless the context ""clearly indicates otherwise,” the term driver refers to any ""person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.” Section 102 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 102. 5 . Moreover, the purpose behind the acknowl-edgement requirement of section 1541 is not furthered by its application to Smith. The requirement of submitting an Acknowledgement Form is to ensure that the driver has notice of the suspension. See Commonwealth v. Kane, 460 Pa. 582, 333 A.2d 925 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Here, Smith does not argue that he did not

    ### Response:
    holding the state did not meet its burden of proving defendant operated a motor vehicle while suspended where the only evidence of actual notice of suspension was that dot mailed defendant the notice of suspension
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Chamberlin, 206 Neb. 808, 295 N.W.2d 391 (1980). While we have held that one may in good faith make an occupational change even though that change may reduce one’s ability to meet financial obligations, we have never determined whether the termination of one’s employment due to one’s own bad acts or fault constitutes good cause justifying modification or termination of alimony payments. See Cooper, supra. Other jurisdictions have addressed this issue. For instance, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has stated, “Although unemployment or diminution of earnings is a common ground for modification, a petition for modific (employing good faith test to determine whether decrease in income should justify decrease in alimony); Antonelli v. Antonelli, 242 Va. 152, 409 S.E.2d 117 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Giesner v. Giesner, 319 N.W.2d 718 (Minn.

    ### Response:
    holding that reduction in income resulting from voluntary employment decision does not require corresponding reduction in payor spouses support obligations even if decision was reasonable and made in good faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and C (Nelson Dep. at 13;24-14:12). They also caused the duplicative second lawsuit to be filed. This Court and the Fifth Circuit rejected the individual Defendants’ defense that they never read the LLC Purchase Agreement before signing it. # 52 at 5-6; # 55; # 170 at 2 (“Dallas Gas erred in not reading the addendum that effected the release, and Dallas Gas ratified the release by keeping the sums received under the contract.”). Where a court has previously held that an unambiguous release and covenant not to sue bars the plaintiffs claims, the plaintiffs breach of the release and covenant not to sue may be deemed “obvious” as a matter of law, and the sued party is entitled to damages. Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 957 F.2d 1302, 1306 (5th Cir.1992) (applying New York law) (<HOLDING>). See also McKissick v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l,

    ### Response:
    holding that where an action is brought in obvious breach of covenant not to sue court has wide discretion to impose liability for litigation expenses including attorneys fees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    WL 370461, at *4 (Minn.App. July 8, 1997) (stating that while section 197.46 specifically allows the veteran’s right to appeal, “both parties have the same right to appeal”), review denied (Minn. Sept. 3, 1997). These decisions cited Schrader as support. Stafne, 1998 WL 778931, at *3; Rollins, 1997 WL 370461, at *4. The district court relied on Schrader and Stafne as support for its dismissal order; Eldredge relies on Rollins in addition to Schrader and Stafne. But as unpublished cases, Stafne and Rollins are not binding authority. Minn.Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2008) (stating that “[u]npublished opinions of the [c]ourt of [ajppeals are not precedential”). And although unpublished cases may have persuasive value, see Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn.App. 1993) (<HOLDING>), because Stafne and Rollins did not involve

    ### Response:
    holding that unpublished opinions are of persuasive value at best and not precedential
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    costs in the trial court on March 27, 2012. Analysis Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs inmate litigation when the inmate claims inability to pay costs. In its 2011 session, the Texas Legislature amended Chapter 14. Prior to the amendments, Chapter 14 “applie[d] only to a suit brought by an inmate in a district, county, justice of the peace, or small claims court in which an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs [was] filed by the inmate.” In its pre-amended state, it was clear that “Chapter 14 [did] not apply to appellate courts.” Nabelek v. Garrett, 94 S.W.3d 648, 649 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); see Jackson v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 178 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The amendments to Chapter 14 became effective

    ### Response:
    holding procedural requirements of section 14004 inapplicable to appellate filings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other acts providing there is a ‘reasonable’ basis ... to ... permit[] an inference that defendant had an aberrant sexual propensity that makes it more probable that he or she committed the sexual offense charged”). ¶ 15 Nor were the offenses so remote in time that evidence of each would not have been cross-admissible due to the danger of unfair prejudice. The attacks on Yolanda, Karen, and Melissa occurred within a three-month period. Although the attack on Alisa occurred two years and nine months before the attack on Yolanda, this time interval did not require the trial court to find that the probative value of the evidence of each attack was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Cf. State v. Arner; 195 Ariz. 394, 395 ¶ 1, 988 P.2d 1120, 1121 (App. 1999) (<HOLDING>); Rule 404 cmt. to 1997 amendment (remoteness

    ### Response:
    holding trial court did not err by permitting evidence that defendant molested another child three years before the victim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    those who live in such humble circumstances to dwell there. That they cannot afford to have their own kitchens and bathrooms, and hallway access thereto, does not render such areas “public” with respect to the constitutional prerequisites for permissible entry by the police .... We should vigilantly guard against permitting ... inroads upon the reasonable expectations of privacy of the lesser situated of our citizens who are forced by economic circumstances to reside in rooming houses. People v. Garriga, 189 A.D.2d 236, 596 N.Y.S.2d 25, 29 (citation omitted), leave to appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 718, 602 N.Y.S.2d 815, 622 N.E.2d 316 (1993). We are aware that other courts have reached a contrary result on this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210, 1214 (D.C.Cir.1976)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Perkins, 286 F.Supp. 259,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants constitutionally protected privacy interest began at the door to his room not at the door to the rooming house
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gualberto Chavez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) summarily affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his motion to reopen deportation proceedings after he was ordered deported in absentia. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Celis-Castellano v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888, 890-91 (9th Cir.2002). We grant the petition. The IJ abused his discretion by denying Chavez’s motion to reopen. See Jerezano v. INS, 169 F.3d 613, 615 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Chavez stated in his motion to reopen that

    ### Response:
    holding that denying a petitioners motion to reopen when he arrived 15 to 20 minutes late was an abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to adequately plead an offer to tender the Plan's shares back to Defendants. After briefing on Defendants’ motion, the Court allowed Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint which included an offer of tender. Thus, Defendants' argument on that point is moot. 25 . The applicable statute of limitations in this case is governed by § 13 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m. As discussed in detail infra, § 13 has both a 1-year and 3-year limitations period. Truly, the 3-year period is a statute of repose, not of limitations. P. Stolz Family Partnership L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 99-107 (2d Cir.2004); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First RepublicBank Corp., 997 F.2d 39, 52 (5th Cir.1993) (judgment vacated on other grounds); Eureka Homestead Soc. v. Zirinsky, 1995 WL 542482, *2 (E.D.La.1995) (<HOLDING>). Because the parties have referred to § 13 in

    ### Response:
    holding that the 3year limit is a period of repose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 467 (describing the practical problems that would ensue if tolling were not permitted in opt-in class actions). It also would place on the court the burden of timing class certification and implementing opt-in procedures in such a way as to make sure that the limitations period was met. This would be virtually impossible in cases such as this, where suit was filed late in the period. See, Brief of Amici Curiae Larry J. Rhutasel et al. at 11-12 (unintentional procedural delays in ruling on class certification would terminate putative class members’ claims if tolling did not permit putative members to opt in to a representative suit after the statute of limitations had run). Such a holding also would create an anomalous difference 8, 139-140, 127 S.Ct. 764, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we agree with the reasoning of the

    ### Response:
    holding that the standard for assessing whether a justiciable controversy exists should not be more stringent in lawsuits seeking a declaration of patent invalidity or noninfringement than in nonpatent fields
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    anatomical areas.” Id. at 1503-1504. When terms are defined, however, a vagueness argument generally fails. See e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, supra, 427 U.S. at 60-62, 96 S.Ct. at 2447-2448, 49 L.Ed.2d at 320-321; Berg v. Health & Hospital Corp., supra, 865 F.2d at 803. See also State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 166, 475 A.2d 31 (1984). Here, N.J.S.A 2C:33-12.2 clearly defines specified sexual activity. In addition, N.J.S.A 2C:33-12.2a(4) contains the verb “facilitate,” which has uniformly been found not to offend the vagueness doctrine. See e.g., Matter of Kaster, 454 N.W.2d 876 (Iowa 1990) (reasoning that proscribed criminal activity was clearly defined and “facilitate” in the context of a forfeiture statute was not vague); People v. Chastain, 733 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Colo.1987) (<HOLDING>); State v. Bush, 195 Mont. 475, 636 P.2d 849,

    ### Response:
    recognizing broad definition of proscribed tools which facilitate burglary reflected legislatures understanding that a burglars choice of tool is limited only by his imagination and ingenuity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    damage to the tracks was done by the work of an independent contractor whom Chessie did not sue. The district court granted summary judgment on the trespass and negligent claims as a result, and Chessie does not ask us to review those decisions. Chessie’s idiosyncratic problems with its state-law claims do not provide a sound basis for finding an implied right of action, which would use congressional silence to work broad changes in the relationship between federal and state law affecting railroads. Finally, to support its argument for an implied right of action, Chessie cites court cases and administrative decisions in which the ICC Termination Act has been held to preempt various state laws. See, e.g., Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co. v. Bickham, 602 F.Supp. 383, 384 (M.D. La. 1985) (<HOLDING>), aff’d mem., 775 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1985);

    ### Response:
    holding that railroads servitude could not be extinguished under state law and enjoining servient estate owners interference with railroad operation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    improper voir dire questions, a party must make a timely, specific objection at the earliest possible opportunity. Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The State asked the jury panel members whether they would require more evidence than one witness if they found the witness to be credible and believed the State proved all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt through that witness. Appellant did not object until after the State had directed the question to two panel members, and one of those potential jurors had further dialogue with the State about the question. Accordingly, appellant did not object at the earliest possible opportunity and waived the issue for our review. See Thrift v. State, 134 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, no pet. granted) (<HOLDING>). Appellant’s first issue is overruled.

    ### Response:
    holding error was not preserved where matter was explored with jury panel before defendant objected
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    State’s decision to characterize that failure as a finding drat K.S. was incompetent to testify. Yet the record demonstrates the State consistently and adamantly characterized Simpson’s efforts to prevent the witness from testifying as a disqualification issue and repeatedly urged the district court to conduct a hearing on her competency as required by statute. The district court’s failure to focus on the State’s argument or to provide any clear basis for its ruling should not fall upon the State. Instead, I would hold that the district court clearly abused its discretion by failing to identify or isolate any legal basis for its harsh ruling despite the State’s efforts to provide the court with a framework for doing, so. See State v. Hernandez, 294 Kan. 200, 207, 273 P.3d 774 (2012) (<HOLDING>); State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d

    ### Response:
    holding trial court abused its discretion when it denied a motion for mistrial after erroneously concluding an issue could be dealt with at sentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cited in City of Phila., 838 A.2d at 588. Accordingly, by 2003, germaneness had evolved to a standard of “whether the court can fashion a single, over-arching topic to loosely relate the various subjects included in the statute under review.” City of Phila., 838 A.2d at 587. Nevertheless, we cautioned that we should be careful not to render Section 3 “impotent to guard against the evils that it was designed to curtail” by fashioning a theme that is all-encompassing in its broadness. Id. at 588 (citing, e.g., DeWeese v. Weaver, 824 A.2d 364 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (finding the theme “business of the courts” too encompassing to uphold a law regulating DNA records and apportioning negligence liability); Pa. Ass’n of Rental Dealers v. Com., 123 Pa.Cmwlth. 533, 554 A.2d 998 (1989) (<HOLDING>)). Thus, in City of Philadelphia,

    ### Response:
    holding that the topic of economic wellbeing of the commonwealth would turn the germaneness requirement into a nullity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    right to free speech and association under the First Amendment’) with Compl. at 7 para. (1) (requesting an order ”[d]eclaring that Defendants are unlawfully depriving plaintiffs of their right to engage in organization and other expressive activity in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). Defs.' Reply at 6 n. 6. 6 . The Court concludes that because Counts I and II of the plaintiffs' complaint are barred pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, the Court need not address whether these counts state a claim for which relief may be granted. 7 . See Orange, 59 F.3d at 1273 (finding that the plaintiffs speech was a matter of public concern because it regarded ""potential fraud at a public university.”); Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 935-36 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Speech is not of public concern ""when it is

    ### Response:
    holding that issues of prison security public safety and official corruption are matters of public concern
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arises, of course, because many formulary orders are not meant to convey anything as to the reason for the decision. Attributing a reason is therefore both difficult and artificial. We think that the attribution necessary for federal habeas purposes can be facilitated, and sound results more often assured, by applying the following presumption: where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground. If an earlier opinion “fairly appear[s] to rest primarily on federal law,” Coleman, [— U.S. at-], 111 S.Ct. at 2559, we will presume that no procedural default has been invoked by a subsequent unexplained order that leaves the judgmen 2d 737, 738 (N.Y.App.Div.1979) (<HOLDING>); see also People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87,

    ### Response:
    holding objection to jury selection process waived where not raised until after entire panel had been sworn
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Swart, 679 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.1982), therefore, does not assist Sandoval-Vasquez. There, we ruled that officers’ entry into a business they knew was closed violated the Fourth Amendment. In this case, however, the officers entered an open business. Sandoval-Vasquez also attempts to distinguish Tolar on the basis that the officers here entered the premises with their weapons drawn, yelling that they were police officers and ordering the occupants against a wall. The officers’ entry in Tolar, in contrast, was peaceful. Sandoval-Vasquez thus maintains that in addition to entering the business shortly before it closed, the officers’ manner of entry into his business rendered the entry unlawful. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the district court that the

    ### Response:
    holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    No. A-201, April 1997 Edition,” an industry standard. And in Avatar Properties, Inc. v. Greetham, 27 So.3d 764, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), although a home warranty was not attached to a purchase and sale agreement, “the agreement state[d] that the warranty was available for examination at [the seller’s] offices and, that upon request the warranty would be attached as an exhibit to the purchase and sale agreement.” The buyers initialed that paragraph, signaling an intent that the warranty be incorporated into the main contract. Id. at 766-67. During the formation of the contract in this case, Tradewinds expressed no similar intent to incorporate the “terms and conditions.” See also Mgmt. Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Constr., Inc., 743 So.2d 627, 631-32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we affirm the order of the

    ### Response:
    holding that purchase contract for computer software referred to license agreement indicated where it could be obtained and provided it with software sealed with the warning by opening this packet you indicate your acceptance of sellers license agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    over KOH’s claims arises independently under article XI, section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution in light of specific provisions therein protecting native Hawaiian rights. Second, Respondent/Appellee-Appellee Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) was required to hold a contested case hearing prior to the issuance of a conservation district use permit (CDUP or permit), as a matter of constitutional due process, because Respondent/ Ap-pellee-Appellee University of Hawaii (UH) had a “property interest” in the CDUP, and the issuance of the CDUP would adversely impact KOH’s ability to engage in native Hawaiian traditional and customary practices as protected by art. XII, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution. See Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawaii 64, 881 P.2d 1210 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Third, jurisdiction arises under the public

    ### Response:
    holding that constitutional due process protections mandate a hearing where the issuance of a permit implicating an applicants property rights adversely affects the constitutionally protected rights of other interested persons who have followed the agencys rules governing participation in contested cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or in privity with a party in the first action.” Id. at 802 (emphasis in original). The second requirement need not detain us. Fullerton pled guilty to a violation of Tex. Penal Code § 19.02. By entering this plea, he admitted that he intended to kill his victims or at least knew that his actions would cause their deaths. In other words, his convictions were valid because he admitted that the deaths were not accidents. The convictions are inconsistent both with the Buckners’ suggestion that Fullerton’s delusions made the shootings acts of self-defense and with their contention that he was legally insane during the incident. If the criminal proceedings decided anything, it was that the shootings were not “occurrences.” See Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 352-54 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). The first and third requisites for issue

    ### Response:
    holding that a judicial confession in a guilty plea is itself sufficient evidence to support the crime charged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    condition, which the evidence primarily addressed and which United received for the first time on appeal. Thus, the physician suggested that United have Hall attend an IME if it intended to allow benefits based on Hall’s current condition. United immediately contacted Hall and set the IME within the extension deadline. A few days later, United sent another letter to Hall explaining this exact argument. Thus, United concludes that its request for an IME was made in good faith. The Court agrees. Accordingly, the Court finds that United’s plan allows it to require Hall to attend an IME during the appeal process and that Hall’s refusal to attend the IME resulted in him not exhausting his administrative remedies. See Zalka v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 65 F.Supp.2d 1369, 1371 (S.D.Fla. 1998) (<HOLDING>); accord Hunter, 251 F.Supp.2d at 111-12

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs refusal to submit to an ime and immediately filing suit precluded the defendant from completing its administrative reviewing of her claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Am. v. SPM Flow Control, Inc., 180 S.W.3d 761, 785 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.). A claim need not demand an exact amount or list every element of damage. Id. “The abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court’s factual findings as they relate to prejudgment interest; but the de novo standard applies to the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.” Figueroa v. Davis, 318 S.W.3d 53, 66 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). When settlement credits are at issue, the declining-principal formula should be used, under which settlements are credited w W.3d 819, 824-25 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied) (rejecting argument that trial court abused its discretion in 2d 702, 705 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Because the trial court must revisit

    ### Response:
    holding that issues not fairly presented to the trial court are waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Johnston argues, as he did in the postconviction court, that he is exempt from execution under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because his severe mental illness places him in the same category as those whose executions are barred because they were under the age of eighteen at the time of the murder or are mentally retarded. The court below denied relief, finding Johnston’s claim was procedurally barred for not having been raised on direct appeal or in prior posteonviction proceedings and because, under this Court’s precedents, mental illness is not a per se bar to execution. We agree with both these conclusions. Relying on the reasoning behind the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (<HOLDING>) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122

    ### Response:
    holding the death penalty unconstitutional for defendants under age eighteen at the time of the crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    total incapacity but in lieu of all other payments for compensation” indicates that once a claimant receives permanent partial disability benefits he or she is not eligible for any other benefits. The plaintiff responds that this court previously has concluded that a claimant can receive total incapacity benefits after having received permanent partial disability benefits and nothing in the present case requires a departure from this precedent. We agree with the plaintiff, and conclude that in interpreting the language and interrelationship of §§ 31-307, 31-308 (b) and 31-315, we do not write on a clean slate, but are bound by our previous judicial interpretations of this language and the statutory scheme. See Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 282 Conn. 477, 501, 923 A.2d 657 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Over the course of the last 100 years, this

    ### Response:
    holding that  12z does not require this court to overrule prior judicial interpretations of statutes even if not based on plain meaning rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vance, 231 F.3d at 261. Several Sixth Circuit cases also suggest that liability is appropriate where the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to known prior acts of harassment by the same perpetrator against victims other than the plaintiff, although these cases ultimately declined to find liability because the particular fact patterns did not support a finding that the defendant both had notice of these prior incidents and acted with deliberate indifference. See McCoy v. Board of Educ. of Columbus City Schs., 515 Fed.Appx. 387 (6th Cir.2013); Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Schs., 469 F.3d 479 (6th Cir.2006); Williams ex. rel. Hart v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dist., 400 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2005) ; see also Lopez v. Metro. Gov’t, 646 F.Supp.2d 891 (M.D.Tenn.2009) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the court finds that there

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants notice of prior harassment against victims other than the plaintiff can give rise to title ix liability so long as the defendant possessed enough knowledge of the harassment that it could reasonably have responded with remedial measures to address the kind of harassment upon which the plaintiffs legal claim is based
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    strategy of “humanizing” or showing only the good characteristics of a defendant is not necessarily deficient where the strategy is “ ‘dictated’ by the defendant’s insistence on his innocence.” Sliney v. State, 944 So.2d 270, 285 (Fla.2006) (citing Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 223 (Fla.1998)). However, in both Sliney and Rutherford, the trial attorney had a sound reason for believing the omitted mitigation would have been harmful in some respect to the defendant’s case. In Sliney, the defendant was examined by a mental health expert prior to the penalty phase, and the report supplied to counsel contained substantial harmful information about the defendant and would have been inconsistent with other mitigation. Id. at 283; see also Sexton v. State, 997 So.2d 1073, 1084 (Fla.2008) (<HOLDING>); Hodges v. State, 885 So.2d 338, 348

    ### Response:
    holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to present mental mitigation that would have opened the door to testimony that the defendant was a sadistic sexual psychopath
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    moved to dismiss at the March 8 hearing. It was therefore defendant’s responsibility to present evidence of materiality at that time. See id. at 274. Defendant failed to do so. Thus the only record evidence concerning the issue of Argyle’s materiality is the above-quoted exchange between the trial court and defense counsel, which took place at the December 10 hearing. We therefore address whether that evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding. The December 10 exchange between the trial court and defense counsel reveals that defense counsel was not able to make a plausible showing that Argyle’s testimony would be favorable to the defense, but rather could only speculate as to how he thought Argyle might testify. Cf. State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Utah 1984) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as delineated infra in our analysis

    ### Response:
    holding that where no description of witnesss evidence offered and no suggestion made as to how testimony would affect defendants case trial court did not err in refusing to issue certificate ordering witnesss attendance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    impose on Louisiana abortion providers. In the context of a challenge to the provisions of a regulatory scheme, such as that at issue here, hardship will often result first and foremost from the “adverse effects of a strictly legal kind” inherent in the provisions at issue. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733, 118 S.Ct. 1665. The Supreme Court has explained that such legal harms inhere in laws or regulations that, for example, “command [some]one to do ... or to refrain from doing [something; ... grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal license, power, or authority; ... subject [some]one to ... civil or criminal liability; [or] create ... legal rights or obligations.” Id.; accord Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 809, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Texas, 497 F.3d at 499 (recognizing

    ### Response:
    recognizing that adverse effects of a strictly legal kind may amount to a showing of hardship where a regulation inter alia modifies a plaintiffs formal legal license or subjects a plaintiff to  civil  liability quoting ohio forestry 523 us at 733 118 sct 1665
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Digital Technologies Corp., 306 B.R. 505, 509 (Bankr.D.Del.2004) (""In fact an overwhelming majority of courts have concluded that liability insurance policies fall within § 541(a)(l)’s definition of estate property.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing In re Matter of Vitek, Inc., 51 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir.1995)). 30 . In re Allied Digital, 306 B.R. at 509; see In re SN Liquidation, 388 B.R. at 584 (""Who owns the proceeds of an insurance policy presents a more complicated issue and requires a more careful analysis.”); In re CyberMedica, Inc., 280 B.R. 12, 16 (Bankr.D.Mass.2002) (observing that ""courts are in disagreement on whether or not insurance proceeds are property of the estate.”) (emphasis in original); e.g., In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 298 B.R. 49 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>); In re First Central Financial Corp., 238 B.R.

    ### Response:
    holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inconsistent with federal law and, therefore, preempted. Fla. Stat. Section 812.014(1) defines theft more broadly than the crime defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 661; the Florida statute makes punishable not only a taking but also knowing usage or attempts to use the property of another with intent to either, temporarily or permanently, deprive the other person of a right or benefit of the property or appropriate the property to his own use. Fla. Stat. § 812.014(1). Defendant would be subjected to additional punishments inconsistent with maritime law, including treble damages and payment of attorney’s fees and costs if Fla. Stat. Sections 812.014(1) and 772.11 were applied. GE Seaco Servs., Ltd. v. Interline Connection, N.V., No. 09-23864-CIV, 2011 WL 98406, at *5 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 12, 2011) (<HOLDING>). Florida’s civil theft statutory scheme does

    ### Response:
    holding the attorneys fees and treble damages provisions of fla stat section 77211 are incompatible with maritime law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    attaches an importance to prompt delivery, or simply because he desires to reduce shipping costs selectively. If selective cost savings were sufficient grounds to use a private courier to carry letters, the Private Express Statutes would be effectively nullified. 44 Fed.Reg. 40,076 (July 9, 1979) (emphasis added). Despite the soundness of this reasoning, the USPS proceeded in this case to ignore it, indeed to contravene it directly, by justifying an unqualified suspension solely on the selective cost and service benefits to businesses engaged in international commerce. This approach is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. Cf. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1074, 1091-92 (D.C.Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 913, 108 S.Ct. 1088, 99 L.Ed.2d 247 (1988) (<HOLDING>). The Postal Service replies that it did

    ### Response:
    holding that agency administering a public interest standard did not engage in reasoned decisionmaking when it focused only on the economic impacts accruing to one segment of the power consuming public
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    submit that he would not have pled to § 924 had he known of the term. He bases his claim strictly on a procedural rule violation which he cannot do under § 2255. Even if the Court’s error is a proper subject of collateral relief, the error did not affect Mr. Cooke’s substantial rights. The Presentence Investigation Report noted the mandatory term of supervised release; in addition, the Court informed Mr. Cooke of the mandatory term at his sentencing hearing. Mr. Cooke failed to object to that information either in the report or at sentencing. Mr. Cooke’s own conduct, or lack thereof, proves that his substantial rights were not affected by the Court’s error. See United States v. Carey, 884 F.2d 547 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067, 110 S.Ct. 1786, 108 L.Ed.2d 787 (S.Ct.1990) (<HOLDING>). Since Mr. Cooke’s substantial rights were not

    ### Response:
    holding that where trial court did not inform defendant of supervised release term during plea colloquy but did advise defendant of term in presentence report and at sentencing defendants sentence stands
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the duration of the proceedings, to cross-examine the State’s witnesses, and to call and subpoena witnesses on the defendant’s own behalf. See generally Rule 5-302 NMRA. {17} Because grand jury proceedings are conducted by a prosecutor acting under the indirect supervision of the grand jury judge, we rely on the structural protections of the grand jury statutes and procedural rules to preserve the target’s rights and the integrity of the grand jury process. If the target of a grand jury investigation establishes, pretrial, that the grand jury proceedings were conducted in violation of these structural protections, the target is entitled to dismissal of the indictment and is not required to demonstrate prejudice. See, e.g., De Leon v. Hartley, 2014-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 16-17, 316 P.3d 896 (<HOLDING>); Davis, 1977-NMSC-049, ¶4 (holding “that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court should have quashed an indictment without requiring the target to show prejudice because the district attorney improperly exercised control over the selection and excusal of grand jurors and the defendant brought this to the attention of the district court before trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not limited to disputes between nonprofit entities. Conditions Precedent Teco asserts Valero has failed to comply with contractual conditions precedent to enforce the agreement to arbitrate. Valero, on the other hand, maintains that whether it has satisfied any condition precedent is a question for the arbitrator, not the court. In support of this contention, Valero cites several federal cases construing the Federal Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 149 (5 th Cir.1987); Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 838 F.Supp. 1156, 1158 (N.D.Tex.1993), aff'd, 47 F:3d 750 (5 th Cir.1995). We note that in construing the TGAA, there is a conflict among Texas courts of appeals on this issue. See, e.g., D. Wilson Constr. Co., 988 S.W.2d at 395 (<HOLDING>); City of Lubbock v. Hancock, 940 S.W.2d 123,

    ### Response:
    holding the trial court may determine issue of condition precedent to enforcement of agreement to arbitrate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on defendant’s long arrest record plus adjudicated criminal history without following § 4A1.3 in its “holistic evaluation” of § 3553(a) factors and affirming above-guidelines sentence); United States v. Perez-Molina, 627 F.3d 1049, 1049-51 (7th Cir.2010) (concluding that district court did not err in disregarding § 4A1.3 because it also relied on other § 3553(a) factors in imposing sentence that doubled high end of guidelines range). Nor was there any error in the court’s consideration of the pending Wisconsin charges during the § 3553(a) analysis because a sentencing court may further consider facts already taken into account during the guidelines calculations. See United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 951(7th Cir.2010); United States v. Tockes, 530 F.3d 628, 633 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). We are even less persuaded by Adams’s

    ### Response:
    recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    circumstances of Strada’s murder. Id. at 1312 (citations omitted). The robberies clarified the relationship between Mandacina, McGuire and Earlywine. The robberies brought both McGuire and Earlywine to Kansas City on numerous occasions to obtain firearms through the Mandarinas and to launder money. Most importantly, the robberies explained why McGuire would entrust Earlywine with knowledge of the Strada murder and why Mandacina would discuss a contract murder with McGuire, in Early-wine’s presence, without fearing that he would be reported to the authorities immediately. In light of the above, the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. The trial court need not issue a prior crimes limiting instruction sua sponte. See United States v. Williams, 994 F.2d 1287, 1290 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). We see no reason to treat the admission of

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of 9-mm ammunition. In response to Israel’s objections to the presentence report, the probation officer noted that the search also resulted in the seizure of video-surveillance equipment and $1,047 in cash. The district court found that Israel possessed the firearms in connection with drug trafficking, noting that there had been a number of controlled buys from Israel, that he was in possession of cocaine when the search warrant was executed, that the firearms were hidden, that there was “a lot” of ammunition, and that scales and other indicia of drug trafficking were found. The district court expressed concern about Israel’s possession of a firearm with a large capacity magazine: “I really don’t know why anybody would have one of those for any reason.” See Taylor, 648 F.3d at 433 (<HOLDING>). Israel argues that the temporal remoteness of

    ### Response:
    holding that the type of firearm and whether it is loaded are also considerations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.2d 913 (2d Cir.1985). In essence, the plan becomes a binding contract between the debtor and the creditors and controls their rights and obligations. See In re Kentucky Lumber Co., 860 F.2d 674 at 679 (6th Cir.1988). “Absent special language in the plan, two propositions seem clear as a result of the substitution of plan obligations for pre-confirmation obligations. First, creditors may engage in all lawful collection activities to enforce plan obligations; second, creditors may not take any steps to collect pre-confirmation obligations.” Lander and Warfield; A Review And Analysis Of Selected Post-confirmation Activities In Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 62 Am.Bankr.L.J. 203, 217 (1988). See also Paul v. Monts (In re International Plastics, Inc.), 906 F.2d 1468, 1474-76 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION The Debtors’ confirmed plan became

    ### Response:
    holding that confirmation of a chapter 11 plan creates a binding contract which may be enforced in state courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    price increase. 17 Although the Court of Appeals concluded that the regulation directly advanced the State’s interest, it did not dispute the District Court’s conclusion that the evidence suggested that, at most, a price advertising ban would have a marginal impact on overall alcohol consumption. Id., at 7-8; cf. Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Assn. v. Attorney General, 142 Mich. App., at 311, 370 N. W. 2d, at 336 (explaining that “any additional impact on the level of consumption attributable to the absence of price advertisements would be negligible”). 18 Outside the First Amendment context, we have refused to uphold alcohol advertising bans premised on similarly speculative assertions about their impact on consumption. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S., at 715-716 (<HOLDING>); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v.

    ### Response:
    holding ban preempted by federal communications commission regulations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as those presented by three other cases, Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930 (9th Cir.1999), Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.1998), and Montero v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856 (9th Cir.1999), where plaintiffs endured multiple harassing incidents over two or more years. In reaching this conclusion, the district court appears to have impliedly adopted a legal standard that would require plaintiffs to suffer more than one incident of sexual harassment over a number of years in order to establish a hostile work environment. However, no such requirement exists or should be implied. Indeed, one incident of sexual harassment may suffice to establish a viable claim if it is sufficiently severe. See, e.g., Little v. Windermere, — F.3d -, -, 2002 WL 84237 at *5 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917,

    ### Response:
    recognizing principle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    absence of probable cause to believe the detainee has a mental disorder. (2) Recognition of Mental Disorder Harvey asserts that Perez’s deposition testimony supports a finding that Perez did not have any training as to § 5150 detentions beyond initial academy training. Harvey argues that had Perez been given additional training, Perez would have realized there was no probable cause to believe Harvey’s behavior was the result of a mental disorder. Where a plaintiff bases a Monell claim on the theory that the training provided on a specific subject is insufficient, the plaintiff cannot prevail by offering, without more, evidence that the government entity miscalculated the amount of time necessary to adequately prepare its employees. See Mateyko v. Felix, 924 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 814, 112 S.Ct. 65, 116

    ### Response:
    holding evidence police department trained officers for three to four hours in the use of tazer guns without more was insufficient to establish monell claim noting failure to provide a more lengthy training program suggests at most negligence on the part of the employer in miscalculating the amount of time necessary to adequately prepare its officers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    eviction), interpreted in Wagoner v. Bennett, 814 P.2d 476, 481 (Okla.1991); Okla.Stat. tit. 41, § 124 (providing a tenant -with an action when a landlord makes an unlawful entry). Therefore, any “other invasion of the right of private occupancy” is appropriately interpreted as also requiring an invasion of a real property right. The clear weight of authority in other courts defines this term precisely as we have suggested. See Red Ball Leasing, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indent. Co., 915 F.2d 306, 312 (7th Cir.1990) (applying the rule of ejusdem generis to the personal injury definition of “other invasion of the right of private occupancy” to determine that under Indiana law, it “precludes covera 766, 215 Cal.Rptr. 416, 421-22 (1985) (same); Harbor Ins. Co., 1989 WL 112532, at *1 (<HOLDING>). Instead of creating an ambiguity, the term

    ### Response:
    holding that under delaware law the policys definition of personal injury as wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy applies only to damages incurred as a result of an invasion of an interest in real property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as to the appropriate legal standard to be applied.” DiBiasi, 988 So.2d at 459.’ “Catrett v. Baldwin County Elec. Membership Corp., 996 So.2d 196, 199 (Ala.2008).” Moon v. Pillion, 2 So.3d 842, 845 (Ala.2008). Legal Analysis The elements of a claim of malicious prosecution are: (1) institution of a prior judicial proceeding by the present defendant, (2) a lack of probable cause, (3) malice on the defendant’s part, (4) termination of the prior proceeding in favor of the present plaintiff, and (5) damage. Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So.2d 824, 831-33 (Ala.1999). The parties agree that there is no dispute that Burnett instituted a criminal proceeding against Ravenel; that the criminal proceeding was terminated in favor of Ravenel, see Chatman v. Pizitz, Inc., 429 So.2d 969 (Ala.1983) (<HOLDING>); and that Ravenel sustained damages. “In this

    ### Response:
    holding that the entry of a nolle prosequi generally suffices as a termination of a criminal proceeding in favor of the plaintiff in a maliciousprosecution action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Council of Young Israel; Rabbinical Alliance of America; Rabbinical Council of America; Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America; and Torah Umesorah-National Society of Hebrew Day Schools. See Movants’ Proposed Answer, dated May 31, 1996, at 2-4. The defendant, Rabbi Schulem Rubin, named in the amended complaint in his official capacity as the Director of the Kosher Law Enforcement Division of the New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets, is represented by the New York Attorney-General (“State” or “defendant”). Plaintiffs and the defendant object to intervention. By order dated July 11, 1996, the Honorable Denis R. Hurley referred this matter, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), to the undersigned. See United States v. Certain Real Property, 751 F.Supp. 1060 (E.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>). Briefs were submitted by all parties, and

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion to intervene is not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the alleged error on appeal. See Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 514, 516 (640 SE2d 280) (2007). Appellant suggests that these evidentiary issues are subject to review on appeal for “plain error.” However, in criminal cases, plain error review currently is limited to appellate review of alleged errors in the sentencing phase of a trial resulting in the death penalty, see Sharp v. State, 286 Ga. 799, 801 (692 SE2d 325) (2010); to alleged violations of OCGA § 17-8-57, see State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 634 (690 SE2d 164) (2010); and, since July 1, 2007, to properly asserted errors in jury instructions, see OCGA § 17-8-58 (b); State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32 (718 SE2d 232) (2011). Thus, plain error review does not apply to the evidentiary issue raised in this case. See Brooks, 281 Ga. at 516 (<HOLDING>). We note that the new Georgia Evidence Code

    ### Response:
    holding that plain error review was not available for alleged improperly admitted testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he was in the immediate area of the transaction shortly after the transaction. Unbeknownst to the arresting officer, another offic xclusionary rule have already been satisfied by the exclusion of the evidence from Mr. Mejia's criminal trial. See Townes, 176 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir.1999) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to § 1983 suit for, inter alia, false arrest and malicious prosecution). 28 . Mr. Mejia's account of the alleged phone call to his employee, Charlie Diego, in which an unidentified individual asked for the owner's name and asked whether the owner was Colombian, is inadmissible hearsay and cannot be considered on this motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e) (providing that summary judgment must be opposed by ""such facts as would r.1991) (pre-Richardson ) (<HOLDING>); Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dep't of

    ### Response:
    holding that private physician who conducted cavity search of drug suspect pursuant to facially valid search warrant was entitled to qualified immunity in suspects  1983 action where he did not act on his own initiative or out of selfinterest he was uniquely qualified to perform search procedure and where court found that extending qualified immunity to physicians under the circumstances of this case would benefitf society by effectuating acceptable means to execute body cavity searches pursuant to a warrant issued on probable cause and benefit the party being searched by providing a safe means of conducting the search in a medically approved manner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Powell’s second trial was for a second crime, separate and distinct from the crime for which he was tried in his first trial. Finally, it is important to note a further state law ground on which this claim founders. The Supreme Court of Virginia correctly found that Powell invited any error that may have been committed by the trial court in this regard. See Powell, 590 S.E.2d at 559-60. It was Powell who chose to disclose to the potential jurors that he had been previously convicted of capital murder. Hence, under the doctrine of “invited error,” Powell may not contend that potential jurors were tainted by their knowledge of his prior conviction when he is the one who disclosed the prior conviction to them. See Saunders v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Collins, 372 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that a court will not notice error which has been invited by the party seeking to take advantage thereof on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Federal Defendants challenge the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court will address their arguments first. 1. Claims against the Federal Defendants. The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for obtaining damages based on tortious conduct committed by a federal employee acting within the scope of his employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1); Simpkins v. District of Columbia Gov’t, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C.Cir.1997). Here, Plaintiff has sued four federal employees for damages based on alleged torts that those employees committed while acting in the scope of their employment as officers of the USSS. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9. Accordingly, Plaintiffs tort claims against the Federal Defendants are governed by the FTCA. See, e.g., Ignatiev v. United States, 238 F.3d 464, 465 (D.C.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The United States’s waiver of sovereign

    ### Response:
    holding that the ftca applied to negligence claims against secret service uniformed division officers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Aaron Shelton pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). On appeal, Shelton argues for the first time that his conviction is unconstitutional because Congress does not have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the mere possession of a firearm, citing United States v. Lopez, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Although Shelton stipulated that the firearms

    ### Response:
    holding unconstitutional 18 usc  922q as beyond congresss commerce clause power
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    responsibility for interpreting provisions of G.L.c. 138 rests with Court, not Commission). Although the Court acknowledges that the Commission’s “experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge and discretionary authority” are entitled to “due weight,” this principle is “one of deference, not abdication.” Brown-Forman, 65 Mass.App.Ct. at 503 (quoting Leopoldstadt, Inc. v. Commissioner of Div. of Health Care Finance & Policy, 436 Mass. 80, 91 (2002). Accord Arnone v. Commissioner of Dep’t of Social Services, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 33, 34 (1997) (“[t]he approach is one of judicial deference and restraint, not abdication”). In this regard, no deference is owed to analysis of the Commission falling outside the purview of its institutional expertise. Brown-Forman, 65 Mass.App.Ct. at 504 (<HOLDING>). ANALYSIS Applying the foregoing standards to

    ### Response:
    holding nondeferential review warranted because the commission drew no inferences from the unambiguous agreement other than its ultimate finding which no matter how couched is in fact a conclusion of law that an agency relationship existed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mute swans, some of which may be those with which they have developed relationships, or have observed and plan to observe again in the future. Defendants have cited no authority suggesting that such an allegation of harm is insufficient based on failure to raise similar challenges in the past. Finally, although defendants appear to be correct in their assertion that the procedural harm arising from a NEPA violation is insufficient, standing alone, to constitute irreparable harm justifying issuance of a preliminary injunction, when combined with the irreparable aesthetic injuries alleged by plaintiffs, such procedural harm does bolster plaintiffs’ case for a preliminary injunction. See Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Fund for Animals v. Clark, 27 F.Supp.2d at

    ### Response:
    holding that there could be no presumption of irreparable harm based on a statutory violation yet finding that ejnvironmental injury by its nature can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration ie irreparable if such injury is sufficiently likely  the balance of harms will usually favor issuance of the injunction to protect the environment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shall constitute a waiver of notice of the meeting except where a person attends a meeting for the express purpose of objecting, at the beginning of the meeting, to the transaction of any business because the meeting was not lawfully called or convened”). Therefore, since a shareholder may waive notice by attending a meeting and not objecting, one cannot say that the failure to provide a shareholder with notice of a meeting causes the actions taken at the meeting to be void ab initio. Third, both this Court and our Supreme Court have consistently held that the failure to provide a director with the required notice of a special board meeting renders the actions taken at the meeting voidable — mot void — and thus subject to ratification. See Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts 385 (Pa.1833) (<HOLDING>); Moller v. Keystone Fibre Co., 187 Pa. 553, 41

    ### Response:
    holding that a corporation may ratify a mortgage executed by the directors at a special meeting convened without notice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    job performance. There is no suggestion of unlawful conduct or other impropriety. The Board’s decision is based on the lack of compatibility between Mr. McBride and the manner in which the Board desires the Authority to be operated. In Bristol Virginia School Board v. Quarles, the court held that public termination for “ineffective leadership” and “lack of communication with personnel” did not implicate protected liberty interests. 235 Va. 108, 366 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1988) (outlining the trend among federal courts to implicate liberty interests in eases involving “specific charges of moral turpitude, criminal activity, or serious character defects,” but not in cases involving “unelaborated charges relating to job performance”). See Robertson v. Rogers, 679 F.2d 1090, 1092 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Bunting v. City of Columbia, 639 F.2d 1090,

    ### Response:
    holding that a superintendents comments to prospective employers that plaintiff was terminated for incompetence and outside activities did not infringe on a protected liberty interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    names of participants, specific examples of double billings, estimations as to the number of times the alleged fraud was perpetrated, examples of non-compliance with Medicare regulations, etc. While it is true that the Complaint discusses mostly common practices rather than specific dates and times of the submission of false claims, the court does not find that this is dispositive of the issue in this particular context. Plaintiffs argue that the documentation which demonstrates the exact dates of all submissions of the alleged false claims to the Government is in possession of Defendants. The court does not expect two former employees, whose employment was terminated almost two years ago, to remember each date. The Ninth Circuit agrees. See United States ex rel. Lee, 245 F.3d at 1051 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have, however, provided Defendants

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    515, 107 L.Ed.2d 516 (1989). Moreover, “it is axiomatic that the proof required to show that a defendant knowingly associated with an existing conspiracy ‘need not be overwhelming.’ ” Viola, 35 F.3d at 44 (citation omitted). Indeed, participation in the conspiracy can be shown entirely through circumstantial evidence. Id. We find that the Complaint states a valid § 1962(d) claim against Ortoli. Specifically, although Ortoli was not an operator or manager of the RICO enterprise, we find that the facts alleged evidence his knowing association with the Madanes Brothers’ conspiracy to defraud the Plaintiff. The Court is satisfied that Ortoli’s alleged actions — ranging from the restructuring of family assets, to drafting paperwork intend p, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 588, 601-02 (N.D.Ill.1994) (<HOLDING>). Baltimore is likewise liable under § 1962(d).

    ### Response:
    holding that although plaintiffs failed to adequately allege  1962c claim against professional broker and its officer based on operating or managing enterprise they adequately alleged rico conspiracy to violate  1962a against same defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Keen, the process of weighing aggravating' and mitigating factors as was erroneously done in Mills’ case, and by the trial judge in Keen, simply does not apply in cases where the jury recommends life. See id. We further explained: Moreover, so there is no doubt as to the proper focus of a life recommendation analysis, reversal under Tedder is in no way prevented even assuming the presence of several valid aggravators. Indeed, that has been the rule rather than the exception. See Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 440, 474 n. 78 (11th Cir.1990) (listing 47 cases reversed by this Court under Tedder between 1975 and 1989 where between one to five valid aggravating factors existed or were assumed to exist), vacated on other grounds, 920 F.2d 721 (11th Cir.1990); Fuente, 549 So.2d at 658-59 (<HOLDING>). Keen, 775 So.2d at 287 n. 24. Clearly, the

    ### Response:
    recognizing propriety of jury override reversal in brookings v state 495 so2d 135 143 fla1986 despite presence of four valid aggravators
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    essentially accidental injury to the person or property of another rather than coverage for disputes between parties to a contractual undertaking.” Redevelopment Auth., 685 A.2d at 589; see also Keystone Filler, 179 F.Supp.2d at 439 (“The policy defines an ‘occurrence’ as ‘an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.’ ”); Augenblick, 1999 WL 975118, at *2 (“An ‘occurrence’ is defined as ‘bodily injury or property damage resulting from an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same general condition.’ ”). The courts in these cases found that the insureds were not entitled to coverage because their underlying breaches of contract were not an “occurrence” or “accident.” Redevelopment Auth., 685 A.2d at 589 (<HOLDING>); Keystone Filler, 179 F.Supp.2d at 440 (“The

    ### Response:
    holding insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify the insured since the underlying suit arises out of a breach of contract which is not an accident or occurrence contemplated or covered by the provisions of a general liability insurance policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no man can be judge in his own case, however exalted his station, however righteous his motives, and irrespective of his race, color, politics, or religion. This Court cannot hold that the petitioners were constitutionally free to ignore all the procedures of the law and carry their battle to the streets. One may sympathize with the petitioners’ impatient commitment to their cause. But respect for judicial process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional freedom. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. at 318-19, 320-21, 87 S.Ct. 1824 (footnotes omitted). The collateral bar rule- stands today. As long as an injunction is issued pursuant to proper procedure and is not .S. 147, 151, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969) (<HOLDING>). The collateral bar rule cuts off citizens’

    ### Response:
    holding that where a licensing scheme is facially invalid for lack of procedural safeguards or unbridled discretion a person faced with such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for which the law purports to require a license
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are admissible if they meet one of the exceptions under the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. RULE EVID. 802. Thus, police investigative reports are admissible in certain circumstances under the business records exception. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(6); see also, United States v. Scallion, 533 F.2d 903, 915 (5th Cir.1976); Harris v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Chemical Svcs., Inc., 635 F.Supp. 1202, 1209 (M.D.La.1986). However, when police reports contain witness statements, and the witness statements are offered to prove their truth, the statements themselves generally are inadmissible. See Ariza v. City of New York, 139 F.3d 132, 133-34 (2d Cir.1998) (witness statements in police investigative report inadmissible as business record). United States v. Dotson, 821 F.2d 1034, 1035-36 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Halperin, 441 F.2d 612,

    ### Response:
    holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    more or less probable. Minn. R. Evid. 401. Although the first CHIPS petition was not pleaded as a basis for the termination petition, the district court took judicial notice of all court records relating to the first CHIPS petition, and appellant did not object. The neglect incident was relevant to whether appellant demonstrated a pattern of failing to comply with the duties of parenthood, including providing a safe and clean environment for the child. It was also relevant to projecting appellant’s future ability to provide a safe environment and suitable level of care for the child. Appellant’s hearsay argument is also unavailing. The reports were admissible under the public-records hearsay exception. Cf. Gardner v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 423 N.W.2d 110, 114 (Minn.App.1988) (<HOLDING>); see generally Minn. R. Evid. 803(8)

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting police reports in civil case under publicrecords exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stating that it was “of the opinion that the suit was frivolous and without merit.” While section 1988 provides that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorneys’ fee ...,” the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees differs if a defendant rather than a plaintiff prevails. In Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 417, 98 S.Ct. 694, 698, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), the Supreme Court noted that under the attorneys’ fees provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976), attorneys’ fees should be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff in all but special circumstances. The Court held, however, that a prevailing defendant should be awarded attorneys’ fees 998 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Since we conclude that the record before us

    ### Response:
    holding delayed title vii suit not frivolous where there was no evidence that the plaintiff knew he had been given a right to sue letter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the plan would likely only perversely benefit ISN. Therefore, given these circumstances, the court acted within its discretion when it allowed the replacement fiduciary to formally terminate the plan. C. The issue of whether ISN’s request for a stay is moot is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Green v. City Of Raleigh, 523 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir.2008). Similarly, whether the district court order requiring ISN to pay Saakvitne was one for injunctive or monetary relief is also subject to de novo review. Because ISN has already paid Saakvitne and ISN did not appeal the district court’s denial of its request for a stay under Fed. R.App. P. 8(a)(2), ISN’s appeal of the earlier December 2009 order is now moot. See, e.g., Koger v. United States, 755 F.2d 1094, 1096-98 (4th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the posting of a supersedeas

    ### Response:
    holding that an appeal by taxpayers in a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the government from collecting income tax deficiencies was mooted because the taxpayers had paid the deficiencies pending the appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    colloquy. We have held: A competent election by the defendant to represent himself and to decline the assistance of counsel once made before the court carries forward through all further proceedings in that case unless appointment of counsel for subsequent proceedings is expressly requested by the defendant or there are circumstances which suggest that the waiver was limited to a particular stage of the proceedings. United States v. Springer, 51 F.3d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir.1995) (concluding that the defendant’s retrial was “obviously” a continuation of the criminal prosecution and previous waiver was intended to stand absent an attempt to withdraw it (quoting Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir.1969)); see also White v. United States, 354 F.2d 22, 23 (9th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>). Our jurisprudence on this point is harmonious

    ### Response:
    holding that at resentencing the district court was entitled to assume that the waiver was still in effect and was not required to again advise defendant of his right to counsel where defendant had waived counsel at the plea stage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    after six years was constitutional. Lamb refrained from deciding however, “whether the legislature could constitutionally abolish all tort claims against builders and designers arising out of improvements they built or designed.” Id. at 443-444, 302 S.E.2d 868. In that case, the court found this was not an issue as “93% of all claims against architects are brought within six years of the substantial completion of the construction.” Id. at 444 n. 7, 302 S.E.2d 868. Similarly, Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., Inc., found § l-50(6)’s statute of repose constitutional in part because “over 97 percent of product-related accidents occur within six years of the time the product was purchased.” 314 N.C. 44, 54, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985). Here, the plaintiff is cla 0, 861 P.2d 625, 30 A.L.R.5th 729 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Berry By and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft

    ### Response:
    holding that statute barring products liability actions for injuries occurring more than 12 years after product is first sold violated state constitutional prohibition against abrogation of right of action to recover damages for injuries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the information but that they were nonetheless unable to comply with the scheduling order deadline. Nothing in the district court’s “good cause” analysis would have changed given that the court identified four specific reasons for concluding that the Appellants had demonstrated an overarching and persistent lack of diligence throughout the case. While the dissent theorizes on the district court’s “general frustration ... with various other delays” in the case, post at 829 n. 2, the district court’s reasoning is precisely the appropriate analysis to determine the existence of “good cause.” That is, in considering whether “good cause” excuses compliance with a scheduling order deadline, the district court must examine whether the movant had been dilig 1419 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). As noted, the Appellants alleged from the

    ### Response:
    holding that good cause did not exist where counsel waited months after filing of the pleadings to propound written discovery and did not take oral depositions of known key individuals to their claims until after the deadline for amending the complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    system expressly state that “[i]nmates may also pursue available remedies in State and Federal court.” 37 Pa.Code § 93.9(b). Even assuming, arguendo, that Paluch’s complaint includes federal claims, to which federal law would apply, Paluch’s “tolling while exhausting” argument is belied by his own evidence, which supports the conclusion that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Under Section 1997e(a), an inmate must exhaust the administrative remedies available at the state prison. Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir.2007). “ ‘[P]roper exhaustion’ [means] that the prisoner must comply with all the administrative requirements and not merely wait until there are no administrative remedies ‘available.’” Id. (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>)). The “administrative remedies available at

    ### Response:
    holding that a procedural default in exhausting administrative remedies bars relief in federal court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the appeal waiver, Garza has filed a notice of appeal. The government moved to enforce the appeal waiver under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (en banc). For the reasons explained below, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. In Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325, we held that a waiver of appellate rights will be enforced if (1) “the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) ... the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) ... enforcing the waiver would [not] result in a miscarriage of justice.” Garza concedes that his appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights. We therefore need not address that factor. See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We reject Garza’s argument that his waiver

    ### Response:
    recognizing that court need not address each hahn factor if defendant does not raise issue relating to that factor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    misdemeanor theft, was referred on February 20, 1990, when Gilkey was 14. On August 27, 1990, a sentence of probation with restitution was imposed for each of these first two offenses. The probation for these first two adjudications, however, was revoked on July 29, 1992, and Gilkey was ordered into custody. On November 3, 1992, when Gilkey was 17, he was referred to the juvenile court for his third juvenile adjudication, for carrying a concealed weapon. A sentence of continued custody was imposed for this third adjudication. Gilkey remained in custody until April 8,1993. Gilkey concedes that his confinement constituted a “juvenile sentence to confinement” for purposes of § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A). See Appellant Br. at 11; see also United States v. Birch, 39 F.3d 1089, 1095 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). He claims, however, that only two points

    ### Response:
    holding defendants placement into kansas juvenile custody qualified as confinement within meaning of ussg  4a12d2a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    them. The same .result applies in this case. Section 679.4061(1)⅛ provision governing discharge upon assignment establishes a rule of contract performance: it determines how a party to a contract may discharge an obligation to make payment on an account created by virtue of that contract—i.e., how it can perform its contractual obligation to pay—after the party has been notified the account has been assigned. Cf. Bldg. Materials Corp., 972 So.2d at 1092 (applying section 679.4061(1) in the context-of a claim for'breach of contract). The 'Department all but concedes that this rule would govern in a contract dispute between private parties. For the reasons we have explained, the rule governs here as well. See also Mooney v. Univ. Sys. of Md., 178 Md.App. 637, 943 A.2d 108, 110-12 (2008) (<HOLDING>), reversed on other grounds, 407 Md. 390, 966

    ### Response:
    holding that sovereign immunity did not protect state agency from liability based on failure to pay assignee of contractual account receivable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    governmental job, thus rendering HSS a state actor and Salon’s conduct in assessing Fridman’s employability state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court finds that, on the record before it, Fridman’s argument is too tenuous to prevail. Traditionally, a defendant must have exercised power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law for its conduct to constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). Accordingly, a private entity’s conduct may become so entwined with governmental policies, or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 755-57 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The existence of a contractual relationship,

    ### Response:
    holding that to the extent that private hospital acted in furtherance of a child welfare statute and not medical considerations it may be held liable under 42 usc  1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 3 . See also Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a First Amendment claim based on arrest fails if probable cause existed); Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The ‘constitutional tort[]‘ of false arrest ... require[s] a showing of no probable cause.”). 4 . See Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455, 456-57 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying doctrine where presentment to magistrate and grand jury occurred after arrest), overruled on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 949 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 5 . See Russell, 546 Fed.Appx. at 434, 436-37; see also Smith, 670 F.2d at 526 (""The constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested.”). 6 .See Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>); Arnott v. Mataya, 995 F.2d 121, 124 n.4 (8th

    ### Response:
    holding that a grand jury indictment insulated police officers from damages accruing after but notbefore the indictment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    period prescribed in § 2953.21 or to the filing of an earlier petition, “the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner’s situation, and the petition asserts a claim based upon that right” and, in addition to meeting one of the foregoing conditions, “the petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of which the petitioner was convicted.” No matter how unlikely it seems that Godbolt’s petition will fall within the narrow exception contained in the statute, it is for the state courts to interpret and enforce their laws on such issues. See Israfil v. Russell, 276 F.3d 768, 771-72 (6th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Godbolt did not explain to the

    ### Response:
    holding that it was proper for the district court to defer to the state courts findings as to whether a petitioners postconviction motion had been submitted according to ohios timeliness requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    information about their search precludes a finding of good faith on their part. And it is enough for us to make clear that Thomas in no way protects evidence obtained on the basis of a warrant which, like this one, was gotten not only illegally but in clear bad faith. CONCLUSION Because the district court’s findings, on the basis of which it correctly concluded that the search in this case constituted an illegal invasion of the defendant’s curtilage, were not clearly erroneous, and because the good faith exception, valuable though it is, does not apply on these facts, we affirm the decision of the district court. 1 . The government argues that in United States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d 93, 95 108 S.Ct. 128, 98 L.Ed.2d 85 (1987); United States v. Ceballos, 812 F.2d 42, 46-47 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with these cases, we hold that the

    ### Response:
    holding that while the question of whether a reasonable person would believe his person was seized was normally a question of law that the district court was still entitled to deference because its determination in this case is inextricably intertwined with the credibility of the witnesses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argument, however, ignores two important limitations to the shield: (1) the shield is removed if the individual’s personal interests motivate his actions, see Rice, 38 F.3d at 912; and (2) the shield generally does not apply when the individual’s actions are discretionary. See Brujis v. Shaw, 876 F.Supp. 975, 978 (N.D.Ill.1995). As noted, the fiduciary shield denies personal jurisdiction if the individual’s actions were “solely on behalf of his employer.” Rice, 38 F.3d at 912. If the individual “was acting also on his own behalf—to serve his personal interests,” the shield does not apply. Id. (emphasis added). The personal interests need not be pecuniary—they may be dislike or malice towards the plaintiff. See id.; Roy v. Austin Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16254 at *6-7 (N.D.Ill.1994) (<HOLDING>). However, a defendant who dislikes or acts

    ### Response:
    holding on a motion to dismiss that plaintiffs allegation that defendants actions were without justification based on the legitimate business interests of the employer and were performed maliciously was sufficient to prove actions taken to serve personal interests
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employer defaulted in that obligation. Cf. Bilotta v. Labor Pool of St. Paul, Inc., 321 N.W.2d 888 (Minn.1982). Having set forth the test for determining whether a special employer relationship exists, we must now analyze these factors as they apply to the facts of the instant ease to determine if Allied is Bowens’s special employer. Whether an individual is a special employee for workers’ compensation purposes is generally a question of fact. However, a court may find special employment status as a matter of law where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, together with affidavits establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact to the contrary. See Union Light & Power Co. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 796 A.2d 665, 669 (D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that temporary employee status for workers compensation purposes is determinable as a matter of law where the particular undisputed critical facts compel that conclusion and present no triable issue of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that have a determinate sentencing scheme.” Id. (quoting Foote, 808 P.2d at 735). Accordingly, we hold that a district court does not generally have the authority to order the Board of Pardons to credit an inmate’s sentence with time served as a condition of probation. However, because the establishment of an original parole date is inherently a sentencing function and the Board of Pardons therefore serves as a sentencing entity in our system, id., “the Board [of Pardons], like the courts, is governed by constitutional requirements addressing accuracy and fairness in the decision-making process.” Id. at 911. Thus, while the Board exercises unfettered discretion in determining the length of an inmate’s sentence, its actions must not violate the inmate’s constitutional rights. See id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we must examine whether the

    ### Response:
    holding that board of pardons must afford inmate due process in original parole hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of that statute, he must show “(1) that the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared unlawful by the [Tennessee Consumer Protection Act] and (2) that the defendant’s conduct caused an ‘ascertainable loss of money or property, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article, commodity, or „ thing of value wherever situated....’” Hanson v. J.C. Hobbs Co., Inc., No. W2001-02523-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5873582, at *9 (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 21, 2012) (quoting Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-18-109(a)(l)). To prevail, therefore, the Tennessee attorney general need not show that S & P violated CRARA or any other federal provision. That is, the right that he seeks to vindicate “is the right not to be lied to in a fashion that causes reliance and results in financial 195 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, if S & P had never invoked

    ### Response:
    holding the same where the plaintiff alleged breach of a contract provision that incorporated federal law by reference and breach of a new york statute by failing to provide uniform rates allegedly required by federal law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion.” H o. 14, 15 (1918); Y.H. v. F.L.H., 784 So.2d 565, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)); 84 Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 656 So.2d 1297, 1299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (stat ing that “intervention under [rule 1.230] assumes an interest in pending litigation which shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding”) (internal quotation omitted). Additionally, a contingent interest in the proceedings, as opposed to a direct and immediate interest, will not justify a party’s intervention. Harbor Specialty Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, 932 So.2d 383, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Grimes, 591 So. 2d at 1094 (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, Infinity’s interest

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a motion to intervene where the intervenors would not stand to gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment in the action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statement that he would “just as soon wait” until he had an attorney before talking to the police [Statement 1], followed immediately by his statement that he was willing to discuss the “circumstances” [Statement 2], was not an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel or a statement declaring an intention to remain silent. People v. McKinney, 794 N.W.2d at 614-15 (internal citation omitted). However, the crux of this case is whether Detective Hod-shire’s comment “Well that’s fine, but like I said” was interrogation. If Hodshire’s statement was interrogation, then the Michigan Supreme Court improperly used McKinney’s second statement in determining that he did not unequivocally request counsel. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision did not

    ### Response:
    holding that after a suspect unambiguously requests counsel the suspects responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    permissible under the sufficient sureties clause of the Iowa Constitution so long as the accused is permitted access to a surety in some form ” Id. at 583. Thus, the Briggs court seemed to recognize that cash and surety are separate options. The court explained that the defendant had presented no evidence to show that she was absolutely precluded from accessing a surety of some form. Instead, her allegations appear to center on the denial of access to a commercial bail bond. . . . [T]here is no absolute right to such access. Briggs has made no claim that she could not otherwise find a sufficient surety. Under other circumstances, we would, perhaps, remand this issue to the district court to determine whether Briggs’ access to a surety was completely precluded. Id 125, 835 N.E.2d 5, 18 (<HOLDING>); Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 354 (holding that an

    ### Response:
    holding an allcash bail violated ohios sufficient sureties clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [the father] to [the mother] in the sum of $2,730.00.” The trial court further ordered the father to pay the attorney for the mother the sum of $2,789.08 within 180 days for the fees incurred in the action. The father filed a timely postjudgment motion, which the trial court granted in part and denied in part. The father timely appealed to this court. The father first argues that the trial court erred in awarding the mother “living expense assistance.” The father contends that Alabama law does not recognize such an award, except for periodic alimony, which, he says, the mother did not request and could not recover. The father further notes that the mother petitioned only for postminority support for their adult disabled daughter, see Ex parte Brewington, 445 So.2d 294, 297 (Ala.1983) (<HOLDING>), which, he says, can be awarded only in

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a parent can petition for postminority support for a disabled child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Michigan Court of Appeals decision that Petitioner consented to the mistrial was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. VI. Conclusion The Court concludes that Petitioner’s right to be free from double jeopardy was not violated. Therefore, it is ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 2 . The Double Jeopardy Clause is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). 3 . Implied consent to a mistrial does not implicate the line of Supreme Court cases holding that fundamental Constitutional rights may not be deemed waived on a silent record. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)(<HOLDING>). In Dinitz, the Supreme Court rejected the

    ### Response:
    holding that waiver of the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination the right to a trial by jury and the right to confront ones accusers cannot be presumed from a silent record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial appears to have been directed toward whether or not Palmer Johnson performed more than the services ordered and not whether there were certain services ordered which it failed to perform. Wisconsin law and not federal principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel governs the effect of the state court judgment on this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978); Omernick v. LaRocque, 406 F.Supp. 1156 (W.D.Wis.1976); Allen v. McCurry, __U.S. __at__, 101 S.Ct. 411 at 415-16, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Thus, this Court must give to the Door County Circuit Court judgment at least the preclusive effect which the courts of the State of Wisconsin would give it. Allen v. McCurry, supra; Williams v. Ocean Transport Lines, Inc., 425 F.2d 1183, 1189 (3d Cir. 1970) (<HOLDING>). Casey argues that neither of the doctrines of

    ### Response:
    holding that a federal court acting under its federal as opposed to diversity jurisdiction may also give greater preclusive effect to a state court judgment than the state courts would give
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    maximum for an indeterminate quantity of drugs, then the type and quantity of drugs is an element of the § 841 offense that must be charged in the indictment and submitted to the jury. submitted to the jury, it was error for the District Court to sentence the Friedmans to life terms on the ITAR counts. We assume, arguendo, that Gary Friedman’s request to charge the jury with determining whether the plot involved a plan to commit a “crime of violence” was sufficient to preserve the issue of the failure to charge the jury with determining whether the deaths of Kovach and Gould were caused by the “crime of violence,” and, accordingly, review the claim for harmless error pursuant to Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(a). See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10-11, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Guevara, 298 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the omission of an element from the jury charge is subject to harmlesserror review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    thus providing no incentive to supervisory employees like plaintiffs, who have authority to give raises and set work hours, to avoid violating the FLSA. (Resp. at 3.) However the decisions discussed above explicitly considered — and rejected- — -the very policy arguments stressed by Defendants here. See, e.g., LeCompte, 780 F.2d at 1264. None of the authorities cited by Defendants as supporting their position addressed the issue of indemnity or contribution for FLSA violations. In Luder v. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2001), the court observed that a supervisor who uses his authority over employees to violate their rights under the FLSA may be liable to those employees (although, in that case, the claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment). There is no sugge (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>).) In light of the consistent holdings by the

    ### Response:
    holding that illinois construction contract indemnification for negligence act invalidates indemnity provision in contract between general contractor and postal service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights “should be valued as an inherent part of his property interest”). We are persuaded that the first line of cases correctly interprets the statute. This interpretation gives meaning to both sentences of § 506(a), and enables bankruptcy courts to exercise the flexibility Congress intended. By retaining collateral, a Chapter 11 debtor is ensuring that the very event Winthrop proposes to use to value the property — a foreclosure sale — will not take place. At the same time, the debtor should not be heard to argue that, in valuing the collateral, the court should disregard the very event that, according to the debtor’s plan, will take place — namely, the debtor’s use of the collateral to generate an income stream. In ordinary circumstances the present value of the income strea 993) (<HOLDING>); In re Green, 151 B.R. 501 (Bankr.D.Minn.1993)

    ### Response:
    holding that motor vehicle to be retained by chapter 13 debtor should be valued at the price the debtor could get for it in a free and open market ie its fair market value
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    IX, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution provides: Neither the state nor any county, school district or municipality, except as otherwise provided in this constitution, shall directly or indirectly lend or pledge its credit or make any donation to or in aid of any person, association or public or private corporation or in aid of any private enterprise for the construction of any railroad except as provided. N.M. Const. Art. IX, § 14. “The Anti-Donation Clause ... prohibits the use of state or local governmental funds to benefit private organizations.” H. Stratton & P. Farley, Office of the Attorney General, State of New Mexico, History, Powers & Responsibilities, 1816-1990 at 125 (Univ. of N.M. Printing Servs.1990). In the context of New Mexico’s 8, 314 P.2d 714, 720 (1957)(<HOLDING>); Hutcheson v. Atherton, 44 N.M. 144, 99 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an appropriation to pay states share of emergency feed certificates issued to livestock owners for the purchase of hay was an unconstitutional subsidy of the livestock industry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Property Mgmt. Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). When a plaintiff moves for summary judgment against a defendant’s counterclaim, the plaintiff must negate one or more of the essential elements of the defendant’s counterclaim. Martin v. McDonnold, 247 S.W.3d 224, 229 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2006, no pet.). Because the trial court’s order did not specify the ground(s) on which the summary judgment was granted, and because there were multiple grounds on which summary judgment may have been granted in the instant case, the State is required to negate all grounds on appeal. See Star-Telegram, Inc., v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tex.1995); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 381 (Tex.1993); Lewis v. Adams, 979 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Evans v. First Nat’l Bank of Bellville, 946

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Ms. Ward’s trust the plain language she used and replaces that language with words of the Court’s own choosing. It is neither this Court’s job nor its prerogative to rewrite the unambiguous language of trusts and wills, even if the terms of the trust or will might seem inequitable to one of the parties. Cf. In re Estate of Lucile B. Snyder, 2009 MT 291, 352 Mont. 264, 217 P.3d 1027. ¶28 As Jack correctly argues, 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of any attempt to recover or offset the debt he at one time owed to Joan. This means that judgment creditors-here, the trustee on behalf of Joan-are prohibited ‘from taking any action against debtors to collect the discharged debts.” In re Clowney, 19 B.R. 349, 353 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1982) (<HOLDING>). The granting of a discharge releases the

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs liability to the defendant was absolved as a result of the bankruptcy order and the defendants were barred from collecting debts from property of the plaintiffs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of that order. We consolidated the appeal and the petition for writ of certiorari for review. Fernwoods has now dismissed its appeals from the March 21 and March 29 orders; Octubre has also dismissed her cross-appeal from the March 10 order. This leaves pending for resolution only the Rodriguez’ cross-appeal of the March 29 order permitting Octubre to intervene and staying collection and their certiorari petition challenging the propriety of that same order. As the following eases establish, the March 29 order must be reversed: Goolsby v. State, 914 So.2d 494, 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (concluding that “any order entered simultaneously with an order of recusal ... [is] void and [has] no effect”); Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A. v. Tarr, 557 So.2d 595, 595-96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>); Economic Dev. Corp. of Dade County, Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that an order granted simultaneously with a recusal order is void unless the trial judges written order  was but a reduction of an earlier adverse oral ruling made prior to the recusal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    amount of time. And, while Movants cite to their jury demand as a reason to withdraw the reference now, the Court may withdraw the reference if and when a trial is necessary, rather than at this early stage of deciding a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court directs that this adversary proceeding be now returned to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order. SO ORDERED. 1 . The Bankruptcy Court determined that the Trustee’s fraudulent conveyance claims were statutorily core, and that the unjust enrichment claims were non-core as pled, without prejudice to the Trustee to replead. See In re Refco Inc., Adv. Pro. No. 07-03060(RDD) (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2008); see also In re Refco Inc. (Memphis Holdings), 461 B.R. 181, 184 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2011) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, since neither party contends the

    ### Response:
    holding that trustees unjust enrichment claim against memphis holdings defendants was statutorily core
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    support for exempting restitution orders from discharge” without the aid of federalism concerns because § 523(a)(7) “does not mention restitution, and it operates only if the penalty is ‘for the benefit of a governmental unit’ — a condition not easy to satis fy when the governmental body is collecting for private creditors.” Towers, 162 F.3d at 954; see also Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 419 n. 4, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990) (stating the goal of the VWPA is “compensating victims”). The Court held that the context in which the word “ ‘benefit’ appears — ‘payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit’ — implies that the ‘benefit’ in question is the benefit of the money that is ‘payable to’ the governmental unit.” Id. at 956. But see Vetter, 895 F.2d at 459 (<HOLDING>); Zajder v. Hills Dep’t Store, 154 B.R. 885

    ### Response:
    holding without comment that kelly applies to restitution paid to a victim bank
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    aff d in part, rev’d, vacated and remanded in part, 226 F.3d 1334 (2000); McCreary v. United States, 35 Fed.Cl. 533, 536 n. 1, 547 (1996) (distinguishing between a patent infringement action between private parties and the ""so-called 'patent infringement’ by the United States, which is an uncompensated taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment”); Penda Corp. v. United States, 29 Fed.Cl. 533, 573 (1993) (reasonable and entire compensation is based upon a theory of eminent domain); Messerschmidt v. United States, 29 Fed.Cl. 1, 44 (1993) (""Therefore, for purposes of the instant claims of 'direct infringement,' or more properly for purposes of this compulsory, nonexclusive license analysis in eminent domain ....""); Ha-las v. United States, 28 Fed.Cl. 354, 360 n. 10 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Judin v. United States, 27 Fed.Cl. 759, 773

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the theory behind united statess use of a patent is a taking
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fox in North Carolina; and, Ms. Gibson engaged in sexual intercourse with Mr. Fox in North Carolina. This is competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding that there is a direct link between Ms. Gibson’s contacts with North Carolina and the injuries alleged in Ms. Fox’s complaint. Replacements, Ltd., 133 N.C. App. at 140-41, 515 S.E.2d at 48. Since the trial court’s findings of fact, ignoring finding of fact twelve, support its conclusion of law that “[t]his action arises directly out of Defendant’s activities within and to the state of North Carolina[,]” we hold that section 1-75.4(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes confers personal jurisdiction in North Carolina. See Dillon, 291 N.C. at 675, 231 S.E.2d at 630; see also Cooper, 140 N.C. App. at 733, 537 S.E.2d at 857 (<HOLDING>). We must next examine whether the exercise of

    ### Response:
    holding that claims of alienation of affections and criminal conversation are claims within the purview of section 17543 of the north carolina general statutes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States, 23 CIT -, - n. 6, 41 F.Supp.2d 319, 323 n. 6 (1999) (noting that “[n]ot all rules of statutory construction rise to the level of a canon, however”) (citation omitted). If, after employing the first prong of Chevron, the Court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the Court becomes whether Commerce’s construction of the statute is permissible. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Essentially, this is an inquiry into the reasonableness of Commerce’s interpretation. See Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1038 (Fed.Cir.1996). Provided Commerce has acted rationally, the Court may not substitute its judgment for the agency’s. See Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also IPSCO, Inc. v. United States, 965

    ### Response:
    holding that a court must defer to an agencys reasonable interpretation of a statute even if the court might have preferred another
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island, Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Apart from the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff can raise an inference of discrimination (i.e., create a prima facie case) with circumstantial or direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640. If the plaintiff attempts to do so and the employer provides evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiffs evidence must be such as to create a triable issue as to discriminatory intent. See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1123 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889

    ### Response:
    recognizing that whether an employee uses the mcdonnell douglas approach or relies on direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent the employee must counter the employers legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action in such a manner as to create a genuine issue as to discriminatory intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    submitted a written curative instruction and asked the court to include it in the court’s final jury instructions: The Cincinnati Insurance Company was mentioned by Mr. Gratzianna. The Cincinnati Insurance Company does not insure Mr. Whitaker or Milford Towing or the Plaintiff. There is no evidence before you that the defendants or plaintiff have or do not have insurance. Whether such insurance exists has no bearing upon any issue in this case. You must not discuss or consider it for any purpose. The district court characterized Gratzi-anna’s comment as not “even a foul tip. It was just a loose comment that I think right now is better off left quiet without any further instruction to highlight ... the comment itself.” The court agreed to address the iss 1565-66, 1568-69 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). This Court held long ago that, when a trial

    ### Response:
    holding no prejudice occurred where party made contemporaneous objection to brief remark about insurance during closing argument and court gave cautionary instruction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the bearer bonds had not yet been detected at that date, the further concealment of the $18 million in profits was either direct actual loss from the con tinuing offense or relevant uncharged conduct committed during the original offense. Therefore, those profits were properly considered in establishing the total loss. B. Whether the $18 Million Profits Were Properly Found by the Court Brennan argues that even if it is proper to consider the profits made as part of the bankruptcy fraud, the District Court did not make its own factual findings with respect to the profits, but merely adopted the facts in the presentence investigation report, in violation of former Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(c)(1) (2001) (now Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B)). See United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 253 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Cherry, 10 F.3d at 1013-14 (Fed. R.Crim.P.

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court must make findings on the record as to the basis for its conclusion about the amount of actual loss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are not material to the court’s disposition of the case. 4 . Because of the timing of this filing — prior to any decision in the case, plaintiff's request for reconsideration is not ripe for judicial review. Reconsideration of an opinion or other action by a court presupposes an underlying prior action which the court may then reconsider. See Rule 59(b) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) (stating the requirement that ""a motion for ... reconsideration of a judgment ... shall be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment” and therefore contemplating that the court will have rendered a decision or taken some other action in the case before the court may entertain a motion for reconsideration) (emphasis added); see also RCFC 59 rules committee note (2002) (<HOLDING>). Because the court, prior to this opinion, has

    ### Response:
    recognizing that both final and nonfinal orders may be the subject of motions for reconsideration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the court makes no determination that Waste Management — Washington has violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, by attempting to monopolize or monopolizing solid waste collection and disposal services at Fairchild AFB, only that Waste Management — Washington may not claim immunity under the “state action” doctrine in the event the court may need to reach that issue in related proceedings or if the Government does not comply with this final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). In that regard, the court notes that the modus operandi employed by Waste Management — Washington in this case apparently has been tried by an affiliated company in another court without success. See, e.g., Waste Management of North America, Inc. v. Weinberger, 862 F.2d 1393, 1397-98 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). If Waste Management — Washington and its

    ### Response:
    holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate waste management of north americas claim that the el toro marine corps air base was required to award waste management of north america with a waste collection award since it was the only permittee in orange county because the case was not properly initiated as a citizen suit under rcra in addition the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit held that waste management of north america did not have standing under 31 usc  35512 since it did not file a proper bid protest nor submit a bid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was lawful. The referral to secondary did not exceed the boundaries of permissible detention for continuing investigation, and did not become a de facto arrest. Cf. State v. Flores, 122 N.M. 84, 89, 920 P.2d 1038, 1043 (Ct.App.1996) (“When a detention exceeds the boundaries of a permissible investigatory stop, it becomes a de facto arrest requiring probable cause.”). {39} Whether the agent subjectively intended to continue his routine investigation or only to immediately ask for consent in secondary is not material to the outcome of this case. “[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the [officer’s] subjective intent.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). In the present case the

    ### Response:
    holding that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop did not depend on the actual motivation of the officer involved as long as the officer articulated a lawful reason for the stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prepublication investigation to ensure it was adequate and complete. But Compuware squandered this opportunity, providing only a short, virtually fact-free, one-paragraph response to Moody’s inquiry. Compuware now attempts to use against Moody’s this cursory response, arguing that Moody’s should have investigated the issue further. But this sort of argument is not supported by precedent. The relevant legal inquiry focuses on the extent of the defendant’s efforts to avoid the truth, not the extent of the defendant’s investigation to discover the truth. See Perk, 931 F.2d at 411-12. Because Moody’s actively sought to learn about the relationship and litigation between Compuware and IBM, any alleged investigatory deficiencies are insufficient to establish actual malice. See id. at 412 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Moody’s investigatory efforts,

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants were not liable for failing to perform the thorough professional investigation the plaintiff would have preferred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are present at the commission of the crime, it matters not by whose immediate agency the crime is committed, all are guilty. The hand of one is the. hand of all. (J.A. at 656.) In other words, the State had to prove only that Howard and Weldon, working together and with malice aforethought, were jointly responsible for Le’s death. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-10 (Law Co-op.1985) (defining murder as “the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied”). Therefore, because South Carolina does not require that a defendant have specific intent to commit murder, nothing in Howard’s original confessions was exculpatory for Fifth Amendment purposes and in no way diminished Howard’s legal blameworthiness for the murder. See State v. Foust, 479 S.E.2d 50, 51 (S.C.1996) (<HOLDING>) (citing State v. Johnson, 291 S.C. 127, 352

    ### Response:
    holding that wrongful intent to injure another may give rise to finding of malice to support verdict of murder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    law claims against state officials, regardless of an otherwise-valid pendent jurisdiction claim. “[A] claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment .... this principle applies as well to state-law claims brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121, 104 S.Ct. 900. Nor does their request for declaratory relief save plaintiffs’ state law claims. “[I]t is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.” Id. at 106, 104 S.Ct. 900; see also Benning v. Bd. of Regents of Regency Universities, 928 F.2d 775, 778 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) Counts Four and Five of the Complaint are

    ### Response:
    holding that a declaratory judgment by a federal court based on state law would constitute an endrun around pennhurst that is equally forbidden by the eleventh amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    make plan payments. The reverse can also occur: a debtor who has recently lost a high-paying job or who received unusual payments (such as severance or a year-end bonus) in the six-month period may show disposable income that is far beyond his or her actual ability to pay. Distortions can also occur with respect to the allowed deductions from current monthly income. For example, the means test envisions a hypothetical chapter 13 scenario in which secured debts are paid in fu 38 (Bankr.W.D.Va.2006) (projected disposable income for above-median income debtor would not include deduction for contractual payments on under-secured debt that debtors would not actually be required to pay because plan bifurcated claim or surrendered collateral); In re Minahan, 394 B.R. 116 (Bankr.W.D.Va.2008) (<HOLDING>); In re Watson, 366 B.R. 523 (Bankr.D.Md.2007)

    ### Response:
    holding that for abovemedian income debtors projected disposable income calculated on form b22c is the starting point but not the ending point in determining debtors correct minimum obligation and both income and expenses must be determined as of date of confirmation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    possession of a gun or ammunition is admissible so long as it is sufficiently tied to the crime charged. For example, in Herman v. State, 896 So.2d 222, 229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), we considered the trial court’s decision to admit evidence that the defendant in a murder case — where the victim was killed with a shotgun — owned a shotgun. The defendant’s shot r ammunition and the crime is too tenuous, such evidence is generally not relevant. In Cooper v. State, the Third District held that evidence of ammunition found on a murder defendant nine months after the murder which could not be definitively matched to the ammunition used in the murder was too tenuous to the crime to be admissible. 778 So.2d 542, 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). See also Sosa v. State, 639 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). Here, there was an adequate nexus between the

    ### Response:
    holding that court erred in allowing 380 caliber cartridges found in murder defendants vehicle into evidence when there was no evidence connecting them to the crime especially in light of the fact that the investigating officer testified the bullet holes he discovered were consistent with 22 caliber ammunition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Tex.App.2000). As the court explained in Bohls v. Oakes, “[p]laintiffs establish their standing as consumers by their relationship to the transaction, not by a contractual relationship with the defendant.” Bohls v. Oakes, 75 S.W.3d 473, 479 (Tex.App.2002) (citing Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 892-93 (Tex.1985)). “A third party beneficiary may qualify as a consumer of goods or services, as long as the transaction was specifically required by or intended to benefit the third party and the good or service was rendered to benefit the third party.” Bohls, 75 S.W.3d at 479; see also Bynum v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 129 S.W.3d 781, 793 (Tex.App.2004) (acknowledging that third-party beneficiaries of a contract have standing to sue under the DTPA); Kennedy, 689 S.W.2d at 892-93 (<HOLDING>); Wellborn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 970 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that employee was consumer of medical insurance purchased by employer for employees benefit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.2005)[“[T]he District Court lack[s] subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA to provide injunctive and declaratory relief’]; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Therefore, Plaintiffs claims under the FTCA are without merit, and should be dismissed. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Defendant Berry and Paul’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs Bivens claim concerning his placement in the SHU on August 31, 2001 be denied. In all other respects, the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment should be granted. September 7, 2006. 1 . To the extent any of Plaintiffs claims relate to his transfer to FCI-Florence, or conditions of confinement at Florence, they are not properly before this court. See Ajaj v. Smith, 108 Fed.Appx. 743 (4th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The text of this order reads as follows:

    ### Response:
    holding that ajaj did not have a protected liberty interest in remaining at fciedgefield and finding that this court was without jurisdiction over anyone with responsibility for  conditions at fciflorence in part because no one with responsibility over that facility was named in that action but noting that the decision was without prejudice to ajajs right to challenge the conditions of his fciflorence confinement in the district court in colorado
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. However, ‘[n]ot every order has the requisite element of finality that can trigger the operation of Rule 51(b).’ Goldome Credit Corp. v. Player, 869 So.2d 1146, 1147 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (emphasis added). A claim is not eligible for Rule 54(b) certification unless it has been completely resolved by the judgment. “.... ‘[T]he trial court cannot confer appellate jurisdiction upon this [Cjourt through directing entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) if the judgment is not otherwise “final.” ’ Robinson v. Computer Servicenters, Inc., 360 So.2d 299, 302 (Ala.1978).” Rather than appealing from the trial court’s interlocutory order, Deakle should have filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. See Ex parte Fort James Operating Co., 905 So.2d 836 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). However, for the reasons explained in Part I

    ### Response:
    holding that a petition for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate mechanism for challenging a trial courts grant of leave to amend a complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    times, requiring them to change schools. Id. at 750. However, all of the moves resulted in their residence being in southeast Missouri. Id. In 1993, the mother informed the father that she intended to move, with the children, to Fulton, Missouri, because of her upcoming remarriage. Id. The father filed a motion to modify custody, which the trial court sustained, finding a substantial and continuing change of circumstances based, inter alia, on the mother’s remarriage and move to Fulton. Id. at 752. The judgment was reversed on appeal, the appellate court finding that the mother’s move from southeast Missouri to central Missouri was not a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a change of custody. Id. at 752-53. See also Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 812 S.W.2d 250, 254 (Mo.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). The one change in the residence of the

    ### Response:
    holding that no substantial and continuing change in circumstances had occurred where there was no evidence of an adverse effect on the child even though the mother has moved six times since her marriage was dissolved
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    858 P.2d 380, 381 (1993)). In doing so, we are “bound to accept all the factual allegations in the complaint as true.” Marcoz v. Summa Corporation, 106 Nev. 737, 739, 801 P.2d 1346, 1347 (1990) (citing Edgar v. Wagner, 101 Nev. 226, 227-28, 699 P.2d 110, 111-12 (1985)). Kaldi contends that his exclusive agency arrangement with Farmers created an employer-employee relationship between himself and the companies. The plain language of the Agreement does not support Kaldi’s assertion. “It has long been the policy in Nevada that absent some countervailing reason, contracts will be construed from the written language and enforced as written.” Ellison v. C.S.A.A., 106 Nev. 601, 603, 797 P.2d 975, 977 (1990) (citing Southern Trust v. K & B Door Co., 104 Nev. 564, 568, 763 P.2d 353, 355 (1988) (<HOLDING>)). Here, provision “I” of the agreement

    ### Response:
    holding that if a document is facially clear it will be construed according to its language
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entitled to relief from the district court’s judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) because the court’s dismissal order violated his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. He appears to argue that the district court’s pretrial dismissal of his complaint under the “dogma” of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), usurped the jury’s fact-finding role. We cannot agree. Whether to grant a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is within the district court’s sound discretion. Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam). Yeyille has shown no exceptional circumstance that warrants relief. A plaintiffs right to a jury trial is not violated merely because his ease is dismissed before trial. See Garvie v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 366 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). There is no requirement to conduct a jury

    ### Response:
    holding that the courts grant of summary judgment did not violate the plaintiffs seventh amendment right to a jury trial and describing the plaintiffs argument that it did as very misleading
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the legislative history behind § 544(a)). The Bankruptcy Code does not authorize the Trustee to collect property or money except that which is owed to the estate. 2. The Trustee alternatively contends that the conspiracy claim belongs to the bankruptcy estate because, unlike in Caplin, the claim here seeks to remedy an injury to all of Bradley’s creditors and not merely a subset thereof. Even assuming that any or all of Bradley’s creditors could properly assert the claim, we disagree that this fact alone confers standing on the Trustee. This court recently clarified that, when determining whether a claim is property of the bankruptcy estate such that the trustee has standing to assert it under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), the distinction between claims that 52-53 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). But Texas law does not suggest that Bradley

    ### Response:
    holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    information to the government in 2007, Koerber did not file his protective-order motion until February 2010, nearly nine months after the grand jury’s indictment. In addition, Koerber did not file his motion to suppress statements from the February 2009 interviews until April 2012. Moreover, Koerber did not file a motion to dismiss for an STA violation until April 2014-nearly five years after the grand jury returned its initial indictment. At the same time, Koerber filed his motion before trial when it was clear that there was an STA violation in this case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (“Failure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial ... shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.”); United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 1001 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). And Koerber did not simply acquiesce to

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant waived the right to dismissal under  3162a2 when he did not file a motion to dismiss before trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Circuits have held that footnote seven creates a general exception to Heck for § 1983 Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims. See, e.g., Beck, 195 F.3d at 559 n. 4 (noting that “use of illegally obtained evidence does not, for a variety of reasons, necessarily imply an unlawful conviction,” with the caveat, however, that the case before it was not one of those “rare situation[s] ... where all evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal arrest”); Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir.1998) (interpreting Heck’s footnote seven to “mean that Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful searches or arrests do not necessarily imply a conviction is invalid, so in all cases these claims can go forward”); Simmons v. O’Brien, 77 F.3d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252, 253 n. 1 (11th

    ### Response:
    holding that beeause harmless error analysis is applicable to the admission at trial of coerced confessions judgment in favor of simmons on this  1983 action challenging his confession will not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is not a pollutant. See, e.g., McFadden, 595 N.E.2d at 764 (finding that an insured could reasonably understand the pollution exclusion to “exclude coverage for injury caused by certain forms of industrial pollution, but not coverage for injury allegedly caused by the presence of leaded materials in a private residence.”). Accordingly, it is at least plausible that the pollution exclusion was not meant to and does not apply to lead exposure claims. There are several lower state court cases, cited by both plaintiff and defendant that interpret the pollution exclusion, as applied to lead poisoning and other injuries, in seemingly incongruous ways. The relevant Appellate Division cases are: American Heritage Realty Partnership v. La Voy, 209 A.D.2d 749, 618 N.Y.S.2d 125 (3d Dep’t 1994) (<HOLDING>); Miano v. Hehn, 206 A.D.2d 957, 614 N.Y.S.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that removal of insulation that released asbestos  a thermal irritant  into an apartment was covered by the pollution exclusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    File is a routine background investigative file like the Government suggests, the file was not located in one of the FBI main files designated for such investi gations, such as the files for administrative matters, for special inquiries for the White House, or for the security clearance investigation program. Id. As the in camera review reveals, all of those features of the DeLoach Memorandum are reflective of the “highly unconventional” nature of the investigation at issue. By pointing out those features, and by presenting the Court with substantial external evidence of similar improper conduct by DeLoach and the Hoover FBI, Plaintiff has demonstrated that the allegation of improper conduct by the FBI is “more than a bare suspicion.” See Favish, 541 U.S. at 174, 124 S.Ct. 1570 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, despite the factual imbalance

    ### Response:
    holding that when the public interest being asserted is to show that responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of their duties the requester must establish more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    likewise conclude that Section 951.1, 25 Pa.C.S. § 2911.1, under which the Commonwealth Court ruled that Camejo cannot appear on the ballot as the candidate of a political body because of his membership in the (minor) Green Party, is inapplicable. I believe that the language of this provision, which includes “thirty (30) days before the primary----” as its reference point of disaffiliation, when read in context, clearly reveals that the General Assembly intended it to apply to major, not minor, political parties. This is so because in the Election Code, the legislature has determined that only major parties may gain ballot access through the primary process. See Heicklen v. Pennsylvania Board of Elections, 751 A.2d 260, 262 (Pa.Cmwlth.), aff'd per curiam, 561 Pa. 33, 747 A.2d 894 (2000)(<HOLDING>) Further, even if Camejo’s affidavit were

    ### Response:
    holding that 25 pacs  28722 is capable of only one meaning that minor political parties must nominate candidates by nomination papers and are not entitled to participate at party primaries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to demonstrate a nexus because his fear of “ordinary crime” or “private violence” by “unknown persons” did not amount to evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground. We cannot say that the record compels a different conclusion. Garcia’s. evidence established at most that crime, including kidnapping for ransom, is widespread in Mexico and that people within both the expatriate and local communities, and at all socioeconomic levels, may be targeted by gangs and drug-trafficking organizations for kidnapping. As a matter of law, such evidence of high levels of general criminal activity within a country alone is insufficient to “constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground.” See Ruiz v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez, 735 F.3d at 1310-11 (explaining

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence that  is consistent with acts of private violence  or that merely shows that a person has been the victim of criminal activity does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to indemnify a public employee for defense costs arising out of willful or wanton misconduct,” regardless of the context in which those defense costs arise. We disagree. The statutes from which the city derives its broad public policy are part of the OTCA. By its terms, the OTCA establishes when the state and its subdivisions must expend public funds to address tort claims. Through the amendment of ORS 30.285 and ORS 30.287 in 1975, the legislature expanded the OTCA to require the state and its subdivisions to take financial responsibility for tort claims filed against their employees. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that ORS 30.287 is directed to “torts, [and] not to other claims.” City of Tualatin v. City-County Ins. Services Trust, 321 Or 164, 171, 894 P2d 1158 (1995) (<HOLDING>). That statute and ORS 30.285 were designed “to

    ### Response:
    holding that ors 30287 does not oblige a municipality to defend an employee against an ethics charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Therefore, Conway has failed to put forward any evidence that National relied on counsel’s advice so as to have reasonable cause for its failure to pay the pre-petition taxes. Similarly, there is no evidence in the record that National’s failure to pay its post-petition taxes was due to reliance on the advice of counsel. Conway’s reference to a few vague and conclusory statements of reliance in the record falls far short of pointing to specific substantive evidence that would support a conclusion that the taxes were not owed. While there is some evidence that counsel told management what debts to pay, no evidence suggests that counsel advised that preferring other creditors would not subject National’s officers to personal liability for the excise taxes. See Newsome, 431 F.2d at 748 (<HOLDING>). Nor is there evidence of any specific

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorneys advice to execute a chattel mortgage in favor of the taxpayers bank did not provide reasonable cause where the attorney did not advise the taxpayer that he could prefer the bank over the united states without sub jecting himself to section 6672 liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has expressed “greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). The evaluation of whether section 4022.13 is vague as applied to Perez must be made with respect to Perez’s actual conduct “and not with respect to hypothetical situations at the periphery of the [regulation’s] scope or with respect to the conduct of other parties who might not be forewarned by the broad language.” diLeo v. Greenfield, 541 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that statute that permitted termination of teachers for due and sufficient cause was not vague as applied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The EEOC interpretive guidance gives as an example of ""broad range of jobs in various classes”: [A]n individual has an allergy to a substance found in most high rise office buildings, but seldom found elsewhere, that makes breathing extremely difficult. Since this individual would be substantially limited in the ability to perform the broad range of jobs in various classes that are conducted in high rise office buildings within the geographical area to which he or she has reasonable access, he or she would be substantially limited in working. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j). 12 . The Seventh Circuit has held that truck driving constitutes a class of jobs. Best v. Shell Oil Co., 107 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir.1997); see also DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Baulos v. Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d

    ### Response:
    recognizing that truck driving constitutes a class of jobs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    they are guaranteed the rights encompassed in the warnings. As far as we can tell, Davis had never been advised of his Miranda rights with respect to this case before talking to Judd. Under these circumstances, we are compelled to conclude that Davis’s untaped confession to Judd should have been suppressed. Notwithstanding, the erroneous admission of this confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Shortly after confessing in his holding cell, Davis gave a taped statement in which he voluntarily gave the same information contained in his prior statement to Judd. This statement was clearly admissible because Davis was fully informed of (and waived) his Miranda rights before the start of the taping session. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (<HOLDING>). As to the second taped confession, given on

    ### Response:
    holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could ever be established by the testimony of a party, which concept the law long abandoned. See Schoenvogel ex rel. Schoenvogel v. Venator Group Retail, Inc., 895 So.2d 225, 238 (Ala.2004) (citing Herbert E. Tucker, Colorado Dead Man’s Statute: Time for Repeal or Reform?, 29 Colo. Law. 45, 45 (January 2000) (tracing the movement away from the common-law rule that rendered parties incompetent to testify in their own cases)). When the record contains no legitimate reason for questioning the credibility of a party’s statements, a decision to disregard those statements based solely on the fact that they assist the party in proving his or her case is necessarily arbitrary and contrary to the law. See generally Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417, 11 S.Ct. 733, 35 L.Ed. 501 (1891) (<HOLDING>). The record lacks any basis on which the trial

    ### Response:
    holding that a finder of fact may not arbitrarily disregard uncontradicted evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Whitestown Court held that the trial court erred by finding that Whitestown had failed to carry its burden of proof. The Court also sought to “remind trial courts of ... the deferential standard accorded to annexing municipalities[.]” Id. at 927, 2015 WL 4557062 at *10. In the end, the Whitestown Court reversed the trial court and instructed that judgment be entered in favor of Whitestown on the remonstrators’ petition. 2. Boonville Annexation [28] As for the case before us, we agree with Boonville that what a municipality needs and can use “is first and foremost a legislative determination.” Ap-pellees’ Br. p. 33. A court, should not substitute its judgment for-what a municipality determines is needed to accomplish its purposes. State v. Collom, 720 N,E.2d 737, 741 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, we observe that necessity “is

    ### Response:
    holding that questions of government necessity and expediency are understood to be exclusively for the legislature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under the ADA are “defined in terms of 12 extensive categories,” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 676, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.2d 904 (2001), and includes places of education, see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J). However, 42 U.S.C. § 12187 states: The provisions of the subchapter [III] shall not apply to private clubs or estab lishments exempted from coverage under title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.2000-a(e)) [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a et seq.] or to religious organizations or entities controlled by religious organizations, including places of worship. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the ground that it is exempt from coverage under Title III of the ADA as a religious private school that is controlled by a religious F.3d 1275, 1279-1280 (10th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim of exemption is an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a separate, published opinion filed contemporaneously with this disposition. 2 . Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, we do not restate them here except as necessary to explain our disposition. 3 . Cervantes is the only one of the petitioners who might benefit from the motion to reopen on the hardship determination, given that the applications of Alma, as discussed herein, and Serrano, as discussed in the separate, published opinion, fail on independent bases. 4 . The BIA properly determined that equitable tolling excused petitioners’ untimely filing of their motion to reopen, in light of their prior counsel’s statements that petitioners’ only option was to appeal to our circuit. See SocopGonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1184-1185 (9th Cir.2001)

    ### Response:
    holding that one need only show that reasonable diligence would not have led to the discovery of essential information bearing on the claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    information in the past” is sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for a stop. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923 (1972). See also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 309, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (1990) (observing that “reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause” and noting that, in Adams, the Court had reasoned that “the unverified tip from the known informant might not have been reliable enough to establish probable cause, but nevertheless found it sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop”); State v. Morton, 363 N.C. 737, 738, 686 S.E.2d 510, 510, adopting per curiam, 198 N.C. App. 206, 217, 679 S.E.2d 437, 445 (2009) (Hunter, J., dissenting) (<HOLDING>); State v. Downing, 169 N.C. App. 790, 794-95,

    ### Response:
    holding that the detectives in this case had reasonable suspicion to believe defendant could be armed based solely on the confidential informants tip that defendant was involved in a recent driveby shooting and was wearing gang colors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether they wish to proceed with' their own lawsuit, or to join a class, if one has been certified. Id. (quoting In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F.Supp.2d 431, 452 (S.D.N.Y.2003)). Plaintiffs argue vehemently that Wyser-Pratte is not binding on this Court because it constitutes an improper limitation of Supreme Court doctrine, represents the minority rule, and was wrongly decided. We recognize that Wyser-Pratte now represents the- minority rule. Compare Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 739 (1st Cir.1983) (approving in dicta of-forfeiture rule), with State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir.2008); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1009 (9th Cir.2008); In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 254-56 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). That several of our fellow Circuits chose not

    ### Response:
    holding that american pipe  tolling applies to plaintiffs who file actions while class certificationis pending
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983). In Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir.1980), we held that § 1985(3) only covers conspiracies against: 1) classes who receive heightened protection under the Equal Protection Clause; and 2) “those individuals who join together as a class for the purpose of asserting certain fundamental rights.” Id. at 1150; see also Haverstick Enterprises, Inc. v. Financial Federal Credit, Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 994 (6th Cir.1994). Bartell’s claim that Defendants discriminated against her on account of her mental disabilities therefore is not actionable. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has not conferred suspect or quasi-suspect status on statutory classifications covering the disabled, see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442, 105 S.Ct. 3249; see also Haverstick, 32 F.3d at 994 (<HOLDING>). Further, Bartell has not alleged that

    ### Response:
    holding that no existing legal precedent supports the plaintiffs argument that  19853 covers discriminatory conspiracies against the handicapped
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.” Goosby, 409 U.S. at 518, 93 S.Ct. 854. In other instances, the Supreme Court has described insubstantial claims as “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,” “wholly insubstantial,” “obviously frivolous,” and “no longer open to discussion.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (collecting cases) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has suggested that this standard is rarely met. See Hagans, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372; Goosby, 409 U.S. 512, 93 S.Ct. 854. Our limited treatment of the “insubstantial” standard makes use of similar language. See Loeber v. Spargo, 144 Fed.Appx. 168, 170 (2d Cir.2005) (unpublished summary order) (<HOLDING>); Green, 380 F.2d at 448 (stating that a claim

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim is insubstantial only if prior decisions render the issue inescapably frivolous and leave no room for any inference of controversy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of compensation is not controlling to our determination of whether it is a wage. Gurnik v. Lee, 587 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Rather, we will consider the substance of the compensation to determine whether it is subject to the Wage Payment Statute. Id. We have recognized that wages are ""something akin to the wages paid on a regular periodic basis for regular work done by the employee."" Wank v. St. Francis College, 740 N.E.2d 908, 912 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (quotation and citation omitted), trams. denied. Deferred payment of compensation that accrued during an employee's tenure is a wage. Id. However, if the compensation is linked to the financial sue-cess of the employer, it is not a wage. See id.; see also Highhouse v. Midwest Orthopedic Inst., P.C., 807 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind.2004) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Pyle v. Nat'l Wine & Spirits Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that compensation is a wage if it is compensation for time worked and is not linked to a contingency such as the financial success of the company
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    PCI Transp., Inc. v. Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 545 (5th Cir.2005) (no need to enjoin allegedly improper fees, when any improper fees levied would be recoverable upon success on the merits); Jayaraj v. Scappini, 66 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir.1995) (no need for injunction where failure to renew his employment contract for an additional term can be redressed by money damages upon success on the merits). 3 .Mr. Alvord accuses the appellees of filing the malpractice action separately as ""an end run around amending the complaint in the present action.” We note that our holding would be no different if the malpractice action were in the same proceeding as the probate action, for the two claims are separate and distinct. See Astor Pictures Corp. v. Shull, 64 A.2d 160, 161 (D.C.1949) (<HOLDING>). 4 . D.C.Code § 14-302(a) (2001) (""In a civil

    ### Response:
    holding that if a single primary right should be invaded by two distinct and separate legal wrongs two causes of action would result
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices ... unique to a particular situation.” Terry, 336 F.3d at 138 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Dunphy argues that the terms and conditions of his employment would have been materially altered by these transfers because they would have enabled him to work out of his home and thus avoid a long commute. While “the difference in location is certainly of tantamount importance to Plaintiff, it does not raise the denial of Plaintiffs transfer request to the level of an adverse employment action.” Duncan v. Shalala, No. 97 Civ. 3607, 2000 WL 1772655, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2000) (<HOLDING>); Nonnenmann v. City of New York, 174 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that denial of a lateral transfer which would have allowed plaintiff to be near his wife was not an adverse employment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Qureshi and parents. 3 . The plaintiff also sued Principal Johnson for abuse of a teacher, but she conceded at the pretrial conference of this case that she will forgo this claim. 4 . These latter non-suspension-related allegations are substantive due process claims because the plaintiff argues that these actions were categorically unconstitutional, not that they were unconstitutional because they were taken before she received notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1352-53 (6th Cir.1990). 5 . The collective bargaining agreement between the JCTA and the Board (the ""CBA”) does appear to grant the plaintiff a property interest in continued pay and benefits since it provides that a teacher may be suspended only for ""just cause.” See Cleveland Bd 85)(<HOLDING>); with Gillard v. Norris, 857 F.2d 1095, 1098

    ### Response:
    holding that fiveday suspension was not de minimis deprivation where it was unreviewable under state law and included first amendment claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    price reduction of $500,000. Ultimately, the general partners agreed to a settlement whereby the price to be paid by Horsham was reduced by $200,000, of which $100,000 would be deducted from the sum to be received by the partnership and $100,000 deducted from the commission to be received by Padmar. Padmar also agreed to guarantee Horsham $500,000 of future lease payments as they became due under the Leases. The sale then closed, and the cash proceeds of sale were distributed to and accepted by all of the limited partners. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The general partners contend this is a derivative action, cognizable in equity and thus this court may find facts in accordance with our view of the preponderance of the evidence. Pelfrey v. Bank of Greer, 270 S.C. 691, 244 S.E. (2d) 315 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, the limited partners argue

    ### Response:
    holding a shareholders derivative action even where the only relief allowed is a recovery of damages is nevertheless a suit in equity and not an action at law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in federal court. See Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2007) (distinguishing between prudential and jurisdictional exhaustion requirements, and holding that the administrative-exhaustion requirement found in the Rehabilitation Act is prudential in nature). Turning now to the case before us, we note that HHC has raised a legitimate question as to whether Allen’s and Slone’s disparate-impact claims have been exhausted. Specifically, HHC plausibly contends that the plaintiffs did not adequately describe their discrimination claim such that an EEOC investigation into potential liability based on disparate impact could have “reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” See Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 545 (6th Cir.1991) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). Allen simply stated in her EEOC charge that

    ### Response:
    holding that this court does not necessarily require the claim to be specifically raised in an eeoc charge provided that it satisfies this scopeofinvestigation test
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the incarceration that results from revocation is a consequence of the underlying crime of conviction. Indeed, New York law provides that time served as a result of revocation must be credited against the original sentence. See id. § 70.40(3) (providing that original sentenc (5th Cir.2011), and United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir.1999), relied on by Bussey, warrant no different conclusion. In Garcia-Rodriguez, the Fifth Circuit ruled that supervision was not tolled during administrative detention pending deportation, see 640 F.3d at 133-34; in Morales-Alejo, the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion with re spect to pre-trial detention where the defendant later pleaded guilty, see 193 F.3d at 1105; but see United States v. Goins, 516 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The reason for these conclusions is that such

    ### Response:
    holding that pretrial detention credited against ultimate sentence triggers tolling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    99 S.Ct. at 1757. Here, defendant’s silence and his participation in the debriefing sessions did not constitute waiver. More than a failure to request counsel and subsequent conversations with the prosecutor pursuant to a cooperation agreement are required to find waiver in the debriefing context. For purposes of clarity, it is helpful to explain precisely what is required. Defendant and his counsel should be given reasonable notice of the time and place of the scheduled debriefing so that counsel might be present. A cooperating witness’s failure to be accompanied by counsel at debriefing may later be construed as a waiver, providing defendant and counsel have had notice so that the consequences of counsel’s failure to attend could be explained to defendant. Cf. Auen, 864 F.2d at 5 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants failure to obtain counsel despite opportunities to do so implied a waiver of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    HRS § 386-88 supersedes HRS § 91-14 and removes the circuit court from the appellate process with regard to the proceedings brought under HRS ch. 386”. Id. In DeVictoria v. H & K Contractors, 56 Haw. 552, 545 P.2d 692 (1976), the supreme court confirmed HRS § 91-14(b) provides that “proceedings for review shall be instituted in the circuit court ... except where a statute provides for a direct appeal to the supreme court."" DeVictoria, 56 Haw. at 556 n. 3, 545 P.2d at 697, n. 3 (emphasis added). Therefore, under Ras and DeVictoria, HRS chapter 91 applies except with respect to the circuit court provision. Thus, HRS § 91-14 concerning the standard of review on appeal governs in the present case. See Ostrowski v. Wasa Elec. Servs., Inc., 87 Hawai'i 492, 495, 960 P.2d 162, 165 (App.1998) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Kleenco, 2 Haw.App. 219, 219, 629

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate review of the boards decision is governed by hrs  9114
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    categories .... “ ‘[U]nless an employee at will identifies a specific expression of public policy, he may be discharged with or without cause.’ ” Id. (quoting Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980)). Accordingly, the courts interpreting New Mexico law have adhered to the rule that retaliatory discharge is a narrow exception to the rule of employment at will and have refused to expand its application. See Zaccardi v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473, 1475-76 (10th Cir.l988)(discharge for refusal to take polygraph examination did not violate public policy); Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir.1985) (discharge for use of employer’s grievance procedure did not violate public policy); Jeffers v. Butler, 762 F.Supp. 308, 310 (D.N.M.1990)(<HOLDING>), aff'd without opinion, 931 F.2d 62 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding that no public policy stated where employee and not public at large would benefit from employees whistleblowing actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    income tax return for the appropriate year, the Commissioner constructed a fraction, using as the numerator the amount of prejudgment interest set by the trial court ($112,000) and as the denominator the total amount of the judgment ($287,000). He then multiplied the total settlement ($250,000) by this fraction and assessed a deficiency on the basis that the resulting product ($97,561) represented the (taxable) interest component of the settlement. See id. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner’s determination, as did we. See id. at 23. Specifically, we approved the Commissioner’s use of a ratio based on .the judgment in apportioning the undifferentiated settlement proceeds as between prejudgment interest and compensatory damages. See id. at 25-26; accord Robinson, 70 F.3d at 38 (<HOLDING>). Since the Commissioner used exactly the same

    ### Response:
    holding explicitly that the jurys verdict furnishes the best indication of how to prorate an ensuing settlement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) (document no. 7). Dwyer already amended her complaint once as of right. The United States objects. Standard of Review The United States’ 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a). If the exception applies, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. See id.; Magee v. United States, 121 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1997). Therefore, the court must resolve the 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss first, before undertaking a summary judgment analysis on the merits of the plaintiffs claim. See Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304-05 (4th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, 191 F.3d 30, 46 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. George Arpin & Sons, Inc., 949

    ### Response:
    holding that consideration of summary judgment motion should await determination of jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Johnson and Wallace, saw two men flee the scene upon their approach. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (stating that “[h]eadlong flight — -wherever it occurs — is the consummate act of evasion”). Furthermore, as the court discussed above, the “totality of the circumstances” to be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed to support Johnson’s seizure also includes all of Johnson’s non-compliant conduct after being ordered to show his hands. See Valentine, 232 F.3d at 358. In the present case, as Silvers stepped out of the police car, Johnson had a “very surprised look” on his case. Tr. at 49. Because Johnson’s eyes got “real wide,” Silvers was led to believe that something was not right. Tr; at 49, 53, see also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (<HOLDING>) As Silvers approached, Johnson pushed Senquiz

    ### Response:
    holding that nervous evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for Offer of Proof and Request for In Camera Inquiry and Combined Incorporated Memorandum of Law.” 8 . On appeal, Smith assigns as error the district court's decision to deny an offer of proof. We do not reach that issue because we reverse and remand with instructions for other reasons. 9 . We note that our decision in Smitherman was not available to the district court when it ruled on the motion at issue in this appeal. 10 . In applying an earlier version of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, we recognized screens could be effective in mitigating imputed conflicts under certain circumstances. See Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d at 344, 348 (discussing the effective use of a ""Chinese wall” by the public defender’s office); Doe v. Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 650 N.W.2d 594, 597-98 (Iowa 2002) (<HOLDING>). It should be noted, however, that under the

    ### Response:
    holding disqualification was appropriate but referencing several aba formal opinions where screening prevented the disqualification of an entire firm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ch. 12, at 2196 (emphasis added). The subject at issue (amendment of RCW 9A.28-.020) is clearly expressed in the title of ESSB 6151. The bill has an overarching theme related to the management of sex offenders, and the title references the criminal attempt statute. The title notifies an interested reader that the amendments to the criminal attempt statute relate to the management of sex offenders. Because the title gives notice of the subjects contained within the legislation, Alexander’s claim that the criminal attempt statute violates the subject-in-title rtain 1999 tax and fee increases be nullified, vehicles exempted from property taxes, and property tax increases (except new construction) limited to 2% annually?” was a general title); Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 193, 217

    ### Response:
    holding title shall voter approval be required for any tax increase license tab fees be 30 per year for motor vehicles and existing vehicle taxes be repealed was a general title
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that even assuming the ground invasion had reached the subsurface and become an “offending concentration under some of the appellants’ properties ... some type of physical damages or interference with use must have been demonstrated for appellants to recover for a trespass.” Id. “Stigma damages” were not enough, as they did not indicate actual damage or interference with use. Id. Plaintiff urges that this Court is bound to follow the standard in Chance, and hold that it must find only “some” interference with use or damage caused by the indirect air and water invasion in this case. Plaintiff argues that despite the clear holding in Chance, the Sixth Circuit in Baker incorrectly added a “substantial” damage or interference standard to the holding in Chance. 533 Fed.Appx. at 522-23. (<HOLDING>). In so holding that “substantial” damage or

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs could not show aerial vapors originating in subsurface plume caused substantial damage or interference with use
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that these education advocates are “other like fiduciar[ies]” under Rule 17(c). See Gardner ex rel. Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131 (3d Cir.1989); Adelman ex rel. Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.1984); Life Ins. Co. v. Cashatt, 206 F.Supp. 410 (E.D.Va.1962). Furthermore, while the Tenth Circuit cautions against appointing multiple individuals to represent a child, see Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir.1989) (reasoning that “[allowing two parties, the court-appointed guardian ad litem and [a next friend], to represent the minor children interferes with the orderly development of the lawsuit”), it does not support the defendant’s proposition that the court does not have the power to replace a guardian ad litem with another guardian for a specific purpose, see Id. (<HOLDING>). Here, after appointing a guardian ad litem,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that upon request a district court may remove the guardian ad litem andor  appoint another guardian ad litem to protect the childrens interests
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    121 S.Ct. 365. The Court reached this holding on the bases that the property at issue had to be property that was valuable in the hands of the victim, not just valuable in the hands of the defendant, and that an unissued video poker bcense did not constitute property that was valuable in the hands of the State of Louisiana. Id. at 22-27, 121 S.Ct. 365. In contrast to the facts in Cleveland, because a government has a property right in tax revenues when they accrue, see Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co., 338 U.S. 561, 566, 70 S.Ct. 386, 9.4 L.Ed. 346 (1950), the tax revenues owed Canada and the Province of Ontario by reason of the Defendants’ conduct in the present case constitute property for purposes of the wire fraud statute. United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 495 (4th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis' ádded). Indeed, the Court in

    ### Response:
    holding that plain language of the mail fraud statute condemns any scheme to defraud in which the mails are employed including the evasion of  sales and use taxes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Co., 120 F.R.D. 82, 86-87 (N.D.Ind.1987)); Aiken v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 151 F.R.D. 621, 623 n. 2 (E.D.Tex.1993) (citing Shields v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 864 F.2d 379, 382 (5th Cir.1989); United States v. AT & T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C.Cir.1980)). Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the burden of proving waiver of work-product protection falls on the party asserting waiver. See High Tech Communications, 1995 WL 83614, at *5. C. Joint Defense Privilege The “joint defense” privilege, sometimes called the “common interest” or “community of interest” rule is not an independent privilege, but merely an exception to the general rule that no privilege attaches to communications that are made in the presence of or disclosed to a third party. See In re Auclair, 961 F.2d at 69 (<HOLDING>); LTV, 89 F.R.D. at 604 (The joint defense

    ### Response:
    holding that the joint defense privilege preserved the attorneyclient privilege against waiver in the context of a group with common interests seeking common representation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the statute be read to mean that a mailing must occur at any time, but not later than three days after posting. See, e.g., Jensen v. Nelson, 19 N.W.2d 596, 598-99 (Iowa 1945) (ruling that where testator had willed a portion of his estate to the county to build a courthouse if the building was completed within ten years after the testator’s death, the estate must furnish the money where the building was completed between the writing of the will and death of the testator); Tanzilli v. Casassa, 324 Mass. 113, 85 N.E.2d 220, 221 (1949) (permitting appeal of a zoning board decision prior to the rendering of that decision, where statute said the appeal must be made within fifteen days after the decision of the board); Reifke v. State, 31 A.D.2d 67, 296 N.Y.S.2d 667, 669-70 (1968) (<HOLDING>); Adams v. Ingalls Packing Co., 30 Wash.2d 282,

    ### Response:
    holding that a property owner can make a claim against the state prior to the completion of the state action where statute says claim must be made within six months after completion of the action by the state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of its status as that of a mail carrier similar to the U.S. Postal Service would, in any event, not be availing in its bid for immunity. Cf. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 408, 117 S.Ct. at 2106 (rejecting defendant's argument that ""[sjince private prison guards perform the same work as state prison guards, ..., they must require immunity to a similar degree”); cf. also id. at 409, 117 S.Ct. at 2106 (stating that approach based on primary activity of private defendants ""bristles with difficulty, particularly since, in many areas, government and private industry may engage in fundamentally similar activities, ranging from electricity production, to waste disposal, to even mail delivery ” (emphasis added)). 32 . Cf. Warner v. Grand County, 57 F.3d 962, 965-67 (10th Cir.1995) (pre-Richardson) (<HOLDING>); Sherman v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987

    ### Response:
    holding that director of crisis center who was private individual and who acted under color of state law by conducting strip search of female detainees for contraband at request of police officer had qualified immunity from  1983 suit arising out of searches because she acted as agent of officer who also had qualified immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    step one allows, and perhaps requires, consideration of legislative history in determining “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue”, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843; and • an analysis of the additional question we have to answer after Brand X, 545 U.S. at 984: Did the Supreme Court hold in Colony that its interpretation of the key phrase “omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein” is “the only permissible reading” of the statute? We agree with the majority that it is wise for us as a trial court to avoid the issue of what level of deference to give this regulation. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 96, 180-181 (2006) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (listing circuit conflicts), vacated and remanded 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). We are particularly cautious about the

    ### Response:
    holding regulations entitled to chevron deference
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conduct sales, merely that it can be viewed by potential customers. Moreover, Boschetto does not allege that any of the Defendants made any other eBay sales or posted listings either before or after the initiation of the lawsuit. While it might be jurisdictionally relevant if Hansing or the Boucher Defendants had used eBay to conduct a significant quantity of automobile sales to California residents or in other states, neither Boschetto’s complaint nor his affidavit allege that any of the Defendants are engaged in such sales. The denial of Bos-chetto’s request for discovery, which was based on little more than a hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally relevant facts, was not an abuse of discretion. See Butcher’s Union Local No. 198 v. SDC Inn, Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion The sale of one automobile

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiffs state only that they believe discovery will enable them to demonstrate sufficient california business contacts to establish the courts personal jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    private agreement that lured his investment. D'Amico also testified that Freeman attended the meeting at which Sudeen explained the structure of the investment. D’Amico's check was deposited in one of Sudeen’s accounts for which Freeman was a signatory, the funds of which were traced to lulling payments that Freeman made to other investors. 8 . United. States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 766 (5th Cir.1994) (""We have held that in some cases the likelihood of criminal wrongdoing is so high, and the circumstance surrounding a defendant’s activities and cohorts are so suspicious, that a failure to conduct further inquiry or inspection can justify the inclusion of the deliberate ignorance instruction."") (internal citations omitted); see United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 967 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Stouffer, 986 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the deliberate indifference instruction was appropriate where the defendant handled calls from irate loan applicants who received no money but made only made a trivial attempt to discern whether anything was wrong
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (3) the blameworthiness of the actor; (4) the nature and severity of the potential penalties for a violation of the law. Id. Applying this analytical framework, we must determine whether Minn.Stat. § 609.165 is criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory. Recently, we addressed this exact issue in an unpublished opinion in State v. Bellanger, No. A06-1907, 2007 WL 4472287, at *l-*2 (Minn.App. Dec. 24, 2007), review denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2008), and concluded that Minn.Stat. § 609.165 was criminal/prohibitory. Although not prece-dential, we find the reasoning in Bellanger to be persuasive, and we adopt it here. See Minn.Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2008) (“[Ujnpublished opinions of the court of appeals are not precedential.”); Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). In Bellanger, we held that Minn.Stat. §

    ### Response:
    holding that unpublished opinions may be persuasive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of both types of aggravated robbery, and Terry pled guilty to conspiracy to commit both. Hence, Terry was convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery in contravention of section 18-4-302(a) and (b). Because aggravated robbery under section 18-4-302(b) is a per se crime of violence under the reasoning of this court’s holding in Alonzo Terry, conspiracy to commit that crime “is itself a crime of violence” under section 18-2-201(4.5). Therefore, under our holding today, Terry must be sentenced according to the provisions of section 16-11-309(1)(a), resulting in a minimum lawful sentence of five years. We thus affirm the court of appeals’ order vacating Terry’s sentence, and we remand this ease for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 . 791 P.2d 374 (Colo.1990) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Section 16-11-309 crimes of violence are

    ### Response:
    holding that a reference to the violent crime sentencing statute in the second degree assault statute required automatic imposition of violent crime sentencing for a defendant convicted of second degree assault
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judicial or quasi-judicial function, as was the case in Lyons. Rather, Showers alleges that Musson negligently performed its excavation, construction, and drainage responsibilities under the contract. Specifically, Showers' complaint alleges that Musson is liable for ""improper drainage, . . . maintenance, excavation, construction procedures, and failure to take corrective measures."" ¶ 53. These assertions are fundamentally different from the assertion that a governmental entity negligently selected a design that a contractor imple mented for a government project. Design selection is a type of governmental entity decision that we have determined is within the legislative or quasi-legislative function immunized under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). See, e.g., Chart, 57 Wis. 2d at 100-01 (<HOLDING>); Lange v. Town of Norway, 77 Wis. 2d 313,

    ### Response:
    recognizing legislative or quasilegislative nature of design decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    12(e); Wallace, 597 F.3d at 798; United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 692 (6th Cir.2009) (“Thus, because the record reveals that Deitz failed to file a Rule 14(a) motion prior to trial, he waived his objection.”); see also United States v. Rox, 692 F.2d 453, 454 (6th Cir.1982) (determining that the defendant waived her objection to misjoinder when she failed to raise the issue until the third day of trial and could not challenge the allegedly improper joinder on appeal). A court may grant relief from the waiver “[f]or good cause,” Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(e); Wallace, 597 F.3d at 798, where the defendant can “articulare] some compelling reason for not filing the motion within the deadline,” United States v. Walden, 625 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir.2010); see also Wallace, 597 F.3d at 798-99 (<HOLDING>). The defendant did not file a motion to sever

    ### Response:
    holding that the verdict must stand because defendant waived her right   has suffered no constitutional harm as a result of all charges being tried together in a single trial and failed to make  any substantive objections to the allegedly improper joinder quoting abboud 438 f3d at 567
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    630 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir.1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A compromise verdict results when jurors resolve their inability to make a determination with any certainty or unanim of damages was not inadequate as a matter of law because the parties did not stipulate to a minimum amount of damages and the evidence at trial did not indisputably set a range of monetary recovery. But there need not be an agreed-upon damages range for an award to be inadequate. See Mekdeci 711 F.2d at 1514 (finding that the zero dollars in damages awarded by the jury to an injured child was inadequate because defendant never disputed the child’s damages and the evidence was uncontroverted). The other required indicia of a compromise verdict are also present here. See Westminster, 12 So.3d at 842 (<HOLDING>); Newalk v. Florida Supermarkets, Inc., 610

    ### Response:
    holding that there was an impermissible compromise where the damages award was inadequate liability was hotly contested at trial the jury was deadlocked the court charged the jury to continue deliberating to reach a decision and less than one hour later the jury returned a verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to defense counsel” must be disclosed to the defendant when no request has been made, but it limited that holding to evidence “obviously of such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a specific request.” Id. at 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392. The courts of appeals, including the Sixth Circuit, have attached an additional gloss to the Brady rule. “ ‘[T]here is no Brady violation if the defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of the information in question, or if the information was available to him from another source.’ ” Jones v. Bagley, 696 F.3d 475, 487 (6th Cir.2012) (quoting Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir.2000)); see also Doan v. Carter, 548 F.3d 449, 460 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). To be entitled to a new trial under Brady,

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to disclose evidence known to the defense cannot form the basis of a brady violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    P. 9(g). As a practical matter, the effect of a trial court’s finding that a defendant is mentally retarded is that the State loses the option to pursue the death penalty. Once a defendant is tried and judgment is entered, the State has no appeal as of right under the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tenn. R.App. P. 3(c) (providing for State’s appeal as of right in limited circumstances, not including a trial court’s finding that a defendant is mentally retarded). Furthermore, even if a defendant were to appeal on other grounds and successfully obtain a retrial, the State would arguably be barred by principles of double jeopardy from seeking the death penalty in subsequent sentencing proceedings. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, denying the State an

    ### Response:
    holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by not appointing him counsel for his sentencing hearing, citing to case law holding that where the sentencing error is due to judicial error the defendant is entitled to representation. See Nickerson v, State, 927 So.2d 114, 117 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). The State concedes that a defendant is generally entitled to counsel at sentencing or re-sentencing. See Cross v. State, 18 So.3d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (stating that a defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney at resentencing). However, the State argues that the defendant was not entitled to the appointment of counsel because the trial court’s actions were ministerial. See generally Frost v. State, 769 So.2d 443, 444 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); Navarrete v. State, 707 So.2d 803, 804 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial courts changing of the written sentence to conform with the oral pronouncement of sentence is ministerial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    133 S.Ct. at 2082. We remand for resentencing so as not to pretermit the trial judge’s role in exercising the full discretion the law provides. B. The three other Olano factors also support vacatur and remand for resentencing here: The ex post facto violation was plain, it affected Head’s substantial rights, and it impaired the integrity of the sentencing proceeding. 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The district court’s error was “plain.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. In this circuit, one circumstance in which an error may be plain is “if, at the time it was made, a clear precedent in the Supreme Court or this circuit established its erroneous character.” United States v. Terrell, 696 F.3d 1257, 1260 (D.C.Cir.2012); see In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851 (D.C.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). In January 2012, when the district court

    ### Response:
    holding that an error can be plain even in the absence of binding case law where it violates an absolutely clear legal norm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as natural persons. 12 U.S.C.A. § 24. ""While apparently never decided in Tennessee, courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that the NBA preempts -state statutes requiring a national bank to register or obtain a certificate of authority before transacting business in a state. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City First Bank of D.C., N.A., 88 A.3d 142, 143-44 (D.C. 2014) (finding that the NBA preempted a statute that prevented a foreign entity from maintaining an action in the District of Columbia unless it registered to do business in the District because such a requirement infringed on national banks’ ability to maintain suits “as fully as natural persons” in accordance with the NBA); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Baker, 204 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 502, 506 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (<HOLDING>); 770 PPR, L.L.C. v. TJCV Land Trust, 30 So.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that an iowa statute requiring a foreign corporation to hold a certificate of authority to transact business in the state was preempted by the nba as the statute pertained to national banks because it infringed on the powers provided to national banks by the nba
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    action under § 113(f). The Supreme Court stated that, for the purposes of the case before it, “it suffices to demonstrate that costs incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by way of § 107(a)(4)(B), and costs of reimbursement to another person pursuant to a legal judgment or settlement are recoverable only under § 113(f). Id. The Court noted, however, that it was not suggesting that §§ 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) do not have any overlap at all. Id. at 2338 n. 6. The Court noted that a PRP may sustain expenses pursuant to a consent decree following a suit under § 106 or § 107(a): “In such a case, the PRP does not incur costs voluntarily but does not reimburse the costs of another party.” The Court did “not decide whether these compelled ., 565 F.Supp.2d 399, 402 (N.D.N.Y.2008) (<HOLDING>); New York v. Next Millennium Realty, LLC, No.

    ### Response:
    holding that nothing in atlantic research provides authority to change the circuits previous decisions holding that a party that has incurred expenditures under a consent order with a government agency and has been found partially liable under  113f1 may not seek to recoup those expenditures under section 107a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for a sweep that requires information to justify it in the first place”). {15} Our review of the testimony at the suppression hearing indicates an absence of any facts suggesting the presence of, much less any danger posed by, other persons on the scene. Burrell admitted he had no facts to suggest that anyone else was in the house, and he admitted that he neither saw nor heard any movement in the house. To the extent other agents conducted surveillance of the residence before Burrell arrived, they also failed to detect the presence of any other persons. We therefore conclude that the search was unwarranted because there was no evidence to support any specific safety concerns involving any other persons at the arrest scene. See United States v. Chaves, 169 F.3d 687, 692 (11th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). {16} The State contends that other courts

    ### Response:
    holding that in the absence of specific and articulable facts showing that another individual who posed a danger to the officers or others was inside the warehouse the officers lack of information could not justify the warrantless sweep and dismissing the governments argument that someone must have been guarding the cocaine inside the warehouse as the kind of unparticularized suspicion or hunch that buie held was insufficient to justify a warrantless sweep internal quotation marks and citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    enforcement agencies, who theoretically could have stopped the supervisor. Id. at 537. In those circumstances, the Cudney court could not say the actions the employee took were the ‘only available adequate means’ to protect the public from drunk driving. Id. at 536-38. ¶16 Then, in Piel v. City of Federal Way, 177 Wn.2d 604, 609-17, 306 P.3d 879 (2013), our Supreme Court held the administrative remedies available through the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) under chapter 41.56 RCW were inadequate, on their own, to fully vindicate public policy when a public employer discharges a public employee for asserting collective bargaining rights. Unlike Korslund and Cudney, Piel involved a prior case holding PERC remedies failed to fully address th 474, 478-79, 276 P.3d 382 (2012) (<HOLDING>), remanded, 180 Wn.2d 1001. Division One of

    ### Response:
    holding the employee remedies available under the commercial motor vehicle safety act 49 usc  31105 adequately protected truck drivers who refuse to violate commercial motor vehicle safety laws even though a statute declared these remedies do not preclude others
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the purchase price owed under the contract was not excused. Question 4 included no grounds for excusing Bartush’s failure to comply with the agreement except the existence of a prior material breach by Cimco; other grounds for excusing Bartush’s failure to comply were submitted in question 5, and the jury answered no to that question also. See, e.g., Tex. Standard Oil & Gas, L.P. v. Frankel Offshore Energy, Inc., 394 S.W.3d 753, 779 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (refusing to construe jury’s answer to excuse question as finding that party’s first-occurring breach was immaterial when excuse question combined prior-material-breach ground with other excuse grounds); Miller v. Kennedy & Minshew, Prof'l Corp., 142 S.W.3d 325, 341 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, although the court’s charge

    ### Response:
    holding unchallenged jury finding that defendants subsequentlyoccurring breach was not excused by plaintiffs prior material breach required defendant to pay plaintiff per the terms of the agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any defect in the aircraft or component part — ceases to be material or admissible in any civil action[.] H.Rep. No. 103-525(11), at 6, reprinted in 1994, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1994, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 1648 (emphasis added). 16 . Here, it appears to be undisputed that the replacement parts alleged to have caused the accident were not manufactured by Appellants or supplied by them within the eighteen-year period. See Plaintiffs' Mem orandum of Law In Support of Their Response In Opposition To Defendant Textron Lycoming's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5 (acknowledging that Appellants did not manufacture the carburetor installed on the accident aircraft at the time of the crash); id. at 21 (same, with respect to the other allegedly defective parts); id. at 15 & Exhibits T, U (<HOLDING>). It should be noted that Appellants now

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the overhaul in which relevant replacement parts were installed was not undertaken by appellants but rather was accomplished by mattituck airbase inc
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence of extraneous offenses of delivery of narcotics and possession of weapons to be admitted with no objection). Here, Garcia’s counsel repeatedly elicited or opened the door to evidence that set his client up for impeachment by the State and damaged Garcia’s credibility with the jury. Given the inherently prejudicial nature of extraneous offense evidence, the fact that the evidence would not have been otherwise admissible by the State during guilt/innocence, and the fact that Garcia’s defense rested almost entirely on his credibility, there could have been no reasonable trial strategy for Garcia’s counsel to elicit and open the door to the similar extraneous offense and the numerous instances of “bad acts.” See Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 484-86 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d 128,

    ### Response:
    holding that where defense depended on defendants credibility there was no possible reasonable strategy and defense counsel rendered deficient performance by intentionally eliciting and opening the door to otherwise inadmissible and clearly prejudicial evidence of defen dants current incarceration on two prior convictions one of which involved similar conduct to the charged offense during the guiltinnocence phase
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the merits.” Ibid, Settled law holds that these relaxed evidentiary standards permit a district court to consider hearsay at the preliminary injunction stage. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 412 n. 8 (7th Cir.1991) (“[Hjearsay can be considered in entering a, preliminary injunction.”); Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2nd Cir.2010) (“hearsay evidence may be considered by a district court in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction”); Levi Strauss & Co, v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir.1995) (“At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction.”); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). As the First Circuit explained: “Affidavits

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence including hearsay evidence at the preliminary injunction stage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ADEA claims. We reject PwC’s construction of the worksharing agreement for another reason: it would effectively rewrite the ADEA’s administrative prerequisites, making them traps for the unwary, poised to spring into action and deny those who may have suffered employment discrimination their right to seek redress in federal court. Indeed, the Supreme Court has announced “a guiding principle for construing the provisions of Title VII,” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 397, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982), which applies with equal force to the ADEA: a technical reading of the statute’s filing requirements is “particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.” Love, 404 U.S. at 527, 92 S.Ct. 616 (<HOLDING>); see also Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 755, 99

    ### Response:
    holding that a title vii claimant need not refile a charge after termination of state proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for refund with the IRS for the amount of tax at issue. See 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (stating that “[n]o suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, ..., until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary ... ”). Third, a plaintiff is required to provide the amount, date, and place of each payment to be refunded, as well as a copy of the refund claim, when filing a refund suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims. See RCFC 9(h)(6). Failure to plead that a timely refund claim has been filed, even in pro se actions, deprives the United States Court of Federal Claims of jurisdiction. See Wozniak v. United States, 618 F.2d 119 (Ct.Cl.1979) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff has not satisfied the prerequisites

    ### Response:
    holding that even in a pro se tax suit a timely claim for refund must be filed to invoke the courts jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the bill she sent had a tendency to expose Lieberman to “hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy,” or injury in her occupation. Copp v. Paxton, 45 Cal.App.4th 829, 839, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 831 (1996). Lieberman failed to demonstrate any such defamatory meaning, and the allegedly inaccurate statement as to the amount of the bill thus cannot sustain a slander claim. Lieberman’s other two examples of “explicit” factual assertions made by Fieger are equally unavailing because they constitute protected opinion. Fieger’s statement that the criminal court “laughed at her and gave her zero” merely offers a hyperbolic and colorful description of the actual outcome: the court denied the request for expert witness fees. See Ferlauto v. Hamsher, 74 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 843 (1999) (<HOLDING>). In Lieberman’s ease, as in Ferlauto,

    ### Response:
    holding that statements that the judge laughed at their motion and thought their motion was a joke merely provided colorful descriptions of the incontestable fact that the court indeed denied the motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a government actor under the facts of this case under a “functional” or “federal action” analysis. Hall correctly points out that the Red Cross has been considered a government instrumentality in tax immunity cases. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359-60, 87 S.Ct. 464, 467-68, 17 L.Ed.2d 414 (1966); United States v. City of Spokane, 918 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir.1990). However, this fact is not dispositive of the issues presented here. The question of whether a corporation is performing sufficient secondary or derivative government functions to be shielded from state taxation under M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) is a far different question from whether it is subject to a constitutional restriction against burdening 127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). As with many other government-chartered

    ### Response:
    holding a federal credit union not to be a government actor for constitutional purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the court granted a running 404(b) objection to the extraneous evidence regarding Cantu’s previous drug use. D. Analysis Cantu’s defense included informing the jury that Jackie had, during past arguments, taken a gun and placed it to her head. The State attempted to rebut that defensive theory by showing that the previous fights were over Cantu’s drug use and this incident was different because the drug test taken after Jackie’s death showed Cantu was not on drugs. The State’s evidence of Cantu’s previous drug use generally would be inadmissible under Rule 404(b), but because the State used it to rebut Cantu’s defensive theory, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the evidence admissible. See Tex.R. Evid. 404(a), (b); Moses, 105 S.W.3d at 626 (<HOLDING>); Albrecht, 486 S.W.2d at 100 (“Probably the

    ### Response:
    holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in its admitting extraneous evidence to rebut a defensive theory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. First, the communication must be “predecisional;” in other words, it must be “antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy.” Jordan, 591 F.2d at 774; Access Reports v. Dep’t of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1194 (D.C.Cir.1991). In determining whether a document is predecisional, an agency does not necessarily have to point specifically to a final decision, but need only establish “what deliberative-process is involved, and the role played by the documents in issue in the course of that process.” Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 868. In other words, as long as a document is generated as part of such a continuing process of agency decision-making, the deliberative-process protections of Exemption 5 may be applicable. Id.; Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 39 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Second, the communication must be

    ### Response:
    holding that a document is predecisional if it was prepared to assist an agency in arriving at a decision rather than supporting a decision already made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    woman ingests a controlled substance that continues to affect the child postpartum; specifically, the child tests positive for a controlled substance following birth. The offense of endangerment of a child under N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-22.2(2) states: “a person who knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or vulnerable adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia ... is guilty of a class C felony.” The State conceded in oral argument that none of the Defendants committed any act exposing her child postpartum, but rather argued the prenatal act of each defendant continued to affect her child postpartum. The State argues that a child is still “exposed” to the controlled substanc 0 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893

    ### Response:
    holding ohios child endangerment statute does not apply to mothers who abuse drugs during pregnancy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    predicate acts to consider, the jury was legally obligated to acquit on Counts One and Two. See id. at 3-4 (“[A]cquittal was compelled as a matter of law once the jury reported its inability to find any unanimously proven predicate acts.”). There is a serious problem with Gotti’s interpretation of PJI 2.78. Acts as to which the jury cannot reach a unanimous verdict must be disregarded in deciding two things — whether defendant is or is not guilty of racketeering. The drafters of PJI 2.78 were therefore not foreclosing a hung jury when they used the word “disregard.” Rather, the word choice is intended to ensure jury compliance with the unanimity rule required by Richardson that has since been engrafted onto substantive RICO violations. See Richardson, 526 U.S. at 824, 119 S.Ct. 1707 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Gotti’s interpretation flies in

    ### Response:
    holding that the jury in a continuing criminal enterprise case must unanimously agree not only that defendant committed some continuing series of violations but also must agree as to which violations make up that continuing series
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pre-trial motion to suppress. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for a new trial without addressing the merits of Robuck’s complaints. In its brief, the State notes that a division in authority exists among the courts of appeal regarding whether nonjurisdictional defects, such as the denial of a motion to suppress, are waived by application of the Helms rule in misdemeanor cases where the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without a plea bargain. Compare Lynch v. State, 903 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1995, no pet.)(applying Helms rule), and Studer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 107, 109 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988)(same), aff'd, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), ivith Salazar v. State, 773 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.)(<HOLDING>), and Yates v. State, 759 S.W.2d 949, 949-50

    ### Response:
    holding merits of complaint regarding motion to suppress addressable based on inapplicability of rule 40b1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a third party. As noted, there is no identifiable third party in this case. The transfers are thus properly viewed as either benefiting the Fund or benefiting Bear Stearns. In either case, reliance by Bear Stearns on the mere conduit concept is unavailing. More importantly, once the funds were deposited, and as long as short positions were open, Bear Stearns did not have to respond to directions from the Fund. Indeed, so long as there were open short positions, Bear Stearns was not required to return the money to the Fund and was also able to initiate affirmative measures with respect to the funds. Thus, Bear Stearns’s position is simply not parallel to the traditional bank cases. See Malloy v. Citizens Bank of Sapulpa (In re First Security Mortgage Co.), 33 F.3d 42, 43 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Chase & Sanborn, 848 F.2d at

    ### Response:
    holding that bank was not an initial transferee where transferor exercised complete discretion regarding deposits to and disbursements from the account and he was entitled to possession of all account funds upon demand
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    property of the estate and whether they are exempt, the Court will not be able to determine whether any plan filed by Judy Jack is feasible and capable of confirmation. Additionally, Violet Jack’s involvement in this case is based upon her asserted child support lien which she asserts is superior to any interest that Judy Jack’s estate may have in the remaining payments; therefore, this is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2)(E). Finally, venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a). B. Samuel Jack’s Capacity to Contract A person does not possess the mental capacity to enter into a contract if he lacks sufficient mind and memory to understand the nature and consequences of the act and the business being transacted. Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 5.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex.1969) (<HOLDING>) (citing Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Brazil, 72

    ### Response:
    holding that a party has mental capacity if she appreciated the effect of what she was doing and understood the nature and consequences of her acts and the business she was transacting
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law,” or includes factual contentions that do not have evidentiary support. Pursuant to Fed.R.CivP. 11, “the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.” Both the Federal Rule and Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11 state that sanctions may include a monetary amount to cover the “expenses” that have been “incurred” by the opposing party, including “reasonable ... attorney’s fees” or “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Based on the language of Fed.R.C regarding similar provisions allowing for sanctions. See Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J.Super. 510, 983 A.2d 604, 623-26 (App.Div.2009) (<HOLDING>); Musaelian v. Adams, 45 Cal.4th 512, 87

    ### Response:
    holding that new jersey rule patterned on fed r civ p 11 precludes a pro se attorney litigant from receiving attorneys fees because such fees are not actually incurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of PILT. We conclude a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to an explicit warranty of future performance. The existence of such a warranty, however, would not automatically make Marvin’s claim timely. Assuming that a future warranty is present, Marvin’s breach of warranty claim accrued when Marvin learned or should have learned of the breach, see Minn.Stat. § 336.2-725(2), and expires four years thence, see id. § 336.2-725(1). “[T]he statute of limitations begins to run ‘when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the defendant’s refusal or inability to maintain the goods as warranted’ ” WatPro, 491 N.W.2d at 6 (quoting Smith v. Union Supply Co., 675 P.2d 333, 335 (Colo.Ct.App.1983)); accord Anderson v. Crestliner, Inc., 564 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). There is evidence in the record that Marvin

    ### Response:
    holding that breach occurred when seller told buyer that seller would do no more to rectify alleged warranty violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that in custody disputes, “the fundamental issue is the best interest of the child.” In a custody contest between two biological parents, “the burden of proof is shared equally by the contestants.... ” Yet, where the custody dispute is between a biological parent and a third party, the burden of proof is not evenly balanced. In such instances, “the parents have a ‘prima facie right to custody,’ which will be forfeited only if ‘convincing reasons’ appear that the child’s best interest will be served by an award to the third party. Thus, even before the proceedings start, the eviden-tiary scale is tipped, and tipped hard, to the [biological] parents’ side.” Id. at 339, 744 A.2d at 1258 (2000) (citations and quotations omitted); see also T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873 (Pa.Super.2000) (<HOLDING>) aff'd, 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913 (2001). ¶ 8

    ### Response:
    holding that biological parents have a prima facie right to custody over third persons
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the False Identification Crime Control Act of 1982, supports this understanding. The . Report contemplates that [t]he intent to use unlawfully is the intent to use (i.e., present, display, certify, or otherwise give currency to) the identification document in any manner so that it would be accepted as identification in- a manner that violates a federal, state or local - law, or is part of the . making of a misrepresentation that violates a law. H.R.Rep. No. 97-802, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3519, 3529. . In this way, any intentional unlawful use or transfer of multiple identification documents whose purpose is to identify individuals to government authorities would inherently be intended to deceive the government in some way. See Serrato-Soto, 570 F.3d at 690 (<HOLDING>). The BIA’s analysis in Matter of Serna further

    ### Response:
    holding that where a statute requires knowing or willful use of an altered or counterfeit social security number the offense in the ordinary case involves dishonesty as an essential element
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it, for example, by informing the jury that as a matter of law, he was not responsible for CWs death. See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 102 A.3d 270, 279 (D.C.2014) (“ ‘[I]m-proper prosecutorial comments are looked upon with special disfavor when they appear in the rebuttal because at that point defense counsel has no opportunity to contest or ciar ify what the prosecutor has said.’ ” (quoting Anthony v. United States, 935 A.2d 275, 284 (D.C.2007))). The lack of a limiting instruction also compounded the effect of the prosecutor’s comment. Specifically, the court failed to instruct the jurors that CW’s death should not be considered as evidence of Nofoa’s guilt in the terroristic threatening and kidnapping ease. Cf. State v. Murray, 116 Hawai'i 3, 19, 169 P.3d 955, 971 (2007) (<HOLDING>); State v. Cordeiro, 99 Hawai'i 390, 416, 56

    ### Response:
    holding the potential for undue prejudice is so great that failure to give a limiting instruction with regard to prior convictions results in error even if the defendant has not requested one citing evans v cowan 506 f2d 1248 1249 6th cir1974
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Billboard Act then in effect directed that “the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the interstate and primary highway systems [shall] be regulated in accordance with sections 226.500 to 226.600 and rules and regulations promulgated by the state highways and transportation commission.” Whiteco’s applications were for four new billboards in locations that were subject to the Missouri Billboard Act. The City could not have relied on ordinance number 13191 in 1994 to lawfully deny Whiteco’s applications. Existing precedent established that municipal ordinances banning all outdoor advertising signs were preempted by the Missouri Billboard Act. See Nat’l Advert. Co. v. Missouri State Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 862 S.W.2d 953, 955-56 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993) (<HOLDING>). National Advertising did not expressly

    ### Response:
    holding that a complete prohibition on outdoor advertising signs imposed by a municipal ordinance is preempted by the missouri billboard act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her individual capacity. In Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern. Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (1993), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was no individual liability under the ADEA. The court explained that the statutory scheme of the ADEA itself indicates that Congress did not intend to impose individual liability on employees. The ADEA limits liability to employers with 20 or more employees, 29 U.S.C.A. § 630(b), in part because Congress did not want to burden small entities with the costs associated with litigating discrimination suits. Surely Congress would not wish to impose the same civil liability on individual employees that it decided to remove from small entities with limited resources. Id. at 587. See also Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corporation, 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). This conclusion is supported by the law of

    ### Response:
    holding no individual liability under the adea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    services. Dr. Ostrer, on the other hand, maintains that he could have proceeded with his BRCA-related clinical activities without taking a license from Myriad. This assertion is based on his belief that the patents Myriad claims cover such activities are invalid because genes are patent-ineligible products of nature. Acting on his belief, Ostrer seeks in this lawsuit a declaration of his right to undertake NfiCA-related clinical activities without a license. Accordingly, Myriad and Dr. Ostrer have taken adverse legal positions regarding whether or not Ostrer can engage in BRCA genetic testing without infringing any valid claim to “isolated” BRCA DNAs or methods of “analyzing” or “comparing” BRCA sequences, as recited in Myriad’s patents. See Aetna Life, 300 U.S. at 242, 57 S.Ct. 461 (<HOLDING>). Dr. Ostrer has also alleged a controversy of

    ### Response:
    holding declaratory judgment jurisdiction existed when the parties had taken adverse positions with respect to their existing obligations on an insurance contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    two of the three physicians or (b) Local 68’s standing to sue the physicians. The argument regarding personal jurisdiction fails immediately. Assuming arguendo that the New Jersey state court had no personal jurisdiction over two of the physi dans, AstraZeneca does not dispute that one of the non-consenting physicians, Antoun, is a resident of and has offices located in New Jersey. (Conapl. ¶ 94.) Moreover, “personal jurisdiction is an individual liberty right and is therefore waivable,” and neither of the other two physician defendants, Berkman and Hopkins, have moved to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction. McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 127 (1st Cir.2005) (citation omitted); see also Seguros Comercial Am. v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 934 F.Supp. 243, 245 (S.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>). AstraZeneca’s argument regarding standing

    ### Response:
    holding that removing defendant could not establish fraudulent joinder based on waivable defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction or defects in service of process available only to joined defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and not contradicted by external evidence, there can almost never be a finding of clear error.” United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir.1997). As a result, the District Court did not clearly err when it found that the window was tint-free. Nor did the District Court err in concluding that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop Davis. The officers observed odd behavior through the front window—an exchange, shocked expressions, and tossing motions. Davis and Blackshear rapidly left the car and began walking away, the latter failing to close the car door. And the activity took place in a high-crime area. The officers thus had a reasonable suspicion that a crime might be afoot. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d

    ### Response:
    recognizing presence in a high crime area unprovoked flight and nervous evasive behavior as factors supporting a reasonable suspicion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by our procedural rules. In the forty years since those decisions, Texas courts have consistently recognized and reaffirmed the existence of the fundamental-error doctrine. Because there is no statute defining the principle, we tend to agree with the commentator who noted that “[tjhere is no single satisfactory definition of the phrase, nor can one easily analyze the cases for prognostic purposes.” Kronzer, supra, § 9.2, at 205. In reviewing our caselaw, however, we are able to distill two types of error that our courts have consistently recognized are subject to fundamental-error review. First, and most commonly, we apply fundamental-error review when a jurisdictional defect exists in the case. See, e.g., Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445-46 (Tex.1993) (<HOLDING>); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez,

    ### Response:
    holding that standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised for the first time on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discretion by failing to give adequate consideration to the Defendant’s financial circumstances, the uncertainty of the degree and duration of her support network, and the realities of her earnings versus her expenses.” The State countered that “Rule 3(b) ... does not permit direct appeal of a trial court’s disposition of a motion to modify the terms of probation.” The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the State that Rule 3(b) does not specifically provide that a defendant may appeal a trial court’s decision regarding modification of probation conditions. We agree as well. Unlike civil litigants, who have an appeal as of right from any final judgment, parties in criminal cases do not always have an appeal as of right under the Rules o 4 WL 50788, *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan.12, 2004) (<HOLDING>). In Adler, this Court examined whether parties

    ### Response:
    holding that denial of the petitioners motion for credit for time at liberty was not appealable under rule 3 or through a commonlaw writ of certiorari
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opportunity to do so, the court deprived Taylor a meaningful opportunity to prove bias. The majority distinguishes Herndon on the basis that here “the district court asked all of the jurors about the extent to which they were aware of the reported remark.” Maj. Op. 350. This characterization of the facts omits the critical fact that the court did not question Juror One (and only Juror One) whether she could contin trict court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]”); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (“By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors’ states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----”); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (<HOLDING>). The majority correctly obseryes that Taylor

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court should determine the circumstances the impact thereof upon the juror and whether or not it was prejudicial in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it. The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected.... Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 70 S.Ct. 652. The Court held that publication notice could not satisfy due process where the names and addresses of the beneficiaries were known. Id. at 320, 70 S.Ct. 652. Nevertheless, this due process right does not require actual notice to each party intended to be bound by the adjudication of a representative action. See id. at 313-14, 70 S.Ct. 652 (“A construction of the Due Process Clause which would place impossible or impracticable obstacles in the way could not be justified.”); accord In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1110-11 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Integra I ”) (<HOLDING>). For due process purposes, rather than looking

    ### Response:
    holding rule 23 and due process requisites satisfied where the record indicated that only seventyseven percent of class members actually received notice of the settlement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a notice “specifically stating the taxpayer’s liability and the basis for the liability;” a FPAA is “sufficient notice” of tax liability to allow the interest to start accruing again. Pl. Reply at 12-13 (citing I.R.C. § 5404(g)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 301.6404-4(a)(7)(ii)). In addition, either the issuance of the FPAA or the Government’s Answer commenced the “qualified offer period.” Pl. Reply at 13-15. Treasury Regulation § 301.7430-3(c)(3) treats a FPAA as a “notice of deficiency” that serves to start the “qualified offer period.” See Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-3(c)(3). For this reason, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that a FPAA is the “functional equivalent of a notice of deficiency,” Sealy Power, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 46 F.3d 382, 385-85 (5th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). Alternatively, the Government’s August 10,

    ### Response:
    holding that a fpaa is the functional equivalent of a notice of deficiency because it serves to afford affected taxpayers that the commissioner has made a final administrative determination of their liability for particular tax years
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    organization. A two-level upward adjustment for Ortiz’s role in the offense, therefore, is not warranted. 2. “Safety Valve” Adjustment Ortiz argues that because he is not a manager or supervisor, he qualifies for a two-level decrease in his offense level. In order to receive this downward adjustment, a defendant must have a pre-adjustment offense level of at least 26 and meet the “safety valve” criteria set forth in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. See U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(6). However, section 5C1.2 only applies to certain enumerated drug offenses: it does not apply to one of the offenses to which Ortiz pled guilty, distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860. See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2; cf. United States v. McQuilkin, 78 F.3d 105, 108-09 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Ortiz cannot receive a two-level

    ### Response:
    holding that relief under 18 usc  3553f the statutory safety valve provision is not available to defendants convicted of a violation of 21 usc  860 because that offense is excluded from the list of offenses to which the statutory safety valve applies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have been submitted by the Board. We do not deem it unreasonable or contrary to Legislative intent for PERC to have concluded that the withholding was not based on an evaluation of the Principal’s performance. We agree with PERC’s observation that an arbitrator can determine whether the Principal’s inability to work warranted withholding his increment. Cf. N.J.S.A. 18A:30-2.1(a) & (b) (leave taken pursuant to work related injury constitutes satisfactory service for purposes of increment adjustment). In any event, in the present circumstances, the arbitrator should not be bound by PERC’s conclusion that the action was for disciplinary purposes in the ordinary sense of imposing discipline on the Principal. Cf. Scotch Plains-Fanwood Bd. of Educ., supra, 139 N.J. at 158, 651 A.2d 1018 (<HOLDING>). The arbitrator’s inquiry should focus on the

    ### Response:
    holding that arbitrator was bound by perc determination that board acted for disciplinary reasons where board failed to appeal that determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Collectively, Drs. Dionee and Zacharia’s conclusions, the “functional capacity evaluation,” and Hartford’s “employability analysis report” supported the decision that Maninger was no longer totally disabled. This evidence provided a reasonable basis for Hartford’s decision. AFFIRMED. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1 . See Nord v. Black & Decker Disability Plan, 356 F.3d 1008, 1009-10 (9th Cir.2004) (citing standard of review); Alford v. DCH Group Long-Term Disability Plan, 311 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir.2002). 2 . See Nord, 356 F.3d at 1009-10. 3 . Id. at 1010. 4 . Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834, 123 S.Ct. 1965, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Corp. Welfare

    ### Response:
    holding that courts have no warrant to require administrators automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimants physician
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C.Cir. 1980)); see also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47 LEd.2d 154 (1976). [7] 7. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 136-37 (2d Cir.1984) (relying on Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52, 94 S.Ct. 2997; Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 454-55, 96 S.Ct. 958; Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135-36, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 LEd.2d 411 (1979)). 8 . 47 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR.) 73.1202 (2004) provides that All written comments and suggestions received from the public by licensees of commercial AM, FM, TV and Class A TV broadcast stations regarding operation of their station shall be maintained in the local public 187 F.Supp.2d 605, 609, 612 (S.D.W.Va.2002) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Suriano v. Gaughan, 198 W.Va. 339,

    ### Response:
    holding that campaign volunteer who had expressed support for one of candidates political positions in television advertisement and who also posed for photographs with candidate did not become limitedpurpose public figure because his actions were not sufficiently significant and because he did not assume a position that  propelled him to the forefront of the campaign
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not permit a defendant to bring counterclaims that would not independently qualify for summary process. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3213:17; Friends Lumber Inc. v. Cornell Dev. Corp., 243 A.D.2d 886, 888, 663 N.Y.S.2d 327, 330 (3d Dep’t 1997). According to the district court, Wireless’s allegations did not so qualify. The court therefore concluded that Wireless could not have asserted its counterclaims in a state proceeding governed by § 3213. But § 3213 is a procedural rule, and when this case was removed to federal court, the regime of the Federal Rules replaced that of § 3213. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(e) (“These rules apply to civil actions removed to the United States district courts from the state courts and govern procedure after removal.”); TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131, 133 (3d Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Sage Realty v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,

    ### Response:
    holding  after summary process was sought under  3213 and the ease was removed to federal court  that the bringing of counterclaims was governed by the federal rules not cplr  3213
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1. The MTCA argues that intervention at this stage is untimely and would prejudice them because the case is in an advanced stage. The mere passage of time, however, does not render an application untimely. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Associates, 844 F.2d 1050, 1056 (3d Cir.1988); Wright & Miller, supra, § 1916 at 425-26. While four years had elapsed before the Seipels filed their motion to intervene, the critical inquiry is: what proceedings of substance on the merits have occurred? See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 695 F.2d at 500 (“a motion to intervene after an entry of a decree should be denied except in extraordinary circumstances.”) (emphasis added). Cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2292, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975) (<HOLDING>). This is because the stage of the proceeding

    ### Response:
    holding that where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffsafter the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place  the principles of younger v harris 401 us 37 91 sct 746 27 led2d 669 1971  apply in full force
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    standing argument is that (1) under the current financial standards certain suppliers would be ruled ineligible for the DME Bidding Process, but (2) proper notice-and-comment rulemaking would have altered the standards used by the Secretary, and (3) under the new financial standards those suppliers would be found eligible. Similarly, the argument concerning harm to beneficiaries is that (1) under the current financial standards the Medicare beneficiary would obtain a rate and quality of care that (2) would be altered by new financial standards (whatever they might be) and (3) would lead to higher costs or lower-quality services. These highly attenuated scenarios are insufficient to confer Article I II standing. See Jacobrown v. United States, 764 F.Supp.2d 221, 227 (D.D.C.2011) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 133,

    ### Response:
    holding that standing does not exist where the court would have to accept a number of very speculative inferences and assumptions in any endeavor to connect the alleged injury with the challenged conduct 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    303 by the transfer of an illiquid promissory security that gave the creditor no more than it already had-its proportionate share of an interest in the debtor’s assets. The Alleged Debtor also observes that the Eden Rock Petitioners brought a lawsuit in New York State court, individually and derivatively, against Stillwater, Gerova and certain of their principals, and that judgment has never been entered for the Eden Rock Petitioners against Stillwa-ter. The fact that litigation is ongoing related “to a petitioning creditor’s claim is insufficient to rebut its prima facie validity.” See In re VitaminSpice, 472 B.R. 282, 293 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2012), citing In re Red Rock Rig 101, Ltd., 397 B.R. 545 (10th Cir. BAP 2008); see also In re AMC Investors, LLC, 406 B.R. 478, 486 (Bankr.D.Del.2009) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Eden Rock lawsuit asserted

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no requirement that a petitioning creditor obtain a statecourt judgment in order to have standing to file an involuntary petition under  303 of the bankruptcy code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argument that an explanation based on a juror’s perceived “snippiness” toward or perceived inappropriate looks at the prosecutor, or on a juror’s perceived better rapport with opposing counsel, is not legally cognizable as a race-neutral explanation in the context of a Batson challenge. As we observed in Smith, “concern about a juror’s rapport with opposing counsel can be a legitimate, race-neutral basis for a peremptory strike.” 966 A.2d at 384 n. 27 (citing Majid v. Portuondo, 428 F.3d 112, 117, 131 (2d Cir.2005)); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 178 Fed.Appx. 152, 156 (3d Cir.2006) (reasoning that prosecutor’s explanations about his perception of jurors’ lack of eye contact were sufficient at Batson step two); United States v. Cordova, 186 Fed.Appx. 742, 744 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). It bears reiterating that “explanations based

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not plainly err by permitting prosecutors strike for proffered reason of jurors negative body language and eye contact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ... [and (2) ] immediately recognizes the object[ ] discovered as evidence of wrongdoing.’” ” State v. Otwell, 733 So.2d 950, 953 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (quoting Smith v. State, 472 So.2d 677, 682-83 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), quoting in turn Herrin v. State, 349 So.2d 103 (Ala.Crim.App.1977)). See also Otwell, 733 So.2d at 953 (recognizing that there is no requirement under the plain-view doctrine that the officer come upon the evidence inadvertently). Here, there is no dispute that Cpl. Wells lawfully stopped Moore for running a stop sign. See Perry, 66 So.3d at 294 (explaining the law-enforcement officers may lawfully stop the driver of a vehicle for a traffic violation). Once Moore was lawfully stopped, Cpl. Wells properly ordered him to get out of the vehicle. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111 (<HOLDING>); Perry, 66 So.3d at 294 (same). After Moore

    ### Response:
    holding that the fourth amendment does not require lawenforcement officers to have a reason for ordering a driver who has been lawfully stopped to get out of the vehicle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ¶47 The principles set forth in section 344 of the Restatement are consistent with Washington precedent. Washington courts have long recognized that the special relationship between a business owner and its invitees triggers a duty on the part of the owner to protect invitees from harm arising from the foreseeable conduct of third parties. See Niece, 131 Wn.2d at 44 (quoting Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Ave. Assocs., 116 Wn.2d 217, 228, 802 P.2d 1360 (1991) (citing Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts 383 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984))); Hutchins, 116 Wn.2d at 223-24 (noting that “the usual case where a duty may be found to protect others from third party criminal assault involves a business and its invitee”); Passovoy v. Nordstrom, Inc., 52 Wn. App. 166, 172-73, 758 P.2d 524 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. Staton, 58 Wn.2d 879, 883, 365 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this case, however, Pigs Gun Club was not a class action. That distinction is significant because interpreting the notice of claim provision to require identification of every potential plaintiff in a class action lawsuit would nullify our class action rule, which provides that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all.” Utah R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis added). Nothing in the Immunity Act suggests that the State declined to waive immunity from class action lawsuits. Accordingly, we hold that a claim providing notice of a possible class action lawsuit satisfies the requirements of the Immunity Act if it is filed by a class representative on behalf of potential class members. Cf. Moreno v. Bd. of Educ., 926 P.2d 886, 892 (Utah 1996) (<HOLDING>). The notice of claim in this ease met that

    ### Response:
    holding that the notice of claim filed by a guardian in a wrongful death action even though erroneously filed on the guardians own behalf was sufficient to preserve the parents claim because the guardian was legally authorized to file a claim on behalf of the parent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    explained, this ease has never been framed to solidify a foundation to support such necessary, broad-scale assessment. We do observe that there is a weakness in PHS and its amici’s particular emphasis on the DOC’s responsibility to provide a safe work environment, since it seems apparent that the Department may rely upon the prison medical companies with which its contracts as an integral component of the agency’s institutional safety planning. The argument for imposition of a duty carries more force relative to the contractual obligations of the prison healthcare company itself, rather than the independent obligations of its individual staff members arising out of physician-patient relationships. Cf. Guy, 501 Pa. at 58-63, 459 A.2d at 750-53 (opinion of the Court, in relevant part) (<HOLDING>). See generally Brief for Amicus Pa. Med. Soc’y

    ### Response:
    recognizing limited thirdparty rights in the context of an attorneyclient professional relationship where the plaintiff was the intended beneficiary of the prevailing standard of care
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Homes, Inc., 202 B.R. 260, 261 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1996) (observing that the final decree does not adjudicate any rights between the parties and is more of an administrative step to allow the clerk’s office to dispose of the fully administered case file). On the other hand, a confirmation order incorporates the terms of a chapter 11 plan, orders the performance of the critical promises the debtor made vis a vis its financial reorganization, fixes the rights and obligations of the debtor to each class of creditors, and articulates the essential agreements governing the relationship between the parties in interest and the reorganized debtor. It is generally regarded as the final court determination in a chapter 11 case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141; In re Layo, 460 F.3d 289, 293-94 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); In re American Preferred Prescription, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a bankruptcy courts order confirming a plan of reorganization constitutes a final judgment with res judicata effect binding the parties by its terms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of fact. However, aside from there being no questions of fact concerning this issue, the 5th Circuit has established that when a trial court’s power to hear a case is questioned with regard to subject matter jurisdiction, it is proper for the trial court to weigh the evidence to determine its power to hear the case. MDPhysicians, 957 F.2d at 180. III. Conclusion ERISA does not govern this case. A self-employed physician, licensed to practice in Texas, is not an employee of the TMA or any of the insurance agencies. The TMA is not Dr. Path’s employer, but rather a “professional association which was established by and for the benefit .of physicians who are licensed to practice” in the state of Texas. See McCaslin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 779 F.Supp. 1312, 1316-1317 (N.D.Ala.1991) (<HOLDING>). ERISA only regulates those plans established

    ### Response:
    holding erisa did not apply when doctor was not employee of the medical association of the state of alabama
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and third methods of proof under Russell lead to the same conclusion as the first method of proof: that the employee is unable to work in any capacity. The first method establishes that the employee is medically incapable of working, while the second and third methods focus on the vocational component of disability. Under those two methods, an employee is deemed totally disabled because even though the employee may be medically capable of performing work, employers nonetheless will not hire the employee. See White, 167 N.C. App. at 673, 606 S.E.2d at 399-400 (affirming award of total disability for closed period based on the Commission’s finding that the plaintiff, during that period, made unsuccessful efforts to find suitable work); Bridwell, 149 N.C. App. at 343-44, 561 S.E.2d at 302 (<HOLDING>). I can find no basis upon which to distinguish

    ### Response:
    holding that even though the medical evidence did not support the commissions findings that the plaintiff was restricted from any and all employment the award of total disability should be affirmed based on findings that the plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought suitable employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to issue Sole-Source Solicitation No. F45613-03-Q-A068 and Contract No. FA4620-04-D-A003 to Waste Management — Washington. Based on this record, there is no question that Blue Dot was prejudiced by the Air Force’s decision and that it has standing to bring this action. See Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1334. C. Relevant Standards Of Review. 1. In Bid Protest Cases. Bid protest actions are reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (“APA”), which provides that: The reviewing court shall — ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be — ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.] 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also NVT Techs., Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. v. United States,

    ### Response:
    holding that an agencys decision is to be set aside only if it is arbitrary capricious an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    territory” during the policy period; and (2) Arising out of the conduct of your business, excluding advertising, publishing, broadcasting or telecasting done by or for you. c. This insurance applies to “advertising injury” only if caused by an offense committed: (1) In the ""coverage territory” during the policy period; and (2) In the course of advertising your goods, products or services. 2. Exclusions This insurance does not apply to: a. ""Personal injury” or ""advertising injury:” (2) Arising out of oral or written publication of material wh after notice of a claim would, however, constitute a waiver of the provision insofar as post-notification attorneys' fees are concerned. Cf. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting Co., 228 Md. 40, La.Ct.App. 1989) (<HOLDING>). The Peavey and Rovira courts agree that the

    ### Response:
    holding that delayed notice relieves insurer of obligation to pay defense costs if it was actually prejudiced by delay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The court examined the history of amendments to the DUI statute and concluded that the Legislature’s addition of § 1201(e) at the same time it amended § 1201(a) to include subsections (a)(l)-(3), see 1973, No. 79, § 1, reflected a legislative concern with preventing multiple convictions based on the different ways the State could prove the operator was impaired. On this basis, the court concluded that § 3323(e) does not bar conviction of two counts of BWI/Fatal. ¶ 55. We need not resolve whether the court’s interpretation of the Legislature’s intent in enacting § 3323(e) is correct because multiple convictions are prohibited for a violation of § 3323(a), even without reliance on § 3323(e), in accordance with our holding in State v. LaBounty, 2005 VT 124, ¶ 10, 179 Vt. 199, 892 A.2d 203 (<HOLDING>). As we explained in interpreting a similar

    ### Response:
    holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between the two markets was due in part to different levels of trade. Commerce found the data insufficient to provide a basis for the claimed adjustments because Böwe did not submit data for its own sales to distributors in the home market. To require Böwe to submit data for sales to distributors in the home market, however, is to preclude Böwe from ever obtaining a level of trade adjustment because it does not sell to any distributors in the home market. Consequently, such a requirement renders Böwe powerless to produce evidence to satisfy the burden of proof that Commerce has laid down for these adjustments in this case. This requirement is not in the regulation; nor does Commerce provide a reasoned basis for it. See NEC Home Elecs. v. United States, 54 F.3d 736, 745 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); American Permac, Inc. v. United States, 12

    ### Response:
    holding that burden imposed to prove a level of trade adjustment was unreasonable because party could under no practical circumstances meet the burden
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    teams and therefore proeompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics” and suggested that rules establishing eligibility requirements of student-athletes were such controls, while rules limiting television broadcasts were not. See id. at 117, 104 S.Ct. at 2969. While the parties have not cited any opinion addressing the particular bylaw at issue here, and we have found none, other courts have held that the NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no-agent” rules, which disqualify a-student-athlete from further intercollegiate competition if the student-athlete enters a professional draft or contacts an agent, are reasonable because they are procompetitive. See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343; Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087-94 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Gaines, 746 F.Supp. at 746; Jones, 392

    ### Response:
    holding that ncaas nodraft and noagent rules do not have an anticompetitive impact on a discernable market
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Alleged Negligence Regarding Chock Straps and Lighting Plaintiff also contends that his workplace was unsafe because (a) the Nissan vehicle that allegedly injured him was “over-restrained,” such that it inched forward when plaintiff removed the chock straps securing it, Appellant’s Br. at 28, and (b) it was too dark for him to see the license plate holder. The district court noted that these claims “need not be considered” because plaintiff raised them for the first time in opposition to summary judgment. Hr’g Tr. at 16. We agree with the district court. See Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 356, 361 (2d Cir.2006) (declining to reach merits of argument raised for first time in opposition to summary judgment); Syracuse Broad. Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1956) (<HOLDING>); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.

    ### Response:
    holding that district court was justified in brushfing aside further argument not alleged in complaint but raised for first time in opposition to summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    368 (1997). Here, Policyholders have not shown that Westchester made any material representation regarding the coverage of the policy. In the absence of an express request for a certain type of coverage, the mere issuance of an insurance policy does not constitute a representation that the policy covers everything the insured expects. Although the Supreme Court of Illinois has recognized that an insurer may make a tacit representation regarding the scope of coverage when it sells a policy that lacks any value whatsoever, see Glazewski, 91 Ill.Dec. 628, 483 N.E.2d at 1266, it has refused to extend this rule to cases where the policy does in fact have some value. See Charles Hester Enterprises, Inc. v. Ill. Founders Ins. Co., 114 Ill.2d 278, 102 Ill.Dec. 306, 499 N.E.2d 1319, 1325 (1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Friesz ex rel. Friesz v. Farm & City

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for tacit misrepresentation where the policy had some value
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the proposed amended judgment offered by Valley Oak, the'trial court stated, “Baratta is correct that this order still doesn’t comply with what I think the second district is looking for or any appellate court, and that is some findings of fact.” Nevertheless, the trial court signed the proposed amended judgment as presented and attached certain portions of the transcript of the prior evidentiary hearing. Baratta now seeks review of this amended judgment for attorney’s fees and costs. In Rowe, the supreme court adopted the federal lodestar .approach for determining a reasonable attorney’s fee under a prevailing party attorney’s fee statute or contractual provision. Rowe, 472 So.2d at 1146; Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Biltmore Constr. Co., 510 So.2d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>). In doing so, the court recognized that while

    ### Response:
    holding that rowe applied to both statutory and contractual prevailing party fee awards
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    make reasonable inferences from the facts he knew. Those parts of the demonstration for which Detective Reynolds lacked personal knowledge were admissible as lay opinion because they were reasonable inferences from those facts he did know by personal knowledge. TEX. R. EVID. 701. Under Rule 701, a witness, even a lay witness, may make reasonable inferences from the evidence. Detective Reynolds, as a lay witness, was entitled reasonably to infer how the crime occurred based on those facts he knew. See Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (stating that a witness’s testimony can include opinions, beliefs, or inferences as long as they are drawn from his or her own experiences or observations); Ventroy v. State, 917 S.W.2d 419, 422 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1996, pet. ref d) (<HOLDING>); Reece v. State, 878 S.W.2d 320, 325

    ### Response:
    holding officers testimony about point of impact automobiles direction of travel and other opinions about crime scene was admissible as both lay opinion and expert testimony in trial for attempted murder of victim struck by automobile when based on personal knowledge and experience
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be narrowly confined to its specifically enumerated areas of review. Commonwealth v. Judge, 591 Pa. 126, 916 A.2d 511, 520 (2007). Such narrow construction would be inconsistent with the legislative intent to channel post-conviction claims into the PCRA’s framework, id., and would instead create a bifurcated system of post-conviction review where some post-conviction claims are cognizable under the PCRA while others are not. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564, 569-70 (1999). Instead, this Court has broadly interpreted the PCRA eligibility requirements as including within its ambit claims such as this one, regardless of the “truth-determining process” language that Appellee invokes from Section 9543(a) (2) (i). See Commonwealth v. Liebel, 573 Pa. 375, 825 A.2d 630 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth ex. rel. Dadario v. Goldberg,

    ### Response:
    holding that claim challenging counsels effectiveness for failing to file a petition for allowance of appeal is cognizable under pcra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    authorized.” As quoted, this language implies that because Vincent’s and Mackey’s decision was “deliberate, considered, or planned,” an inquiry into whether the practice was authorized is irrelevant. This proposition, however, is unsound. First, Piatt’s holding is the far narrower proposition that alleging challenged conduct to be a “matter of consistent policy” is sufficient to withstand attack on Parratt grounds. 773 F.2d at 1034. As alleged, the conduct in Piatt was authorized by state policy, 773 F.2d at 1034; therefore, Parratt does not apply to the conduct, whether deliberate or not. The language quoted by the majority is thus clearly dicta. Even more importantly, the dicta in Piatt is directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S.Ct. at 3203 (<HOLDING>). We should follow the Supreme Court. 2. The

    ### Response:
    holding that parratt does apply to intentional conduct if the conduct is unauthorized
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under the Jencks Act for a copy of the FBI 302 Report. The government refused on the ground that the report was not a “statement” within the meaning of the Act. Without conducting an in camera review of the document, the district court declined to require its production, finding, “[A]ll I can do is go by the law, and I just don’t think this is a Jencks Act statement.” We review the district court’s finding for clear error. See United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 634 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 322, 133 L.Ed.2d 223 (1995); United States v. Smith, 31 F.3d 1294, 1301 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1170, 130 L.Ed.2d 1124 (1995). In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 77 S.Ct. 1007, 1 L.Ed.2d 1103 (1957) (<HOLDING>), Congress enacted the Jencks Act, which

    ### Response:
    holding that criminal defendants are entitled to obtain for impeachment purposes statements made by government witnesses to government agents that relate to the subject matter of the witnesses direct testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    value * * * of one-half the share of said farm,” court held that the term “in fee simple” clearly and conclusively imported the testator’s intent to grant a fee simple estate in the grandson.) See, also, Widows’ Home v. Lippardt (1904), 70 Ohio St. 261, 71 N.E. 770, paragraph two of the syllabus, (where will provided “I give and bequeath to my beloved wife all my estate, * * * in fee simple * * *; that after the death of my wife, if there is anything remaining of my personal or real estate it shall be distributed in the following manner * * court held that the wife had the power to sell the real estate and “a deed making such a conveyance, good as against the widow, is good against the second devisees”); Koval v. Koval (C.P.1966), 8 Ohio Misc. 206, 208, 37 O.O.2d 265, 221 N.E.2d 490 (<HOLDING>). But, see, Panzero v. Panzero (Feb. 3, 1989),

    ### Response:
    holding that it is difficult to imagine any language more forceful than the words absolutely and in fee simple to bestow complete ownership upon zella koval and where a fee simple in real property or the equivalent in personal property is given an attempted gift over of any property remaining after the designated persons death is of no effect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in increasing premiums for minority stockholders in merger freeze-outs, compared to tender offer freezeouts effected without special committees); James F. Cotter, Anil Shivdasani, & Marc Zenner, Do Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offers?, 43 J. of Fin. Econ. 195 (1997) (finding that, in the context of a tender offer, the presence of an independent board increases the tender offer bid premium and overall stockholder gains). 45 .Such an approach might also provide incentives for a controlling stockholder to proceed by means of a tender offer to the minority stockholders, and thus potentially avoid the need to actively negotiate with a special committee. See generally In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (<HOLDING>); but see In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders

    ### Response:
    holding under its reading of solomon v pathe commcns corp 672 a2d 35 del1996 and other similar cases that a goingprivate tender transaction made by way of a tender offer is not subject to entire fairness review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    granted and are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). III. SUMMARY For the preceding reasons, the Court: 1) DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ RICO claims because they fail to state claims for which relief may be granted, and because the WDCA reverse-preempts those claims under the McCarran-FergusonAct; and 2) DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ state-law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants for failure to state claims for which relief may be granted. SO ORDERED. 1 . While Cass urt deferred to the state administrative agency’s primary jurisdiction only on the ground that the Eñe doctrine would compel such deferral. See 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 72; Virginia Imports, Inc. v. Kirin Brewery of Am., LLC, 296 F.Supp.2d 691, 698, 698 n. 1 (E.D.Va.2003) (<HOLDING>). 3 . While Cassens contends that the

    ### Response:
    holding that in a diversityjurisdiction case involving only state claims the primaryjurisdiction doctrine does not apply in favor of a state agency as compared to a federal agency and holding that even if the doctrine were to apply a federal district court sitting in diversity would defer to a state agencys primary jurisdiction only if state courts would so defer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not argue that the Court should determine an award of compensatory education. Instead, Ms. Lopez requests only “that this Court remand this case to the Office of Dispute Resolution so that the hearing officer may award compensatory education.” Pl.’s Mem. at 5. The District “does not object to a remand.” Def.’s Mem. at 3; see id. at 9; see also Pl.’s Reply at 1 (noting the “District’s acquiescence to Ms. Lopez’s proposed remand”). The parties thus agree that remand is appropriate in this case. The D.C. Circuit has held that a district court may remand for the purposes of considering an award of compensatory education following a finding that a child was denied a FAPE. See Reid, 401 F.3d at 526; see also Branham ex rel. Branham v. Gov’t of D.C., 427 F.3d 7, 13 (D.C.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). District courts in this circuit fre quently

    ### Response:
    holding that reid permits the district court either to take supplemental evidence or to return the case to the hearing officer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issue presented in this case: that the allowance of a rule 30A (k) deposition does not necessarily require the quashing of a subpoena to the deposed witness as being unreasonable or oppressive. We think the drafters of the rule would not have imposed such a drastic limitation on the important right of parties to call witnesses of their own choosing without explicit language or comment. Certainly in adopting the rule this court did not so intend. Additionally, it should be kept in mind that the judge’s order restricted the defendants’ right of cross-examination, a right which has long been recognized in both civil and criminal cases. See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691-692 (1931); The Ottawa, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 268, 271 (1865). See also Fuller v. Rice, 4 Gray 343, 344 (1855) (<HOLDING>); McCormick, Evidence § 19 (3d ed. 1984).

    ### Response:
    recognizing right to crossexamine a deponent fully otherwise deposition should not be admitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that although the rule “does not require the producing party to engage in a post-production review to determine whether any protected communication or information has been produced by mistake,” the “rule does require the producing party to follow up on any obvious indications that a protected communication or information has been produced inadvertently.” For example, when a privileged document is used at a deposition, and the privilege holder fails to object immediately, courts have found the privilege to be waived. Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 206 (5th Cir.1999); Brandon v. D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 07-CV-1256, 2008 WL 2096883, at *3 (S.D.Cal. May 16, 2008) (listing cases); cf. Clarke v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 08-CV-02400, 2009 WL 970940, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009) (<HOLDING>). Of course, the burden of proving that

    ### Response:
    holding twomonth delay in asserting privilege including failure to assert privilege at a deposition weighed in favor of finding waiver and describing cases in which waiver was found after delay ranging from six days to one month
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights independent of that agreement, including state-law contract rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collective-bargaining agreement.” 482 U.S. at 396, 107 S.Ct. at 2431. An employer may then allege that plaintiffs state law claims are preempted, but must do so in state court. Id. at 397, 107 S.Ct. at 2432. Even if the employer proves that plaintiffs claims are preempted, this “does not establish that they are removable to federal court.” Id. at 398, 107 S.Ct. at 2432 (state law claims for breach of individual employment contracts made while plaintiffs were not members of bargaining unit did not arise under federal law and were not removable). Accord, Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 n. 12, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1885 n. 12, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (<HOLDING>). This distinction between jurisdictional

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim was not completely preempted and noting that state court on remand would have to apply federal law to remaining issues requiring interpretation of collective bargaining agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exclusion. Absent such an indication, this court will not intervene to rewrite the contract. Despite the opinion of the Washington Supreme Court in Kent, this court is satisfied that diesel fuel, regardless of the way it is “discharged,” “dispersed,” or “released,” is within the definition of pollutants in the insurance policy at issue. As to defendants’ argument that the policy provision “is intended to protect against outside pollutants and waste cleanup, not the effects of a pest control cleanup,” this court is satisfied that the unambiguous language of the policy excludes all pollutants and does not exclude pollutants based on their source or location. See Damar Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 856 F.Supp. 679, 682-83 (N.D.Ga.1993), aff'd, 21 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir.1994), (<HOLDING>) Even though the court is disturbed by the

    ### Response:
    holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the elevator maintenance, repair, and inspection exercised the appropriate care in keeping the elevators in safe operating condition. A. Liability for Delegation of a Non-delegable Duty The United States exercised its discretion to carry out its responsibilities for maintaining the elevators at the VA Medical Center by contracting with Otis and Bayline. “[T]he law is clear that the government may delegate its safety responsibilities to independent contractors in the absence of federal laws or policies restricting it from doing so.” Andrews v. United States, 121 F.3d 1430, 1440-41 (11th Cir.1997) (citations omitted); Moore, 2014 WL 949985, at *5 (citing Cochran v. United States, 38 F.Supp.2d, 986, 992-93 (N.D.Fla.1998)); see also Feyers v. United States, 749 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Dingler v. United States, No. 1:06-cv-181,

    ### Response:
    holding the government was entitled to delegate responsibility for safety of rail yard workers to their private employers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the law (and we need not pass upon that issue), it was the duty of the town clerk — not Attorney Brule — to record and index the notice of intent in accordance with the General Laws. See Gerardi, 414 A.2d at 476 (noting that the town clerk is ""bound to comply with the applicable [recording] statutes”). 7 .Mr. Beauregard argues that the motion justice erred when he ruled that there was “no dispute concerning the lack of [Attorney Brule's] malice.” Because we are affirming the grant of summary judgment based on the fact that Mr. Beauregard failed to show that the attorney defendants made a false statement about Mr. Beauregard’s ownership of the property which he wished to develop, we need not address the malice issue. See Lavoie v. North East Knitting, Inc., 918 A.2d 225, 228 (R.I.2007)

    ### Response:
    recognizing that this court may affirm summary judgment on grounds other than those relied upon by the motion justice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    District of Columbia embodies “a preference for the testimony of treating physicians over doctors retained for litigation purposes,” the hearing examiner nonetheless “may choose to credit the testimony of a non-treating physician over a treating physician.” Short v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 723 A.2d 845, 851 (D.C.1998). Particularly is that so if “the contradicting medical evidence from the employer was from a doctor who examined” the claimant, King v. W.C.A.B. (Wendell H. Stone Co.), 132 Pa. Cmwlth. 292, 572 A.2d 845, 846 (1990) (cited in Stewart v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Sens., 606 A.2d 1350, 1353 (D.C.1992)), and, in any case, the hearing examiner must explain his decision to credit the one opinion over the other. See Short, supra, at 851 (<HOLDING>). Although an agency as finder of fact

    ### Response:
    recognizing examiners right to discredit treating physicians opinion but remanding for explanation where examiner did not mention opinions of those physicians
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Unfortunately, the Appellants’ attempt to establish that their decision to terminate Wright did not violate a clearly established right wholly misunderstands the limited nature of our interlocutory review. The Appellants contend that their decision to terminate Wright was based on HUD’s audit report, which suggested, at best, that he was a poor manager, and, at worst, that he was guilty of potentially criminal conflicts of interest. They further contend that their reliance on the report, whether or not mistaken, was not unreasonable under the circumstances. They conclude, therefore, that because Wright “cannot demonstrate that the individual Defendants were ‘p L.Ed.2d 348 (1981); Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Whether the Appellants’ decision to terminate

    ### Response:
    holding that six cited cases were sufficient to inform a reasonable government official in 1988 that racially based retaliatory actions may violate the employees rights as enumerated in  1981
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    days: Any information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges. If an individual has been charged with a felony in a district in which no grand jury has been in session during such thirty-day period, the period of time for filing of the indictment shall be extended an additional thirty days. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). 4 . The indictments, though, need not allege identical facts. As Perez demonstrates, minor variations in the facts alleged in the indictments will not prevent an initial indictment from tolling the STA clock. Perez, 217 F.3d at 328; see also United States v. Mitchell, 723 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). We express no opinion on the permissible

    ### Response:
    holding that additional facts in superseding indictment filed more than thirty days after arrest did not violate sta
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judgment A summary judgment motion must be granted if there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), not, as Appellant states, “if there are any genuine issues of fact.” “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In considering the motion for summary judgment, the district court properly relied on the state trial transcript and not solely on Walker’s Rule 56 pleadings. See Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 481, 485 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We review a grant of

    ### Response:
    holding that the entire record may be examined when considering a summary judgment motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sold, handled, distributed or disposed of by you....” Section V, 15.a. The court was unable to locate any Indiana or Seventh Circuit case law dealing with the definition of “product” as that term is used in CGL insurance policies, and, in fact, neither party in this case cites any case that specifically defines the term. The Ninth Circuit offers some assistance in the case of Hydro Systems, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 472 (9th Cir.1991), wherein the court wrote: Several courts have examined the meaning of the term “product” as it relates to product hazard exceptions. The majority of courts “define ‘products’ as goods or services which the insured deals in as his stock or trade.” CPS Chem. Co. Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J.Super. 558, 489 A.2d 1265, 1270 (1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Paxton-Mitchell Co. v. Royal Indemn.

    ### Response:
    holding that industrial wastes were not products under a products hazard exception because they were not intended for consumption sale or use by others 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was affected. We disagree. Evidence in the record must support a finding that Anagnos's failure to use a turn signal affected other traffic. See City of Milwaukee v. Johnston, 21 Wis. 2d 411, 413, 124 N.W.2d 690 (1963). Given that the deputy was in the far right-hand turn lane, we cannot see how he was affected by Anagnos's failure to use a turn signal in the left lane. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to indicate that there were any other vehicles on the highway that could have been affected by Anagnos's left turn. We affirm the circuit court's decision that Anagnos did not violate § 346.34(l)(b), and therefore hold that the deputy did not have probable cause to stop Anagnos for a traffic violation. See State v. Longcore, 226 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 594 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1999) (<HOLDING>), affd by an equally divided court, 2000 WI 23,

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no probable cause when an officer makes a stop based on a mistake of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    criminal sense. The district court agreed and granted the motion, reasoning that “the website was obviously directed at a younger audience and contained loose, figurative, slang language such that a reasonable person would not believe ESPN was actually accusing Plaintiffs of being involved in criminal activity.” The Knievels moved to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), but the motion was denied. The Knievels then noticed this appeal. They contend that the Montana Constitu tion guarantees them a jury trial on their defamation claim, and that the district court erred as a matter of law when it dismissed the action. II. We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Cervantes v. United States, 330 F.3d 1186, 1187 (9t 38 P.2d 580, 586 (1943) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v.

    ### Response:
    holding that notwithstanding the ambiguous language of the montana constitution it is for the court and not the jury to pass upon demurrers to the complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    charged with this offense only after he expressed his desire, during plea negotiations, to go to trial on the conspiracy charge. Ogman offers no authority, however, and we are aware of none, that would permit a district court in these circumstances to not consider all offenses to which a defendant pleads guilty when calculating a sentence. Ogman voluntarily pled guilty to both crimes with which he was legitimately charged. Thus, the district court reasonably considered both convictions in calculating his sentence. See United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582 (2d Cir.1991) (“[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.”); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, Ogman argues that the district court

    ### Response:
    holding that a prosecutors threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Officer at Brunswick. 3 .Affidavit of Ray Shurling, Operations Officer at Brunswick. 4 . In addition, as noted previously, pedestal fans are located in each of the housing units. Smoking is prohibited in the library, dining hall, gymnasium and medical department. Furthermore, inmates in the general population are afforded recreational opportunities and are confined to their housing units only during count or after knockdown in the evening. 5 . While the record in this case indicates that officials at the Brunswick facility are adequately accommodating both smokers and nonsmokers, the physical plants of other prisons may not permit such an accommodation. In such circumstances, a total ban on smoking may be appropriate. See Doughty v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 731 F.Supp. 423 (D.Colo.1989) (<HOLDING>); Elliott v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 796 P.2d 71

    ### Response:
    holding that complete ban on smoking in county jail does not violate eighth or fourteenth amendments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not appear to have any connection to a willing buyer’s estimate of the price he would -pay for the property. The contribution by these costs to the property’s value is speculative. To the extent the inclusion of such costs in the valuation is an attempt , to collect - reimbursement for Defendant’s prior investment in the property, the costs are impermissible, as the Fifth Amendment does not guarantee the landowner ■ a -return on his investment. [United States ex rel. & for Use of TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 285, 63 S.Ct. 1047, 87 L.Ed. 1390 (1943)]. United States v. 15,478 Square Feet of Land, more or less, situate in the City of Norfolk, VA, 2011 WL 2471586, at *6 (E.D.Va. June 20, 2011); see also Crosby v. Pickaway Cnty. Gen. Health Dist., 303 Fed.Appx. 251, 262-63 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Further, none of the experts, including

    ### Response:
    holding that landowners could not recover consequential damages due to delay or for the interest on incurred construction loans utilities insurance and real estate taxes for the period after county agency allegedly effected a regulatory taking by revoking permits previously granted to install sewage system on property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the time of filing. See Quality Fabrication, 2003 Ct. Int’l Trade LEXIS 27, at *2. Miller did so because she was affirmatively instructed by government officials that the DOL website was the appropriate source of information. See id. at *13. Miller subsequently emailed her regional Labor office to inquire about her petition. See id. at *2. Two days later, Miller received an email response from Labor stating “ ‘these things take time.’ ” Id. Miller, however, pursued this action pro-actively in that she contacted: (1) two local Representatives from Congress; (2) the State of Pennsylvania Department of Labor Trade Adjustment Representative; (3) a state legislator; and (4) Labor’s NAFTA-TAA office located in Washington, D.C. See id. at *2-*4. In addition to these extens LEXIS 27 at *2 — *5 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs, acting in a reasonably prudent

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs extensive efforts to inquire as to the status of the relevant naftataa petition were sufficient to satisfy the due diligence standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    counsel for indigent defendants at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), and during their first appeal as of right, Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, 83 S.Ct. 814, but refusing to extend that right to discretionary appeals. Wainwright v. Toma, 455 U.S. 586, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (1982); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). No reasonable jurist, even in light of the dicta in Evitts, could have interpreted these cases as requiring the kind of relief that Pursell now seeks. Granted, there are cases imposing general requirements on states when they venture into areas where they are not constitutionally required to tread. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (<HOLDING>). These cases were adequately summarized in

    ### Response:
    holding that although state is not required to operate welfare program it must do so in accordance with the due process clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as to the rights of the parties thereto and their privies.” Stewart v. SunTrust Mtg., 331 Ga. App. 635, 638 (3) (770 SE2d 892) (2015) (punctuation omitted). Further, “[a] lender owes a borrower a duty to exercise a power of sale in a security deed fairly, which includes complying with statutory and contractual notice requirements.” Thompson-El v. Bank of America, 327 Ga. App. 309, 310-311 (2) (759 SE2d 49) (2014). In her complaint, James asserts that BANA breached the terms of the security deed by failing to provide proper notice of default and her right to cure as mandated by Paragraph 22 of that deed. These allegations are sufficient to support a breach of contract claim, and the trial court erred in dismissing it. See Babalola v. HSBC Bank, USA, 324 Ga. App. at 755 (2) (b) (<HOLDING>); see also Stewart v. SunTrust Mtg., 331 Ga.

    ### Response:
    holding that complaint alleging that creditors failed to comply with the notice provisions contained in the security deed stated a claim for breach of contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supplemental jurisdictio y action premised on alleged bad faith termination from IAI “cannot be maintained against parties with whom no employment relationship existed — i.e., the named defendants other than IAI.” Rothmeier contends that respondents breached fiduciary duties owed to him by terminating him from the partnerships in bad faith. However, the partners here acted pursuant to (1) the IAI Venture I partnership agreement, which provided for automatic termination of Rothmeier’s partnership interest upon his termination from IAI and (2) the IAI Venture II partnership agreement, which provided for termination of a partner’s interest at the sole discretion of the other partners. Neither agreement abrogates the fiduciary character of the partnerships. See Appletree, 494 N.W.2d at 893 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, under Delaware law, a partner

    ### Response:
    holding that partners may not agree to eliminate the fiduciary character of their relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Castle, 913 S.W.2d 627, 633 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, writ denied). Rule 263 requires that the parties submit the agreed statement to the clerk and that the court certify it. However, even when the parties fail to conform to the technical requirements of the rule, an appellate court may treat the case as one involving an agreed statement of facts under rule 263 if the record indicates that the trial court heard the case on stipulated facts. See Kessler, 932 S.W.2d at 736 (finding no statement of facts necessary for review where order stated that the court considered only the motion before it, the attached exhibits, the brief in response, and the arguments of counsel); Lambda Const. Co. v. Chamberlin Waterproofing and Roofing Sys., 784 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the trial court’s final

    ### Response:
    holding case tried on stipulated facts where order indicated that the parties agreed during telephone hearing with the court that no material issue of fact existed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appellant) must include at least one of three statements in his notice of appeal. The three statements are: 1) that the appeal involves a jurisdictional defect, 2) that the substance of the appeal was raised below by written motion and ruled upon by the court, or 3) that the trial court granted permission to appeal. Tex.R.App. P. 25.2(b)(3). Moreover, it is the inclusion of these statements which vests us with jurisdiction over the appeal. Should they be omitted, we are restricted to considering only those points averring jurisdictional defects or impugning the voluntariness of the initial plea. Flowers v. State, 935 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (involving the predecessor to the current rule of appellate procedure); see Watson v. State, 924 S.W.2d 711, 714-15 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). As previously mentioned, appellant pled

    ### Response:
    holding that the rule also applies to those attempting to perfect an appeal after their community supervision is revoked and they are adjudicated guilty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and one count of conspiring to structure, they faced a combined maximum fine of $1,000,000. Because the amount the Strelskis were required to forfeit — a total of $140,630 — is well below the $1,000,000 statutory maximum, there is a strong presumption that the forfeiture is constitutional. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, Wilton Manors, Fla., 175 F.3d at 1309. The maximum fine authorized for the Strelskis under the sentencing guidelines is $50,000 each, resulting in a combined total fine of $100,000. Although the forfeiture amount exceeds the maximum fine under the guidelines, it is still “near the permissible range of fines under the sentencing guidelines,” which means that it is almost certainly not excessive. See United States v. 127 & j.29 Hall St., 74 F.3d 1165,1172-73 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The Strelskis contend that the fine is

    ### Response:
    holding that forfeiture of property valued at 65000 was not excessive where the maximum fine under the sentencing guidelines was 40000
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a complaint involving an indispensable party). As a result, the Court dismisses without prejudice plaintiffs’ claims under the TCA related to Verizon’s alleged wrongdoing. See generally Direct Energy Marketing Ltd. v. Duke/Louis Dreyfus LLC, 50 Fed.Appx. 469, 473 (2d Cir.2002) (noting that the proper procedure is to dismiss the claims without prejudice to allow plaintiff to renew its claims in another tribunal). (vi) Extensive Delay, Shifting Rules and Negligence In their final mash of TCA claims, plaintiffs paint a tale of egregious delay, deliberately shifting regulatory sands and gross administrative negligence. These factors, plaintiffs argue, created the types of barriers to entry that the TCA was intended to prevent. The City protests that the d 1160, 1176 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiffs allege both a six to eight

    ### Response:
    holding that the combination of lengthy application process burdensome application and unfettered discretion violates the tca
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    into Samuels' record would have informed Wright of the prior plea agreement. The facts of this case suggest otherwise. The prosecutor announced that Samuels would be a surprise rebuttal witness without prior notice to Wright. This was an insufficient amount of time for counsel to adequately prepare in time for trial. And in this time frame, it would have been unfair to require Wright to learn about the existence of all documentary evidence related to Samuels. See Gershman, supra, at 696. 70 . Cf. Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir.2001) (finding a Brady violation where the government's disclosure prevented any ""opportunity for a responsible lawyer to use the information with some degree of calculation and forethought”). 71 . See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763 (<HOLDING>); People v. Steadman, 82 N.Y.2d 1, 603 N.Y.S.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the prosecutors nondisclosure of material evidence affecting a witnesss credibility which goes uncorrected falls within the requirements of brady
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903; accord Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127, 110 S.Ct. at 984; Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-43, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). The Court has also applied the Mathews balancing test to the adequacy of notice. See Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 & n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1563 & n. 15, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that its flexible approach to due process taking account of private interests the potential for reducing erroneous deprivations and the costs of procedures needed to reduce errors applies to evaluations of notice as well as the procedures at a hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    United States, 480 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir.1973). In fact, it is impossible for the “the validity of the underlying conviction, and, indeed, of the sentence itself’ to be at issue in a Rule 35(b) proceeding. Id.; see also United States v. White, 251 Fed.Appx. 658, 659 (11th Cir.2007) (“Contrary to White’s assertion, Rule 35(b), by its own terms, provides for a reduction of a sentence, not the vacating of a sentence and a resentencing.”). If the validity of the underlying conviction or sentence cannot be at issue in a Rule 35(b) proceeding, it makes no sense to say that a Rule 35(b) reduction constitutes a genuine “resentencing” that gives rise to a new “judgment” that imprisons the § 2255 movant. See Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212-14, 58 S.Ct. 164, 166, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937) (<HOLDING>). Instead, a defendant imprisoned by a sentence

    ### Response:
    holding that once a sentence is imposed it is a valid final judgment until it is reversed or vacated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the IML are not within the control of the state. Under the IML, appropriations are made to the Department’s instructional material fund, created by the state treasurer. Section 22-P5-5(A). Disbursements from the instructional material fund are made “by warrant of the department of finance and administration upon vouchers issued by” the Department. Section 22-15-6. The Department makes payment to an in-state depository for instructional material distributed to private schools as agents for their students. Sections22-15-7(B), -9(E). No funds are appropriated, to any private school. The mere indirect or incidental benefit to the private schools does not violate Article IV, Section 31. Cf. State ex rel. Interstate Stream Comm’n v. Reynolds, 1963-NMSC-023, ¶ 17, 71 N.M. 389, 378 P.2d 622 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs rely on Harrington v. Atteberry,

    ### Response:
    holding that incidental benefits to a nonprofit organization from appropriations made to the state engineer with absolute control of the expenditure does not violate article iv section 31
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the case so that the court can make the necessary factual findings. United States v. Rowland, 906 F.2d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 1990). Here, the court reviewed and adopted the PSI, but then found that employment opportunities in prison and after release would enable McCorvey to pay a fine in the amount of $800. McCorvey has offered nothing to show his inability to pay this small amount. As the court noted, McCorvey is only 48 years old, has a college education, and has no medical conditions that would prevent him from being able to work while incarcerated and after release. Thus, it appears that the court sufficiently considered the necessary factors before imposing a fine. McCorvey has offered nothing other than the PSI’s findings of his outstanding debt as evidence of his Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Rule 403 provides, ""[a]lthough relevant,

    ### Response:
    holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    N.W.2d 406, 407 (1969) (“[A] conviction can rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness.”). Although Had-gu contends that Owens’ reliability is questionable, that credibility was attacked on cross-examination, and it is the “exclusive function of the jury” to judge the credibility of witnesses. Dale v. State, 535 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn.1995). The jury convicted Hadgu despite attacks on Owens’ credibility, and this court must assume the jury believed Owens. Moore, 438 N.W.2d at 108. Hadgu also contends the police failed to use available means to verify and corroborate Owens’ testimony. But there is no requirement that the state corroborate Owens’ testimony because he was not an accomplice to Hadgu. See State v. Swyningan, 304 Minn. 552, 556, 229 N.W.2d 29, 32 (1975) (<HOLDING>). There is merit in Hadgu’s contention that

    ### Response:
    holding that a person who obtains drugs from a seller is not an accomplice of the seller
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    examine and challenge all factual information upon which the court based his sentence."" Id. ¶ 9 It is proper for the trial court to impose restitution at sentencing unless defendant objects to its imposition and requests a full hearing on the amount at that time. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(e) (1999); State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611, 612 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). In this regard, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201(4)(e) (1999) states: ""If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue."" Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the statute is clear-any request for a full restitution hearing must be made at or before sentencing. Cf. Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1029 (Utah 1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah

    ### Response:
    holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the said [victim’s] personal liberty____” We have implied that kidnapping is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1)(ii) because it involves a “serious potential risk of physical injury to the ... kidnapped person.” United States v. Lonczak, 993 F.2d 180, 182-83 (9th Cir.1993). In an analogous context, we explicitly held that “kidnapping entails a ‘serious potential risk of physical injury’ to the victim, making the offense a ‘violent felony1.... ” United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1009 (9th Cir.1988). That holding has been followed by other circuits which have determined that kidnapping is a “crime of violence” because it, by its very nature, involves a substantial risk of physical violence. See United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320, 324-25 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Salemi 26 F.3d 1084, 1086

    ### Response:
    holding that the potential for violence against the victim is an inherent aspect of the crime of kidnapping under 18 usc  924
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    brief, Northlake argues that the trial court in the First Petition lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Northlake had not exhausted its administrative remedies. Our supreme court has held that “the exhaustion of administrative remedies under [the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act] is a procedural error and does not implicate the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 19 N.E.3d 757, 760 (Ind.2014), amended on reh’g, 27 N.E.3d 768 (Ind.2015). Moreover, Northlake argued in the First Petition that it was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies because it would suffer irreparable harm while the administrative appeal was finalized. See, e.g., State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Ispat Inland, Inc., 784 N.E.2d 477, 483 (Ind.2003) (<HOLDING>). Northlake cannot now argue that the trial

    ### Response:
    holding that a party may gain judicial review without exhausting its administrative remedies where pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile where strict compliance would cause irreparable harm and where the applicable statute is alleged to be void on its face
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the trial court should have treated his petition as a motion filed under Rule 3.800. We agree in part. The first issue raised in the petition alleged trial court error in the jury instruction. Because this issue could have been raised on appeal, the claim was not cognizable in a postconviction motion. See Waterfield v. State, 1 So.3d 235, 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). The second issue, however, alleged a discrepancy between the written sentence and the sentence that was orally imposed. In particular, Barrett alleged that the court never orally imposed a habitual felony offender (HFO) designation. Because this type of discrepancy can be challenged in a Rule 3.800(a) motion, we i’everse and remand with direction to treat the claim as such. See State v. Akins, 69 So.3d 261, 268 (Fla.2011) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and

    ### Response:
    holding that modification of judgment and sentence to reflect an hfo designation that was not orally pronounced at sentencing violated double jeopardy and constituted an illegal sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210, 216, 77 S.Ct. 793, 1 L.Ed.2d 776 (1957) (internal quotations and citation omitted). It is well established that a pay-when-paid clause in the circumstances at bar does not foreclose a subcontractor’s right to bring suit for payment under the Miller Act against a general contractor and its surety. See United States ex rel. Walton Tech., Inc. v. Weststar Eng’g, Inc., 290 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir.2002) (“A subcontractor that has performed as agreed need not await the Government’s payment of the contractor before initiating an action under the Miller Act against the contractor or the surety.”); see also United States ex rel. T.M.S. Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Tex., 942 F.2d 946, 949 n. 6 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. McKenney’s, Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that a paywhenpaid clause does not preclude a subcontractor from recovering under the miller act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    course did not materially alter the terms and conditions of plaintiffs employment and therefore plaintiff could not recover under Title VII for such conduct). “To hold otherwise would be to expand the definition of ‘adverse employment action’ to include events such as disciplinary filings, supervisor’s reprimands, and even poor performance by the employee — anything which might jeopardize employment in the future. Such expansion is unwarranted.” Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708 (emphasis in original). Similarly, Reno’s other asserted incidents of retaliation are equally lacking in consequence. Humiliation experienced by Reno as a result of Moorer’s derogatory comments does not constitute an ultimate employment decision. See Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 886 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Neither does Moorer’s unfulfilled threats to

    ### Response:
    holding that conduct causing public humiliation was not an actionable adverse employment action because public perceptions were not a term or condition of employment of the plaintiffs employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result. Restatement (Second) of Pres. Comm’n, 652 N.W.2d 742, 749 (S.D.2002)); see also Johnson v. Rapid City Softball Ass’n, 514 N.W.2d 693, 697 (S.D.1994) (“A release is not fairly made and is invalid if the nature of the instrument was misrepresented or there was other fraudulent or overreaching conduct.”); Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1382 (Del.Ch.1992) (“It is generally held that the unconseionability test involves the question of whether the provision amounts to a taking of an unfair advantage by one party over the other.” (quoting Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Dover, 372 A.2d 540, 552 (Del.Sup.1977))); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 908, 912 (Del.1989) (<HOLDING>). There was no reasonable manner for

    ### Response:
    holding that to support a finding of unconscionability a court must find that the party with superior bargaining power used it to take unfair advantage of his weaker counterpart
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could not have meant what it unmistakably said.” Id. (quoting Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45:12, at 105-07). In Sherwinr-Williams, we declined to apply the absurd results doctrine, even though the outcome under the plain language of the statute — allowing a retailer to claim a manufacturer’s tax credit — appeared counterintuitive. Id. at 427-28. We emphasized “we will not ignore clear legislative l 8, 331 (2011) (noting defendants convicted of a felony receive sentencing credit for time subjected to electronic and home monitoring pretrial). Most courts have held electronic monitoring and home supervision does not satisfy the “custodial” or related requirements of their state sentencing credit statutes. See, e.g., Matthew v. State, 152 P.3d 469, 473 (Alaska Ct.App.2007) (<HOLDING>); Bush v. Arkansas, 338 Ark. 772, 2 S.W.3d 761,

    ### Response:
    holding confinement to home and work through electronic supervision does not equate to custody
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we consider five factors: (1) the nature and seriousness of the statement; (2) whether defense counsel invited it; (3) whether the district court sufficiently instructed the jury to disregard it; (4) whether defense counsel had the opportunity to respond to the improper statement; and (5) whether the weight of the evidence was against the defendant. See Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d 1295, 1304 (7th Cir.1995). First, we consider the prosecution’s comment on the weight of the evidence to be less damaging than other forms of impermissible argument. Typically, in vouching situations, the prosecution has attempted to bolster a witness’s credibility by introducing facts that were not in evidence. See Cheska, 202 F.3d at 950-52 (<HOLDING>); Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d at 1304 (finding

    ### Response:
    holding that a prosecutors comment that a witnesss cooperation had convicted 23 other people impermissibly bolstered witnesss credibility through evidence outside the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brian Zahn appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment for defendant following a bench tri 1080, 1093 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383

    ### Response:
    holding title vii analysis applies in ada case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cause for a valid arrest), and, as discussed above, nothing — including Judge Nelson’s order — affected this belief. The BCDC Ap-pellees’ knowledge of Judge Nelson’s order cannot, as Mr. Reed would have it, be equated with a knowledge of an unlawful detention. 2. One-Hour Delay in Release Mr. Reed also suggests he has claims pursuant to § 1983 and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act because, after Judge Murdoch ordered his release, a BCDC employee detained him one hour longer than the other prisoners for being a “sniffler.” As a preliminary matter, we note that none of the BCDC Appellees was involved in the delay. Consequently, Mr. Reed has no § 1983 claims against the BCDC Appellees, regardless of the lawfulness of the detention. See Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). As for claims of false imprisonment, neither

    ### Response:
    holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    without mentioning sentencing — stated that there are “additional allegations in the indictment, which will be addressed, if necessary, in the verdict .... These are allegations that the defendant committed the offense while brandishing a dangerous weapon; that the defendant physically restrained a person to facilitate his escape; and that the defendant took property valued at more than ten thousand dollars.” Before and after reading the indictment, the district court admonished the prospective jurors that the indictment itself was not evidence and could not be used to infer guilt. After a two-day trial, the district court instructed the jury as to the robbery charge, and submitted a special verdict form for each of the sentencing allegations. The court cautioned that (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 200 (4th

    ### Response:
    holding denial of involvement in crime is not assertion of right to remain silent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    need not accommodate a disability by foregoing an ‘esse 1995) (under Rehabilitation Act, employee with excessive absences related to claimed disability was not qualified individual). “Gross attendance problems can prevent a disabled person from being qualified for a position even when the attendance problem is related in whole or in part to the disability.” 1 H.H. PerRitt, Jr., Amerioans With Disabilities Act Handbook, § 3.06[E] at 124 (4th ed.2003). In fact, “[n]umerous federal courts have held that disabled employees cannot establish that they can sufficiently perform the essential functions of a job without showing they can maintain a regular and reliable level of attendance at that job.” Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., No. CV 94-5344 SVW(GHKX), 1994 WL 740765 (C.D.Cal. December 6, 1994) (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed that P & G’s Medical Account

    ### Response:
    holding that inability to maintain regular and reliable level of attendance defeated plaintiffs qualification for the job
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 1252. Whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”) is a question of law we review de novo. Espino-Castillo v. Holder, 770 F.3d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny the petition for review. The BIA did not err in determining that Paz-Valadez’s conviction for knowingly possessing a false identification document with intent to defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) is categorically a CIMT because “intent ... to defraud” is an element of the crime. See Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A crime involves fraudulent conduct, and thus is a [CIMT], if intent to defraud is either explicit in the statutory definition of the crime or implicit in the nature of the crime.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Espino-Castillo, 770 F.3d at 864 (<HOLDING>). Paz-Valadez’s argument that his conviction is

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a court may not apply the modified categorical approach if the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral turpitude internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim. Mr. Stevens appealed to this court. Discussion Our review of Veterans Court decisions is limited by statute. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), we may review “the validity of a decision of the [Veterans] Court on a rule of law or of any statute or regulation ... or any interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied on by the Court in making the decision.” Unless the appeal presents a constitutional issue, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law ed record can be considered “an accurate account” of his service in the military. The question of whether the record is accurate is also a factual matter, outside the jurisdiction of this court. See Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Third, Mr. Stevens “requests]” that this

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim that medical records were falsified was a factual question outside of the courts jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1. The majority’s proposition that the Commission does not exercise a function that “appertains to” the judicial branch is simply wrong. As this Court stated in Young: The Judicial Conduct Commission plays a highly important, albeit not a determinative, role in the administration of judicial discipline by investigating and conducting confidential hearings regarding complaints against justices and judges. Consequently, the Commission exercises a type of judicial authority and operates within the judicial branch. Original op. ¶ 84. We also pointed out in Young that other jurisdictions “have also held judicial conduct commissions with similar authority to be within the judicial branch.” Id. ¶ 85 (citing Whitehead v. Nevada Comm’n on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 878 P.2d 913 (1994) (<HOLDING>)). ¶47 The majority denigrates the important

    ### Response:
    holding executive branch prosecution of disciplinary charges against judge before commission violated separation of powers clause in nevada constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the government. By calling the Prince a thief, so the argument goes, Zoar-ab expressed a political opinion that identified him as a threat to the government for which he was and fears will be persecuted. The IJ rejected the argument, characterizing the matter as a personal business dispute, not a political matter. The IJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. Zoarab was clearly acting as an angry investor, not a political dissident, when he and his cousin-in-law sought to confront the Prince. Asylum is not available to an alien who fears retribution solely over personal matters. Matter of Y-G, 20 I & N Dec. 794, 799 (BIA 1994) (explaining that a love quarrel with a Haitian soldier was a “purely personal matter”); see also Matter of Pierre, 15 I & N Dec. 461, 463 (BIA 1971) (<HOLDING>). Courts have routinely rejected asylum

    ### Response:
    holding that a fear of retribution from a husband a high political official was a strictly personal matter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a more favorable sentence under the advisory sentencing guidelines regime mandated by Booker.""), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 266, 163 L.Ed.2d 239 (2005); United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir.2005)(en banc) (”[R]emand to the district court is appropriate for the purpose of ascertaining whether the sentence imposed would have been materially different had the district court known that the sentencing guidelines were advisory.”); United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 738 (10th Cir.2005)(en banc) (""[T]he District Court’s mandatory application of the Guidelines was not 'particularly egregious’ or a 'miscarriage of justice.’ ”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 495, 163 L.Ed.2d 375 (2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1306 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, 406 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir.2005),

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant necessarily bears the burden of satisfying the third prong of the plain error test
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    996 F.2d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir.1993). In Castaldo v. Denver Public Schools, 276 Fed.Appx. 839 (10th Cir.2008), the Tenth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it chose not to apply equitable tolling to the plaintiffs EEOC charge when the plaintiff alleged: (i) that his employer did not post notices regarding the filing of EEOC charges; (ii) that he was too incapacitated by his shoulder injuries to file an EEOC charge; and (iii) that he was proceeding pro se. See 276 FedAppx. at 841. The Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court’s conclusion that the failure to post EEOC notices was not a sufficient justification for equitable tolling. See 276 Fed.Appx. at 841. See also Wilkerson v. Siegfried Ins. Agency, Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 347 (10th Cir.1982)(<HOLDING>). The district court noted that the plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding that the simple failure to post  notices without intent to actively mislead the plaintiff respecting the cause of action does not extend the time within which a claimant must file his or her discrimination charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appellant testified that he did not intend to shoot anyone and that he brought the gun with him in the hope that he could scare the group surrounding the car and get them away from Gonzalez. He also testified that he brought the gun with him to confront the group because he “thought it was the only way [he] could get [the group] away from Ryan.” He stated that when he brought the gun, he hoped to “[s]care [the group] to leave.... ” We conclude that the record contains some evidence that appellant’s purpose in threatening to use deadly force was “limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary.” See id. Thus, because some evidence supports this defensive issue, we hold that appellant was entitled to a section 9.04 instruction. See Brown, 955 S.W.2d at 279 (<HOLDING>); see also Shaw, 243 S.W.3d at 658 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that defensive theory must be submitted to jury when theory is raised by evidence from any source
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the choice of relying on consent by a third party or securing a warrant, should secure a warrant and must therefore accept the risk of error should they instead choose to rely on consent. II Our prior cases discussing searches based on third-party consent have never suggested that such searches are “reasonable.” In United States v. Matlock, this Court upheld a warrantless search conducted pursuant to the consent of a third party who was living with the defendant. The Court rejected the defendant’s challenge to the search, stating that a person who permits others to have “joint access or control for most purposes . . . assume[s] the risk that [such persons] might permit the common area to be searched.” 415 U. S., at 171, n. 7; see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 731, 740 (1969) (<HOLDING>). As the Court’s assumption-of-risk analysis

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant who left a duffel bag at anothers house and allowed joint use of the bag assumed the risk that the person would allow someone else to look inside
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order summarily affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his motion to reopen proceedings in which he was removed in absentia. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion, Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (2005), and we deny the petition for review in part and dismiss it in part. The IJ did not abuse her discretion in denying Lopez’s motion to reopen because the record indicates that Lopez’s hearing notice was mailed to his address of record and he did not provide a sworn affidavit containing information to rebut the presumption of delivery created by regular mail. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1); Salta v. INS, 314 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Lopez’s contention that the BIA erred by

    ### Response:
    holding that a sworn affidavit that neither the alien nor another responsible party residing at his address received the notice will generally rebut the presumption of delivery created by regular mail
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence of impairment of ability to drive due to the influence of alcohol. Alternatively, if chemical testing was performed in accordance with the statute, the crime may be proved by forensic evidence that the defendant’s alcohol concentration exceeded the statutory percentage. Idaho v. Andrus, 118 Idaho 711, 800 P.2d 107, 109 (1990). Here, neither Loader nor Ojeda were subjected to any chemical testing to determine their blood alcohol content at the time of the accident. As a result, Wood must prove Loader was intoxicated for purposes of the Idaho statute by “evidence showing consumption of alcohol and some discernible impairment related to the motorist’s ability to drive.” State v. Bronnenberg, 124 Idaho 67, 856 P.2d 104, 107 (Idaho App.1993); Andrus, 800 P.2d at 110-11 (<HOLDING>). Only Loader and Browning testified in person

    ### Response:
    holding that impairment must be noticeable or perceptible proven by observations of some type of ascertainable conduct or effect and relate to the ability to drive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    McDonough has failed to produce evidence to show that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of walking. Walking is considered a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2011). However, it is undisputed that McDonough could walk continuously for one hour a day and intermittently for four hours a day. Moreover, McDonough spent two hours a day delivering mail, walking fifteen to twenty minutes non-stop. She also walked up and down the stairs in her home. For exercise, she would walk to a nearby lake and she even went to the gym a couple of times each week to take part in a water walking therapy class. As a matter of law, this evidence does not support McDonough’s disability claim. See, e.g., Neal v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 379 Fed.Appx. 632, 634 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); see also Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence that plaintiff could walk only four hours a day was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that she was disabled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    modification to the statute in the thirty years since funeral expenses were made available. C As a rule, a claim for punitive damages may lie only where there is a valid underlying cause of action. Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 45, 477 A.2d 1224 (1984). In a negligence action, the maintenance of a valid claim requires the plaintiff to show a breach of duty and resulting damage. Ibid, (citing Stanley Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295, 315, 108 A.2d 616 (1954) (other citations omitted)). In this case, Coastal stipulated negligence and causation, leaving only the issue of damages for the jury’s determination. Coastal argues that because pain and suffering comprise the sole compensable inju Starkenburg v. Montana, 282 Mont. 1, 934 P.2d 1018, 1031 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Tirrell v. Navistar Int’l, Inc., 248

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff in survival action bears burden of proving that death was not instantaneous although a few seconds survival constitutes sufficient amount of time to vest accrual of cause of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the cases that court relied on. Chenoweth offered a string cite of cases it relied on in supporting its proposition that the judgment was void or irregular. Further into the opinion, the court states in obvious reference to its string cite that “the final judgment rendered against the garnishee was void or irregular (depending upon which opinion is followed) _” Chenoweth, 342 S.W.2d at 502. Upon reviewing these cases and subsequent ones, we find that Missouri courts have become accustomed to using the terms “void” and “irregular” seemingly interchangeably (Shanks and Butler), or at the very least have failed to draw a meaningful distinction between the two terms in situations similar to the facts of the present case. See, e.g., Roberts v. Meek, 45 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Mo.App.1931) (<HOLDING>); Gilbert v. Malan, 231 Mo.App. 469, 100 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    full hearing as to the underlying felony conviction itself). Because the prior conviction was established in a proceeding cloaked with due process, the rights to adequate notice and a fair adjudication have already been satisfied. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 453-54, 120 S. Ct. at 2362; see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 329-30, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 1227 (1999). Moreover, where the previous conviction is acknowledged, it represents an objective fact that is not subject to dispute, and concerns about the need for additional due process protections in a subsequent proceeding are mitigated. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 453-54, 120 S. Ct. at 2361-62; People v. Watson, 322 Ill. App. 3d 164, 167-68, 749 N.E.2d 1078 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, the triggering

    ### Response:
    holding that the existence of prior convictions are typically matters of public record of which the trial court can take judicial notice without violating the defendants right to due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that increase in prejudice to the defendant as they diminish in v biting all expert testimony — including all ""consistent with” testimony — except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (""At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (<HOLDING>). CADY, Chief Justice (dissenting). I

    ### Response:
    holding that only those aspects of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    millions of dollars in revenue each year. Throughout its arguments on nonobviousness, Western Union places significant emphasis on the fact that both parties evaluated the Orlandi Valuta system that existed at the time of the invention and decided to develop their own new and improved systems. We agree with MoneyGram that the district court erred in its analysis of secondary considerations of obviousness and in its heavy reliance on them in denying MoneyGram’s JMOL of obviousness. We find the evidence of secondary considerations irrelevant in supporting the jury verdict of nonobviousness. Our case law clearly requires that the patentee must establish a nexus between the evidence of commercial success and the patented invention. See In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the proponent must offer proof that the sales were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    violations of the FDCPA. D. Attorneys’Fees and Costs Since Plaintiff successfully demonstrated that Absolute violated the FDCPA, she is entitled to “costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). As a result, the undersigned turns to Plaintiffs request for attorney’s fees and costs. 1. Attorneys’ Fees “The starting point in fashioning an award of attorney’s fees is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.” Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994); Hepsen v. J.C. Christensen and Assocs., Inc., No. 10-12231, 2010 WL 3329836 (11th Cir. Aug.25, 2010) (calculating attorneys’ fees under FDCPA using lodestar); Moton v. Nathan & Nathan, P. C., 297 Fed.Appx. 930, 931-32 (11th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). The product of the reasonable hourly rate and

    ### Response:
    holding that lodestar analysis must be used to calculate attorneys fees under the fdcpa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (further quotation omitted). Mr. Camp argues that the ALJ improperly determined that his mental impairments were not severe, despite evidence to the contrary. Our review of the administrative record raised one concern: Mr. Camp’s Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 50. A GAF score of 41-50 indicates “[sjerious symptoms ... OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning.” American Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed.2000). But the mental health evaluator did not indicate that Mr. Camp’s GAF score impaired his ability to work. The score, without evidence that it impaired Mr. Camp’s ability to work, does not establish an impairment. Cf Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Camp also asserts that the ALJ

    ### Response:
    holding aljs failure to reference the gaf score in the rfc standing alone does not make the rfc inaccurate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Conversely, if the lender increases the interest rate in a manner not previously disclosed, the rate increase would constitute a new transaction subjecting it to new disclosure requirements. In Key Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Dean, 695 So.2d 808, 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), we held that “increases in interest rates are not considered ‘new transactions’ when a creditor gives prior disclosure that rates are subject to change, the conditions of the changes, and the limits of any possible change.” We further stated that “If [the lender] properly disclosed the variable-rate information, then each rate change would be just a subsequent occurrence.” Id. at 810; accord Hubbard v. Fidelity Federal Bank, 824 F.Supp. 909, 918 (C.D.Cal.1993), ajfd in part and rev’d in part, 91 F.3d 75 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). It is not merely the initial “mis-disclosure”

    ### Response:
    holding under 12 cfr part 226 supp i  20a1984  a lender is obligated to provide new disclosures if the variable rate feature was not properly disclosed in accordance with regulation z and the lender 1 increases the rate based on a variable rate feature that was not previously disclosed or 2 adds a variablerate feature to the obligationemphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    blood alcohol content); Toler v. State, 623 So.2d 408, 411 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (refusing to instruct on intoxication even though the defendant had “way too much to drink” and “could not remember some things that occurred”). Petitioner was indeed drunk on the night the crimes were committed, but “[generally, voluntary drunkenness is no defense to a criminal charge.... [T]he degree of intoxication which must be demonstrated to exonerate a defendant is great.” State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 606-07, 298 A.2d 378, 381 (1973). Petitioner simply cannot point to evidence sufficient to satisfy that standard, leaving us with no basis to hold that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give the instruction. See Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 199, 203-04, 946 A.2d 444, 451, 454 (2008) (<HOLDING>); Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 242, 686 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the requested instruction was not required under rule 4325c because even assuming that the requested instruction was a correct statement of law the trial judge exercised his discretion properly
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to continue a defendant’s supervised release after a violation rather than revoke the release term). It immediately invited defense counsel to speak about whether there should be a revocation, and there is no error in the court deciding that LeBoeuf s violations and conduct as testified by Hernandez warranted revocation and imprisonment as opposed to a continuance on release. Furthermore, the district court’s other remarks during the hearing show that its various references to “punishment” did not invoke § 3553(a)(2)(A). The court explained that the 24-month sentence it imposed “adequately addresses the factors the Court should consider,” and also that those factors were not reflected in the advisory guideline range. The court’s references to the factors that “ 00 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, any error by the district court

    ### Response:
    holding that district court may consider  3553a2a and noting circuit split on the issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    non-diverse agents, holding that where “[the principal’s] liability, like that of the two employees, was, in effect, predicated upon the alleged [misconduct] of the latter, the showing manifestly went to the merits of the action as an entirety, and not to the joinder.” 232 U.S. at 153, 34 S.Ct. 278. Likewise, in Hauck this Court refused to find fraudulent joinder on the basis of evidence equally dispositive of the liability of a diverse principal and its non-diverse agent, given that “any resolution of [the agent’s] liability necessarily operates to discharge the liability of [the principal] as well because ... the liability of [the principal] in this case is, at least in part, derivative of that of its agent.” 2006 WL 1 . 4:03CV0034-P-B, 2004 WL 555250, at *2 (N.D.Miss. Mar.15, 2004) (<HOLDING>); Polk v. Lifescan, Inc., No. Civ A.

    ### Response:
    holding that the common claims or defenses test applies to a claim of fraudulent joinder asserted by a diverse principal as to a nondiverse agent because a finding of fraudulent joinder as to the agent necessarily involves a decision on the merits as to the principal given the doctrine of respondeat superior
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    amphetamine, the government had to show that Mendoza distributed amphetamine to a third party, that he did so knowingly and intentionally, and that he knew he was distributing a controlled substance.”); United States v. King, 356 F.3d 774, 779 (7th Cir.2004) (noting that the Government had to prove that the defen dant distributed methamphetamine knowingly or intentionally, knowing that substance was a controlled substance). 2 . See United States v. Mallett, 496 F.3d 798, 801-02 (7th Cir.2007) (concluding that evidence of a drug sale eight months before the charged conduct was properly admitted to show intent and knowledge in a prosecution for maintaining a crack distribution place and for possession with intent to distribute); United States v. Hurn, 496 F.3d 784, 787-88 (7th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Blount, 502 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of a 10yearold drug conviction was properly admitted to show intent in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does impose various duties upon those operating motor vehicles in this state, not every violation of article 6701d constitutes negligence as a matter of law. Caughman v. Glaze, 412 S.W.2d 357, 362 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1967, writ refd n.r.e.). On a number of occasions, Texas courts have held that violations of particular sections found in article 6701d did not constitute negligence per se. These courts have held that, because a breach of these particular sections was conditioned upon proof that the defendant failed to act “safely,” “with safety,” or “prudently,” these sections imposed upon the complainant the burden of proving that his opponent acted reasonably. See Cudworth v. South Texas Paisano Constr. Co., 705 S.W.2d 315, 317 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); Renfroe v. Ramsey, 477 S.W.2d 648, 650

    ### Response:
    holding that whether a driver operated his vehicle on an improved shoulder in safety as per section 54a depends upon whether he acted reasonably under the common law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Appeals held, ""Viewing the evidence'-in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that L_M_was compelled to participate in incestuous intercourse with appellant through the use of force, threats and undue influence. Thus, L_M_is -not an accomplice Id. Under previous cases interpreting the standard adopted in Mercer and followed in Botin, it is doubtful that evidence of threats alone would have been sufficient to overcome the Bolin presumption that the victim, in Brown was an accomplice. See Trejo v. State, 135 Tex.Crim. 39, 117 S.W.2d 115, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938]) (Court of Criminal Appeals held ""[w]e are unable to reach the conclusion that the witness was not an accomplice” despite testimony by complaining witness that her father “had sexual int 2d 1038, 1039 (1934) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, by ruling that the defendant's

    ### Response:
    holding that complaining witness was an accomplice as a matter of law despite her testimony that i didnt consent to it  when i had intercourse with my father i tried to get away but i couldnt do it i tried to get loose from him  i tried to get up and hit him but that didnt do no good he was so much stouter than i was was insufficient to establish that she was not an accomplice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter.”) (internal quotation marks and cithtions omitted)/ The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to avoid our court’s premature interference with' the agency’s processes. See Liu v. Waters, 55 F.3d 421, 424 (9th Cir.1995). We have made an exception to the exhaustion requirement for constitutional challenges,to statutes and to the administrative rules of procedure. See Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d 1562, 1567 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that because the BIA has no jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues, the general rule requiring exhaustion does not preclude petitioners from raising constitutional challenges to the Immigration and Naturalization Act or to the INS’s procedures); see also Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845,

    ### Response:
    holding that where petitioners did not simply challenge the validity of their orders of removal but had questioned whether the statute grants the ins authority to remove them to a country that cannot accept them the court of appeals retains jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by ERISA (MTD at 24-25); again, for the reasons given in the preceding section, the Court rejects that contention. The elements of a DTPA claim are (1) the plaintiff is a consumer; (2) the defendant committed a false, misleading, or deceptive act; and (3) the act caused the consumer’s damages. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. §§ 17.45(4), 17.50(a); see also Brown & Brown of Tex., Inc. v. Omni Metals, Inc., 317 S.W.3d 361, 387 (Tex.App.2010) (“Under the DTPA, a consumer may bring an action when he has relied to his detriment on a false or misleading representation, and the reliance is a producing cause of damages.”). The question of consumer status under the DTPA is question of law for the court to decide. Lukasik v. San Antonio Blue Haven Pools, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 394, 40 , (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Because Plaintiff was an intended third-party

    ### Response:
    holding that son of woman who bought garage door opener was a consumer because primary purpose of the purchase and installation into home was to benefit son
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also Note, 58 BayloR L.Rev. at 259. That is, the existence of the basic fact of a contractual jury trial waiver gives rise to a presumed fact that the waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily made until the presumed fact is rebutted. Accord Hunter, 988 S.W.2d at 473. Because we begin with this presumption, the burden is on the party seeking to enforce the prelitigation contractual jury waiver to rebut this presumption with evidence that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made with full awareness of the legal consequences. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132-33 (enforcing contractual jury waiver when “undisputed” facts established waiver was knowing and voluntary as a matter of law); accord In re Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex.2006) (orig.proceeding) (<HOLDING>). But see L & R Realty, 715 A.2d at 754-55

    ### Response:
    recognizing that contractual jury waiver provision that was conspicuous  because it was in bolded font and in all capital letters  met burden of party seeking to enforce provision to make prima facie showing that waiver was knowing and voluntary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for which evidence has been presented that satisfies this key element of a Title VII case. Plaintiff provides the Court with the agency’s response to his appeal of the reduction in force before the District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals. Moreover, the portions of plaintiffs deposition that defendant submits contain plaintiffs testimony about the termination of his employment. Ex. 1 to Def.’s Mot. at 192, 194-96. Termination of employment clearly constitutes a materially adverse action. See Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C.Cir.2003). 7. After receiving notice of the RIF and before his employment was terminated, plaintiff was escorted from his place of employment and put on administrative leave. PL’s Opp. at 26-27. Once again, plaintiff does not supply suffici D.C.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Boykin v. England, No. 02-950, 2003

    ### Response:
    holding sevenday suspension was not materially adverse because although it was disciplinary in nature plaintiff was able to remain on the job and in pay status
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requesting only reconsideration of an order awarding attorney fees tolls the effectiveness of a notice of appeal because the Millers’ Rule 60(b) motions not only challenged the attorney fee award but also sought to vacate the district court's announced judgment of dismissal. See Jones v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 223 F.3d 130, 137-138 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that a Rule 60(b) motion seeking attorney fees is covered by Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) when the motion also addresses the merits of the judgment). 3 . Vacating the district court’s order does not inappropriately reverse this Court’s prior motion panel decision to dismiss, based on lack of jurisdiction, the Millers' appeal of the district court's Rule 60(b) order. See United States v. Houser, 804 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Also before the Court are Appellants'

    ### Response:
    holding that the law of the case doctrine does not bar a panel reviewing the merits of an appeal from reconsidering a motions panels jurisdictional ruling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    benefits calculated under the Minimum Benefit Formulas, the amendment actually decreases the dollar amount of the participant’s net annuity- 16 . Plaintiffs have brought their § 1024(b)(4) claim pursuant to both 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (which provides for injunctive relief) and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (which gives the court discretion to impose civil penalties on a plan administrator in certain circumstances). In their Reply in support of their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that the court may not as a matter of law impose civil penalties under 29 U.S.C. 1132(c) on the plan administrator for a § 1024(b)(4) violation. Plaintiffs have not had a chance to respond to this argument, and the Court will not consider it at this time. See Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 942 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 17 . Unlike prior SPDs, the 2000 Honeywell

    ### Response:
    holding that a court need not review arguments not specifically and distinctly raised in a partys opening brief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    actions do not fall under section 5-60-101’s lawful exceptions, which include autopsies, embalming, or us ing the body for medical and scientific purposes. Therefore, in viewing the light most favorable to the State, we should give deference to this jury verdict and hold that substantial evidence supported Ham-monds’s conviction of abuse of a corpse. C. Jury instruction I would affirm the circuit court’s refusal to give Hammonds’s proffered jury instruction. Nonmodel jury instructions are to be given only when the trial court finds that the model instructions do not accurately state the law or do not contain the necessary instruction on the subject at hand. Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 297, 197 S.W.3d 468 (2004); see also Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Any party that | ^wishes to challenge the

    ### Response:
    holding no error in rejecting the appellants proffered instruction even though that statement was based on language from case law when the amci instruction was a proper statement of the law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Karras argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Hoy’s motion to determine his attorney’s lien. Karras contends that Hoy could only recover fees due through a separate action in quantum meruit. We disagree. First, quantum meruit is not the only remedy available to Hoy. Quantum meruit is “an equitable doctrine, based on the concept that no one who benefits by the labor and materials of another should be unjustly enriched thereby; under those circumstances, the law implies a promise to pay a reasonable amount for the labor and materials furnished, even absent a specific contract therefor.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1243 (6th ed.1990). However, South Dakota law explicitly allows an attorney to recover fees by operation of an attorney’s lien , 619 P.2d 620, 623 (Okla.1980) (<HOLDING>). We specifically adopt the reasoning of the

    ### Response:
    holding that a lawyers claim for impression of his statutory charging lien upon the recovery secured in an action may be prosecuted as an ancillary proceeding to the main litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are proper....” Pope, 94 So. at 869; see also Pait v. State, 112 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1959). A trial court’s limitation on voir dire is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Pope, 94 So. at 865. Defense counsel attempted to question potential jurors as to whether “a girl could come to court and lie?” and whether “a girl can come to court and lie about being raped?” and about a “rape charge.” The court prohibited references to “a girl” and “rape charge” because they seem to refer to the facts of the case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing these reasonable limitations on voir dire. Counsel’s ability to determine the fairness of jurors was not restricted by this limitation. Any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Blevins v. State, 766 So.2d 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>).

    ### Response:
    holding that reversal was not required where the trial court prevented defense counsel from asking hypothetical questions to illustrate the difficulty of proving a defendants innocence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    J. Jacqueline Moore appeals the summary denial of her motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which raised eleven claims. Because the rationale for denial, along with record attachments, supports the trial court’s ruling with respect to ten of the claims, we affirm as to those issues without further discussion. However, we reverse the summary denial of Moore’s first claim, and remand for an evidentiary hearing on that claim only. Moore was convicted of attempted first degree murder with a firearm following a jury trial on that charge. Her conviction was affirmed on appeal. Moore v. State, 942 So.2d 897 (Fla. 5th DCA 20 ) (<HOLDING>); Rigdon v. State, 621 So.2d 475 (Fla. 4th DCA

    ### Response:
    holding that it was error to admit into evidence a gun purchased by the defendant which was not connected with the charged crimes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court to certify. This presents serious questions on.two separate fronts: our jurisdiction over this appeal under section 1292(b), and our general policy of declining to.consider arguments not made to the district court in the motion leading to the order.under appeal. Unlike the court, I cannot brush these concerns aside. Regarding our jurisdiction under section 1292(b), the Supreme Court has made clear that an appellate court can review “any issue fairly included within the certified order” because “[a]s the text of § 1292(b) indicates, appellate jurisdiction applies to the order certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court.” Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205, 116 S.Ct. 619, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996) (<HOLDING>). But the “court of appeals may not reach

    ### Response:
    holding that where the district court decided two issues in the certified order but identified only the damages issue as the controlling question of law the court of appeals could nonetheless address the other issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    figure and it is not relevant to this appeal. 2 . Downey also brought claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq and Lo 2:04CV75-P-A, 2005 WL 1229695, at *5 (N.D.Miss. May 24, 2005) (concluding, in a case where the plaintiff ""received every benefit to which she was entitled under the FMLA,” that Ragsdale implicitly invalidated 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a)); Farina v. Compu-ware Corp., 256 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1056-57 (D.Ariz.2003) (noting that under Ragsdale, a plaintiff ""must show that she detrimentally relied on and was prejudiced by Defendant's improper notice” and that ""[pllaintiff provides no evidence that she was prejudiced”); Felder v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-1438, 2003 WL 22966364, at *5 (E.D.La. Dec. 16, 2003) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Blue Dot Servs. Co., 283 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding in a case where it was not clear whether the plaintiff suffered prejudice from the lack of notice that a plaintiff could not obtain reinstatement based on lack of notice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Watson testified that he arrested Wall because Wall stopped walking towards his car. Wall testified that he never stopped. He was walking away as directed and merely asked Watson to investigate a possible assault. Moreover, Wall never intimidated or obstructed employees or customers in Watson’s presence. California law prohibits a peace officer from arresting someone suspected of committing a misdemeanor unless the officer “has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in the officer’s presence.” Cal.Penal Code § 836(a)(1). Additionally, the arrest was accomplished by violence, again in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (<HOLDING>). If Wall’s account is true, the balance of the

    ### Response:
    holding that a fourth amendment excessive force analysis requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case including the severity of the crime at issue whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court, holding that a competitive injury must be shown in order to state a claim under § 192(a) and (b). Because I believe that no such showing is required, I dissent. II Proper statutory analysis begins with the plain text of the statute. See Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 127 S.Ct. 2352, 2356, 168 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007) (“We begin, as always, with the text of the statute.”) (citation omitted); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981) (“The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.”) (quotation omitted); see also In re Rogers, 513 F.3d 212, 225 (5th Cir.2008). “It is well established that when a statut 9, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The remaining parts of § 192 further support

    ### Response:
    holding that courts ordinarily should resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    vacate the TTD award. Employer argues that because “Claimant opted not to continue employment with the City, Claimant is not entitled to [TTD] benefits from the City and the City was under no obligation to offer light duty work to Claimant.” We are not persuaded by Employer’s argument. The clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court’s finding, affirmed by the panel, that Claimant’s termination from employment was not voluntary. Employer’s characterization of the events following Claimant’s receipt of the “Final Lay-off Notice” as a voluntary resignation lacks record support. ¶ 14 First, we note that “continued employment is not a statutory requirement for eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits.” Patterson v. Sue Estell Trucking Co. Inc., 2004 OK 66, 8, 95 P.3d 1087 (<HOLDING>). An employer is not relieved from its

    ### Response:
    holding that an injured dump truck driver who was at fault in a workrelated automobile accident and cited for driving with a suspended license could not be denied ttd benefits even though employer fired him after his injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the prosecutor explained in closing arguments, Farris testified that she saw the money just after 5:18 p.m., which means he had not yet purchased any drugs. Instead, as the prosecutor asserted, the more likely scenario is that Gipson called Harper at 5:15 p.m. to tell Harper that Ricks would making the delivery. 11 . In his appeal brief Gipson relies on the Ohio Court of Appeals decision in Ricks’s trial, which found that Ricks arrived between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., see State v. Ricks, 196 Ohio App.3d 798, 965 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (2011), rev’d 136 Ohio St.3d 356, 995 N.E.2d 1181 (2013). But this evidence was not before the Ohio Court of Appeals in this case, and therefore may not be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of its decision. See Cullen, 563 U.S. at 180-82, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (<HOLDING>). 12 . This further included several meetings

    ### Response:
    holding that review under  2254d1 is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits rejecting the petitioners claim that the federal habeas court could consider evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his performance evaluation in September 2010, and by subjecting him to unwarranted disciplinary action. The October 2009 denial of promotion occurred more than six months after Nicholson engaged in protected activity, and the changes to Nicholson’s performance evaluation in September 2010 occurred 18 months after the protected activity. A time period greater than six months, without more, is not a sufficiently short period of time to satisfy the causal connection element of a retaliation claim. See Cooper, 795 F.2d at 1272; see also Clay v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 718 (6th Cir.2007) (finding no causal connection where gap between protected activity and adverse employment action was six months); Cecil v. Louisville Water Co., 301 Fed.Appx. 490, 502 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The approximately two-month gap between

    ### Response:
    holding that adverse employment activity that occurred 10 months and 17 months after protected activity was insufficient on its own to create a reasonable inference of causation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    medical reporting. 13 See NRS 616B.324 (explaining that a self-insured employer’s administrator is the employer’s agent). 14 See Schmidt v. Beeson Plumbing and Heating, 869 P.2d 1170, 1175, 1175 n.7 (Alaska 1994); Barrington v. Employment Sec. Com’n, 286 S.E.2d 576, 578 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (“It is well established that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied in workers’ compensation cases.”); Appleby v. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 47 P.3d 613, 619 (Wyo. 2002) (explaining that substantive legal issues like equitable estoppel may be determined by an administrative agency as part of a contested workers’ compensation case and has been applied to prevent strict application of statutory limitations periods); see generally Lentz v. McMahon, 777 P.2d 83, 88-91 (Cal. 1989) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Harrison Living Trust, 121 Nev.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that administrative agencies routinely apply equitable estoppel in administrative hearings and that permitting them to do so is consistent with administrative remedy exhaustion requirements and separation of powers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Trombetta and Youngblood is not relevant to the instant appeal. B. The law recognizes three general circumstances that give rise to a claim that the State violated a criminal defendant’s right to due process by failing to “provide evidence to the defense which is within, or potentially within, [the State’s] purview.” State v. Steffes, 500 N.W.2d 608, 612 (N.D.1993). The first circumstance arises when the State violates the defendant’s due process rights by collecting and preserving evidence from the crime scene only to withhold the evidence “when the defendant requests it, or when it otherwise becomes material to the defense.” Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963 ate v. Wells, 103 Idaho 137, 645 P.2d 371, 373 (Ct.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); State v. Stepter, 794 S.W.2d 649, 655

    ### Response:
    holding that the state is not allowed to suppress evidence but it need not collect evidence for the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other things, that he has a “significantly protectable” interest in the property or transaction that is the subject of the suit. See Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). Klaas daims that 18 U.S.C. § 3771, which provides crime victims with certain rights, gives him a “significantly protectable” interest. We agree with the district court that it does not. Section 3771 gives crime victims rights in certain cases involving individual criminal defendants and prisoners and prescribes certain remedies. This case does not involve an individual defendant or prisoner, and intervention is not among the remedies listed in the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b), (d); cf. Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 136 (4th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Klaas’s claim to an interest in

    ### Response:
    holding that  3771 does not give crime victims the right to intervene in federal habeas proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contractors. Such decisions are not, of course, wholly immune from review. The Secretary’s discretion, like that of a prosecutor, remains “subject to constitutional constraints,” including those “imposed by the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480. Moreover, the Commission retains authority to adjudicate — subject to the appropriate standard of review — whether safety violations have in fact occurred. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 815(d), 823(d). In this case, however, Twentymile has stipulated that the conditions cited by the Secretary constitute violations of safety standards. See ALJ Decision, 25 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 353. We therefore grant the Secretary’s petition for review. The decision , 459-60 (D.C.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); In re Sealed Case, 131 F.3d 208, 216

    ### Response:
    holding that an agencys decision to reach a settlement is nonreviewable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at issue, or its specific application, is one with which an average juror might not be sufficiently familiar, or if the trial court determines that the expert testimony would “assist the jury in comprehending the evidence and determining issues of fact.” Odom, supra, 116 N.J. at 70, 560 A.2d 1198. The proposed expert witness must be adequately qualified and possess sufficient knowledge and experience to express an opinion and explain its basis to the jury. Id. at 71, 560 A.2d 1198; Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. at 208, 478 A.2d 364. Ordinar 7 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1990); United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 616-18 (2d Cir.) (sustaining admission of expert-witness testimony concerning characteristics of narcotics “stash pad” and providing interpretation of financial records seized a 46-48 (1988) (<HOLDING>); State v. Avila, 166 Conn. 569, 353 A.2d 776,

    ### Response:
    holding admissible police officers expert testimony that seized cocaine of eightythree percent purity would be cut with lactose to achieve lesser purity prior to streetlevel distribution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    both an expert and fact witness); Cheek, 740 F.3d at 447 (recognizing “inherent dangers” with using one witness as both an expert and lay witness). Although the prosecution was careful to preface every question with “based upon your training and experience,” it seems that “experience” sometimes meant experience with this particular ease, not general experience as a task force agent. For example, when asked on cross-examination (during his expert testimony) how he came to the conclusion that “one” meant “one ounce of cocaine,” Clark attributed this interpretation to his experience “from what [he] gathered through the investigation” as lead case agent. App. Dkt. 70-3, 127. It was error to allow this transitioning back and forth between expert and fact testimony. See York, 572 F.3d at 426 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Moreland, 70S F.3d 976, 983

    ### Response:
    holding district court erred in admitting a witnesss responses to the governments questions about six fiftyfive and five dollar where the appeals court could not tell whether the witnesss interpretations were based on his exper tise or a conversation with the informant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sold, that no one was already buried in the spot, or that no other circumstance would preclude the sale of the spot. 4 . Gaspard died sometime between the moving of Mr. Guerra's coffin and the Guerra’s complaint to the funeral commission. The Guer-ras contend Gaspard's death was a suicide but the record is unclear as to the cause of his death. 5 . Appellants contend, in part, by their third issue that the evidence was insufficient to establish that SCI, the corporate parent of SCI Texas, was liable for the Guerras' injuries. Appellants contend that SCI is a separate legal entity from SCI Texas and that the relationship between the companies does not make SCI automatically liable for the actions of SCI Texas. See generally Lucas v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372, 374-75 (Tex.1984) (<HOLDING>). However, the Guerras never alleged that SCI

    ### Response:
    holding that a court will generally not disregard the corporate fiction and hold a corporation liable for the obligations of its subsidiary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in In re Marrama, 430 F.3d 474 (1st Cir.2005), cert. granted — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 2859, 165 L.Ed.2d 894 (June 12, 2006), to decide “whether the right to convert a chapter 7 bankruptcy case to another chapter can be denied notwithstanding the plain language of the statute and the legislative history.” 2006 WL 295220 (petition for certiorari filed Jan. 30, 2006). The First Circuit in Marrama found that “at any time” meant “simply [] that the debtor may seek to convert at any time during the pendency of the bankruptcy case ” and that the statute does not prevent a court from refusing to convert based on the debtor’s own “willful misconduct, such as an intentional abuse of the bankruptcy process.” 430 F.3d at 479 (emphasis added). See also In re Finney, 992 F.2d 43, 45 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, a bankruptcy appellate panel for

    ### Response:
    holding that bad faith in a  706a conversion permits the court to consider sua sponte whether the petitioner engaged in abuse of process under 11 usc  105a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    correctly recognizes that sub-ACLs are not a mandatory measure, and that an FMP must simply establish an overall suite of accountability measures sufficient to prevent overfishing. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 22, ECF No. 36 (citing Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 831 F.Supp.2d 95, 117 (D.D.C.2011)). Indeed, the MSA makes no mention of sub-ACLs. Cf. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(15) (2012) (requiring that the Secretary “establish a mechanism for specifying [overall] annual catch limits”). The issue is thus whether NMFS, by not implementing Oceana’s sub-ACL proposal, acted arbitrarily and capriciously by ignoring bycatch of target stocks in non-directed fisheries. See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Both the Guidelines and the administrative

    ### Response:
    holding that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem or offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.2d 844, 851 (5th Cir.1991). 134 . Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d at 811, citing Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir.1983). 135 . See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 824-28, 97 S.Ct. at 1496-98; Degrate v. Godwin, 84 F.3d 768, 768-69 (5th Cir.1996); Pembroke v. Wood County, Texas, 981 F.2d 225, 229 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 973, 113 S.Ct. 2965, 125 L.Ed.2d 665 (1993); Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d at 811-12; and Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 772-73 (5th Cir.1986). 136 . See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,-, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2182, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). 137 . See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at---, 116 S.Ct. at 2179-82; Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1329 (5th Cir.1996); and Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d at 821. 138 . See Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir.1988), (<HOLDING>); and Eisenhardt v. Britton, 478 F.2d 855 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that denial of access to carbon paper and reproduction equipment and denial of facetoface access to other inmates did not deprive an inmate of his right of access to the courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    AND JUDGMENT ROBERT E. BACHARACH, Circuit Judge. Mr. Miguel Angel Gutierrez-Carranza was convicted on federal charges and faced unrelated charges in Mexico. After the federal conviction, he requested extradition to Mexico and the district court denied the request based on a “lack of jurisdiction.” R. vol, I, at 7. We affirm. The defendant had no power to initiate his own extradition. The court’s power to order extradition derives from 18 U.S.C. § 3184. Under § 3184, a district court can initiate extradition proceedings only after the federal government files a sworn complaint for extradition based on a request from a foreign jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 3184; see Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 186, 23 S.Ct. 98, 47 L.Ed. 130 (1902) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, extradition could take place only

    ### Response:
    recognizing with respect to a virtually identical predecessor to  3184 that a complaint must be made under oath charging the crime for which extradition is sought
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hamilton v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 552 F.2d 681, 682 (6th Cir.1976) (privilege of participation in interscholastie sports is outside due process protections); Albach v. Odle 531 F.2d 983, 984 (10th Cir.1976) (interscholastic athletic participation not a constitutionally protected right); Zehner v. Central Berkshire Reg’l Sch. Dist., 921 F.Supp. 850, 862 (D.Mass.1995) (taking part in interscholastic athletics was not constitutionally protected claim of entitlement); Simkins, 434 N.W.2d at 368 (interscholastie participation is mere expectancy); Bruce v. S.C. High Sch. League, 258 S.C. 546, 189 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1972) (participation in high school extracurricular activities is a privilege); Menke v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 2 Ohio App.3d 244, 441 N.E.2d 620, 623 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Whipple, 629 P.2d at 386 (“While we think

    ### Response:
    holding that student has no fundamental right to participate in high school athletics
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prejudice as a result of the jury selection procedure. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(c) (1999); State v. Miller, 339 N.C. 663, 681, 455 S.E.2d 137, 147, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 893, 133 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1995); State v. Fletcher, 348 N.C. 292, 312, 500 S.E.2d 668, 680 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1180, 143 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1999). Defendant further argues that the improper jury selection procedure violated his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. However, defendant did not raise this constitutional issue at trial; consequently, the trial court did not have the opportunity to consider or rule on this issue. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Therefore, defendant has failed to preserve this assignment of error for appellate review. See State v. Fleming, 350 N.C. 109, 122, 512 S.E.2d 720, 730 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 145 L. Ed. 2d 274

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 13). The plaintiff fails to meet the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, which requires that he show that AMHA treated him differently than employees outside the protected class for the same or similar conduct. Under Mitchell, the Sixth Circuit held that sharing the same supervisor and being subject to the same standards are not sufficient to establish that a non-minority employee is similarly situated. See generally, Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992). Singfield must show that the non-minority employees “have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.” Clayton v. Meijer, Inc., 281 F.3d 605, 611 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) Singfield cannot show that AMHA treated him

    ### Response:
    holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    properly bring a disciplinary action against a prisoner for filing a grievance that is determined by those officials to be without merit anymore than they can properly bring a disciplinary action against a prisoner for filing a lawsuit that is judicially determined to be without merit. That the Constitution does not obligate the state to establish a grievance 'procedure is, we believe, of no consequence here.... Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Eighth Circuit recognizes that (1) an inmate possesses a First Amendment right to be free from retaliation for filing a grievance, id., while simultaneously recognizing that (2) an inmate does not have a due process “liberty interest in access to [a grievance] procedure,” Flick, 9 th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Like our sister circuits, we see no

    ### Response:
    recognizing first amendment retaliation right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (and other cell phones in the area) to identify the phone to the network for authentication. That process would be repeated at different locations until the target cell-phone number was identified— here, that included the identification of several prepaid cell phones subscribed to in fictitious names using a post office box address in California. Defendants assert that the identification information was obtained “illegally” — and therefore evidence derived from that infor mation should be suppressed — because the use of a cell-site simulator to capture “autonomously” transmitted information could not be authorized under the pen-registe e itself provide for the suppression of evidence as a remedy for its violation. See United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the district court that use of

    ### Response:
    holding suppression not available remedy for violation of 18 usc  1321 et seq
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    329 Ga. App. at 518 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord In the Interest of L. T, 325 Ga. App. at 592. 14 Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 518 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Luangkhot v. State, 292 Ga. 423, 424 (1) (736 SE2d 397) (2013); see also Deal, 294 Ga. at 173 (1) (a) (“[I]f the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end.” (punctuation omitted)). 15 Horton v. Dennis, 325 Ga. App. 212, 216 (750 SE2d 493) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Joyner v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 268 Ga. App. 835, 838 (2) (602 SE2d 871) (2004). 16 Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296, 299 (3) (637 SE2d 716) (2006). 17 See, e.g., Lockwood v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 330 Ga.App. 513, 515-16(1) (767 SE2d 829) (2014) (<HOLDING>); Nelson v. Nelson, 176 Ga.App. 107, 109 (2)

    ### Response:
    holding that an award of attorney fees was authorized by ocga  13111 a 3 when the requirements of that statute were satisfied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of whether to impose negligence per se should not be made merely by counting how many factors lean each way. Id. at 305-06. Rather, the factors should act as guidelines to assist courts in determining the ultimate question of whether imposing tort liability for violations of a statute is fair, workable, and wise. Id. Because the parties briefed this case prior to the supreme court’s decision in Perry, their arguments did not address all of the factors listed by the court. However, McCurdy’s primary argument on appeal is that the standard of conduct defined in section 61(a) is conditional in nature, and, therefore, the statute does not provide an absolute duty sufficient to support the application of negligence per se. This argument closely parallels one v.App. — Austin 1971, no writ) (<HOLDING>). These courts have reasoned that, if a

    ### Response:
    holding that whether a driver yielded the right of way as per section 74 depends upon whether he acted negligently or unreasonably
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1567, 1573 (11th Cir.1992) (explaining that a facial challenge is proper because the regulation “affects the enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees and subjects the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to licensing requirements”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Because Frandsen and Morris challenge the permit regulation, which is a prior restraint on speech, on grounds that it fails to provide constitutionally required procedural safeguards, the general rule set forth in Adler does not apply to their facial challenge. A prior restraint on expression exists when the government can deny access to a forum for expression before the expression occurs. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795 n. 5, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2756 n. 5, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The regulation presently at issue clearly

    ### Response:
    holding that a regulation was not a prior restraint because it did not authorize suppression of speech in advance of its expression
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it unnecessary to address these arguments because of our resolution of a necessary threshold question: Does Section 553 apply to the transactions at issue here? The Turners argue that the administrative offsets were not setoffs within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 553 at all, but rather were voidable preferences falling under 11 U.S.C. § 547. We agree. Setoff is an equitable right of a creditor to deduct a debt it owes to the debtor from a claim it has against the debtor arising out of a separate transaction; it “allows parties that owe mutual debts to state the accounts between them, subtract one from the other and pay only the balance.” Matter of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., 896 F.2d 54, 57 (3d Cir.1990); see also Jones v. England, 782 P.2d 119, 122 (Okla.1989) (<HOLDING>). The United States has an inherent right of

    ### Response:
    recognizing existence of common law right of setoff in oklahoma
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and alleging that as a result of Hoffenberg’s pre-existing use, One Harbor acquired an easement by implied reservation and that as a result of continued use by One Harbor and its predecessors in interest, One Harbor acquired an easement by prescription. The trial court specifically found that Hoffenberg took title to each parcel “individually and as trustee,” that no trust or beneficiary was identified in any conveyance of either parcel, and that there was no evidence that a trust relating to either parcel was ever recorded. The trial court applied the provisions of section 687.07, Florida Statutes (1959), and concluded, inter alia, that Hoffenberg was the fee simple “individual” owner of each parcel at the time that the Agreement was executed. The trial court also found that ) (<HOLDING>). An easement, by definition, is the right to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that as long as the lots belonged to the same owner there could be no easement in favor of one lot or servitude upon the other
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 478. Central to the Court’s conclusion in Ingersoll-Rand was the fact that the state law in question was not ""a generally app at Ingersoll-Rand does not require preemption of state-law malpractice claim against insurers). 5 . MVP makes the claim that “[ajlmost all Courts of Appeals that have considered the question agree that state causes of action asserted against non-fiduciaries are preempted by ERISA.” MVP Br. at 26. The three circuit court cases which MVP cites, however, .involve suits brought by employees to recover plan benefits. See Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 418 (4th Cir.1993) (finding that an employee’s suit against administrator and underwriter for denied medical benefits was preempted); Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 414, 417 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Howard v. Parisian, Inc. 807 F.2d 1560, 1565

    ### Response:
    holding that an employees suit against agent for denied disability benefits was preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Rules “have the force of law” throughout the state Id. at 166. The Court expressly reaffirmed Holt, however, explaining that the Rule 16(a)(2) “exception to disclosure and inspection does not apply to investigative files in possession of state agents or law enforcement officers, where the files have been closed and are not relevant to any pending or contemplated criminal action.” Id. Four years later, in 1991, the General Assembly amended the Public Records Act by replacing the phrase “state statute” with the phrase “state law.” This Court has since held that the phrase “state law,” added by the 1991 amendment, encompasses the Rules of Civil Procedure such that documents shielded by the Rules need not be disclosed pursuant to the Public Records Act. See Ballard, 924 S.W.2d at 662 (<HOLDING>); see also Swift v. Campbell, 159 S.W.3d 565,

    ### Response:
    holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the tennessee rules of civil procedure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    finds that good cause sufficient to require admission exists. The burden of establishing good cause is upon the party offering the evidence and good cause must be shown in the record. Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.5. This rale is mandatory, and the only remedy — exclusion of the witness — is automatic unless the offering party presents good cause on the record to excuse its imposition. See Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914. The purpose of this rale is to require complete discovery so the responsible assessment of settlement is promoted and trial by ambush is prevented. See id. The case law is fairly liberal in providing good cause when the location information provided was sufficient to allow the requesting party to find the witness. See Smith v. Southwest Feed Yards, 835 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>); Varner v. Howe, 860 S.W.2d 458, 464

    ### Response:
    holding failure to designate party as witness not fatal because interrogatory answers showed party had knowledge of relevant facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    514 U.S. at 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671; Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325, 117 S.Ct. 832; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146. 37 . Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 130, 113 S.Ct. 580. 38 . See ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1); cf. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 829, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) (concluding that a general state garnishment statute’s application to employee welfare benefits was not preempted by ERISA because ERISA was silent about enforcement mechanisms for money judgments whereas ERISA explicitly prohibited assignment of pension benefits). 39 . See Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289 & n. 13 (5th Cir.1988). 40 . See LeTourneau Lifelike Orthotics & Prosthetics, Inc., 298 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Physicians Multispecialty Group v.

    ### Response:
    holding that antiassignment provisions are not per se invalid as applied to health care providers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    award of prejudgment interest is normally left in the discretion of the trial judge. We find that the trial court did not err in assessing interest at 8%.... ” (citation omitted)). Defendants do not suggest an alternative rate of prejudgment interest, and the Court concludes that 8% is an appropriate rate under Mississippi law. Cf. Miss.Code Ann. § 75-17-1 (setting 8% per annum rate for claims on “notes, accounts and contracts”). Prejudgment interest will begin with the date the first suit was filed. See id. § 75-17-7 (establishing that prejudgment interest begins on “date determined by such judge to be fair but in no event prior to the filing of the complaint”); see also Sw. Recreational Indus., Inc. v. FieldTurf Inc., No. 01-50073, 2002 WL 32783971, at *9 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the Court may take judicial notice

    ### Response:
    holding that district court erred by failing to follow prejudgmentinterest accrual date in state statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in state court and the Attorney General issues a scope certification, then the Act requires that the case be removed to federal court and the United States be substituted as the party defendant. Id. at 2679(d)(2). However, section 2679(d)(2) goes further than section 2679(d)(1) by stating, “This certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal.” Whether a federal employee is ultimately immune from suit, therefore, depends entirely upon whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment when the events which underlie the lawsuit occurred. Previously in the Fourth Circuit this determination was left solely in the hands of the Attorney General. See Johnson v. Carter, 983 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 57, 126

    ### Response:
    holding that the attorney generals scope certification is to be given conclusive effect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 972 (1st Cir.1995) (“In general, the law ministers to the vigilant, not to those who sleep upon perceptible rights.”). Thus, the government argues that the defense’s failure immediately to object when Kevin was asked about convictions in addition to his unlawful sexual contact convictions constrains this court from considering the matter on appeal absent plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Examination of the transcript, however, reveals that Meserve’s attorney objected as soon as it became obvious that the government’s line of questioning was in violation of Rule 609, i.e., when the government indicated that the conviction about which it was asking was a twenty-year-old disorderly conduct conviction. To 17 (D.C.Cir.1966) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Benavente Gomez, 921

    ### Response:
    holding that defense counsels failure to object until after he learned the nature of the document being used to refresh the defendants recollection did not render objection nugatory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Claimant had pursued that position in good faith. (R.R. 83-5a.) The duties of the position were “[c]ontacting organizations by phone to recruit fund raising campaigns.” (R.R. 109a.) She again indicated that the duties were within Dr. Durning’s sedentary work guidelines. After reviewing the six job referral notices, we disagree that they were insufficient to put Claimant on notice of the general duties and the exertional classification of the positions. Four-Way Construction. Certainly, the notices were sufficient to put Claimant on notice of the basic job duties and of the fact that they were within the sedentary guidelines set forth by Dr. Durning. Compare School District of Philadelphia v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Stutts), 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 413, 603 A.2d 682 (1992) (<HOLDING>). We note, however, that at least three of the

    ### Response:
    holding that job referral notices without information advising a claimant that the job was within a category for which he received medical clearance were insufficient under kachinski
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    It maintains first that the Supreme Court’s SUWA case, 542 U.S. 55, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137, which concerns limitations on APA suits for an agency’s failure to act, bars review; second, that the Court’s analysis in Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460, likewise prevents us from addressing the EIS’s failings; and third that the BLM is owed deference as to the methodology it adopts to comply with its NEPA obligations, including the failure to consider wilderness characteristics at all. None of these arguments is persuasive. a. SUWA SUWA held, inter alia, that an APA suit under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” “can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to ta 99, 1503 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463

    ### Response:
    holding a rod to be final agency action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    116, line 1] she states, ‘[Baker] may be the sole owner but it is still my house.’ ” Doc. 31 at 18. There are at two obvious problems with this contention. First, the cited page 116 of Griffin’s May 3, 2012 Examination Under Oath contains no such statement, and there are no similar statements in any of the bordering pages. The eourt confesses that it did not read the entire 294 pages of the examination to ascertain whether it could perhaps find the quoted language or any passage remotely similar to it because “judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs” or, in this case, in a voluminous evidentiary record. Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also United States v. Adkinson, 135 F.3d 1363, 1378-1380 (11th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>); Dickson v. Amoco Performance Prod., Inc., 845

    ### Response:
    holding that it is not the courts duty to sift through the record for evidence that supports a partys contentions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Supreme Court determined in its discretion that the time had come to return the FJD to local control; the Justices then debated alternatives, voted, and issued a directive reorganizing the FJD. This procedure was no different from that which a legislature would follow in like circumstances. In sum, the issuance of the March 26 order was both substantively and procedurally legislative, and accordingly the dis trict court did not err in applying legislative immunity to Justices Zappala, Cappy, and Nigro with respect to claims arising from Gallas’ termination as Executive Administrator. Having reached this conclusion, we must afford quasi-legislative immunity to Sobolevitch, whose role in the reorganization derived from the Supreme Court’s order. See Aitchison, 708 F.2d at 99-100 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Gallas’ counsel conceded before the

    ### Response:
    holding that borough attorney who was acting in direct assistance of legislative activity was entitled to absolute immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Transamerica Financial Services (In re Matthews), 724 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1984) (per curiam). The Matthews purchased a piano and a stereo with money borrowed from Transamerica Financial Services (Transamerica). The collateral listed as securing the loan included the piano, the stereo, and other household goods and other personal property of the Matthews. Subsequently, Transamerica refinanced the loan for a longer term at a lower monthly payment and issued a new loan. The Matthews used the new loan to pay off the old and, additionally, received $63.14 in cash and paid insurance charges of $279.23. The Matthews filed a petition for bankruptcy in November 1980. When Transamerica filed for relief from the Automatic Stay to repossess the collateral, the Debtors 84 B.R. 6 (D.R.I.1988) (<HOLDING>); (citing In re Matthews, supra, and In re

    ### Response:
    holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to present her reasons to the court as to why she should be granted a continuance. The scheduling order Ray relies on did not satisfy the requirements under the rule. Other than containing the date the petition was filed, there was no indication in the scheduling order alerting the judge that the case was subject to imminent dismissal. Simply agreeing on a trial date without including “grounds for continuance” circumvents the requirements under rule 215.1. Ray had the burden of keeping her case alive and avoiding an automatic dismissal under rule 215.1. See Greif v. K-Mart Corp., 404 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Iowa 1987). Accordingly, the stipulation as to a trial date does not save her case from automatic dismissal under rule 215.1. Compare Butner v. Beyer, 593 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Iowa 1999) (<HOLDING>). We find, therefore, this case was correctly

    ### Response:
    holding district court was without authority to dismiss the case on rule 2151 grounds when an application had been filed and a continuance ordered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was a convicted felon, and allow the State to parade the defendant’s prior felony history before the jury, over objection by the defendant, was an abuse of discretion and deprived defendant of his fundamental right to a fair trial. (A96) (emphasis added). Reviewing this sentence in the context of the arguments made in Petitioner’s Opening Brief, the Court likewise concludes that it is insufficient to put the state supreme court on notice that Petitioner was raising a federal constitutional claim. As the Court noted, Petitioner did not analyze his claim in constitutional terms and his reference to Old Chief as not binding on the state courts undermines Petitioner’s argument that he raised a federal constitutional claim. See e.g. Bright v. Snyder, 218 F.Supp.2d 573, 578-579 (D.Del.2002) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the Court finds further support

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioners reliance on a case which concluded that a defendants right to a fair trial was violated was insufficient to place court on notice that petitioner was advancing a constitutional due process claim because the decision was based on state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that it claims will cause individualized inquiries to overwhelm the common issues. These claimed defenses are that (1) ECMC’s warning on a previous call can establish a customer’s awareness of and implied consent to future recordings of subsequent calls, and (2) a caller’s hold time for each individual call can serve as a proxy for notice and consent. (See id. 11:16-12:2, 12:13-27.) i. ECMC’s Prior Awareness Defense The Court will first consider the effect of ECMC’s proposed “prior awareness” defense. As ECMC correctly notes, the existence of prior awareness of its recording practice or consent thereto could raise the possibility of individual differences among class members. See, e.g., Right v. CashCall, Inc. (“CashCall II""), 231 Cal.App.4th 112, 132, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 439 (2014) (<HOLDING>). Here, however, ECMC offers evidence only that

    ### Response:
    holding that because the defendant has the right to litigate the issue of each class members consent the trial court did not improperly exercise its discretion in finding that these issues would predominate over common questions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Estate].” It is undisputed that at the time they signed the Release, the Mahans had knowledge of Claim 7 and knew that it would be assigned to them. Debtor conceded that prior to the closing of the loan with United Southern Bank, the Mahans decided that rather than simply pay off the Loan with Mercantile Bank, they would acquire the Mercantile Bank Loan documents, including Claim 7, by way of assignment. Debtor testified that when the Mahans signed the Release, they were aware of the escrow of the assignment of Claim 7 and of the note and other Loan documents. Debtor also testified that at the time the Mahans signed the Release, they knew that once Southeastern’s debt to Mercantile Bank was paid, Mercantile Bank would assign Claim 7 to the Mahans 208, 210 (Fla. 5th Dist.Ct. App.2002) (<HOLDING>); Hold v. Manzini, 736 So.2d 138, 141 (Fla.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that all inclusive language  from the beginning of the world to the days present barred all claims arising prior to releases execution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    abused its discretion.” Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1231 (11th Cir.2008). The district court “has discretion to deny leave to amend ... when the moving party offers no adequate explanation for a lengthy delay.” In re Engle Cases, 767 F.3d 1082, 1119 (11th Cir.2014). Witt’s motion was submitted a year after the action was initially filed and lacked any supporting explanation for why leave should have been granted. Her thread bare request failed to state why justice required the opportunity to submit a fourth version of her complaint. As we see it, the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend. Moreover, Witt’s proposed amendment was futile. See Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 716 (11th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>) “Because justice does not require district

    ### Response:
    recognizing this court may affirm for any reason supported by the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when a union member brings a meritorious grievance, the union’s decision to ignore that grievance or to process it in a perfunctory manner is considered a ministerial action that breaches the union’s duty if it is arbitrary, discriminatory, or performed in bad faith. Nevertheless, a court reviewing a union’s conduct will not find that the union has exercised its duties perfunctorily unless it has treated the union member’s claim so lightly as to suggest an “egregious disregard” of her rights. Kirbyson, 795 F.Supp.2d at 940 (citations omitted). B. Defendants Have Not Demonstrated that the Six-Month Statute of Limitations Bars Vegas’s Claims. The applicable statute of limitations for hybrid § 301/fair representation claims is six months. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164-65, 103 S.Ct. 2281 (<HOLDING>). The limitations period begins to run when the

    ### Response:
    holding that section 10b of the national labor relations act 29 usc  160b sets the applicable statute of limitations for hybrid  301fair representation claims at six months
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arid mandatory right originating outside of the CBA. see e.g., Rabe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 636 F.3d 866, 873 (7th Cir.2011) (“A state law claim is preempted only when it asserts rights or obligations arising under a collective bargaining agreement or when its resolution is substantially dependent on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.”); Detabali v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 482 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir.2007) (“[T]he need to interpret the [collective bargaining agreement] must inhere in the nature of the plaintiffs claim.. If the claim is plainly based on state law, § 301 preemption is not mandated simply because the defendant refers to the [collective bargaining agreement] in mounting a defense.”); Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 209 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Trevino v. Ramos, et al., 197 F.3d 777, 781

    ### Response:
    holding that an employees retaliation claim was not preempted by section 301 because he was exercising his rights under the states antidiscrimination laws and the terms of the cba were at most relevant background for the employees termination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been brought out on voir dire. At trial, defense counsel filed a motion for new trial and a motion to voir dire Julian. After a detailed hearing conducted August 8, 1994, at which Julian was thoroughly examined, the court denied the motion for new trial. As the postconviction court stated, “The underlying substance of this claim is clearly Mr. Julian’s potential bias, an issue which could have been raised on direct appeal because it was thoroughly addressed at the conclusion of the trial.” On this basis, the court rejected the claim as procedurally barred, finding that it could have been raised on direct appeal. To the extent Kimbrough seeks review of the substantive issue underlying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we agree. See Maharaj v. State, 684 So.2d 726 (Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Sireci v. State, 469 So.2d 119, 120

    ### Response:
    holding that postconviction relief claims which either were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal were properly denied without an evidentiary hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the statute, different terms may be used to show criminal intent. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 264, 72 S.Ct. 240 (“Congress ... has seen fit to prescribe that an evil state of mind, described variously in one or more such terms as ‘intentional,’ ‘wilful,’ ‘knowing,’ ‘fraudulent,’ or ‘malicious,’ will make criminal an otherwise indifferent act....”) Here, section (a)(3) requires a higher mens rea than general criminal intent; a defendant must “knowingly” falsify header information and “intentionally”. transmit it. Thus, a defendant must at the very least know he is being deceptive while sending multiple commercial emails. Under Mor-issette, and its progeny, this satisfies the “evil-meaning mind” requirement. See U.S. v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 74-75, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 432 n.

    ### Response:
    holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government did not constitute a trap for the unwary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and injustice warrant the setting aside of an arbitration award.” Id. When a non-prevailing party seeks to vacate an arbitration award, it bears the burden in the trial court of bringing forth a complete record that establishes its basis for vacating the award. Anzilotti, 899 S.W.2d at 266; GJR Mgmt. Holdings, L.P., 126 S.W.3d at 263-64 (citing Kline v. O’Quinn, 874 S.W.2d 776, 790 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (op. on reh’g)). When there is no transcript of the arbitration hearing, the appellate court will presume the evidence was adequate to support the award. Jamison & Harris v. Nat’l Loan Investors, 939 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); House Grain v. Obst, 659 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Many Texas courts have held that without a

    ### Response:
    holding the appellate court must presume adequate evidence to support the award when appellant sought to vacate the award based on gross mistake with no transcript of the arbitration proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    permanent place of incarceration. Our Court of Criminal Appeals has followed this view. See Lock, 839 S.W.2d at 444. In Lock, a prisoner who was serving a sentence in a Kentucky jail filed a request for final disposition of an indictment pending against him in Sumner County, Tennessee. Id. at 438. After the passage of 180 days, the prisoner filed a motion to dismiss the Sumner County charges, asserting that he had not been tried within the time period required by the IAD. Id. at 439. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the State’s argument that the IAD was not applicable because it found that the prisoner was in a county jail, not a state prison. The court held that “[i]f a prisoner is under custodial authority by virtue of serving a term of imprisonment, the 0-21 (D.Colo.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Evans, No. 1:08CR00024-006,

    ### Response:
    holding that it is inconsistent with the purpose of the iad to deny its protections to a sentenced prisoner who serves time no matter how lengthy in a temporary facility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“[W]e conclude that § 1404(a) is the proper avenue of relief where a party seeks the transfer of a case to enforce a forum-selection clause, while Rule 12(b)(3) is the proper avenue for a party’s request for dismissal based on a forum-selection clause.”); Hillis v. Heineman, 626 F.3d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that a party’s defense for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) based on a forum-selection clause was valid and was not waived by the filing of a counterclaim); Muzumdar v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 438 F.3d 759, 760-62 (7th Cir.2006) (“A challenge to venue based upon a forum selection clause can appropriately be brought as a motion to dismiss the complaint under [Rule] 12(b)(3).”); Sucampo Pharm., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 548-50 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies,

    ### Response:
    holding that a forumselection clause may be enforced under rule 12b3 as a motion to dismiss on the basis of improper venue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to appropriate its business opportunities. See Cal. Corp. Code § 16404(b); Leff, 33 Cal.3d at 514, 189 Cal.Rptr. 377, 658 P.2d 740. Second Measure’s request to dismiss Counterclaims 2 and 4 is therefore DENIED. 3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Counterclaim 5) a. Relevant Substantive Law To establish a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must show “(1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.” People ex rel. Harris v. Rizzo, 214 Cal.App.4th 921, 950, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 443 (2013) (quotation omitted). Section 16404 of the California Corporations Code provides a nonexclusive list of the fiduciary duties that one partner owes to another. See Enea v. Superior Court, 132 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1565, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Because fiduciary duties are imposed by

    ### Response:
    holding that the list is comprehensive but not exhaustive quotation and emphasis omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 1273-1274. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir.1993). Consequently, the Court refuses to conclude that one incident is, as a matter of law, insufficient to support a hostile work environment claim. That conclusion, coupled with the evidence that the incident at issue was especially severe, leads this Court to conclude that Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the hostile work environment claim. Courts have pointed out that the racial epithet of “nigger” is particularly offensive. See Rodgers, 12 F.3d at 675. In Rodgers, the Seventh Circuit stated that the word “nigger” is unambiguously racist and held that its use on even a few occasions affects the terms and conditions 878, 885 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the Court concludes that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a single offensive racist comment was not sufficient to establish a hostile work environment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.""); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (""[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....""); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (<HOLDING>); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881

    ### Response:
    holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine restitution and probation costs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by reference the Condominium Documents, and indicates that these Documents would be provided to Venezia at some indeterminate point after execution of the Purchase Agreement. (See Purchase Agreement at 1 (“DEVELOPER WILL FURNISH [Condominium Documents] TO BUYER.” (emphasis in original).) In other words, the terms of the Purchase Agreement provided either the same period or a longer period of time within which Venezia had the opportunity and ability to cancel the Agreement without cause, which again obviates his cause of action based on the failure of the Purchase Agreement to include language that precisely mirrored the language set forth in the statute. Cf. Werdmuller Von Elgg v. Carlyle Developers, Inc., No. 09-cv-132-Orl-31 KRS, 2009 WL 961144, at *2 (M.D.Fla. April 7, 2009) (<HOLDING>). Venezia’s response does not even address

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of 15 usc  1703b where their purchase contract gave notice that they had a right to cancel the agreement by giving notice to the seller until midnight of the fifteenth day following the signing of the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remedies must be exhausted.” Id at 810, 554 P.2d at 1307. This Court, in Carter v. State, Dept, of Health & Welfare, 103 Idaho 701, 652 P.2d 649 (1982), reaffirmed this holding by stating: In V-1 Oil Company v. County of Bannock, we held that the proper method of contesting an agency or judicial decision is by appeal, and that an order or judgment may not later be collaterally attacked by means of a declaratory judgment action. The appellants’ collateral attack upon their orders of commitment by means of a declaratory judgment action is thus clearly impermissible. Id at 702, 652 P.2d at 650 (citation omitted); see also Conley v. Looney, 117 Idaho 627, 630, 790 P.2d 920, 923 (Ct.App.1990) (citing Bills v. State Dept, of Revenue and Taxation, 110 Idaho 113, 714 P.2d 82 (Ct.App. 1986)) (<HOLDING>). Count I of Ag Air’s amended complaint seeks

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant hjaving failed to exercise administrative appeal  cannot now collaterally attack the tax deficiency determination in an independent action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we grant the Levy defendants’ Rule 50 motion in part, on other grounds, we need not reach the issue of whether in any circumstance, duress may toll the copyright statute of limitations. However, we note that Judge Broderick, in his April 15 Order, held ""that under the facts of this case, the recognition of a toll for duress would be consistent with the purposes of the Copyright Act and the duress toll which should be utilized is that provided under the law of this court's forum state, New York.” April 15 Order at 11; Cf. Donahue v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 633 F.Supp. 1423, 1442 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (acknowledging that duress toll may have a role, albeit a narrow one, in antitrust actions.) But cf. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 808 F.Supp. 213, 225 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (<HOLDING>). In any event, it is doubtful that'we could

    ### Response:
    holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that a new trial is not warranted. United States v. Rochan, 563 F.2d 1246, 1250 (5th Cir.1977). III. CONCLUSION We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to instruct the jury on Appellant’s theory of temporary innocent possession of a firearm. Further, the district judge’s conduct in this case does not warrant a new trial. Accordingly, we affirm Palma’s conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. 1 . Almonte testified at trial that she stood away from Palma and German during the transaction and rejoined them when they left the store. 2 . German paid for the grips, upon Palma’s request. 3 . In the past, we have declined to entertain the theory of a ""mere inspection” defense. See United States v. Beverly, 194 Fed.Appx. 624, 628 (11th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). And while we have indicated that a

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a mere inspection instruction in a firearm possession case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only if that effect can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.” United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir.1994) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Even assuming — without in any way deciding — that the law disproportionately impacts Native Americans, Parshall provides no meaningful evidence that Congress intended to discriminate against Native Americans when it passed 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). He argues that Congress should have been aware of the law’s likely disproportionate impact on Native Americans, which suggests, according to Parshall, “at least a possibility” of discriminatory intent. Such assertions fall short of establishing the Congressional intent necessary to show a violation of the Fifth Amendment. See id.; United States v. DeMarce, 564 F.3d 989, 1000 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). C. Eighth Amendment Parshall argues that his

    ### Response:
    holding that a 30year sentence imposed under 18 usc  2241c did not violate a defendantnative americans equal protection rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    confrontation, that is one' thing. But I cannot believe that the legislature intended that a minor who is in possession of a stolen package of cigarettes from a convenience store or a woman who is driving a car one mile per hour over the speed limit is unable to defend himself or herself under the stand-your-ground doctrine when approached by an aggressor seeking to cause the unlawful actor great bodily harm completely unrelated to these prior (and continuing) transgressions. And I do not believe the text chosen by our legislature requires such an understanding. To the contrary, I believe the text permits the meaning I .assert. See, e.g., Beal v. State, 225 So.3d 1276, 1288 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (Barnes, J., dissenting); cf. City of Jackson v. Perry, 764 So.2d 373, 379 (Miss. 2000) (<HOLDING>). I believe the facts o’f the present case

    ### Response:
    holding that for recovery under the mississippi tort claims act to be barred because of a victims criminal activity at the time of the injury it must beshown that the criminal activity has some causal nexus to the wrongdoing of the tortfeasor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    suit. Fourth, the patent explicitly disclaims any relation between Figure 4b and the aspects of the invention dealing with the discharge of the primary switch’s parasitic capacitance. See col. 5, 11. 44-51 (“neglecting ... parasitic effects including the ones associated with ... the capacitance of non-ideal hardware realizations of the primary switch 10 ..., the operation of the magnetizing current mirror as a reset mechanism is illustrated by an example in 4b.”). It is therefore less plausible that the inventor would rely on this figure to define the invention’s switch-timing properties. Finally, Unitrode presses an argument based on claim differentiation for adopting a voltage-based definition for ON period. See Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987 (Fed.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>).* The doctrine of claim differentiation is a

    ### Response:
    holding the scope of a particular claim can often be determined on inspection of other claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    before magistrate or justice of peace “without any reference to the act for trial of small causes in this colony”). As the preceding statutes indicate, in colonial New Jersey, as in England, certain forfeiture and penalty proceedings to enforce police statutes and to punish minor criminal offenses, such as violations of the fish and game acts, proceeded before justices of the peace without juries. See Greely v. City of Passaic, 42 N.J.L. 429, 431 (E. & A. 1880) (noting that “[Pjarliament conferred upon the [justice of the peace] certain judicial functions, as a means of enforcing the game acts” by “a summary proceeding, technical in character, of a quasi-criminal nature, and totally unlike an action at law”); State v. Lakewood Mkt. Co., 84 N.J.L. 512, 523, 88 A. 194 (Sup.Ct.1913) (<HOLDING>); Carter Bros. v. Camden Dist. Court, 49 N.J.L.

    ### Response:
    holding that penalty action instituted pursuant to fish and game procedure act of 1897 did not include jury trial because it has been repeatedly held in this state that in a summary procedure for the collection of a penalty for violation of a police regulation neither party is entitled to a trial by jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by Congress to address a particular situation will at times have consequences that could not have been intended by its draftsmen; and such unintended consequences may engender ambiguity where none at first appears. In this case, the court is correct in stating that the language of section 622 clearly applies to a Secretary of Agriculture by virtue of his being an “officer ... of the United States authorized to perform ... duties described by this subchapter.” 21 U.S.C. § 622. Yet the section’s summary dismissal sanction, as applied to a cabinet officer, would appear to exceed Congress’s authority. It is in such circumstances that courts will invoke the doctrine of judicial severability. See, e.g., Robert Dollar Co. v. Canadian Car & Foundry Co., 220 N.Y. 270, 115 N.E. 711, 713 (1917) (<HOLDING>). This is a judicial remedy with which the

    ### Response:
    holding that where a single section of a statute attempts or purports to cover two entirely distinct and separable classes of cases one properly and the other improperly  the section may be upheld as to the class which constitutionally may be thus covered even though condemned as to the other
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of defense). It should be noted that even inadequate provocation coupled with an objectively unreasonable reaction may be relevant to a case, like this one, because the jury may find that it creates a reasonable doubt about the existence of the “malice” (under our new Code, the mental state of knowledge or purpose) required for murder, id. at 314-15, thus warranting a possible verdict on a lesser-included offense of murder. Murder eases will almost always turn on the mental state of the accused. Deciding that question is the jury’s function. 2 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 164, at 259 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1979) (where there is dispute, jury should decide questions of adequate provocation); see also American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 210.3, at 57-61 (perm. ed. 1980) (<HOLDING>). Even “words alone,” when they are racial

    ### Response:
    recognizing limited value of categorical rules on mitiga tion developed by common law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    notice of its elements to those who may potentially be charged under that statute: “The underlying principle is that no person shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which one could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.” Server v. Mizell, 902 F.2d 611, 613 (1990). I agree with the magistrate judge that the statutory definitions of “sexual contact” and “sexual intercourse” are clear. That they are similar does not make them ambiguous. The definitions in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5) explicitly describe, in graphic detail, the conduct required for each act. Furthermore, as I said above,- each act requires different elements. I believe that an ordinary person is able to understand the meanings of, and the differences between,' these definitions. See Server, 902 F.2d at 613-14 (<HOLDING>). The petitioner’s last claim is that the same

    ### Response:
    holding that the illinois statutory definitions of sexual penetration and sexual conduct cover clearly distinct conduct and that therefore the statute was not unconstitutionally vague
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    McDonough intercepted the package at the mail facility located at the Dayton Airport, sometime during the morning of September 5, 2001. The label for the package indicated that delivery had been promised by noon on September 5th. In other words, the Defendant did not have a right to possess it until noon. Judge Merz issued that warrant at 9:54 a.m., on that date. There is no indication that the package could not have been delivered from the Dayton Airport to Mail Boxes, Etc., in Centerville, in two hours, if Judge Merz had refused to grant the requested search warrant or if no contraband had been discovered therein. Consequently, one could question whether the detention of the package was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. England, 971 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). However, since the Government has failed to

    ### Response:
    holding package was not seized when it was detained since it could have been delivered in timely fashion if cocaine had not been discovered inside
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Government action challenged as violating the Establishment Clause must satisfy the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971): To pass muster under Lemon, the challenged practice must (1) reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. Preliminarily, to prevail on its Establishment Clause claim, plaintiff must prove two key facts: (1) anthroposophy constitutes a “religion” for Establishment Clause purposes; and (2) if anthroposophy is a religion, that there is an anthroposophieal curriculum at the subject public Waldorf-method schools. See Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1227 (<HOLDING>). As set forth above, the parties agreed that

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the court had to first consider whether the object in question can be defined as religious for establishment clause purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brief, 1. Klayman’s response is twofold. He admits to making the income alleged by the Government but points out his annual income over that period fluctuated greatly from as low as $61,000 to $328,000. Plaintiffs Response to Gov’t’s Facts ¶ 26. Secondly, he points out that for the years 2001 through 2003 the majority of the reported income constituted “phantom,” or passive, non-cash income passed through from Herkly, his Subchapter S corporation. See Response to Gov’t’s Facts ¶ 24; Klayman Dep. 47-49 attached to Plaintiffs Response; see also Government Ex. 118-120, Form 1040 for 2001-2003, Schedule E. Neither of these reasons, however, explains why no payment at all was made toward his tax debt for the previous years. See In re Scarpiello, 240 B.R. 203, 209 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1999) (<HOLDING>); In re Lacheen, 2005 WL 1155257 *4

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to make any tax payment despite having resources sufficient to pay all or a substantial portion of tax liability constitutes evasion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the court, after a noticed hearing that Michelle failed to even attend, then ordered restitution in early 2007. ¶ 19 Unlike Alton D., this is not a case in which the juvenile court set a reasonable deadline, or for that matter any time limit, within which a restitution claim had to be submitted. See Alton D., 196 Ariz. 195, ¶¶ 2, 19, 994 P.2d at 403, 406-07. And, unlike the situation in Kevin A., in this ease the juvenile court never indicated that “ ‘restitution [would] be closed’ ” at a certain point in time. Kevin A., 201 Ariz. 161, ¶ 3, 32 P.3d at 1089; see also In re Richard B., 216 Ariz. 127, ¶ 17, 163 P.3d 1077, 1081 (App.2007). Nor did the victim fail to comply with any deadline or other order concerning restitution. Compare Alton D., 196 Ariz. 195, ¶ 19, 994 P.2d at 407 (<HOLDING>), and Kevin A., 201 Ariz. 161, ¶¶ 4, 8, 32 P.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that when in light of the circumstances of a particular case the court sets a reasonable deadline by which victims must present their restitution claims and supporting evidence any victim who fails to comply is barred from recovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    two fundamental reasons. First, appellant’s reliance on the fact that she was convicted of murder under a theory of accomplice liability is misplaced in this context. As we implicitly held in Ramsey, in determining whether Wharton’s Rule applies to a substantive offense the conviction of which is based on accomplice liability, the focus must be on the underlying criminal act of the particular substantive offense rather than on the accomplice aspect of the offense. 2 Va.App. at 272, 343 S.E.2d at 470. The accompliceship itself is not the completed criminal act upon which the conviction is based but simply the means by which criminal responsibility for the completed criminal act is incurred under Code § 18.2-18. See Snyder v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1009, 1017, 121 S.E.2d 452, 458 (1961) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the accomplice aspect of the

    ### Response:
    holding that before the accessory to a crime can be convicted as such it must be shown that the crime has been committed by the principal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 20.2b, at 906 n. 21 (5th ed.2005). And, finally, the petitioner argues that the district court was required to grant her request for an evidentiary hearing under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-13, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). As a matter of statutory law, we reject the Commonwealth’s importunings. Here, the petitioner adduced extensive evidence in the state court. The exact manner in which she elected to make the point is less important than the fact that she did make the point; her proffer went directly to the merits of the claims that she later sought to pursue in the federal court proceedings. We conclude, therefore, that the district court was not statutorily prohibited from taking evidence on those claims. See Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Matheney v. Anderson, 253 F.3d 1025, 1039

    ### Response:
    holding federal evidentiary hearing not statutorily barred when petitioner had sought to develop factual basis for claim in state court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was the pipe cut incident, we refrain from deciding whether that incident, standing alone, would qualify as a “sudden and accidental” release. Although we may disagree with the district court’s legal analysis of the issue, because we affirm on other grounds, a further discussion by this court is unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. C. The Administrative Proceedings FAG’s insurance policy declares that Liberty has a duty to defend “any suit against the insured seeking damages.” Liberty asserts that it does not, and never did, owe an obligation to FAG to defend against agency action in administrative proceedings because those proceedings are not “suits.” FAG disputes this assertion, claiming that the relevant Eighth Circuit opinion, Gen. Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d at 713-14 (<HOLDING>), is no longer viable because it relies on a

    ### Response:
    holding that agency demand letters are not suits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir.1995). “ ‘[Objections disputing] the correctness of the magistrate’s recommendation but failing] to specify the findings ... believed [to be] in error’ are too general.” Spencer, 449 F.3d at 725 (quoting Miller, 50 F.3d at 380). The defendant did not object to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the plaintiff established the first two elements of his prima facie case. “[T]he failure to file specific objections to a magistrate’s report constitutes a waiver of those objections.” Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir.2004). Since the defendant did not challenge those conclusions, the Court need not address those items, since those arguments are waived, see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231,

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to object to the magistrate judges report releases the court from its duty to independently review the motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    C.R.S. (2006). 2 . 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2000) states: In any State court proceeding [concerning] ... an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe.... 3 . Article VI, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution establishes the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver. Denver is the only county to have separate probate and juvenile courts. Other counties in Colorado handle probate and juvenile matters in their district courts. 4 . See, e.g., L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d 1271, 1274, 1277 (Colo.2000) (<HOLDING>). While L.L. was a case of guardianship in the

    ### Response:
    recognizing childrens need for stability and permanency and thus upholding placement of children in permanent guardianship of foster parents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    although specifically invited to do so, the State has presented no evidence from the record that Raphael’s attorney knew of the nature of the ex parte hearing and yet deliberately chose not to object. To the contrary, the record shows that the trial court did not fully inform Raphael’s attorney of the nature or content of the hearing. Based on the trial court’s abridged account to Raphael’s attorney of its contact with I.W., along with the lack of support for the theory that Gould knew the full extent of the constitutional errors and deliberately chose not to object, we cannot say that Raphael’s failure to object to the ex parte hearing and to I.W.’s testimony was tactical. Because the trial court committed plain error, we recognize Raphael’s constitutional claims on (E.D.Mich.19.72) (<HOLDING>); cf. J & L Diversified Enters. v. Municipality

    ### Response:
    holding that the polices torturing of a witness until he provided incourt testimony incriminating the defendant violated the defendants right to due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    901-950 [1957], for injuries sustained when he fell asleep while driving home after being required to work twenty-six hours without sleep because hazard of journey arose out of and in course of “extraordinary demands of employment”). See Hed v. Brockway Glass Co., 309 Minn. 73, 76 (1976) (affirming compensation award to worker who fell asleep while driving home after being required to work longer hours as bricklayer than generally required); Snowbarger v. Tri-County Elec. Coop., 793 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Mo. 1990) (affirming award of compensation to worker who fell asleep while driving home after being required to work “unusually long overtime hours” of manual labor, eighty-six hours in one hundred hour period). See also Deland v. Hutchings Psychiatric Ctr., 203 A.D. 2d 776, 778 (N.Y. 1994) (<HOLDING>). In all such cases, however, the employer had

    ### Response:
    recognizing substantial body of authority from other states and the federal courts holding that fatiguerelated injuries can be compensable in some circumstances but remanding case for explanation why contrary precedent within jurisdiction was not followed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has held on more than one occasion, not inconsistent with Magnolia, that the language in section 85.321’s predecessor (section 13 of article 6049c) does, in fact, create a private cause of action. Turnbow v. Lamb, 95 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir.1938) (“Article 6049c, section 13, Vernon’s Civil Stat. Texas, expressly recognizes and preserves to an injured party his cause of action for damages ‘or other relief against a violator of the oil production laws.”); see Sun Oil Co. v. Martin, 330 F.2d 5, 5 (5th Cir.1964) (adopting the lower court’s reasoning in Sun Oil Co. v. Martin, 218 F.Supp. 618, 621-22 (S.D.Tex.1963) (explaining that a violation under section 13 of article 6049c “may give rise to an action for damages”)); see also Ivey v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 36 F.Supp. 811, 816 (S.D.Tex.1941) (<HOLDING>). Although section 85.321 and section 13 of

    ### Response:
    holding in accord with fifth circuit law that a plaintiff does not have standing to sue pursuant to section 13 of article 6049c if no railroad commission regulation or state law violation occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the sexual battery statute, we must hold it was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction over, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment of defendant’s guilt of, that offense. An arrest of judgment is proper when the indictment “wholly fails to charge some offense cognizable at law or fails to state some essential and necessary element of the offense of which the defendant is found guilty.” State v. Gregory, 223 N.C. 415, 418, 27 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1943). Further, “[w]hen an indictment has failed to allege the essential elements of the crime charged, it has failed to give the trial court subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, and the reviewing court must arrest judgment.” State v. Bullock, 154 N.C. App. 234, 244, 574 S.E.2d 17, 23 (2 t. App. 1995) (<HOLDING>). However, this Court reached a contrary result

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant who was indicted for first degree rape and convicted of sexual battery had no remedy on appeal when he requested that the erroneous lesser nonincluded charge be submitted to the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that if the last overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed on July 12, 1979, the July 12, 1984 indictment was filed one day too late. Id. at 1531. Finding the Guerro decision persuasive, the Eleventh Circuit held that in conspiracy cases — whether an overt or covert act is alleged — the day following the event is when the statute of limitation begins to run. Id. at 1532-33. In a case where the conspiracy continued until July 12, 1979, the following day was the first day of the limitation period, and the indictment filed on July 12, 1984 was timely. Id. at 1533. This Circuit has long held that the day of the offense is excluded when determining the trigger date for the statute of limitation. See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 64 F.2d 950, 950-51 (9th Cir.1933) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Tawab, 984 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an indictment returned on march 7 1930 was not barred by a threeyear limitation statute where the offense occurred on march 71927
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities” may a court assert general jurisdiction over a defendant. Id. at 318, 66 S.Ct. at 159. For example, in Helicópteros Nacionales, the Supreme Court held that a defendant corporation’s contacts with the forum state, which included the temporary physical presence of a corporate officer for contract negotiations, regular purchases of equipment and training services from a business in the forum, and personnel training in the forum, were not sufficiently continuous and systematic so that the attempted exercise of general jurisdiction would satisfy the requirements of due process. 466 U.S. at 418-19, 104 S.Ct. at 1874; cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445, 447-48, 72 S.Ct. 413, 418, 419, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952) (<HOLDING>). While the record shows that Flex-sys sold its

    ### Response:
    holding that the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was reasonable and just when the corporations president maintained an office in the forum where he conducted activities on behalf of the company such as keeping company files holding directors meetings carrying on business correspondence and distributing salary checks drawn on forum bank accounts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    28-29 (homemade key designed to burglarize coin-operated machines). The Legislature cannot foresee what these objects might be. The Legislature may have intended section 16.01 to cover possession of these objects, which would otherwise go unpunished. Third, we are not convinced that the Legislature intended section 16.01 to be construed more broadly, in all respects, than the statute it replaced. Under the plain language of the former statute, it applied to objects “commonly used” to commit burglary or safecracking. But under section 16.01, objects must be “specially designed, made, or adapted for use in the commission of an offense.” “Commonly used” allows for broader application than “specially designed, made, or adapted.” See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). We also note that the practice commentary

    ### Response:
    holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence on you. Even if what you told us is true, a jury will still convict you of first degree murder. You’ve got 12 people sitting back there and they’ve read about all this stuff in the papers and, man, these people will just string you by the nape of your neck right now if they get their hands on you. Hell, we know you done it. You know you done it. We can prove it in court. Admit it. Say you’re sorry. Try and get off light. That’s your only recourse. Brewer, 386 So.2d at 234-35 (emphasis supplied). To advise a suspect of potential penalties and consequences does not amount to a threat. See Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d at 1475. In a similar manner, encouraging a suspect to cooperate with law enforcement is not coercive conduct. See Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 512 (Fla.2005) (<HOLDING>). It is recognized that advising a suspect that

    ### Response:
    holding that parole officers advisement to defendant to cooperate did not vitiate the voluntariness of his statements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of twelve counts of mail fraud and three counts of copyright infringement, and specifically found Susel was in the business of receiving and selling stolen property. Before sentencing, Susel objected to the jury’s finding, which subjected him to an increase in his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4), and asserted he should receive a three-level reduction for only partially completing his offense under U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b). The district court applied the § 2B1.1(b)(4) increase, denied the § 2X1.1(b) decrease, and sentenced Susel under the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines to fifty-one months in prison and three years of supervised release. A few days after sentencing, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756-57, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (<HOLDING>). The district court held a resentencing

    ### Response:
    holding guidelines to be only advisory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the jury’s joint enterprise finding. Subsection (a)’s vicarious liability language therefore cannot apply to Hospital based on a joint enterprise theory of vicarious liability. Second, also as set forth above, the instructions and definitions given to the jury in connection with the negligence question, question 2, submitted to the jury only the issue of LMS’s and Hospital’s direct liability. The jury did not make any other fact finding that would support the imposition of vicarious liability on LMS for Hospital’s breach of its direct duties to Chesser. See, e.g., St. Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 537-38 (discussing various theories of vicarious liability); accord Obstetrical & Gynecological Assocs., P.A. v. McCoy, 283 S.W.3d 96, 105 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Thus, absent some fact finding that would

    ### Response:
    recognizing that purely vicarious liability claim against entity as opposed to direct liability claim did not require expert report in addition to report filed regarding doctor employed by entity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Furthermore, Wiggins’s contention violates the purpose of the notice provision to “immediately” give notice of legal process: “to afford [State Farm] an opportunity to control litigation.” See Reeves, 539 So.2d at 256 (citation omitted). Thus, written notice to State Farm of the Incident and of Wiggins’s suit was delayed by more than three years and one year, respectively. Sanders has not offered an excuse for the delay. In fact, the correspondences to State Farm by Sanders and his parents show that they did not want State Farm to be involved in the matter relating to the Incident. Although Wiggins contends that she gave written rt’s declaratory judgment that a one-year delay with insufficient reasons for the delay was too late to require indemnification); Pharr, 429 So.2d at 1019— 20 (<HOLDING>); Thomas, 334 So.2d at 885 (holding that a

    ### Response:
    holding that an eightmonth delay without excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other elements required for a viable defamation claim under Louisiana state law. See Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So.2d 552, 559 (La. 1997) (“Four elements are necessary to establish a defamation cause of action: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.”); see also Lee v. Pennington, 830 So.2d 1037, 1045 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding report of the plaintiffs arrest was neither false nor defamatory). Indeed, we have already concluded that there was probable cause for Thorn’s arrest, and under these circumstances, Louisiana law affords police officers a qualified privilege against defamation actions. See Trentecosta, 703 So.2d at 562-64 (<HOLDING>); see also Roche v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 303

    ### Response:
    holding that police officers have a qualified privilege against defamation claims for reporting the fact that a person was arrested and the charges for which the person is being held
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the next sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id. However, if the allegations taken as true do not establish a violation, “there is no- necessity for further inquiries.” Id. The United States Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he qualified immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Peng alleges that Gage violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free of an unlawful seizure because Gage arrested him without probable cause. Gage arrested Peng for robbery. In California, where the arrest occurred, “robbery” is defined as (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Second, Peng asserts that there is a material

    ### Response:
    holding that possessing property of another for the purpose of security on a debt does not give rise to probable cause to arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    since it was not brought within the statutory “reasonable time.” W.S. 14-2-104(a)(ii). In addition, we hold that the petition is barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and judicial es-toppel. In 1977, Wyoming adopted a slightly modified version of the Uniform Parentage Act, W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120. See generally, Uniform Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A. 287, 287-345 (1987 & 1991 Cum. Supp.). The Act was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in response to several United States Supreme Court decisions premised on the discriminatory treatment of illegitimate children and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S.Ct. 872, 35 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164,

    ### Response:
    holding that an illegitimate child is guaranteed a right of support from his father
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a provision of CSRS that requires five years of civilian service for disability retirement eligibility. See 757 F.2d at 264-65. We rejected the argument that military service creditable under § 8332 for the purpose of calculating the proper annuity should also count as civilian service to meet the eligibility requirements of § 8337(a). Id. at 265. We explained that the five-year civilian service require ment is a “threshold standard of eligibility” and only if this threshold standard is met could military service be counted to determine the appropriate annuity. Id. “Congress obviously wanted only those individuals with a minimum of federal civilian service to be entitled to a federal civil service annuity.” Id.; see also Tizo v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 325 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (citing Pub.L. No. 80-426, § 5, 62 Stat. 48,

    ### Response:
    holding that under the 1948 version of csrs civil servants were required to meet the fiveyear service requirement exclusive of military service 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Defendant asserts that the 1991 Amendments to Title VII do not apply to § 1981 claims, and therefore that a successful mixed-motive defense is still a complete bar to liability under § 1981. The Second Circuit has not directly addressed this question. However, that court has concluded that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not apply to retaliation claims under Title VII, see Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir.2000), nor to claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), see DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir.1993). Other circuits that have directly addressed this question have concluded that the 1991 Amendments do not apply to § 1981. See Mabra v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local Union No. 1996, 176 F.3d 1357, 1357 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Aquino v. Honda of Am., Inc., 158 Fed.Appx.

    ### Response:
    holding that the 1991 mixedmotive amendments do not apply to  1981 based on an independent analysis of the amendments and  1981
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    causation in the context of a claim based on the principles of informed consent doctrine. That concession, therefore, does not extend to the determination of plaintiffs’ wrongful birth claim. Plaintiffs contend that the PDR, which contained specific warnings that Provera could cause bilateral limb reduction, the retention of a defective ovum, and general genetic anomalies, constituted evidence of the standard of care governing the doctors’ duty of disclosure. In determining what constitutes a medically accepted risk when defining a doctor’s duty to warn, we have recognized that the PDR, standing alone, is not and should not be the touchstone of what risks a physician must reveal to his or her patient. See Morlino v. Medical Ctr. of Ocean County, 152 N.J. 563, 580, 706 A.2d 721 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the fact that the PDR contained

    ### Response:
    holding that because pdr warnings are written for many reasons including compliance with fda requirements advertisement the provision of useful information to physicians and an attempt to limit the manufacturers liability pdr warning alone does not establish physicians duty of care
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would result in direct and immediate hardship and would entail more than possible financial loss. "" Winter, 900 F.2d at 1325. The district court found DSC’s risk of additional seizures and injunction actions “too speculative to warrant judicial intervention.” DSC claims the district court erred in failing to distinguish between the potential risks of tentative FDA policy statements and the very real liabilities imposed by a final, announced enforcement position and actual seizures. Again, DSC’s position assumes that the FDA has made a final determination as to the general status of CoQlO. In light of our rejection of DSC’s finality argument, we hold the district court correctly found that DSC failed to show sufficient hardship to require bypassing final agency 86 n. 18 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The cases are also distinguishable on the

    ### Response:
    holding fda seizure action did not constitute final agency action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rather than among investors.” (citing Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.1978)), rev’d on other grounds, 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir.1990) (per curiam); Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F.Supp. 797, 803 n. 6 (E.D.N.C.1986) (“A common enterprise exists where the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts of and success of the party seeking the investment or of a third party.” (citing SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir.1974)), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir.1987) (table). Other courts, although not directly addressing the issue whether vertical commonality alone is sufficient, have indicated which approach to vertical commonality they follow. See In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F.Supp. 1192, 1248 (E.D.Va.1988) (<HOLDING>), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no common venture where the fortunes of the purchasers were not tied to the fortunes of the seller
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in that year for EARN centers had worked out financially. PWDC’s President’s statement that many of the EARN centers “earned above the contract amount in certain performance benchmarks” and that those payments “ ‘busted’ the budget” could have given the jury a basis for accepting KRA’s interpretation of the contract. (App. at 2586.) If performance payments had “busted” the budget, then the jury could have concluded that PWDC had not eabined profit to 10% and had instead allowed contractors to keep all of their profits. But even if the District Court should have allowed the e-mail into evidence, the error was harmless. It is highly likely that the admission of the e-mail would not have altered the jury verdict. See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 917 (3d Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>). While the e-mail could have supported KRA’s

    ### Response:
    holding that noneonstitutional errors in civil suits are harmless only if it is highly probable that the errors did not affect the outcome of the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    common area premises where the marijuana was actually found were accurately described in the search warrant. Trial counsel does not provide ineffective assistance by failing to make a meritless objection. Forrest v. State, 290 S.W.3d 704, 717 (Mo. banc 2009). “[Before an individual can challenge a search and seizure, he or she must establish that he or she had a ‘legitimate expectation’ of privacy in the area searched or the items seized.” State v. Martin, 892 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Mo.App. W.D.1995) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). “[TJenants of multifamily dwellings have no legitimate expectation of privacy in common or shared areas.” U.S. v. Mendoza, 281 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir.2002); U.S. v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Movant lived in an apartment complex where he

    ### Response:
    holding that in a multifamily dwelling where other residents had access to a basement storage locker there was no legitimate expectation of privacy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2112, 2189 (""[traditionally, the interest of truth in the administration of justice has been subordinated in the law to the interest of preserving privileged communications where [certain] relationships have been involved: ... husband-wife_ [18 U.S.C. §2517(4)] is intended to vary the existing law only to the extent that an otherwise privileged communication does not lose its privileged character because it is intercepted by a stranger""). See also 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5711 (""[n]o otherwise privileged communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged character.”); U.S. v. Geller, 560 F.Supp. 1309, 1326 (E.D.Pa.1983), aff'd, 3rd Cir., 745 F.2d 49 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109, 105 S.Ct. 786, 83 L.Ed.2d 780 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 28 . 370 U.S. 139, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that 18 pacsa  5711 and its federal counterpart 18 usc  25174 prevent the government from introducing recordings of communications between spouses resulting from tap on third partys telephone
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    distanced Issa from the egregious crimes that occurred inside the victims’ home and best explained why Issa’s blood was found outside on the fence but was not conclusively matched with any of the blood found inside the home. And this is exactly the kind of 8 SE2d 840) (2014) (same). 43 Alvelo, 290 Ga. at 615 (5) (punctuation omitted); accord Wheeler, 327 Ga. App. at 318 (3). 44 See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b); see also State v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213, 214 (1) (790 SE2d 66) (2016) (noting that when trial counsel fails to object to a jury cha Jefferson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 842, 852 (6) (720 SE2d 184) (2011); see Whitaker v. State, 283 Ga. 521, 524 (3) (661 SE2d 557) (2008) (noting that the fact that a defen itted); see Parks, 281 Ga. App. at 681 (2) (same). 53 See Whitaker, 283 Ga. at 524-25 (3) (<HOLDING>); Jefferson, 312 Ga. App. at 853 (6) (same). 54

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial and instead giving a curative instruction when an improper comment on a defendants silence was not directed to any particular statement or defense offered by the defendant was made during the witnesss explanation of the course of events and did not have the effect of being probative on the issue of guilt or innocence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    theory of the case, any weakness or implausibility in that theory is a matter for the jury, not for the court. See Folger v. State, 648 P.2d at 113. Admittedly, there are some exceptions to this doctrine where the defense of necessity is concerned. There are several Alaska eases which conclude that trial judges did not abuse their discretion in refusing to give necessity defenses. However, we believe that a close reading of those cases establishes that the defendants in those cases had clear legal alternatives to violating the law. See Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977, 980 (Alaska 1979) (finding that defendant had several lawful alternatives and that “[t]he seriousness of the offenses committed by Nelson were disproportionate to the situation he faced.”); Schnabel, 663 P.2d at 966 (<HOLDING>); Cleveland, 631 P.2d at 1081 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant had adequate alternatives in judicial and administrative remedies to the course he took
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relevant law of the two states is similar. Robinson bases its argument that the Committee lacks standing on the holding in Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir.1991), that when “a bankrupt corporation has joined with a third party in defrauding its creditors, the trustee cannot recover against the third party for the damage to the creditors.” Moreover, when the alleged malfeasor is the corporation’s sole shareholder and decision-maker, the Wagoner rule bars the trustee from suing even if the trustee claims that the debtor was harmed because, in that situat kruptcy trustee had no standing to sue a professional for aiding and abetting the unlawful investment activity of the president and sole shareholder of the bankrupt company); Mediators, 105 F.3d at 822 (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, the Committee, citing Reider v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the creditors committee could not sue third party aidersandabettors because the participation of the sole shareholder and decisionmaker of the debtor rendered the debtor a participant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    holds, that the placement of traffic control devices is a discretionary duty. Because the placement of traffic control devices, i.e., the road construction signs, is a discretionary duty, § 11 — 46—9(1)(d) applies, and Hinds cannot be liable “whether or not the discretion be abused.” Even if an abuse of discretion standard were to apply to the placement of the road construction signs, the Court would find that Hinds did not abuse its discretion. The Court is aware that such a finding would require the Court to engage in fact finding. However, the Court finds that even if an abuse of discretion standard applied, no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Hinds is liable for the placement of the road construction signs. See Gonzalez v. Denning, 394 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir.2004)(<HOLDING>). The Court reaches this conclusion after

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment was appropriate when no reasonable factfinder could have found for the nonmovant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recordings made by a participant to the conversation who was “acting under color of law.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c). Second, § 2511(2)(d) allows the use of recordings made by participants in a conversation unless that party had a “criminal or tortious” purpose in making the recording. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). Because we find that Whitacre acted under color of law, we do not need to reach the second possibility. The government asserts that Whitacre was acting as a cooperating witness, and therefore under color of law, from November 1992 through the end of the conspiracy. See Obron Atlantic Corp. v. Barr, 990 F.2d 861, 864 (6th Cir.1993) (allowing use of tape recordings made by corporate executive in price-fixing investigation); United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1582 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319, 322

    ### Response:
    holding that cooperating witness under direction of fbi was acting under color of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). First, banks like Regions are not subject to LUTPA, which provides that: The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to: (1) Any federally insured financial institution, its subsidiaries, and affiliates or any licensee of the Office of Financial Institutions, its subsidiaries, and affiliates or actions or transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana Public Service Commission or other public utility regulatory body, the commissioner of financial institutions, the insurance commissioner, the financial institutions and insurance regulators of other states, or federal banking regulators who possess authority to regulate unfair or deceptive trade practices. La. R.S. 51:1406; see Bank One, N.A. v. Colley, 294 F.Supp.2d 864, 868 (M.D.La.2003) (<HOLDING>); State Bank of Commerce v. Demco of Louisiana,

    ### Response:
    holding that a national banking association chartered by or under the authority of the united states was exempt from the lutpa as a matter of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Restitution Order In issue three, appellant argues that the trial court had no authority to compel appellant, as a condition of probation, to make restitution to anyone other than DBS, the named complainant. A trial court may not order restitution to be paid to a person who was not a victim of the charged offense. Martin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 674, 677-78 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). In order to preserve error concerning a probation order, however, a defendant must make a timely and specific objection. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see Idowu v. State, 73 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (stating if defendant wishes to complain about appropriateness of trial court’s restitution order, he must do so in trial court); see also Lemos v. State, 27 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>). There is no evidence in the record to reflect

    ### Response:
    holding defendant waived complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    agencies have some procedural limitations on their discretion, it does not follow that substantively they have no discretion. Such a conclusion is overly formalistic and ignores the on-the-ground reality that DSHS was the party that had control over the formula for authorized service hours. ¶26 As described above, when a party has discretion over a future contract term, it has an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in setting and performing that contractual term. Here, the contract provided that service providers wo the duty of good faith did not apply to a landlord’s refusal to consent to a lease agreement when the contract gave the landlord the unconditional right to do so); Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Westwood Lumber, Inc., 65 Wn. App. 811, 820, 822-23, 829 P.2d 1152 (1992) (<HOLDING>). DSHS relies heavily on Monotype Corp. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court erred by imposing a duty of good faith on seattlefirst in relation to a course of dealing when that course of dealing conflicted with the express terms of the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Giordano, 41 Fed.Appx. 522, 522-28 (2d Cir.2002) (reviewing application of rebuttable presumption for plain error (if at all) where defendant failed to object to it at detention hearing); United States v. Guebara, 15 Fed.Appx. 584, 589 (10th Cir.2001) (reviewing issue that was not raised at bond revocation proceedings for plain error). Under plain-error review, in the light of the lack of authority in this, or any other, circuit regarding whether the rebuttable presumption is limited only to cases whose facts involve actual minor victims (again, Emmons’ conduct involved undercover agents), the district court could not have plainly erred in applying the rebuttable presumption in favor of detention pursuant to § 3142(e). See United States v. Hull, 160 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). As discussed, Emmons’ alternative contention

    ### Response:
    holding that an error whose identification requires the extension of precedent is not plain
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In their summary judgment motion, Defendants argued Plaintiff failed to show a vegan diet is central or indispensable to the practice of Buddhism. (Defendants’ .Brief in Support at 4-6.) The Magistrate Judge concluded “[wjhile a reasonable juror could perhaps conclude that such is the case, the evidence of record more than supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs religious beliefs are sincerely (and intensely) held.” (R & R at 894.) Defendants object, arguing whether a belief is sincerely held is a distinct issue from whether the belief is central to the practice of a religious faith. Defendants reassert that Plaintiff has not established that his request for a vegan diet is central to the practice of his religious faith. See Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,

    ### Response:
    holding the plaintiffs failed to establish the centrality or indispensability to their religious observances of the location at issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by insured; insured not directed by government to remediate site; action against insured by those remediating the property pursuant to government cleanup directive; held: suit for ""damages""). Under Hills, there is insurance coverage in connection with this second category of sites. ¶ 7. The third category presents a situation where the insured is responsible for at least part of the contamination of a site that it does not own, and has been directed by a government to remediate the site, but has not done so. The insured is sued by the government to recover money it spent to clean up the site. There is no insurance coverage in connection with the scenarios encompassed by category three. Regent Ins. Co. v. City of Manitowoc, 205 Wis. 2d 450, 463, 556 N.W.2d 405 (Ct. App. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Johnson Controls argues that the supreme

    ### Response:
    holding that where the government sues an insured to recover incurred cleanup costs under  107a4a of the cercla  or to impose a plan for remediation that action is not a suit for damages but is rather a suit for equitable monetary relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at the car wash, see Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (finding relevant characteristics of the location may be considered in assessing reasonable suspicion); (4) both men were wearing heavy cotton, dark-colored hoodies with their hoods pulled over their heads on a very warm night, see Lee v. Hefner, 136 Fed.Appx. 807, 809-10 (6th Cir.2005) (affirming the district court’s finding of reasonable suspicion where one of the factors cited by the officer was that the suspect was “wearing dark clothing”); (5) Royal and Kelley were visibly nervous, sweating profusely, and had given evasive answers to the officers’ questions, see Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (“[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.”); Waldon, 206 F.3d at 604 (<HOLDING>); and (6) the officers observed what appeared

    ### Response:
    recognizing a defendants giving of evasive answers when asked what he was doing in the area as a factor establishing reasonable suspicion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    six or seven months, they purchased approximately one-half of a kilogram of cocaine to split; (2) Bolware and Chisolm also purchased cocaine powder from an individual named “B” on 20 to 40 different occasions, and Bolware estimated that they received over 50 kilograms of cocaine from “B”; and (3) McCloud testified that on approximately 20 occasions from January through June 2006, he would buy 4 or 5 crack cocaine “cookies,” which were approximately 21 to 23 grams each, from Chisolm and Bolware. This evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Chisolm conspired to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base between April 17, 2006, and June 3, 2008. See Hernandez, 433 F.3d at 1333; Thompson, 422 F.3d at 1292 (<HOLDING>). Because the evidence was sufficient for a

    ### Response:
    holding that sufficient evidence supported conspiracy because the government established the existence of a continuing relationship between mr stratton and ms thompson in which mr stratton would supply ms thompson cocaine the bulk of which she would distribute to customers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. The State presented insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for possession of alcohol by a minor under section 562.111, Florida Statutes. See State v. Williams, 742 So.2d 509, 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). Even considering the relatively low burden of

    ### Response:
    holding to prove possession the state must show that a defendant possessed a certain substance the substance was illegal and he had knowledge of the presence of the substance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reasoning is nonetheless apropos in cases of addiction. Where the State seeks to introduce drug addiction without first establishing a defendant’s identity as the culprit, his drug addiction has no relevance or probative value as to the motive of an otherwise unknown culprit. In other words, without a sufficient identification of the defendant as the intruder, the necessary chain of reasoning breaks and we need not reach the relationship between drug addiction and motive. In the absence of some identification of the defendant as the intruder, his heroin addiction, though introduced to show motive, would necessarily fill in the missing logical gaps that Rule 404(b) requires a prosecutor to fill. See Gould v. State, 579 P.2d 535, 539 (Alaska 1978) (introduction of heroin (Kan. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Adkins v. Com., 96 S.W.3d 779, 783-85, 793

    ### Response:
    holding crack cocaine addiction admissible to prove motive to kill and rob when accomplice identified defendant and defendants cell mates testified she had admitted her actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argue that they cannot be exempt even though salaried because AEP requires them to account for at least 40 hours of work each week and to make up for partial-day absence either by working extra hours or by taking vacation time or paid time off. An employer may require exempt salaried employees to make up for time missed from work due to personal business. It is only when an employer actually deducts from an employee’s paycheck that the employee is ineligible for the exemption. See, e.g., Cowart v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 213 F.3d 261, 265-66 (5th Cir.2000) (finding that employees who were required to make up personal time off and suffered no salary deductions for the lost time were paid on a salary basis); Haywood v. North Amer. Van Lines, Inc., 121 F.3d 1066, 1070 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Because the planners concede that AEP has not

    ### Response:
    holding that the regulations prohibit only monetary discipline of exempt employees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether to order the prisoner’s removal in this category of cases, ‘it follows that such a case may proceed without attendance by the prisoner-parent.’ ” (In re Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 599.) Counsel could have rightly perceived that the court was not under a mandatory obligation to order father’s removal, and thus any objection to proceeding without him would have been futile. 2. Findmg of Intent to Abandon Under Section 7822 Father also contends the trial court erred because it could not terminate his parental rights without a finding of intent to abandon under section 7822. Father argues that, without this finding, there was no showing of parental unfitness as required by Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 849 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216] (Kelsey S.) (<HOLDING>). As we explain in part 1. of the Discussion,

    ### Response:
    holding that if an unwed father promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities  emotional financial and otherwise  his federal constitutional right to due process prohibits the termination of his parental relationship absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.3d at 217 — 18 (classifying the “radio dispatch tape made during defendant’s arrest” as potentially useful evidence). Generett has given us no reason why the LeSabre or its contents plainly would exculpate him and indeed he has not even cited Brady v. Maryland in his brief to this court. Generett fares no better under the “potentially exculpatory evidence” test. Most importantly, he has given us no reason to believe that the government officials acted in bad faith by auctioning off the LeSabre in this case. The record reveals no evidence of a “calculated effort to circumvent [Brady’s] disclosure requirements” or “official animus” or a “conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488,104 S.Ct. 2528; Young-blood, 488 U.S. at 58; Jobson, 102 F.3d at 218 (<HOLDING>); cf. Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 580 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that despite the governments dilatory response to defendants discovery requests the government did not act in bad faith because there is no evidence that anyone  suspected that the tape was exculpatory and the tape was erased not as a result of malice but routine police department policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conspiracy of which he was a part. In affirming the trial court’s conviction, we held that the defendant’s actual participation [in the conspiracy] (answering telephone, taking drug orders and referring buyers to the independent contractors, delivering and selling drugs, as well as occasionally picking up drug shipments and preparing packages for sale) in [the] drug trafficking conspiracy went well beyond that of a simple buyer-seller relationship. The full activities of the drug conspiracy were not only reasonably foreseeable to [the defendant], but were also performed in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity and advanced an objective within the scope of the conspiracy that he joined. Id. at 1327. See also United States v. Magana, 118 F.3d 1173, 1206 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In the ease under consideration, Gray-Bey’s

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant is liable for entire quantity of drugs attributable to conspiracy in circumstances where defendant is one of conspiracys central figures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a veteran-friendly procedure that would enable accrued-benefits beneficiaries to more readily substitute, and that a more restrictive procedure for requesting substitution may thwart Congress’s objectives in enacting section 5121 A. Nevertheless, although the Secretary notified Mrs. Reliford that she could waive the right to submit additional evidence, he did not notify her that she could waive substitution, in contravention of his policy. Thus, the Court holds that the Board erred by failing to follow the Secretary’s own established procedures. See Morton, supra. The Court is cognizant of its statutory duty to take due account of the rule of prejudicial error. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) (requiring the Court to “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error”); Shinseki v. 06 (2005) (<HOLDING>). These matters are to be provided expeditious

    ### Response:
    holding that the existence of our jurisdiction turns on whether the claim was reasonably raised to the board and remanding for determination of whether the claim was reasonably raised when there was an evidentiary factual basis therefor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    federal officials. Under Alabama forfeiture law, cash is considered fungible and may be replaced by a monetary instrument such as a cashier’s check. Section 15-5-63, Ala.Code 1975, a part of the Alabama Comprehensive Criminal Proceeds Forfeiture Act, § 15-5-60 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, provides, in part: “(5)a. In cases where the property to be forfeited is cash, monetary instruments in bearer form, funds deposited in an account in a financial institution, or other like fungible property, it shall not be necessary for the state to identify the specific property, other than as U.S. currency, cash, monetary instruments in bearer form, or as funds deposited in an account in a financial institution, involved in the of urrency and $20.00 in Canadian Currency, 103 F.3d 902, 905 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Although “[i]t behooves authorities to

    ### Response:
    holding that the cashiers check was an appropriate fungible surrogate for the seized currency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Graves “had many chances.” R.N., T.N.’s father, testified that Graves’s behavior with Billy was “very peculiar,” such as “riding around the countryside when he should be in school. Putting him up in an apartment. And telling other people that that’s his son.” R.N. further testified that he was “not alleging” that Graves used Billy for “sexual reasons.” None of these statements constitutes evidence of an extraneous offense. Rather, each of the witnesses denied knowledge of any improper conduct with other boys. Accordingly, with respect to Graves’s relationships with other boys, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that the State must prove extraneous offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bluitt v. State, 137 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Prior Convictions During punishment, the

    ### Response:
    holding that such an instruction is a useless act if no unadjudicated offenses have been introduced
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any cases addressing the issue of whether section 574.037 is a provision pertinent to an article 46.03, section 4(d)(5) proceeding, and therefore applies to such a proceeding. Based on the unambiguous language of the Texas Mental Health Code and article 46.03, we conclude that section 574.037 is a provision of the Texas Mental Health Code pertinent and applicable to a proceeding under article 46.03, section 4(d)(5). Section 574.037 is contained in a sub-chapter entitled, “PROCEEDINGS FOR COURT-ORDERED . MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES.” See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 574.031-.037. Courts of appeals have determined that five of the seven sections in this subchapter apply to proceedings under article 46.03 regarding court-ordered mental health services. See id; Campbell, 118 S.W.3d at 801-03 (<HOLDING>); Campbell, 68 S.W.3d at 757 n. 3 (stating that

    ### Response:
    holding  574032 574035 and 574036 applied to one of campbells prior hearings under article 4603 section 4d5
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    protections that Miranda affords. A. The holding in Edwards v. Arizona makes clear the unreasonableness of the state court decision. As required by that case, Sessoms “expressed his desire” for the assistance of counsel, and was therefore “not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel [had] been made available to him.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880. “Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel ‘requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.’ ” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991)); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (<HOLDING>). These decisions, which constitute clearly

    ### Response:
    holding that if a suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and is guaranteed by the constitution.” We further held: The provision of the constitution must be construed liberally in favor of free and unrestricted access to the records, and that access can be denied only when a law, specifically and unequivocally, provides otherwise. Whenever there is doubt as to whether the public has the right of access to certain records, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the public’s right to see. To allow otherwise would be an improper and arbitrary restriction on the public’s constitutional rights. Id. Since Title Research Corp., we have reaffirmed that “the public has a constitutional right of access to court records.” Copeland I, supra, 930 So.2d at 941 (citing Title Research Corp., supra); In re John Doe, 96-2222 (La.9/13/96), 679 So.2d 900, 901(<HOLDING>) However, the fact that a document is filed in

    ### Response:
    holding that as a general rule pleadings filed in this court are public records and are not subject to being sealed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that order. 2. GM II Having resolved the question of whether this court had jurisdiction to issue the original writ of mandamus, we turn to the relatively more straightforward question of whether we have jurisdiction to issue the writ for which petitioners now pray. We conclude that we do. Our jurisdiction is premised, as it was in GM I, on the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Under that act, the courts of appeals have the authority to, inter alia, issue writs of mandamus to district courts to ensure compliance with earlier mandates. U.S. v. Cannon (In re U.S.), 807 F.2d 1528, 1529 (11th Cir.1987); Oswald v. McGarr, (In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation), 620 F.2d 1190, 1195-96 (7th Cir.1980). Cf. In re Allied-Signal, Inc., 915 F.2d 190, 192-93 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). GM premises its current request for a writ of

    ### Response:
    recognizing authority but declining to issue writ
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and upheld the Commission’s regulations. Id. at 1143. We observe that before 1989, courts that reviewed programs designed to test police officers for drug use differed about whether the officers fell within the highly regulated industry exception. Compare Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n of New Jersey, Local 318 v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d. 133, 136-41 (3d Cir.1988) (“PBA Local 318”) (finding that police are members of highly-regulated industry and upholding suspicionless drug testing of police officers), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 1637, 104 L. Ed.2d 153 (1989) with Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.Supp. 1507, 1518-19 (D.N.J.1986) (finding that fire fighters are not members of pervasively regulated industry), and FOP, supra, 216 N.J.Super. at 469, 524 A.2d 430. (<HOLDING>). This divergence in views depended on the

    ### Response:
    holding that police officers are not members of highly regulated industry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an agreement, it is not contained within the record. Instead, the bystander’s report simply indicates that the parties agreed that the trial court “would hear all three cases together.” Therefore, based upon my review of the record, it is apparent that the trial court conducted a single trial of all three cases. See People v. Lopez, 367 Ill. App. 3d 817, 819 (2006) (noting that appellant has burden of providing sufficiently complete record to support claims of error and that any doubts that may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against appellant). By agreeing to a single trial on all of the cases, defendant cannot now complain that the trial court heard evidence of defendant’s conduct in the other cases. See People v. Gresham, 104 Ill. App. 3d 81, 87 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Finally, I disagree with the majority’s

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants failure to file a motion to sever waives objection to single trial on multiple charges
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    they expressly state or overwhelmingly imply that KSU waived Eleventh Amendment immunity. To resolve this dispute, we must evaluate whether a state may waive immunity by its affirmative conduct in the context of a federal. program or whether Edelman mandates that a state can waive only by express statements or overwhelming implication in its statutory or constitutional text. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238. n. 1 & 239-40, 105 S.Ct. 3142; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673, 94 S.Ct. 1347. Several Supreme Court decisions. provide that neither receipt of federal funds, participation in a federal program, nor an agreement to recognize and abide by federal laws, regulations, and guidelines is alone sufficient to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246-47, 105 S.Ct. 3142 (<HOLDING>); Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that participation in federal programs and receipt of federal funds under such programs fall far short of manifesting a clear intent  to waive immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Althen, 418 F.3d at 1278 (requiring that a petitioner show “a medical theory causally connecting the vaccination and the injury”); see also Pafford v. Health & Human Servs., 451 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed.Cir.2006) (asking, under the first Althen element, “can [the] vaccine(s) at issue cause the type of injury alleged?” (internal quotation omitted)). Even if Dr. Shoenfeld’s testimony satisfied the first prong of Althen, under the very deferential standard of review afforded the decision of the special master, it was not arbitrary and capricious for him to find Dr. Maclaren’s testimony more credible than that of Dr. Shoenfeld, and thereby give substantial weight to Dr. Maelaren’s rejection of a causal link between the MMR vaccine and Petitioner’s Type 1 diabetes. See Lampe, 219 F.3d at 1360 (<HOLDING>); see also Crutchfield, 2014 WL 1665227, at *10

    ### Response:
    holding that the united states court of federal claims may not reweigh the factual evidence quoting munn 970 f2d at 871
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Property (Mortgage ) § 5.1(a), an “assumption of liability” means “a promise by the transferee of mortgaged real estate, whether made to the transferor or to the mortgagee, to perform the obligation secured-by the mortgage.” (emphasis added); see also Burlington State Bank v. Tucker, 76 S.W.2d 811, 814 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1934, writ refused) (“Her father’s obligation would not under said statute become her personal obligation; but she could, for the protection of her inheritance, validly assume it ....”). Wells Fargo cites several cases stating that every party to a contract must agree to modify that contract. See, e.g., Powell v. Thompson, 130 Tex. 577, 112 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex.1938); Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 22 1, 193 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1938, writ dism’d) (<HOLDING>). Struble was not a necessary party to the

    ### Response:
    holding that even after a debt has been assumed a creditor can look to the maker for the collection of its note and the enforcement of its lien upon the assuming partys failure to pay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    submitted in support of their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Federal Defendants and Nebraska argue that this extra-record evidence is impermissible under the APA’s limitation on “the scope of judicial review.. .to the administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time that he or she made the decisions.” Fed. Defs.’ Mot. at 5 (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. Costie, 657 F.2d 275, 285 (D.C.Cir.1981). While it is true that “[a]s a general rule, plaintiffs may not supplant or supplement the administrative record,” Fed. Defs.’ Mot. at 6 (citing Peterson Farms I v. Madigan, 1992 WL 118370 (D.D.C.1992)), this Circuit has recognized that courts may consider extra-record evidence in its review of agency actions under certain circumstances. See Costle, 657 F.2d at 286. (<HOLDING>). The D.C. Circuit has also recognized that

    ### Response:
    recognizing a judicial venture outside the record for background information or to determine the presence of the requisite fullness of the reasons given
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    lesser included offense. State v. Espinosa, 686 So.2d 1345 (Fla.1996). However, in State v. Von Deck, 607 So.2d 1388 (Fla.1992), our Supreme Court held that an instruction cannot be given on a permissive lesser included offense unless both the accusatory pleading and the evidence at trial support the commission of that lesser included offense. Here, the information filed against Donovan alleged the charge of kidnapping as follows: COUNT 1: In the County of BRE-VARD, State of Florida, on July 11, 1999, Michael Curtis Donovan, did forcibly, secretly or by threat, confine abduct or imprison another person [K.B.] ag conviction because it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on that permissive lesser included offense. See Torrence v. State, 440 So.2d 392 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)(<HOLDING>). Donovan also argues that he was entitled to

    ### Response:
    holding that aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense in prosecution for armed burglary attempted robbery and use of a firearm in the com mission of a felony because the allegation in the information that the accused carried a firearm was insufficient to charge the elements of aggravated assault
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Ray Rogers, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s judgment dismissing, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, his civil rights action alleging that the United States Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine by requiring prison staff to assess and collect prisoners’ district court filing fees in installments pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Cooper v. Pickett, 187 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir.1997), and we affirm. Because the PLRA’s filing fee requirement is a procedural rule that does not infringe on the authority of the courts, the district court did not err by dismissing Rogers’ action. Cf. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Rogers’ contention that this court erred by

    ### Response:
    holding that the plras three strikes rule is a procedural rule that does not violate the separation of powers doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not assert that she imported Pike is inconsistent with her interpretation of Shallal. No cases support Talhelm’s attempt to read the public-body requirement out of the statute. The relevant precedents are strictly to the contrary. See, e.g., Richards v. Metron Integrated Health Sys., No. 242502, 2004 WL 443991, at *2 (Mich. Ct.App. Mar.11, 2004) (unpublished opinion) (nursing home employee did not meet the “public body” element when he threatened to report patient abuse to higher-ups at the company); Roulston, 608 N.W.2d at 530-31 (denying employer’s motion for summary judgment against employee who had reported suspected resident abuse at a nursing home to state investigators); see also Allen v. Charter County of Wayne, 192 Fed.Appx. 347, 350-51 (6th Cir.2006) (unpublished opinion) (<HOLDING>). The Michigan Supreme Court has recently

    ### Response:
    holding that employee who admitted that she had no intention of affirmatively seeking out the state auditors or giving them any information  unless she was specifically asked could not establish a prima facie case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his claims during “both the period of time before the ineffective assistance of counsel was or should have been discovered and the period from that point until the motion to reopen is filed.”). In fact, although Zheng stated that he did not learn of the ineffective assistance of his former counsel until he hired an attorney to file his motion to reopen in 2010, he failed to assert that he took any action in his proceedings during the more than seven years between his order of removal and the filing of his motion to reopen. See id. Finally, Zheng does not challenge the BIA’s determination that he failed to establish his prima facie eligibility for relief based on his practice of Falun Gong in the United States. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for

    ### Response:
    recognizing that failure to offer new previously unavailable evidence establishing a prima facie case for the underlying relief sought is a proper ground on which the bia may deny a motion to reopen
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim that the State negligently placed the barrels. Id. at 251 (emphasis in original). The court explained that the maintenance crew was merely carrying out the policy of the State because the barrel and sign warning system chosen by the crew complied with the department of transportation’s Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Id. Thus, the court held that the decision to warn rather than repair was discretionary, and the decision to use barrels and signs, as opposed to another warning device, was discretionary. Id. In contrast, when a governmental unit fails to maintain public works, such as a storm drainage system, or street and storm sewers, those activities are not discretionary functions. See City of Fort Worth v. Gay, 977 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the State contends that the

    ### Response:
    holding city not immune from liability where claims were based on the citys failure to maintain clean and inspect an area of the street
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“service effected on a registered agent within the scope of its agency is imputed to the litigant”). On that date, CT Corp. had the duty to receive or accept and forward the process or lawsuit to WCT. See Tex. Bus. Orgs.Code Aun. § 5.206(a)(1) (West 2012). WCT argues that CT Corp. had no obligation to forward the process to WCT because CT Corp. was the registered agent for a second entity that used the same common name. The dilemma faced by CT Corp. does not, however, alter the applicable law. By contracting to act as the registered agent of WCT, CT Corp. became WCT’s agent on whom Arnold was entitled to serve the lawsuit she filed against WCT in its assumed name. See Cummings v. HCA Health Servs, of Tex., Inc., 799 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>); see also Chilkewitz, 22 S.W.3d at 830

    ### Response:
    holding service on hospital corporation of america dba tidelands general hospital was service on the assumed name and constituted service on hca health services inc dba tidelands general hospital because ct corporation system was the registered agent for both
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ann. § 21-3-201 to -203, -205 (Michie 1996), which prohibits age discrimination in public employment but does not manifest consent to be sued for such discrimination in federal court. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (“A state will be deemed to have waived its immunity only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.”) (internal quotations omitted); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 493 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm. 1 . The Honorable

    ### Response:
    holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    722, 724 (3d Cir.2009) (""If it is necessary to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence, the court may conduct a hearing."" (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted in Rainey) (quoting Durant v. Husband, 28 F.3d 12, 15 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2)))). 9 .""Delay in realizing satisfaction on a claim rarely serves to establish the degree of prejudice sufficient to prevent the opening [of] a default judgment” in favor of a defendant who has appeared, Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., Ltd., 691 F.2d 653, 656-57 (3d Cir.1982) (emphasis added), but the standard must apply differently when the district court is evaluating whether to grant default judgment against an absent defendant. Cf. Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 164 (<HOLDING>). See also infra note 11. 10 . See Chamberlain,

    ### Response:
    holding that default judgment was not warranted where the defendant answered late but answered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Morgan), 156 Pa.Cmwlth.304, 627 A.2d 250 (1993), aff'd, 545 Pa. 70, 680 A.2d 823 (1994). It is clear that an employer must pay medical expenses after indemnity benefits have been suspended until the employer’s petition to review medicals is granted. Consolidated Freightways v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Jester), 145 Pa.Cmwlth.369, 603 A.2d 291 (1992). See also Deremer v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 61 Pa. Cmwlth. 415, 433 A.2d 926 (1981). However, an employer’s liability does not extend beyond the time when compensation benefits are terminated. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Randall), 545 Pa. 22, 679 A.2d 765 (1996); Consolidated Freightways. See also Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments Div., 526 Pa. 25, 32, 584 A.2d 301, 304 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Article III (Liability and Compensation),

    ### Response:
    holding that a termination of benefits must go handinhand with a termination of the liability of an employer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in tribal court. Mr. Valenzuela argues that the district court was incorrect. He asserts that he exhausted all tribal court remedies and that “[a]ny further attempts to exhaust tribal remedies would be futile and result in irreparable damage.” Aplt. Br. at 18. First, Mr. Valenzuela argues that he waived his right to appeal in his written plea agreement and therefore had no tribal court remedies to exhaust. We agree with the district court that Mr. Valenzuela’s appeal waiver does not excuse his failure to pursue habeas corpus relief in the tribal court. The appeal waiver did not expressly waive Mr. Valenzuela’s right to collaterally attack his conviction in tribal court. See United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1181-83 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). That step was necessary to exhaust Mr.

    ### Response:
    holding that waivers of  2255 collateral attack rights must be expressly stated to be enforceable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    class, so it appears that they seek to include all fifty states. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 94-97.) Again, like the consumer protection issue, courts faced with the question of whether variations in the state law of unjust enrichment bar class certification have reached different outcomes. Compare, e.g., Overka v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 265 F.R.D, 14, 19-21 (D. Mass. 2010) (stating that “unjust enrichment claims in different states are substantially similar” and certifying a 34-state class) and In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 220 F.R.D. 672, 697 n.40 (S.D, Fla. 2004) (stating that the “standards for evaluating various states classes’ unjust enrichment claims are virtually identical”) with Casa Orlando Apartments, Ltd. v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 624 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Rapp v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 302 F.R.D.

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs survey here fails to show that burden of proof standards do not vary or that differences in state unjust enrichment laws are insignificant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    came too late.”). The district court acted within its discretion in dismissing Adams’s duplicative complaint with prejudice and preventing her from “fragment[ing] a single cause of action and [ ] litigating] piecemeal the issues which could have been resolved in one action.” Flynn v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 418 F.2d 668, 668 (9th Cir.1969) (per curiam). AFFIRMED. 1 . We note that we are affirming the district court’s dismissal on the basis that the second action was duplicative of the first, and not on the basis that the district court had the discretion to dismiss the second action as a sanction for failing to comply with the Rule 16 scheduling order issued in the first action. Cf. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 146 F.3d 1071, 1073-74 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the plaintiff in Atchison, Adams was

    ### Response:
    holding that district court abused its discretion in dismissing a secondfiled action with prejudice where plaintiffs claims against a thirdparty defendant were permissive not mandatory under federal rule of civil procedure 14
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be designed specifically to accommodate creditors like LVNV, who claim to be unable to produce documents. Given these provisions, it is difficult to understand how providing a summary of documents supporting a claim, or at least providing an explanation for why the proof of claim has nothing attached to it, unduly burdens creditors. The only explanation could be that certain creditors wish to continue their routine of executing and filing proofs of claim without objection and without any evidence — essentially, without having to do any work. This practice violates the Bankruptcy Rules and undermines the bedrock notion of the legal system that claimants bear the burden of proving their claims. See Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 21, 120 S.Ct. 1951, 147 L.Ed.2d 13 (2000) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons stated above, LVNVs original

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself and that one who asserts a claim has the burden of proof that normally comes with it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the movant “ ‘presents claims subject to the requirements for successive applications as well as claims cognizable under Rule 60(b),’ ” such a motion is a mixed Rule 60(b)/§ 2255 motion. Id. at 400 (quoting United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 207 (4th Cir. 2003)). In his Rule 60(b) motion, Strom sought a remedy for a perceived flaw in his § 2255 proceeding — namely, the district court’s failure, in ruling on the § 2255 motion, to address Strom’s claims of actual innocence and that plea counsel induced Strom’s guilty plea by assuring Strom that he would receive a 10-year sentence — and raised a direct attack on his conviction and sentence. Accordingly, the motion was a mixed Rule 60(b)/§ 2255 motion. McRae, 793 F.3d at 397, 400; see Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n.4, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (<HOLDING>); Winestock, 340 F.3d at 207 (stating that “a

    ### Response:
    holding that a movant files a true rule 60b motion when he  asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the contempt. (d) A rule provided for under subsection (b) may not issue until the facts alleged to constitute the contempt have been: (1) brought to the knowledge of the court by an information; and (2) duly verified by the oath of affirmation of some officers of the court or other responsible person. (emphasis added). The initial motion for contempt filed by Co-Alliance was not verified as required by Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-5(d)(2). However, we have held that “not every technical requirement of the indirect contempt statute must be followed, so long as the contempt defendant’s due process rights are respected.” In re Contempt of Wabash Valley Hosp., Inc., 827 N.E.2d 50, 63 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); cf. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114, 118 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (<HOLDING>). Benson does not mention in his appellant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that because the petition lacked verification by oath it faded to meet the statutory requirements and could not serve as a basis for a rule to show cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to raise it in a subsequent application. See Silvesan v. State, 1999 ND 62, ¶ 12, 591 N.W.2d 131. He may not raise this issue now. See id. C [¶ 14] Finally, Murchison contends he was denied a fast .and speedy trial. [¶ 15] Section 29-32.1-12(1), N.D.C.C., allows a court to deny a post-conviction application on the grounds of res judicata if the same claims have been fully and finally determined in a previous proceeding. See Hughes, 2002 ND 28, ¶ 8, 639 N.W.2d 696. [¶ 16] Murchison raised the speedy trial argument in his first Application for Post-Conviction Hearing. When that application was denied by the trial court, Murchison did not appeal. Murchison has had this issue fully and finally determined in a previous proceeding. See Murchison, 1998 ND 96, ¶ 11, 578 N.W.2d 514 (<HOLDING>). The doctrine of res judicata cannot be

    ### Response:
    holding that when no appeal was taken from an initial application for postconviction relief the claims were fully and finally determined in that previous proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    immunity. See Validity and Construction of Indian Reorganization Act, 28 A.L.R. Fed.2d 563 at § 27 (citing cases); but see id. at § 28 (citing cases holding that sue-and-be sued clause does not constitute express waiver). Here, however, CNI’s charter does not contain a broad sue-and-be-sued clause; instead, the ability to take legal action is limited to action approved by the board of directors. Thus, even if we were to conclude that a broad sue-and-be-sued clause waives tribal-sovereign immunity, this clause is insufficient to do the job. Cf. Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir.2000) (“[T]he enactment of such an ordinance ... does not waive a tribe’s sovereign immunity.... [The o uper. 357, 747 A.2d 837, 841-42, 844 (1999) (<HOLDING>); but see Rush Creek Solutions, Inc. v. Ute

    ### Response:
    holding that a controllers signature on a contract containing a forum selection clause was insufficient to waive sovereign immunity in part because the right to waive immunity was reserved to the tribal council
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which, among other things, imposes federal criminal penalties on sex offenders who knowingly fail to register or update their registrations. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250; 42 U.S.C. § 16913. Congress enacted SORNA in 2006 but delegated to the Attorney General the authority to determine whether and when SORNA should apply retroactively to sex offenders convicted before SORNA’s effective date. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d); Reynolds v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 975, 181 L.Ed.2d 935 (2012). The Attorney General has exercised this authority and made SORNA retroactive, but the circuits have split over which action by the Attorney General was successful in making the statute retroactive. Compare United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th

    ### Response:
    holding that sorna was made retroactive by the attorney generals february 28 2007 interim rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on this aspect of his appeal. Similarly, Culver merely asserted, without more, that Deborah Culver’s physical possession of the property on the date she filed for bankruptcy is a sufficient interest in property under section 541 to trigger the automatic stay. (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Stay Pending Appeal at 6). Whether the debtor has an interest in property is determined by non-bankruptcy law. William L. Norton, Jr., Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 51:5 (2d ed.2002) (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979)). Culver has not identified any body of Maryland law recognizing that a mere possessory interest in property is sufficient to invoke the automatic stay. Cf. In re Ford, 3 B.R. 559, 565 (Bankr.Md.1980), aff'd, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Culver has not met his burden of

    ### Response:
    holding that a debtors interest in a tenancy by the entirety is property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 because of debtors undivided present interests in the use possession income and right of survivorship of the property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [the victim] was dying, did she c tention that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by invoking the victim’s memory and referring to spiritual authority. As noted, the prosecutor stated in closing remarks, “[i]t is fitting and proper that I do this for [the victim’s] memory,” and “this closing speech [has] become, for me, sort of a benediction for all the evil that we have been confronted with in this case.” N.T., Oct. 28, 1994 at 3. The prosecutor further concluded his remarks by stating, “God bless you.” Id. at 18. The trial court held that such references did not amount to the type of religious inferences that warrant the grant of a new trial. PCRA Court Opinion, Oct. 13, 2010, at 24 (citing Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (1991) (<HOLDING>)). The PCRA court reiterated the trial court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a new trial was warranted where the prosecutor stated as the bible says and the murderer shall be put to death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.3d 135, 143 (4th Cir.2010) (“Because we hold that an indictment need not set forth vicarious coconspirator liability, it was not error for the district court to instruct the jury on this theory.”). As members of the conspiracy, all of the defendants, including Phun, were legally responsible for the possession of firearms, which was a reasonably foreseeable act by their cocon-spirators in furtherance of that conspiracy. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180. 10 . The defendants do not contest, and we find, that Snyder’s testimony met Rule 701’s second requirement, as it was undoubtedly helpful to the jury's ability to understand the conversations. 11 . Even if we were to follow the Ninth Circuit's approach in United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), there is no indication that Snyder gave any

    ### Response:
    holding inadmissible an agents testimony that certain activities were consistent with those of an experienced drug trafficker
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    video disks (DVDs). According to the officers, Officer Molinaro discovered a gun in Williams’s waistband during a search of his person after the arrest. It was later determined that Williams had several prior felony convictions, and Williams was indicted under § 922(g)(1) in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Williams elected to go to trial. Prior to trial, he stipulated that he was a convicted felon so that the name and nature of his recent prior convictions — a 1991 conviction for possession with intent to distribute heroin, a 1995 conviction for possession with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine, and a 1995 handgun conviction— would not be introduced to the jury. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The prosecution called Officers Molinaro and

    ### Response:
    holding that fedrevid 403 prohibits the government from introducing the name or nature of a prior felony conviction in a  922g1 case when such information would tend to lure a juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning regarding a defendant who had stipulated to his felon status
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the MERS system supplies the thinnest possible veneer of formality and legality to the wholesale marketing of home mortgages to large institutional investors. But what of it? MERS’s certifying officers “purport[ ] to hold the position of ... vice president, ... secretary, ... [or] assistant to ... such office or position.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 54B. That they hold themselves out as officers of MERS, the “entity holding [the] mortgage,” is all that the statute requires with respect to a signer’s authority. Id. The corporate resolution, however auto-generated, does give them actual authority to act on MERS behalf. Indeed, this is immaterial. Even without it, their assignments would be “binding upon [MERS] ... [and] entitled to be recorded.” Id.; see Kiah, 2011 WL 841282, at *7 (<HOLDING>); In re Marrón, 2011 WL 3800040, at *3 (“Though

    ### Response:
    holding that even if the individual who signed the mortgage assignment lacked the authority to do so the assignment would still be binding on mers because he purported to be authorized
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    limited arbitration provision are legal in nature,” we review the district court’s judgment de novo. Paul Revere Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Kirschhofer, 226 F.3d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir.2000). “The FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.” Dialysis Access Ctr., LLC v. RMS Lifeline, Inc., 638 F.3d 367, 376 (1st Cir.2011) (quoting Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2776, 177 L.Ed.2d 403 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Employers and employees may contractually agree to submit federal claims, including claims under the ADA, to arbitration. Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 149-51 (1st Cir.1998); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

    ### Response:
    holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of the Department. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the transfer of a lawsuit from a county of proper venue to another county of proper venue is not reversible error. II. The Department contends that the transfer of a civil lawsuit from a county that qualifies as a proper venue to another county that might originally have been considered a proper venue is not reversible error as a matter of law. We disagree. Venue selection presupposes that the parties to the lawsuit have choices and preferences about where their ease will be tried. See Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 15.001-15.040 (Vernon 1986 & Supp.1994); Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enterprise Prod. Co., 833 S.W.2d 736, 741 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Venue may be proper in many counties under

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the plaintiff has the right to file suit in any permissible county
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    but deemed unsalable. Perfetti moved for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction against Defendants after learning that Defendants had diverted the candy to retail stores for sale rather than recycling it. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants Perfet-ti’s motion for a preliminary injunction. I. Facts This Court draws the facts from the Verified Complaint, the affidavits and sworn declarations filed by Perfetti, and the testimony and exhibits from the hearing on May 28, 2015. See Doe v. S. Iron R-l Sch. Dist., 498 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir.2007) (affirming a preliminary injunction based on a verified complaint and additional documents); Movie Sys., Inc. v. MAD Minneapolis Audio Distribs., 717 F.2d 427, 431-32 (8th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Perfetti is a global manufacturer of candy

    ### Response:
    holding that courts may rely solely on affidavits in granting preliminary injunctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    need for the expert’s testimony that it cannot obtain without “undue hardship, which is necessary to overcome a motion to quash by an unretained expert.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee’s note (An expert can “withhold their expertise” unless the subpoenaing party can “show[ ] a substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship; and ensures that the subpoenaed person will be reasonably compensated”); see also Chavez ex rel. v. Board of Educ. of Tularosa Mun. School, No. CIV-05-380JB/RLP, 2007 WL 1306734, at *6 (D.N.M. Feb. 16, 2007). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there are no other comparable witnesses that are unwilling to testify on its behalf regarding the subject patents-in-suit. Id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I find it unnecessary to

    ### Response:
    holding the subpoenaing parties failed to demonstrate they could not obtain substantial equivalent testimony to that of the unretained expert
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remains in full force and effect as to such other acts.” Id. (citing Sanchez v. Dickinson, 551 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ)). When the parties have agreed to rights and obligations that are “collateral to and independent of the conveyance, such as completion of construction or escrow agreements pending construction,” those rights “survive[ ] a deed that is silent in respect to the construction or escrow agreement.” Id. We thus held in Harris that the parties’ execution of an escrow agreement “contemporaneously with” their - execution of a deed that “pertained only to the conveyance” itself “plainly shows” that the parties “did not intend to merge the conditions of the agreement into the deed.” Id. S.W.2d 818, 823 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1962, writ refused n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). , Because Ms. Cosgrove’s promise to correct

    ### Response:
    holding that sellers agreement to furnish title policy was a separate agreement not superseded by the deed and properly not included in the deed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights are never property rights or that the Government may always take them for their own benefit without compensation. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223-24, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (internal conditional grant of funds to California did not subject the federal government to liability for California’s actions. Second, California’s legislature cannot be considered to have acted under federal ore, cannot be construed as a grant of authority for California to pass legislation on behalf of the federal government. This is not even a case in which Congress first regulated a particular field and then delegated its authority to regulate that field to another sovereign entity. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975) (<HOLDING>). California had, at all times, the inherent

    ### Response:
    holding that congress which regulated the introduction of alcoholic beverages in indian country could validly delegate to indian tribes its authority to regulate that subject matter because indian tribes themselves possessed independent authority over the subject matter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fee Statements covering May of 2010 contain two expense charges: $14.25 in FedEx delivery services and $2.44 in total postage costs. [Adv. Doc. No. 87-3, p. 16]. The Court concludes that both of these expenses—totaling $16.69— are reasonable and, therefore, recoverable as a portion of McKool Smith’s sanction award. In sum, the Court concludes that McKool Smith is entitled to $73,522.85 in fees and $655.15 in expenses, for a total amount of $74,178.00. This award represents both the amount of fees and expenses this Court determines were reasonably expended by McKool Smith in prosecuting the Original Motion for Sanctions, in addition to the amount this Court believes is appropriate to deter repetition of the Plaintiffs’ bad faith conduct. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (<HOLDING>); Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New

    ### Response:
    holding that the court should limit the amount of sanctions to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the jury found that Moncivais did not commit the murder under the immediate influence of sudden passion and assessed punishment at 50 years’ confinement. Moncivais timely appealed. Sufficiency of the Evidence Moncivais contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he did not kill Erik under the immediate influence of sudden passion. A. Sudden Passion Proof of sudden passion can reduce an offense from a first degree felony to a second degree felony and the defendant must prove sudden passion by a preponderance of the evidence. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(d) (West 2003); see McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); see also Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 206, 211-12 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). “‘Sudden passion’ means passion directly

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant bears burden at punishment phase to prove issue of sudden passion by preponderance of evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    6 . A plaintiff may prove discrimination through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Ramsey v. City & County of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (10th Cir.1990). Proof of ""an existing policy which itself constitutes discrimination” would constitute direct evidence. Id. at 1008. But contrary to Mr. Jones’s argument, the record does not contain direct evidence of a discriminatory policy. In order to be ""direct,” evidence must prove “the existence of a fact in issue without inference or presumption.” Hall v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 476 F.3d 847, 854 (10th Cir.2007) (quotation omitted). For example, an employer's express adoption of a discriminatory policy constitutes direct evidence. See Trans World. Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) (<HOLDING>). To prove the existence of a discriminatory

    ### Response:
    holding employers admitted policy discriminatory on its face
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has been a ""legislative delegation” of regulatory authority to an administrative agency, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, courts must defer to that agency’s interpretation of that statute, so long as that interpretation is ""based on a permissible construction of the statute,” id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. The NLRB’s interpretation of the Act receives this ""Chevron deference” unless its interpretation is unreasonable. See N.L.R.B. v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713, 121 S.Ct. 1861, 149 L.Ed.2d 939 (2001). 4 . The holding of N.L.R.B. v. C. & C. Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 87 S.Ct. 559, 17 L.Ed.2d 486 (1967), is not to the contrary. That case dealt with the jurisdiction of the Board to adjudicate matters turning on contractual interpretation. Id. at 428, 87 S.Ct. 559 (<HOLDING>); see also Bath Marine Draftsmen’s Ass’n v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the nlrb has the authority to interpret cbas in the first instance where its interpretation is for the purpose of enforcing a statutory right which congress considered necessary to allow labor and management to get on with the process of reaching fair terms and conditions of employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    vexation of conflicting claims. See Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 406-08, 59 S.Ct. 563, 567-69, 83 L.Ed. 817 (1939); John, supra, 141 F.R.D. at 33; see generally 7 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1704 at 501 (2d ed. 1986). As interpleader provides a method to compel adverse claimants to litigate their claims to property in a single proceeding, the burden is on the party seeking interpleader to demonstrate its entitlement to the remedy. Id. § 1714 at 583. The plaintiff demonstrably has failed to carry its burden in this case. In general, an existing and a prospective claim from separate parties are sufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirement of multiple liability. See Bell v. Nutmeg Airways Corp., 66 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.Conn.1975) (<HOLDING>); 3A Moore & Lucas, supra, ¶ 22.-08[2]. The

    ### Response:
    holding that adversity existed between plaintiff and defendantclaimants despite fact that plaintiff al leged he was nothing more than stakeholder as he requested court to enjoin future claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requirement applies to “for cause” drug testing as well as random drug testing. DOC chose not to apply these procedures in White’s case. DOC has never shown that its refusal to apply the established procedure in this case was anything other than arbitrary. The agency’s arbitrary abandonment of its published procedure encroached upon petitioner’s due process rights. See Wareham v. Singletary, 700 So.2d 427, 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court held that inmates facing disciplinary charges must be afforded certain minimal safeguards.”). By denying relief, the circuit court condoned the denial of due process. Certiorari is therefore appropriate. See Plymel v. Moore, 770 So.2d 242, 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we grant the petition for

    ### Response:
    holding that a denial of due process warrants mandamus relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    began running on October 16, 2003. Our resolution of this dispute depends upon our construction of the legal disability statute. Initially, we reiterate that [o]ur approach to statutory construction begins with the statute’s language, and if it can end there — with our finding of a clear meaning of the Legislature’s intent — then we must stop. “Our search for a statute’s purpose begins with the words of the statute itself. If the statute is unambiguous, we need only to enforce the statute as writtenf,]” with no recourse to the broader statutory scheme, legislative history, historical background, or other external sources of the Legislature’s purpose. Galaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509, 516 (Tenn.2005) (quoting In re Conservatorship of Clayton, 914 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tenn.Ct.Ap 14 (1975) (<HOLDING>); O’Brien v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 405 Mass.

    ### Response:
    holding that statute of limitations did not begin to run against a non compos mentis individual in spite of interested parties being available to bring suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would have been permissible. In other words, our decision appears to have agreed with the premise that the government may use classified information without disclosure, if that information truly implicates national security. Here, the classified information implicates national security. 10 . We recognize that the utility of the methods described in text may be limited. For example, the information conveyed by an unclassified summary will be decidedly less helpful to the entity than the classified information itself. But limited utility is very different from no utility. An unclassified summary is analogous to privilege logs in the context of discovery disputes, yet their use is routine. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(5); see also MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Compare EO 13,224, § 1(a), (b) (blocking

    ### Response:
    holding that on a motion for attorney fees the requesting party must disclose its time sheets to the other party redacted as necessary where protected by the attorneyclient privilege
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is that drawing any inferences from a party’s failure to call a witness equally available to both sides is impermissible.”). Andrews contends that the prosecutor “effectively shifted the burden of proof in this prosecution to the defendant.” Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, Andrews’ argument that the burden of proof was shifted is not supported by the record, because the district court gave the following instructions to the jury: “[T]he defendant is presumed by the law to be innocent. The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or to produce any evidence at all. The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant.” See Iredia, 866 F.2d at 117-18 (<HOLDING>). Plain error is not shown. D Andrews contends

    ### Response:
    holding that prosecutors comment  if there was  evidence available to defense lawyers dont you think they would put it on  did not require reversal because district courts instruction  that burden was on the government  should have sufficiently erased any doubts as to which party had the burden of proof
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    clearly erroneous findings of fact, carefully and correctly set out the law governing the issues raised, and clearly articulate the reasons underlying the decisions, issuance of a full written opinion by this court would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the opinions of the magistrate judge and the district court, we AFFIRM. We add only that, although we agree with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that because the trustee in Sharp’s bankruptcy abandoned any interest in this cause of action, Sharp has standing to bring this action and to represent the class, we would find that Sharp has standing principally on the ground that Sharp’s interest in this action was never the property of the bankruptcy estate. See In re Young, 66 F.3d 376, 378-79 (1st Cir.1995)

    ### Response:
    holding that the 1994 amendment to  348 of the bankruptcy code should control in preamendment ongoing cases and that the debtors tort causes of action that accrued while the case was proceeding under chapter 13 did not become property of the estate or subject to the bankruptcy proceedings upon conversion of the case to chapter 7 proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    silent about a medical problem or tell a patient he has a clean bill of health when he does not. Pickup was justified on the same basis. SOCE therapy is analogous to prescribing a harmful drug. Liability could attach for providing SOCE therapy because the therapy had the chance to harm minors psychologically. As Pickup and Lowe recognized, however, even if quack medicine (or what the State deems to be quack medicine) can be prohibited without scrutiny, doctors cannot be prohibited from talking to their patients about quack medicine. See 472 U.S. at 231, 105 S.Ct. at 2584 (White, J„ concurring) (“I do not think [the State] could make it a crime ... privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of medical thought.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 740 F.3d at 1228 (<HOLDING>). I believe, apparently unlike the Majority,

    ### Response:
    holding only that a doctor may not counsel a patient to rely on quack medicine but recognizing that a doctor may talk to patients about quack medicine such as soce emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on evolving circumstances, they were not merely attempts to revive waived issues. For this reason, “application of the firm waiver rule here would be pointless,” and we will consider Hill’s arguments. Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 695 n. 5 (10th Cir.2004). We review a district court’s refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent prisoner in a civil case for an abuse of discretion. See Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir.1995). “The burden is on the applicant to convince the court that there is sufficient merit to his claim to warrant the appointment of counsel.” McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1985). “Only in those extreme cases where the lack of counsel results in fundamental unfairness will the district court’s decision be overturned.” Id. at 839 (<HOLDING>). We have previously directed district courts

    ### Response:
    holding a prisoner with multiple sclerosis attending court in a wheelchair who had diminished eyesight hearing and ability to communicate and needed to present complex medical issues requiring expert opinion should have been appointed counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980) is most instructive. In Anderson, the Supreme Court expressly held that Doyle does not apply in situations where “a defendant ... voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings [because he] has not been induced to remain silent.” Id. at 408. Here, as in Anderson, before the Defendant made his statement regarding who owned the drugs in Apartment 22, the Defendant had already answered a number of prior questions; thus, his affirmative statement (that “he did know [who the owner of the drugs was]; however, he would not inform [Agent Hayes] of that person’s name”) was not silence, but rather an admission that he knew the identity of the drug owner but refused to reveal the party’s name to Agent Hayes. See also Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 201 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Crowder, 719 F.2d 166, 168,

    ### Response:
    holding that an agents testimony regarding defendants compound statement that he had been out fishing all night but he didnt wish to say any more was not a doyle violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plain meaning of a clear statutory text. We therefore hold that the clear text of § 2713 creates a mandatory condition precedent barring all OPA claims unless and until a claimant has presented her claims in compliance with § 2713(a) and either: (1) all responsible parties deny all liability; or (2) the claim is not settled by payment within 90 days after (A) the claim was presented, or (B) advertising was begun under section 2714(b) of the Act, whichever is later. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(c). C. Consequence of Dismissal All parties agree that the district court’s dismissal should not be treated as a dismissal with prejudice. Appellants remain free to refile this action, if and when they comply with OPA’s claims presentation procedure. See also Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31-33, 110 S.Ct. at 312 (<HOLDING>). Cf. United States v. Daniel Good Real

    ### Response:
    holding that after dismissal plaintiffs may refile suit after compliance with rcras 60day notice requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ark. v. Hill, 122 B.R. 539, 541 (ED.Ark.1990).” In re Merrick, 175 B.R. at 336-337. To determine whether a “proceeding” is subject to the automatic stay under section 362(a)(1), many courts have followed the analysis employed in the Third Circuit which is the following: “Whether a specific judicial proceeding falls within the scope of the automatic stay must be determined by looking at the proceeding “at its inception.” “That determination should not change depending on the particular stage of the litigation at which the filing of the petition in bankruptcy occurs.” Thus, the dispositive question is whether a proceeding was “originally brought against the debtor.” Maritime Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1204-1205 (3d Cir.1992) (citations o , 491 n. 2 (8th Cir,1993) (<HOLDING>); Gecy v. Bank of Ozarks (In re Gecy), 510 B.R.

    ### Response:
    holding that a thirdparty action instigated by two debtors against a third party was not subject to the automatic stay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not a statute of limitations in the traditional sense, but a part of the state's insurance laws dictating what terms must be included in group health policies. As such, we question whether it could impact claims existing at the time of its passage (rather than merely claims brought under policies issued in 1985 or thereafter which included the terms required by the statute), and whether the Missouri legislature would have had reason to include any saving language in the statute. This dilemma raises the more general concern about whether provisions in state insurance codes, such as § 376.426(14), should even be considered ""analogous” statutes of limitation for ERISA purposes. See Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Group Long Term Disability Ins. Program, 222 F.3d 643, 647-48 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). As stated above, however, we decline to

    ### Response:
    holding such statutes are not analogous statutes of limitation for erisa purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that was neither deep enough or long enough to require stitches, and a scraped elbow did not require prompt medical attention under the Eighth Amendment. See Davis v. Jones, 936 F.2d 971, 972-73 (7th Cir.1991). In sum, Pinkston’s split lip and swollen cheek do not qualify as injuries that are “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Wynn, 251 F.3d at 593. Furthermore, even if we were to assume, for purposes of argument only, that Pinkston has indeed somehow established an objectively serious medical need, he has certainly failed to demonstrate that Madry and Grisselle were deliberately indifferent to that hypothetical need. See Board, 394 F.3d at 478; see also Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407, 1420 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Woods, 233 F.3d 482, 484

    ### Response:
    holding that when findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses rule 52 demands even greater deference to the trial courts findings for only the trial judge is in a position to be aware of the variations in demeanor including but not limited to the actions mannerisms and facial expressions that bear so heavily on the listeners understanding of and belief in what is said
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    error that had a “ ‘substantial and injurious [effect or influence’ ” on the outcome of the proceedings. McKenna, 65 F.3d at 1490 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). The state court’s factual findings are entitled to deference, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and the district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. McKenna, 65 F.3d at 1490. Also important to our analysis is the posture of this case, which comes to us on collateral review of Lopez’s conviction in state court, not on direct review of a conviction in federal district court. In this context, our inquiry is limited to whether Lopez was sentenced in violation of the United States Constitution. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Quoting from Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,

    ### Response:
    holding that a federally issued writ of habeas corpus  reaches only convictions obtained in violation of some provision of the united states constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when she applied for a supervisor’s position, Johnson was required to be fingerprinted. The fingerprints were submitted to a law enforcement agency for review and Johnson’s previous conviction for affray was disclosed. When asked to clarify or explain the criminal charge, Johnson admitted that in 1980 she had been charged with aggravated assault and affray. She stated the aggravated assault charge was dismissed and she entered a plea of nolo contendere to the affray charge and was fined. One could agree with Johnson that she might have been confused if the Board’s question was, “Have you ever been convicted of a crime?” because the term conviction is confusing to both the legal and lay communities. See Proffitt v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 658 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>). However, the Board asked not only whether

    ### Response:
    holding that because the term conviction is ambiguous to lawyers judges and laymen the claimant did not commit misconduct when she wrote she had not been convicted of felony where adjudication had been withheld
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    previously, plaintiffs interests can and should be adequately protected in the state proceeding given the substantial similarity of the state proceeding to the federal one. Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of abstention. g. Vexatious and reactive nature of the federal claim The Supreme Court recognized that the “vexatious or reactive nature of either the federal or the state litigation may influence the decision whether to defer to a parallel state litigation under Colorado River. ” Cone, 460 U.S. at 17, 103 S.Ct. 927. Where courts find bad faith on the part of plaintiff, a stay or dismissal may be warranted “as a means to deter vexatious use of the courts.” Holland, 840 F.Supp. at 1101; see also Baseline Sports, Inc. v. Third Base Sports, 341 F.Supp.2d 605, 611-612 (E.D.Va.2004) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, Livingston and Winn

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff brought its claim to district court for a vexatious purpose when the claim was a mirror image of the state court action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    districts in which they serve. Sullivan, 106 S.W.3d at 189. Texas law places control of probation departments in the hands of district judges, who are elected state officials. See PYCA Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d at 1417 n. 3. In Shore, the court explained that because the district judges are empowered to employ and dismiss individuals in the probation department, any actions by the director “would be as an agent for the Judges.” 414 F.Supp. at 385; see Sullivan, 106 S.W.3d at 189. The Shore court further explained that “any equitable relief granted must therefore be directed against the ‘Judges ....”’ 414 F.Supp. at 385; see Sullivan, 106 S.W.3d at 189 (citing Clark v. Tarrant County, 608 F.Supp. 209, 211 (N.D.Tex.1985), rev’d in part on other grounds, 798 F.2d at 739 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>)). Because ultimate control over JCCSCD staff

    ### Response:
    holding that probation department employees are not county employees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sentence” may not “then appeal the merits of a sentence conforming to the agreement.” United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1993). The plea agreement stipulated that Blackwell “committed the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony-conviction for a crime of violence.” App’x at 10, That stipulation resulted in a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months under the terms of the plea agreement. Id. at 11. At sentencing, the district court decided to follow the plea agreement and sentenced Blackwell to 36 months imprisonment. Because Blackwell’s sentence conformed to his plea agreement, he received the benefit of that agreement and he has waived any challenge to his sentence on the basis of Johnson. See United States v. Morgan, 406 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, and finding no

    ### Response:
    holding that the inability to foresee that subsequently decided cases would create new appeal issues does not supply a basis for failing to enforce an appeal waiver on the contrary the possibility of a favorable change in the law after a plea is simply one of the risks that accompanies pleas and plea agreements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    York, 804 F.3d 277, 294 (3d Cir. 2015) (“To state an equal-protection claim, Plaintiffs must allege (and ultimately prove) ‘intentional discrimination.’” (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976))). Additionally, because Lee does not allege that she is a member of a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class, her claim would be subject to rational basis review. See id. at 298-99. Lee would not plausibly be entitled to relief under this standard because, as the District Court observed, the Palimony Law is “extremely rationally related to the end goal” (Oral Arg. Tr. at 23), of “providing greater clarity in the enforcement of palimony agreements” (App. 400). See F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Lee’s Amended Complaint fails to

    ### Response:
    holding that a law survives rational basis review so long as there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from enforcing its billboard ordinance, save wind load and electrical requirements, should Whiteco or its successors apply to rebuild in the same location, or to relocate in a new location, any of the forty-two billboards identified in the Agreement. Applying the settled principles above, the Agreement had “the effect of interfering [with the proper exercise of City’s police power], [and] must necessarily give way to an appropriate exercise of [City’s] police power.” State ex rel. Kansas City, 524 S.W.2d at 859. Because City had no authority to contract away future enforcement of its zoning ordinance against rebuilt or relocated billboards, the Agreement exceeded the scope of City’s powers in violation of section 432.070, and is void. North Kansas City Sch. Dist., 369 S.W.2d at 165 (<HOLDING>); Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., 3 Rathkopfs The Law

    ### Response:
    holding that any attempt by way of contract to deprive a city of  control over exercise of it police powers is void
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to support denial, is nevertheless relevant.”) The single most important factor is whether prejudice would result to the nonmovant as a consequence of the amendment. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1053 (9th Cir.1981). In the Ninth Circuit, if a complaint does not include the necessary factual allegations to state a claim, it is not sufficient to allege such claims in a motion for summary judgment. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1080 (9th Cir.2008); see also Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir.2006) (“ ‘Simply put, summary judgment is not a procedural second chance to flesh out inadequate pleadings.’ ”); Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968-69 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The first amended complaint alleges a general

    ### Response:
    holding that the complaint did not satisfy the notice pleading requirements of federal rule of civil procedure 8a because the complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether [it] ha[d] some job that [Burns] might [have been] able to fill.” Dalton, 141 F.3d at 677 (noting that “reassignment is particularly important when the employee is unable to perform the essential functions of his or her current job, either with or without accommodation”); see also Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (stating that “[njumerous courts have assumed that the reassignment obligation means something more than treating a disabled employee like any other job applicant”). Because prior decisions of this court hold that an employee has the burden of identifying particular positions to which he could be reassigned based on his qualifications, we affirm 'the district court’s order granting summary judgment for KCC. See Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Dalton, 141 F.3d at 679 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that reassignment is not required where the disabled plaintiff sought to escape the employers legitimate nondiscriminatory policy requiring all employees seeking transfers from parttime to fulltime positions to take a written exam
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the F.D. Rich decision, courts deciding the issue had held almost without exception that the provision was a venue requirement. United States ex rel. Capolino Sons, Inc. v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 364 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 924, 87 S.Ct. 239, 17 L.Ed.2d 148 (1966). It is well settled that venue provisions are subject to contractual waiver. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315, 84 S.Ct. 411, 414, 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964). Three circuits have addressed forum selection clauses that conflict with the Miller Act’s venue provisions. All three have held that as a mere venue requirement, § 270b(b) is subject to contractual waiver by a valid forum selection clause. See FGS Constructors, Inc. v. Carlow, 64 F.3d 1230, 1233 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); G & C Enterprises, 62 F.3d at 36; In re

    ### Response:
    holding the miller acts venue requirement could be waived by defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    innocence by giving jurors an instruction that minimized the significance of their anonymity. Before jurors filled lowed its anonymity discussion by instructing jurors that the defendants enjoyed a presumption of innocence, and repeated that instruction both at the beginning and conclusion of the trial. See Preliminary Instruction at 3, reprinted in J.A. I 260; Trial Tr. (Sept. 18, 1989) at 46, reprinted in J.A. VIII; id. (Dec. 1, 1989) at 74, reprinted in J.A. XVII. This step further mitigated any prejudice from the anonymous jury procedure. See Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1133; see also Crockett, 979 F.2d at 1216 (finding repeated instructions on presumption of innocence to protect defendant from possibility of prejudice resulting from impan-elment of anonymous jury); Vario, 943 F.2d at 241 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, appellants find fault in the

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court took adequate steps to safeguard defendants presumption of innocence where judge failed to instruct jurors as to reason for their anonymity but fully instructed them on presumption of innocence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dismiss Counts III-V pending adjudication of Count I. With regard to Count II, the court held that the power to revoke an objection is implied by the power to interpose one, and that the sixty-day period was intended only to limit the Attorney General’s authority to interpose objections. Id. at 211. Appellees urged that the claims set forth in the remaining counts were not subject to judicial review, because section 5 of the Voting Rights Act precludes judicial review of actions taken by the Attorney General under its provisions, and commits the decision to interpose objections wholly to agency discretion. However, the District Court deferred consideration of the review-ability of Counts III through V, and ruled on the basis of Harper v. Levi, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 520 F.2d 53 (1975) (<HOLDING>), that the “procedural” issue raised by Count I

    ### Response:
    holding reviewable the attorney generals alleged failure to exercise his independent judgment before deciding not to object to a proposed voting change
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    failed to establish that Kennedy’s stock sales were “unusual.” As discussed above, Kennedy disclosed all his holdings in the November announcement. The additional 30,000 shares that Kennedy sold in January represented less than 11% of his holdings; after the sale, Kennedy owned approximately 259,000 shares and/or options of IMCERA stock. Further, the complaint failed to allege that any other defendant sold any shares of IMCERA stock during this period. The fact that the other defendants did not sell their shares during the relevant class period undermines plaintiffs’ claim that defendants delayed notifying the public “so that they could sell their stock at a huge profit.” In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,060, at 94,-697, 1992 WL 394927 (N.D.Cal.1992) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, it appears that the 30,000 shares

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs claims that defendants artificially inflated the companys share price so that they could sell their stock at a huge profit was undermined by the fact that one of the four defendants did not sell his stock during the class period
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in understanding the case and in reaching a correct verdict.” State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 136, 184 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1971). It is recognized by this Court that “the preferred method of jury instruction is the use of the approved guidelines of the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions.” In re Will of Leonard, 71 N.C. App. 714, 717, 323 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1984). “In a criminal trial the judge has the duty to instruct the jury on the law arising from all the evidence presented.” State v. Moore, 75 N.C. App. 543, 546, 331 S.E.2d 251, 253, disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 188, 337 S.E.2d 862 (1985). This places a duty upon the presiding judge to instruct the jury as to the burden of proof upon each issue arising upon the pleadings. See State v. Redman, 217 N.C. 483, 8 S.E.2d 623 (1940) (<HOLDING>). “The rule as to the burden of proof is

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    109 Utah 213, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (1946)). This requires a system of coordination between the holder of the easement and the owner of the land through which it passes. The Court thus concluded that the BLM needed to make an “initial determination” regarding the reasonableness and necessity of any proposed improvements beyond mere maintenance of the previous condition of the road. Id. at 1084-85. This approach was elaborated and applied in district court cases after Hodel. In United States v. Garfield County, 122 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Utah 2000), the court held, with reference to the same road at issue in Hodel, that any road construction within the National Park, beyond “maintenance,” would require advance notification of the Park Service and mutual accommodation between the P Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that proposed improvements to an rs 2477 route in a national preserve is subject to regulation by the national park service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1 . See Tex. Lab.Code § 417.002. Goudeau raised no objection to USF & G's intervention in his pleadings or summary judgment response. 2 . 243 S.W.3d 1, 10. The portion of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming summary judgment against Goudeau's former wife Tasha, see id. at 5-6, has not been appealed. 3 . Fies Hawai’i 117, 883 P.2d 38, 53 (1994) (finding coverage as occupancy if insured vehicle ""started the chain of events” that resulted in injury). 13 . See Torres v. Travelers Indem. Co., 171 N.J. 147, 793 A.2d 592, 593 (2002) (""[I]n order to obtain UM coverage where occupancy is in issue, a plaintiff is required to establish a substantial nexus between the insured vehicle and the injury sustained.”). 14 . See Genthner v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 681 A.2d 479, 482 (Me.1996) (<HOLDING>); Sayers v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 192 Mont.

    ### Response:
    holding attempt to apprehend hitandrun driver was directly and reasonably related to the operation and use of the insured vehicle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.2d 711 (5th cir.1985) ], its intended purpose should be upheld so long as it otherwise offends no substantive rights. See In re Adams [734 F.2d 1094 (5th cir.1984) ]. We see no such result here. On the contrary, if bankruptcy court jurisdiction is not permitted over a class action of debtors, Rule 7023 is virtually read out of the rules. Id. at 754 (internal footnotes omitted). ... There is also disagreement about whether the bankruptcy court may exercise jurisdiction over a nationwide class of debtors or is limited to exercising jurisdiction over debtors whose petitions are filed within the same judicial district. Compare, e.g., In re Noletto, 244 B.R. 845, 849 (Bankr.S.D.Ala.2000) (permitting nationwide class) with Barrett v. Avco Fin. Servs. Mgmt. Co., 292 B.R. 1, 8 (D.Mass.2003) (<HOLDING>). The class at issue in this case was limited

    ### Response:
    holding court lacks jurisdiction over putative class members whose bankruptcies were discharged outside of judicial district
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    award was not an abuse of discretion. The district court based its award on a variety of factors: it cited the need for deterrence, and recognized that “the willful and pervasive nature of [Chertok]’s misrepresentations, and the time and effort they added to this litigation,” called for a “considerable sanction.” Joint Appx 290-91. It balanced those considerations against the fact that we vacated two out of the three Rule 11 violations it originally relied on, and the fact that StreetEasy devoted less than one third of its submissions to the affirmed Rule 11 violation. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the district court’s decision to award one-third of the original amount was not within the range of permissible decisions. See Eastway Constr. Corp., 821 F.2d at 128 (<HOLDING>); see also Caisse Nationale de Credit

    ### Response:
    recognizing district courts wide range of discretion in setting amount of rule 11 sanctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the “fast-steering” language of the claim preamble is not a limitation of any of the claims. See STX LLC v. Brine Inc., 54 USPQ2d 1347, 1349 (Fed.Cir.2000) (“The fact that the first squeezes that formed the basis of the commercial offer to sell might not have exhibited the desired degree of ‘improved playing and handling’ characteristics ... is irrelevant, not least because the preamble to claim 1 is not a limitation.”). Nor should the court consider things like the alleged “operator friendly” characteristics of the ’220 trowel that do not appear in the claims. Finally, the court should appreciate that experimentation and modification of non-claimed features of the Red Rider will not necessarily preclude the finding of an on-sale bar. See Theis, 610 F.2d at 793, 204 USPQ at 194 (<HOLDING>). 4. Marking Bartell argues that the

    ### Response:
    holding that experimental use  does not apply to experiments performed with respect to nonclaimed features of an invention
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Ford Motor Cre creditor owes to the debtor must be incurred for the specific purpose of achieving setoff rights.” In re Summit Fin. Servs., Inc., 240 B.R. 105, 120 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1999) (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Mfr. & Traders Trust Co. (In re The Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.), 146 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir.1998)). The debtor has the burden of proving that a creditor obtained a claim for the purpose of obtaining setoff rights. In re Energy Co-op., Inc., 100 B.R. 992, 995 (N.D.Ill.1989) (citing Record Club of Am. v. United Artists Records, 80 B.R. 271 (S.D.N.Y.1987)). “There must be facts to show an intent to manipulate the balance in order to create an issue of fact.” Energy Co-op., 100 B.R. at 995. See In re Dillard Ford, Inc., 940 F.2d 1507, 1513 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). But see In re Bohlen Enter., Ltd., 859 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a creditor did not incur debt for the purpose of set off where it stopped payment to the debtor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is not dependent on the alleged merits of an appellant’s underlying claim. Boone, 409 S.W.3d at 598. Rather, the relevant inquiry in determining whether to apply the escape: rule is deciding whether the defendant’s escape adversely affected the criminal justice system. Id.; McCartney, 297 S.W.3d at 926. Here, Appellant twice failed to appear for sentencing. The trial court was forced to issue a capias warrant, and law enforcement had to locate, and apprehend Appellant out of state and transport him back to Missouri. The trial court had to, schedule three sentencing hearings, resulting in a delay of nearly six months. Appellant’s actions in absconding from justice adversely impacted the criminal justice system, warranting application of the escape rule. See Wagner, 172 S.W.3d at 924 (<HOLDING>); McCartney, 297 S.W.3d at 926 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding a failure to appear for sentencing constitutes an escape under the rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must be a substantial one, a “well-founded, rule of domestic policy established to protect the morals, safety or welfare of our people.” Bevins, 195 S.W. at 155 (emphasis supplied). Where no Kentucky resident has been affected, rarely will that standard be met. It is not met here where the competing public policies — supposing a Kentucky policy against this UIM exclusion — concern only the balance to be struck between required insurance coverage and insurance affordability, a balance different states have assessed differently. Since here no Kentucky resident is affected, nothing requires a Kentucky court to interfere with the balance Pennsylvania has chosen for its citizens. Cf. United Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frye, 381 Ill.App.3d 960, 320 Ill.Dec. 639, 887 N.E.2d 783 (2008) (<HOLDING>); Cherokee Insurance Company, Inc. v. Sanches,

    ### Response:
    holding that illinois public policy did not require the application of illinois law to an illinois accident involving only indiana residents insured in indiana
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be a little over 17 grams. He continued his argument by drawing the same distinction between simple manufacturing and trafficking. He stated, I think the evidence that has been presented is, at this point ... not sufficient for at least trafficking ... [b]ut it’s certainly the—it’s too speculative to present the trafficking. So, if we don’t have—if we have enough to present to the jury, I submit we have—it would be for manufacturing as opposed to trafficking. In denying the motion, the trial court specifically referred back to the previous discussion about “theoretical yield,” indicating the trial court understood the directed verdict motion to address the sufficiency of the State’s evidence on the element of quantity. See State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 353, 737 S.E.2d 490, 497 (2013) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hendricks, 408 S.C. 525, 531, 759

    ### Response:
    holding the issue was preserved when the trial court immediately appeared to understand the objection was a renewal of a previous argument
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prosecutor’s failure to strike venire-member 33 for the same reason as Robertson was the result of a mistake in his notes and not evidence of his disparate treatment of Robertson based on race. Here, in response to the challenge by appellant’s trial counsel, the prosecutor represented to the trial court that he exercised a peremptory strike on all venire-members who he had marked in his notes as stating that they could not consider life imprisonment and that he did not strike veniremember 33 because she was not marked in his notes as having given this response. Appellant’s counsel did not cross examine the prosecutor on this statement or request the production of the prosecutor’s notes to assess the truth of the statement. See Pondexter v. State, 942 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>); Salazar v. State, 795 S.W.2d 187, 193

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant is entitled to prosecutors voir dire notes if they were actually used by prosecutor to refresh his memory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it is mandatory and therefore the exclusive remedy for the Leonards’ counterclaims. Failure to arbitrate, Shepler argues, barred suit on the Leonards’ claims and was not subject to waiver by Shepler. ¶15 Most contract terms will be viewed as mandatory in the sense that the parties agreed that they will be bound by them and expect that they will be enforced by the court. However, this does not mean that contract terms cannot be waived or modified. It is also well established that parties may contract for an exclusive remedy that limits their rights, duties, and obligations. Graoch Assocs. #5 Ltd. P’ship v. Titan Constr. Corp., 126 Wn. App. 856, 865, 109 P.3d 830 (2005). But, the contract must clearly indicate the parties’ intent to make the stipulated remedy exclusive. Id. at 865-66 (<HOLDING>); see also Torgerson v. One Lincoln Tower, LLC,

    ### Response:
    holding that one year warranty was not an exclusive remedy for defective construction where the contract did not so state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to his own skill, which we interpret the law not to mean, as distinguished from the chance or unpredictability of the mechanism, which we construe the law to proscribe. Id. at 874-75. Additionally in State v. Broward Vending, Inc., 696 So.2d 851 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997), the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that where “the game is set to play-itself and to record a certain win/loss ratio[,] ... the element of chance is inherent in the game.” Id. at 852. These prior Florida cases clearly put Plaintiffs on notice of the meaning of the phrase “outcome is determined by factors unpredictable by the player or games in which the player may not control the outcome of the game through skill.” See Fla. Stat. § 849.161(l)(a); see also Martin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 136-37 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). As, the Fourth Circuit stated in Martin v.

    ### Response:
    holding that prior south carolina cases interpreting whether a device is a game of chance demonstrate  a plainly legitimate sweep and more than a conceivable application which is all that is required to survive a facial challenge to a criminal statute where constitutional rights are not implicated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regardless of whether or not the June 20th Order triggered the filing requirements of Rules 50 and 59, it is not necessary to decide if the June 20th Order triggered the 10-day filing requirement of these Rules. Specifically, if the June 20th Order did trigger the 10-day filing requirement, Schering’s motion may be considered by this Court because they were timely filed. If, however, the June 20th Order is not a “judgment” under Rule 50 and 59, Schering’s motion may nonetheless be considered by this Court because the filing requirements embodied in those Rules are maximum filing requirements and do not prevent a party from filing such motions prior to the entry of “judgment.” Although parties typically do' not file post-trial motions until entry of final judgment resolving al Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017, 102 S.Ct. 1711,

    ### Response:
    holding that district court improperly denied rule 50b motion filed after entry of final judgment because previous judgment which did not resolve issue of attorneys fees did not trigger rule 50b filing requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The debtor is not directly obligated to her minor children for Mr. Sinton’s charges, but this fact is not determinative of discharge. In the case of Silansky v. Brodsky, Greenblatt & Renehan (In re Silansky), 897 F.2d 743 (C.A.4 1990), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the holding of the District Court that attorney’s fees ordered to be paid to attorneys for debtor’s former spouse were within the coverage of § 523(a)(5) and not dischargeable, following the holdings of such cases as Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661 F.2d 6 (C.A.2 1981), that classified fees allowed to a spouse’s attorneys in divorce proceedings as nondisehargeable debts in the category of alimony, maintenance, and support. See Brodsky, Greenblatt & Renehan, Chartered v. Daumit (In re Daumit), 25 B.R. 371 (Bankr.Md.1982) (<HOLDING>); Burns v. Burns (In re Burns), 186 B.R. 637,

    ### Response:
    holding that counsel fees awarded to debtors wife in a divorce action were nondisehargeable under  523a5
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 471, 107 L.Ed.2d 462 (1989)). The Navy concedes that it is an agency with a mixed function. Therefore, it must demonstrate that it “had a law enforcement purpose based upon properly delegated enforcement authority” for compiling the ESQD arc maps. Church of Scientology, 611 F.2d at 748. The Navy does not meet this standard. Agencies with law enforcement powers have the ability to conduct investigations or adjudications to enforce laws or regulations. See, e.g., Church of Scientology Int’l v. I.R.S., 995 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir.1993) (finding that the Exempt Organization Division of the IRS performs a law enforcement function “by enforcing the provisions of the federal tax code that relate to qualification for tax exempt status”); Lewis v. I.R.S., 823 F.2d 375, 379 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Binion v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 695 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the irs has a law enforcement purpose in the context of a criminal tax investigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    result: An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to another for physical harm which results from an act done by the other or a third person in reliance upon the truth of the representation, if the actor (a) intends his statement to induce or should realize that it is likely to induce action by the other, or a third person, which involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the other, and (b) knows (i) that the statement is false, or (ii) that he has not the knowledge which he professes. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 310 (1965) (emphasis supplied). Though cited to in passing by the Court of Appeals in a small number of cases, § 310 has not been expressly adopted by Maryland courts. But see Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, at 791 n. 14, 955 A.2d 769 (2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Virginia Dare Stores v. Schuman, 175

    ### Response:
    recognizing that although the plaintiff attempted to make a claim under section 310 the plaintiff failed to establish the element of duty required to sustain that claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judgment. It is inherently of such character that the voters, no matter how intelligent, cannot be expected to investigate and have access to all the information which we may assume the city council, with the aid of their attorney, acquire. Full information should be obtained and carefully considered before a conclusion is reached. Oakman v. City of Eveleth, 163 Minn. 100, 203 N.W. 514, 517 (1925). See also Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. of Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, 293 Minn. 227, 198 N.W.2d 531, 536-37 (1972) (stating a proposed city charter amendment that would have allowed citizens to refer actions such as the settlement of lawsuits could create a “chaotic situation” in city government); Peterman v. Village of Pataskala, 122 Ohio App.3d 758, 702 N.E.2d 965, 967 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The dissent’s self-generated contention to

    ### Response:
    recognizing a settlement prevented a municipal referendum as it was not a legislative action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judge. Kiefer Filppula entered a plea of nolo contendere to the following crimes: (1) possession of a prescription drug without a prescription in violation of section 499.03, Florida Statutes (2009); (2) possession of cannabis with intent to sell in violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2009); (3) possession of alprazolam in violation of section 893.13; and (4) possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of section 893.147. On appeal, Filppula argues that the court imposed illegal sentences on counts two and three. We agree and reverse. For count three, the possession of alprazolam, the court orally sentenced Filppula to five years’ probation with two 1991) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the order of probation states that

    ### Response:
    holding that the law is clear that when a defen dant is sentenced to a split sentence consisting of incarceration and probation  the combined sanction cannot exceed the maximum period of incarceration provided by law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jobs at the GS-12 grade level. See Luper Suppl. Decl. Ex. G, ECF No. 34-12 (labeling both jobs as ""GS 12” positions on Mr. Willis’s resume). That Mr. Willis’s previous specialized experience was not credited to him is therefore insignificant in assessing Ms. Thompson and Mr. Willis’s comparative qualifications. 7 . Below, the Court addresses Ms. Thompson’s allegations of impermissible bias shown through factors other than her own qualifications. See infra Part IV.B.2. 8 . Other circuits, including the D.C. Circuit, corroborate this legal principle. See Hendricks v. Geithner, 568 F.3d 1008, 1014 (D.C.Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment when the plaintiff’s evidence ""supports at most favoritism, not sex discrimination’’); Caldwell v. Washington, 278 Fed.Appx. 773, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52, 56 (1st

    ### Response:
    holding that when a plaintiff proves the defendants stated reasons for hiring someone else were pretext for offering the position to a personal friend and not a pretext for racial discrimination she does not establish triable issues of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    I. & N. Dec. at 124 (reasoning that it would be “inconsistent” to interpret Section 1226(c) in a manner that “permits the release of some criminal aliens, yet mandates the detention of others convicted of the same crimes, based on whether there is a delay between their release from criminal custody and their apprehension by [DHS]”). Finally,. the Court’s interpretation of Section 1226(c) is further reinforced by Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has held that “a provision that the Government ‘shall’ act within a specified time, without more, [is not] a jurisdictional limit precluding action later.” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 158, 123 S.Ct. 748, 154 L.Ed.2d 653 (2003); see United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Sylvain v. Attorney General of the

    ### Response:
    holding that the government may detain criminal defendants leading up to trial even if they do not comply with the relevant statutes command that a judicial officer shall hold a bond hearing immediately upon the persons first appearance before the officer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    That alone is enough to demonstrate the regulation provided defendants with the fair notice required by the Due Process Clause. See Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975) (explaining that statutes which require interpretation using standard tools of legal analysis are not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 82-85 (1st Cir.2005) (rejecting a defendant’s fair notice challenges after interpreting a criminal statute in light of its legislative history). Looking beyond the language of Part 273.2(f)(3) and the legislative purpose of e is particularly fair because the record establishes they, as required by their business model, kept abreast of developments in hazardous waste regulation and had act .3d 722, 727 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). The government’s search of Executive’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a guidance document is not binding where it provided only a list of factors the agency would consider rather than a clear statement of policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the State satisfied its burden of proof. Therefore, counsel’s failure to object was not deficient. We also find that the prosecutor’s alleged improper vouching for Skalnik was a fair comment in response to defense counsel’s attack on Skalnik’s credibility during closing argument. Defense counsel referred to Skalnik as a “professional thief’ and a poor police officer. The State was entitled to rebut these comments. Accordingly, Dailey has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s failure to object constitutes deficient performance. With regard to the prosecutor’s alleged “blatant misstatement of fact” concerning Shaw’s testimony, this claim was never raised in Dailey’s postcon-viction motion. Therefore, it is not cognizable on appeal. See Gordon v. State, 863 So.2d 1215, 1219 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). Dailey also argues that the cumulative effect

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim is proeedurally barred where it was not raised in the defendants motion for postconviction relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    664 A.2d 1370 (1995) (for purposes of appellate review, what is not of record does not exist). The uncontradicted evidence indicates that Forrest McDanel and his wife, Jacquelyn, are named as the sole owners of the truck. There is no evidence supporting appellant’s allegation that the truck was titled in the name of McDanel Painting, or any other indication in the record that the truck was a commercial vehicle. Because there is no evidence in the official record that the truck was a commercial vehicle, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the status of the vehicle. Consequently, appellant’s claim that the truck was a commercial vehicle, and, thus, she is entitled to the presumption that the operation of the truck was for the owner’s purposes must fail. See Waters, supra (<HOLDING>). 4 . Although Forrest McDanel and his wife,

    ### Response:
    holding that in pennsylvania there is a rule that proof of the ownership of a business vehicle involved in an accident raises a presumption that the operation of the automobile was for the owners business purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    she accordingly lacks the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” which is “an injury in fact that is ... actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Drutis, 499 F.3d at 611 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Majority correctly observes that “[o]ur decision in Horvath did not revolve around whether the plaintiff suffered a financial loss.” (Majority Op. at 416.) It did, however, turn on the question of whether the plaintiff had demonstrated an individual loss, i.e., an actual injury to that particular plaintiff. That showing is required when a plaintiff is seeking individual relief under ERISA. See In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 159 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Yet the Majority appears to conclude, as one

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 in contrast to  502a2 which allows relief on behalf of a plan is required to prove an individual loss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    890, 893 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). Abuse of discretion occurs when a decision by the trial court is “so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.” Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Public records and reports, in any form, of public offices or agencies setting forth matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report are not hearsay, even if the declarant is available as a witness. Tex.R. Evid. 803(8)(B). An exception controls criminal cases, however, in which records and reports concerning matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel are inadmissible hearsay. See id.; Cole v. State, 839 S.W.2d 798, 804-07 & n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (op. on reh’g) (<HOLDING>); Bermen v. State, 798 S.W.2d 8, 12

    ### Response:
    holding that fulltime forensic chemists employed by texas department of public safety were lawenforcement personnel whose reports were not admissible under either the publicrecord hearsay exception rule 8038b or the businessrecord hearsay exception rule 8036
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for federal protection, aid, and grants of land.” Id. at 218, 79 S.Ct. at 269. Were the State to expressly disclaim jurisdiction and the federal courts to give up their protective jurisdiction over Indian lands, including water rights, the Indians would seem deprived of the benefit of the original bargain that they were driven to make. Of course, by general statute, Congress later expressed its willingness to have any state assume jurisdiction over reservation Indians if the state legislature or the people voted affirmatively to accept such responsibility. Id. at 222, 79 S.Ct. at 271. To date, Montana does, not appear to have accepted such responsibility. In passing, we note that McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n., 411 U.S. 164, 179, 180, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 1266, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1972) (<HOLDING>), has expressly limited the application of the

    ### Response:
    holding that arizona could not impose an income tax on reservation indians
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Alvarez-Bernabe, 626 F.3d 1161, 1165-66 (10th Cir.2010); see also United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1180-83 (10th Cir.2006) (upholding a 41-month sentence for illegal reentry based in part on a 16-level enhancement for a prior conviction). Based on this precedent, the district court could reasonably rely on the 16-level enhancement to arrive at an appropriate sentence. Mr. Soto-Robledo relies not only on the alleged unfairness of the 16-level enhancement, but also on the alleged failure to adequately consider mitigating factors. According to Mr. Soto-Robledo, these factors deserved greater weight. But the district court has the discretion to balance mitigating factors, such as cultural assimilation. See United States v. Galarza-Payan, 441 F.3d 885, 889-90 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Alvarez-Bernabe, 626 F.3d at 1167

    ### Response:
    holding that a 57month sentence for illegal reentry was substantively reasonable rejecting the defendants effort to rebut the presumption of reasonableness based on evidence of cultural assimilation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    so disabled. The second certified question asks us to construe the legal disability statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106, to determine whether its provisions toll the statute of limitations for individuals of unsound mind when that person’s legal representative accepts responsibility for the injured person’s tort claims arising out of a single incident. As noted above, the statute of limitations for actions for injuries to the person is one year. TenmCode Ann. § 28-8 — 104(a)(1) (2000). However, Tennessee’s legal disability statute provides that: [i]f the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of eighteen (18) years, or of unsound mind, such person, or such person’s representatives and pri 590, 592 (Minn.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); Sacchi v. Blodig, 215 Neb. 817, 341 N.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that appointment of a conservator does not remove a mentally disabled persons legal disability so as to start the statute of limitations running
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judge announces that she has denied a group of motions, and this group includes the Insureds’ motion to strike as untimely the Reply Evidence. The trial judge further states that she had set the Motion for submission on March 18, 2005, and that counsel knew about this setting. No party challenges this statement, states that the court did not re-set the submission date, expresses surprise that the trial court had set the Motion for submission on that date, or objects to any alleged lack of notice that the submission date had been re-set. The trial court also announces that it is granting the Motion. The Insureds’ counsel complains that the Reply Evidence had been on file for less than ten days before the submission date for the Motio S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, pet denied) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the timeliness of the Reply Evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that trial courts resetting of hearing date for motion for summary judgment made timely summaryjudgment evidence that had been untimely based on hearing date in effect when the evidence was filed and served
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    5708, can justify a contrary result. We decline to accept Cooper’s invitation to place the burden on the defendant to request a nominal damages instruction. Cooper was the party seeking a finding of actual injury and, as such, bore the responsibility of requesting a nominal damages instruction if it wanted the jury to consider that option. Of course, Cooper may well have decided for tactical reasons that it did not want the jury to consider that option. But whether Cooper failed to request an instruction on nominal damages by choice or inadvertence, it should bear the consequences. Because Cooper did not request such an instruction, it cannot now contend that we should infer a finding of nominal damages. See Walker v. Anderson Electrical Connectors, 944 F.2d 841, 844-45 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 1043, 122

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of nominal damages when she had failed to request them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statutory sodomy, and it does pot consist of an attempt to commit the latter offense. Thus, first-degree sexiial misconduct as defined by section 566.090 does not satisfy any of the subparts of section 566.046.1(2) and therefore is not a lesser included offense of first-degree statutory sodomy. Our holding is consistent with State v. Greenlee, 327 S.W.3d 602, 621 (Mo.App. E.D. 2010), in which this Court held that first-degree sexual misconduct, as defined by section 566.090 is not a.lesser included offense of first-degree statutory sodomy because the former requires proof of “lack of consent.” Id. Ward’s argument is based entirely on the principle that a person under the age of fourteen can never legally consent to any kind of sexual activity. State v. Stokely, 842 S.W.2 Mo.banc 1965) (<HOLDING>); State v. Baker, 276 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Mo. banc

    ### Response:
    holding that intent and motive play but little if any part in statutory rape
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were offered or admitted in evidence. 3 . It is not clear from this record why the final hearing occurred two months after service on Ducatt. 4 . Jusseaume offered this testimony without objection. 5 . If one party’s cross-examination of the other could result in harassment, intimidation, or threats, the court may exercise its discretion to constrain that cross-examination. See M.R. Evid. 611(a)(3) (“The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence on direct and cross-examination so as to ... protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”). ""[Tjrial judges retain wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on ... cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, p 5 (1997) (<HOLDING>). There is no allegation here, however, that

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may take steps to minimize fear in a child witness if the court finds that the child would be substantially traumatized in a way that compels the limitation of confrontation rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in a case involving a yielding motorcyclist-rather than section 41-6a-904, which requires vehicles to yield to emergency vehicles and includes a subsection stating this does not eliminate the duty of emergency vehicle operators to others on the road-when considering an emergency vehicle operator's duty, further affirming this conclusion. Willden v. Duchesne Cnty., 2009 UT App 213, 193, 4, 6-15, 217 P.3d 1143. 16 . Urtag Cons § 41-6a-212(1)(b). 17 . See Richards, 2012 UT 14, ¶ 23, 274 P.3d 911. 18 . See, eg., Estate of Day v. Willis, 897 P.2d 78, 81 n. 7 (Alaska 1995) (""We do not interpret these sections as establishing a duty to protect fleeing offenders. Rather, these provisions focus on the safety of innocent third parties.""); Bryant v. Beary, 766 So.2d 1157, 1160 (Fla.Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>); City of Winder v. McDougald, 276 Ga. 866, 583

    ### Response:
    holding that these statutes are not intended to create a duty where none exists but to preserve any that do exist
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    injuries to children who may have fallen therein.... ” Neal v. Home Builders, 232 Ind. 160, 111 N.E.2d 280, 286 (1953) (quoting 38 AmJur. § 151), reh’g denied. Thus, the risk of falling from a height to the ground or of falling into an excavation, pit, or ditch is considered obvious and, therefore, generally precludes the application of the doctrine. See 62 Am. JuR.2d § 352. However, certain exceptions have been made in cases where a dangerous condition was concealed, where the structure from which the child fell was defective, where there existed a distracting influence which made it likely that the child would not appreciate the danger, or where the child was too young to appreciate any risk. See id. at § 353; see also Greene v. Di Fazio, 148 Conn. 419, 424, 171 A.2d 411, 414 (1961) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the parties dispute the

    ### Response:
    holding that the jury could find that a nine year old boy did not realize the risk of falling fiom a plank over an open stairwell in a house under construction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would still be John’s though ‘apples and oranges’ are listed before pears. The comma after ‘apples and oranges’ is not a period, it’s a comma. They are still ‘John’s ... pears.’ It is illogical to say otherwise. Also, the apples, oranges, kiwis, and pears are still John’s though ‘fruit’ appears in the middle of the statement and is a term that overlaps the others. Appellants’ Reply Brief at 7. To the extent that the Haires argue that “the entire list of categories is controlled by the possessive ‘its,’ ” we observe that the list includes “riders,” “motorcycle owners,” “mechanics and pit crew, and owners and lessees of premises,” Appellants’ Appendix at 47, and the plain language of the Release does not reveal whether these entities are or are not owned by or separate from Haspin 1267 (<HOLDING>). The Haires also argue that Donald was not in

    ### Response:
    holding that contradictory references clouded the intent of the document parol evidence may be utilized to determine the parties true intentions respecting the documents application and that the entry of summary judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a factual determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    549 S.W.2d 698, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (reversing and remanding because trial court erroneously overruled motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence); see also Tex. R. App. P. 21.3 (setting out grounds for granting a new trial, many of which refer to newly discovered evidence). In addition, if trial counsel is aware of exculpatory evidence that is not effectively used at trial, the defendant can make an ineffective claim in his motion for new trial. Tex. R. App. P. 21.7 (the court “may receive evidence by affidavit or otherwise”). Finally, counsel can be deficient when he fails to object to erroneous language in a jury charge. Willis v. State, No. 06-02-00108-CR, 2003 WL 21524704 (Tex. App.-Texarkana July 8, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); McDade v. State, No. 06-01-00134-CR, 2002 WL

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure of defense counsel to object to erroneous punishment charge authorizing an illegal sentence is ineffective assistance of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As stated above, the Ninth Circuit generally takes a broader view, and often finds that expert testimony is appropriate regarding the objective substantial similarity of literary works. See Olson, 855 F.2d at 1449; Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.1977). Nonetheless, several Ninth Circuit cases have recognized the limitations of expert testimony in this area. See Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir.2003) (upholding the district court’s decision to disregard the parties’ expert reports where the court engaged in an extensive analysis of the alleged similarities in expressive elements of the works and ""neither expert opinion [was] very relevant to the conclusions drawn by the court”); Olson, 855 F.2d at 1450-51 (<HOLDING>); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts decision to discount expert testimony was appropriate where the expert deemphasized dissimilarities between the works and compared scenes a faire
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    believe that an interlocutory appeal may be taken from a pretrial ruling in a criminal case that denies any relief sought on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause. We disagree. [A defendant] is not entitled to an interlocutory appeal to avoid whatever slight increment of strain, embarrassment, or expense might arise from having to defend against allegations made or evidence presented in connection with a court on which trial will in any event occur.”); United States v. Gulledge, 739 F.2d 582, 586 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Unlike the defendant in Abney, Gulledge will undergo a second trial regardless of our ruling .... Consequently, full protection of his fifth amendment right does not depend on appellate review at this time.”); United States v. Head, 697 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1982) (<HOLDING>). Significantly, in this case, Pickering did

    ### Response:
    holding no jurisdiction under abney when appeal even if successful could only lessen and not wholly remove the possibility of conviction upon being again tried
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    they ignored the obvious warning signs of the alleged mispricings by Smirloek of the funds portfolios.” The examples of such “obvious warning signs” provided by Appaloosa and Tepper are: “significant inconsistencies in markets in which Smirloek invested for the funds; significant discrepancies in securities valuations from different dealers for the funds’ portfolio securities; and the substitution of the prices of more valuable securities for those of less valuable securities in the funds’ portfolio valuations.” As further support for their allegation of conscious misbehavior or recklessness, Appaloosa and Tepper contend that the James River Defendants “failed to institute any meaningful systems of internal controls over Smirl 9 CIV. 8761, 2000 WL 977673, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that here, the facts alleged

    ### Response:
    holding that scienter had not adequately been pled where the plaintiffs provided none of the required facts underlying the complaints allegations as to the information that was supposedly available to the individual defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    first year. DOT, meanwhile, continued to forward the balance of the commissions, minus a percentage for administrative costs, to the Commonwealth's Bureau of Blindness and Visual Services. (DOT’s brief at 4.) 12 . As noted previously, DOT terminated each of the five contracts effective January 14, 1990. Accordingly, the contracts for Site 55, Site 56, Site 62 and Site F were in the second renewal period at the time of termination; only the contract for Site 61 was still in the first renewal period. 13 . See also Central Transportation, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Cambria County, 490 Pa. 486, 417 A.2d 144 (1980); Citizen Care, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 118 Pa.Cmwlth. 397, 545 A.2d 455 (1988). But see Spatz v. Nascone, 368 F.Supp. 352 (W.D.Pa.1973) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Although it is true, as DOT argues in

    ### Response:
    holding that where a contract results from joint efforts of attorneys for both sides contract should not be construed against either party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    783 A.2d 543, 557 n. 54 (Del.2001); Security First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d at 568; Mattes v. Checkers Drive-In Rests., Inc., 2001 WL 337865, at *5 (Del.Ch.); Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., 2001 WL 1334182, at *3; Sahagen Satellite Tech. Group, LLC v. Ellipso, Inc., 791 A.2d 794, 796 (Del.Ch. 2000). 42 . The ""credible basis” standard is also settled law in those states that look to Delaware law for guidance on matters of corporation law. See, e.g., Arctic Fin. Corp. v. OTR Express, Inc., 272 Kan. 1326, 38 P.3d 701, 703-04 (2002) (looking to Security First and Thomas & Betts for guidance regarding a books and records inspection under Kansas law); Towle v. Robinson Springs Corp., 168 Vt. 226, 719 A.2d 880, 882 (1998) ( , 2001 WL 1334182, at *4 (Del.Ch.) (<HOLDING>); Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 2001 WL 818173,

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffshareholders demonstrated a credible basis for its  220 claim tjhrough the testimony of their two trial witnesses and the documents introduced as evidence regarding the actions of the corporations board of directors through evidence of suspicious expense figures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disbursing the $65,000. Moreover, even if it were to be assumed that federal common law does not govern the perfection of MHFA’s security interest, see supra note 11, the same result would obtain under Massachusetts law. In Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Boston Harbor Marina Co., 159 B.R. 616 (D.Mass.1993), the district court held that a Massachusetts mortgagee which recorded its assignment of rents in the registry of deeds as an adjunct to its mortgage, “perfected” its lien in the rents so as to constitute the rents “cash collateral” under Bankruptcy Code § 363(a), and that there was no need for the creditor to take possession of the real property (e.g., as by foreclosure) or the rents (e.g., as by appointment of a receiver) prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id. at 620-22 (<HOLDING>); see also H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st

    ### Response:
    recognizing distinction between perfection which governs secured creditors rights against third parties and enforcement of liens which controls creditors rights against its debtor rejecting theory that such inchoate or unenforced security interests are voidable under bankruptcy code  544a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    District of California. Before turning to the relative merits of these venues, the court addresses two disputed legal issues between the parties: whether the venue provision of Title VII commands greater deference to a plaintiffs choice of forum and affects the section 1404(a) analysis, and whether the venue provision impl 3 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying section 1404(a) to a Title VII action); Harrison v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 807 F.Supp. 1513, 1516-17 (D.Or.1992) (same); Dean v. Handysoft Corp., 2005 WL titled to greater deference where a case arises under Title VII. Congress expanded the available fora to plaintiffs grieving civil rights violations, thereby expressing intent to broaden a Title VII plaintiffs choice of forum. See Passantino, 212 F.3d at 504 (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Where venue is governed

    ### Response:
    holding that title viis broad venue provision was necessary to support the desire of congress to afford citizens full and easy redress of civil rights grievances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recreational facilities ***.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 85, par. 3 — 106.) Section 3 — 106 applies to situations where a municipality fails to maintain property under its control intended for recreational use by allowing an unsafe condition to exist. Section 3 — 106, unlike section 3— 102, contemplates liability only if the governmental unit or employee acts in a willful and wanton manner. Pursuant to section 3— 106, there is no municipal liability for negligence resulting in injuries occurring on public property intended for recreational purposes, unless the local public entity is guilty of willful and wanton conduct. Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 501. Accord Jarvis v. Herrin City Park District (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 516, 285 N.E.2d 564 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff first argues that defendant has no

    ### Response:
    holding that a forest preserve will be liable for injuries only in the case of willful and wanton negligence that proximately causes such injuries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plaintiff provides no evidence — other than her own bare allegations of futility — that requesting a second claim review would have been “clearly useless.” Such bare allegations of futility are simply insufficient to defeat defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See Rando, 1999 WL 317497, at *4 (granting summary judgment to an ERISA defendant when plaintiff responded to defendant’s summary judgment motion with unsupported allegations of futility). Moreover, the record indicates that the second claim review would have been conducted by different individuals than the first claim review, and that fact is also sufficient to preclude the court from finding that any further review would have been futile. See Getting v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 108 F.Supp.2d 1200, 1203 (D.Kan.2000) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 2001 WL 201966. For these reasons, the

    ### Response:
    holding that the fact that different individuals could have conducted the subsequent review of denial of benefits was itself sufficient to preclude a finding futility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    75 Fed.Reg. 8747-01 (Feb. 25, 2010). At the time the bankruptcy petition was filed in this case in December 2007, the relevant dollar amount was $136,875. 16 . “Dependent” is defined in § 522 to include a spouse. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(1). 17 . Id. § 522(p)(l)(D). 18 . H.R. Rep. 109-31, pt. 1, at 15-16 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 102, cited by In re Rogers, 513 F.3d at 227. 19 .11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(2)(B). 20 . Id. § 541(a)(2). 21 . 461 U.S. 677, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983). 22 . Id. at 680, 687, 103 S.Ct. 2132. 23 . Id. at 697, 103 S.Ct. 2132 (quoting U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1; U.S. Const, amend. XVI) 24 . See generally 11 U.S.C. § 363. 25 . Id. § 363(g). 26 . Id. § 363(h). 27 . See Laster v. First Huntsville Properties Co., 826 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tex.1991) (<HOLDING>); Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 161 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that former wifes interest in her homestead was held in cotenancy with a mortgagee who succeeded to her former husbands 2617 fee simple interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jerry Crawford.” Complaint, ¶ VII. May further stated that “because the sexual harassment caused Plaintiff to leave her employment and because the said harassment interfered with her advancement within the company, the sexual harassment claimed in the Plaintiffs complaint did, in fact, result in a tangible job detriment.” Response Brief at 2. Here, the court agrees with Autozone that May has not suffered- any tangible employment action, as that term is defined above. When an employee quits, even when under stressful or undesirable conditions, it simply is not a company act. May was not fired, and has presented no evidence that she was passed over for a promotion, reassigned, or given any change in benefits. See Young v. R.R. Morrison & Son, Inc., 159 F.Supp.2d 921, 924 (N.D.Miss.2000) (<HOLDING>). The court is of the opihion, that with regard

    ### Response:
    holding that because plaintiff chose to leave her employer she did not suffer any tangible employment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial. In Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (1980), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute which gave health care arbitration panels original jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims. The court based its decision on statistical evidence that the delays involved in processing claims under the statutory procedures oppressively burdened the right of a jury trial so as to “ ‘make the right practically unavailable,’ ” concluding that the actual operation of the arbitration procedure was not “ ‘reasonably designed to effectuate the desired objective’ of affording ‘the plaintiff a swifter adjudication of his claim, at a minimal cost.’ ” Id. 421 A.2d at 195 (quoting Parker v. Children’s Hosp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932, 939 (1978) (<HOLDING>)). In concluding, the court narrowed its

    ### Response:
    holding that statute was too new to determine whether its actual operation resulted in unconstitutional infringement on jury trial right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “purposeful and deliberate attempt ... to suppress dissent within the union.” Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir.1973); Cotter, 753 F.2d at 229 (2d Cir.1985). This is because “the rights of union members to belong to an open democratic labor organization are infringed” when a “dominant group •strives to stifle dissent and efforts at reform” through removal of a political opponent from office. Adams-Lundy v. Association of Professional Flight Attendants, 731 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir.1984). To fall within this exception, a plaintiff must present “clear and convincing proof’ that her dismissal was “part of a series of oppressive acts by the union leadership that directly threaten the freedom of members to speak out.” Cotter, 753 F.2d at 229; see also Schonfeld, 477 F.2d at 904 (<HOLDING>). In the past, we have allowed such claims to

    ### Response:
    holding that to state a cause of action the alleged scheme to suppress dissent must be evident either in the established history or articulated policy of the union
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    security if [it] is a security issued by an investment company that is registered, or that has filed a registration statement, under the Investment.Company Act of 1940.” 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2). The Second Circuit recently stated that a variable insurance product is a “covered security” under SLUSA when: (1) it is a “security”; and (2) the separate accounts used for marketing the product are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See Lander, 251 F.3d at 109. First, the plaintiffs variable universal life insurance policy is a “security” because it invests in mutual funds which are regulated by the SEC. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 70-72, 79 S.Ct. 618, 621-22, 3 L.Ed.2d 640 (1959) (<HOLDING>); Lander, 251 F.3d at 109 (same). See also

    ### Response:
    holding that a variable annuity is properly classified as a security
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is critical in discerning the source of a victim’s injuries by excluding other possible causes of injury. Further, this Court is satisfied a victim’s motive in making a statement excluding a possible source of her injuries is consistent with promoting her treatment for those injuries. Thus, Appellant’s claim that the answer did not meet KRE 803(4) is simply incorrect. Of greater concern is Appellant’s claim that the statement improperly identified him as the victim’s assailant. Under KRE 803(4), “the general rule is that the identity of the perpetrator is not relevant to treatment or diagnosis.” Colvard, 309 S.W.3d at 244. This Court has a long history of finding this type of hearsay extremely prejudicial when repeated by a professional on the stand. See Colvard, 309 S.W.3d at 247 (<HOLDING>); Sharp v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 542, 545

    ### Response:
    recognizing extreme prejudice and reversible error due to physicians testimony repeating hearsay of alleged victim of sexual abuse identifying defendant as alleged perpetrator
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    view of the unsettled state of the law on this issue, IBM’s adoption of the position that it viewed as favorable to itself, and its decision to raise the issue as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, was not unreasonable (imprudent, perhaps, but not unreasonable). Therefore, TM’s motion in limine to prevent IBM from asserting a defense under § 1498 is denied and the amendment is allowed. 5. TM’s motion for sanctions as per Fed.R.Civ. , 57 F.Supp.2d 961 (C.D.Cal.1999) (surveying the caselaw and holding that § 1498 is jurisdictional as to governmental defendants and, in the case of private defendants, establishes an affirmative defense that must be timely asserted). 2 . See Croll-Reynolds Co. v. Perini-Leavell-Jones-Vinell, 399 F.2d 913 (5th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1050, 89 S.Ct. 688, 21

    ### Response:
    holding that the accused item was used by the government under an older version of  1498 and that therefore the only remedy was a suit against the united states in the court of claims now the court of federal claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.1994); Ruston Gas Turbines, 9 F.3d at 418. The “minimum contacts” aspect of due process can be satisfied by either finding specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction. See Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647. If the conduct of a defendant that supports personal jurisdiction is related to a stated cause of action, personal jurisdiction is known as “specific jurisdiction.” See Ruston Gas Turbines, 9 F.3d at 418-19. The minimum contacts prong for specific jurisdiction can be satisfied by a single act if the nonresident defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit and protection of its laws.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant establishes minimum contacts by purposely engaging in conduct directed toward the forum state such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The second question we must address is whether the plaintiffs’ cause of action is time-barred. The district court addressed both the general five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims found at Ark.Code Ann. § 16-56-111(b), and the general three-year statute of limitations for constructive fraud claims found at Ark.Code Ann. § 16-56-105(3), and concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims were not barred under either statute. We agree with the district court’s conclusion, but not with its reasoning. Hav ing determined that NEI may be subject to liability for the original developer’s obligations pursuant to the Arkansas TimeShare Act, we conclude that Time-Share Act’s statute of limitations governs this action. See Shelton v. Fiser, 340 Ark. 89, 8 S.W.3d 557, 560 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The Time-Share Act actually contains two

    ### Response:
    holding that under arkansas law a specific statute of limitations involving the particular subject matter governs over more general statutes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    after a juror indicated that the verdict did not represent her individual verdict, and Muller asserted that the evide 6, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (concluding that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when, without probable cause, they seized the defendant from a neighbor’s home and transported him to the police station for interrogation without telling him he was free to go); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724-28, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969) (ruling that an unreasonable seizure occurred when police brought the defendant to the police station without probable cause, a warrant, or his consent for fingerprinting and brief questioning before he was released); see also Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 631-33, 123 S.Ct. 1843, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1491 (3d Cir.

    ### Response:
    holding that police executed an illegal arrest when they took a teenage suspect from his home and brought him in handcuffs to the police station for questioning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So.2d 401, 402 (Fla.1978), to define statutes of repose and distinguish them from statutes of limitations). Consistent with their function, statutes of repose are understood to set “an outer limit beyond which [claims] may not be instituted.” Hess, 175 So.3d at 695. As such, they are generally regarded as establishing an absolute bar to the filing of any claim after the expiration of the repose period and as being immune to the efforts of claimants to avoid-it. See, e.g., May v. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, 1156 (Fla.2000) (describing nonclaim statute in the probate code as' a statute of repose and as creating “a self-executing, absolute immunity to claims”); Sabal Chase Homeowners Ass’n v. Walt Disney World Co., 726 So.2d 796, 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). On its face, section 726.110 is a repose

    ### Response:
    holding that statute of repose was not subject to toiling provision applicable to statute of limitations because among other reasons it would ignore fundamental distinctions between ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of paternity as if it were any other regulatory issue entrusted to that administrative body, judicial review of a decision of great importance affecting matters beyond the scope of the agency’s purview will have been significantly curtailed. Our common understanding of the essential nature of the parent-child relationship is such that we do not easily countenance the possibility that a person could be considered a child in one context, but not in another. However, if the question of paternity is decided by an administrative body — particularly one that is uneasy or ill-equipped to make the decision — there is the unwelcome possibility of different determinations of parentage in different fora. See Oubre v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 680 A.2d 699, 703 (D.C.1993) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, unless the governing statute has a

    ### Response:
    recognizing exception to application of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles to decisions of administrative proceedings where there has been manifest error in the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    primary arguments why the district court’s sentence should be vacated. First, Hernandez contends that because the sentencing guidelines are advisory after Booker, a district court has discretion as to how and when it determines § 3553(f) eligibility. Second, Hernandez argues that because § 3553(f) contains mandatory language, it is invalid after Booker, Hernandez’s Hoofcer-based challenges are foreclosed by recent Ninth Circuit opinions in United States v. Hernandez-Castro, 473 F.3d 1004, 1005-06 (9th Cir.2007), where we held that § 3553(f)(1) was not “rendered advisory by Booker,” and United States v. Cardenas-Juarez, 469 F.3d 1331, 1334-35 (9th Cir.2006), where we held that despite its mandatory language, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) survives Booker, and if triggered 336-37 (8th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Echeverri-Jaramillo, 777

    ### Response:
    holding that possession of the equivalent of 279 pounds of marijuana valued at 279000 dollars justified the district courts refusal to provide a lesser included instruction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “require” tracked section 7B1.3(f)’s provision that a revocation sentence “shall be ordered to be served consecutively” to the sentence for the new criminal offense. See USSG § 7B1.3 (1990); see also USSG § 7B1.3 (2011) (same). As noted above, the Guidelines in effect when Head committed the underlying offense included no requirement or presumption of consecutive prison terms upon revocation of supervised release. See USSG ch. 7 (1988). Unconstrained by section 7B1.3(f), the district court had discretion under the 1988 Guidelines and the general guidance offered by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e), and 3584 to impose either a consecutive or concurrent sentence. See United States v. Ayers, 795 F.3d 168, 172 (D.C.Cir.2015); see also United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 852 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Reliance on section 7B1.3(f) here created at

    ### Response:
    holding in agreement with fourth fifth seventh eighth ninth and eleventh circuits that courts general sentencing discretion under 18 usc  3584 authorizes district courts revoking supervised release to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    829 S.W.2d at 271-72. 23 . Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Texas v. Texoma Directional Drilling Co., 622 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ). 24 . Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. McManus, 633 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex.1982). 25 . See Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 387 S.W.2d at 24 (disagreeing with the Court of Civil Appeals who held that a court must look beyond the pleadings and policy); Brooks, Tarlton, Gilbert, Douglas & Kressler v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1358, 1367-68 (5th Cir.1987) (applying Texas law to hold that the proper question in determining duty is not what could have been pled, but what was pled). 26 . Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 633 S.W.2d at 788. 27 . Houston Petroleum Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 830 1464 (N.D.Cal.1992) (<HOLDING>); Qualman v. Bruckmoser, 163 Wis.2d 361, 471

    ### Response:
    holding that claims alleging negligent misrepresentation and failure to disclose seek economic damages not property damages within insureds policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    estoppel claim dismissed because Cornell fails to identify any promise any of the Individual Defendants made. I agree with the Individual Defendants. As I noted above, the only basis that exists for Cornell’s promissory estop pel claim is the sewage facility agreement and the surrounding promises. See supra Part IV.E. In the complaint, Cornell only alleges that the Borough made the promises regarding the dedication of the facility and the reimbursement of Cornell’s expenses. See Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 31, 33-34, 148. Cornell does not claim that any of the Individual Defendants made any of these or other promises. Accordingly, I will dismiss the promissory estoppel claim against the Individual Defendants. See Crouse v. Cyclops Industries, 560 Pa. 394, 745 A.2d 606, 610 (2000) (<HOLDING>). E. Immunity Defenses The Individual

    ### Response:
    holding that the first element of a promissory estoppel claim is the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected to induce action emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    articulate its intent. Moreover, we can imagine an altogether rational reason the legislature might decide to write a statute with a strict Hability punishment provision. As Judge Staton wrote for the Court of Appeals, ""A dealer's lack of knowledge of his proximity to the schools does not make the illegal drug any less harmful to the youth in whose hands it may eventually come to rest."" Williford v. State, 571 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). Accordingly, we hold that the conviction was not deficient for failure to prove that Walker knew he was within 1,000 feet of a school when he committed the crime. Walker also argues that the evidence of dealing was insufficient because he did not have the $20 bill given to him by Witten in his possession at the time of his arrest. In ligh 988) (<HOLDING>) (collecting cases); Mullins v. State, 486

    ### Response:
    holding obscenity statute required proof of scienter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Article 78.” (citing N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 89)). Accordingly, plaintiffs claim that defendant Pickering violated FOIL will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Section 1983. 7. First Amendment Mail Interference The First Amendment protects an inmate’s right to send and receive both legal and nonlegal mail, although prison officials may regulate that right if the restrictions they employ are “ ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’ ” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)); see also Johnson v. Goord, 445 F.3d 532, 534 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Legal mail is entitled to

    ### Response:
    holding that prisoners do have a right  albeit a limited one  to send and receive mail
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    physician. The physician that treated Street testified as to the adequacy of Street’s care. Street offers only his own conclusory statements to the contrary. ""[Ijnadequate prison medical care violate[s] the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause [only when it amounts to] 'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners'”. Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1978 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). Street's medical needs were met. While there is evidence that Street had requested more medical care (i.e., pain medication prior to his hospital visit), ""there is no evidence that [the defendants] either w[ere] aware of or had any responsibility for this lack of medical attention.” Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 155 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 14 . In Farmer, the Court noted, ""At what

    ### Response:
    holding failure to check medical records of inmate that eventually died to be mere negligence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    medical care. We disagree. As the magistrate judge noted, in order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide medical care, a plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that “(1) the harm to the plaintiff was objectively serious; and (2) the official was deliberately indifferent to her health or safety.” Board, 394 F.3d at 478, accord Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-37, 114 S.Ct. 1970. At the evidentiary hearing Pinkston failed to establish either prong of this long-standing test. Initially, we note this court has held that injuries, such as those alleged by Pinkston — a split lip and a swollen cheek— do not rise to the level of an objectively serious medical need. For example, in Davis v. Jones, this court held that a one-inch laceration to an arrestee’s templ Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

    ### Response:
    holding that we will not secondguess the credibility determinations of a trial judge because he or she has the opportunity to observe the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the witnesses focusing on the subjects reactions and responses to the interrogatories their facial expressions attitudes tone of voice eye contact posture and body movements  as  well as confused or nervous speech patterns in contrast with merely looking at the cold pages of an appellate record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Smith, 718 F.2d at 1276 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)). The reasonable doubt instruction in this case, viewed in the context of the charge as a whole, diluted this burden by creating a standard that “could mislead [the members of the court-martial] into finding no reasonable doubt when in fact there was some.” Holland, 348 U.S. at 140, 75 S.Ct. at 138. The strongest language in the charge that might serve to correct this impression, that stating that “[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt means proof to a moral certainty,” see United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333, 1347-48 (10th Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936, 94 S.Ct. 1934, 40

    ### Response:
    holding that moral certainty language compensated for willing to act language in an otherwise proper reasonable doubt instruction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the plain language of the public disclosure bar to hold that ""[i]t does not deny jurisdiction over actions based on disclosures other than those specified”); United States ex rel. O’Keeffe v. Sverdup Corp., 131 F.Supp.2d 87, 91 (D.Mass.2001). 71 .LeBlanc I, 913 F.2d at 20. 72 . See Mathews, 166 F.3d at 863-64; United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (4th Cir.1994); O'Keeffe, 131 F.Supp.2d at 92; United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 874 F.Supp. 35, 40 (D.Mass.1995) (""LeBlanc II""). 73 . O’Keeffe, 131 F.Supp.2d at 92 (quoting United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d Cir.1992)) (emphasis in original); see also United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 386-88 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of

    ### Response:
    holding that a qui tam action is based upon a qualifying disclosure if the disclosure sets out either the allegations advanced in the qui tam action or all of the essential elements of the qui tam actions claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    7 Sexuality Res. & Soc. Pol’y 176, 186, 188 (2010) (noting that in a national survey, 95 percent of gay men and 84 percent of lesbian women reported that they “had little or no choice about their sexual orientation.”). Finally, Plaintiffs note that homosexual citizens constitute a minority group that lacks sufficient political power to protect themselves against discriminatory laws. In fact, the history of same-sex marriage bans across the nation illustrates the historical lack of political power possessed by gays and lesbians. Plaintiffs point out that not only do homosexuals fit all factors to be considered a suspect classification, but in fact, several courts have already admitted as much. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 480-84 (9th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>); see also Pedersen, 881 F.Supp.2d at 294

    ### Response:
    holding use of peremptory strike against gay juror failed heightened scrutiny
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Eastern District of Texas, the plaintiffs choice of venue. Nintendo informed the district court that the majority of NOA’s relevant documents are located within the transferee venue. The record also shows that all of Nintendo’s research and development documents are located in Kyoto, Japan. Notwithstanding this evidence, the district court assumed that Nintendo’s relevant documents were equally spread between its headquarters in Japan and Washington, and minor satellite offices in California and New York. By including these minor offices in the equation, the trial court hypothesized that the Eastern District of Texas could serve as a centralized location. This court has already questioned this type of reasoning in another case involving the Eastern District of Texas. See id. at 1344 (<HOLDING>). Because most evidence resides in Washington

    ### Response:
    holding that it is improper to consider the centralized location of the eastern district of texas when no identified witness resides in the district
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    true or false. Certainly, different members of the general public might provide different specific definitions of this term or might emphasize different factors in assessing whether housing is “decent, safe, and sanitary.” However, the fact that each individual's exact definition of the meaning of this phrase might differ does not undermine the proposition that the general meaning of the concept is commonly understood. As we have noted in another, quite different context, despite the fact that certain words or phrases might “strike distinct chords in individual jurors,” they can nevertheless have a “plain meaning of sufficient content that the discretion left to the jury” is “no more than that inherent in the jury system itself.” Milton v. Procunier, 744 F.2d 1091, 1096 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); see also James v. Collins, 987 F.2d 1116,

    ### Response:
    holding that the texas capital sentencing scheme is permissibly applied when the sentencing jury evaluates the terms deliberately probability criminal acts of violence and continuing threat to society without any specific definitions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    process that would reflect a lower cost than others ” (emphasis added)). The harm BBSSI will suffer outweighs the harm to defendant and to CMR. 4. Whether Injunctive Relief Is in the Public Interest BBSSI asserts that “Safeguarding the integrity of the procurement process is a matter of high public interest that is best served by enjoining arbitrary and capricious agency action, or action generally inconsistent with procurement law and regulations.” Pl.’s Mot. 31. Defendant describes the “detrimental impact” upon the military as “severe” if injunctive relief is awarded, noting that there exists a strong public interest in not interfering with an agency’s procurement process. Def.’s Mot. 31. CMR argues that the public interest is not served “by issuing contrac Fed.Cl. 431, 434 (2005) (<HOLDING>). The public interest was compromised by the

    ### Response:
    recognizing the publics interest in receiving the best value in public services
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    need not be treated as an •element required to be found by the jury suggests that the same fact need not be treated as an element that is required to be alleged in the charging instrument. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 568, 122 S.Ct. 2406 (stating that factor increasing a defendant’s minimum sentence “need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt”). The symmetry between charging and fact finding suggested by Apprendi has not been universally embraced. Some courts have concluded that the notice guarantee of the Sixth Amendment may be satisfied with respect to a fact that is an element under Apprendi by means other than an allegation in the charging instrument. See, e.g., State v. Nichols, 201 Ariz. 234, 33 P.3d 1172, 1176 (Ariz.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>). But other courts have followed the line of

    ### Response:
    holding that facts related to commission of offense necessary to establish eligibility for enhanced penalty of life imprisonment need not be alleged in the charging document provided that the notice of them given to the defendant comports with arizonas traditional notice requirements for alleging sentence enhancements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to the search. She also assigned error to certain of the trial court’s findings of fact. Although the Court of Appeals held that Ellen consented to the search, it did not address her challenge to the trial court’s findings. She did F.2d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding the validity of a warrantless search where the defendant was present and did not consent, but his wife did consent, because the rule developed in Mat-lock did not depend on the defendant’s absence); People v. Sanders, 904 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Colo. 1995) (“The valid consent of a person with ‘common authority’ will justify a warrantless search of a residence despite the physical presence of a nonconsenting co-occupant.”); State v. Frame, 45 Or. App. 723, 609 P.2d 830, 833 (1980) (<HOLDING>); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A

    ### Response:
    holding that the consent to search given by the defendants wife and cohabitant was an effective consent because it was consistent with the rationale set forth in united states v matlock
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has also held that nervousness alone does not constitute reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and grounds for detention. See Laime v. State, supra. Despite the fact that Lilley was shaking, he did not exhibit any additional signs of nervousness, such as an inability to maintain eye contact with Officer Bowman or evasiveness, prior to the conclusion of the traffic stop. Accordingly, his nervousness, without any other questionable circumstances, would not constitute reasonable suspicion. Nor does there appear to be anything inherently suspicious about using a rental car rented by a third party even when combined with the nervousness of the suspect. Certainly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agrees with that conclusion. See United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). In the case at hand, Lilley explained to the

    ### Response:
    holding that the totality of the circumstances failed to generate reasonable suspicion to warrant becks renewed detention where 1 beck was driving a rental car rented by an absent third party 2 the car was licensed in california 3 there was fastfood trash on the passengerside floorboard 4 there was no visible luggage in the passenger compartment of the car 5 beck had a nervous demeanor 6 becks trip was from a drugsource state to a drugdemand state and 7 the officer disbelieved becks explanation for the trip
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the part of the officers. Having concluded that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated any constitutional violation, it becomes unnecessary for us to consider whether the rights at issue were clearly established such that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 608, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). The district court correctly ruled that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Because the police officers did not violate Caricofe’s constitutional rights, the other defendants may not be held liable for failing to train or supervise those officers. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567,

    ### Response:
    holding that a municipality cannot be held liable for an official policy or custom if it has been determined that the individual defendants did not violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    letter. On March 22, 2001, Perch filed suit against the City of Quincy for sex and disability discrimination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, and for sex discrimination under the Equal Protection clause, on the basis of both CFS-related and cancer-related conduct. On November 30, 2001, the City of Quincy moved to dismiss Perch’s cancer-related discrimination claims. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court is to accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favora t from filing claims in court which allege different types of discrimination, or are based on materially different facts, from the administrative charge. See, e.g., Lattimore, 99 F.3d at 465 (<HOLDING>); Silva v. Hit or Miss, 73 F.Supp.2d 39, 41

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff could not add civil claim based upon different facts that are separate and distinct both qualitatively and temporally  and relate to the conduct of different individuals from facts in administrative charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and denied the rest. On March 1, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint in this Court alleging ERISA violations. After an extension of time, Defendants moved to dismiss on May 10, 2004. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on June 22, 2004. On October 14, 2004, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which does not modify Plaintiffs’ original claims, but merely adds a new Count V. Defendants have also moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. DISCUSSION A. Motion to Dismiss Standard For the purposes of the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court assumes that the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are true, unless such allegations are contradicted by documents referenced in the Complaint. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will be

    ### Response:
    holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that a defendant is “able to provide.” Id. ¶ 12. The statute in Keller is also part of a recoupment scheme whereby a state seeks to recover costs from providing court-appointed counsel to indigent defendants. not support her argument. The fact that Fuller and its progeny require a finding of ability to pay does not mean that one is required here because those cases concern whether schemes to exact payment for the costs of appointed counsel from criminal defendants unconstitutionally impinge upon the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Here, no constitutional right to counsel is implicated; the trial court instead ordered defendant to pay the costs of caring for her animals during the litigation. See State v. Diamondstone, 132 Vt. 303, 305, 318 A.2d 654, 656 (1974) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14. Defendant also cites State v. Haught,

    ### Response:
    holding that court not required to find ability to pay before imposing criminal fine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the law restricting third party beneficiary status remained unchanged by our decision in Montana. Accord Roedler v. Dept. of Energy, 255 F.3d 1347 (Fed.Cir.2001). Accordingly, because the shareholders did not stand to directly benefit under the contract, they are at most incidental beneficiaries of the contract with no rights to enforce the contract against the United States. We reverse the Court of Federal Claims summary judgment of liability in favor of the shareholders and remand the case so that the court may consider any remaining claims asserted by the shareholders. II. FDIC’s Breach of Contract Claims We review the Court of Federal Claims’ legal conclusion that the FDIC has asserted a justiciable claim de novo. See Alger v. United States, 741 F.2d 391, 393 (Fed.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Article III, section 2 of the United States

    ### Response:
    holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Company was forced kicking and screaming to settle.”); id. (""They are intent now on buying your vote.”). Compare Riley, 529 A.2d at 252. 22 . See, e.g„ id. at 1 (""They are so afraid of you finding out what they are up to.”); id. at 2 (""They haven’t disclosed any of this because they want you to think that they are doing this all on their own.”). 23 . Doe v. Cahill, 884 A,2d at 465 (noting the known unreliability of internet blogs and chat rooms). See also Riley, 529 A,2d at 252 (same for newspaper editorials); SunEnergy 1, LLC v. Brown, 2015 WL 7776625, at *4 (Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2015) (same for online reviews). 24 . Austin, 418 U.S, at 284, 94 S.Ct. 2770 (calling plaintiff a ""traitor"" in the course of a labor dispute was nonactionable opinion); Bresler, 398 U.S, at 14, 90 S.Ct. 1537 (<HOLDING>) 25 . Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 183-84

    ### Response:
    holding a characterization of a real estate developers position as blackmail to be nonactionable opinion because in context even the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole a vigorous epithet used by those who considered breslers negotiating position extremely unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    renewed his policy that was in effect on the date of the accident, March 24, 2006. From 2002 until the date of the accident, Murray never alleged that he attempted or recommended to place liquor liability coverage for Ennie. Considering these facts, Murray created an “unreasonable risk of harm” to Ennie at the earliest in the fall of 2002 and at the latest during the last policy renewal in December 2005. Any meeting between Poeng and Murray that occurred in 2006 regarding insurance coverage was a continuation of Murray’s wrongful act of failing to provide the proper coverage. As such, Murray’s wrongful acts did not occur “wholly after” the retroactive date of January 1, 2006. Therefore, we hold that Murray is not covered under the AAIC policy, and that the Dist 5, 627-28 (8th Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). Here, AAIC named Easter and Ennie in its

    ### Response:
    holding that an injured person having a possible claim against an insurer who has been made a party defendant to an action for declaratory judg ment possesses the requisite interest to be heard on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 704 F.Supp. 441, 447-448 (same); White v. Fed. Res. Bank (1995) 103 Ohio App.3d 534, 538-539 [660 N.E.2d 493, 496] (same); Osei-Bonsu v. Federal Home Loan Bank of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 726 F.Supp. 95, 97-98 (dealing with section 12 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, as amended, as codified at section 1432(a) of title 12 of the United States Code, its common designation, which, in line with the model of section 24, Fifth, grants a federal home loan bank the power to “dismiss” any of its officers, among others, “at pleasure” by its board of directors: holding to the effect that section 1432(a) has been impliedly amended by Title VII). But compare Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d 1093, 1100 (<HOLDING>). 5 In stating that section 24, Fifth, as

    ### Response:
    holding in the context of section 341 fifth that the mere existence of federal agediscrimination laws apparently including the adea does not create a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution in the form of job entitlements for government employees over a certain age
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (“Facial neutrality is not determinative .... The [Free Exercise] Clause forbids subtle departures from neutrality and covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In reaching this conclusion we do not suggest that “every religious sect or group within a prison— however few in number — must have identical facilities or personnel.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). But under Turner, neutrality must be ensured, or its absence sufficiently explained in light of a legitimate penologoical interest, for summary judgment to be appropriate. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415-16, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Hammer v. Ashcroft, 512 F.3d 961,

    ### Response:
    holding that turners neutrality requirement allows a prison policy to draw distinctions so long as those distinctions flow from the governments legitimate penological interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indispensable party. Id. This aspect of the opinion must not be overstated, as the court ultimately held that the patent owner did not transfer all of the substantial rights in the patent to the plaintiff; rather, it transferred only the right to license the patent to one specific (sub)lieensee. Id. at 1379-80. While the case was decided in the context of a Rule 19 dispute, the decision rested on the fact that none of the named plaintiffs had rights of ownership that created standing to sue. Alternatively, in one case requiring Rule 19 joinder of the holder of a reversionary right, the reversionary right was triggered upon the expiration of an agreement transferring all of the substantial rights of the patent. Moore U.S.A. Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 60 F.Supp.2d 104 (W.D.N.Y.1999) (<HOLDING>). In Moore, any extension of the agreement

    ### Response:
    holding that the assignor of a patent retained substantial rights in the patent and must be added as an indispensable party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    clearly established law. See Levine v. City of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir.2008) (“Under the defense of qualified immunity, a government official is immune from civil damages unless his conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known”); see also Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85 (clarifying that sincerity of prisoner’s religious beliefs, not objective doctrinal centrality of beliefs, determines whether Free Exercise Clause applies). The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on Campbell’s Equal Protection claim because Campbell did not present evidence indicating that he was similarly situated to inmates who were permitted to possess religious oil. See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 623 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Campbell’s remaining contentions are

    ### Response:
    holding that equal protection claim by prisoner lacked merit where prisoner not similarly situated to others who were permitted to engage in relevant conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for appellate review). As to the merits, we are troubled by the lack of evidence in the record regarding the authority of M.P.H. Holdings to initiate the supplemental proceedings. A plain reading of section 33-15-102(a) requires a foreign corporation to have a certificate of authority prior to initiating any action in this state. See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (“Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.”); see also Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 307 S.C. 33, 37, 413 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Although the master referred to section

    ### Response:
    holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporations capacity to sue but did not affect the courts subject matter jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2012). Parker did not advance the procedural error argument before the district court, and we therefore review it for plain error. Miller, 557 F.3d at 916. Having reviewed the sentencing transcript, we find no plain error in the district court’s consideration of the statutory factors or explanation of its sentence. The district court announced that it had considered the factors, and the colloquy with defense counsel indicated the district court was thinking about Parker’s specific history and characteristics. The court had detailed information regarding Parker’s history of supervision, criminal history, original offense of conviction, and the numerous violations of supervised release conditions. See United States v. Robinson, 516 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Nor is Parker’s within-Guidelines-range

    ### Response:
    holding that the context for appellate review is the entire sentencing rec ord
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    denied, 529 Pa. 625, 600 A.2d 541 (1991). Here, Licensee first argues that the trial court erred in determining that he had, in fact, refused the blood test, maintaining that, although he refused to sign the hospital consent form, he agreed to submit to the actual blood test. Although acknowledging that our holding in Smith would defeat this argument, Licensee urges that we reconsider that opinion, contending that, in Smith, this court exceeded its authority and usurped legislative authority by superimposing upon section 1547 the requirement that a licensee execute a hospital consent form. In Smith, we relied on the underlying principles expressed in Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Miller, 155 Pa.Cmwlth. 564, 625 A.2d 755 (Pa.Cmwlth.1993) (<HOLDING>), Lewis v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa.Cmwlth. 326,

    ### Response:
    holding that a request to the licensee to sign a consent form is not an impermissible precondition to testing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arise where, at some point, the factual detail in a complaint is so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Id. A plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” to show entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955; accord, e.g., Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231-32; Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir.2007) (the court is not “compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”) (quotations and citations omitted); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir.2005). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that rule 8 pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations but it demands more than an unadorned thedefendantunlawfullyharmedme accusation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Thus, at this stage of these proceedings, the Court must decide whether the Sykes are entitled to offer evidence to support their claims, not whether they will ultimately prevail. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In doing so, the Court may consider “official public records” that are relevant to the Sykes’ claims without converting Bayer’s motion to one for summary judgment. See Gasner v. County of Dinwiddle, 162 F.R.D. 280, 282 (E.D.Va.1995); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2509, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (<HOLDING>). III. First, the Sykes claim that Bayer is

    ### Response:
    holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the trial court erred in allowing the jury to award mental-anguish damages to the homeowners. Id. The Bowerses argue that, in a negligence case, the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff is not in a zone of danger, should be allowed to recover damages for mental anguish resulting from an incident that causes damage to property if the damage to the property is committed under circumstances of insult or contumely. See Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986). We disagree. Under Alabama law, it is well established that damages for mental anguish are not recoverable in tort where the tort results in mere injury to property unless the damage to property is committed under circumstances of insult or contumely. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Bush, 608 So.2d 361, 364 (Ala.1992) (<HOLDING>); Smith & Gaston Funeral Directors v. Wilson,

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff could not recover mentalanguish damages because he had failed to rebut the defendants prima facie showing that the alleged trespass was not attended by words or acts of insult or contumely
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    liability is not cut down by the subsequent 'additional condition’ making defendant liable for actual cost of repairs or replacement.”). 16 . In at least some of these cases, however, courts found the policy language ambiguous and therefore applied the rules of construction requiring the court to construe the terms of the insurance policy against the insurer. See, e.g., Delledonne, 621 A.2d at 354; Campbell, 109 S.E.2d at 577. In others, courts applied rules of construction contrary to those followed in Texas and strictly construed the policy language against the insurer without first finding that the language was ambiguous. See, e.g., Gibbs, 127 S.E.2d at 461; Corbett, 134 S.E. at 338. 17 . See, e.g., Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 1, 754 P.2d 330, 331 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Ray v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 200 Cal.App.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that an insurer has no obligation to pay diminished value in addition to repairs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the “executive” privilege. Such importation is potentially misleading because the executive privilege is inspired, at least in part, by a policy consideration that plays little or no role in cases against police officers. At the root of the executive privilege is concern about preserving a constitutionally appropriate balance and separation of the largely disparate powers of the three great branches of the federal government. In the seminal cases about executive privilege the courts have been concerned primarily about finding an appropriate accommodation between the constitutionally independent status and needs of the presidency of the United States and the needs of our system of justice. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3107, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (<HOLDING>). These high level, politically most sensitive

    ### Response:
    holding that the presidential privilege is inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    3 .It is the content of this section that compels the temporary sealing of this memorandum opinion. See United States v. Lentz, 1:01cr150 (E.D.Va.) (sealing orders). 4 . In a memorandum opinion dated August 22, 2005, defendant's motion to suppress the recordings of these telephone calls and to preclude their disclosure to the government’s trial team under either the attorney-client privilege or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied. See United States v. Lentz, v. Blakney, 581 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir.1978) (stating that ""if the exemplars would provide probative and relevant evidence in the case there would seem no merit in the claim of prejudice when questions were asked which brought out the refusal to provide them”); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 36 (6th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). 9 . Only one circuit has

    ### Response:
    recognizing that evidence that defendant refused to comply with the court order to provide a voice exemplar is admissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to address whether this letter could lead an objectively reasonable, but unsophisticated recipient, to believe the discharged debt was still payable. Merely focusing on the statutory notice contained in the letter, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a), as the court did, neither constitutes such a finding nor fulfills our mandate because such an inclusion in a collection letter does not, by itself, exempt a party from liability under § 1692e. During the course of the bench trial, evidence, testimonial or otherwise, was received, but without findings of fact on this evidence from the trier of fact, we cannot conduct a meaningful review of the magistrate judge’s judgment, and therefore must again remand. See Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415, 422, 63 S.Ct. 1141, 87 L.Ed. 1485 (1943) (<HOLDING>). Based on the record before us, therefore, we

    ### Response:
    holding that a proper determination of the questions of law  cannot be made in the absence of suitable findings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deserve deference. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699-700, 116 S.Ct. 1657. However, although we review the district court’s findings of fact only for clear error, our review of the district court’s probable cause determination is de novo. Id. at 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657. Mr. Brown’s primary argument is that the officers lacked probable cause because they confronted him, not on the basis of “reasonably trustworthy” information, but on the basis of information obtained from an “informant,” Dill, whose credibility was previously unknown to the police. Mr. Brown rests this argument on cases holding that information from anonymous sources might not be sufficiently reliable to constitute probable cause for arrest. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 80 (3d

    ### Response:
    holding that anonymous call that gave police no predictive information to corroborate tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify stop and frisk
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response. Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. 466 U.S. at 216-17, 104 S.Ct. at 1762-63 (citations omitted). Thus, Consiglio did not continue to detain Appellee by merely asking him a question about whether he was transporting contraband. When a traffic stop ceases to be a detention and the driver voluntarily consents to additional questioning, no further seizure occurs. See United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059,

    ### Response:
    holding that detention ended when police officer returned drivers license and registration and driver voluntarily consented to additional questioning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to do so may result in a reprimand, a suspension of their license, or a permanent revocation of their license. See Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 377 (Iowa 1987) (stating that “the code of professional responsibility sets the standard for an attorney’s conduct in any transaction in which his professional judgment may be exercised”); Iowa Sup.Ct. R. 118.10 (discussing discipline by supreme court). It is also significant that the underlying goal of the licensing and supervision of attorneys is to protect the public from the consequences of unqualified legal advisors. See Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Lawler, 342 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1984). These facts unquestionably demonstrate that the attorney licensing requirement has a regulatory purpose. Cf. Mincks, 611 N.W.2d at 277 (<HOLDING>). We now determine whether “the interest in the

    ### Response:
    holding that grain dealer licensing statute has a regulatory purpose where the department of agriculture and land stewardship has general supervision over grain dealers and the purpose behind the statutory licensing requirement is protection of the public
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2014); Clark v. New York State Office of State Comptroller, 09-CV-716 (GLS/CFH), 2014 WL 823289 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014); Davis v. Vermont, Dep’t of Corr., 868 F.Supp.2d 313, 322 (D.Vt.2012); Perciballi v. New York, 09-CV-6933 (WHP), 2010 WL 3958731 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010); Padilla v. New York State Dep’t of Labor, 09-CV-5291 (CM)(RLE), 2010 WL 3835182 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2010) (“[E]very district court in this Circuit to consider the issue has concluded that sovereign immunity bars Title V claims.”); Emmons v. City Univ. of New York, 715 F.Supp.2d 394, 408 (E.D.N.Y.2010); Mosh-enko v. State Univ. of New York at Buffalo, 07-CV-0116 (RJA)(JJM), 2009 WL 5873236 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2009); Chiesa v. New York State Dep’t of Labor, 638 F.Supp.2d 316, 323 (N.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Demshki v. Monteith, 255 F.3d 986,

    ### Response:
    holding that if a state is immune from underlying discrimination then it follows that the state must be immune from claims alleging retaliation for protesting against discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to discharge its liabilities to all creditors who extended credit or whose claims arose before such return. N.Y. Partnership Law § 106(4) (McKinney 1988). 9 . The court cited Barbro Realty Co. v. Newburger, 53 A.D.2d 34, 385 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1st Dept.1976) for this proposition. Barbro held that a partner who joins a partnership during the term of a preexisting lease is personally liable for the partnership's rent payments while he or she is a partner. Id., 53 A.D.2d at 36, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 70 (""The lease agreement may have been executed prior to the entry of the defendants into the partnership, but the defendants, who were partners at the time of the default, may be held personally liable therefor.” (citing Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785, 244 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1968) (<HOLDING>) and In re Ryan's Estate, 294 N.Y. 85, 60

    ### Response:
    holding that future rent is not attachable under statute providing that a debt is not attachable unless it is certain to become due
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rules provide pleading requirements for fraud claims in federal court, and are therefore the governing authority on this issue. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, most causes of action need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “Special matters,” such as fraud claims, however, must be “stated with particularity.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) (“Rule 9(b)”). The elements of a fraud claim requiring particularity include “ ‘the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the representations and what he obtained thereby.’ ” Harrison, 176 F.3d at 783-84. Also, reasonable detrimental reliance on a misrep ah River Co., 352 F.3d 908, 921-22 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In the complaint in the instant case, the

    ### Response:
    holding that fraud claims were wrongfully dismissed for insufficient particularity as they provided sufficient notice of the facts of the alleged misconduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Grievance v. Webster, 402 Md. 448, 463-64, 937 A.2d 161, 170 (2007), quoting Guida, 391 Md. at 53, 891 A.2d at 1097. Regardless of if an attorney deposits unearned fees into a personal or operating account, he or she must have the consent of the client. Shakir, 427 Md. at 206, 46 A.3d at 1167 (attorney violated Rule 1.15(c) when he failed to deposit unearned fees into attorney trust account without client consent although the record did not indicate whether it was a personal or operations account). Here, Respondent deposited Ms. Nelson’s fee in an account other than an attorney trust account without the written informed consent of Ms. Nelson and failed to keep any sort of record of the transaction, and therefore violated Rules 1.15(a) and ( d. 673, 712, 810 A.2d 996, 1019 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Here, Respondent accepted a $1,500.00 fee,

    ### Response:
    holding an attorney violated rule 84c when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients money in trust
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Royal Colony of New Jersey: 1760-1769 52-53 (providing for fines as well as forfeiture and destruction of heavy steel and iron traps before “any one Magistrate or Justice of Peace”); “An Act for the more effectual Preservation of Deer in this Colony,” (passed Dec. 6, 1769), id. at 582-85 (providing for forfeiture and destruction of steel and iron traps weighing over five pounds in proceeding before magistrate or justice of peace); “An Act for the Preservation of Deer and other Game, and to prevent trespassing with Guns,” (passed Dec. 21, 1771), Paterson, supra, at 19-22 (providing that anyone who sets a trap larger than that commonly set for foxes and muskrats, shall suffer £5 fine, three month imprisonment, and forfeiture and destruction of trap in pro 00, 602, 10 A. 108 (Sup.Ct.1887) (<HOLDING>); Shivers v. Newton, 45 N.J.L. 469, 476

    ### Response:
    holding that right to trial by jury did not attach in suit to recover penalty for violation of 1886 act to prevent deception in the sale of oleomargarine butterine or any imitation of dairy products since violation was petty offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    abrasions and his November 2010 C & P examination that mentioned the presence of a scar on his buttocks. The Secretary argues that the Board (1) addressed the evidence of record concerning whether Mr. Johnson’s service-connected skin condition resulted in scarring, and (2) provided an adequate statement of reasons and bases for concluding that it did not. The Secretary notes that the Board found that Mr. Johnson’s disability involved hyperpigmentation, pruitis, and dryness, but not scarring. The Secretary also notes that, although mild abrasions were observed on Mr. Johnson’s November 2013 C & P examination report, the examiner did not find scarring. Moreover, the Secretary contends that the scar noted on Mr. Johnson’s buttocks in his November 20 .3d 1560, 1564 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Meeks v. West, 12 Vet.App. 352, 354 (1999)

    ### Response:
    holding that all parts of a statute must be construed together without according undue importance to a single or isolated portion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980)). In this case, the officers discovered 110 pounds of marijuana during a search pursuant to a warrant, the validity of which is not contested. The record is clear that the officers decided to procure this search warrant before the initial entry into the house. Moreover, the record reflects that the probable cause relied upon to obtain the warrant was based on information gathered by the officers before the initial entry into the house. Therefore, the officers’ initial entry into the house did not contribute in any way to the discovery of the marijuana appellant was charged with possessing. Cf. Guo, 64 S.W.3d at 668 (<HOLDING>); State v. Aguirre, 5 S.W.3d 911, 914-15

    ### Response:
    holding that where information obtained from illegal warrantless search of a briefcase was used to establish probable cause for the warrant to search briefcase evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant was properly suppressed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process. Rivers-Frison v. Southeast Mo. Community Treatment Ctr., 133 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir.1998) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, plaintiffs have not established that Hood had any role in the decisionmaking process at issue in this case. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “ ‘some causal relationship is necessary to demonstrate the significance of non-contemporaneous statements, or statements made by persons other than the relevant decision-maker, to the resolution of the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination.’ ” Kohrt, 364 F.3d at 898 (quoting Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 779 (8th Cir.1995)); see Richards v. Farner-Bocken Co., 145 F.Supp.2d 978, 995-96 (N.D.Iowa 2001) (<HOLDING>). In this instance, there is no evidence that

    ### Response:
    holding that ageist comments by coworkers were merely  stray remarks that while indicating an agediscriminatory animus on the part of those employees under the circumstances of the case were of no probative value as to the employers decisionmaking process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or internally inconsistent; (3) whether the interpretation conflicts with the substantive or procedural requirements of the ERISA statute; (4) whether the Plan Administrator interpreted the words at issue consistently; and (5) whether the interpretation is contrary to the clear language of the Plan. Finley, 957 F.2d at 621. The Plan Administrator does not render any language in the Plan meaningless or inconsistent. In fact, the interpretation is consistent with the Plan’s goals of excluding coverage for certain injuries arising out of particular circumstances, such as criminal activity. There is no evidence that the words at issue were ever interpreted inconsistently with regard to other claimants. Further, the interpretation is not contrary to the 1998 WL 385897, *2-3 (6th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>). “When a plan administrator offers a

    ### Response:
    holding that the plan administrators decision to deny benefits to wifes claim for accidental benefits was not arbitrary and capricious because a clause in the husbands policy specifically excluded from accidental death coverage any purposeful selfinflicted injuries and any injuries caused by drug use and husband had died as a result of drunk drivingxper curiam
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to compel sterilization. According to the 2002 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, one parent in families with two children may be “encouraged” to undergo sterilization, but sterilization is not required. The reports depict the Chinese government as generally pursuing its family planning goals through economic incentives, delayed family licenses, the imposition of fines, and the imposition of mandatory birth control such as intrauterine devices or implants. Since the reports do not show that Zheng would be in danger of this procedure upon return to China, we find no substantial evidence that would warrant reversing the holding of the BIA. B. Zheng claims that he was denied his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. See Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Zheng alleges that the IJ denied his petition

    ### Response:
    holding that aliens in deportation hearings enjoy due process protections under the fifth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    manifest itself or progress to sickness or disease during the policy period”). The undisputed medical evidence in this case establishes that exposure to and inhalation of asbestos fibers begins a cumulative process in which the body suffers virtually continuous injuries. The insurance policies in this case obligate the insurers to “pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury ... to which this insurance applies.” In light of the medical evidence of the pathogenesis of asbestos-related diseases and the policy language, coverage under the policies, obligating the insurers to afford a defense to and potential indemnification of l Ins. Co., 10 Cal.4th 645, 689, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 324, 913 P.2d 878 (Cal.1995) (<HOLDING>); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 138

    ### Response:
    holding that the continuous injury trigger of coverage should be applied to third party claims of continuous or progressively deteriorating bodily injury or property damage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and health insurance and death benefits could not survive even minimum scrutiny under Alaska’s Equal Protection Clause and were invalid). 3 . Similarly, Procito argues that extending Nimitz and Kurtz to same-sex families would violate the Due Process Clauses of Article I, Sections 1 and 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. She argues that adopting a construction of Section 402(b) of the Law that categorically excludes same-sex couples from being able to establish the “necessitous and compelling” nature of their reasons for leaving employment would create an ""irrebuttable presumption,” which would deprive them of the ""meaningful opportunity to be heard” guaranteed by Due Process. See Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342, 684 A.2d 1060 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 4 . In a reply brief Procito asserts that

    ### Response:
    holding that oneyear license suspension based on single epileptic seizure without opportunity to present evidence of fitness created irrebuttable presumption in violation of due process rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Amendment 1984-1 was a valid part of the Plan and that the Reference B Report was not a reliable source of data, and had used the SPD’s actuarial factors despite a conflict with other Plan documents. (Def. Opp. 18-19; Def. R. 56.1 Statement ¶ 57.) Thus, plaintiffs assert that PBGC was obligated to affirmatively inform participants that, if these determinations were incorrect, they could potentially be entitled to greater benefits. While a fiduciary may not mislead participants about its decisionmaking processes, it does not have to affirmatively advise participants of every step in its internal deliberations, unless the fiduciary itself has created confusion as to the action being considered. Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir.1994); see also Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 278 (<HOLDING>). Any fiduciary making benefits determinations

    ### Response:
    holding that employer had no obligation to voluntarily disclose deliberations regarding a plan amendment before it had actually been adopted and noting burden on fiduciary and likelihood of confusion arising from overly stringent voluntary disclosure requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the court’s decision to strike defendants’ pleadings and enter default was just, related to the claims at issue in the violated discovery order, and supported by a careful written analysis of the pertinent factors. Additionally, we conclude that appellants’ continued discovery abuses and failure to comply with the district court’s first sanction order evidences their willful and recalcitrant disregard of the judicial process, which presumably prejudiced Dingwall, Yang, and Chai. See Hamlett v. Reynolds, 114 Nev. 863, 865, 963 P.2d 457, 458 (1998) (upholding the district court’s strike order where the defaulting party’s “constant failure to follow [the court’s] orders was unexplained and unwarranted”); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products, 460 F.3d 1217, 1236 (9th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). In light of appellants’ repeated and

    ### Response:
    holding that with respect to discovery abuses prejudice from unreasonable delay is presumed  and failure to comply with court orders mandating discovery is sufficient prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Lukumi and Fraternal Order of Police forbid. We believe that the Borough’s selective, discretionary application of Ordinance 691 against the leehis violates the neutrality principle of Lukumi and Fraternal Order of Police because it “devalues” Orthodox Jewish reasons for posting items on utility poles by “judging them to be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons,” and thus “single[s] out” the plaintiffs’ religiously motivated conduct for discriminatory treatment. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537, 113 S.Ct. 2217; Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 364-65. Just as the exemptions for secularly motivated killings in Lukumi indicated that the city was discriminating against Santería animal sacrifice, and just as the medical exemption in Fr f Va., 515 U.S. at 831-35, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (<HOLDING>). In contrast, the principle of Northwest

    ### Response:
    holding that free speech clause precludes state university that pays student publications printing costs from denying funding based on publications religious viewpoint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    counselor who treated her. During the administrative hearing, Dr. Vargas testified that the plaintiff has a generalized anxiety disorder with a panic disorder. Opponent’s Evidence Submitted in Response to Exhibit D of the Court’s Order, Exhibit 2, at 150. Dr. Vargas also testified that the plaintiff had been prescribed anti-depressant medication in the past, id. at 134, 138-39, and that she had been suicidal, id. at 136. The plaintiff infers that “[t]he testimony of [her] psychotherapist, Dr. Vargas, was strong enough that Judge Volkman stopped the hearing immediately after hearing Dr. Vargas’ testimony.” Opponent’s Amended Responsive Submission in Response to Exhibit D of the Court’s Order, at 5. Again, the plaintiffs inference is not reasonable. See Brown, 848 F.2d at 1540 n. 12 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff commits the common fallacy of

    ### Response:
    holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    embracing the commission of a. series of crimes so related to each other that proof of one or more tends to prove the crime charged and to connect the accused with its commission.” McClain, 240 N.C. at 176, 81 S.E.2d at 367. As a result, evidence that Defendant was involved in a long-standing plan to possess and sell or deliver prescription medications as evidenced by proof of the commission of prior bad acts is, under this State’s decisional law, admissible for the purpose of proving that Defendant possessed prescription drugs with the intent to sell and deliver on 22-23 August 2006 in furtherance of that same common plan or scheme. State v. Houston, 169 N.C. App. 367, 372-73, 610 S.E.2d 777, 781-82 (2005), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 359 N.C. 639, 617 S.E.2d 281 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Evidence that Defendant possessed a number of

    ### Response:
    holding evidence of uncharged prior cocaine sales with numerous similarities to those for which the defendant was on trial admissible for among other purposes showing the existence of a common plan involving the prior sales and the transactions which were the subject of the charges pending against the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), based on an adverse credibility finding. Mejia-Lopez argues that: (1) the IJ did not act as a fair and impartial arbiter because he was predisposed to make an adverse credibility determination; and (2) the adverse credibility provision of the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C), is unconstitutional on due process grounds. After thorough review, we dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part. We review de novo our own subject matter jurisdiction. Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 762, 765 (11th Cir.2007). We lack jurisdiction to review a claim unless the petitioner has exhausted her administrative remedies for that claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). We review only the BIA’s decision, except to

    ### Response:
    holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider claims that have not been raised before the bia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Trust Company, 212 S.W.3d 893, 911 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). In Bell, a landowner filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking title to property upon which the State had built a highway. The State claimed title to the property by a lost deed and adverse possession. Id. This Court held that Bell’s suit was, in effect, a trespass to try title action against the state. Id. at 294. The landowner in Bell, however, did not seek compensation for an inverse condemnation, but instead sought title to the land. Id. Thus, our court’s holding in that case is distinguishable. In Texas Southern, a bank sued the university for inverse condemnation after the university refused to pay for equipment provided to it under a lease/purchase agreement. 212 S.W.3d at 898-99. Our court (<HOLDING>). Finally, the defendants respond that the

    ### Response:
    holding that inverse condemnation claim survived jurisdictional plea where foundation alleged that state mineral leases encroached on foundations property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a party should not be held to the terms of the contract. See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Gerber Truck Serv., Inc., 870 F.2d 1148, 1149 (7th Cir.1989) (noting that the federal “receiver of a failed bank ... [is] entitled to enforce [a] writing without regard to understandings or defenses applicable to the original parties”); McCullough v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 870, 872 (1st Cir.1993) (reading Langley to mean that “a contractually bound party’s attempt to avoid a contractual obligation and/or to seek damages through a claim of misrepresentation is nothing more than a challenge to the truthfulness of a warranty ... and a concomitant claim that the truthfulness of that warranty was a condition of the first party’s performance”); FDIC v. Bell, 892 F.2d 64, 65-66 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, when a party alleges, on the basis of

    ### Response:
    holding that langley barred a defense based on banks failure to disclose a material fact regarding financial condition of company whose obligations were guaranteed by defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Utah violated a mandate issued by the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit by assigning certain criminal cases to himself. Because there is no such mandate in the instant case, and because the Chief Judge did not assign any cases to himself, Ritter is readily distinguishable from the instant case. 2. Sanctions The Court has inherent powers that enable it to enforce standards of conduct and to perform its case-management function. These inherent powers apply in both civil and criminal cases, Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d at 9, and “include the judicial authority to sanction counsel for litigation abuses which threaten to impugn the district court’s integrity or disrupt its efficient management of the proceedings.” Id. at 7. See also United States v. Stokes, 124 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The choice of an appropriate sanction is

    ### Response:
    holding that courts may invoke their supervisory powers to implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights to preserve judicial integrity or to deter illegal conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it considered the proposed density urban. 35 The principal cases cited by the parties are Patzkowsky v. Klamath Cty, 8 Or LUBA 64, 71 (1983) (requiring county to discuss whether subdivision into one-acre lots in area 14 miles from UGB and two miles from nearest unincorporated community would comply with Goal 14); 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Clackamas County, 3 Or LUBA 316, 327, 330 (1981) (to designate one-, two- and five-acre residential zones without addressing their impact on UGBs violates Goal 14); Medford v. Jackson Cty, supra, n 19, 2 Or LUBA at 389-91 (describing as “quasi-urban” a 2,600-acre area between Medford and Eagle Point containing 4,300 residents and the largest concentration of industry in the county); Metropolitan Serv. Dist. v. Clackamas Cty, 2 Or LUBA 300, 307 (1981) (<HOLDING>); In the Matter of Linn County’s Comprehensive

    ### Response:
    holding that although 13 lots on 31 acres 1 12 miles from ugb and 12 lots on 28 acres 12 mile from ugb are not necessarily  urban as a matter of law close proximity to ugb requires county to consider whether ugb would be affected by the approval of these subdivisions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. National Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992)). 14 . Grand Crossing, L.P. v. United States Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 03 Civ. 5429, 2008 WL 4525400, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008) (quoting S.E.C. v. Ashbury Capital Partners, No. 00 Civ. 7898, 2001 WL 604044, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2001)). Accord Commerce Funding Corp. v. Comprehensive Habilitation Servs., Inc., 233 F.R.D. 355, 361 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (""[A] movant may not raise on a motion for reconsideration any matter that it did not raise previously to the court on the underlying motion sought to be reconsidered.”). 15 . United States v. Treacy, No. 08 Cr. 0366, 2009 WL 47496, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009) (quotation omitted). Accord Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 16 . Makas v. Orlando, No. 06 Civ. 14305,

    ### Response:
    holding that a court will deny the motion when the movant seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    procedure.” Id. (Emphasis added). Similarly, the court in Wittenberg v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education, No. 1:05 CV 818, 2006 WL 2568937, at *5, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63812, at *17 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2006), held that the prior version of the stay-put provision “should be read to mandate an agreement after a decision of a hearing officer in a due process hearing conducted by the SEA only if there is no further appeal to a state review official.” (Emphasis added). The Wittenberg court premised its holding on its finding that “the statute on which the regulation is based does not contemplate a situation in which a hearing conducted by the state will be appealed to a state review official.” Id.; see also CJN v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 323 F.3d 630, 642 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, the court in Benjamin v. Greater

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not err when it found that the stayput provision did not apply to a firsttier due process hearing conducted by a local school district
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    adequacy of the summons in light of Rule 4.15(F), we bear in mind the constitutional due process protections which a defective summons must nevertheless satisfy.” In re J.H., 898 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied. ""An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality, is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec tions.” Munster, 829 N.E.2d at 58. However, Trial Rule 4.15(F) cures only technical defects in service of process, not a total failure to serve process. LaPalme, 621 N.E.2d at 1106; see also Idlewine v. Madison Cty. Bank & Trust Co., 439 N.E.2d 1198, 1201-03 (Ind.Ct.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Kelly v. Bennett, 732 N.E.2d 859, 862

    ### Response:
    holding that trial rule 415f will not cure defective service of process where no person authorized by the rules was actually served
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to” an employee benefit plan and, consequently, be preempted, even though the state law’s effect on benefit plans is only incidental. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 139, 111 S.Ct. 478. These cases, where the state law’s effect on ERISA-encompassed employee welfare benefit plans, are the more difficult types of cases to ascertain the proper outcome. Further adding to the confusion is the fact that despite Congress’s intention that ERISA cut a wide swath of preemption through state laws, the Supreme Court has recognized certain limitations: “Some state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law ‘relates to’ the plan.” Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. 2890; see also Mackey, 486 U.S. at 841, 108 S.Ct. 2182 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Court’s decisions do not provide a

    ### Response:
    holding that a specific provision of georgias garnishment statute was preempted by its express reference to erisa plans but at the same time refusing to extend erisa preemption to georgias entire garnishment procedure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    found defendant incompetent to stand trial). Second, the rules of construction indicate a strong preference for harmonizing the rule and the statute. See State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar, 115 N.M. 573, 575, 855 P.2d 562, 564 (1993) (instructing courts to presume that “the legislature did not intend to enact a law inconsistent with existing law” and to disfavor “judicial repeal of legislation by implication”). Third, Child’s interpretation is logical and avoids absurd results. See State v. Mendoza, 108 N.M. 446, 452, 774 P.2d 440, 446 (1989) (“Where the rule is unambiguous, we interpret it literally and give effect to the plain meaning of the rule ... unless to do so leads to an absurd or unjust result.”). See also State v. Ware, 115 N.M. 339, 342, 850 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). {13} In contrast, we are not persuaded by the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that to avoid absurd results the court has a duty to interpret the rules of criminal procedure with logic and common sense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (setting forth the second prong of the “discretionary function exception” test, which requires the court to determine that “the judgment or choice in question [is] grounded in considerations of public policy or susceptible to policy analysis” for the exception' to apply); Hardscrabble Ranch, L.L.C. v. United States, 840 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir. 2016)(ex-plaining that “the discretionary action must be based on the purposes of the applicable regulatory regime”)). According to C. Warren, where there is a risk of serious danger there cannot be a policy consideration that justifies the United States’ “inattentiveness or failure to intervene.” Motion to Amend Reply at 13 (citing Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 1991)(<HOLDING>)). Thus, C. Warren concludes the Motion to

    ### Response:
    holding that the discretionary function exception was inapplicable to a center for disease control scientists failure to maintain safety procedures and to warn laboratory workers about a dangerous rabies sample to which he had exposed them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (1987); People v. Young, 334 Ill. App. 3d 785, 789 (2002). A trial court, upon determination of guilt, has no authority to assess a fine or impose a sentence other than that provided by statute. People ex rel. Daley v. Suria, 112 Ill. 2d 26, 38 (1986); People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542 (1981); People ex rel. Ward v. Moran, 54 Ill. 2d 552, 556 (1973); People ex rel. Ward v. Salter, 28 Ill. 2d 612, 615 (1963). This court and our supreme court have held that a void sentence is considered to have never been imposed and that “[a] void sentence is treated as a complete nullity, without legal effect, since inception.” People v. O’Neal, 281 Ill. App. 3d 602, 614 (1996), aff’d in part & rev’d in part by People v. Garcia, 179 Ill. 2d 55, 73 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Although O’Neal and Garcia deal with

    ### Response:
    holding that consideration of original sentence on remand for resentencing was inapplicable when original sentences were void
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A lie does not become the truth simply because the person hearing it knows that it is a lie. The premise underlying this argument reveals the true nature of the matic because they are effectively invoking estoppel against the government. The Defendants contend that because the government’s remission of payment represents that the government entity has evaluated all the relevant information and (presumably) determined that a claim is valid, the government should be estopped from arguing that the claim is invalid in a subsequent judicial proceeding. The premise underlying this argument is contrary to our longstanding presumption that estoppel against the government is impermissible. See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 382, 386, 68 S.Ct. 1, 92 L.Ed. 10 (1947) (<HOLDING>); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond,

    ### Response:
    holding that a farmer who obtained federal insurance based on improper advice by an agent of the federal crop insurance corporation that his entire crop qualified for insurance could not recover for the loss of his crop because the government could not be estopped from denying the claim by the agents erroneous statements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    226.32(a). A “high cost” mortgage covered by HOEPA is a consumer credit transaction with a creditor: 3) that is secured by the consumer’s principal dwelling 4) and is a second or subordinate residential mortgage, not a residential mortgage transaction, a reverse mortgage transaction, or a transaction under an open credit plan For such loans, a failure to satisfy the requirements of TILA/HOEPA can result in civil liability for the lender, which may be asserted as a matter of defense by recoupment. See 15 U.S.C.A. §1640. The HOEPA, therefore, does not apply to credit transactions unless such transactions are secured by a property used or intended to be used as the mortgagor’s principal dwelling. 15 U.S.C. § 1603; see also Antanuos v. First Nat’l Bank, 508 F. Supp. 2d 466 (E.D. Va. 2007) (<HOLDING>). 3. Is the subject mortgage a residential

    ### Response:
    holding tila applies only to credit transactions secured by real or personal property used or expected to be used as the principal dwelling of the debtor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and time of the sale. That notice, had it been given, would have stated the time of the sale. See Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 51.002. If appellants wanted to avoid the sale, they were required to pay the balance on or before that time. While it would have been preferable for the bankruptcy court’s order itself to have given the parties a specific time on August 1, 2000 in which to make the $650,000.00 payment, we cannot agree that that flaw allows us to ignore the plain language of the order. Appellees’ also direct us to other extrinsic evidence to show the bankruptcy court did not intend the sale to occur only on August 1, 2000. However, the bankruptcy court’s order is not ambiguous. When an order is not ambiguous, we enforce it literally. Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 441-42 (Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Bums Motors, Inc., 22 S.W.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that unambiguous decree must be enforced literally without consideration of matters extrinsic to the decree
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 7. In the absence of that certification, the Court has little difficulty concluding that the complaint was not served, and that in consequence, Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirement of Rule 25(a)(3) to serve the motion to substitute “on nonparties as provided in Rule 4.” Id. (emphasis added); see George v. United States, 208 F.R.D. at 31-32 (stating “non-party successors or representatives of the deceased party must be served the suggestion of death in the manner provided by Rule 4 for the service of a summons” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). It is axiomatic that a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a would-be party that has not been “served with a copy of the complaint.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(1); see Ayres v. Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A, 99 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Macaluso v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl.

    ### Response:
    holding that personal jurisdiction is not conferred if service under rule 4 is not properly effected
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CTL/Thompson Texas, LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 390 S.W.3d 299, 301 (Tex.2013). Here, in both his answer and in discovery, Frazier admitted that the HVAC design was faulty, thus giving merit to plaintiffs claims. Frazier’s, own admissions lend support to plaintiffs claims that negligence occurred in the construction of the HVAC system, and granting a motion to dismiss in this case would defeat the purpose of this statute. In light of this, we conclude that Frazier “substantially invoked the judicial process,” Murphy, 374 S.W.3d at 631, and thus waived his right to a certificate of merit. The dissent focuses on Texas cases that, emphasize the quantity of activity in a case rather , than the substance of activity. See, e.g., Crosstex Energy Services, 430 S.W.3d at 394-95 (<HOLDING>). The dissent claims that “the majority

    ### Response:
    holding that no waiver existed where a party filed an answer exchanged 11000 pages of written discovery and entered into a rule 11 agreement among other actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or reasonable and prudent at the time.” (citations omitted)). 22 . Thrift contends that the Second Note was a renewal of the First Note; the Hubbards do not agree with this characterization. 23 . At the time Thrift wrote the letter, he believed that the stock transfer had not satisfied the original debt. 24 . Peerless argues that allowing compounded interest would impermissibly add to the contract. Awards of prejudgment interest are damages, however, and need not be specified in the contract nor agreed to by the parties. 25 . See Enterprise-Laredo Assocs. v. Hachar's, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 822, 839 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (''[Pjrejudgment interest may be awarded on a breach of contract claim.”); O’Reilly v. Grafham, 797 S.W.2d 399, 401-02 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 26 . Tex.Rev.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-1.05, § 1

    ### Response:
    holding that cavnar rule applies to nonpersonal injury economic damages cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    against Detectives Murphy, Kierse and O’Connell, since, according to the facts set forth above and admitted by Mr. Hickombottom, they were not involved in the interrogation or processing after Hickombottom’s arrest. McGuire and Tansey, however, are left with Hickombottom’s remaining claims. The court will address each in turn. First, Mr. Hickombottom claims that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to a prompt hearing by delaying his appearance before a magistrate. The defendants did question Hickombottom for about eleven hours after his arrest, but had nothing to do with him after that time. Eleven hours is not an unreasonable period in which to delay an appearance before a magistrate. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Whatev er happened afterward is not, or at

    ### Response:
    holding that period of up to fortyeight hours between arrest and initial appearance before judicial officer is presumptively reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Small Estate Affidavit, which includes an estimate of the Property’s value. As evidence of Mrs. Brush's loan indebtedness, Wells Fargo relies on an affidavit attached as an exhibit to its summary judgment motion. This affidavit estimate falls outside the range of materials that a court may consider in a Rule 12(c) motion. Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied as to its argument that the Brushes’ have failed to show damages for Wells Fargo’s breach of the loan modification contract. 6 . The Texas Supreme Court has yet to address whether foreclosure is “debt collection” under the TDCA. Other courts applying Texas law have permitted foreclosure-related claims under the TDCA. See, e.g., Watson v. Citimortgage, Inc., 814 F.Supp.2d 726, 734-35 (E.D.Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>); Akintunji v. Chase Home Fin., L.L.C., 2011 WL

    ### Response:
    holding that foreclosure is debt collection under the tdca and allowing the plaintiffs claim that the mortgagors representations surrounding the foreclosure were fraudulent deceptive or misleading
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 254 F.Supp.2d 434, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). “The court must consider each mo tion independently of the other and, when evaluating each, the court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. (citing Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001)). Plaintiffs’ N.Y. Labor Law § 196-d Tip-Sharing Claim New York Labor Law Section 196-d prohibits any “employer or his agent” from “demanding] or accepting], directly or indirectly, any part of the gratuities, received by an employee, or retaining] any part of a gratuity or of any charge purported to be a gratuity for an employee.” N.Y. Lab. Law § 196-d (McKinney 2002); see Chung v. New Silver Palace Rest., Inc., 246 F.Supp.2d 220, 230 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). The drafters of Section 196-d “sought to end

    ### Response:
    holding that section 196 d clearly prohibits partowner employees who wield  broad managerial authority from retaining tips
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is a misreading of the decision for review. In addition to erroneously concluding that the action should proceed to a jury determination, the trial court further erred by instructing the jury as if Bombay was an ordinary negligence case. The trial court instructed the jury on the liability issue without using the word “intentional.” The trial court then gave an instruction on comparative negligence and submitted to the jury a verdict form that allowed for a finding of comparative negligence. Such instruction was directly contrary to section 768.81(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), which provided that comparative negligence was not applicable in an intentional tort action, a principle which had long been the common law of Florida. See Mazzilli v. Doud, 485 So.2d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>), review dismissed, 492 So.2d 1333 (Fla.1986);

    ### Response:
    holding comparative negligence not defense to intentional tort
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to reopen deportation proceedings, arguing that she was not removable because her assault charge fell within the “petty offense” exception of INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), and could not therefore be construed as a crime involving moral turpitude. The BIA denied that motion, and Membreno timely appealed. Discussion The Immigration and Nationality Act deprives a court of jurisdiction to review “any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 1182(a)(2).” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). This section also deprives a court of jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions denying motions to reopen or reconsider such final orders. See Sarmadi v. INS, 121 F.3d 1319, 1321 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Section 1182(a)(2) renders “any alien

    ### Response:
    holding that withdrawal of judicial review over final orders of deportation also withdraws jurisdiction from motions to reconsider or reopen
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1999). Specifically, a RICO plaintiff must “(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, at 1231, the court held that a complaint did not meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard because it did not include “statements setting forth the content, date, or place of any alleged misrepresentations, and the identity of the persons making them.” Id. (brackets omitted). Instead, the complaint “contain[ed] sweeping and general allegations of mail and wire fraud directed at all the defendants rather than connecting the alleged fraud to the individual defendants.” Id.; see also McGee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 08-CV-392 FB CLP, 2009 WL 2132439, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2009) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, although a plaintiff may “allege

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity where he loosely alleged throughout his complaint that the defendants contacted each other by means of the mails andor the wires without specifying precise methods of communication or identifying any specific fraudulent statement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “input” from the respondent which was lacking in Go-dette. Ms. Lea testified at some length by telephone, but the hearing committee did not credit what she had to say. Since the committee’s credibility findings were not clearly erroneous, the Board was bound to accept them. There is no room here for the Board to “speculate” that Ms. Lea’s evasion of service, like that of Mr. Godette, may have been motivated by “hopelessness and perhaps despair.” In addition to the evidence of evasion of service, the Board also failed to consider other evidence of Ms. Lea’s deliberate disregard for the disciplinary process. In particular, given that substantial evidence supported the committee’s credibility findings, the Board erred in failing to accept those findings. See Temple, 629 A.2d at 1208-1209 (<HOLDING>). The committee found that Ms. Lea’s testimony,

    ### Response:
    holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    findings or abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s request for partition. We note that EPIC vests the probate court with the jurisdiction to hear an equitable claim for partition. MCL 700.1303(l)(b); see, also, Van Etten, supra at 287 (observing that MCL 700.22 extended equitable jurisdiction to the probate court in limited instances, including granting the relief of partitioning property). In an action for partition, the court determines “whether the premises can be partitioned without great prejudice to the parties,” the property’s value and use, and any other matters the court finds pertinent. MCR 3.401(A). Here, none of the parties suggested a viable method to partition the property into the four equal parcels required to comply with the trust’s terms of distributio 1933) (<HOLDING>). The concerns discussed in these cases apply

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a metes and bounds partition when land contains oil and gas results in a serious loss to a coowner who receives a lot without oil or gas under the surface with the loss due solely to the division of the land
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in denying supersedeas under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(3) and (a)(5), even though those provisions were in effect at the time of the ruling.” Cascos, 319 S.W.3d at 217. This analysis is clearly wrong, however, because, as noted above, the supreme court’s opinion in Long expressly referenced the trial court’s discretion under what is now TRAP rule 24.2(a)(3): Sweitzer [the judgment creditor] had possible mechanisms for seeking enforcement of the injunction.... Sweitzer could have sought denial of suspension of the injunction. See former Texas R.App. P. 47(f) (allowing trial court to decline to permit other judgments to be suspended) (currently Tex.R.App. P. 24.2(a)(3)); City of Robstown v. Westergren, 774 S.W.2d 739, 740-41 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi, 1989, no writ) (<HOLDING>). In re Long, 984 S.W.2d at 626. Thus, not only

    ### Response:
    holding that district court has discretionary authority under former rule 47f to deny a city suspension of an injunction pending appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assignments. See id. at 304, 302. Appellants in this case did have notice that there was assigned parking at Le’Lisa; however, they did not have notice as to how the system worked. Further, appellants had notice from Article XVI of the by-laws that the document could be amended by a 66% percent vote of the unit owners. Appellants also had notice that the by-laws could contain “restriction^] on or requirement[s] respecting the use and maintenance of the units and the common elements.” RP § 11-104(c). See Allers v. Tittsworth, 269 Md. 677, 686, 309 A.2d 476 (1973) (""Every man is presumed to know the law”). Therefore, appellants knew the by-laws could be amended by the insertion of use restrictions. Cf. Board of Directors of By the Sea Council v. Sondock, 644 S.W.2d 774 (Tex.Ct.App. 1982) (<HOLDING>). Appellants also attempt to distinguish Juno

    ### Response:
    holding that condominium owners knew at time of purchase they bought subject to all provisions of declaration one of which was right to amend it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    properly admitted as evidence of a common scheme or plan. We believe the trial court properly admitted the victim’s testimony as evidence of a common scheme or plan. See Clasby, 385 S.C. at 155, 682 S.E.2d at 896 (“Where there is a close degree of similarity between the crime charged and the prior bad act, both this [c]ourt and the [c]ourt of [ajppeals have held prior bad acts are admissible to demonstrate a common scheme or plan.”) (quoting State v. Gaines, 880 S.C. 23, 30, 667 S.E.2d 728, 731 (2008)). The victim’s testimony in this case established the incidents of abuse occurred in the same manner and in the same locations as the conduct that formed the basis of the charge of CSC with a minor brought against Berry. See State v. Whitener, 228 S.C. 244, 265, 89 S.E.2d 701, 711 (1955) (<HOLDING>); State v. McClellan, 283 S.C. 389, 392, 323

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the common scheme or plan exception is generally applied in cases involving sexual crimes where evidence of acts prior and subsequent to the act charged in the indictment is held admissible as tending to show continued illicit intercourse between the same parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issued shares and options off the market. 3 . Flora asserts that he was somehow less sophisticated than Firepond's representatives and that the lock-up agreement was not the product of negotiation because it was offered on a take it or leave it basis, under the threat that if he refused to sign, the IPO might not go forward. The court finds neither argument persuasive. First, Flora was sophisticated enough to negotiate and perform multimillion dollar business agreements. Second, the court is not convinced that the lock-up agreement, in these circumstances, was a contract of adhesion. Even if it was a contract of adhesion, that fact alone does not create a special duty of care where none otherwise existed. See Vierkant by Johnson v. AMCO Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>); Safeco, 531 N.W.2d at 871 (not including

    ### Response:
    holding that contracts of adhesion are not voidable unless unconscionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his more particular two-fold argument that it was the testimony about the specific crime— possession of a stolen firearm — and the fact it was also firearm related that made Officer Brumfield’s testimony more prejudicial than probative. As to this, we are mindful that Officer Brumfield only testified on direct that Grindle had been arrested and, when he was arrested, a .45-caliber pistol was recovered but did not match the murder weapon. And Grindle did not object to this testimony. It was Grindle’s attorney, not the State, that brought up the underlying reason for his arrest — that he allegedly possessed a stolen pistol. Because Grindle’s lawyer was the one who elicited the testimony, Grindle cannot argue now it was improperly introduced. See Rubenstein, 941 So.2d at 755 (¶¶ 52-53) (<HOLDING>). ¶58. Despite Grindle’s opening the door to

    ### Response:
    holding appellate argument that statement violated rule 404b was improper because it was the defendant who elicited the statement at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 2305, 90 L.Ed.2d 881 (1986). Tribal sovereign immunity “is subject to the superior and plenary control of Congress,” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978), but the Court of Appeals has ruled that, as relevant to this suit, Congress did not impair the Nation’s immunity. Vann II, 534 F.3d at 749. Of course, like all sovereigns, the Nation is free to assert or to waive its immunity as it sees fit, see Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991), and “[i]t is settled law that a waiver of sovereign immunity in one forum does not effect a waiver in other forums.” West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 226, 119 , 137 Cal.App.4th 175, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 875, 883 (Cal.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted) (quoting Am. Indian Agric.

    ### Response:
    holding that because a waiver of immunity is altogether voluntary on the part of the tribe and thus the tribe may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted    the issue must be determined in the forum that the tribe has chosen for determination of the viability of claims against it to wit arbitration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is, CMS requires approval from off-site corporate doctors to obtain required medical treatment. Plaintiff asserts that this policy results in a denial of medical care deemed appropriate by the patient’s treating physician. Finally, CMS has an orientation program that emphasizes cost and compliance over patient care. (ECF No. 224, pp. 13-14). Plaintiff asserts that he was denied care by at least two doctors, Dr. Nagaldinne and Dr. Hendricks, on the basis that the treatment would be too costly. The Court finds that Plaintiffs claims against CMS fail as a matter of law. The Court holds that CMS’s policy requiring administration of narcotic medication in the infirmary does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Peterson, 2012 WL 4108908, at *14, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132848, at *46 (<HOLDING>); see also Steele v. Weber, 278 Fed.Appx. 699,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs allegation that he was denied prescribed pain medication because of a mdoc policy that narcotic pain medications must be given in the infirmary fails to establish an eighth amendment violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the venire. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel’s representation was objectively unreasonable and that, but for counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068-69 (1984); Foreman, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 142. In the present case, given all the evidence against defendant, there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel questioned, or asked the judge to question, the venire regarding the Zehr principles. Accordingly, defendant’s contention of ineffective assistance is without merit. See also Foreman, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 143 (<HOLDING>). In his reply brief, defendant argues that

    ### Response:
    holding that counsels failure to question the venire regarding the zehr principles did not constitute ineffective assistance where there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the information had been sought only for possible impeachment purposes. See id. at 630. The proper test to be applied by the trial court in such circumstances is whether the safety of the informant will be compromised by disclosure. See Garcia v. Florida, 379 So.2d 441, 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). If so, then the court must weigh the interests of the state against the defendant’s right to develop his defense. See id. It is unclear whether the trial court in the instant case attempted to apply this balancing test in ruling on the motion to compel. We, therefore, quash the trial court’s discovery order and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. WOLF, KAHN and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur. 1 . See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)

    ### Response:
    holding that suppression by prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where evidence is material to either guilt or punishment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    without merit. “The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects those rights that are ‘fundamental,’ that is, rights that are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (citation omitted); see also Greenbriar Vill., L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook, City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.2003) (“Fundamental rights are those rights created by the Constitution.”) (citation omitted). In this case, Behrens has failed to allege the deprivation of any fundamental right. We have previously held that “[b]ecause there is no fundamental right to adopt or to be adopted, it follows that there can be no fundamental right to apply for adoption.” Lofton, 358 F.3d at 812; see also Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that prospective adoptive parents do not have a fundamental liberty interest in adoption
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    officer was taking an interest in the plaintiff. Id. Here, no deputies under Sheriff Ball had ever engaged in sexually impermissible or suggestive conduct. And nothing in Fite’s record suggested that he had a proclivity to engage in sexually prurient behavior. As in Andrews, where we found no patently obvious need to train an officer not to rape young women even in the face of actual knowledge of deviant behavior, we do not believe that there is a patently obvious need to train an officer not to sexually assault women, especially where there is no notice at all that such behavior is likely. An objectively reasonable officer would know that it is impermissible to touch a detainee’s sexual organs by forcible compulsion. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1308 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Fite himself acknowledged in his

    ### Response:
    holding that the court was not persuaded that a plainly obvious consequence of a deficient training program would be the sexual assault of inmates and that specific or extensive training hardly seems necessary for a jailer to know that sexually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a deemed party under the doctrine. Under Texas law, Lapiner cannot satisfy any of the elements of the doctrine of virtual representation. Lapiner is not bound by the underlying judgment — Is-ramco is bound. The claims adjudicated in this shareholder derivative action are for injury to the corporation, as distinguished from injury to its shareholders. See Swank v. Cunningham, 258 S.W.3d 647, 661-62 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2008, pet. denied); see also Redmon v. Griffith, 202 S.W.3d 225, 233 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2006, pet. denied). Our analysis is not altered even though the shareholder derivative action judgment may “bring about reduced earnings, salaries, or bonuses.” See BJVSD Bird Family P’ship, L.P. v. Star Elec., L.L.C., 413 S.W.3d 780, 785-86 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Finally, there is no identity of interest

    ### Response:
    holding that the appellants interest as a stakeholder in an entity did not satisfy the privity element of the virtual representation doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at Soldier Field because parking facilities increased the usefulness of the stadium property); Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at 382-83, 657 N.E.2d at 893 (sidewalk deemed public recreational property within meaning of section 3—106 where school painted four-square court on sidewalk and allowed children to play on it). This extension of the law does not justify further expanding the application of section 3—106 to injuries occurring outside a public entity’s property line. The District’s interpretation of section 3—106 is too expansive and would overcome the common law duty of due care codified by section 3—102(a) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/3—102(a) (West 2000) (a local public entity has a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe conditio Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (<HOLDING>). The plain wording of the Illinois statute

    ### Response:
    holding that legislative purpose for new jersey governmental tort immunity statute encouraging public agencies to open unimproved lands to public use was not thwarted when immunity was not applied to injuries caused by dead tree collapsing onto adjacent public road or private residential property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allow the Restaurant to litigate the matter. Cf. Barr v. Resolution Tr. Corp. ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992) (“Res judicata, or claims preclusion, prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit.”). The Restaurant therefore attempted the other approach ad dressed in Mantas, that is, it filed a separate suit to resolve the settlement dispute and asked the appellate court to abate the appeal of the underlying cause pending that resolution. Our own precedent indicates that res judicata would not apply in these circumstances. See Wood v. Cosme, 447 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ) (<HOLDING>). In the unusual circumstances presented here,

    ### Response:
    holding that res judicata does not bar litigation of a claim pleaded in an earlier case if the record of the case shows that the court refused to decide the issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1255, 1260 (8th Cir.1994) (Cabbell), this court reversed an obstruction of justice enhancement because “the district court did not evaluate [the defendant’s] testimony in a light most favorable to him as required by section 3C1.1, application note 1.” Howev er, we note that, effective November 1, 1997, “an amendment to [§ 3C1.1] ... removed the ‘ “most favorable” language and advised courts simply to “be cognizant that inaccurate testimony or statement may result from confusion, mistake, or faulty memory, and thus not all testimony or statements necessarily reflect a willful attempt to obstruct justice.” ’ ” United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, —, 2000 WL 33709971, at *22, (2d Cir.2002) (amending previous opinion); see also United States v. Behler, 100 F.3d 632, 638 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 855, 118 S.Ct. 152,

    ### Response:
    recognizing amendment to  3c11
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Esperanza Robles-Cruz and her husband Jorge Robles-Cruz, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition pro se for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the immigration judge’s denial of their applications for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review constitutional claims de novo, Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir.2002), and we deny the petition. The Petitioners contend that it is a violation of equal protection to treat aliens with U.S. citizen relatives differently than aliens without U.S. citizen relatives. We are unpersuaded by this contention because the differential treatment is not wholly irrational. See Hernandez-Mezquita v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 1161, 1164-65 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. ** This

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioner must show that classification is wholly irrational in order to demonstrate equal protection violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and his familial obligations did not warrant a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range. See United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir.2006) (rejecting defendant’s assertion the district court failed to consider adequately his personal history and troubled family life, holding sentence was reasonable as court considered each section 3553(a) factor and determined defendant’s claims did not “necessitate[;] deviation from the suggested guidelines sentence”); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 34 (2d Cir.2006) (concluding although the sentencing court had the power to reduce the sentence under section 3553(a) based on defendant’s cooperation, “the court was not obliged to provide any such benefit”); United States v. Laufle, 433 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1161

    ### Response:
    holding although different sentencing court may have given more weight to defendants cooperation disagreement with the courts assessment does not warrant reversal since our task is confined to determining whether the district court considered the appropriate range of factors and arrived at a reasonable sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As presented, the record supports a reasonable inference that SESH authored the “limited margin of error” language, and that inference must be credited on summary judgment. In short, SESH cannot now prevail on the ground that the ambiguous Easement terms are to be construed against the drafter because the identity of the drafter is, itself, a disputed question of material fact. Where, as here, the contract language is ambiguous, the rules of contract construction do not resolve it, and fact questions persist, it is for the finder of fact to decide the contract’s meaning. See McLemore, 7 So.3d at 327 (“Where factual issues arise, the resolution of the ambiguity becomes a task for the jury.”) (citations omitted); Murray v. Holiday Isle, LLC, 620 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1322 (S.D.Ala.2009) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s Motion is therefore denied as to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that courts must submit the ambiguity to the finder of fact if application of  canons of construction proves insufficient to resolve it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rule 9(G)(l)(b)(vi) creates what appears to be an exception to an exception. Again, that rule provides that ""[r]ecords of juvenile proceedings as declared confidential by Ind.Code § 31-39-1-2 [are excluded from public access], except those specifically open under statute.” Read literally, that rule states that all court records are public, except those specifically confidential by statute, except those specifically open by statute. It is not clear if the records ""specifically open by statute” are the same records that are ""accessible to the public” in the first place. See Admin. R. 9. 8 . One may think that our earlier statement that the transcript here is presumptively confidential is obviously true, or at least that it should be obviously true. See In re T.B., 895 N.E.2d at 345-46 (<HOLDING>). But the commentary to Administrative Rule

    ### Response:
    holding under indiana code section 313262 that the juvenile court erred in releasing the transcript of a confidential proceeding to news media
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on work-life expectancies compiled by the United States Department of Labor). In this regard, however, we must agree with the appellant. If sufficient, reliable evidence of Weil’s actual expenses is available then the district court should give the appellant the latitude to introduce this evidence. Once again we note that the actual maintenance deduction is a jury question and if the evidence of Weil’s actual maintenance expenditures will assist the jury in this determination then the evidence should be permitted. Weil’s estate is free to argue to the jury as to why the statistics are more accurate than the evidence of actual maintenance expenses presented by the appellant. See, e.g., Strickland v. Roosevelt County Rural Elec. Coop., 99 N.M. 335, 657 P.2d 1184, 1191 (Ct.App. 1982) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 358, 658 P.2d 433

    ### Response:
    recognizing the limitations of estimates of worklife expectancy and personal maintenance deductions based on department of labor tables
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on or after June 30, 1994, to register as sex offenders. Id. at 373. In 2001, the Act was amended to require all offenders con-vieted of certain sex offenses to register as sex offenders regardless of conviction date. Id. The State determined that Wallace was required to register under the Act, but our supreme court held that the Act, as applied to Wallace, violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws contained in the Indiana Constitution ""because it impose[d] burdens that [had] the effect of adding punishment beyond that which could have been imposed when his erime was committed."" Id. at 384. We note that Herron has waived his ex post facto argument because he did not present the issue to the trial court. See Saunders v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1117, 1122 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trams. demied (<HOLDING>). Waiver notwithstanding, the Act is not an ex

    ### Response:
    holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the Constitution’ ”) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2363, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974)); see also Roberson, 486 U.S. at 688-93, 108 S.Ct. at 2101-04 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). II Courts must be wary of exaggerating what are properly recognized as contemptible improprieties into grandiose visions of injustice. The temptation to entertain such visions is especially great in cases that pit lonely criminal defendants against the police and prosecutorial powers of their state governments. The danger in succumbing to such temptation is that rules designed to secure the integrity of the legal process can gradually take the form of escape valves whose only notable effect is to provide safe haven for indisputably guilty persons. Cf Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1264 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that  the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendants guilt or innocence 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appeared in Hinds County Justice Court and through them attorneys, pled not guilty. Similarly, on February 11, 2009, plaintiff Charles Shawn Lucrow was charged in Rankin County, Mississippi with driving under the influence. He initially appeared and pled not guilty in Rankin County Justice Court. On March 16, 2010, while the charges remained pending against them in the state justice courts, plaintiffs filed the present action in this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants, as a mat ter of official policy, custom and practice, systematically deny justice court defendants access to favorable evidence relating to both guilt and punishment, in violation of their due process rights. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-96, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>). More particularly, plaintiffs alleged that

    ### Response:
    holding that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a ROPS for this particular tractor other than the information set forth in the owner’s manual that Bren-Tex provided the Hensens with the tractor. 15 . Because it is not before us, we express no opinion on whether Bren-Tex may recover the attorney’s fees or costs it incurred for the trial or appeal of its indemnity claim, as contrasted from its defense of the Hensens’ lawsuit. KEM THOMPSON FROST, Justice, concurring. This court correctly reverses the trial court’s judgment because there was no evidence of independently actionable conduct by Bren-Tex that caused Michael Hensen’s death. There was no evidence to support independent liability in this regard as to the alleged DTPA and implied-warranty claims. The majority opinion also correctly holds that there was no eviden 1-83 (Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>); Winn ex rel. Winn v. Pollard, 62 S.W.3d 611,

    ### Response:
    holding that seller of frontend loader had no duty to warn injured worker concerning the dangers of operating the loader without a rops because the dangers were obvious under an objective standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to which such conduct reasonably points.” Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Henson asserts that there is no evidence that he touched.either Daniel or Patterson. And he maintains that the State did not prove the mens rea elements of each offense. In particular, he contends that .there is. no evidence that he had the specific intent to use the car as a deadly weapon. We address each contention in turn. . . Touching As our Supreme Court has stated, “[w]hile battery requires [a] defen dant to have intended to touch another person, [he] need not personally touch another person since battery may be committed by the unlawful touching by [the] defendant or by any other substance put in motion by [the] defendant.” Matthews v. State, 476 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Ind. 1985) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Here, the State presented

    ### Response:
    holding intent to touch satisfied where defendant fired bullets at officer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977) (“A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute [Title VII] was passed.... [I]t is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences.”). Reno cannot, due to the circumstances surrounding Metro’s refusal to promote her in 1991 and 1992, prevail on her claim that these incidents evince an overall pattern of continuing discriminatory conduct by Metro. Reno’s promotion denials occurred over a three year period and each involved a different hiring manager, negating Reno’s contention that such decisions were linked to or otherwise shared commonality with the 1993 promotion denial. See Scott v. Claytor, 469 F.Supp. 22, 25 (D.D.C.1978) (<HOLDING>); Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp., 835 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been shown that the defendant’s insurer was doing anything other than investigating and processing an insurance claim, which is the nature of an insurer’s business. That Aetna learned of attorney Majewski’s involvement as early as October 26, 1987, is not dispositive, for the defendant has failed to prove that it switched to a litigation posture because of such knowledge. The mere awareness by an insurer that an injured person was seeking legal advice would not ordinarily cause one to anticipate litigation. Thus, any statements made by witnesses to the defendant, its agents, or its insurer (per the express language of Rule 26(b)(3)) soon after the incident are not protected by the work product doctrine. Accord, Schmidt v. California State Auto. Ass’n., 127 F.R.D. 182, 184 (D.Nev.1989) (<HOLDING>) Some eight months later on June 8,1988, Aetna

    ### Response:
    holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at some later date. Id. Therefore, a reasonable basis for the different classification of unwed fathers and unwed mothers in section 78-30-4 is the fact that while identification of both parents of an illegitimate child is necessary, identification of a child’s mother is automatic because of her role in the birth process, while identification of the father is not. A reasonable basis for the different classification of filing and nonfiling fathers is the state’s need to distinguish those fathers who have accepted legal responsibility for the care of their children from those fathers who have not. Id. ¶ 21 Based on this analysis and prior decisions, section 78-30-4.13 does not violate C.F.’s right to equal protection. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62, 103 S.Ct. at 2993-94, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (<HOLDING>); Wells, 681 P.2d at 204; In re J.P., 648 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that new york statutory scheme governing adoption did not violate unmarried fathers right to equal protection by according different legal rights as between birth mother and putative father
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“[Wjhere the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or properties ... even though nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute.... ”). But this does not make the invocation of the United States’s name a mere formality. Indeed, in a recent case involving § 81, the Seventh Circuit rejected a standing challenge based on the non-Indian relators’ having no connection whatsoever with the contracts, because the United States was the plaintiff, and it had standing. See United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1211-15 (7th Cir.1995); cf. United States ex rel. Mosay v. Buffalo Bros. Management, Inc., 20 F.3d 739 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Congress wished to protect tribes by aligning

    ### Response:
    holding that tribal members may sue as relators
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Taylor argues that: (1) his conviction was unconstitutional, under the Commerce Clause, because § 922(g)(1) does not regulate an activity with a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce; and (2) he was sentenced in violation of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), because the district court enhanced his sentence based upon facts not charged in the indictment or admitted by him, pursuant to a mandatory sentencing scheme. We review the constitutionality of statutes de novo. United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1271 (11th Cir.2001). Taylor preserved his Booker error by objecting, based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), at sentencing. See United States v. Mathenia, 409 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, he is entitled to preserved

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant properly preserved booker claim by citing blakely in his written objections to the psi and reminding the court at sentencing of his blakely objection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As we have often stated, the focus of inquiry at the summary judgment stage “always remains on the ultimate question of law: whether the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of [the protected characteristic].” Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1336-37 (8th Cir.1996). This approach “is consistent with the Supreme Court’s ... decision in St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, [509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407] (1993), where the Supreme Court held that a plaintiffs proof of pretext is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination.” Davenport, 30 F.3d at 945 n. 8; accord McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that at the pretext stage the plaintiff must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may ... certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Although we have never addressed the precise issue of whether § 406(b)(1)(A) authorizes an award of attorney’s fees where the district court’s judgment remanding the case to the Commissioner does not explicitly mention attorney’s fees, we have noted that the congressional intent behind § 406(b) is, in part, “to encourage effective legal representation of claimants by insuring lawyers that they will receive reasonable fees directly through certification by the Secretary.” Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>). We have also noted that one of § 406(b)’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court may not authorize an attorney to charge fees for representation in court when the commissioner has already authorized that attorney to charge fees for representation in administrative proceedings and declining to reach the secretarys contention that  406b does not allow a court to authorize attorneys fees unless it renders a judgment on the merits favorable to the claimant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). IPS Card Solutions, Inc. v. Boyd, No. 00 CIV.0776 (MBM), 2000 WL 620213, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 12,2000). 6 . Courts and text writers have characterized the attorney-client privilege as the oldest privilege for confidential communication known to the common law. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981); Federal Ins. Co. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 816 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn.1991); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: Evidentiary Privileges § 6.2.4, at 471 (2002); Edna S. Epstein, TheAttomey-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine 2 (4th ed. 2001) (""Epstein”). 7 . Johnson v. Patterson, 81 Tenn. 626, 649 (1884) (<HOLDING>); McMannus v. State, 39 Tenn. (2 Head) 213,

    ### Response:
    holding that the codification of the attorneyclient privilege embodies the commonlaw rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and performance benefits. In any event, the tag-line is too vague and non-specific to conclude that it necessarily implies a direct comparison to Gatorade. 28. Moreover, the claim “Upgrade your game” is also puffery. The claim is exaggerated and boastful, and no reasonable consumer, having read the slogan, would be justified in believing that it would actually result in improved athletic abilities, such as playing a better game of basketball. See, e.g., Time Warner Cable, Inc., 497 F.3d at 160 (an “ ‘exaggerated, blustering, and boasting statement upon which no reasonable buyer would be justified in relying’ ” is puffery) (quoting Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir.2000)); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 29. The tagline is also puffery in that any

    ### Response:
    holding that statement less is more was generalized boasting upon which no reasonable buyer would rely
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conflicts with another provision of the restrictive covenants in this case and in Buckner. In the present case, the provision reads, [T]he owner or owners of any of the above land shall have the right to sue for and obtain an injunction, prohibitive or mandatory, to prevent the breach of or to enforce the observance of the restrictions, in addition to ordinary legal actions for damages, and failure to of the parties or owner or owners of any of the lot or lots ... to enforce any of the restrictions herein set forth at the time of its violation shall in no event, be deemed to be a waiver of a right to do so thereafter. [Emphasis added.] The covenants in Buckner contained substantially similar language. See Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Stroud v. VBFSB Holding Corp., 917 S.W.2d 75,

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate court may judicially notice its own records
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.Supp.2d 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y.2007); Kreinik v. Showbran Photo, Inc., No. 02CV1172, 2003 WL 22339268, at *8, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18276, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2003) (“To state a claim under Section 215, [employee] must adequately plead that [employer’s] counterclaims constituted an adverse employment action taken because of [employee’s] complaints under the Labor Law.”). In addition, New York’s anti-retaliation provision requires a nexus between the employee’s complaint and the employer’s retaliatory action. Kreinik, 2003 WL 22339268, at *8, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18276, at *29 (finding that employee’s allegations sufficiently plead that his labor law complaints were a motivating factor for employer’s adverse action); Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.Supp.2d 151, 162 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). The defendant asserts entitlement to summary

    ### Response:
    holding that the close connection in time between the complaint and termination indicated that complaints could have been a motivating factor for employees termination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    district courts may expand the record in a case to include “additional materials relevant to the determination of the merits of the petition.” Rule 7, 2254 Rules. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Notes state that Rule 7’s purpose is to “eliminate some unnecessary hearings.” In accordance with Rule 7, therefore, Twill expand the record in this case to include Pursell’s mitigation evidence. This approach is consistent with Rule 7 and case law interpreting that provision. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Horn, 129 F.Supp.2d 390, 403 (M.D.Pa. 2001) (expanding the record on a claim for ineffective assistance based on trial counsel’s failure to introduce mitigating evi dence during the sentencing hearing when the facts were not in dispute); see also Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454, 1460 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Admittedly, questions arise when courts use

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing when the petitioners habeas submissions demonstrate that the petitioner is conclusively entitled to relief in such circumstances an evidentiary hearing would be a waste of judicial resources
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    constitutional due process claim and does not raise any additional arguments on appeal, the State is not entitled to relief. We express no opinion as to the merits of the State’s arguments with respect to Superintendent Hawkins or the validity of the Secretary’s decision-making process. III. CONCLUSION We dismiss the appeal for lack of standing. 1 . The Honorable Roberto A. Lange, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota. 2 . Nearly six years elapsed between Superintendent Hawkins' final term as council chairman and his appointment with the BIA. See South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t. of Interior, 775 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1139 (D.S.D.2011). 3 . In 1975, the Supreme Court of the United States held an wentieth Jud. Cir., St. Clair Cnty., Ill., 986 F.2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). The State has not argued on appeal or before

    ### Response:
    holding municipalities  are not persons within the meaning of the due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    678, 683 (N.D.Ga.1993) (for purposes of motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, court may consider document that is authenticated by and attached to affidavit, and affiant must be person through whom the exhibits could be admitted into evidence), aff'd, 42 F.3d 645 (11th Cir.1994). Kuchersky also declares, under penalty of perjury, that he has attached “true and correct copies of’ business and governmental records relating to Navoi. Translations of the Kuchersky declarations and other attached documents were provided by Alexander Ahmedov, Counsel at the Embassy of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The exhibits and declarations submitted by Navoi are properly before the court and establish Navoi’s prima facie case. Cf. Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Development B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 847-49 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 979, 121 S.Ct. 426,

    ### Response:
    holding that affidavits and exhibits submitted by defendant made prima facie showing that entity was organ of foreign state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Curiously, however, the Currys do not direct us to either video or photographic evidence in the record of Andrew and Grace’s recordings of their comings and goings. In any event, it is undisputed le an uninvited invasion of the inside of plaintiffs home could constitute a claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion, harassment of plaintiff in a restaurant or on the public street outside his home could not). The surveillance cameras did not intrude into the Currys’ private physical space. As for the Currys’ claim that a police officer came to their house to investigate Andrew and Grace’s report of vandalism, they have neither alleged nor proven that the officer did not have a right to be there, especially since probable cause was found for Jeffery’s arrest. See Cullison, 570 N.E.2d at 31 (<HOLDING>). Based on the undisputed facts, the trial

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff must demonstrate that there was an intrusion upon his or her physical solitude or seclusion such as by conducting an illegal search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at oral argument, however, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Abbott v. United States forecloses that argument, and Smith’s claim fails. * * * We AFFIRM. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(l)(B)(iii). 2 . 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). 3 .18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). 4 . See Fifth Cir.Crim. Pattern Jury Instr. (2001) § 1.30. 5 . See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). 6 . See United States v. Seale, 600 F.3d 473, 487 (5th Cir.), cert denied,-U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 163, 178 L.Ed.2d 97 (2010); see also United States v. Mejia, 844 F.2d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>). 7 . See United States v. Salinas, 480 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that an objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve for appeal an exception to the hearsay rule that was not specifically raised
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    review was ordered for February, 2000. At this review, the Board interviewed Appellant and informed him that he had failed to complete his mandatory therapeutic substance abuse program, failed to obtain a favorable recommendation from the Department of Corrections, and, moreover, the Board still did not have an updated INS report. Consequently, the Board denied parole the second time concluding that the fair administration of justice could not be achieved through Appellant’s- release. The Board again reviewed Appellant’s eligibility for parole in February of 2002, but refused to parole him for the same reasons it denied parole in February of 2001. Evidently believing his continued incarceration to be unlawful, Appellant filed a mandamus petition with the Com 2d 502 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (<HOLDING>). Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 4/9/2002. The court,

    ### Response:
    holding that parole is not a right in pennsylvania
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    declaration, the individual Plaintiffs provide over 91 years of experience at CUC’s main power plant. (Gary Camacho Deck, ECF No. 7-3 at 5.) Without their expertise, Camacho argues that there will continue, to be a “direct deterioration of service to the Utility’s customers and the general public of the CNMI.” (Id. at 6.) This includes an increase in overtime pay to cover the lack of manpower, delayed preventative scheduled maintenance on generators and other equipment, and delayed projects and other scheduled maintenance. (Id. at 7.) A plaintiff satisfies the irreparable harm requirement by demonstrating that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 129 S.Ct. 365; Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>). “The possibility that adequate compensatory

    ### Response:
    holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirming a March 30, 2010 Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) decision that found there was no clear and unmistakable error (“CUE”) in a September 6, 1973 rating decision (“September 1973 Rating Decision”) that granted total disability resulting from individual unemployability (“TDIU”), effective June 27, 1973. Peterson v. Shinseki, No. 10-2433, 2012 WL 87578, at *1 (Vet.App. Jan. 12, 2012). In February 2006, Mr. Peterson sought to revise the September 1973 Rating Decision on the basis of CUE, and on March 30, 2010, the Board determined that the September 1973 Rating Decision was not the result of CUE. The Veterans Court agreed, reasoning that the alleged error was not outcome-determinative. See Willsey v. Peake, 535 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (citing Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet.App. 310

    ### Response:
    holding that cue required a showing that the alleged error in the challenged decision would have manifestly changed the outcome at the time it was made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    261 S.W.3d at 368-69; Starrin, 2005 WL 3343875, at *1. We agree that if section 547.3215 had been relied upon by the officer and argued in the trial court, it would have made Officer Gilbert’s traffic stop abundantly reasonable. But nothing at the suppression hearing—not Officer Gilbert’s testimony and not the argument of counsel—presented that theory to the trial court. In this case, the State effectively relied strictly on subsections (a) and (c) of section 547.323 of the transportation code. Elsewhere in the State’s brief, it conceded that its failure to rely on section 547.3215 at trial precludes it from relying on that provision here on appeal. Any reliance on section 547.3215 was not preserved. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; State v. Mercado, 972 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (<HOLDING>). Because the State did not rely on section

    ### Response:
    holding that in cases in which the state is the party appealing the basic principle of appellate jurisprudence that contentions not argued at trial are deemed to be waived applies equally to the state and the defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    causation standard under the enhanced penalty provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1347: Our decision is also guided by the principles of proximate cause. “The concept of proximate cause incorporates the notion that an accused may be charged with a criminal offense even though his acts were not the immediate cause of the victim’s death or injury.” Guillette, 547 F.2d at 749. “In many situations giving rise to criminal liability,” the harm “is not directly caused by the acts of the defendant but rather results from intervening forces or events.” Id. “Where such intervening events are foreseeable and naturally result from [the defendant]^ criminal conduct,” the defendant is “criminally responsible for the resulting harm.” Id.) see also Hoopengamer v. United States, 270 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.1959) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, even if [the defendant] did not

    ### Response:
    holding defendant culpable for the natural and probable consequence   of his conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    probate court approved the Master’s conclusion that Adkins “attacks the ‘trust’ as a sham, but does not present a showing that the [relinquishment] agreement was entered into mistakenly, fraudulently, or by coercion. The terms of the ‘trust’ are of no concern to Mr. Adkins if he has relinquished any interest in it.” Although Adkins opposed the Master’s recommendations, there was no subsequent action by the probate court. Adkins does not appeal this order. With regard to the fraud-related defenses, Adkins filed a “Petition to Rescind and Void the ‘Relinquishment Agreement’ for the Causes of Fraud and Constructive Fraud,” but later withdrew the motion. Where a party has withdrawn pleadings, he cannot later appeal based on such grounds. See Ogden v. State, 395 P.2d 371, 372 (Alaska 1964) (<HOLDING>). Adkins’ fraud-related claims relating to the

    ### Response:
    holding appeal improper where trial judge did not rule upon question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 224 Or 57, 61, 355 P2d 742 (1960) (“The purpose of an exclusion clause is the opposite of that of a coverage clause. * * * [T]he effect of an exclusion clause is to deny the protection of the policy to someone who, but for the denial, would be an insured.”); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 793 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining an “exclusion clause” as “a clause in an insurance policy barring certain losses or risks from coverage”). A condition of forfeiture exists where, initially, the policy provides coverage for the loss, but acts of the insured nullify the coverage. Day-Towne v. Progressive Halcyon Ins. Co., 214 Or App 372, 381, 164 P3d 1205 (2007), rev den, 346 Or 65 (2009); see, e.g., Kabban v. Mackin, 104 Or App 422, 429, 801 P2d 883 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Here, for a condition of forfeiture to exist,

    ### Response:
    holding that the policy insured property but failure to occupy premises negated coverage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    felt safe. Accordingly, we find that § 1040.18a promotes a compelling State interest as applied to Appellant. 133 As compelling as the State's interest of protecting minors is in the present case, the statutory provision must still be narrowly drawn to serve those interests if the provisions is to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126-27, 109 S.Ct. at 2886-37. The statute must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms. Id., 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2886-87. This standard necessarily disfavors a blanket ban or complete prohibition. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813-14, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 1886-87, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000); Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28, 109 S.Ct. at 2887-88 (<HOLDING>); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463

    ### Response:
    holding total ban on indecent dialaporn telephone communications not narrowly drawn to serve the governments compelling interest in protecting children
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no reasonable person in Plaintiffs position would have believed that the activities listed in her Complaint constituted a violation under any law or regulation pertinent to SOX. Finally, even assuming Plaintiffs activities were protected under SOX, she cannot demonstrate that these activities were a contributing factor in her termination — the last prima facie element. Although Plaintiff alleges that her reports from March 2003 to January 3, 2008, caused her discharge on August 8, 2008, without additional evidence, the eight-month gap between Plaintiffs last complaint and her discharge “is not sufficiently proximate to permit the inference that protected activity was a contributing factor to her termination.” Pardy v. Gray, No. 07-6324, 2008 WL 2756331, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2008) (<HOLDING>); Sussberg v. K-Mart Holding Corp., 463

    ### Response:
    holding that a sixmonth gap between the protected activity and the employees termination was insufficient to infer that the protected activity was a contributing factor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    forced prosecutors to institute bargaining systems that allowed them to dispose of minor cases expeditiously. Id. at 32. In 1945, for example, eighty-five percent of the 36,114 cases brought in federal court were resolved by guilty pleas. See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, University of Albany, Table 5.22.2010, http://www.albany.edu/ sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf (last visited August 10, 2015). By 1955, eighty percent of the 35,501 federal cases brought were settled by plea deals. Id. In 1965, post Gideon, ninety percent of the 28,757 federal cases opened were .resolved with plea agreements. Id. In 1970, the Supreme Court declared constitutional the practice of plea bargaining. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92

    ### Response:
    holding guilty pleas are not constitutionally forbidden and are valid if made voluntarily and intelligently
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or otherwise demonstrating that they received little or nothing of value under the contract. See, e.g., Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1097 (W.D.Mieh.2000) (“[N]either the text nor the commentary to the Holder Rule limits the availability of affirmative consumer claims against assignee-creditors to those who assert a right of rescission under common law.”); Simpson v. Anthony Auto Sales, Inc., 32 F.Supp.2d 405, 409 fn. 10 (W.D.La.1998) (“[A] plaintiff should not be required to first prove that she has received little or nothing of value in order to recover from her creditor, as the FTC notice does not advise the creditor” of such a requirement); Jaramillo v. Gonzales, 132 N.M. 459, 50 P.3d 554 (App.2002), cert. denied, 132 N.M. 288, 47 P.3d 447 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Alduridi v. Community Trust Bank, N.A., 1999

    ### Response:
    holding that ftc holder rule does not limit affirmative claims to those instances where rescission would be appropriate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute, a party may not secure a declaration of its statutory rights by seeking relief under the DJA. This general principle is implied by the Court’s decision in In re Resolution of State Comm. of Investigation, supra, 108 N.J. at 46, 527 A.2d 851. The Court declined to render a declaratory judgment on the question whether the State Commission on Investigation (SCI) unlawfully disclosed information about the plaintiffs. The Court held that plaintiffs lacked a private right of action to secure injunctive relief against the SCI arising out of the alleged disclosures. Ibid. (“[0]ur decision that the plaintiffs may not obtain the injunctive relief they sought undermines their need for a declaratory judgment.”); see also In re A.N., 430 N.J.Super. 235, 244-45, 63 A.3d 764 (App.Div.2013) (<HOLDING>); Med. Soc. of N.J. v. AmeriHealth HMO, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that the chancery division lacked jurisdiction under njsa 2a1655 to determine medicaid eligibility where the authority to do so was vested in the division of medical assistance and health services
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    may conduct a pat-down search (or “frisk”) if he or she “harbors an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous.” Davis, 94 F.3d at 1468; see also United States v. Duncan, 131 F.3d 894, 898 (10th Cir.1997) (concluding that officers had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in on-going criminal activity and therefore could order him to get out of car and conduct a pat-down search). Here, the evidence supporting the officers’ reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs (i.e. his coming and going from the apartment named in the search warrant and the hand-to-hand contact observed outside the apartment) also indicated that he might be armed and dangerous. See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that during an investigatory detention officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    scheme by filing a parallel proceeding before the NLRC complaining about his employment with IPS. The ap-pellees argue that the district court should not exercise jurisdiction because some conduct about which the appellants complain is actually required by Filipino laws and regulations. In their motion to dismiss, the appellees relied heavily upon Section 10 of the Migrant Workers Act to argue that the NLRC has exclusive jurisdiction and is a strong expression of the Philippines’ interest in this case. While Section 10 is one fact that weighs in favor of dismissal insofar as it demonstrates that the Philippines regulates the complained-of activity, contrary to the appellees’ argument, Section 10, alone, does not support dismissal of the appellants’ ease. See Randall, 778 F.2d at 1150 (<HOLDING>). On balance, some evidence relevant to the

    ### Response:
    holding that the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of saudi arabias labor law cannot deprive an american court of subject matter jurisdiction rejecting outright the notion that the law of a foreign country can unilaterally curtail the power of our  courts to hear a dispute unless some other agreement or treaty requires that result
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judicial notice that Denton County had a population of over 25,000. 3 . Officer Stewart testified that he did not have Lyons sign the warnings as it was not required by Department policy. 4 . According to Jessee this letter was mailed a day or two after July 2nd. 5 . We have attempted to summarize this somewhat confusing portion of the charge, which portion takes up four double-spaced legal size sheets of paper. 6 . See Weaver, 700 S.W.2d at 777 (interpreting section 24 of TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6701/-1 to require that visual recordings be made of DWI suspects). 7 . We make no holding that the trial court was required to so instruct the jury; only that it had discretion to do so and to see that it was done properly. Compare Drewett v. State, 704 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)

    ### Response:
    holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has held that SORA is rationally related to a “legitimate state interest of protecting the public.” See Golba, 273 Mich App at 620. Put another way, SORA in general is rationally related to the Legislature’s stated purpose of protecting the people of Michigan from those who have committed offenses that “pose[] a potential serious menace and danger to the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people, and particularly the children, of this state.” MCL 28.721a; see also Temelkoski, 307 Mich App at 270 (“SORA . . . has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose . . . .”); Fonville, 291 Mich App at 380. However, the issue of whether the requirement of registration for offenders who commit the crime of unlawful imprisonment of a minor without a sexual purpose survives r 27 (2010) (<HOLDING>); People v Cintron, 46 AD3d 353, 354; 848 NYS2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the requirement of sex offender registration for the defendants conviction of false imprisonment of a minor was not cruel and unusual punishment and did not violate substantive or procedural due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the trial court to hold a hearing on the issue of a defendant's absence at trial in order to allow the defendant to rebut the initial presumption of waiver. In support of this position, he cites Willis, 525 N.E.2d 610. In Ellis, the defendant failed to appear for trial, and the trial court later questioned him, without his attorney present, about the reason for his absence. Another panel of this court ordered a new hearing regarding the defendant's absence at trial, finding that ""Ellis was entitled to a hearing affording him an opportunity to explain his absence,"" and that it was a critical stage of the proceedings at which he was entitled to representation. Id. at 612. In support of its conclusion, this Court cited Gilbert v. State, 182 Ind.App. 286, 290, 395 N.E.2d 429, 482 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Holtz argues that this Court's position in

    ### Response:
    holding that for reviewing court to look solely at the facts initially before the court regarding defendants absence would be patently unfair
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), ""was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds”). The ICA unanimously decided the case in a two-page summary disposition order relying on settled law that the charge failed to allege an attendant circumstance of the offense. State v. Wheeler, 120 Hawai'i 256, 203 P.3d 676 (App. 2009) (summary disposition order) (citing HRS § 702-205 and Jendrusch in concluding that the ch ir.1996) (stating that a prior U.S. Supreme Court decision did not announce a new rule of constitutional law because it merely engaged in statutory interpretation); United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278, 279 (9th Cir.1997) (accord); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1195-96 (4th Cir.1997) (accord); United States v. McPhail, 112 F.3d 197, 199 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 34 . To the extent the concurrence’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a prior us supreme court decision did not present a new rule of criminal procedure but merely interpreted a statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. 4B Elevator Components Unlimited, 148 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir.1998) (applying Section 388 under Iowa law); Erickson v. Monarch Indus., 216 Neb. 875, 347 N.W.2d 99, 108 (1984) (stating that “warning of a product’s defects is unnecessary where the supplier of the product has reason to believe that those who will use it will have such special experience as will enable them to perceive the danger”) (quotation omitted). U t] was under a duty to warn, its failure to do so could not have been the proximate cause of the accident because [the employer] and the plaintiffs decedent [a supervisory employee] were aware of the danger”); Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 300 (8th Cir.1996) (same); Hammond v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 204 Neb. 80, 86, 281 N.W.2d 520, 524 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, under Nebraska law, the “rule of

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to warn of a gas leak could not have been a proximate cause of the accident if the gas company already knew of the leak
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Appellant provides no evidence — and indeed does not even assert — that the court’s order was ever given effect. Appellant is not entitled to relief merely on the basis of a trial court order that, although inconsistent with a current rule, led to no improper action or omission. Consistent with Rule 576, decisional law from this Court has clarified Commonwealth policy regarding hybrid representation. No defendant has a right to hybrid representation, either at trial or on appeal. Commonwealth v. Ellis, 534 Pa. 176, 626 A.2d 1137, 1139 (1993); Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.3d 282, 293 (2010) (characterizing as a “legal nullity” a pro se Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement filed by an appellant who was represented by counsel); Commonwealth v. Colson, 507 Pa. 440, 490 A.2d 811, 822 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Here, Appellant was represented by

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no constitutional right for a represented defendant to act as cocounsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    filed because of sudden illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment. At the same time, this is not a case of debtors who ran up debt by consistently living beyond their means. Rather, it appears that they were the victims of a collapsing real estate market that caught them by surprise as they were attempting to move from one house to another that was more suited to their needs. In retrospect, they clearly extended themselves unwisely, but certainly they were not the only home buyers in the 2005 to 2007 time frame who did not foresee the precipitous drop in property values that took even experienced real estate professionals in Northern Virginia by surprise. In any event, poor financial decisions, standing alone, do not equate to abuse. In re Smith, 354 B.R. 787 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 2006) (<HOLDING>). The fall-off in real estate values left the

    ### Response:
    holding in prebapcpa case that chapter 7 filing was not a substantial abuse simply because debtors made unwise financial decisions that increased their monthly living expenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Due Process Clause because it failed to provide any protection for the parent’s “fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughter.” Id. at 70, 120 S.Ct. at 2062, 147 L.Ed.2d at 59. The Court then cited with approval state statutes and court decisions that, unlike the Washington statute, protect that fundamental right. See, e.g., Cal. Fam.Code § 3104(e) (West 1994) (rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation not in child’s best interest if parents agree otherwise); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann., tit. 19A, § 1803(3) (West 1998) (authorizing visitation if in child’s best interest and does not significantly interfere with parent-child relationship or “parent’s rightful authority over the child”); Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 (N.D.1999) (<HOLDING>). Summing up, the Court described the

    ### Response:
    holding visitation statute unconstitutional because it disregards presumption favoring parental decisionmaking forcing parents to prove visitation not in childs best interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    they have elsewhere within the State or Territory: :(! ‡ !{« S}! * ifc “(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States . ' . . ; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein. “(c) Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian tribe, 4, 18 L.Ed.2d 643 (1967) (<HOLDING>). See Board of Regents v. New Left Education

    ### Response:
    holding local ordinances are not state statutes within the meaning of 28 usc  2281 requiring convening of a threejudge district court to enjoin a state statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    19(a), and; (2) if the absent party is necessary and cannot be joined, then the court must decide if “in equity and good conscience” the action should be dismissed because the nonparty is indispensable. Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir.1990). (1) In order to determine if the absent party is necessary to the suit; (a) a court must determine if complete relief is possible among those already parties to the suit and; (b) whether the absent party has a legally protected interest in the suit. Id. at 558. This interest must be more than a-financial stake, and more than speculation about a future event. Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir.1986); See McLaughlin v. International Ass’n of Machinists, 847 F.2d 620, 621 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that speculation about a future event is inadequate interest in a suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hospitals’ records undoubtedly assert that baby Joseph’s condition at the time of discharge was that of “no fever, alert, no distress”, and “good, stable”. However, plaintiffs’ experts conclude through their opinions after scrutinizing the hospitals’ records that the lack of sufficient documented objective vital signs at the time of discharge from HHM, and the mere reliance on the child’s appearance accompanied by a normal chest x-Ray at the time of discharge from San Pablo is meager evidence of baby Joseph’s stability at time of discharge. The Court must, therefore, leave the issue to be resolved by a jury’s weighing of the hospitals’ documented record against the opinion of plaintiffs’ experts suggesting that the records were insufficient. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (<HOLDING>). Without entering into an opinion one way or

    ### Response:
    holding that credibility determinations the weighing of the evidence and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions not those of a judge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no earlier than December 7, 2003. If their claims accrued before that date, then this court is without jurisdiction to hear them. A. Claim Accrual and Statute of Limitations in Overflight Takings Cases A claim against the government under the Tucker Act first accrues “when all the events which fix the government’s alleged liability have occurred and the plaintiff was or should have been aware of their existence.” Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1988) (emphasis in original). In determining whether plaintiffs knew, or should have known, of the requisite factual predicates establishing the government’s alleged liability in this case, the court must apply an objective standard. See Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Because plaintiffs bear the burden of

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff does not have to possess actual knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for the cause of action to accrue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the entire state over the parochial interests of individual municipalities. 2 . In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Baer appears to translate the common-law maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas into a federal constitutional duty, on the part of local municipalities, to protect property owners from the use of neighboring properties in ways that are undesirable to them. See Concurring Opinion, at 729-31, 734-37, 83 A.3d at 1002-03, 1005-06. The decisions referenced in the concurrence, however, generally concern the boundaries of the police power to establish zoning regulations restricting the ability of landowners to do as they wish with their own properties. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S.Ct. 114, 121, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926) (<HOLDING>); City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514

    ### Response:
    holding that a zoning ordinance impinging upon a landowners desired use of his property does not offend substantive due process norms so long as the regulation is not clearly arbitrary and unreasonable having no substantial relation to the public health safety morals or general welfare
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    against each other, thereby avoiding ‘the absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A.’ ”) (quoting Studley v. Boylston Nat’l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528, 33 S.Ct. 806, 57 L.Ed. 1313 (1913) (emphasis added)). In this case, allowing Bechtel to set off its obligation to Shaw against Bechtel’s claim against the Debtor would result in a different absurdity — essentially, A (Bechtel) would not have to pay B (Shaw) because C (Debtor) owes A. Shaw argues that the phrase “other transactions” in the Offset Provision means other transactions with “SUBCONTRACTOR,” which is now Shaw. Shaw concedes that to the extent there are any sums due by it to Bechtel under any of the Contracts assigned by the Debtor to it, Bechtel may offset those sums against t le’s State Bank, 68 F.2d 110, 111 (4th Cir.1934) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Bechtel asserts that the parties

    ### Response:
    holding that contract party could still offset funds placed on deposit by assignor to secure payment of assigned note
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    spent more time on Mar Oil matters after the New York action was dismissed than he had prior to and during the action is unsupported and seems so improbable that, on the basis of all the evidence, we are left with the firm conviction that a mistake was made. Since the court made no explicit finding of the number of hours Morrissey spent in service of Mar Oil after January 26, 1983, and its implicit finding was clearly erroneous, and since the record provides no clear quantification of those hours, we remand to the district court for a further finding on this question. Second, we have difficulty with the fee award because the court applied its $200/ hour rate to all of the time spent by Morrissey. Application of a judicially calculated reasonable rate .S.2d 285, 288 (1st Dep’t) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 1028, 517

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys could not recover fees in excess of amount billed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are not under oath and not subject to cross-examination.” United States v. Chong, supra, 104 F. Sup. 2d 1234 n.5. Moreover, it is important to remember that “[t]he imposition of death by public authority is . . . profoundly different from all other penalties . . . .” Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 605. In a capital sentencing proceeding, there is no verdict of “not guilty”—rather, a capital defendant who is not sentenced to death will receive a sentence of life imprisonment. Therefore, because the potential harm from an erroneous sentencing verdict is far greater for the defendant than it is for the state, the balance of equities requires that any inaccuracies in the capital sentencing process be resolved in favor of the defendant. See State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. 233-34

    ### Response:
    recognizing the unique and irrevocable nature of the death penalty and    the consequently overarching need for reliability in the imposition of such a penalty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as denying to any party the right to trial by jury where there are substantial issues of fact to be determined. A summary judgment may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damage.”). 21 See OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) (“[A]n action for medical malpractice shall be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.”). 22 See OCGA § 9-11-10 (b) (providing that “[e]ach claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth”). 23 Cf. Deen v. Pounds, 312 Ga. App. 207, 211 (1) (718 SE2d 68) (2011) (<HOLDING>); Goodman v. Satilla Health Servs., 290 Ga.

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe reglan and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence punctuation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    legal rights of the parties but also took steps toward decreeing a proper remedy. Thus in its January 20, 1998 order, the court resolved the merits of the Hospitals’ claims, and with its April 30, 1998 order, directed the Secretary to calculate the amount of outlier payments due to the Hospitals and to make payment accordingly. This latter order has spawned some confusion about our jurisdiction because of the general rule applicable to civil actions that “where assessment of damages or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved,” a district court’s judgment is not “ ‘final’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976); see also A & S Council Oil Co. v. Lader, 56 F.3d 234, 238 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). For it is clear that neither of the district

    ### Response:
    holding that an order establishing liability but referring the issue of damages to arbitration is not final
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it from either the United States, one of the fifty states, or the District of Columbia; all others are 'foreign' corporations”). The United States Supreme Court has also suggested that whether a corporation is foreign or domestic is dependent on its ""charter.” See, e.g., Can. Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 537, 3 S.Ct. 363, 27 L.Ed. 1020 (1883) (""A corporation 'must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty,’ though it may do business in all places where its charter allows * * *. But wherever it goes for business it carries its charter, as that is the law of its existence * * *.""). We have expressed a similar view on nationality. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohsman & Sons, Co. v. Starkweather, 214 Minn. 232, 237, 7 N.W.2d 747, 749 (1943) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Our conclusion is confirmed by Treas.

    ### Response:
    holding that while a state statute granted a foreign corporation the rights and privileges enjoyed by domestic corporations it did not transform such corporations into domestic or resident corporations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    without inference or presumption.” Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir.1993) (emphasis added). For example, we have held that a job interviewer’s statement that the plaintiffs age caused him concern was not direct evidence of discrimination in the employer’s decision not to hire the plaintiff. Haas v. ADVO Sys., Inc., 168 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir.1999). Although the interviewer’s remarks were neither vague nor remote in time — and despite a reasonable inference that the interviewer had influenced the employer’s hiring preferences — we nevertheless noted that an additional inference was required before we could conclude that the decisionmaker himself chose not to hire the plaintiff based on age discrimination. Id. at 734; cf. Fierros, 274 F.3d at 195 (<HOLDING>). In the context of TxDOT’s motion for summary

    ### Response:
    holding that a decisionmakers own statement  that the plaintiff would not receive a pay increase because she engaged in protected activity  is direct evidence of discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    definition that is applicable in all settings' Thus, 'the meaning of [cohabitation] depends upon the con text in which it is used.' '' Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App 37, ¶ 7, 107 P.3d 693 (second alteration in original) (quoting Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985)). The jury instructions employed the definition of eohabitant found in the Cohabitant Abuse Act, informing the jury that Watkins was a cohbabitant of Father if either he was ""related by blood or marriage to [Father]"" or he ""resides or has resided in the same residence as [Father]."" See Utah Code Aun. § 78B-7-102(2) (2008). However, that definition is limited to the provisions of the Cohabitant Abuse Act and is not necessarily applicable in other contexts. See Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866, 868-69 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). \ 13 The definition found in the Cohabitant

    ### Response:
    holding that the cohabitant abuse acts definition of cohabitant did not abrogate the definition of cohabitant developed by case law in the context of alimony termination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    breadth of the consent decree as follows: [By THE COURT:] Well, I've reviewed the matter and the case started out as a residence case, and I know that the consent decree has some additional broad language in it. But it started out as a residence case. And now under the mantle, let us say, of a contempt proceeding, it has shifted ground, and it's becoming a testing and selection case. App. I at 5. Even if the case did initially center on the residency requirement, the proper focus must be on the language contained within the consent decree itself. A judicially approved consent decree, like a settlement agreement, is essentially a contract for purposes of construction. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3078, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (<HOLDING>); Kasper v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d

    ### Response:
    recognizing that consent decrees have a dual character that of contract and that of judicial decree subjecting them to different treatment for different purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “prima facie, classifiable under two or more headings” (ie., heading 9405 and heading 7013), the merchandise would nevertheless be properly classified under heading 9405, pursuant to GRI 3(a) — the rule of “relative specificity.” As outlined above, GRI 3(a) requires that— where merchandise is prima facie, classifiable under two or more headings — “[t]he heading which provides the most specific description shall be preferred to headings providing a more general description.” See GRI 3(a). As the Explanatory Notes emphasize, only if merchandise cannot be classified pursuant to GRI 3(a) does GRI 3(b) come into play. See Explanatory Note GRI 3(b)(VI) (stating that GRI 3(b) “applies only if Rule 3(a) fails”); Bauer Nike Hockey USA, Inc. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1246, 1252 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). It is clear beyond cavil that heading 9405,

    ### Response:
    holding that where the gri 3a rule of relative specificity adequately resolved proper classification of merchandise customs erred in reaching gri 3b essential character analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    even if we were to accept Kovler's contention that he backed up his vehicle before taking the photographs, Kovler admitted that ""the rear of his vehicle [was] no more than a foot beyond the pole” (marking the beginning of the stopping prohibited zone) as originally parked. (O.R. at 52.) 12 . Kovler also appears to argue that the trial court should not have considered this matter as an appeal. Rather, Kovler contends that the trial court should have required the City to file a civil complaint under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure to allow the matter to be fully litigated. Kovler envisions a process involving discovery and a full civil trial; however, Kovler offers no legal support for such a contention. See Boniella v. Com., 958 A.2d 1069, 1072 n. 8 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (<HOLDING>), appeal denied sub nom. In re Handgun, 600 Pa.

    ### Response:
    holding issue spotting without legal citation precludes appellate review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Model Act, especially when the General Assembly would have been fully aware of the Model Act’s commentary when enacting our Business Corporation Act. This interpretation is also consistent with opinions of this Court in analogous situations. See Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 103 N.C. App. 479, 482, 405 S.E.2d 794, 796 (“Jeanne Lowder’s claims arise from and depend on the role of her husband as officer of the corporation. To regard her claims otherwise would be to enable officers of a corporation to defraud their companies and avoid any accounting or detection by acting through their spouses and then allowing a spouse to assert claims.”), disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 119, 409 S.E.2d 595 (1991); cf. City of Asheville v. Morris, 133 N.C. App. 90, 92, 514 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, there is no need, in this case, to

    ### Response:
    holding that civil service board members had interests in the matter and should have recused themselves when one member had a husband and another a son who would be affected by the boards decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    MedtroMc first argues that res judi-cata requires KulinsM to plead all bases for jurisdiction in his original pleading. TMs argument is inconsistent with our precedent. In McCarney v. Ford Motor Co., 657 F.2d 230 (8th Cir.1981), we held that a dismissal based on subject matter jurisdiction: should preclude relitigation of the same [jurisdiction] issue but not a second smt on the same claim even if arising out of the identical set of facts_ [W]here the second suit presents new theories of relief, admittedly based upon the same operative facts as alleged m the first action, it is not precluded because the first decision was not on the merits of the substantive claim. Id. at 233-34 (citations omitted); cf. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407, 1411 (8th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Ku-linsM based his first action on federal

    ### Response:
    holding second action barred by res judicata because plaintiff asserted identical claims and jurisdictional grounds as the first action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    denying their motions for a new trial and an evi-dentiary hearing on the basis of alleged juror misconduct and extrinsic influence on jurors. According to William and Chantal, since their motions demonstrate a color-able showing of extrinsic influence, the court erred by not conducting an eviden-tiary hearing on their motions. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree. The only evidence offered by William and Chantal in support of their motions for a new trial and an evidentiary hearing consisted of the Porter and the Roberts Affidavits. With respect to the Porter Affidavit, all but two of the statements contained therein are excluded by Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) because they involve thé jury’s deliberative process and the mental impressions of juror Hart. The two statem (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion

    ### Response:
    recognizing that trial court is obligated to conduct evidentiary hearing only when defendant makes a colorable showing of extrinsic influence 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from hourly ongoing client matters relates to bankruptcy law in the following way. Under 11 U.S.C. § 548, a bankruptcy trustee has the power to avoid any fraudulent transfer of an interest of the debtor in property within a specified period before the bankruptcy. A transfer will be fraudulent if it was done with intent to “hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors, § 548(a)(1)(A), or if it meets certain criteria for a constructive fraudulent transfer, § 548(a)(1)(B). For purposes of bankruptcy law, debtors have an interest in any property that would have been part of the bankruptcy estate if not for the transfer. See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58, 110 S.Ct. 2258, 110 L.Ed.2d 46 (1990). Certain subsequent transferees of the debtor’s property can also be 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945) (<HOLDING>). The answers provided will help clarify the

    ### Response:
    holding that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state law that determines the outcome of the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    policy on the basis of speculation that the l 66 (1999) (finding electronic monitoring does not place a defendant “in custody” within meaning of sentencing credit statute); State v. Climer, 127 Idaho 20, 896 P.2d 346, 350 (Idaho Ct.App.1995) (concluding “house arrest” through electronic monitoring is not “incarceration”); State v. Muratella, 240 Neb. 567, 483 N.W.2d 128, 129-30 (1992) (“Being confined to one’s home, subject to electronic monitoring, with the freedom to engage in employment and probation-related activities, is far less onerous than being imprisoned.”); State v. Faulkner, 102 Ohio App.3d 602, 657 N.E.2d 602, 604 (1995) (finding pretrial electronic home monitoring does not entitle defendant to sentencing credit); Commonwealth v. Kyle, 582 Pa. 624, 874 A.2d 12, 20 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Tagorda v. State, 977 S.W.2d 632, 633-34

    ### Response:
    holding time spent on electronic monitoring while on bail release does not constitute custody within meaning of sentencing credit statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Constitution or federal law, it should “afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure rather than for the federal court to devise ... its own plan.” Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978). This case presents an exceptional circumstance, however: the General Assembly enacted the 2016 Plan after another panel of this Court invalidated the 2011 Plan as a racial gerrymander. Harris, 159 F.Supp.3d at 627. When a court finds a remedial districting plan also violates the Constitution, courts generally do not afford a legislature a second “bite-at-the-apple” to enact a constitutionally compliant plan. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27, 95 S.Ct. 751, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586, 84 S.Ct. 1362

    ### Response:
    holding that if a state fails to enact a constitutionally acceptable remedial districting plan the responsibility falls on the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    differs not at all from the speculation in Hughes Properties that a jackpot might never be paid by a casino. As we observed in Hughes Properties, the potential of nonpayment of a liability always exists, and it alone does not prevent accrual. The beneficiary of a liability always has the option of waiving payment, but a taxpayer is still unquestionably entitled to deduct the liability. An injured employee entitled absolutely to reimbursement for medical services under a workers’ compensation statute, for example, may fail to utilize the medical services. The employer, however, has been held to be entitled to deduct the expected medical expenses because the workers’ compensation law creates liability. See Wien Consolidated Airlines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 528 F. 2d 735 (CA9 1976) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, any business liability could

    ### Response:
    holding that accrual basis taxpayer may deduct expected workers compensation payments in year of injury even though injured workers may not utilize medical benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that summary judgment in its favor meant that the School District was not negligent, it does not follow that Edison Learning was negligent. For example, both Edison Learning and the School District may have fully complied with their duties and the assault may have been the sole fault of Viruet’s attacker. Indeed, if dismissing the School ■ District was sufficient to establish Edison’s negligence, Viruet himself could have asserted collateral estoppel against Edison at trial. Nor does the fact of settlement between Edison Learning and Viruet es tablish Edison Learning’s negligence. Settlements are not final adjudications for the purposes of collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Eighth N.-Val, Inc. v. William L. Parkinson, D.D.S., P.C., Pension Trust, 778 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa.Super.Ct.2001) (<HOLDING>); Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding a compromise to settle the dispute meant there was therefore no actual litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    awards arising from LCAs than from reviews of CBA determinations. In Cooper Natural Resources, the arbitrator ignored the LCA, relying solely on the CBA. The court in that case was not faced with an issue like that in the present case, where the arbitrator interpreted a provision of the LCA and a party challenged the arbitrator’s interpretation. Thus, Cooper Natural Resources does not support Continental’s position that a more searching review of an arbitrator’s interpretation of an LCA is mandated. Second, none of the authorities relied upon by the court in Cooper Natural Resources support a “no deference” standard of review for awards arising from LCAs. In Tootsie Roll Indus., Inc. v. Local Union No. 1, Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers’ Int’l Union, 832 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>), the court applied the same standard of review

    ### Response:
    holding that an arbitrators award should have been vacated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1941) (internal citations omitted). “The parties agree that the plaintiffs are citizens of North Carolina and defendants Whitehead and Aden are citizens of Virginia. The parties also agree that TRI was incorporated in Virginia and TRINC was incorporated in North Carolina.” (Appellant’s Br. at 11-12.) For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(c)(1). The district court held that TRINC’s North Carolina citizenship did not destroy complete diversity because TRINC was a “sham” defendant under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder. See Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97, 42 S.Ct. 35, 66 L.Ed. 144 (1921) (<HOLDING>). As Hugger and Settle “acknowledge that there

    ### Response:
    holding that the right of removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder of a resident defendant having no real connection with the controversy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    X-Rite thus acted upon a questionable interpretation of Michigan law without first having ascertained whether representation by Vandeveer Garzia would involve a substantial likelihood of prejudice to its interests. X-Rite, 748 F.Supp. at 1228 (footnote omitted); see also Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 336 F.Supp.2d at 621-22. As in X-Rite, the defendants in this case proceeded under the same questionable interpretation of South Carolina law. The insurance companies, in contrast, adhered to settled principles under South Carolina law regarding their right and duty to defend by providing counsel (i.e., Robert McKenzie) to represent the defendants for all claims filed against them, despite the reservation of rights. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 259 S.C. 586, 193 S.E.2d 527, 530 (1972)(<HOLDING>); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Best, 728 F.Supp. 1263,

    ### Response:
    holding that insurance company operating under a reservation of rights had the right and the duty to control the defense until such time as it was determined that it had no liability insurance coverage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of constitutional violations in immigration proceedings, see Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 516 (9th Cir.2001), and we dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review. We lack jurisdiction to consider Vega Sanchez’s challenge to the IJ’s discretionary determination that he failed to demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2003); Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir.2002). Vega Sanchez contends the IJ violated his due process rights by using a boilerplate decision. The IJ’s decision indicates she gave Vega Sanchez’s application the required individual determination. Cf. Paramasamy v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1050-52 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The IJ set forth the facts as testified to by

    ### Response:
    holding an ijs boilerplate demeanor findings failed to provide an adequate basis for this court to conduct its review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from that before the court in 1997. In essence, the argument is that a change in factual circumstances after the prior determination bars the application of collateral estoppel here. 2. Changed Circumstances Courts appear to waiver in considering whether “changed circumstances” vitiates the application of the “identical issue” element of collateral estoppel, or whether it presents an equitable exception to the application of collateral estoppel, even if the “issue” to be determined is the same. Compare Anspach ex rel. Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Fed. Appx. 180, 184 (3d Cir.2010) (using “identity of issues” terminology) and Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 126 F.3d 461, 477 (3d Cir.1997) (same) with Leventry v. Price, 319 F.Supp.2d 562, 568 (W.D.Pa.2004) (<HOLDING>) and Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc. v. El Dia,

    ### Response:
    holding collateral estoppel elements met considering changed circumstances in the context of an exception to the general rule of collateral estoppel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    170 Colo. 465, 468 P.2d 305 (1969). Thus, even assuming Jenkins intended to include legally adopted children when he referred to his daughters’ children in his 1944 will, he could not have intended to include equitably adopted children. The probate court found that Jenkins’ use of the terms “children, her lawful issue” and “child or children” in his will created latent ambiguity and the court thus resorted to extrinsic evidence to determine whether Jenkins intended to include adopted children as beneficiaries of his testamentary trust. Where evidence extrinsic to the will is considered, our standard of review is whether the probate court’s decision was clearly erroneous or completely unsupported by the evidence. See, e.g., M.D.C./Wood, Inc. v. Mortimer, 866 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Colo.1994) (<HOLDING>); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that only when facts are presented to the trial court by uncontested documentary evidence may an appellate court draw its own conclusions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Moreover, although the Burberry Check mark does not include an equestrian knight, it is undisputed that Burberry has obtained trademark protection for an equestrian knight mark, and that it often sells handbags and other goods displaying a combination of the two marks. It is also undisputed that Appellants used their mark on handbags — the same category of goods on which Burberry used its marks. The district court was therefore correct to afford the jury the opportunity to view the government’s evidence and form an independent conclusion regarding whether Appellants’ plaid design was substantially indistinguishable from the Burberry Check mark and whether the inclusion of the equestrian knight figure made any difference. See United States v. Yi, 460 F.3d 623, 629 n. 4 (5th Cir.2006)(<HOLDING>). And this evidence was sufficient to support

    ### Response:
    holding that it was for the jury to determine whether a battery that used the signature duracell copper top and black body was a counterfeit even though the text on the counterfeit battery read dinacell
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provide “bare facts” instead of demonstrating that an offender’s guilty plea was based on that conduct. Huerta-Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 888 (9th Cir.2003). It therefore appears that this Court cannot consider Plaintiffs admission in his Amended Complaint and deposition that he was married to Colette Fisher at the time of the 1997 incident under the modified categorical approach. Hayes indicates, however, that it is unnecessary to examine the elements of the predicate offense when analyzing whether that offense was “committed by a person who has a specified domestic relationship with the victim.” Rather, courts may look at the facts underlying the conviction to determine whether the “domestic relationship” requirement is satisfied. See Hayes, 555 U.S. at 421, 129 S.Ct. 1079 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Under Hayes, the question of

    ### Response:
    holding that it suffices that a prior conviction   was in fact for an offense  committed by the defendant against a spouse or other domestic victim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    schemes. See State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 14 P.3d 997 (2000), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 122 S.Ct. 386, 151 L.Ed.2d 294 (2001) (the Arizona Supreme Court followed the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Walton in denying a claim that the Arizona death penalty law was unconstitutional because it eliminated jury consideration in the sentencing process); People v. Anderson, 25 Cal.4th 543, 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347, 386 (2001) (the California Supreme Court rejected the argument that the California death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it did not require “(3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt”); Weeks v. State, 761 A.2d 804 (Del.2000) (<HOLDING>); Mills v. Moore, 786 So.2d 532, 536-37

    ### Response:
    holding that apprendi does not apply to state capital sentencing schemes where judges are required to find certain aggravating circumstances before imposing a death sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “immunity questions should be resolved as early as possible.” The State, in its answer, concedes that, although § 13A-3-23 creates an immunity defense, Watters is unable to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief because, it says, the Code section includes no procedure requiring a pretrial hearing. Thus, according to the State, the trial court’s order stating its intent to consider Watters’s immunity defense “in due course” is sufficient and Watters’s petition is due to be denied. We cannot agree. Both the State and Watters acknowledge in their pleadings to this Court that the Court of Criminal Appeals, subsequent to the issuance of its order in this case, has issued opinions relevant to the issue before us. See Malone v. State, 203 So.3d 126, 131 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016) (<HOLDING>); Harrison v. State, 203 So.3d 126, 131 (Ala.

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant was entitled to a pretrial evidentiary hearing on his claim of immunity based on selfdefense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    13 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964); Teamsters Local 115 v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 399 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827, 102 S.Ct. 119, 70 L.Ed.2d 102 (1981); cf. National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 910 F.2d 964, 966-68 (D.C.Cir.1990) (en banc) (emphasizing the extreme deference due agency remedial decisions). Even remedial decisions must, however, follow announced policies and procedures. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 852 F.2d 1344, 1347 (D.C.Cir.1988). The Local correctly points out that, in accordance with the American Rule, attorney’s fees generally are not awarded in Board proceedings. Summit Valley Indus. Inc. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 456 U.S. 717, 721-23, 102 S.Ct. 2112, 2114-15, 72 L.Ed.2d 511 (1982) (<HOLDING>). It contends that attorney’s fees would be

    ### Response:
    holding that labor management relations act  303 which authorizes recovery of damages for employers injured by an unfair labor practice does not provide authorization for awarding attorneys fees for board proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the rules and regulations for determining fitness of locomotives. Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 612, 47 S.Ct. 207, 209, 71 L.Ed. 432, 438-39 (1926). This, therefore, excludes state regulation of safety appliances, parts and appurtenances of locomotives. Id. at 613, 47 S.Ct. 207. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that in passing FLIA, Congress intended the Act to occupy the entire field of regulating locomotive equipment. Id. at 611, 47 S.Ct. 207. ¶ 74. While it is clear that FLIA preempts any state regulation of locomotive design, a majority of courts have also found that FLIA preempts common law actions against locomotive operators and locomotive manufacturers. See, e.g., In re W. Va. Asbestos Litigation, 215 W.Va. 39, 592 S.E.2d 818, 822 (2003) (<HOLDING>); General Motors Corp. v. Kilgore, 853 So.2d

    ### Response:
    holding asbestos claim against railroad preempted by the flia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). The Supreme Court, in Schmerber v. California, addressed this issue directly and found that the compelled administration of a blood test falls within the reach and protections of the Fourth Amendment. 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). Any forced extraction of blood, therefore, invades one’s expectation of privacy in bodily integrity, and its reasonableness must be adjudged under a Fourth Amendment analysis. In addition, when blood is extracted and analyzed to reveal information derived from one’s DNA, a second intrusion into one’s expectation of privacy occurs. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616, 109 S.Ct. 1402; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In Skinner, the Supreme Court held that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a test of a urine sample implicates the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fat from a fee application.’ ” Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933; N.Y. Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir.1983)); see also Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994) (“We do not require that .the court set forth item-by-item findings concerning what may be countless objections to individual billing items.”). Barbu, 2015 WL 778325, at *5. In addition to eliminating unnecessary hours, courts may -reduce the number of hours when presented with time entries that are lack sufficient specificity to permit reasoned review. Id.; see also Annuity, Pension, Welfare & Training Funds of Int’l Union of Operating Engineers Local 14-14B, AFL-CIO v. Integrated Structures Corp., 2013 WL 4095651, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2013) (<HOLDING>). ■ Counsel claims that it expended a total of

    ### Response:
    holding that courts must apply acrosstheboard reductions for vague entries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    concealment and notes the Court has said that fraudulent concealment in health care liability claims estops a health-care provider from relying on limitations to bar a plaintiffs claim. Shah v. Moss, 67 S.W.3d 836, 841 (Tex.2001); see also Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Tex.1983). Thus, he notes, we have recognized exceptions to section 74.251’s two-year statute of limitations in limited circumstances even though several of our decisions have characterized the two-year statute of limitations as “absolute.” See Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex.1997) (“We have repeatedly held that section 10.01 [74.251’s predecessor] establishes an absolute two-year statute of limitation for health care liability claims....”); Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889, 892-93 (Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also In re USAA, 307 S.W.3d 299, 310-11

    ### Response:
    holding that section 1001 controls over the limitations provision of the wrongful death statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were executed. The record therefore contains no evidence establishing what the original parties to the transaction anticipated at contract inception concerning QDS’s “cost of performing under the [L]ease [A]greement[s] if the option is not exercised.” UCC § 1-201(37)(x) (West 2002). Without this evidence, the Court is unable to make the statutory calculation required under New § l-201(37)’s Option Price/Performance Cost Test. See APB Online, 259 B.R. at 819-20 (declining to consider affidavit testimony because affiant did not “participate[] in the lease transactions or the computation of the option prices” and holding that the “record is insufficient to permit [the court] to conclude ... that the ... option price was or was not nominal”); Edison Bros. Stores, 207 B.R. at 811-12 (<HOLDING>); Zaleha, 159 B.R. at 585-86 (“Debtor’s

    ### Response:
    holding that debtor failed to meet its burden of proving lease should be recharacterized as a disguised security agreement because the record before the court provides no credible evidence as to the projected fair market of the leased equipment on the dates the debtor will be entitled to exercise the purchase options
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to avoid punishment for running away — did amount to an “all or nothing” defense. Accordingly, Pepe-Frazier has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard. (c) Failure to object to the sentence for aggravated child molestation. Pepe-Frazier contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge his sentence for aggravated child molestation (652 SE2d 501) (2007) (finding a “rare case” of gross disproportionality in holding that 10-year sentence for commission of consensual oral sex between 17-year-old defendant and 15-year-old victim constituted cruel and unusual punishment, given General Assembly’s recent sweeping change in the punishment for consensual teenage oral sex). 42 See Jones, 290 Ga. at 676 (3) (<HOLDING>). 43 OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (2). 44 See Blue v.

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel by counsels failure to challenge sentence as equating to cruel and unusual punishment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sold two copies of the video to residents of Puerto Rico through the mail, and 2) Defendant sold 20 subscriptions to its magazine in Puerto Rico, in which they advertised the sale of the video. Defendant argues that LNE’s sale of two videos in Puerto Rico — one of which was purchased by Plaintiff Aníbal Agos-to — cannot logically be considered the legal or “proximate” cause of Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries since they were not a substantial factor in the sequence of events that led to the claimed injury. See Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., 250 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir.2001) (defendant’s actions will be considered the “proximate cause” of the alleged harm only if it was “a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.”); Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 13 F.Supp.2d 371, 378 (E.D.N.Y.1998) (<HOLDING>). As alleged in the Complaint, the overwhelming

    ### Response:
    holding that television station was not subject to personal jurisdiction in  new york under that states longarm statute since libel claim did not arise from defendants delivery of mail orders to new york
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Winstar). For these reasons, the Government’s November 17, 2003 Motion for Reconsideration concerning the authority of the FSLIC and FHLBB to enter contracts is denied. The second basis for reconsideration concerns the effect of Transohio Savings Bank v. Director, OTS, 967 F.2d 598, 620 (D.C.Cir.1992), a decision that the Government argues bars plaintiffs’ contract claims in this case. See 11/17/03 Gov’t Mot. to Reconsider at 1; see also id. at 6-10. As a threshold matter, the Government waived the defense of collateral estoppel by not asserting it in the September 22, 1999 Answer or raising this issue in any motion or brief prior to seeking reconsideration. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 410, 120 S.Ct. 2304, 147 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000) (<HOLDING>); see also RCFC 8(c), 12(b). In addition, since

    ### Response:
    holding that an affirmative defense is ordinarily lost if not timely raised
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    equated to the making of a new contract. Rather, we give effect to the terms of the agreements themselves and conclude that they were executed once, in 1984, and that the original agreements continued to be in force until John Deere attempted to exercise its rights under the 120 notice provision in 2007. See 11 Williston on Cont of one party, John Deere, to terminate the contract without cause on 120 days notice. Applying the Act would effectively extend the dealer agreements indefinitely unless John Deere can meet the terms of the Act’s good cause provision. We conclude that this would substantially impair the contractual relationship between John Deere and Reliable Tractor and would violate the Contracts Clause. See Morgan v. Kemper Ins. Cos., 754 F.2d 145, 147-48 (4th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Garris v. Hanover Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 1001,

    ### Response:
    holding that a retroactive application of a statute impairing an insurers contractual right to terminate an agent without cause violated the contract clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    593-94, the mandatory nature of our current rule was clarified in January 2005 when preexisting versions in the Kentucky civil and criminal rules, versions leaving the sequestration of witnesses largely to the trial court’s discretion, were rescinded, and KRE 615 was established as the controlling rule in our courts. Because, under the current rule, a court may decline a party’s request to sequester a particular witness only if one of the rule’s three express exemptions applies, the rule creates a strong presumption in favor of sequestration. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 60 F.3d 128, 135 (2nd Cir. 1995) (discussing the nearly identical federal rule). Moreover, the party opposing the presumption bears the burden of showing that one of the exemptions applies. Hatfield, 250 S.W.3d at 595 (<HOLDING>); Opus 3 Ltd., 91 F.3d at 628 (noting that “the

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial court errs by exempting a witness from sequestration absent the requisite showing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court earlier determined that ""Trooper Swets['s] contact with [Haar] was not the product of a traffic stop.” Conclusions of Law ¶ 3 (emphasis added). 2 . The circuit court also erred in reasoning that a number of cases have concluded that canine sniffs not incident to a traffic stop are subject to the same rules as sniffs conducted incident to a traffic stop. The circuit court’s cited cases all involved canine sniffs that were either incident to a traffic stop or involved parked and unattended cars in public places where the defendant had no expectation of privacy. None of the court's cited cases involved what is alleged here: an investigatory detention of persons or property performed to conduct a canine sniff. See e.g. United States v. Engles, 481 F.3d 1243, 1245 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Friend, 50 F.3d 548, 551-52

    ### Response:
    holding dog sniff of a vehicle parked on a public street did not violate the fourth amendment when canine sniff was conducted after the driver was validly stopped and arrested for driving on a suspended license
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and asked for a lawyer based on “her practice” and the notations on the jacket. (Tr. at 141.) This supposition, which does not account for the possibility of clerical mistakes in a busy prosecutor’s office, is in contrast to the specific, uniform recollections of Officers Argila, McCarthy and Fogarty, who each testified in detail about Garcia’s receipt and subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights, and the drafting and ratification of his statement. (Tr. at 33-39, 98-101, 128-29.) As this Court has no reason to doubt the credibility of the three officers in this case, their specific recollections trump ADA Coyne’s bare assumption that the criminal file jacket accurately represents her conversation with Officer Fogarty. See United States v. Martinez, 634 F.Supp. 1144, 1147 (S.D.N.Y.1986)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Patterson, No. 02

    ### Response:
    holding that police officers sworn affidavit that miranda warnings were given was held sufficient to deny suppression of defendants postarrest statement in the absence of properlysupported statement by defendant to the contrary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    receive a downward departure for providing substantial assistance to the government. The sentencing court did just that. It did not consider McFarlane’s extensive drug dealing history in setting his guideline range of 60 to 71 months, but did consider that history in determining whether to grant a downward departure and how much of a departure to grant. The court granted the government’s motion for a downward departure, but limited the extent of the departure based in part on McFarlane’s extensive drug dealing history. Thus, the terms of McFarlane’s cooperation agreement, and correspondingly his constitutional rights, were not violated when he received at least a ten-month downward departure, based partly on testimony he gave at his code-fendants’ trial. See Luloff, 15 F.3d at 766 (<HOLDING>); Nyhuis, 8 F.3d at 742 (holding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that an immunity agreement limited to title 21 drug offenses was not violated when the defendant was charged with unlawfully possessing a gun a nondrug offense based on testimony provided pursuant to the immunity agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    event, it is apparent that the Debtor believed that there was some urgency to the delivery of the transcripts and her counsel communicated her concerns to Penn’s counsel. 8 .While the parties have stipulated that such a written policy exists, the written policy itself wa S.D.Tex. Apr.27, 2005) (concluding that denial of transcript to chapter 13 debtor because of outstanding student loans was a violation of the automatic stay); Loyola Univ. v. McClarty, 234 B.R. 386 (E.D.La.1999) (university’s act of withholding chapter 13 debtor’s transcript violated automatic stay); In re Scroggins, 209 B.R. 727, 730 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1997) (act of parochial school withholding transcript of chapter 13 debtor's minor child violated the automatic stay); In re Carson, 150 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1993) (<HOLDING>); In re Gustafson, 111 B.R. 282, 288 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that college violated stay by not delivering transcript to chapter 7 debtor when debt had not yet been determined dischargeable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level increase of the offense level for possession of a firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(l). Lemar contends the two-level increase was not warranted because there was no evidence indicating he or any of his co-conspirators possessed a firearm during the commission of their offenses. We review for clear error the district court’s finding that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a narcotics offense. See United States v. Willis, 899 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir.1990). A criminal defendant can be held accountable for a firearm possessed by a co-conspirator, if the possession was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant as part of the criminal activity. See id. at 875 (<HOLDING>). Lemar testified at sentencing that during

    ### Response:
    holding that actual knowledge of a coconspirator possessing a firearm qualifies as foreseeability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statement from the defendant that he would have accepted the plea if he were better advised); Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir.1991) (requiring some substantiation of petitioner’s claim outside of the petition itself before the claim acquires “sufficient credibility to warrant a further investment of judicial resources in determining the truth of the claim.”); Ellzey v. United States, 210 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1051 (C.D.Ill.2002) (citing Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065 (7th Cir.1991)) (self-serving affidavit, albeit made under penalty of perjury, is insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing without additional objective evidence to support the alleged facts, especially when the government disputes those facts); Paters v. United States, 159 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 240-41

    ### Response:
    holding that a petitioners declaration in support of his claim signed under penalty of perjury does not constitute objective evidence under toro
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    second day of trial, after AUE had, the City contends, elected its damages remedy by moving for summary judgment on liability on a breach of contract theory. We review questions of law de novo, see L-3 Commc’ns Corp. v. OSI Sys., Inc., 607 F.3d 24, 27-28 (2d Cir.2010), and conclude that the City’s arguments lack merit. First, although summary judgment is generally treated as the procedural equivalent of a trial, see S.J. Capelin Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Mfg. Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 338, 341, 357 N.Y.S.2d 478, 313 N.E.2d 776 (1974), AUE’s motion for summary judgment addressed liability alone. Hence, to the extent the motion was the equivalent of a trial for these purposes, it did not address damages or rescission at all. Cf. Reilly v. Natwest Markets Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). AUE cannot be deemed to have elected its

    ### Response:
    holding that where plaintiff did not seek to rescind a contract and only sought quantum meruit recovery after a jury had determined an enforceable contract existed plaintiff was limited to recovery under the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reduction and determining his criminal history category of III, together with a total offense level of 25, resulted in a Guidelines range of seventy to eighty-seven months. It also noted his seventy-month sentence, together with the consecutive firearm sentence of sixty months, resulted in a total sentence of 130 months. Two years later, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced the statutory mandatory minimum sentencing penalties for crack cocaine by significantly reducing the prior crack/powder ratio but which did not apply retroactively to defendants previously sentenced under the prior existing mandatory minimum sentencing statutes. See Pub.L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (Aug. 3, 2010). See also United States v. Lewis, 625 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1790, 179

    ### Response:
    holding statutory reduction in mandatory minimum penalty based on new ratio is not retroactive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consent to a search cannot form any part of the basis for reasonable suspicion."" Wood, 106 F.3d at 946; see United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 794 (10th Cir.1999). Haley's conduct in relue-tantly agreeing to a search of the luggage and refusing to consent to a search of the car is not a cireumstance supporting reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir.1998)(""Any other rule would make a mockery of the reasonable suspicion and probable cause requirements, as well as the consent doctrine. These legal principles would be considerably less effective if citizens' insistence that searches and seizures be conducted in conformity with constitutional norms could create the suspicion or cause that renders their consent unnecessary.""); Karnes, 62 F.3d at 495 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Carter, 985 F.2d 1095, 1097

    ### Response:
    holding that the fact that defendant granted consent to police to search some items and then refused to give consent to additional searches cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We certify direct conflict with Richardson v.

    ### Response:
    holding that probation is a sentence for habitualization purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    896 F.2d 605, 609 (1st Cir.1990). The Third Circuit has held that a defendant’s offer of proof which contains only a conclusory statement alleging falsity does not satisfy the “offer of proof’ requirement of Franks. United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1328 (3d Cir.1993). Further, the Fifth Circuit in Williams v. Kunze, 806 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.1986), similarly held that a Franks hearing is not mandated where the record is devoid of a sworn statement supporting the defendant’s allegations of falsity. Id. at 599. The Tenth Circuit has stated that a defendant’s allegations of falsity alone do not meet the preliminary burden placed on the defendant under Franks. United States v. Ross, 920 F.2d 1530, 1533 (10th Cir.1990). The Ninth Circuit has even held that the productio Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Zambrano, 841 F.2d 1320,

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants allegations that the warrant affidavit contained falsified information did not satisfy franks even though the defendants offer of proof consisted of twentynine 29 affidavits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    7 .We also note that the burden on the government was not insignificant. Kennedy was seeking $18,000 merely to enable Arthur Anderson to assess how much money it then would need to conduct the audit that Kennedy requested. R.O.A. Supp.Vol. 14 (order of 5/4/93 at 5). 8 . In this regard, we distinguish the cases in which the denial of an expert psychiatrist was deemed a due process violation. Those cases recognized that when the defendant's mental state is an important issue and is seriously in question, and when obtaining an accurate assessment of that mental state is uniquely dependant on psychological expertise, an expert psychiatrist indeed becomes a basic and integral tool to presenting an adequate defense. See, e.g., Ake, 470 U.S. at 74, 80-83, 105 S.Ct. at 1091-92, 1094-96 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 928-29

    ### Response:
    holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present insanity defense and crossexamine state psychiatrists because of the tremendous reliance jurors place on psychiatric testimony where there is often no single accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1880, 1888 (Fed.Cir.1998). III Turning first to the summary judgment that claims 1 and 3 of the '880 patent were not infringed, we commence our plenary review of that ruling by determining the proper scope of the claims at issue. TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1120, 60 USPQ2d 1017, 1024 (Fed. Cir.2001). Claims 1 and 3 of the '880 patent require a “means for causing said at least one laser beam to strike the periphery of the energy zone for visibly outlining said entire energy zone.” The parties agree that those claims at issue are in means-plus-function format and therefore invoke the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. See Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1232, 57 USPQ2d 1679, 1684 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Section 112, paragraph 6, allows a paten-tee

    ### Response:
    holding that claim limitation using the term means for and not reciting any structure presumptively falls within the scope of  112  6
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    To establish that the Customer List is entitled to trade secret protection until the trial on the merits, TMC must show a probability of success in proving that the Customer List is entitled to trade secret protection. 28. TMC did not show a probability of success in proving that the Customer List is entitled to trade secret protection pending trial on the merits because of 1) the extent to which the Customer List was known by employees and others involved in the business, 2) the lack of measures taken by AICE to guard the secrecy of the Customer List, and 3) the ease or difficulty with which the Customer List could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. (Emphasis added.) TMC does not challenge specific findings of fact. See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex.1986) (<HOLDING>); Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ogg, 122 S.W.3d

    ### Response:
    holding unchallenged findings of fact are binding unless contrary is established as matter of law or there is no evidence to support finding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appeals did not present any analysis, it is clear that the court made a choice of law decision. This Court presumes that the court of appeals followed the directive of the Supreme Court despite the absence of any explicit discussion on the threshold choice of law issue. 41 . The Fifth Circuit does not cite authority to justify this part of its holding. Defendants attempt to distinguish Griffin because there are no funds on deposit withthis Court (or in any court) for any of the Plaintiffs. Other Texas cases establish, however, that the policy proceeds do not have to be located in Texas for the insurable interest doctrine to apply. The doctrine serves to protect the lives of Texas citizens irrespective of the vagaries of the location of the policy proceeds. See Cheeves, 28 S.W. at 275 (<HOLDING>); Tamez, 999 S.W.2d at 15 (""[I]t is against

    ### Response:
    holding that the primary justification of insurable interest doctrine was that the public has an interest that no inducement shall be offered to one man to take the life of another
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conclude” that the IJ and the BIA ruled erroneously. See INA § 242(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). As Thap has not established that there was any past persecution, there is no presumption that he would be subject to persecution upon returning to Cambodia such that the burden of rebutting that presumption would shift to the government. Therefore, the court finds that Thap cannot establish a clear probability of persecution in Cambodia on the basis of any past persecution to which Thap or his family were subject. We next examine whether Thap can prove that there is a future threat of persecution based on a protected ground should he return to Cambodia. Almuhtaseb, 453 F.3d at 750 (citations omitted); Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). Again, Thap has not

    ### Response:
    holding that a wellfounded fear requires petitioner to show more than a generalized or random possibility of persecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When no definite term is set forth in a contract, the contract is terminable at will. Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877, 879, 438 N.E.2d 351 (1982); Simons v. American Dry Ginger Ale Co., 335 Mass. at 524-25, 140 N.E.2d 649; Fall River Housing Joint Tenants Council, Inc. v. Fall River Housing Auth., 15 Mass.App.Ct. 992, 994, 448 N.E.2d 70 (1983) and cases cited. Mass Cash does not dispute the lack of dura-tional term in the contract, but it seeks to fit its contract into the category of cases which hold that where a contract contemplates the achievement of a definite end, but is silent as to its duration, a reasonable time is implied based on all relevant evidence. See, e.g., Thermo Electron Corp. v. Schiavone Construction Co., 958 F.2d 1158, 1164 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Bushkin Assoc., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 815

    ### Response:
    holding contract to sell a project which contained no time limits was to be performed within a reasonable time as determined by the court based on all the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    facility; (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure and functions of the workforce of such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B). JC Penney challenges Bukta’s proposed accommodation, arguing that a part time schedule imposes an undue hardship on its business by eliminating the essential job requirement of attendance. Essential function means the fundamental duties of the position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). Attendance can be an essential job function. See Brenneman v. MedCentral Health System, 366 F.3d 412 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that attendance can be an essential function of a position and that excessive absenteeism rendered an employee unqualified for such a position
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    541, 551, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) (“Our prior decisions have made clear that a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the most 'loyal Democrats happen' to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of that fact.”); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (“[R]edistricting in most cases will implicate a political calculus in which various interests compete for recognition .... ”); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753, 93 S.Ct. 2321 (“Politics and political considerations are inseparable from dis-tricting and apportionment.”); see also Cooper v. Harris, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1455, 1488, 197 L.Ed.2d 837 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (<HOLDING>); Whitford v. Gill, 218 F.Supp.3d 837, 934-35

    ### Response:
    recognizing the constitutionality of at least some amount of political gerrymandering
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    him, and likewise did not list himself as a party on appeal in his client’s notice. Moreover, Jones's brief in this action was filed on January 11, 2006, which was over two months after the final judgment was entered and well after the deadline for filing a notice of appeal had expired. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal as to the entry of sanctions. 2 . Jones was terminated in May 2003, but did not file a claim with the EEOC until July 2004, which was well after expiration of the 180-day limitation period enumerated in Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2005e-5(e)(l); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). And he made no argument in favor of equitable tolling of the limitation period. Cf. Forehand v. Fla. State Hosp. at Chattahoochee, 89 F.3d 1562, 1570 n. 17 (11th Cir.1996)

    ### Response:
    holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the waiver of his constitutional rights, and signed the written admonishments only after reviewing the documents with his attorney. In addition, appellant waived his right to a jury trial and understood that once sentences were pronounced, he would not have the opportunity to plea “not guilty” or contest the charges. Appellant’s new counsel filed a motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty and pleas of true prior to the PSI hearing. Appellant stated he had felt pressured by his former attorney to enter the pleas. At the PSI hearing, the trial court allowed argument on this motion. The trial court, exercising its discretion, denied the motion. There is no evidence in the record to show an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See DeVary v. State, 615 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (<HOLDING>); Stancliff v. State, 852 S.W.2d 639, 640-41

    ### Response:
    holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion although the defendant had been admonished incorrectly on the punishment range
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In that case, jurisdiction existed when the case was filed and the question was whether the amended complaint subsequently divested the court of jurisdiction; here, plaintiffs argue the inverse. Id. Similarly, several other cases relied on by plaintiffs relate to amended rather than supplemental complaints, and thus are not on point. 4 . Recent cases bring into question whether the statutory limitations implicated in these cases are truly jurisdictional or are ""nonjuris-dictional ‘claim-processing rules.’” See Gonzalez v. Thaler, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 641, 648, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012) (noting that in the past, the Court was less than meticulous in rendering statutory language jurisdictional); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011) (<HOLDING>); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, — U.S. -,

    ### Response:
    holding that the 120day filing deadline at issue was ajmong the types of rules that should not be described as jurisdictional but rather claim processing rules
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is admissible). The designated evidence submitted in the present ease revealed that the personal injuries suffered by Rainwater in the accident caused severe pain and prevented him from working resulting in severe depression and an addiction to pain medication. Shortly before the suicide, Rainwater called 911, strangled and beat his former spouse, and tried to set the house on fire. After being arrested, Rainwater beat his head and hands on the door of his cell until police subdued him with foam. After that, Rainwater hanged himself in his cell. The resolution of the present case hinges upon determinations of proximate cause and decedent’s state of mind, matters which ordinarily must be decided by the jury and not by way of summary judgment motion. See McKinney, 597 N.E.2d at 1005-06 (<HOLDING>); Nelson, 634 N.E.2d at 512 (holding that issue

    ### Response:
    holding that issue of whether death was proximately caused by intervenihg and superseding cause was not appropriately resolved by summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the issue of whether a grace period, i.e., a period between the recognition of the right to obtain a marriage license and a couples' obligation to do so, might otherwise be warranted. Additionally, because marriage was .available to same-sex couples at the time of Mr. Sapp’s death, the Court does not address the parties’ respective arguments regarding the earlier availability of domestic partnership. 7 . The terms “lawful” and ""valid” aré nearly synonymous in this context, and cases ""tend[ ] . to use the latter term in enunciating the doctrine.” Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 723, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (citations omitted). ""Although ' in many situations there is little practical difference between lawful and valid,"" the use of the latter term ""may engender confusion” in some contexts. Id (<HOLDING>). ""The putative marriage doctrine protects the

    ### Response:
    holding that the belief in a valid religious marriage is insufficient to come within the doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judicial review of merely discretionary decisions,” and citing Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir.1997)). Because IIRI-RA expressly preclud .2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir.1986) (affirming district court’s denial of preliminary injunction that would interfere with Attorney General’s discretionary power to choose facility where deportable aliens were detained in absence of proof of actual deprivation of statutory right to counsel or denial of due process). Thus, the complaint does not allege that an actual or continuing constitutional violation had occurred that could be remedied by judicial action. We emphasize, however, that our holding in this case has no application to constitutional habeas claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Jurado-Gutier-rez, 190 F.3d at 1145-47 (<HOLDING>). While the immigration statutes may not

    ### Response:
    holding that review under  2241 still available notwithstanding express language in iirira barring review by any court of final orders of removal for aliens deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense and distinguishing between direct and collateral review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Perry factors, namely, whether the statute puts the public on notice by clearly defining the required conduct. See Perry, 973 S.W.2d at 309. Of all the considerations set forth in Perry, we believe this factor is the most relevant to the statute at issue in this case because a statute which defines a violation in conditional terms is less likely to support the application of negligence per se than one which provides an absolute, and thus more definite, standard of care. Accordingly, we must determine whether the standard of conduct found in section 61(a) was defined with sufficient clarity to impose tort liability for a violation of that statute. See Perry, 973 S.W.2d at 309. Although article 6701d, entitled “Uniform Act Regulating Traff .App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Hemphill v. Meyers, 469 S.W.2d 327, 328

    ### Response:
    holding that whether a driver safely entered an intersection as per section 71c depends upon whether he acted prudently
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as follows: 980.07 Periodic examination; report. (1) If a person has been committed under s. 980.06 and has not been discharged under s. 980.09, the department shall conduct an examination of his or her mental condition within 6 months after an initial commitment under s. 980.06 and again thereafter at least once each 12 months for the purpose of determining whether the person has made sufficient progress for the court to consider whether the person should he placed on supervised release or discharged. At the time of a reexamination under this section, the person who has been committed may retain or seek to have the court appoint an examiner as provided under s. 980.03 (4). See State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶ 15, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155 (Sykes, J., lead opinion) (<HOLDING>). 12 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.07(2) provides as

    ### Response:
    holding that time limits in wis stat  980071 are mandatory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    beyond that normally present in first-degree murder.” Brown, 315 N.C. at 65, 337 S.E.2d at 827. State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 61-62, 436 S.E.2d 321, 356 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 129 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1994). In this case the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, reveals that this murder falls within the scope of each of the above categories. First, the evidence permits the inference that the killing was physically agonizing to the victim. After shooting the victim four times, defendant repeatedly kicked and pistol-whipped the helpless victim. The victim was conscious and in extreme pain for at least fifteen minutes after the shooting and assault, attempting to talk despite his broken jaw and wounded tongue. See Brown, 315 N.C. at 67, 337 S.E.2d at 828 (<HOLDING>). Further, the evidence permits the inference

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence that the victim was conscious for fifteen minutes after being shot six times supports a finding that the victim suffered great physical pain prior to death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Morales, 98 S.W.3d 343, 348 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied). The answer to the question of whether prejudgment interest may be calculated on attorneys’ fees that have been paid prior to judgment, as in this case, is less than clear, with our sister courts splitting on the issue, and the supreme court remaining silent. The Dallas Court of Appeals has expressly held that .under no circumstances may prejudgment interest be recovered on attorneys’ fees. See Carbona v. CH Med., Inc., 266 S.W.3d 675, 688 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). However, other courts have taken a less rigid view and have allowed a trial court to award prejudgment interest on attorneys’ fees paid prior to judgment. See Nova Cas. Co. v. Turner Const. Co., 335 S.W.3d 698, 706 (Tex.App.-Houston 2011, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Colthurst, 253 S.W.3d 353, 362

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest on attorneys fees paid prior to the entry of judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (refusing to challenge the agency’s standards for determining which applicant is more qualified). Therefore, this argument also fails to rebut the defendant’s legitimate non-retaliatory reason. Finally, the plaintiff attempts to rebut the defendant’s non-retaliatory reason by arguing that it is insufficient on its face because the defendant caused her inability to work through the agency’s discriminatory practices. Compl. ¶ 13. The result of the plaintiffs hostile work environment is instructive on this point: if “the complained of conduct in this case does not rise to the level” of a hostile work environment, the plaintiffs argument fails to adequately rebut the defendant’s non-discriminatory reason. Peda v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 214 F.Supp.2d 1007, 1020 (N.D.Iowa 2002) (<HOLDING>). Because the plaintiff could still succeed on

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs argument that the defendant caused plaintiffs inability to return to work cannot hold water because the socalled causation was insufficient to rise to the level of actionable harassment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plain at the time of appellate review. See Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550. To satisfy the third Olano factor, Paz must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there exists “a reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable sentence with the Booker error eliminated by making the Guidelines advisory.” Id. at 551. Paz cannot demonstrate that there exists. a reasonable probability that the district court would have imposed a more favorable sentence under an advisory guidelines system. First, the district court, in its discretion, chose to depart upward because Paz’s criminal history category substantially under-represented the seriousness of his criminal history and the likelihood he would commit other crimes. See United States v. Sayre, 400 F.3d 599, 601 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Second, not only did the district court

    ### Response:
    recognizing the futility of remanding a sentence for the application of advisory guidelines where the district court had previously departed upward
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contract. Additionally, under SES’s subcontract, SES declared that “it ha[d] investigated all pertinent conditions relative to the performance of the work contained in this Agreement, knowing the character, quantities and sources of materials to be used in performing the work, [and] the labor conditions prevalent in the area in which the work is to be performed.” SES does not seek the difference between the 00812 rate and the 00813 rate as damages. Cf. Morrison-Hardeman-Perini-Leavell v. United States, 183 Ct.Cl. 938, 392 F.2d 988, 997 (1968) (noting that contractor can recover against government, where government directed contractor to pay, both retroactively and in future, new higher minimum prevailin Servs., L.P., 317 S.W.3d 431, 456 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. filed) (<HOLDING>). We reject SES’s reliance on these cases.

    ### Response:
    holding that contractor was not precluded from recovering damages against owner for defective specifications stated in contract notwithstanding lumpsum and prebid investigation provisions in contract because owner made positive assurances concerning reliability of said specifications
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1, 40, 748 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 359 Md. 335, 753 A.2d 1032 (2000). Thus, even if the issue were preserved for review, we would discern no reversible error. Nor do we see reversible error in the prosecutor’s reaction, in the jury’s presence, to the objection when it came. At the bench conference that followed, counsel for appellant Varela objected to the prosecutor’s “giving his theory of expert testimony in front of the jury.” The court admonished the prosecutor to desist from making such statements in front of the jury. No further relief was requested by any appellant. In the absence of a request for relief, either in the form of a curative instruction or a mistrial, appellants have nothing about which to complain. See Lamb v. State, 141 Md.App. 610, 644-45, 786 A.2d 783 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In any event, we are hard pressed to find

    ### Response:
    holding that where an objection is sustained and curative instruction given and no further relief such as a mistrial additional curative instruction or striking of the offending comment is requested there is nothing for the appellate court to review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    add one point to an offender score if it finds by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant was under community custody when he committed the current offense. Former RCW 9.94A.525(19) (2007); State v. Jones, 159 Wn.2d 231, 239 n.7, 241, 149 P.3d 636 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1354 (2007). Here, the State correctly concedes that no evidence supported this finding. Accordingly, we remand for resentencing. C. Same Criminal Conduct ¶28 Jackson further argues that the sentencing court erred when it declined to hold that his DUI and reckless driving convictions were the same criminal conduct under RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a)(i). He did not raise this issue at the sentencing court and has waived the right to appeal it. In re Pers. Restraint of Shale, 160 Wn.2d 489, 496, 158 P.3d 588 (2007) (<HOLDING>). D. Remedy ¶29 The remaining concern is the

    ### Response:
    holding that issue waived when the defendant failed to ask the court to make a discretionary call of any factual dispute regarding the issue of same criminal conduct and he did not contest the issue at the trial level
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discovering their wrongdoing. Davis was not a case where the plaintiff recognized a basis for a lawsuit but was persuaded to forego enforcing her right until after the statute of limitations expired. The policy underlying equitable estoppel would certainly justify its application to the fiduciary relationship allegedly abused in Davis. However, S.A.P. should not be read to let in thro d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (determining insurer equitably estopped from raising statute of limitations defense, when it agreed to appellant's demand to arbitrate, and had helped to pick arbitrators before five-year period for claim proceeding to arbitration ended); Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), abrogated by May v. Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>); Alachua County v. Cheshire, 603 So.2d 1334

    ### Response:
    holding estate of decedent estopped where widow affirmatively told hospital that estate had no assets and would not be probated where decadents estate in fact did have assets to pay unpaid medical bills
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    guest was precluded when insured’s promise to maintain insurance on home insured was not currently occupying showed insured’s intent that insurance was to benefit guest living in home), citing Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska Commun., 623 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 1981) (commercial tenant was implied coinsured for limited purpose of defeating insurer’s subrogation claim when lease provision required landlord to obtain and keep in effect insurance on premises). Although an insurance company has the right to recover against a wrongdoer whose conduct has subjected the insurance company to liability, no right of subrogation can arise in favor of an insurer against its own insured. Jindra v. Clayton, 247 Neb. 597, 529 N.W.2d 523 (1995). See, also, Fellmer v. Gruber, 261 N.W.2d 173 (Iowa 1978) (<HOLDING>); Housing Inv. Corp. v. Carris, 389 So. 2d 689

    ### Response:
    holding that seller carried insurance for benefit of buyer and held proceeds in trust for buyer when seller agreed to maintain insurance until possession date but bam burned before buyer took possession
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because, whereas the latter is necessarily satisfied out of, and thus constitutes a property interest in, marital property, the former is not satisfied out of, and thus cannot constitute a property interest in, marital property — instead, the former will be satisfied out of property that either no longer constitutes, or never constituted, marital property. The Court notes that its holding regarding the dichotomy that exists between in kind relief and equalization relief vis-a-vis the classification of a pre-petition equitable distribution right is not all that novel since at least one other court has also found such a dichotomy to exist, see In re Emelity, 251 B.R. 151, 154-157 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.2000), although such court’s analysis differs from this Court’s in other regards, see Id. (<HOLDING>). Also, so as to compare this Court’s decision

    ### Response:
    holding that a prepetition equitable distribution right to equalization relief constitutes a discharged prepetition claim and distinguishing while agreeing with in re marriage of seligman 14 calapp4th 300 18 calrptr2d 209 214215 1993 wherein it was held that a prepetition equitable distribution right to in kind relief does not constitute a prepetition claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provision will include Buyer, Seller and Broker, will be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees costs and expenses. However, as Regency pointed out, it is not a party to the Contract. According to the language of the Contract, the “prevailing party” only pertains to the “Buyer, Seller, or Broker.” P.C.D.’s reliance on authority enlarging the meaning of the word “party” is misplaced because the courts in those cases are referring to parties to a lawsuit, not parties to a contract. See, e.g., Lage v. Blanco, 521 So.2d 299, 300 (3d DCA Fla. 1988). The fact that Regency may have had some rights arising from the Contract due to its status as first lienholder does not make Regency a formal party to the Contract. See, Gwen Fearing Real Estate, Inc. v. Wilson, 430 So.2d 589, 591 (4th DCA Fla.1983)(<HOLDING>). Likewise, seeking its own affirmative relief

    ### Response:
    holding broker not a party to a purchase contract and therefore not liable for attorneys fees even though provision providing for payment of the brokers commission was contained in the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 732 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa.Super.1999). As such, JNOV is only proper where, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, the facts are so clear that reasonable minds could not disagree that the verdict was improper. Burton-Lister, 798 A.2d at 236. “JNOV ... may not be employed to invade the province of the jury.... Thus, where the jury has been presented with conflicting evidence, a motion for JNOV should be denied.” Rohm & Haas Co., 732 A.2d at 1248 (internal citations omitted). Initially, we observe that Tube City presents no argument in support of its claim that the trial court should have entered JNOV on the negligent misrepresentation count, and so we will not consider it. See Owens v. Mazzei, 847 A.2d 700, 705-06 (Pa.Super.2004) (<HOLDING>). With regard to fraud, Tube City argues that

    ### Response:
    holding that the superior court will not address an issue presented in the statement of questions involved where no corresponding analysis is included in the brief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Japan was not satisfied. 15 . In Byrd, the defense counsel ""did not reveal the name of the individual officer, nor turn over log books, as had been requested by plaintiff's counsel.” See the case cited supra note 11. In fact, the defense counsel in Byrd did not comply with the plaintiff's repeated requests and disclose the name of the new defendant until after the limitations period ran. Id. 16 . The Court concluded that Enron failed to establish that relief was warranted under Cornwell. The Cornwell court held that when a plaintiff possessed information related to an added defendant's identity and its involvement in the alleged transactions, there is no mistake in identity and the failure to have named that new defendant is considered “a matter of choice.” Cornwell, 23 F.3d at 705 (<HOLDING>). In reaching its conclusion, the Cornwell

    ### Response:
    holding that cornwell was not required to sue them and her failure to do so in the original complaint in light of her obvious knowledge and the detailed nature of that pleadings exhibit must be considered a matter of choice not mistake
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requires proof of both knowledge and intent by any person who makes a “knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission...” N.J.S.A. 56:8-2; Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, supra., 148 N.J. at 607-608, 691 A.2d 350, Cox v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra., at 18, 647 A.2d 454, Varacallo v. Ma ndividual reliance, but does not require proof that such reliance was reasonable. Parks v. Macro-Dynamics, Inc., 121 Ariz. 517, 591 P.2d 1005 (1972). North Carolina requires proof of “actual” and “detrimental” reliance upon defendant’s misrepresentations, from which it may be inferred that such reliance need not necessarily be reasonable. Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc., 99 N.C.App. 587, 394 S.E.2d 643 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that recovery under the north carolina unfair and deceptive trade practices act  is limited to those situations when a plaintiff can show that plaintiff detrimentally relied upon a statement or misrepresentation and he or she suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendants deceptive statement or misrepresentation 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as ""the Petitioners.” 3 . The policy originally was with CNA Personal Insurance, the predecessor in interest of Encompass. 4 . The numerical figures were apparently added by the insurance agent, per an instruction on the form. 5 . The General Assembly subsequently increased the minimum coverage amounts to their current levels. Chapter 441, Laws of Maryland 2010 (raising minimum personal injury liability coverage to $30,000 per person up to $60,000 per accident); Chapter 681, Laws of Maryland 1999 (raising minimum property damage coverage to $15,000). 6 . Even if a waiver is executed by the ""first named insured,” it is ineffective if the insurer’s notice of the effect of the waiver is deficient. IN § 19-510(c); cf. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Powell, 292 F.3d 201 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, Petitioners apparently

    ### Response:
    holding that waiver of um coverage was ineffective under south carolina law because insurer did not adequately advise insured party about um coverage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under the remainder aggregate rule, be deemed to have increased the sentence, the total time Weingarten will serve is the same under the new sentence as under the previous one. The district court’s conclusion that its initial aggregate sentence was still appropriate is understandable, given its finding that the factual mosaic and the “central factor[s]” that “[bore] on the imposition o[fj the appropriate sentence remained] the same.” While we can imagine a record that would support a finding of vindictiveness where the district court imposed the same total sentence after the reversal of certain counts reduced the extent of the harm legally attributable to the defendant, this is not that case. Cf. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 253-54, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008) (<HOLDING>). As “nothing in the record remotely suggests

    ### Response:
    recognizing with approval the practice following vacatur of some counts of conviction on appeal of increasing the defendants sentence on remaining counts to yield an aggregate sentence equal to the original aggregate imposed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims, the subsection applicable to, the dismissal of his PCRA petition was Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(D)(1). (“Upon the conclusion of the hearing the judge ' shall determine all material issues raised by the defendant’s petition and the Commonwealth’s answer, or by the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss, if any-. (1) If the judge dismisses the petition, the judge promptly shall issue an order denying relief. The order shall be filed and served as provided in Rule [of Criminal Procedure] 114.”). 8 . Appellant concedes that his substantive due process, right-to-counsel, and right-to-appeal claims fail if we reject his facial challenge to the statute’s constitutionality. Appellant’s Brief at 34. Accordingly, in light of our disposition, we need not address these claims. See Turner, 80 A.3d at 764 (<HOLDING>). 9 . The PCRA court also attributes some blame

    ### Response:
    holding that because process is not an end in itself once a court has found that the petitioner does not have a valid liberty interest a challenge to both procedural and substantive due process must fail
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    neither did Mr. Bowen. ¶ 30. Bowen does not require an independent action seeking partition. Mr. Myers already had a request for a sale properly before the chancellor. A remand in order to obtain another is superfluous. ¶ 31. Additionally, the majority suggests that to enforce a partition here would subvert longstanding public policy encouraging marriage. I do not find that the public policy arguments in favor of marriage impact on whether a spouse may seek the partition by sale of a financially burdensome marital home. Joint owners of property, even spouses not contemplating divorce, are entitled to seek partition of property. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-21-8 (Supp.2002), Trigg v. Trigg, 498 So.2d 334, 335-36 (Miss.1986). See also Miller v. Miller, 838 So.2d 295, 298 (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). ¶32. Trigg and Miller speak to the

    ### Response:
    holding that denial of divorce and corresponding equitable distribution does not preclude a partition action by res judicata
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    545, 219 Ill.Dec. 823, 672 N.E.2d 331 (1996) (suppressing juvenile’s confession where his mother’s attempts to see her son “were clearly frustrated by the police so that they could create an intimidating atmosphere and obtain a confession”); People v. Montanez, 273 Ill.App.3d 844, 210 Ill.Dec. 295, 652 N.E.2d 1271 (1995) (same); In re J.O., 231 Ill.App.3d 853, 173 Ill.Dec. 406, 596 N. (1986) (same). The second approac ing that juveniles are not permitted to waive privilege against self-incrimination unless friendly adult is present and gives guidance); In re E.T.C., 141 Vt. 375, 449 A.2d 937 (1982) (interpreting Vermont Constitution to require presence of interested adult during custodial interrogation of juvenile); State ex rel. J.M. v. Taylor, 166 W.Va. 511, 276 S.E.2d 199 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Sevion v. State, 620 N.E.2d 736

    ### Response:
    holding that juveniles may waive right to counsel only upon advice of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The court then adjudicated his guilt, imposing a sentence of ten years confinement with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Di vision. Appellant subsequently filed a pr o be binding, stating, “Texas Code of Criminal Procedure ... expressly denies a defendant the right to appeal from a trial court’s determination to adjudicate.” 28 S.W.3d 627, 633 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi, 2000, no pet.). Article 42.12 § 5(b) expressly allows, however, an appeal of all proceedings after the adjudication of guilt on the original charge. Examples of proceedings after adjudication that may be appealed include the assessment of punishment and the pronouncement of sentence. Perez, 28 S.W.3d at 633; See also Jones v. State, 39 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Appellant does not complain of any error

    ### Response:
    holding that a court of appeals has jurisdiction to review claim of ineffective assistance of counsel occurring after the adjudication of guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    misrepresentation claim against him fails because they have failed to allege that he made a representation to any plaintiff. Plaintiffs respond that Morrison is alleged to have made a representation in his written opinion regarding the reverse merger in which he opined that all the requirements and SEC regulations had been complied with and that good and valuable consideration had been paid by all the alleged purchasers of the Literary Playpen, Inc. stock. The court concludes that the alleged misrepresentations in Morrison’s opinion letter are sufficient for the purposes of a motion to dismiss. Such allegations are sufficient since under Iowa law fraudulent misrepresentation claims may be based on statements made to third parties. See Clark v. McDaniel, 546 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1996) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, this portion of Morrison’s motion

    ### Response:
    holding that no direct contractual relationship is required between the alleged tortfeasor and the person who justifiably relies to his or her detriment on the alleged tortfeasors representations because under restatement second of torts section 533 1977 hereinafter restatement persons who fraudulently misrepresent the truth can be held liable to third parties if they have a reason to expect their misrepresentation will be communicated to third parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    view of the sexual innocence inference theory. Thus, Oatts was required to show that the prior sexual act occurred and that the prior sexual act was sufficiently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the knowledge to imagine the molestation charge. Here, Oatts failed to show that the prior acts closely resembled those in the present case. Oatts’s attorney did not proffer any evidence that the prior molestation was similar to the current offense. Oatts’s attorney stated that the “similarities of the allegations are very, very close” and the current allegation “is that Mr. Oatts touched [A.S.] while they were in bed together, and in fact Tony touched [A.S.] while she was in bed.” Transcript at 120. However, Oatts did not offer sp c. 244, 683 N.E.2d 188, 192-193 (1997) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, appeal denied. II. The next

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not err by excluding the victims earlier reports of sexual abuse because too many sexual details remain unaccounted for after consideration of what defendant hoped to prove with the prior sexual conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    establishes sufficient facts from which a jury could reasonably infer Davis had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” D.B. Davis met D.B. on the street. Davis then booked a room at the hotel and posted an ad to Backpage.com featuring a picture taken of D.B. in a room at the hotel — from this a jury could reasonably infer Davis spent time with D.B. that day taking her picture for the ad. And on the very next day, Davis brought D.B. to Rivera, introduced her to Rivera, and then drove the two to the hotel. Viewing this ■ evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude any rational jury could have found Davis had a reasonable opportunity to observe D.B. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781; see also United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 976-76 (11th Cir. 2017) (<HOLDING>). IV. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment

    ### Response:
    holding the government proved the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the minor when among other things he spent twenty minutes taking pictures of her for her backpage ad
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    request that they leave. See People v. Medrano, 78 Cal.App.3d 198, 144 Cal.Rptr. 217 (Cal.App.1978), disapproved on other grounds, Vista Verde Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 29 Cal.3d 307, 172 Cal.Rptr. 720, 625 P.2d 263 (Cal.1981). a. Was Blair Field open to the public for purposes of section 602(n)? California Penal Code section 602(n) defines refusal to leave property occupied by another as a form of trespass. The statute “envisions an originally innocent entry, followed by an unlawful sojourn after refusal of requests to leave.” Medrano, 144 Cal.Rptr. at 227-28. The location of Blair Field within a public park supports the plaintiffs’ contention that the property was open to the public. See Denney v. Takaoka, 1993 WL 96602, *5, C-92-0818 FMS (N.D.Cal. Mar. 30, 1993) (<HOLDING>). The defendants contend, however, that Blair

    ### Response:
    holding that a universityowned land used as a park was open to the public for purposes of section 602n
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    procedural default arguments are rejected and the Court finds the merits of the petition ripe for review. A status and scheduling conference will be scheduled to establish the further procedure of the case. An appropriate order follows. ORDER AND NOW, this 17th day of February 2009, it is hereby ORDERED that a telephone status and scheduling conference is SCHEDULED for Tuesday, March 24, 2009 at 10:30 a.m. Petitioner’s counsel shall initiate the call to Chambers at 215-597-4073 when all parties are on the line. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . In the imposition of the death penalty, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder victi osecutor’s argument did not violate Caldwell, and reinstated the death sentence. Commonwealth v. Beasley, 524 Pa. 34, 568 A.2d 1235 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Petitioner filed a timely petition for

    ### Response:
    holding the prosecutions remarks did not lessen the jurys sense of responsibility as the ultimate arbiter of the sentence to be imposed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by courts as “overbroad,” Kapeluschnik, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22883, at *18, and “frivolous,” Sturdevant v. Thomas E. Jolas, P.C., 942 F.Supp. 426, 430 (W.D.Wis.1996). At the same time, courts have noted that “in cases where the likelihood of legal action is not clear from the language, the letter’s source can be determinative, especially if it purports to be from an attorney.” Jenkins v. Union Corp., 999 F.Supp. 1120 (N.D.Ill.1998). “Because to most consumers, the relevant distinction between a collection agency and an attorney is the ability to sue,” a letter signed by an attorney signals to the unsophistcated consumer that legal action is at hand. United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d 131, 136-37 (4th Cir.1996); see Russey v. Rankin, 911 F.Supp. 1449, 1454 (D.N.M. 1995) (<HOLDING>). In addition to the source of the

    ### Response:
    holding that a letter clearly threatened litigation when it purported to be from an attorney and declared that we have the legal right to file a lawsuit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have obtained it by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the taint of the initial police illegality. When applying that doctrine, we always must keep in mind two distinct policy justifications that bear on the answer to that issue. The first is that the predicate for Oregon’s exclusionary rule is the court’s responsibility to vindicate the invasion by the police of a defendant’s personal rights under Article I, section 9, in obtaining evidence. This court has held that an individual’s personal right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under that provision also embraces a right to deny the state any ability to use evidence obtained in violation of that right to convict the individual of a crime. See State v. Davis, 313 Or 246, 249, 834 P2d 1008 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Oregon’s rights-based exclusionary rule

    ### Response:
    recognizing principle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    upheld a finding of liability against a chief operating officer and a chief executive officer where the officers had a “ ‘significant ownership interest with operational control of significant aspects of the corporation’s day-to-day functions; the power to hire and fire employees; [the power to] determin[e][] salaries;[and the responsibility to] maintain [ ] employment records.’” Lambert, 180 F.3d at 1001-02, 1012 (quoting the district court’s jury instruction). “The evidence, moreover, strongly supports the jury’s determination that both Ackerleys exercised economic and operational control over the employment relationship with the sales agents, and were accordingly employers within the meaning of the Act.” Id. at 1012. See also Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States Dep’t of Labor v. Cole Enters.,

    ### Response:
    holding corporations president personally liable where he had ultimate control over businesss daytoday operations and was the corporate officer principally in charge of directing employment practices
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Marion Barry. Nevertheless, as the district court found, these desires do not constitute implied promises. Ahn acknowledges that a promise of secrecy was not expressed in the plea agreement. The agreement did, however, include an integration clause, which specifically stated that no other agreements or promises existed between the parties. Standing alone, such a clause would be strong evidence that no implied promises existed' — after all, integration clauses “establish that the written plea bargain was ‘adopted by the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.’ ” United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 210 (1981)); accord United States v. Hunt, 205 F.3d 931, 935 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alegria, 192 F.3d 179, 185

    ### Response:
    holding that a merger clause normally prevents a criminal defendant who has entered into a plea agreement from asserting that the government made oral promises to him not contained in the plea agreement itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not, we believe, a factor that ought to have been eliminated from any consideration. Conclusion Because the bankruptcy court did not take into account all of the factors that it ought to have weighed and because it did not place the ultimate burden of establishing the § 523(a)(15)(B) exception on the debtor, we must vacate the decision of the district court and remand the case to that court with instructions to remand it to the bankruptcy court for new factual findings made under the proper burden of proof. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the district court with directions that the case be remanded to the bankruptcy court for further consideration consistent with this opinion. Vacated And Remanded. 1 . Cf. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Congress supplemented the reach of this

    ### Response:
    holding that  522f doesnot permit a debtor to avoid a lien granted to the debtors former spouse under a divorce decree that extinguishes all previous interests the parties had in the property and in no event secures more than the spouses former interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    citations omitted). Plaintiffs argue that the 2013 Agreement’s arbitration provision is unenforceable in its entirety because it is unconscionable under California law. The Court agrees. 1. Procedwral Unconscionability For largely the same reasons that this Court held the delegation clause in the 2013 Agreement was procedurally unconscionable, the entire 2013 arbitration provision is procedurally unconscionable as well. Under any standard, the 2013 Agreement’s opt-out provision was illusory because it was highly inconspicuous and incredibly onerous to comply with. Hence, the Court concludes that the arbitration provision in the 2013 Agreement was presented to drivers on a take-it-or-leave it basis, and was adhesive and oppressive. See Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 113, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 (<HOLDING>); see also Section III.C.1, supra. Similarly,

    ### Response:
    holding that a standardized contract which is imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength and that relegates the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it is necessarily oppressive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    DANIELS, Chief Justice. {1} The plaintiff insureds (Plaintiffs) in these three consolidated cases were issued uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage in amounts less than the liability coverage provided by their automobile insurance policies. See Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Weed Warrior Servs., 2010-NMSC-050, ¶ 15, 149 N.M. 157, 245 P.3d 1209 (2010) (<HOLDING>). The Court of Appeals concluded that none of

    ### Response:
    holding that new mexicos uninsured motorist statute nmsa 1978 section 665301 1983 requires an insurer to offer um7 uim coverage in an amount equal to the liability limits of the policy and that the choice of the insured to purchase any lower amount functions as a rejection of that maximum amount of coverage statutorily possible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tending to show that Bree-land’s weapon was manufactured as a shotgun and later altered, and he acknowledged at oral argument that the weapon had apparently been modified. The evidence at trial supporting this conclusion consisted of Officer Barnett’s testimony that the stock appeared to have been sawed off and filed down, and the weapon itself, the stock of which has been visibly changed into a pistol-grip. Viewing this evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn f 7, 124 (5th Cir.1995) (“To warrant reversal of a conviction, prosecutorial misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it casts serious doubts upon the correctness of the jury’s verdict.”). We similarly decline to reverse Bree-land’s conviction based on the allegedly erroneous admission of a (5th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). Ill For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM

    ### Response:
    holding that any error that court may have made in admitting inadmissible evidence was harmless because government presented overwhelming evidence establishing defendants guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    while the opponents argue that, no matter under what guise an individual is deprived of his liberty, he should be afforded these rights. ‘ ‘Suffice it to say that the constitutionality of withholding from juveniles all the rights given criminals has been upheld by the courts in almost every instance where it has been questioned.” Holman, supra, 39 Or L Rev at 316-17 (footnote omitted). See also Report of the Legislative Interim Committee on the Judiciary, Proposed Revision, Oregon Juvenile Code (1976). 11 See also State v. Gullings, supra, 244 Or at 176-77 (“The procedure is civil, not criminal, and equitable in that the remedies may be flexible and based upon ‘conscience’ and judgment, rather than upon more or less rigid rules of law.”); Hills v. Pierce, supra, 113 Or at 390 (<HOLDING>); State v. Dunn, supra, 53 Or at 308-09

    ### Response:
    holdingthat purpose of juvenile court is not to convict or punish but to protect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    To datfe, however, Pacleb has not actually received complete relief on those claims. Thosé claims, therefore, are not now moot. In addition, because “a would-be class representative with a live claim of her own must be accorded a fair opportunit er of judgment, whereas Allstate purported to hold its Rule 68 offer open. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell-Ewald, however, Allstate has not continued to press that argument, and properly so. Under Campbell-Ewald, the key question is whether an offer has been accepted, regardless of whether it has lapsed or remains on the table. See Campbell-Ewald, 136 S.Ct. at 666 (""We hold today, in accord with Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that an unaccepted settlement offer has no force.” (emphasis added)); id. at 672 (<HOLDING>). 3 . We grant Allstate’s motion to supplement

    ### Response:
    holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    order regular community supervision if the de fendant is adjudged guilty of aggravated sexual assault under section 22.021 of the Penal Code. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(l)(E). A trial judge also may not order shock community supervision if the defendant is ineligible for regular judge-ordered community supervision. See id. § 6(a)(1); State v. Posey, 330 S.W.3d 311, 315 (Tex.Crim.App.2011); State v. Dunbar, 297 S.W.3d 777, 780 (Tex.Crim.App.2009). Because imprisonment was the only punishment option, we hold that the trial judge did not err in failing to order a section 9 presentence investigation. Id. § 9(g)(3); see also Skinner v. State, No. 06-00-00184-CR, 2001 WL 193882, at *2 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Feb. 27, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). Jimenez further contends that the trial court

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant whom trial court had adjudicated guilty of aggravated sexual assault after defendant had violated community supervision agreement was ineligible for judgeordered community supervision and thus fit within section 9g3 exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    seat with his foot. Both defendants denied this. This testimony is not credible because a CB is not illegal, and there would have been no motivation to hide it under a seat. Instead, it was in front of the console on the floor where the documents were kept. Stark moved the CB when he went into the console to retrieve the papers. Finally, defendants gave a consistent story that they were traveling to Vermont to go mountain-biking and offered proof, including the mountain bikes. The government argues that th 1, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (expressing concern in the airport search context about a drug courier profile that would “describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers who would be subject to v ted States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1418-19 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 549

    ### Response:
    holding that because the government was unable to prove that a truck in which illegal drugs were discovered was stolen the driver and passenger had standing to challenge the search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on their face, were sufficient. Doc. Nos. 46 at 19-20 (“[T]he judgment already provides for exceptions, exemptions and means to further avoid its application to any person, ... and no person at this time is so situated that the disposition may as a practical matter impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest.”); 47 at 43-45 (distinguishing Vasquez as a case that dealt with the enforcement of a gang injunction order, rather than the facial validity of the order itself, and noting the “expectation that Los Angeles authorities will implement the injunction only lawfully and fairly”) (emphasis added). Here, however, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the City from enforcing the injunction against him by arguing th 91, (AFGE) v. Martin, 969 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if Plaintiffs prior arguments

    ### Response:
    holding that a us department of labor drug testing plan did not on its face violate the fourth amendment but emphasizing that the ruling did not preclude an as applied constitutional challenge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    promotional and concealment money laundering require the government to prove that the defendant knowingly used the ""proceeds” of an unlawful activity, Wilkes's analysis of Santos is applicable here. Cf. Dis, op. at 1100. 17 . The dissent’s reliance on the Fourth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396, 407 (4th Cir.2012) is also misplaced. In defining and applying ""essential expenses,” Cloud relies on the Santos plurality’s reasoning that the term ""proceeds” excludes any payout to a co-conspirator. Id. at 403-09. We have not interpreted Santos so broadly, relying instead on Justice Stevens’s case-by-case approach. See, e.g., Wilkes, 662 F.3d at 549. Other circuits have likewise refused to interpret Santos as broadly as the Fourth Circuit. See Kratt, 579 F.3d at 562 (<HOLDING>); Garland v. Roy, 615 F.3d 391, 402 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that proceeds means profits only when imposing a money laundering count leads to a radical increase in the statutory maximum sentence and only when nothing in the legislative history suggests that congress intended such an increase
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (rather than an erroneous application m.App.2002) (same); State v. Mercado, 972 S.W.2d 75, 77-78 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). It is thus not apparent how decisions such as Allen, holding that an appellate court may not affirm a trial court's granting of a motion to suppress ruling on a ground not raised in the . trial court, conforms with the holdings in Mercado, Martinez and Hailey. See State v. Allen, 53 S.W.3d 731, 733-34 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). 4 .In addition to other considerations, such as that the suppression ruling in the DWI case was not a final judgment on the merits and that jeopardy had not attached in that case, that ruling did not reflect a finding of any particular fact. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)(<HOLDING>). In explaining its ruling in the present case,

    ### Response:
    holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when an issue of ultimate fact has necessarily been determined by a valid final judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.2000). Examples of BMPs that have been accepted as substitutes for effluent limits include: nutrient management plans for concentrated animal feeding operations, see Waterkeeper All., 399 F.3d at 497, 502, filtration of stormwater runoff from ditches before it enters rivers and streams (by timber companies), and constructing roads with surfacing that minimizes sediment in runoff (by timber companies), see Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1326, 1338, 185 L.Ed.2d 447 (2013). The narrative standard here is nowhere as specific as any of these examples. Indeed, it requires nothing more of a shipowner than to meet the TBELs. This interpretation is hardly consistent' with the regulations that require WQBELS to ensure compliance. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (<HOLDING>). Third, EPA claims that WQBEL standards will

    ### Response:
    holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    direct financial benefit from the infringing activity and ‘has the right and ability to supervise’ the infringing activity.” Id. (quoting Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.2004)). Bridgeport argues that Universal is liable for both vicarious and contributory infringement of Change Gone Come. The vicarious liability, it argues, arose because Universal “has the right to police the infringements” of T-Funk. It, however, has not supported this assertion with evidence. While Universal entered into an exclusive publishing agreement with Hutton, the agreement merely provides Universal with the right to own and exploit his works, not to control his song writing activities. Cf. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750-51, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989) (<HOLDING>). There is no vicarious liability because

    ### Response:
    holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hearing “if the substance of the affidavit purporting to contain newly discovered evidence, when taken at face value, is insufficient to entitle the petitioner to the relief requested.” Scherf v. State, 788 N.W.2d 504, 508 (Minn.2010). To prove a claim by clear and convincing evidence requires a party’s evidence to be “unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.” Gassier v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 583 (Minn.2010). The innocence prong in subdivision 4(b)(2) requires “more than an uncertainty” about the petitioner’s guilt. Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 170. Instead, estab lishing “actual innocence” requires the petitioner to prove it is “more likely than not that no reasonable jury would convict.” Id; see also Miles v. State, 800 N.W.2d 778, 783 (Minn.2011) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Brown has failed to meet the

    ### Response:
    holding that a petitioner must demonstrate that the newly discovered evidence on its face would prove the petitioners innocence by a clear and convincing standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Norris, 96 F.3d 1085, 1088 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Brown, 921 F.2d 785, 791 (8th Cir.1990)). “Our function as an appellate court is not to reweigh the evidence. To the contrary, we must accord ‘great deference’ where a state appellate court has found the evidence supporting the conviction constitutionally sufficient,” as is the case here. Id. (citations omitted); see also Blair-Bey v. Nix, 44 F.3d 711, 713 (8th Cir.1995) (finding that, in evaluating claims that the evidence was insufficient to find guilt, courts must examine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”); Redding v. State, 881 F.2d 575, 578 (8th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). A

    ### Response:
    holding that in evaluating sufficiency of the evidence in habeas corpus petitions we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the government and the recipient. In Jones, the Supreme Court emphasizes that the amount and nature of notice required by due process must take into account “unique information about an intended recipient regardless of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case.” Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1716. A fiduciary relationship between the government and the intended recipient certainly constitutes such “unique information” — especially in light of other relationships that have been consistently held to increase the government’s notice obligations. Where, for example, the notice recipient is a ward of the state (such as a prisoner), the government has been held to a higher standard of notice. See, e.g., Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d 791, 794-95

    ### Response:
    holding that where the recipient is a federal prisoner the government is required to provide him with actual notice of a deprivation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Intelligence Agency, 591 F.Supp. 60, 67 (D.D.C.1984), and judges “lack the expertise necessary to second-guess ... agency opinions,” Halperin v. Central Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C.Cir.1980) (deferring to the agency’s opinion and holding that certain CIA affidavits provided ample evidence to show potential harm under a limited de novo review). If the court finds that the agency’s affidavits are insufficiently detailed, it should deny summary judgment. Campbell, 164 F.3d at 31 (remanding to the district court to allow the FBI to further “justify” its Exemption 1 claim because its declaration failed to “draw any connection between the documents at issue and the general standards that govern the national security exemption”), remanded to 193 F.Supp.2d 29, 38 (D.D.C.2001) (<HOLDING>); Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 79 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that a declaration was insufficient by merely concluding without further elaboration that disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his marriage to Ms. Short, and that the loan therefore constitutes a separate property debt incurred by him prior to his marriage to Ms. Short. In the post-nuptial agreement, however, Mr. Short promised to repay his loan to Ms. Short “if the marriage lastfed] more than three years.” More significantly, the decree of dissolution of June 3, 1993, provided that Mr. Short “owed to [Ms. Short] $41,450” at 8.469% interest and that Mr. Short would “pay the sum of $600 per month to [Ms. Short] until such time as the loan [was] paid.” Mr. Short’s contention that his $50,000 loan from Ms. Short is not divorce-related, even though the terms of its repayment were expressly incorporated into the decree of dissolution, lacks merit. See, e.g., In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d 879, 881-82 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Ill Mr. Short next argues that the bankruptcy

    ### Response:
    holding nondischargeable a husbands debt to his wife where the husband had agreed to assume the debt under the terms of the couples divorce agreement and stating that  523a15 is intended to cover divorcerelated debts such as those in property settlement agreements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    set aside and the charge dismissed. We disagree. Wharton’s Rule is a judicially created “doctrine of criminal law enunciating an exception to the general principle that a conspiracy and the substantive offense that is its immediate end are discrete crimes for which separate sanctions may be imposed.” Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 771, 95 S.Ct. at 1287. See generally Boyd, 236 Va. at 351, 374 S.E.2d at 303 (articulating the current law in Virginia that convictions may be had in a single trial for “both the completed substantive offense and the underlying conspiracy”). Under the rale, “[w]hen to the idea of an offense plurality of agents is logically necessary, conspiracy [to commit that offense] ... cannot be maintained.” Stewart v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 473, 478, 303 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1983) (<HOLDING>) (quoting 2 F. Wharton, Criminal Law § 1604, at

    ### Response:
    holding that whartons rule applies to the crime of pandering
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2002). A court lacks habeas jurisdiction to evaluate claims “grounded solely in the INS’s failure to exercise its prosecutorial discretion.” Id. Pure issues of law may be raised in habeas petitions. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (noting historical use of writ to challenge detentions based on “errors of law, including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes”); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003) (upholding use of habeas to challenge on constitutional grounds the “statutory framework” permitting detention without bail); Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 203 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir.1998)) (<HOLDING>). “[I]f a statute makes an alien eligible to be

    ### Response:
    holding that federal courts possess habeas jurisdiction over claims arising under implementing legislation and regulations of the convention against torture
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when he knowingly obtains or exercises control over anything of value of another without authorization, or by threat or deception, and knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the thing of value in such manner as to deprive the other person permanently of its use or benefit. With regard to both the Dunn and McCarthy funds, both parties initially authorized Rishel to obtain control over the funds for the express purpose of purchasing baseball season tickets. After Rishel failed to purchase the tickets, both Dunn and the McCar- thys attempted to reach Rishel to no avail, and thereafter withdrew their authorization. To constitute theft pursuant to § 18-4-401(1)(b), ""[clontrol of the property need not be unauthorized from the outset."" People v. Treat, 193 Colo. 570, 568 P.2d 473, 476 (1977)(<HOLDING>). ""It is sufficient [for purposes of the

    ### Response:
    holding that although authorization was initially given for property exercise of that control continued to be authorized only because the defendant deceived the rightful owner of the property into believing that a legitimate use was being made of the property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.” Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 344. In neither case, however, did the court condone unfettered tampering with legislation presumed to be constitutional. Indeed, the Justices stressed, that “each State is free to address difficult issues of individual liberty in the manner its own Constitution demands.” Opinion of the Justices, 440 Mass. at 1208. The court specifically added that its decision “leaves intact the Legislature’s broad discretion to regulate marriage.” Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 343-44. Simply stated, barring same-sex Massachusetts residents from marriage violates the Massachusetts Constitution. The Massachusetts evasion s (1978) (<HOLDING>), citing Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656,

    ### Response:
    holding that the alaska hire law which requires that all oil and gas leases easements or rightsofway permits et cetera contain requirement that qualified alaska residents be hired in preference to nonresidents is unconstitutional as violative of the privileges and immunities clause of the constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1997) (“An inmate shall be released on parole by the written order of the parole board if the board determines . . . there is a reasonable probability that the inmate can be released without detriment to the community or to the inmate; and . . . the inmate is willing and capable of fulfilling the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.”). 17 Without making a determinative decision, we note that the practical application of § 204b to plaintiff presents an instructive comparison to the case at bar. Unlike the current case, if § 204b’s seventy-percent rule had been applied to plaintiff, the statute’s plain terms would have retroactively increased the length of plaintiffs minimum sentence. This, presumably, would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 544, 133 S. Ct. at 2084 (<HOLDING>); see also Puckett v. Abels, 684 So. 2d 671,

    ### Response:
    holding that retroactive application of advisory sentencing guidelines violated ex post facto clause because guidelines increased minimum sentencing range
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    punitive damages against Defendants Ekstrom, Sockwell, and Walker. “Punitive damages are available against individual [government officials] in a § 1983 claim only where the [officials’] ‘conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983)). As discussed above, Ekstrom, Sockwell, and Walker are dismissed from this action in their individual capacities. Plaintiff is therefore precluded from seeking punitive damages against them. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if Ekstrom, Sock-well, or

    ### Response:
    holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state official sued in his or her official capacity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tries to analogize its case to one considered by the Eighth Circuit in Frye v. Kansas City Missouri Police Department, 375 F.3d 785 (8th Cir.2004). In Frye, the plaintiffs demonstrated against abortion by standing on the side of a road holding signs, some of which contained pictures of mutilated fetuses. Id. at 788. Following complaints from drivers, the police gave the plaintiffs the choice of either relocating to a different portion of the road or taking down the graphic signs. Id. Several demonstrators were arrested under the loitering ordinance when they refused to obey. Id. The Eighth Circuit found no First Amendment violation. The court stated that the officers’ actions were not motivated by the content of the signs, but rather out of a concern for public safety. Id. at 790 (<HOLDING>). The facts in the instant lawsuit are

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs message was not suppressed but only regulated as to time place and manner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cincinnati, 622 F.3d at 534-35. After determining the type of forum, the Court addresses whether the limitations placed on Plaintiffs’ speech satisfy the constitutional standard applicable to that forum. Summum, 555 U.S. at 469-70, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Because Plaintiffs seek access to the Atrium’s Holiday Display, specifically the space next to the Nativity Scene, the Atrium is the space within which a determination of the relevant forum must be analyzed. United Food & Comm. Workers Union, Local 1099 v. S.W. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 352 (6th Cir.1998) (where plaintiff sought access to advertising space located on exterior of public bus, the advertising space was the forum at issue); Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Dep’t of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1151-52 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). See also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors

    ### Response:
    holding that where plaintiff sought access to display cases in ohare airport terminal the display case and not the terminal itself was the relevant forum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and expenses incurred as a result of the wrongful removal or retention. 1988 WL 411501, at *7. ICARA, however, shifts the burden to a respondent to show why an award of fees, costs, and expenses would be “clearly inappropriately.]” [ (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3)).] The First Circuit has explained that under § 11607(b)(3), the district court “has a duty ... to order the payment of necessary expenses and legal fees, subject to a broad caveat denoted by the words, ‘clearly inappropriate.’ ” Whallon v. Lynn, 356 F.3d 138, 140 (1st Cir.2004). Such caveat provides the district court “broad discretion in its effort to comply with the Hague Convention consistently with our own laws and standards.” Id.; see also Chafin [v. Chafin], [— U.S.-,] 133 S.Ct. [1017,] 1022[, 185 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) ] (<HOLDING>). West v. Dobrev, 735 F.3d 921, 932 (10th

    ### Response:
    recognizing that under  11607b3 a court ordering the return of a child generally must require respondent to pay the fees costs and expenses associated with the return
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the loss at issue here. Having decided that each policy provides pro rata coverage, we must address the issue of the first $200,000 of liability, as Payless’s policy with USF & G contains a self-insured retention of that amount applicable to this claim. The district court concluded that Payless was self-insured for that amount, and that the self-insurance was “other insurance” within the meaning of CU’s “other insurance” clause, such that Payless’s self-insurance was primary over CU’s excess coverage for the first $200,000 for which USF & G is not liable. Although Minnesota courts have found certificates of self-insurance to constitute “insurance” in the context of automobile insurance and compulsory liability insurance statutes, see McClain v. Begley, 465 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Mmn.1991) (<HOLDING>), we do not believe that those cases dictate a

    ### Response:
    holding that the certificate of selfinsurance filed with the commissioner is the functional equivalent of an insurance policy for purposes of minnesotas nofault statutes minnstat  65b49 subd 31 2002
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    circumstances of each case. Dominguez, 149 F.R.D. at 168; Goldwater, 136 F.R.D. at 340. 1. Witness’ Area of Expertise, Education, and Training. Although it is uneontroverted that Dr. Golnick is a physician who specializes in neurology, the record is devoid of evidence that Dr. Golnick is a preeminent expert in his field or that he possesses knowledge or training unique from other neurologists. Even if the record did reflect that Dr. Golnick possessed unique expertise or training in the field of neurology, courts have been slow to award exorbitant fees based on an expert’s special abilities. See Anthony, 106 F.R.D. at 464 (denying fee request of $420.00 per hour by physician who was “one of only a handful of physicians” with expertise to testify on subject); Dominguez, 149 F.R.D. at 168 (<HOLDING>); cf. Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that physician who specialized in taste and smell taught medical school classes and conducted research in his area of expertise was not entitled to earn premium fee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    attorney is considered a state official in Mississippi....”). Finally, even if Appellees’ failure to identify C.G. Smith and produce her statement was untimely, this conduct is not sanctionable, as the evidence is not germane to the merits of this case. As discussed above, because the evidence shows that C.G. Smith did not provide her statement to the District Attorney until after Ard’s assault, the statement has no bearing on whether Rushing or Lincoln County acted with deliberate indifference. “An appellate court need be involved [in discovery rulings] only when a party’s substantial rights have been prejudiced and the proceeding would have turned out differently had the evidence been disclosed.” Bass v. City of Jackson, 540 F. App’x 300, 302 (5th Cir.2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). For these same reasons, Ard has failed to

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no indication that the district court abused its discretion in denying the discoverysanction motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    adjudicative administrative proceedings,” we confirmed again that “under the general statutory authorizations for appeal, agencies are entitled to appeal from adverse circuit court judgments where the functions of the agencies ‘are so identified with the execution of some definite public policy as the representative of the State, that their participation in litigation affecting their decisions is regarded by the Legislature as essential to the adequate protection of the State’s interests.’ ” Id. at 294, 643 A.2d at 416 (quoting Consumer Protection v. Consumer Pub., supra, 304 Md. at 743, 501 A.2d at 54). That approach was followed as well in Board of Liquor v. Hollywood, 344 Md. 2, 684 A.2d 837 (1996), where we overruled Liquor License Board v. Leone, 249 Md. 263, 239 A.2d 82 (1968) (<HOLDING>) and found standing to appeal. We could have

    ### Response:
    holding that a county liquor license board had no standing to appeal the reversal of its decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    will not be considered by the Supreme Court. If the Court of Civil Appeals did not decide all properly preserved and briefed issues, the Supreme Court may, if it should vacate COCA's opinion, address undecided matters. Hough v. Leonard, 1993 OK 112, ¶ 15-16, 867 P.2d 438, 445-46. 34 . Oklahoma statutes, 12 O.S.2001 § 551 et seq., provide a comprehensive scheme that governs trials. The terms of 12 O.S.2001 § 651 provide: ""A new trial is a reexamination in the same court, of an issue of fact or of law or both, after a verdict by a jury, the approval of the report of a referee, or [a claim of fundamental prejudicial error in the verdict form] is insufficient to warrant reversal of the verdict and judgment of the jury.” LPCX Corp. v. Faulkner, 1991 OK 46, ¶ 32, 818 P.2d 431, 440-41 (<HOLDING>); In Nichols v. Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding defendants were precluded from challenging the validity of jury verdict forms for failure to have complained at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and exit. The employee’s actual knowledge of the dangerous condition is imputable to Hardee’s. Hardee’s also had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition because it knew that the par 14, 165 S.W.2d 390, 393-94 (1942) (whether condition was so obvious that plaintiff was bound to see it and whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent in not observing it were both questions of fact for the jury’s consideration); Turcol v. Shoney’s Enterprises, Inc., 640 S.W.2d at 507-08. However, the facts and circumstances in a particular case may be so one-sided that the trial court can say, as a matter of law, that a dangerous condition was so open and obvious that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the danger and assumed the risk. See, e.g., Harris v. Niehaus, 857 S.W.2d at 226-27 (<HOLDING>); Hokanson v. Joplin Rendering Co., 509 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding as a matter of law that natural condition present was open and obvious to all who would encounter it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    state’s argument is very persuasive. The Second Circuit has already held that Connecticut has a sufficient economic interest in the regulations and FMPs promulgated as a result of the Secretary’s actions under § 1854(f)(A) to challenge those regulations in its own right. Dep’t of Commerce, 204 F.3d at 415 n. 2. The Second Circuit declined to address the issue of Connecticut’s standing as parens patriae. Id. This court finds that the economic interest that provided the basis for standing in Daley is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a state have a quasi-sovereign interest apart from any private citizens in order to maintain a parens patriae suit against the United States. See, Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982)(<HOLDING>). Unlike in some cases where parens patriae

    ### Response:
    holding that a state has a quasisovereign interest in the economic wellbeing of its citizens and in not being denied its rightful status within the federal system
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and In re Comer, 716 F.2d 168 (3d Cir.1983), the challenged order of the district court does not fully adjudicate a specific adversary proceeding between the parties. To the contrary, the district court’s ruling that the bankruptcy court’s September 30, 1993 disbursement order was a “money judgment,” and not a mandatory injunction, ensured continuation of the controversy, i.e., preserving the issue of whether the Government is entitled to set off the $8.36 million now in the registry account against the claims of the Government agencies. Even under the most relaxed concept of finality, the October 19, 1993 order of the district court granting the Government a Rule 62(d) stay pending appeal cannot be viewed as the equivalent of a final order. Compare In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1041 (<HOLDING>). An order granting a stay pending appeal is

    ### Response:
    holding that order denying representation to class of future claimants in bankruptcy proceeding is equivalent to denial of request to intervene and order denying right to intervene is appealable final order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    User is the requisite element, and it may be by any who have occasion to travel over public lands, and if the use be by only one, still it suffices. (quoting Leach v. Manhart, 102 Colo. 129, 77 P.2d 652, 653 (1938)); accord, Barker v. County of La Plata, 49 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1214 (D.Colo.1999). See also Wallowa County v. Wade, 43 Or. 253, 72 P. 793, 794 (1903) (affirming R.S. 2477 claim’ despite the servient landowner’s showing that “the road over the land inclosed by him had never been worked or improved by the county authorities, or under their direction”); Fitzgerald v. Puddicombe, 918 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Alaska 1996) (“[n]or does the route need to be significantly developed to qualify as a ‘highway’ for RS 2477 purposes”); Ball v. Stephens, 68 Cal.App.2d 843, 158 P.2d 207, 209 (1945) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with our conclusion that

    ### Response:
    recognizing rs 2477 right of way even though it was never improved or maintained by the county
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    original sentencing hearing was legally insufficient to support such a finding. In Butler v. State, 46 Md.App. 317, 416 A.2d 773 (1980), we vacated an enhanced sentence, imposed under section 643B(c), based on two prior convictions for crimes of violence, because one conviction was not final and the other conviction, for robbery in the District of Columbia, may have been for a crime of violence bu 309 (2003) (“While we recognize that we have found New Hampshire’s Double Jeopardy Clause to provide greater protection than its federal counterpart in certain circumstances ... we are not persuaded that we should interpret the State Constitution differently than the Federal Constitution in this context."") (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 594 Pa. 106, 116 n.6, 934 A.2d 1191 (2007) (<HOLDING>). 6 , The defense maintained that the

    ### Response:
    holding that double jeopardy protections did not prevent the state from presenting evidence of youthschool sentencing enhancement when the original sentence was overturned on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir. Ct.2005) (quoting Padilla v. Silver Diner, 63 Va. Cir. 50, 57 (Va. Cir. Ct.2003)). Plaintiff alleges that Voorthuis Optician’s insistence that she report to work in the District of Columbia, where her medical malpractice coverage may not have applied, created an intolerable work condition that forced her to resign. Am. Compl. at ¶ 36. Even assuming that plaintiffs resignation was occasioned by conduct “so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” plaintiff failed to identify a specific statute which defendants violated by asking her to report to work in the District of Columbia. See Johnson v. Behsudi, 52 Va. Cir. 533, 538 (Va. Cir. Ct.1997) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, plaintiffs claim of

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to sustain an action for constructive discharge the plaintiff must show that the conduct resulting in the resignation violated a virginia public policy embodied in an existing statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “subjects, or causes to be subjected,” a person to deprivation of a right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see, e.g., Board of County Com’rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402-03, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). As assistant coaches and an athletic trainer, Defendants Palladino, Mr. Ducar, Ms. Ducar, and Prentice were not Defendant Dorrance’s supervisors and had no authority over his behavior. In the absence of legal control over Defendant Dorrance, these Defendants’ reporting omissions cannot be said to have affirmatively caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Therefore, the § 1983, failure-to-report claims against Defendants Palladino, Mr. Ducar, Ms. Ducar, and Prentice must be dismissed. See Reid v. Kayye, 885 F.2d 129, 131-32 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch.

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants were not in control and therefore were not supervisors and not subject to liability under  1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he acted in conformity therewith * * * [s]o, it’s not used to show the defendant committed this particular crime. He’s presumed innocent. [E]vidence of any other unlawful activity is not used to show that someone has the capacity to commit a crime.” Having withdrawn his objection to the admission of his prior-arson reference, defendant did not object to this instruction or request any supplementation or alteration to its wording. As a result, this instruction became the law of the case. See, e.g., State v. Giordano, 413 A.2d 93, 94 (R.I.1980). Hence we must not only presume that the jury followed this instruction, but also we will not allow defendant to complain about the adequacy of this charge on appeal when he failed to do so at the trial. See, e.g., Cardoza, 649 A.2d at 748 (<HOLDING>). However, notwithstanding this instruction,

    ### Response:
    holding that when defendant argued on appeal that the trial justice should have given the jury a sua sponte limiting instruction regarding alleged rule 404b evidence defendants failure to object at trial constituted a waiver of that issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of [the contract containing the provision for arbitration].” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). The complaint describes a controversy that did not arise out of the termite agreement. In their brief to this Court, the Orkin defendants argue that “the fact that the termite [agreement] [was] entered into after the ‘termite letter’ [was] prepared is of no legal significance.” We disagree. The Orkin defendants cite no authority for such a broad interpretation of the “thereafter arising” language of § 2 of the FAA, and we know of no authority that could provide such a broad interpretation. It would be a strained reading of the FAA as well as circuitous log 1255, 1258 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In the present action, the Lar-kins claim

    ### Response:
    holding that that plaintiffs claims which accrued before he became bound by the arbitration rules of the pacific stock exchange were not arbitrable because the record contained little if any evidence to show that the plaintiff knew of the existing controversy when he became bound by the arbitration rules
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on to provide the court with authority to extend support beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday if there are physical or mental disabilities of the child or upon a showing of other exceptional circumstances. In light of the above statute, it would appear at first blush that the now appealed from family court order erred in requiring Mother to pay the full amount of support as noted in the Original Support Order until Daughter was almost twenty years of age. However, where one of multiple children reaches majority, a parent’s child support obligation will not be affected absent a family court order modifying the amount of support owed. Bull v. Smith, 299 S.C. 123, 126, 382 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1989). See also Stroman v. Williams, 291 S.C. 376, 380, 353 S.E.2d 704, 706 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Where one of multiple children becomes

    ### Response:
    holding that where a support order provides for payments for the benefit of two or more children the marriage or emancipation of one minor child does not automatically affect the liability of the father for the full sum prescribed in the order 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court that his claims should survive because they involved continuing injuries that did not end until January 24, 2000. The district court construed this as an argument for the application of the continuing violation doctrine. The district court then rejected this argument because it concluded, based upon an unpublished decision of this court, that the continuing violation doctrine is not applicable to § 1983 cases. McCormick v. Farrar, No. 02-2037-GTV, 2003 WL 1697686, at *4 (D.Kan. Mar.20, 2003) (unpublished) (citing Rassam v. San Juan Coll. Bd., 113 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.1997)). This court has not, however, announced a precedential blanket rule that the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable to § 1983 suits. Cf. Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1513-14 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Rassam, the case relied on by the district

    ### Response:
    holding continuing violation theory inapplicable to  1981 claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by double yellow lines on Salisbury Street. Although the two signs alerted motorists that there was a “K-9 CHECK POINT AHEAD,” in fact, there was no K-9 officer at the checkpoint. A K-9 officer was present and available to assist, however, in a vehicle parked near the narcotics officers who were observing the activities from Pelican Drive. The narcotics officers stationed on Pelican Drive observed a burgundy Pontiac Grand Am approach the checkpoint signs and then execute an illegal u-turn across the grass median after passing the first checkpoint sign but before reaching the checkpoint itself. Upon observing that conduct, the narcotics officers pursued the Grand Am and executed a stop. Three narcotics officers approached the stopped car. Narcotics officers Almeida and K Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Scott Brooks’s commission of a

    ### Response:
    holding that unless the law enforcement officers show of authority succeeds in restraining a person the person has not been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a purchaser. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130,119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)(noting that injury-in-fact is a constitutional minimum). Thus, to prove constitutional standing, a plaintiff must show that it has suffered a cognizable “injury-in-fact” that has been caused by the defendant and is redressable by the court. See generally, Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18, 26-27 (1st Cir.2007); Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir.2006). BPI Global has satisfied that requirement here by showing that it took on investment risk as general partner for several of the very funds it managed. Whether less would be sufficient to satisfy the Constitutional minimum is a question I need n er, Peabody & Co., Inc., 604 F.Supp. 764, 767 (D.C.Mo.1985) (<HOLDING>). Although the First Circuit has not to date

    ### Response:
    holding that a purchaser for the purposes of  12a2 includes a representative or an agent for a purchaser
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for subsistence and lodging constitutes an improper increase in their compensation.” Id. at 225, 178 P.2d at 438. Noting that we had stated, in Olmsted & Gillelen v. Hesla, 24 Ariz. 546, 553, 211 P. 589, 591 (1922), that “[i]n the Constitution compensation is employed to designate salary,” we rejected the petitioners’ argument that legislators could not recover the per diem payments. We concluded that “[w]hen the State repays the legislators and their employees for personal expenses, this does not constitute additional compensation but is merely a reimbursement for actual cash outlays necessarily incurred for subsistence while away from home and in the performance of duty.” Earhart at 226, 178 P.2d at 438; see also Geyso v. City of Cudahy, 34 Wis.2d 476, 149 N.W.2d 611, 614-15 (1967) (<HOLDING>). B. ¶ 9 Although petitioners seek to

    ### Response:
    holding that the words salary and expense are separate and distinct terms which connote entirely different concepts salary is a fixed periodical compensation paid for services rendered whereas an expense is a charge incurred in performing those services
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    waiver of appeal paragraph. This paragraph essentially indicates that the defendant acknowledges that he’s been advised of his rights to appeal only in very limited circumstances and that he will not be allowed to challenge his conviction under Title 28, 2255; and Title 18, Section 3742; however, he is reserving the right to appeal any punishment in excess of the statutory maximum. THE COURT: And the statutory maximum in this case, Mr. McIntyre, at least with respect to Count 3, is 240 months. MR. WELDON: That is correct. THE COURT: You understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. The record thus demonstrates that the district court made McIntyre fully aware of the waiver of his appellate rights regarding his sentence and thus complied with Rule ll(b)(l)(N). Cf. Almany, 598 F.3d at 240-41 (<HOLDING>). McIntyre’s only argument in opposition to the

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts question do you also understand that under some circumstances you or the government may have the right to appeal any sentence that i impose did not comply with rule llbln and failed to properly notify the defendant about the waiver of his appellate rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recognize that the services rendered to the patient are necessary for the protection of the third person. DiMarco, supra at 424-25 (footnote omitted). The DiMarco rule, which was underscored by the Superior Court’s subsequent holding in Troxel v. A.I. duPont Institute, 431 Pa.Super. 464, 636 A.2d 1179 (1994), is that a physician’s duty of care is owed not only to his or her patient, but also to identifiable third parties who will suffer if a physician negligently errs in the handling of a case of infectious disease. See also Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 557 Pa. 340, 733 A.2d 623, 628 (1999) (recognizing that the role of physicians in protecting the public from communicable diseases was central to our decision in DiMarco); Matharu v. Muir, 29 A.3d 375 (Pa.Super.2011) {en banc) (<HOLDING>). The rule I derive from DiMarco and the

    ### Response:
    holding that physicians owed a duty to protect an infant against rhsensitization
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    repealing act violated a prior constitutional provision virtually identical to Article 3, sec. 56 because it changed the city’s charter, the Court observed: From a reading of the entire section it is clear that its object and meaning is to prohibit the granting of special favors by the legislature, and to require that all legislation upon the subjects therein enumerated should be equal and uniform. It certainly did not mean to take away from the legislature its inherent power of repealing any law theretofore passed by it, and we must hold that said repealing act is a )(stating that adoption of a constitutional provision against special legislation does not prevent the repeal of previously enacted special law); Luehrman v. Taxing District of Shelby County, 70 Tenn. 425, 2 Lea 425 (1879)(<HOLDING>). We conclude that Article 3, sec. 56 does not

    ### Response:
    holding that constitutional provision which prohibited local and special laws did not limit legislatures inherent power to repeal the corporate privileges of a particular community and therefore act which repealed the charter of the city of memphis was not unconstitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    basis review appears to be an issue of first impression in Michigan. Many other jurisdictions have faced similar challenges to the inclusion of false imprisonment crimes, even absent a sexual purpose, in their sex offender registration statutes. The majority have upheld the statutes under rational basis review. See, e.g., Moffitt v Commonwealth, 360 SW3d 247, 255-257 (Ky App, 2012) (concluding that although the defendant’s conviction of child kidnapping included a sexual component, the purpose of Kentucky’s registration statute was the protection of children and the requirement of registration for certain offenses against minors, regardless of a sexual component, did not offend substantive or procedural due process); State v Smith, 323 Wis 2d 377, 397-407; 780 NW2d 90 (Wis, 2010) (<HOLDING>); Rainer v State, 286 Ga 675, 676-679; 690 SE2d

    ### Response:
    holding that even though the offense was not of a sexual nature requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender following his conviction for false imprisonment of a minor was rationally related to the government interest in protecting the public and did not violate the defendants right to due process or equal protection under the law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    who purport to hire, as contractors, minions to carry out the proprietor’s own “regular trade or business” in an attempt to avoid workers’ compensation liability for employees. King v. Snide, 144 Vt. 395, 400-01, 479 A.2d 752,754 (1984). The legislative intent in designating these individuals as “statutory employers” was “to impose liability only upon the owner or proprietor of a regular trade or business . . . where an uninsured independent contractor is carrying out some phase of the owner’s or operator’s business.” Id. at 401, 479 A.2d at 754. ¶ 9. Thus understood, the statutory defini that unofficial manager of a wood lot was not statutory employer of an independent logger’s employee injured on the premises); Packett v. Moretown Creamery Co., 91 Vt. 97, 99-101, 99 A. 638 (1917) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, and like in In re Chatham Woods

    ### Response:
    holding that a creamery was not statutory employer of a contractor hired to build a new structure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    against imposition of punitive damages on governmental entities.” Vt. Agency of Nat. Res, v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 784, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (citation omitted). Consequently, the inquiry here is whether Plaintiffs argument that Defendant actually is not a municipality, and thus the punitive damages immunity is inapplicable, is valid. (See Br. in Opp’n (Doc. 21) at 13.) “The board of education of each county in the State shall be a body corporate ....” N.C. Gen. Stat., § 115C-40. Among other powers, duc., 315 F.Supp.2d 784, 810 (M.D.N.C.2004) (“Defendant Guilford County Board of Education is a governmental entity and therefore is immune from punitive damages,” (citation omitted)); Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 208, 293 S.E.2d 101, 115 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Ripellino v. N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, 158

    ### Response:
    holding that in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary municipal corporations are immune from punitive damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testify one way or another. Id. Thus, there was no indication that the impeachment evidence would be relevant, or even admissible. Id. In this case, disqualification would rest at present upon the chance that the prosecution might call the personnel manager to testify regarding Padilla's personnel file. We have no evidence in this record to support a determination that the possibility of that cireum-stance w 82 (1994) (stating that a defendant has no standing to invoke a third party's privilege in either a criminal or civil action}; State v. Evans, 802 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo.1991) (stating that ""the physician-patient privilege is personal to the patient, and generally no person ... other than the patient may so object""); Osborn v. Fabatz, 105 Mich.App. 450, 306 N.W.2d 319, 322 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Hence, it falls not to the defendant in this

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant had no standing to invoke a third partys physicianpatient privilege in a paternity action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    compliment each other, but courts have found that in most cases they are so intertwined in the defendant’s argument that they appear to raise the same question: are the plaintiffs claims so “completely preempted” that the only way to avoid removal due to federal question jurisdiction is through the “artful pleading” of the state-law claim? Thus, these courts have viewed “complete preemption” as a prerequisite to the application of the “artful pleading doctrine”. See, Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475, 118 S.Ct. 921 (“The artful pleading doctrine allows removal where federal law completely preempts a plaintiffs state-law claim”); Braco v. MCI WorldCom Communications, Inc., 138 F.Supp.2d. 1260, 1268, n. 10 (C.D.Cal.2001); Crump v. WorldCom, Inc., 128 F.Supp.2d. 549, 559-60 (W.D.Tenn.2001)(<HOLDING>); Minnesota by Hatch, at 373. The instant

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the artful pleading doctrine in practice is subsumed by the complete preemption doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by other Nashville-area employers, and not the operating costs of its other facilities. After weeks of fruitless negotiations, Peterbilt locked out the employees on June 23, 2008. The parties ceased negotiations in August, and the Madison plant closed for good in 2009. After the unions filed an unfair labor practice charge against Peterbilt, the Board’s Regional Director filed a complaint alleging unlawful nondisclosure of relevant bargaining information and unlawful lockout under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(5), (d) (prohibiting employers from “interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or eoerc[ing] employees in the exercise of’ their collective-bargaining rights and requiring good-faith negotiations); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153, 76 S.Ct. 753, 100 L.Ed. 1027 (1956) (<HOLDING>); Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,

    ### Response:
    holding that the acts duty of good faith includes the disclosure of information relevant to the employers bargaining position
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disclosure: “A record of an agency relating to a noncriminal investigation, including: .., -[i]nvestigative materials, notes, correspondence and reports.” Section 708(b)(17)(ii) of the RTKL (emphasis added). In the absence of definitions in the. RTKL for either “noncriminal” or “investigation,” we have concluded .that “noncriminal” applies to investigations- other than those which are criminal in nature and that “investigation” means “a systematic or searching inquiry, a detailed examination, or an official probe.” Dep’t of Health v. Office of Open Records, 4 A.3d 803, 810-811 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). The inquiry, examination, or probe must be “conducted as part , of the agency’s official duties.” Id. at 814. See also Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Chawaga, 91 A.3d 257, 259 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the OOR determined that

    ### Response:
    holding that an official probe must be conducted pursuant to an agencys legislatively granted factfinding and investigative powers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Defendants have not shown that a reasonable officer could have believed that entry with intent to arrest would not violate clearly established law. Thus summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity would be inappropriate if the intent was to arrest or if facts as to intent are in dispute. A genuine dispute exists as to whether or not defendants ordered the storming of the house primarily for the purpose of arresting Quade. The fact that this dispute turns on an essentially subjective element (the officers’ purpose), while qualified immunity involves an inquiry into “objective reasonableness” does not mean that qualified immunity is any more or less available in this context than it would otherwise be. See Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir.1991) (Branch I) (<HOLDING>); Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1468-69 (9th

    ### Response:
    recognizing the tension between harlows emphasis on objective reasonableness and the subjective elements which are at times at issue in lawsuits against public officials including lawsuits based on alleged fourth amendment violations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether her voice, and theatrical style, would have been identifiable if another song had been presented, and not “her song”, which unfortunately for her was owned by others and licensed to the defendants. Id. at 716. Similarly, Plaintiffs in this case assert that the “sound associated with Plaintiffs’ ‘What I Like About You’ is part and parcel of who they are as entertainers.” (Pis.’ Mot. at 9.) Their claim is therefore that their “sound in connection with the music, lyrics and arrangement” is distinctive. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that their sound is identifiable separate from the Song. The Court therefore reaches the same conclusion as the Sinatra court and holds that Plaintiffs’ claim must fail. 2. First Amendment Defenda nc., 444 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1039 (C.D.Cal.2006) (<HOLDING>); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325

    ### Response:
    holding that a video game clearly qualifies as an artistic work entitled to first amendment protection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S.C. § 2241 application for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (stating no appeal may be taken from a “final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court” until an applicant obtains a COA); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 869 (10th Cir.2000) (stating § 2253(c)(l)(A)’s requirements apply when a state habeas applicant is proceeding under § 2241). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny a COA and dismiss this matter. I.BACKGROUND Mr. Haff is a pretrial detainee at the Denver County Jail. He filed a § 2241 application for a writ of habeas corpus, urging the federal district court to stop the state criminal prosecution. See Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The § 2241 application asserted five claims:

    ### Response:
    holding   2241 is the proper avenue by which to challenge pretrial detention
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Department of Labor’s regulations were a permissible interpretation of § 196-d. See N.Y. Lab. Law § 199 (authorizing Department of Labor Commissioner to issue rules and regulations for enforcing state laws governing employers’ payment of wages to employees); Samiento v. World Yacht Inc., 10 N.Y.3d at 79, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 88, 883 N.E.2d 990 (instructing that “Labor Department’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference” pursuant to general administrative law principle that “construction given statutes and regulations by the agency responsible for their administration, if not irrational or unreasonable, should be upheld”). See generally Golf v. N.Y. State Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 91 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 674 N.Y.S.2d 600, 605, 697 N.E.2d 555 (1998) (<HOLDING>). But no court — state or federal — appears yet

    ### Response:
    holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not been briefed and because the case can be resolved under sufh-ciency-of-the-evidence review, we assume without holding that a penis is not an ""object” within the meaning of § 2246(2)(C). 3 . Additionally, Rule 412 also would bar the admission of this evidence. When a party seeks to offer evidence that “someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence,” the party is required to file a motion describing the proposed evidence at least fourteen days before trial and to notify the victim of the proposed evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 412(c)(1). Here, Brown Thunder neglected to file a Rule 412 motion and failed to notify H.C. or her guardian or representative of the proposed Speker evidence. See United States v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir.1998)

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence based upon the defendants noncompliance with the deadlines in rule 412c
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was justified at its inception and then (2) whether the action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances for the stop in the first place. Id. at 24, ¶ 27, 170 P.3d at 273 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868). ¶ 46 The second detention started when Officer Craft grabbed Appellant’s arm and informed him he was being detained. Men-denhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (A person is “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only when by means of physical force or show of authority his freedom of movement is restrained.). Because Officer Craft and Appellant were engaged in a consensual encounter immediately prior to this point, Appellant was not seized and the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. United States v. Munoz, 590 F.3d 916, 920 (8th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Flores, 474 F.3d 1100, 1103

    ### Response:
    recognizing that once a completed traffic stop evolves into a consensual encounter there is no seizure and the fourth amendment is not implicated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cannot alter the effect of the verdict. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d at 752. Submission of an immaterial issue is not harmful unless it confuses or misleads the jury, which we determine by considering its probable effect on the jury in light of the charge as a whole. Id. Here, reading the charge as a whole, we do not find that the question submitted was ambiguous or misleading. The question asked the jury to determine separately the negligence of the Bowens and Crow-son. A finding that the Bowens were not the proximate cause of the occurrence in question exonerated them from liability. Consequently, the question pertaining to Crowson’s negligence was immaterial — in other words, any answer pertaining to Crowson’s negligence would not have altered the verdict. See Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d at 752-53 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, putting the findings on

    ### Response:
    holding question of contributory negligence was harmless because once jury found defendant did not proximately cause the occurrence in question defendant was exonerated of liability such that neither an affirmative nor a negative answer to plaintiffs negligence could have altered the verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “shall” in subsection (b) of F.L. § 5-1029 is obligatory, not permissive. Indeed, the word “shall” is used throughout F.L. § 5-1029 in its mandatory sense, with the word “may” being used when permissive action is implied, in explicit contrast to the word “shall.” Moreover, as we have explained, the historical context of the enactment of what is now F.L. § 5-1029 indicates that with respect to the alleged father in a paternity action, the testing afforded by that section upon motion has been referred to and treated as mandatory. To be sure, the Court of Appeals in child custody cases and in cases brought under the Estates and Trusts Article has held that it is within the discretion of the court to permit blood or genetic testing. See Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 621 A.2d 898 (1993)(<HOLDING>); Turner v. Whisted, supra, 327 Md. 106, 607

    ### Response:
    holding that in domestic law custody case blood tests to determine paternity of child born out of wedlock may only be ordered upon a showing of good cause under the best interest of the child standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    premises Coleman’s quiet title action on his contention that certain of the loan documents contain forged signatures. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 16.) Coleman does not dispute that he signed some documents at Fairway Financial, but he does dispute the validity of his signatures on the Balloon Note and TIL Disclosure Statement. (Doc. No. 46-1 at ¶¶ 6-7, 43.) Wells Fargo argues both that Coleman has, consistently with the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing, failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact with regard to the validity of the signatures, and ictions for the proposition at least some quiet title actions are unburdened by a statute of limitations as long as the challenged cloud on the title persists. See, e.g., Bangerter v. Petty, 225 P.3d 874, 879 (Utah 2009) (<HOLDING>); Salazar v. Thomas, 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 186

    ### Response:
    holding there is no statute of limitations on action to quiet title by landowner who was in continuous possession of property under claim of ownership
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    She, not [the child], bears the primary responsibility to ensure that [the child] visit with her father according to the parenting plan. And she must, in good faith, make every effort to require [the child] to do so.” (emphases added)). 10 . Because we find this issue is dispositive, we decline to reach Mother’s arguments regarding admitting evidence and limiting cross-examination. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when the resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). Moreover, our decision on those two issues would not change the ultimate disposition of this case. See Weir v. Citicorp Nat. Servs., Inc., 312 S.C. 511, 517, 435 S.E.2d 864, 868 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Recco Tape and Label Co. v. Barfield, 312

    ### Response:
    holding the exclusion of cumulative evidence was not prejudicial error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    agreements because, the district court reasoned, the agreements violate the Assignment of Claims Act (hereinafter the Act), 31 U.S.C. § 3727, which governs the “transfer or assignment of any part of a claim against the United States Government,” id. § 3727(a)(1). This determination was in error. The Act provides, in relevant part, that the assignment of a claim may be made “after a claim is allowed, the amount of the claim is decided, and a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued.” Id. § 3727(b). In effect, the Act serves as a defense that the Government can raise against a claim and not, as the district court’s analysis indicates, an ex ante bar to forming a contingency-fee agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 386 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>); see also Applegate v. United States, 35

    ### Response:
    holding that counsels claim against the government pursuant to a contingencyfee agreement was invalid because it was in violation of the antiassignment act 31 usc  203 predecessor to the assignment of claims act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ing water right to acres put into irrigation within first years of appropriation)). Walton III allowed Walton to irrigate the 30 acres put into irrigation by his predecessors, but found that a delay of 23 years was not appropriation within a reasonable time, for the remaining acreage. Id. The parties generally agree that under Walton III the Court may look to Washington law for guidance in determining whether a non-Lummi has exercised due diligence to perfect a Winters right transferred with the sale of allotted lands. E.g. Lummi Brief, docket no. 718, at 32 (“Washington law provides guidance for a determination of reasonable diligence and suggests that a successor must put water to use within fifteen years of the parcel leaving Indian ownership.”); see also Walton III, 752 F.2d at 400 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff United States suggests that under

    ### Response:
    holding the court may look to state law for guidance where federal law is not fully developed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    193 N.W.2d 744 (1972). Moreover, we determine probable cause by an objective standard of reasonableness: whether the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of crime will be found. See State v. Craven, 253 Neb. 601, 571 N.W.2d 612 (1997). Here, Reilly had probable cause to search the car because of the dog’s alert. A dog’s identification of drugs in luggage or in a car provides probable cause that drugs are present. U.S. v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1994). But a person’s mere proximity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 238 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, probable cause to search a car

    ### Response:
    holding that search warrant for tavern and its bartender did not permit body searches of all bars patrons
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    21, 2011 EEOC Addendum; November 15, 2012 EEOC Charge. Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to the Federal Defendants and her Title VII and ADEA claims fail on this independent basis. See Johnson v. Ashcroft, No. 00-cv-2743, 2001 WL 34366564, at *3 (D.D.C. June 21, 2001) (dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where the plaintiff did “not name either of the federal defendants” in the plaintiffs EEOC complaint). The plaintiffs Complaint also asserts a claim of wrongful discharge related to her termination. Yet, Title VII and the ADEA provide the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging race and age discrimination. See Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 318

    ### Response:
    holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n. 34, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968)(“There is of course no question that the Federal Government, unless barred by some controlling constitutional prohibition, may impose the terms and conditions upon which its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed.”). If Congress imposes a “condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously;” otherwise, the State cannot “voluntarily and knowingly accept[ ] the terms of the ‘contract.’ ” Id. Spending clause legislation, when knowingly accepted by a fund recipient, imposes enforceable, affirmative obligations upon the states. See Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 427, 94 S.Ct. 2274, 41 L.Ed.2d 159 (1974), modified on another ground, 422 U.S. 1004, 95 S.Ct. 2625, 45 L.Ed.2d 667 (1975) (<HOLDING>); King, 392 U.S. at 333, 88 S.Ct. 2128; see

    ### Response:
    recognizing that states and local agencies must fulfill their part of a spending clause contract if they choose to accept the funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which a fair-minded jury could find that intentional racial discrimination on the part of the Defendants caused Andromeda to close. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 434. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count III. VI. Supplemental Jurisdiction The rulings above dispose of Plaintiffs’ federal claims. The state law claims (Counts VI-V) remain. This Court could retain the state law claims only by exercising its supplemental jurisdiction. This case does not, however, present a compelling reason for this Court to decide claims that arise solely under state law. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Counts VI-V. The dismissal is without prejudice so that they may be refilled in state court if Plaintiffs so elect. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Revene v. Charles County Commr’s, 882 F.2d 870, 875 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). VII. Conclusion For the reasons stated

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts order dismissing the pendent statelaw claims  should have been entered without prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    document, commonly referred to as the ""blue seal document,"" stated: I, the Secretary of State, of the State of Maine, certify that the office of the Secretary of State is the legal repository of the Great Seal of the State of Maine and also custodian of the records relating to the revocation, restoration and suspension of operators’ licenses and registrations, and that the paper to which this is attached is a true copy from the records of this office. I further certify that, according to our records the license or right to operate of Morris D. Murphy, whose date of birth is July 9, 1958, was suspended effective September 15, 2008 by the Secretary of State Notice of suspension was sent by regular mail, no later than September 5, 2008 in accordance with the pro 406, 410-11 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Washington v. Kronich, 160 Wash.2d 893, 161

    ### Response:
    holding that the dmv transcript used to prove revocation and notice was nontestimonial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have no right to determine any additional deficiency in respect of the same taxable year, except in the case of fraud, and except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, relating to assertion of greater deficiencies before the Board, or in section 273(c), relating to the making of jeopardy assessments. * * * 6 The cases cited supra pp. 197—198 involve sec. 6212(c) or its predecessor, former sec. 272(f), both of which are textually similar to sec. 6223(f). One notable difference, however, is that sec. 6212(c) and former sec. 272(f) generally prohibit the Commissioner from mailing an additional deficiency notice for a taxable year for which the taxpayer has timely petitioned the Court with respect to a previous deficiency notice. Cf. Gmelin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-338 (<HOLDING>), aff’d without published opinion, 891 F.2d 280

    ### Response:
    holding that former sec 272f does not require that the commissioner wait until the period for filing a petition as to a deficiency notice expires before issuing another deficiency notice as to the same taxable year
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    accepted the scheme of entrant classes from England as adopted common law. The national character is now dominated by a rapid-paced urban and suburban culture. The exigencies of this urban civilization have produced a more ‘gregarious society and have increased the probability that people will enter the property of others. [Recent Developments, Torts — Abrogation of Common-Law Entrant Classes of Trespasser, Licensee, and Invitee, 25 Vand L.Rev. 623, 640 (1972) (footnote omitted).] “Today, the preeminence of land over life is no longer accepted. Human safety may be more important than a landowner’s unre stricted freedom.” Smith, supra, 469 F.2d at 101; see also Michael Sears, Comment, Abrogation of the Traditional Common Law of Premises Liability, 44 U. Kan. L.Rev. 175, 185-86 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Kerrie Restieri-Heslin, Note, 24 Seton Hall

    ### Response:
    recognizing the emergence of the more modern and humanitarian theory of compensation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has established procedures for termination that include elements such as a probationary period, warnings for proscribed conduct, or procedures for employees to air grievances. See Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 424, 427, 773 P.2d 1231, 1234 (1989) (upholding finding of implied contract based on employee manual, words, and conduct of parties); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20, 24-26, 766 P.2d 280, 284-86 (1988) (affirming finding of implied contract based on words and conduct of parties), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109, 109 S.Ct. 3163, 104 L.Ed.2d 1026 (1989); Lukoski v. Sandia Indian Management Co., 106 N.M. 664, 667, 748 P.2d 507-510 (1988) (upholding finding of oral contract amended by employee handbook); Forrester v. Parker, 93 N.M. 781, 782, 606 P.2d 191, 192 (1980) (<HOLDING>). We have upheld findings that there was no

    ### Response:
    holding that when terminating nonprobationary employee employer is bound by policies established in personnel policy guide that control the employeremployee relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not necessarily doom an application for relief under” the CAT. Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003.) To qualify for relief under the CAT, an applicant must establish that it is “more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). As noted above, there is no evidence of past torture inflicted upon Funes, and, while Guatemala’s human rights record remains poor, there is no evidence of “gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights” of the sort that would entitle Funes to CAT relief. The IJ’s finding that it is not more likely than not that Funes would be tortured if removed to Guatemala is supported by substantial evidence. Cf. Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1218-23 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). PETITION DENIED. * This disposition is not

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioner was entitled to cat relief where he had been tortured in the past for speaking out about war country conditions had deteriorated since he fled army had continued to look for him and had engaged in reprisals against his family
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to release a prisoner rests on a myriad of considerations.... The chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause.” Id. The Sandin court took pains to point out that the technical rule violation in that ease was not likely to affect the prisoner’s parole prospects. The appellant in the case at hand has argued that the “technical” violation in this case did, in fact, affect his parole prospects — it terminated those prospects. In Syllabus Point 3 of State v. Farmer, 193 W.Va. 84, 454 S.E.2d 378 (1994), we indicated that “ ‘[ejrrors involving deprivation of constitutional rights will be regarded as harmless only if there is no reasonable possibility that the violation cont th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); In re Shapiro, 122 Cal.Rptr. 768, 14 Cal.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that no prejudice to the defendant arose from a delay in holding his parole revocation hearing twentyfour hours beyond the ninetyday limit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contended for the first time at oral argument (and afterwards in a letter filed under 5th Cir. R. 28(j)) that the district court's determination was tantamount to finding him responsible for (1) the “reasonably foreseeable acts” of co-conspirators under U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3; (2) having “transferred any firearm ... with ... reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6); and (3) having committed first degree murder under § 2A 1.1, without addressing any of those guideline provisions. Because it was not properly briefed on appeal, that argument is waived. NLRB v. Seaport Printing & Ad Specialties, Inc., 589 F.3d 812, 816 n. 7 (5th Cir.2009); see also United States v. Thames, 214 F.3d 608, 611 n. 3 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 14 . See Bell, 371 F.3d at 244 (""Our concerns

    ### Response:
    holding that inadequately briefing an issue constitutes waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cook chose not to present evidence available to him at the suppression hearing, but the issues he raised and were determined there are identical to the issues here. Next, Cook contends the suppression hearing was not a complete, full, and fair litigation of these issues, but was a summary proceeding addressing some immaterial evidentiary issues which likely would have been re-considered had he gone to trial. To the contrary, the constitutional issues in Cook’s criminal proceedings were litigated in an evidentiary hearing at which he was represented by counsel, and had the right and opportunity to testify, present evidence, call and cross-examine witnesses, and appeal the court’s ruling. See 3D Constr. & Dev., L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 117 P.3d 1082, 1087 (Utah App.2005) (<HOLDING>). There is no reason to doubt the quality,

    ### Response:
    holding the completely fully fairly element is met if the party against whom preclusion is sought had adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on statutory grounds ""to avoid constitutional issues.”)). The United States has represented that Jane Doe will testify at trial, and the Confrontation Clause will not bar admission of the statements, even if they are testimonial, so long as Wilson has an opportunity to cross-examine Jane Doe regarding them. The Court has no reason to believe that the United States will not be true to that representation. So long as the United States remains true to that representation and Jane Doe testifies, there is no constitutional reason to prohibit admission of the statements. It may be that Doe’s statements to Dr. Ornelas, which were part of a medical examination, were ""made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment, rather than to inculpate” Chaco. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 755 (9th Cir.2009)(<HOLDING>). On the record before it, however, the Court

    ### Response:
    holding that the state courts conclusion that statements to dr appleton were nontestimonial because they were made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment rather than to inculpate was not an unreasonable application of the legal principle established by crawford 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Here, Plaintiffs are the nonmoving party. II. DISCUSSION Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ consolidated, amended complaint on several grounds, the first of which is that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Section 13 of the 1933 Securities Act provides that a federal securities fraud action must be brought within one year following the discovery of the untrue statement or omission giving rise to the claim. 15 U.S.C. § 77m; see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1228 & n.

    ### Response:
    holding that actions asserting claims based on  10b and rule 10b5 must be initiated within a year of discovering the facts establishing the violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of state. The proposed class therefore lacks the geographic diversity that favors a finding of numerosity. Finally, the Plaintiffs have not established that all fifty potential plaintiffs were deprived of compensation and would be able to participate in the litigation. Despite these concerns, case law demonstrates that plaintiffs may establish that join-der would be impracticable with as few as fifty members. See In re Thornburg Mortg. Inc. Sec. Litig., 912 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1234 (D.N.M.2012) (Browning, J.)(citing Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d at 936 (“[T]he difficulty in joining as few as 40 class members should raise a presumption that joinder is impracticable.”)); Lopez v. City of Santa Fe, 206 F.R.D. at 289 (citing Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 136 F.R.D. 672, 679 (D.Kan.1991) (<HOLDING>)). The Court has not refused to certify a class

    ### Response:
    holding that joinder is impracticable where the class consisted of at least fifty members
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Defendant Phillip Davis pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and the district court sentenced him to 120 months of imprisonment. The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in designating Davis as a “career offender” pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1 in light of Johnson v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (invalidating as unconstitutionally vague the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). For the reasons set forth in our recent decision in United States v. Pawlak, No. 15-3566, slip op. at 2-13, 822 F.3d 902, 903-11, 2016 WL 2802723 (6th Cir. May 13, 2016) (<HOLDING>), and upon the government’s concession of

    ### Response:
    holding an identical residual clause in the us sentencing guidelines unconstitutionally vague
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    point out that ERISA contains a savings clause. Id. at 398. “Specifically, the savings clause provides that ERISA’s preemption provision ‘shall not be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States.’ ” /¿.(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)(1998)). The Court then cited Gurry’s analysis with approval for the proposition that nothing in § 34-34 conflicts with ERISA. Id. at 399. Judge Payne recognized that the Bankruptcy Code explicitly contemplated that “state laws have a central role in defining applicable exemptions to be made in protecting property of the estate from the reach of lding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). See also In re Weinhoeft, 275 F.3d 604, 605

    ### Response:
    holding texas exemption law was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the sole reason that they refused to perform an illegal act. Tennessee common law, however, only requires a showing that the employee’s refusal to perform an illegal act was a substantial factor in the employer’s decision. 3.Most Significant Relationship Test Texas courts resolve conflicts of law in tort claims by applying the “most significant relationship” test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318-19 (Texas 1979) (“[I]t is the holding of this court that in the future all conflicts cases sounding in tort will be governed by the ‘most significant relationship’ test as enunciated in Sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts.”); see also Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez, 365 S.W.3d 655, 661 (Tex.2012) (<HOLDING>). Section 6 states: (1) A court, subject to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a texas common law claim for retaliatory discharge is a claim sounding in tort
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    might hurt you? A. From him. From him hurting my mom. Q. Your mom told you about that, didn’t she? A. No. I was there. As indicated above, the definition of domestic abuse includes “the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm or bodily injury.” SDCL 25-10-1(1). Whether Erica’s fear was irrational, as the trial court concluded, must be analyzed in light of her knowledge of her father’s violent history: [The victim’s] state of mind could very well have been the product, in part at least, of her past interactions with appellant. The fear she claimed to have felt and the reasonableness of that fear could and should be determined with reference to her history with appellant. Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, 82 Ohio App.3d 809, 613 N.E.2d 678, 682 (1992); see also Gordon, 553 N.E.2d at 921 (<HOLDING>). [¶ 21] To ignore Kevin’s violent history is

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of prior confrontations was relevant as to whether victims fear was reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not burden the rights of private parties. Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 804 (Fed.Cir.2002) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483). The Supreme Court's opinion in Landgraf stresses repeatedly the concern that private rights not be retroactively burdened. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (""[ejlementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly” (emphasis added)), 282 (”[t]he introduction of a right to compensatory damages is also the type of legal change that would have an impact on private parties’ planning” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 266, 271, 272, 284, 114 S.Ct. 1483. 4 . See supra note 1. 5 . Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 308, 313 (1991) (<HOLDING>). 6 . See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104(b), 7105(c), 7266;

    ### Response:
    holding that where the law or regulation changes after a claim has been filed or reopened but before the administrative or judicial appeal process has been concluded the version more favorable to the appellant should  apply unless congress provided otherwise or permitted the secretary to do otherwise and the secretary did so emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 4th 135, 140, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 333 (2004) (citing Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 967, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 45 P.3d 243 (2002)). Typically, commercial speech is “speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” Rezec, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 141, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 333 (internal citations omitted). The Court finds that the assurances made by RCHSD’s staff do not constitute commercial speech. However, because Ms. Prescott has sufficiently alleged a UCL claim, based on the alleged misrepresentations on RCHSD’s website, RCHSD’s motion to dismiss her UCL claim is denied. ii. Standing on Behalf of Decedent Ms. Prescott has standing, as an individual representative, to bring k “UCR” Rates Litig., 903 F.Supp.2d 880, 898 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (<HOLDING>). Here, as to the fraudulent prong of the UCL,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs could only pursue ucl claims via assignment if they satisfied class action requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ass’n, 76 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex.App.2002) (stating that “[t]he phrase ‘unless otherwise provided’ or similar language, when used in a statute, usually refers to other statutes pertaining to the same subject matter” (reversed in part on other grounds, 141 S.W.3d 158 (Tex.2004))); Cook v. Turner, 219 Conn. 641, 644, 593 A.2d 504, 505 (1991) (concluding that the word “law” in the phrase “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by law” is “limited to state and federal statutes”); Oregon County R-IV Sch. Dist. v. LeMon, 739 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Mo.Ct.App.1987) (stating that “ ‘ “except as otherwise provided by law,” means except as otherwise provided by statute’ ” (quoting Yates v. Casteel, 329 Mo. 1101, 1104, 49 S.W.2d 68, 69 (1932))); Manchin v. Browning, 170 W.Va. 779, 785, 296 S.E.2d 909, 915 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Trujillo v. Tanuz, 85 N.M. 35, 40, 508 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the phrase provided by law means prescribed or provided by statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tatarinov did not contest that fact, the Oregon Court of Appeals declined to correct the error. Id. at 81. Tatarinov sought habeas relief in federal court, but the district court denied his petition. The adequate and independent state ground doctrine bars federal courts from considering a federal constitutional argument on habeas review if “a state court declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected Ta-tarinov’s claim based on its consideration of the equitable interests of the parties in his case, which is independent of federal law. See Nitschke v. Belleque, 680 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). The Oregon plain error rule is also an

    ### Response:
    holding that oregons plain error review is independent of state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, but refused to do so because it interpreted the Guidelines to prohibit a departure where, as here, the crime involved actual violence. Because the district court rested its decision on an issue of law, this court has jurisdiction to review its decision, and its decision is subject to de novo review. Section 5K2.13 states that “the court may not depart below the applicable guideline range if ... (2) the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s offense indicate a need to protect the public because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 (1998) (emphasis added). The Guidelines thus prohibit departure where the offense involved actual violence. Accord United States v. Thames, 214 F.3d 608, 614 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The district court looked at all the

    ### Response:
    holding that under  5k213 no departure may be given where the crime was violent in nature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were sentenced, the amended VWPA thus had the potential to increase the amount of restitution they would have to pay, from an amount set by the court by taking into account appellants’ financial circumstances, to full restitution. Accordingly, if the court determines that the VWPA should apply to this case, it must use the old version to avoid running afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See United States v. Thompson, 113 F.3d 13, 15 n. 1 (2d Cir.1997) (dictum). Baggett, 125 F.3d at 1322. Accord, United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320, 1327 n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1997); Williams, 128 F.3d at 1241; United States v. Thompson, 113 F.3d 13, 15 n. 1 (2nd Cir.1997); United States v. Sclafani, 996 F.Supp. 400, 403-04 (D.N.J.1998). But see, United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). We are persuaded by the analysis adopted in

    ### Response:
    holding that retroactive application of mvra does not violate the ex post facto clause because restitution is not a criminal punishment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is directed exclusively at whether notice was given by the uncertified, putative class. Because there is no case or controversy between the Oil Companies and the named appellants over this issue, the district court had no authority to reach this issue before ruling on certification. Nevertheless, despite this apparent flaw in the district court’s order, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that we lack the authority to vacate the ruling because there is no appealable order before us. 1 . Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir.2002). 2 . Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. 3 . Id. 4 . Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. 6 . See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 874 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Scott v. Maggio, 695 F.2d 916,

    ### Response:
    holding that justiciability must be analyzed separately on the issues of money damages and the propriety of equitable relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of fault is analogous to principles of comparative negligence, which have been held to be substantive. See Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir.1970) (recognizing that “that the Mississippi comparative negligence statute, ‘is part of the substantive law of Mississippi’”) (citations omitted). The Mississippi Supreme Court similarly considers the right to contribution among tortfeasors to be substantive. Estate of Hunter v. GMC, 729 So.2d 1264, 1276 (Miss.1999). Furthermore, courts from other states consistently hold that laws on apportionment of fault are substantive, not merely procedural. See, e.g., Matter of Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz Off Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1992 A.M.C. 913, 35 Fed.R.Evid. Serv. 1204, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 20835 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Clawans v. United States, 75 F.Supp.2d 368,

    ### Response:
    holding that question of whether defendant tortfeasors were entitled to reduction in plaintiffs claims by amount of alleged nonparty tortfeasors responsibility was one of substantive law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Harmon, 742 F.3d 451, 459 (10th Cir.2014) (discussing Giglio rule). 2 . The defendants’ summary judgment briefs did contain some passing references to immunity. They argued that they did not lose the absolute immunity connected with the fulfillment of their duties under Giglio merely because third parties disseminated the Giglio materials to the police chiefs, the newspaper, and the website. The district court never reached this argument, because it found sufficient evidence that it was the defendants themselves who disseminated the materials to the police chiefs and the newspaper. We lack appellate jurisdiction to resolve a dispute concerning this factual finding in a qualified immunity appeal. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (<HOLDING>). To the extent we may reach factual issues in

    ### Response:
    holding district courts determination that summary judgment record raised genuine issue of fact concerning petitioners involvement in unconstitutional conduct did not constitute appealable final decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if the producer intends it to be used for that disease or condition. FDA responds that “for such disease or condition” refers only to the uses included on a drug’s label. The statute does not unambiguously foreclose FDA’s interpretation. Because Congress has not “directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” we must determine whether the agency’s interpretation is “a permissible construction” of the Orphan Drug Act. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); see also Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying Chevron). We conclude that it is. First, FDA’s reading of the statute closely hews to the text. See Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). As the Fourth Circuit reasoned in Sigma-Tau

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the reasonableness of an agencys interpretation turns in part on the constructions fit with the statutory language
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indirect criminal contempt proceedings must not only notify the alleged contemnor that sanctions are being sought, but that the proceedings will be criminal in nature. In re Marriage of Morse, 240 Ill. App. 3d 296, 304, 607 N.E.2d 632, 638 (1993), citing In re Marriage of Alltop, 203 Ill. App. 3d 606, 616, 561 N.E.2d 394, 400-01 (1990), and Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 58-59, 558 N.E.2d at 425. Thus, indirect criminal contempt proceedings cannot be initiated by a pleading captioned so as to imply that the proceedings will not be criminal. Instead, a party seeking a finding of indirect criminal contempt must say so explicitly by filing a pleading captioned “petition for adjudication of criminal contempt.” In re Marriage of Carpel, 232 Ill. App. 3d 806, 823, 597 N.E.2d 847, 860 (1992) (<HOLDING>). As with any other criminal defendant, an

    ### Response:
    holding that pleading captioned petition for rule to show cause implies that proceedings will be civil because a criminal defendant can never be compelled to show cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    over Plaintiffs claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1340, 1346(a)(1) or 26 U.S.C. §§ 6330, 7429. 2. The United States Court of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over Tort Claims. The Complaint alleges numerous claims of fraud, including “mail fraud,” “constructive fraud,” “misrepresentation of material facts” and “conspiracy to defraud.” See Compl. at 1. These claims, however, sound in tort. The United States Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction does not extend to cases sounding in tort. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (“[t]he United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim ... for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” (emphasis added)); see also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Jurisdiction to hear such claims exclusively

    ### Response:
    holding that the united states court of federal claims lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort including fraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at 311 n. 16. Plaintiff’s claims herein were of such a nature. 183 . Rule 41(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a district court to dismiss a case when the plaintiff fails to prosecute his case. Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 771 (5th Cir.1997), (habeas corpus action); Dorsey v. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., 84 F.3d 170, 171 (5th Cir.1996), quoting Salinas v. Sun Oil Co., 819 F.2d 105, 106 (5th Cir.1987). The court may dismiss for want of prosecution either on a motion of a defendant or sua sponte when the court determines dismissal is necessary to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388-89, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); Clofer v. Perego, 106 F.3d 678, 679 (5th Cir.1997), (<HOLDING>); Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d at 771; Long v.

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts possess the inherent authority to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute with or sans notice to the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Communications Act The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) prohibits “intentionally accessing without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided,” and thereby obtaining access to an “electronic communication while it is in electronic storage.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). It also provides for the recovery of civil damages by a person aggrieved by a violation of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a). Rene alleges that the Defendants violated the SCA when they accessed her email messages. The Defendants contend that any email messages viewed by them were not in “electronic storage,” and, as a result, do not fall within the protections of the statute. “Electronic storage” is defined as “any temporary, intermediate storage .Supp.2d 965, 987 (C.D.Cal.2010) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Weaver, 636 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that webmail messages opened and retained by the user absent a showing that the webmail service was archiving copies for backup purposes were not within the definition of electronic storage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he has refunded or paid restitution within twelve (12) months from the date of this Order to: A. Thomas Dunn in the sum of $1,105.76, plus interest at the statutory rate from January 31, 1999; B. The McCarthys in the sum of $1,176.00, plus interest at the statutory rate from January 31, 2000. 8. Rishel is Ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings; the People shall subrait a Statement of Costs within ten (10) days of the date of this Order. Respondent shall have five (5) days thereafter to submit a response thereto. 1 . At the time of this proceeding Rishel was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day pursuant to the sanction imposed by the Supreme Court in People v. Rishel, 956 P.2d 542 (Colo.1998). See In re C de Baca, 11 P.3d 426, 430 (Colo.2000)(<HOLDING>). 2 . C.R.C.P. 251.5 provides that misconduct

    ### Response:
    holding that a suspended lawyer remains subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the court for acts committed while suspended
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the court’s approval, that certain information and documents exchanged during discovery and throughout the proceedings shall be deemed confidential. This confidential material would be excluded from public inspection and may only be made available to specific persons directly involved with the case. Having examined the submissions, the motion for a protective order is DENIED without prejudice. The court recognizes the parties’ concern in keeping particular information confidential due to the sensitive nature of items such as trade secrets and customer lists. Nevertheless, the court is also required to balance that concern with that of the general rule of open, public proceedings within the United States court system. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Due to the significant nature of this issue,

    ### Response:
    recognizing a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents including judicial records and documents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of immunity.” Lymon v. Aramark Corp., 728 F.Supp.2d at 1251. Accord Barreras v. State of N.M. Corr. Dep’t, 133 N.M. 313, 319, 62 P.3d 770, 776 (Ct.App.2003) (“In the absence of affirmative legislation, the courts of this state have consistently declined to permit individuals to bring private lawsuits to enforce rights guaranteed by the New Mexico Constitution, based on the absence of an express waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act.”); Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, 124 N.M. 479, 482, 952 P.2d 474, 477 (Ct.App.1997) (noting that a plaintiff cannot seek damages for violations of rights under the New Mexico Constitution against a city or its employees or agents unless the NMTCA waives immunity); Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 106 N.M. 446, 449, 744 P.2d 919, 922 (CtApp. 1987) (<HOLDING>); Begay v. State, 104 N.M. at 488, 723 P.2d at

    ### Response:
    holding that no waiver of immunity exists for damages arising out of alleged educational malpractice claim against a school board
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    particular address at which service was attempted; therefore, there was no evidence indicating that the mother’s house was the defendant’s “dwelling house or usual place of abode.” Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller’s treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure discusses “dwelling house or usual place of abode” as follows: “The language ‘dwelling house or usual place of abode’ in Rule 4(e)(2) is taken directly from the former Equity Rule 13. Despite the length of time these words have been a part of federal practice, the judicial decisions do not rticular case. Courts evaluate those facts mindful that the purpose of Rule 4 is to ensure that service is reasonably calculated to provide a defendant with actual notice of the action. Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666 (4th Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that service was proper where a copy of the summons and complaint was left with the defendants wife at the defendants maryland house in which the defendant had lived before moving ahead of his family to arizona where he had purchased a house intending never to return to maryland and to move his family to arizona noting that the service was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of service at the defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode where the service succeeded in actually apprising him of the lawsuit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    substances may have been marijuana being, used in a criminal enterprise in which the marijuana was delivered in amounts of less than one-fourth of an ounce, which would not constitute a felony offense. Considering the evidence, in the light most favorable to the challenged finding, indulging every reasonable inference that would support it, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not, the trial evidence would not enable reasonable and fair-minded people to find that the money is contraband under the charge submitted to the jury. Therefore, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that the seized money is contraband. 1 . See Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex.2000) (<HOLDING>); Hirschfeld Steel Co. v. Kellogg Brown & Root,

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate court could not review the sufficiency of the evidence  based on a particular legal standard because that standard was not submitted to the jury and no party objected to the charge on this ground or requested that the jury be charged using this standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    re Marc Antoine Fenelon, No. A038 921 625 (B.I.A. Jan. 14, 2016), aff'g No. A038 921 625 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 14, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. We have reviewed the decisions of both the IJ and BIA “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). Despite Fenelon’s assertions otherwise, we lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a controlled substance offense. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); Ortiz-Franco v. Holder, 782 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we retain jurisdiction to

    ### Response:
    holding that the jurisdictional bar applies to the denial of deferral of removal under the cat
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    26-acre tract. 10 . If anything, Rubarts may lend support to an estoppel defense by the Dearings. See 896 F.2d at 112. The Dearings assert that Perry is estopped from asserting his homestead rights to the 26-acre tract the first time in their reply brief to this court. Because ""an appellant’s original brief abandons all points not mentioned therein,” and the argument has not been fairly presented to the bankruptcy court, we decline to consider this new argument. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 905 F.2d 840, 854 (5th Cir.1990)(quoting Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 1530, 1539 n. 14 (5th Cir.1984)). Accord City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 661 n. 1 (5th Cir.2003). 11 . See White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310, 313, 45 S.Ct. 103, 69 L.Ed. 301 (1924)(<HOLDING>). 12 . The affidavit itself does not contain

    ### Response:
    holding that the right of the debtor to claim property as exempt is generally determined on the facts as they exist on the date of the filing of the petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    justified on balance, we emphasize that their appraisal of Bar-tell’s mental disabilities was an insufficient predicate for abrogating her parental rights. Specifically, both the district court and Defendants place significant credence on Dr. Van Goethem’s evaluation of Bar-tell’s “limited” intelligence level, see Bartell, 12 F.Supp.2d at 648, which is purportedly manifested by her low verbal IQ test score. While critical thinking and reasoning skills are undoubtedly relevant, at some level, to the ability of a parent to raise her child, the State must make a specific and tangible showing, not a presumptive one, on the precise nature of the links between these capacities and a particular child’s needs. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Dr. Van Goethem’s report is

    ### Response:
    holding that narrowtailoring requires a state to act with precision and to use the least restrictive means of achieving its compelling interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    law only. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (“We conclude that Young ... [is] inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law.”). Moreover, Acting Commissioner Mauriello is merely a co-defendant along with NJ DEP. Nothing about this suit suggests that it is aimed a Mauriello’s actions, apart from NJ DEP itself. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic- Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 506 (3d Cir.2001) (“Young does not apply if, although the action is nominally against individual officers, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and the suit in fact is against the state.”) (citing Pennhurst); see also Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 64 S.Ct. 873, 88 L.Ed. 1121 (1944) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Ex Parte Young does not apply. (2) Nor

    ### Response:
    holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and operators at the time of release are responsible parties regardless of who caused the release of hazardous substances. New York v. Nat’l Servs. Indus. Inc., 352 F.3d 682, 684 (2d Cir.2003); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044. The term “operator” in the case of a facility means: “any person who :.. operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). Under CERCLA, “any person who operates a polluting facility is directly liable for the costs of cleaning up the pollution.” U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 65, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 1886, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). “This is so regardless of whether that person is the facility’s owner, the owner’s parent corporation or business partner, or even a saboteur who sne 854, 854 (D.Del.1989) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Plaintiffs argue that the Fire

    ### Response:
    holding that a states regulation of a hazardous waste site did not make it an operator of the site
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the armed robberies were offenses “occurring on occasions different from one another” using Shepard-approved materials. “We review de novo whether crimes were committed on occasions different from one another within the meaning of the ACCA.” Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1261. II- McCloud contends that the Government failed to meet its burden of proof because the Shepard documents do not state the time and location of his prior convictions,' or otherwise indicate that the offenses were “temporally distinct.” See id.; Almedina, 686 F.3d at 1315. The Shepard documents in this case include the charging documents for each armed' robbery, the transcript of the plea colloquy, and undisputed statements in the PSI. McCloud’s arrest affidavits are not Shepard documents. See Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1383 (<HOLDING>); of United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 676 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that courts may not use police reports to determine whether predicate offenses under  924e1 were committed on occasions different from one another 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    body language would not be improper — was also reasonable. See Burks, 27 F.3d at 1429 & n. 3 (noting that trial counsel’s evaluation of a potential juror’s demeanor, tone, and facial expressions may lead to a ""hunch” or ""suspicion"" that the juror might be biased, and that a peremptory challenge based on this reason would be legitimate); United States v. Power, 881 F.2d 733, 740 (9th Cir.1989) (accepting as legitimate the government's explanation that a juror’s ""fidgeting and looking around as he sat in the jury box ... made the prosecutor believe that the individual would not be an attentive juror”). 12 . Although Collins does not challenge the prosecutor's strike against Juror 019, this strike is relevant to Collins’ Batson challenge. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted); Purkett,

    ### Response:
    holding that a prosecutors motive may often be inferred from the totality of relevant facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we must now determine whether Stebner was prejudiced sufficiently enough to render the jury’s verdict manifestly unjust. See Erickson, 175 Mont. at 91, 572 P.2d at 520. ¶21 We agree with Alside that Stebner was not prejudiced by Juror Schneider’s comment regarding her research and subsequent understanding of the term “preponderance.” The comment did not affect the verdict because the jurors had already voted eleven to one in favor of Alside when the comment was made. Also, two jurors testified that they based their vote on the evidence, not on Juror Schneider’s comment. Three jurors testified that they based their vote on the evidence presented at trial. Moreover, no new information was presented on the definition of “preponderance.” See Erickson, 175 Mont. at 92, 572 P.2d at 520 (<HOLDING>). According to the affidavits, the internet

    ### Response:
    holding no prejudice occurred because no new information was presented on the material matter in dispute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims cannot be procedurally barred and thus may always be raised for the first time on post-conviction. See Stiles v. State, 902 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Okl.Cr. 1995). 13 . Sellers v. State, 889 P.2d 895, 897-98 (Okl.Cr. 1995); Castro v. State, 880 P.2d at 388; Mann v. State, 856 P.2d 992, 994 (Okl.Cr. 1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1869, 128 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994); Nguyen v. State, 844 P.2d 176, 178 (Okl.Cr.1992), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 3006, 125 L.Ed.2d 697 (1993). 14 . 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The United States Supreme Court has not specifically set forth a standard by which to assess the effectiveness of appellate counsel. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 392, 105 S.Ct. 830, 833, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) (<HOLDING>). However, this Court has applied the

    ### Response:
    holding that the due process clause requires that criminal defendants be provided the effective assistance of counsel on their first appeal of right but declining to devise the means by which to define the appropriate standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    resolve the question of whether a confession, the voluntariness of which has been fully and finally litigated in prior proceedings, precludes a convicted person from subsequently presenting a prima faeie case that exculpatory results obtained from DNA testing of items of evidence would establish his or her actual innocence, requires us to interpret the relevant language of Section 9543.1. Because statutory interpretation is a matter of law, our standard' of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. McClintic, 589 Pa. 465, 472, 909 A.2d 1241, 1245 (2006). Consequently, we are not bound by the lower court’s conclusions regarding the proper meaning of the applicable provisions of this statute. See Commonwealth v. Kyle, 582 Pa. 624, 632, 874 A.2d 12, 17 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Our review is further governed by the

    ### Response:
    holding that our court owes no duty of deference to the legal conclusions of lower courts regarding an issue of statutory construction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    term would run concurrently with the pending state sentence. But when later asked whether the sentences should run concurrently, the federal sentencing judge indicated that they should not. The BOP subsequently denied NPT concurrent sentencing designation. Mr. Thomas argues, however, that the sentences should run concurrently because that is what he agreed to in his state plea agreement. But as we recently explained in a factually similar case, “[although [Mr. Thomas’s] state sentence provides for concurrent service of the federal and state sentences, the state court’s decision cannot alter the federal-court sentence,” which runs consecutively to, not concurrently with, the state sentence. United States v. Eccleston, 521 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir.) (citing Bloomgren, 948 F.2d at 691) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 430, 172

    ### Response:
    holding that whether a defendants federal sentence would run consecutively to his state sentence is a federal matter which cannot be overridden by a state court provision for concurrent sentencing on a subsequentlyobtained state conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    102, 104 (1888). The Iowa Supreme Court similarly held “that the communication by a husband of a venereal disease to his wife, knowingly, is good and sufficient cause for a divorce, and is cruelty of the most flagrant kind.” Holmes v. Holmes, 186 Iowa 336, 170 N.W. 793, 794 (1919). The Maryland Court of Appeals held that “if a spouse, although knowing he or she is afflicted with a venereal disease, yet continues to maintain sexual relations and communicates the disease to the other spouse, such action constitutes extreme cruelty.” Kline v. Kline, 179 Md. 10, 16 A.2d 924, 925 (1940). And the Supreme Court of holding that knowing communication of an STD to a wife was “extreme cruelty” and grounds for divorce); Cadle v. Cadle, 28 Tenn.App. 498, 191 S.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Tenri.Ct.App.1945) (<HOLDING>). While the most recent of the above-cited

    ### Response:
    holding that communication of a venereal disease would constitute cruel and inhuman treatment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the elements of a cause of action.’ ” Id. (quoting Coody v. A.H. Robins Co., 696 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, writ dism’d by agr.)); Reynolds v. Guido, 166 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied). When asserting a limitations defense at the pleading stage, the defendant’s burden to establish the accrual date includes negating the applicability of the discovery rule. Doe v. L cognizing a two-year statute of limitations for DTPA and negligence claims under Texas law). The Texas statute of limitations for fraud and breach of contract claims is four years. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.004(a)(4) (Vernon 2002) (fraud); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.051 (Vernon 2008) (breach of contract); Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463, 468 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 592

    ### Response:
    recognizing a fouryear statute of limitation for fraud claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    occurs prior to the fraud. The alleged fraud must be prior to or contemporaneous with the securities transaction in question.” Perez-Rubio v. Wyck-off, 718 F.Supp. 217, 236 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (cited in Dietrich v. Bauer, 76 F.Supp.2d 312, 342 (S.D.N.Y.1999)). The fraud alleged by plaintiffs dates back to the first day of the relevant class period, February 19, 1998. Plaintiffs allege a continuous fraudulent scheme by defendants, and not that defendants only engaged in fraudulent acts when they announced in their February 1999 press release that the IPR & D figures for the acquisition of Rosetta and Sense8 were going to have to be changed. Further, the Supreme Court has approved of the “fraud on the market theory.” Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-50, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs impliedly allege that they relied

    ### Response:
    holding reliance is still an element of a 10b5 action and that the fraud on the market theory subject to rebuttal is applicable to meet the reliance element in securities fraud cases where corporations make materially misleading statements in an impersonal and efficient market
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim or might motivate the court of appeals to raise such a claim on its own. In summary, under the circumstances, the court of appeals ought to have addressed the preservation issue urged in the State’s motion for rehearing. This case involves a serious question about whether error was in fact preserved under common, everyday notions of procedural default. This Court should either remand the case to the court of appeals to consider the issue or it should consider the preservation issue on discretionary review. I respectfully dissent to the Court’s decision to dismiss this petition as improvidently granted. 1 . 791 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). 2 . Jones v. State, 942 S.W.2d 1, 2 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); see also Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 151 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>) and Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 199 n. 4

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion for rehearing regarding a preservation of error issue was an appropriate vehicle to force appellate courts to observe their systemic requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a motion to reopen and review de novo claims of due process violations including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir.2005). Jurisdiction is proper under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review. The BIA has established several procedural requirements for aliens seeking to reopen their removal proceedings based on a claim that they were denied due process because of the ineffective assistance of their attorney. See Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639. Petitioners concede that they did not satisfy the hozada requirements, but argue that compliance is unnecessary because their former counsel’s ineffectiveness is obvious on the face of the record. See Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525-26 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). To demonstrate ineffective assistance of

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to comply with the hozada requirements is not fatal where the alleged ineffective assistance is plain on the face of the administrative record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the Guidelines defines sophisticated means as “especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C), n. 8. Here, the record shows that Regensberg conducted a complex and sophisticated scheme, including the creation of fraudulent loan documents, detailed reporting of fake earnings, use of Ponzi scheme payments to lull his investors, and alteration of an account statement to make it appear as if he had not lost his investors’ money. See United States v. Jackson, 346 F.3d 22, 25 (2d Cir.2003) (“[Ejven if each step in the scheme was not elaborate, the total scheme was sophisticated in the way all the steps were linked together....”); United States v. Lewis, 93 F.3d 1075, 1083 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). As in Lewis, Regensberg’s offense conduct,

    ### Response:
    holding in tax case that the sophisticated means enhancement applied even when each step in the planned tax evasion was simple because when viewed together the steps comprised a plan more complex than merely filling out a false tax return
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and her statements were further corroborated by her mother [and other witnesses].”). 15 Harper v. Barge Air Conditioning, Inc., 313 Ga. App. 474, 475 (1) (722 SE2d 84) (2011) (punctuation omitted); see also OCGA§ 15-12-134. 16 Wood v. B &S Enters., Inc., 314 Ga. App. 128, 133 (4) (723 SE2d 443) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 17 Harper, 313 Ga. App. at 475 (1) (punctuation o 879, 884 (3) (694 SE2d 707) (2010) (“It is well settled that the permissible range of the state’s closing argument is very wide.”). 23 Id. (punctuation omitted). 24 Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 346 (16) (c) (687 SE2d 438) (2009). 25 The examining physician testified it is not unusual to observe a lack of injuries when oral sodomy and digital penetration are alleged. 26 See Arrington, 286 Ga. at 346 (16) (c) (<HOLDING>). 27 Pearson v. State, 277 Ga. 813, 815 (3)

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants claim that state engaged in burdenshifting was without merit when state argued that defendant had not rebutted evidence and trial court instructed jury as to burden of proof
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    substantial rights were not affected. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1423, 1433 n. 4, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (noting that where the affected rights relate to sentencing, the outcome a defendant must show to have been affected is his sentence). Therefore, the district court did not err by finding that the government did not breach the plea agreement, and we affirm. AFFIRMED. 1 . Melendez-Baez also mentions that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motions to continue his sentencing hearing or to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. However, because Melendez-Baez failed to devote a discrete section of his brief addressing these arguments, he has abandoned them on appeal. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1284 n. 8 (11th Cir.2003)

    ### Response:
    holding an issue abandoned in a counseled case where although the defendant made passing references to issues in his brief he did not devote a discrete section of his brief to the argument and the references were undertaken as background to claims that he had expressly advanced
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    partially closed to the public. They argue further that the denial of their 10(e) motion prevents them from having a complete record to be able to brief this court on the closure issue. We disagree. As the district court correctly observed, Rule 10(e) is a mechanism by which the court can “correct omissions from or misstatements in the record for appeal.” Order at 2, Aug. 26, 2011, ECF No. 557 (citing S & E Shipping Corp. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 678 F.2d 636, 641 (6th Cir.1982)). The Rule does not, however, “allow the court to add to the record on appeal matters that might have been but were not placed before it in the course of the proceedings.... ” United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 336 (7th Cir.1986); see also Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870, 875 (10th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the district court denied the

    ### Response:
    holding that 10e motion to supplement the record must be denied where appellant knew of but failed to introduce the relevant evidence at trial because rule 10e does not grant a license to build a new record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not attempt to extract promises by jurors, but was instead attempting to ascertain whether they could impose the death penalty if they found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The questions were relevant to determine whether the jurors could impose the death penalty, to uncover bias or prejudice, and to assist both parties in exercising their peremptory challenges. {20} “[T]he district court has discretion in determining how voir dire should be conducted and reversal is available only where the discretion is abused.” Trujillo, 99 N.M. at 252, 657 P.2d at 108. Because this questioning did not commit jurors to return a death sentence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to question 1068, 1073-74 (1988) (<HOLDING>). 4. The State’s Peremptory Challenges {21}

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not err by allowing the prosecution to question prospective jurors regarding their ability to announce a death sentence in an appropriate case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    full search of automobile incident to citation for speeding since ""[n]o further evidence of excessive speeding] was going to be found” once vehicle was stopped and citation issued). 22 . Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243. 23 . United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993). 24 . Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 837, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). 25 . United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-86, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). 26 . Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 64 (citing Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685-86, 105 S.Ct. at 1575 (rejecting a per se rule that a twenty-minute detention was too long under the circumstances)). 27 . United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 432 (5th Cir.2001). 28 . Id.; see United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542-43 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); People v. Cox, 202 Ill.2d 462, 270 Ill.Dec.

    ### Response:
    holding that prolonged detention beyond time necessary to write citation was unreasonable absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    C. Defendant’s timely assertion of his right to a speedy trial ¶47. Bateman filed a demand for a speedy trial on February 3, 2010, two days after his arraignment, and 310 days after his arrest. Therefore, Bateman claims that this factor should weigh in his favor. ¶ 48. “Although it is the State’s duty to ensure that the defendant receives a speedy trial, a defendant has some responsibility to assert this right.” Taylor, 672 So.2d at 1261. “[F]ailure to assert this right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. This Court has held that this factor weighs against a defendant who waits a significant amount of time after arrest to demand a speedy trial. C.f., Noe v. State, 616 So.2d 298, 301 (Miss.1993) (<HOLDING>); Wall v. State, 718 So.2d 1107, 1113

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants failure to assert his right to a speedy trial until one year after his arrest weighed heavily against him under this barker factor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which was issued against Moore for possession of a controlled dangerous substance. The Warrant was apparently based on the detective’s observation of the substance in the jacket Moore had been seen wearing. Some time after Moore’s arrest, the substance found in Moore’s jacket tested negative for a controlled dangerous substance. A New Jersey Grand Jury voted no-bill against Moore for conspiracy, burglary, theft, and receiving stolen property. With regard to the second Warrant, Moore was found not guilty on a down-graded charge for failure to make lawful disposition of a controlled substance. Six months later Moore filed a complaint alleging various causes of action against several defen dants. Only Moore’s claim for malicious prosecution was allowed to proceed. The parties Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also LAR 3.4. Having concluded that

    ### Response:
    holding court had jurisdiction where the appellant filed a motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees which evidenced an intent to appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ill. App. 3d at 396-97. The trial court ruled that the real reason that the officers went to the defendant’s home was to look for marijuana and that the theft investigation was just a ruse. This court agreed and also agreed that the officers’ misrepresentation was so unfair that it rendered the defendant’s consent invalid. Daugherty, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 400. We stated: “Where, as here, the law enforcement officer without a warrant uses his official position of authority and falsely claims that he has legitimate police business to cond 991) (finding consent invalid where the police officers misrepresented that, if the defendant would not consent to a search of his yacht, they could seize the yacht while they obtained a search warrant); People v. Bailey, 273 Ill. App. 3d 431, 437 (1995) (<HOLDING>); People v. Cardenas, 237 Ill. App. 3d 584,

    ### Response:
    holding that consent was invalid where the defendant initially refused request for search and officers made unsupportable legal threat to detain the defendants bag
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    solicitation. Even an unsophisticated consumer would understand that no call is placed unless the caller wishes to transmit a message, and the adjective “important” conveys no substantive information about that message. See Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051, 1055 (8th Cir.2002) (applying an objective “unsophisticated consumer test” when determining whether a debt collector’s practices are deceptive or misleading in violation of the FDCPA). The Court concludes that the messages left by JCC on Zortman’s voice-mail do not constitute “communications” with a person other than the consumer. ■ The FDCPA recognizes that debt collection is a legitimate commercial activity. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e); Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 318-19 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). The Act further recognizes that debt

    ### Response:
    recognizing that part of the purpose of the act is to prevent competitively disadvantaging debt collectors who do not engage in abusive practices
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Qiu failed to demonstrate his eligibility for withholding of removal to the extent his claim was based on his ex-wife’s forced abortion. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir.2007) (en banc) (providing that any alleged persecution must be “personally experienced” if it is to form the basis of relief). Qiu has not alleged that he engaged in any form of resistance that would render him eligible for relief. See Matter of S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 10 (BIA 2006). Nor did the agency err by concluding that because Qiu is unmarried, any claim that he would face future persecution on account of possible future violations of the family planning policy would be too speculative to merit relief. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). B. Falun Gong The agency also reasonably

    ### Response:
    holding that absent solid support in the record for the petitioners assertion that he would be subjected to persecution his fear was speculative at best
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Morse v. Ripken, 707 So.2d 921, 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). The law, however, distinguishes between pure expressions of opinion, which are constitutionally protected, and mixed expressions of opinion, which, like factual statements, are not. Pure opinion occurs when the defendant makes a comment or states an opinion based on facts which are set forth in the a ion is based are stated in the article, but those “facts” are either incomplete or incorrect, or the speaker’s assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may imply a false assertion of fact. In that event, the statement is not protected as pure opinion. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); see also Anson v. Paxson Commc’ns Corp., 736 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). Whether a statement is one of fact or one of

    ### Response:
    holding that false remarks on a radio talk show were not automatically shielded from liability because they were opinion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    circumstances are insufficient to meet the standard of reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant had knowingly hired or offered to hire his passenger to engage in a sexual act. Were we to hold otherwise, police officers would have carte blanche based on suspicion of solicitation of a prostitute to stop any vehicle late at night whenever he saw a driver and a known prostitute in the vehicle, to require the driver to exit the vehicle, and to question the driver and the passenger regarding their relationship. That conduct, no different than the conduct in the present ease, is tantamount to a seizure of a driver based on the mere presence of a passenger known to have committed a past criminal act. Cf. State v. Affsprung, 2004-NMCA-038, ¶¶4, 20-21, 135 N.M. 306, 87 P.3d 1088 (<HOLDING>); State v. Jones, 114 N.M. 147, 151, 835 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an officers request of a passenger who was present solely by virtue of the coincidence he was a passenger for the passengers identification just because the officer wanted to know who he was dealing with for safety purposes constituted an unlawful detention
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Second, based on the Plan documents and the defendant’s conduct, it appears that the Pension Board actually had the authority to determine issues relating to credited service, which forms the basis of this dispute. Third, as explained in more detail below, GM already has had the opportunity to litigate the question whether the plaintiff voluntarily walked away from his job in October 1978 when it contested — and lost — the plaintiffs worker’s compensation claim. Therefore, pursuing that same issue through several internal and administrative procedures would serve no useful purpose. It is true that many courts insist on strict adherence to the administrative procedures set forth under a particular plan, see, e.g., Phipps v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 625 F.Supp. 1038 (S.D.Ohio 1985) (<HOLDING>); how ever, compliance with all administrative

    ### Response:
    holding that employee could not sue due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies even though the employees request for internal review had become bogged down due to parties inability to jointly agree on a doctor to perform another evaluation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Beathard, 767 S.W.2d at 428; Losada v. S mant, Baccus, was indisputably acting covertly on behalf of law enforcement. He was cooperating in the hopes of completing enough “case credits” to have his charges dismissed. Accordingly, to determine the sufficiency of the corroboration of the informant, we must eliminate all of his testimony and determine whether there is other evidence that tends to connect Appellant to the offense of possession with intent to deliver. In Cantelon, an officer testified that the informant met the defendant at an agreed upon time and place, that he searched the informant, and that he watched as the informant, carrying a specific amount of cash and an audio recorder, met with the defendant and then returned without the cash, carryi Amarillo 2004, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); Tave v. State, No. 2-02-449-CR, 2004 WL

    ### Response:
    holding testimony of officer and narcotics investigator who both witnessed drug transaction coupled with audio recording of transaction constituted sufficient corroboration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    destruction, impairment or loss of use of any common element; (E) Matters relating to or affecting the units or interests of the unit owners including but not limited to damages, destruction, impairment or loss of use of a unit or portion thereof, if: (i) Resulting from a nuisance or a defect in or damage to a common element; or (ii) Required to facilitate repair 'to any common elements; and (F)Any other matter to which the association has standing under law or pursuant to the declaration bylaws or any articles of incorporation. Or.Rev.Stat. § 100.405(4)(e). As defined in the statute, “common elements” include the hot and cold water systems. See Or. Rev.Stat. § 100.005(16); see also Ass’n of Unit Owners of Bridgeview Condos. v. Dunning, 187 Or.App. 595, 612-13, 69 P.3d 788 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Plaintiff has statutory standing to sue

    ### Response:
    holding that when a complaint alleges defects involving common elements a home owners association has standing to sue for damage to noncommon elements as well
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (orig. proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion if it incorrectly interprets or improperly applies the law. In re Dep’t of Family & Protective Services., 273 S.W.3d 637, 642-43 (Tex.2009) (orig. proceeding); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. Absent extraordinary circumstances, mandamus will not issue unless relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 210-11 (Tex.2004) (orig. proceeding) (citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839). Whether a clear abuse of discretion can be adequately remedied by appeal depends on a careful analysis of costs and benefits of interlocutory review. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding). As this balance depends heavily on circumstances, it Worth 2009, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>); In re Garza, 153 S.W.3d 97, 100 (Tex.App.-San

    ### Response:
    holding that mandamus is appropriate to challenge temporary orders because they are not subject to interlocutory appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    placing other pedicle screws in those same patients, such information would demonstrate “knowledge” of how to do the surgery, but a lack of competence or care in the performance of the surgery. Plaintiffs’ desire to introduce such other acts evidence ran more to showing lack of competence or care — that is, malpractice— with respect to other patients. From such evidence, the jury then could infer that Dr. Callahan had a propensity to commit malpractice by misplacing pedicle screws and thus may or perhaps must have committed similar malpractice in the surgery to Mr. Bair. However, Rule 404(b) bars the use of evidence of other alleged wrongs to show, circumstantially, action in conformity therewith. Thus, the legitimate probative value of the p App. 626, 607 N.W.2d 100, 105-06 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Tranisi, 212 Neb. 843, 326 N.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that mistrial was warranted for trial court allowing questions concerning prior malpractice lawsuits against witness because evidence of prior malpractice actions against a witness is not relevant to the witness competency or knowledge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an attorney knowingly misappropriated his or her client’s funds. In re Barlow, 140 N.J. 191, 196, 657 A.2d 1197 (1995). Respondent is correct that we have held that shoddy recordkeeping alone does not suffice for a finding of knowing misappropriation. In re Konopka, 126 N.J. 225, 228, 596 A.2d 733 (1991); In re Librizzi, 117 N.J. 481, 491-92, 569 A.2d 257 (1990); and In re Gallo, 117 N.J. 365, 373, 568 A.2d 522 (1989). In In re Fleischer, 102 N.J. 440, 447, 508 A.2d 1115 (1986), however, we held that although poor accounting does not establish a knowing misappropriation, poor accounting is not a Wilson defense if evidence indicates knowing misappropriation. See also In re Skevin, 104 N.J. 476, 486, 517 A.2d 852 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028, 107 S.Ct. 1954, 95 L.Ed.2d 526 (1987) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); In re Irizarry, 141 N.J.

    ### Response:
    holding that a knowing misappropriation may be established by evidence that clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondent knew the invasion was a likely result of his conduct and that  willful blindness satisfies the requirement of knowledge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    authorizing the disclosure of grand jury documents and information to investigators and data analysts of the Insurance Fraud Bureau of Massachusetts (“IFB”). The IFB is a quasi-governmental agency created by statute to prevent and investigate fraudulent insurance transactions and composed of two voluntary private associations of insurance carriers. See United States v. Pimental, 199 F.R.D. 28, 29-30 (D.Mass.2001) (describing make up and functions of the IFB); accord In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 158 F.Supp.2d at 98-99 (same); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 429 Mass. 362, 708 N.E.2d 644, 646-647 (1999) (same); see In Re Justices of the Superior Court, 218 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir.2000) (referring to IFB as “quasi-governmental entity”); United States v. Pimental, 201 F.R.D. 24, 26 (D.Mass.2001) (<HOLDING>). The government requested court authorization

    ### Response:
    recognizing that federal government did not fund ifb
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    retaliated against. Accordingly, Texas Tech and TTUHSC’s 12(b)(1) motion is DENIED. A State Must be a “Person” Within the Meaning of the False Claims Act Having addressed the issue of whether Texas Tech and TTUHSC are immune from suit because of their status as state institutions, and having found that they are not entitled to sovereign immunity, the court turns now to unraveling the mystery of what is a “person” for purposes of the False Claims Act. The False Claims Act does not define the word person. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729. Ordinarily, “ ‘in common usage, the term “person” does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it.’ ” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2308, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>)(quoting Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    seized motorist for the short period of time that it typically takes to locate and produce vehicle registration or ownership papers (even if the papers are contained within a vehicle being towed and thus not within immediate reach) is a relatively slight intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests. Consequently, in assessing whether, as of 8:02 p.m., the facts gave Rugen “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting [Hornbecker] of criminal activity,” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657 (describing the “reasonable suspicion” required to justify a Terry stop) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), we are somewhat less demanding than we would be if we were evaluating the lawfulness of a Terry stop that resembled a full, custodial arrest, see, e.g., Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6 (<HOLDING>); Stanley, 915 F.2d at 55 (similar); cf. United

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the inquiry into whether the facts adequately supported a terry stop is informed by the nature and quality of the intrusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of [the stay put provision, Congress] unequivocally,” intended to “strip schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally employed” and that the provision “means what it says”). The meaning of the phrase “current educational placement,” never expressly defined in the statute, is at the heart of the dispute between the parties in the case at bar. In Burlington, the Court observed that an administrative decision in favor of the parents “would seem to constitute agreement by the State to the change of placement,” 471 U.S. at 372, 105 S.Ct. 1996; in other words, the decision would seem to constitute a “current educational placement.” Other courts have followed this understanding of the relevant statutes. See, e. g., Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of

    ### Response:
    holding that the decision of the supreme court in burlington established that a ruling by the education appeals panel in favor of the parents position constitutes agreement for purposes of the pendent placement provision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). However, the same immunity does not apply to prosecutor’s actions that are administrative and investigative. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 n. 16, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2734 n. 16, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Similarly, officials that initiate and prosecute agency enforcement measures subject to agency adjudication are entitled to absolute immunity. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911-12, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). It is the official’s function, not role or status, that determines whether absolute immunity applies. Id. at 511-13, 98 S.Ct. at 2913-14. The Third Circuit has not addressed the issue of absolute immunity for child welfare work L.Ed.2d 719 (1991) and Austin v. Borel, 830 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). In 1994, the Supreme Court denied a petition

    ### Response:
    holding that social worker was not entitled to absolute immunity for filing complaint becausejudicial proceedings were initiated by district attorney who filed petition for adjudication
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the court to rely only upon the fact of conviction and the definition of the prior offense. Kirksey, 138 F.3d at 124. If the definition of the prior offense is ambiguous, however, the court must look beyond the definition to the charging document and to any statements incorporated into that document. Kirksey, 138 F.3d at 124-26. In conducting its ACCA assessment, a court may also consult the jury instructions in the earlier case to determine whether the erized Wardrick’s 1988 conviction for resisting arrest as a violent felony. The act of resisting arrest poses a threat of direct confrontation between a police officer and the subject of the arrest, creating the potential for serious physical injury to the officer and others. See United States v. James, 337 F.3d 387 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Wardrick’s conviction for

    ### Response:
    holding south carolina conviction for failure to stop for a blue light to be violent felony under acca because prohibited conduct creates potential for confrontation and violence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Master, supra, 748 F.Supp. at 392 (“The court notes that there is no statutory language in the CERCLA statute which supports such an argument”). Certain of the courts that have held governmental agency involvement can satisfy the NCP’s public comment requirement appear to have relied on the fact that the agency’s process itself involved opportunities for public input and involvement. See Estes v. Scotsman Group, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 988, 991 (C.D.Ill.1998) (“Cases allowing public agency involvement to be substituted for public comment have only allowed such a substitution if the public is provided an ample opportunity for comment and there is substantial involvement throughout the cleanup by a state agency”); Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 779 F.Supp. 1519, 1537 (N.D.Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>), rev’d. in part on other grounds, 2 F.3d 746

    ### Response:
    holding that the ncp public participation requirement was fulfilled because the indiana department of environmental management gave public notice and received public comments before issuing an npdes permit for the cleanup even if it did not hold a public hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Court noted that neither § 841(b)(1) nor the Sentencing Guide lines defined the words “mixture” or “substance.” Id. at 461-62, 111 S.Ct. at 1925-26. The Court therefore applied the ordinary dictionary meaning of the terms and concluded that the combination of the pure LSD and blotter paper is a “mixture” within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 462, 111 S.Ct. at 1925. Amendment 488 does not contradict Chapman because the Sentencing Commission has the authority to review the work of the courts and revise the Guidelines by adopting an interpretation of a particular guideline in conflict with prior judicial constructions of that guideline. See Stinson, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 1919; see also Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348, 111 S.Ct. 1854, 1857, 114 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (<HOLDING>). At the time of the Chapman holding, the

    ### Response:
    holding that congress necessarily contemplated that the commission would review the work of the courts and revise the guidelines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    search Baldón, either predicated on individual suspicion, background information particular to Baldón that would have been known to the parole officer, or the general mission of parole. Thus, the only issue we address on appeal is whether a parole agreement containing a consent-to-search clause renders suspicionless and warrant-less searches of parolees reasonable under the search and seizure clause of the Iowa Constitution. Additionally, we only analyze the consent issue in this case on state constitutional law grounds. The United States Supreme Court has not yet directly weighed in on the issue to direct an outcome under the Fourth Amendment or to aid us in our resolution under our state constitution. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 n. 3, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2199 n. pp.1976) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, only a handful of courts

    ### Response:
    holding probationers acceptance of search provision of parole agreement did not constitute freely and voluntarily given consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an inmate was injured by a foreign object in the food. His sole allegation that a security guard knew of an incident when pebbles were found in prison beans does not support a finding that Atkinson knowingly disregarded a substantial risk that an inmate would bite into or ingest a foreign object. The security guard did not indicate that Atkinson was aware of the pebbles. In a § 1983 suit, “[a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official ... is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Because Green was unable upon remand to remedy the insufficient factual allegations against Atkinson, the district court’s dis missal of the claim was proper. See id.; George v. King, 837 F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Green also addresses the merits of new claims

    ### Response:
    holding single incident of food poisoning did not amount to a violation of prisoners constitutional rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    By implicating the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Protégé asks this court to look beyond the four corners of the 2007 Employment Agreement to the terms of the 2004 Employment Agreement and to conclude that the exclusion of a provision prohibiting Protégé from reducing Colameta’s salary or changing his job duties gave Protégé the authority to do both. The 2007 Employment Agreement, however, is unambiguous; indeed, neither Protégé nor the defendants argue to the contrary. The court therefore cannot use the 2004 Employment Agreement to assist in the interpretation of the 2007 Employment Agreement, whether through application of the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius or otherwise. See McAdams v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 287, 300 (1st Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). B. Protégé’s Breach of the 2007 Employment

    ### Response:
    holding that principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius has no place in interpretation of unambiguous contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court noted that a district judge in an extradition proceeding is acting pursuant to special powers and not any part of the judicial power of the United States. Id. at 120, 14 How. 103 (citing to Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 48). Modern courts continue to rely on the concepts expressed in Ferreira and Kaine in determining that 18 U.S.C. § 3184 does not violate the principle of separation of powers. See In re Extradition of Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 864 n. 11 (9th Cir.1996) (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 3184 does not violate principles of separation of powers because a long line of precedents hold that a district judge acting pursuant to Section 3184 does not exercise any part of the judicial power of the United States); Lo Duca v. U.S., 93 F.3d 1100 (2nd Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). There are additional reasons why a court may

    ### Response:
    recognizing that individual judges rather than the federal courts are subject to 18 usc  3184 that judges are thus functioning as commissioners under  3184 rather than exercising powers under article iii and that the statute thus does not violate the separation of powers doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the question presented. Where the error is prejudicial, the defendant is entitled to have his motion reconsidered and passed upon as a discretionary matter.’ ” Johnson, 346 N.C. at 124, 484 S.E.2d at 376 (quoting State v. Lang, 301 N.C. 508, 510, 272 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1980)); see also Barrow, 350 N.C. at 646, 517 S.E.2d at 378. Here, the trial court instructed the jury, without objection from the parties, as follows: As to the second question, members of the jury, it is your duty to recall the evidence as the evidence was presented. So you may retire and resume your deliberation. From these instructions, we are convinced that the trial judge did not impermissibly deny the request based solely on the unavailability of the transcript. See Barrow, 350 N.C. at 648, 517 S.E.2d at 378-79 (<HOLDING>); State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 35, 331 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the ability to present the transcript to the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    concludes that Syracuse is not entitled to any damages related to the removal of the certification tags. La. Civ.Code Ann. art. 2002 (a contracting party “must make reasonable efforts to mitigate” damages caused by another’s breach of contract). B. Orion’s Breach of Contract Claim Against Syracuse 1. Bar to Recovery of Damages by Syracuse The core of Orion’s affirmative defenses is that Syracuse cannot recover on his claim because he breached the Agreement while Orion fully performed. See, e.g., B.F. Edington Drilling Co. v. Yearwood, 239 La. 303, 118 So.2d 419, 422 (1960) (concluding that party that installed well could not obtain payment of the contract price because the well did not meet the contract specifications); City of Houma v. C-Well Ltd., 515 So.2d 646, 648 (La.Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>); Copeland v. Drury, 494 So.2d 1189, 1193

    ### Response:
    holding that party may not recover damages for breach of contract where its own bad faith caused the other partys breach
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    such decisions. 429 A.2d at 781. The court in City of Scranton, further noted that Section 1 of Act 111, 48 P.S. § 217.1, limits the issues that are subject to mandatory bargaining and that Act 111 “does not remove all regulation [of policemen and firemen] from the scope of a municipality’s managerial decision-making, particularly any regulation which might be considered ‘essential for the proper and efficient functioning of a police [and fire] force.’” Id. [quoting Sharon v. Rose of Sharon Lodge, No. S, 11 Pa.Cmwlth. 277, 315 A.2d 355, 358 (1973)]. Accordingly, this court concluded in City of Scranton that Act 111 does not remove from the employer’s managerial authority the total number of firemen on a force. Compare Appeal of City of Erie, 74 Pa. Cmwlth. 245, 459 A.2d 1320 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Subsequently, in City of Philadelphia v.

    ### Response:
    holding that arbitration panel did not err in concluding that the number of firemen per rig constitutes a work condition rather than a matter of managerial prerogative and therefore was a proper subject of bargaining
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to confront the witnesses against him. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 901(a) provides: General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. ¶ 14. The State argues that the passports needed no authentication because they are authentic on their face. The State concedes that the passport of Robert Keys was obtained through a fraudulent application because Bob used an alias to obtain the passport. We do not agree that a fraudulently obtained passport could be considered authentic on its face for the purposes of establishing the information contained within as factual. See U.S. v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460, 466 (2nd Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>); Gulotta v. United States, 118 F.2d 683, 685

    ### Response:
    holding that a passport is not competent evidence to prove the defendant was not in thailand absent proof by thai authorities that if the defendant had entered or exited thailand an entry would have been placed on his passport
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reflected in Document 00813. The 00813 rates similarly do not prohibit a contractor’s payment of higher wages to his employees. After a dispute arose about the switch, in a letter sent to Mor-ganti, the City wrote that it would reimburse the Hobby Airport contractors and subcontractors for variances between the 00812 rate and the 00813 rate. In response to the letter, Morganti requested the difference between the rates on behalf of itself and its subcontractors, including SES. The City denied the claim. It took the position that the switch to the 00813 rate did not harm Morganti and SES because none of their employees received a wage increase due to the switch. SES’s presiden , No. 14-04-00120-CV, 2006 WL 176862, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 26, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>). 2) Analysis Here, SES maintains that it

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants failure to disclose sublease did not cause breachofcontract damages because plaintiffs deal fell through for reasons independent of failure to notify plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was initially made a party to this action but was subsequently removed as a party. 2 . The Depreciation Lands Museum, which is within 500 feet of the subject property, has a cemetery on its premises. 3 . The Township made only a fleeting reference to standing in its discussion of whether ASI's claims implicate an ""overwhelming federal interest.” 4 . Although this regulation was passed pursuant to the ADA, the broad remedial language of the RA is similarly intended to extend relief beyond qualified individuals with disabilities. See Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Pa., 364 F.3d 487, 491 (3d Cir.2004) (citing Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 330-32 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813, 116 S.Ct. 64, 133 L.Ed , 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (<HOLDING>); Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd

    ### Response:
    recognizing the ability of corporations to protect property rights in federal court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “[the trustee, after notice and a hearing, may ... sell ..., other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate.]” 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1985). * * * If there are objections, however, the trustee must seek approval of the proposed sale from the bankruptcy court. The appropriate standard used by courts in reviewing a trustee’s recommendation has been enunciated in myriad ways. See, e.g., In re Schipper, 933 F.2d 513, 515 (7th Cir.1991) (stating that sales are an exercise of a fiduciary duty that requires an “articulated business justification”); In re Chung King, Inc., 753 F.2d 547, 549 (7th Cir.1985) (opining that the sale must result in the estate obtaining the best price possible under the circumstances); In re Apex Oil Co., 92 B.R. 847, 866 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1988) (<HOLDING>); In re Phoenix Steel Corp., 82 B.R. 334,

    ### Response:
    holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motion for appropriate relief was not proper because it was not made after a verdict had been reached. See State v. Handy, 326 N.C. 532, 535, 391 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1990) (motion for appropriate relief is a “post-verdict” motion); N.C.G.S. § 15A-1414(a) (1999) (motion for appropriate relief may be made “[a]fter the verdict but not more than 10 days after entry of judgment”). The Defendant’s motions, therefore, must be characterized as “pretrial” motions brought “prior to a trial that the Government had a right to prosecute and that... [Defendant was required to defend.” Sanford, 429 U.S. at 16, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 20. Accordingly, the State’s appeal of the trial court’s 14 January 2000 order is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See McGraw v. State, 688 So. 2d 764, 771 (Miss.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 830, 139 L. Ed. 2d 51

    ### Response:
    holding pursuant to sanford and serf ass that a defendants untimely motion for acquittal made subsequent to a jury deadlock must be treated as a pretrial motion and thus review of the trial courts judgment granting such motion is not precluded by the double jeopardy clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because appellant Arn’s application for the modification of his pretrial release conditions also was a pretrial motion providing excludable time, no violation of the Speedy Trial Act occurred. See United States v. Wirsing, 867 F.2d 1227, 1230-31 (9th Cir.1989). 2. The district court’s misreading of a single phrase in the conspiracy instruction did not constitute plain error, because the written instructions provided to the jury properly stated the requisite conspiracy elements and unanimity requirement. See United States v. Ancheta, 38 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.1994). 3. The district court properly rejected appellants’ proffered factual impossibility instruction, as impossibility is not a defense to conspiracy or attempt. See United States v. Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 949, 957 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). 4. The district court properly instructed the

    ### Response:
    holding that impossibility is not a defense to attempts or conspiracy under the hobbs act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his four and one-half-year sentence, not his habitual felony offender sentence. Although this is the argument that the State should have raised at Hall’s hearing on his motion to correct his sentence, the Department does not have the authority to review and reject a trial court’s specific award of credit. See Pearson v. Moore, 767 So.2d 1235, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“As part of the executive branch, DOC lacks the power to adjudicate the legality of a sentence or to add or delete sentencing conditions.”); Slay v. Singletary, 676 So.2d 456, 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (en banc), aff'd, 688 So.2d 319 (Fla.1997) (“[T]he Department of Corrections lacks the authority to correct an illegal sentence or render the illegality harmless.”); Wilson v. State, 603 So.2d 93, 94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (<HOLDING>). “Sentencing is a power, obligation, and

    ### Response:
    holding that the award of the credit is a judicial task to be accomplished at sentencing rather than an administrative function to be accomplished postsentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    analysis whether Kelly-Ryan at one point claimed that the policy was a marine insurance policy, because even a joint stipulation cannot cure a jurisdictional defect. See Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 342 (9th Cir.1996); see also Galt G/S v. Hapag-Lloyd AG, 60 F.3d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]e inquire sua sponte whether admiralty or diversity jurisdiction provided the district court with an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.... ”). We thus turn to the question whether admiralty jurisdiction exists over Kelly-Ryan’s claim against Royal. Admiralty jurisdiction hinges on whether the Big Shield insurance policy with the MEL endorsement is a maritime insurance contract. See Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 35-36, 20 L.Ed. 90 (1870) (<HOLDING>). If the Big Shield policy is maritime, “and

    ### Response:
    holding that admiralty jurisdiction extends to maritime insurance contracts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    device; a person who transcribes recorded testimony; an attorney for the government; or a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (in). Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(2). The D.C. Circuit has held that Rule 6(e) qualifies as an Exemption 3 withholding statute, even though the Criminal Rules are ordinarily not labeled as such. See Senate of P.R. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 582 & n. 23 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“although rules of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court generally do not qualify as ‘statutes’ for exemption (b)(3) purposes!,] [Rule 6(e)] does so qualify because it was specifically adopted by an Act of Congress.”) (internal citation omitted). See also Fund for Constitutional Gov’t v. Nat’l Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 867 (D.C.Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the FBI relied on Exemption 3

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 6e qualifies as a statute for purposes of exemption 3
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fund, 900 F.2d 1138, 1142 (7th Cir.1990). Here, the above-factors weigh in UNUM’s favor. When UNUM’s plan administrator decided to terminate Reagan’s benefits, he had before him the following evidence to support his conclusion: (1) the fact that Dr. Kurkjian could find no objective evidence that Reagan suffered from any cardiac disease; (2) the fact that neither Dr. Kurkjian nor Dr. Laping believed that any restrictions or limitations upon Reagan’s wo agree regarding Reagan’s medical condition and ability to work, such a disagreement does not support a finding of arbitrary and capricious . In fact, reasoned differences among qualified medical experts preclude such a finding. See Smith v. Office of Civilian Health and Med. Program of Uniformed Servs., 97 F.3d 950, 959 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Ladd v. ITT Corp., 148 F.3d 753, 756

    ### Response:
    holding that widespread disagreement among qualified medical experts over a medical issue virtually precludes a reviewing court from concluding that an agency decision that agrees with one side is arbitrary or plainly wrong even if the court finds other views more persuasive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not manage a fund entrusted to him by the client....”); In re Gelson, 12 F.Supp. 924, 925 (E.D.N.Y.1935) (“An attorney receiving money which is the property of his client, does so in a fiduciary capacity, within the purview of the bankruptcy law.”). Moreover, numerous cases have applied the defalcation exception to debts owed by corporate officers, notwithstanding the absence of any express trust. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939) (“A director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders. Their powers are in trust.” (citations omitted)); In re Hammond, 98 F.2d 703, 705 (2d Cir.1938) (“It can scarcely be doubted ... that a director [is a fiduciary].”); In re Bernard, 87 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir.1937) (<HOLDING>). The district court’s view that only the

    ### Response:
    holding that directors and officers are fiduciaries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Creek sub-watershed; and may significantly impact other wildlife. In contrast, the Forest Service asserts that its finding of no significant impact was reasonable because “the Forest Service and Fish and Wildlife Service biological analyses demonstrate that impacts to wildlife, including the northern spotted owl ... will not be significant. Watershed analysis demonstrates that none of the watersheds in the project area will be significantly affected.” (Defi’s Mem. In Supp. Of Mot. For Summ. J. and in Opp’n to Pis.’ Mot. For Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 10.) 1. Northern Spotted Owl The EA concludes that the project “will affect, is likely to adversely affect” the Northern Spotted Owl. (EA at 58, AR 417.) Standing alone, this suggests the need for an EIS. Ocean Advocates, 361 F.3d at 1125 (<HOLDING>). The Forest Service concludes however, that

    ### Response:
    holding that the presence of one intensity factor may be sufficient to deem the action significant in certain circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    invasion, and Issa’s blood found on a wooden fence slat in the back yard of the subject home, Issa’s counsel argued in his closing that his client went with others to the victims’ home but abandoned the robbery plan, was then shot by one of the other perpetrators, and remained in the back yard for some time after being wounded. And in a further effort to explain why all three victims testified that the perpetrator who struggled with C. D. was shot, Issa’s counsel posited that this unknown perpetrator faked being wounde r v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 283 (745 SE2d 646) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Gordon v. State, 334 Ga. App. 633, 634 (780 SE2d 376) (2015). 61 Gordon, 334 Ga. App. at 634 (punctuation omitted); see McNair, 293 Ga. at 283 (noting that the rule of 7 5 SE2d 187) (2015)

    ### Response:
    holding that trial counsels strategy of explaining that defendant was at the scene of crime to deal drugs rather than commit robbery was not unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    installation services. In addition, Siemens has stated that when installation services are provided, “they are part and parcel of the contract for sale of equipment to the customer.” These are clear indications that Siemens has provided recurrent work for installation services as defined by the Kentucky courts. See Cain, 236 S.W.3d at 588; Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. Sherman & Fletcher, 705 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Ky.1986) (finding that “a person who engages another to perform a part of the work which is a recurrent part of his business, trade, or occupation is a contractor”). Siemens has also continued to provide installation services since the NAS contract and indicates that this work is recurrent. See Daniels v. Louisville Gas and Electric Company, 933 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Ky.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). We find that Plaintiffs placed an unwarranted

    ### Response:
    holding that lg  e may be classified as a contractor when it subcontracted with tsa to conduct emissions testing at irregular or sporadic intervals which satisfied the definition of regular or recurrent work
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any case that specifically addresses the precise issue here, i.e., whether the US-CIS’s termination of an alien’s refugee status constitutes final agency action.” R. 31 PagelD# : 568. But “the parties do cite cases that have considered whether the USCIS’s termination of an alien’s asylee status or its denial of an application to adjust status is final agency action within the meaning of the APA.” Id. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that “[t]hese cases provide a useful framework for resolving the issues before this Court.” Id. Where removal proceedings are pending, such as in this case, further administrative relief is available and the termination of an alien’s current status is an intermediate, nonfinal agency action. See Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); see also Cabaccang v. USCIS, 627 F.3d 1313,

    ### Response:
    holding that termination of asylum is not final agency action because it is only an intermediate step in a multistage administrative process succeeded or accompanied by removal proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only in the way and to the extent that it would have been punishable if the territory embraced by the reservation remained subject to the jurisdiction of the State.” 219 U.S. at 10, 31 S.Ct. at 214. Within this framework, the federal assessment could be imposed in this case only to the extent of $15.00, the most that could be charged a defendant under the Virginia victim compensation scheme. Such a result seems counterintuitive, or at least impractical. Although the result follows from the reasoning of Press Publishing Co., it is not clear whether fines— especially unique fines such as the special assessments — must be treated in the same way as sentences of incarceration for purposes of the “like punishment” analysis. But cf. United States v. Kendrick, 636 F.Supp. 189 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (<HOLDING>); cf. also United States v. Patmore, 475 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that punishment in this court for an offense under ncgs  1381 north carolinas driving while intoxicated statute cannot exceed a fine of 1000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year the maximum punishment for a misdemeanor under 18 usc section 1 because to allow the greater punishment that could be imposed under state law would conflict with the federal policy of limiting us magistrates nonconsensual jurisdiction to that allowed under the federal definition of a misdemeanor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Commentary to ABA Defense Function Standard 4-8.2. See also United States v. Ruth, 768 F.Supp. 1428, 1435 (D.Kan.1991). For other cases where courts have applied the Flores-Ortega standard to privately retained counsel who informed their clients that they would not continue to represent them on appeal, see Raney v. State, 986 So.2d 468 (Ala.Crim.App.2007); Esters v. State, 894 So.2d 755 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); and Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652 (Tenn.2003); Cabinatan v. United States, unpublished, 2011 WL 255691, *5 (D.Haw.2011) (rejecting the contention that, because the defendant's trial attorney ""was not retained or paid to prosecute an appeal, he therefore owed no duty to Cabinatan to file a notice of appeal.""); Richardson v. United States, 612 F.Supp.2d 709, 715-16 (N.D.W.Va2009) (<HOLDING>); Schaefer v. United States, unpublished, 2008

    ### Response:
    holding that trial counsel owes a criminal defendant a duty to file a notice of appeal regardless of whether the attorney was retained for the appeal or not
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    amply justified in concluding that despite the fact that the hearing on Nelson’s motion in limine to exclude the Rule 404(b) evidence was deferred until trial, the speedy trial clock did not run during the entire pendency of this motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F); United States v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir.1991) (“Motions necessitating hearings, such as suppression hearings ... are governed by section 3161(h)(1)(F). As such, the entire time from the fifing of the motion to the conclusion of the hearing is excludable, even when the hearing is deferred until trial.”)(citing United States v. Garcia, 778 F.2d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir.1986) and United States v. Mastrangelo, 733 F.2d 793, 796 (11th Cir.1984)); see also United States v. Beard, 41 F.3d 1486, 1488 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Thus, no more than 30 non-excludable days

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a district courts decision to defer hearing a motion until trial does not render the intervening time nonexcludable under  3161h1f
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether the trial court found that adultery caused the dissolution of the marriage or related to pre- or post-separation conduct, (2) state the basis for the trial court’s award to Cynthia of more property than she requested, and (3) contained no explanation for the trial court’s “harsh rebuke” that Daniel had made a game of the divorce and the dissolution of his business and that his conduct constituted a “mockery of our judicial system.” Daniel asserts he is “left guessing” as to the basis for the trial court’s ruling and cannot adequately address the findings on appeal. Daniel’s complaints necessarily relate to the trial court’s failure to make additional findings pursuant to rule of civil procedure 298. See Moore v. Moore, 383 S.W.3d 190, 200-01 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Rule of civil procedure 298 provides that,

    ### Response:
    recognizing distinction between findings of fact under section 6711 of the family code and findings of fact under rules of civil procedure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    goal in construing statute is to fulfill intent of legislature). ¶ 132 Before 1985, § 40-254(A) provided that a party dissatisfied with a Commission decision could commence an action “to vacate and set aside” the decision. A.R.S. § 40-254, Historical and Statutory Notes. Section 40-254(C) was the same as it reads today. Thus, before 1985, the superior court indisputably lacked authority to grant any relief under the statute other than affirming, modifying or setting aside a Commission decision. See Sun City Water Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 113 Ariz. 464, 466, 556 P.2d 1126, 1128 (1976) (concluding court lacked authority to affirm Commission decision in part and remand another portion); Arizona Corp. Comm’n v. Fred Harvey Transp. Co., 95 Ariz. 185, 190, 388 P.2d 236, 239 (1964) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 133 In 1985, the legislature amended §

    ### Response:
    holding superior court lacked authority to remand to commission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Penn Central Transportation Company, 944 F.2d 164, 165-66 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906, 112 S.Ct. 1262, 117 L.Ed.2d 491 (1992). 7 .Id. at 166. 8 . For a discussion of the ownership and operational history of the Reading Terminal, see Reading Company v. City of Philadelphia, 823 F.Supp. 1218, 1222-25 (E.D.Pa.1993). 9 . Conrail has now dropped its motion for summary judgment on the immunity portion of Count II. ConraiTs Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 1. The summary judgment motions of the Uni .R. 406, 409 (Sp.Ct.R.R.R.A.1990) (concluding that an interpretation of language in the FSP. is within the Special Court’s jurisdiction); Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Penn Central Corporation, 533 F.Supp. 1351, 1353-55 (Sp.Ct.R.R.R.A.1982) (<HOLDING>); Stratford Land and Improvement Company, Inc.

    ### Response:
    holding that the interpretation of both conveyance orders and documents is within the jurisdictional grant of  209e2
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of collateral procedural issues (such as limitations placed on attorneys’ fees), which do not implicate the merits of the case, should remain binding and are ordinarily not subject to further review when the case is remanded to a federal transferor court. See Walitalo, 968 F.2d at 747-48 (“the district court did not err in specifying how the originating trial courts should calculate the amount of lead and liaison counsel’s fees in those cases remanded for trial ... the district court appointed lead and liaison counsel and thus had authority to determine the amount of their compensation”). The federal rulings also apply to a case remanded to state court upon a finding that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See Willy, 503 U.S. at 137-38, 112 S.Ct. 1076 (<HOLDING>). “[I]t is well established that a federal

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between the two cannot be clearly erroneous.” United States v. Plancarte-Vazquez, 450 F.3d 848, 854 (8th Cir.2006). Although, after reviewing the sentencing transcript, I find the district court’s view of Clark’s testimony, both on direct examination and on cross, to be a real stretch, I cannot say it is clearly impermissible. Thus, I must determine whether Brown was a supervisor or manager based on the district court’s view of the evidence, rather than Brown’s view. Under our precedent, although it is a very close call, I cannot say the district court’s determination — Brown was a supervisor based on his use of Clark to drive him to drug transactions, in exchange for food, drink, shelter, and marijuana — was incorrect. See United States v. Maejia, 928 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 262, 267

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant may be considered to have a leadership role when he hired one driver and recruited another
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of any specific contractual duty. Notwithstanding, Granite Rock contends that the alleged tortious interference claim still meets the requirement that “the resolution of the lawsuit be focused upon and governed by the terms of the contract.” Painters & Decorators, 707 F.2d at 1071. Granite Rock’s theory is that because breach of the underlying contract is a necessary element of the tortious interference claim, the resolution of the tort claim is “focused upon” and “governed by” the contract. We reject Granite Rock’s argument, because its position clashes with the plain language of section 301(a) and the Majestic Housing requirement that the underlying agreement must have created the rights or liabilities which the parties seek to vindicate by their suit. Majestic Housin .1982) (<HOLDING>); United Food & Com. Workers Union, Local No.

    ### Response:
    holding that a complaint for interference with a collective bargaining agreement against a nonparty to that agreement is not actionable under  301a of the lmra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the date of both the New Jersey Tort Claims Act amendment and the Supreme Court’s affirmance in State v. Michaels), would serve to bar plaintiff’s claim against these defendants unless plaintiff filed within the limitations period and satisfied the notice provision. Because plaintiff did not file her notice of claim until February 27, 1995, it would be untimely under this scenario. The court is puzzled as to why the individual defendants in opposing Newark’s motion to remand or to dismiss did not flag this issue. 13 . New Jersey courts have relied on this section of the Restatement in other contexts. See, e.g., Rubin v. Nowak, 248 N.J.Super. 80, 83, 590 A.2d 249 (App.Div.1991). 14 . With respect to criminal proceedings, see, e.g., Day v. Zubel, 112 Nev. 972, 922 P.2d 536, 539 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Greenberg v. Wolfberg, 890 P.2d 895, 904, n.

    ### Response:
    holding that the final termination of the criminal proceedings occurred when criminal charges  were dismissed with prejudice rather than when the accused was released from prison pending a retrial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    after having been ordered or directed to do so. Under these circumstances, a defendant necessarily knows that failure to appear will “affect the judicial proceeding.” Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. We have gone further and construed § 3146 as requiring a willful violation of a requirement to appear for a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., Weaver v. United States, 37 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (9th Cir.1994) (“To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146, the government ordinarily must prove that the defendant (1) was released pursuant to that statute, (2) was required to appear in court, (3) knew that he was required to appear, (4) failed to appear as required, and (5) was willful in his failure to appear.”); see also United States v. Smeaton, 762 F.2d 796, 797-98 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). In this context, “[wjillfulness requires a

    ### Response:
    recognizing willful failure to appear as an essential element of the bailjumping offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY MICHAEL R. MURPHY, Circuit Judge. This matter is before the court on Keith Frazier’s pro se requests for a certifícate of appealability (“COA”) and to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. Frazier seeks a COA so he can appeal the district court’s dismissal, on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing no appeal may be taken from a “final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court” unless the petitioner first obtains a COA); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 869 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We grant Frazier’s motion to proceed on

    ### Response:
    holding that  2253clas requirements apply when a state habeas petitioner is proceeding under  2241
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a search is unreasonably intrusive: (1) whether the police have a “clear indication” that the desired evidence will be found, (2) the presence of exigent circumstances such as the imminent destruction of evidence or a risk to individual safety, and (3) whether the methods used to obtain the evidence was performed in a reasonable manner. Id.) see also Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986). Applying the framework set forth in Schmerber to the conduct of Officers Olsen and Vesely, we note that prior to forcing open defendant’s hand, the officers had been informed that the driver of the truck, in which defendant was a passenger, had been involved in a suspected drug transaction moments earlier. Upon approaching the truck, both officers ob .2d 519 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we overrule defendant’s assignment

    ### Response:
    holding police officers application of pressure to defendants throat causing him to spit out three plastic baggies containing crack cocaine was not unreasonably intrusive in light of the risk of losing the evidence and the potential health risk to the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that “are distinctively incident to the provision of airline service,” and thus necessarily exclude an air carrier’s common law duty to exercise ordinary care. 813 F.Supp. at 517-18. The court opined that extending the pre-emptive reach of Section 1305 to exempt air carriers from “ordinary premises liability” within a terminal building would justify exempting them from the duty to exercise reasonable care in their “downtown ticketing offices,” or in any other facility they owned or operated. Id. at 518. The court found it “impossible to 'discern any 'policy reason” justifying such an illogical result, and concluded that it “is inconceivable that. Congress intended to preempt state common law duties in this context.” Id. See also Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F.Supp. at 324 (<HOLDING>). The Court holds that Section 1305 does not

    ### Response:
    holding that congress did not intend to preempt state common law actions for personal injury based on the negligence of the airline or its employees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regarding Appellant’s sores. Without objection, Officer Meyer testified: that upon pulling her over, he noticed her hand shaking; that her behavior was “unusual”; that after obtaining her consent to search the car, he found a glass pipe with off-white residue; that upon her arrest he found another glass pipe in the trunk of Appellant’s car; and that upon a subsequent search, he found two small baggies containing a crystalline residue. This testimony, along with the items themselves and a lab report properly admitted into evidence, also establish the same essential fact as the testimony regarding Appellant’s sores — that Appellant used methamphetamine. The testimony regarding Appellant’s sores was, therefore, not prejudicial. See State v. Ponder, 950 S.W.2d 900, 910 (Mo.App. S.D.1997) (<HOLDING>). Point I is denied. Point II Appellant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that if evidence is improperly admitted but other evidence establishes essentially the same facts there is no prejudice to the accused and no reversible error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    abuse”. There is no evidence in the record that the insureds’ understanding of the coverage departed in any way from that of the insurer’s. Even when we resolve all doubts concerning the meaning of the language employed in the policy in favor of the insured, we conclude that the notice concerns discussed in Canadian Universal are not invoked in this ease. Even if we were to agree with the Martins that NUFIC failed to provide adequate notice of a substantial reduction of coverage in this case, the appellants would nonetheless be unsuccessful. Although NUFIC’s earlier claims-made policy did not contain explicit exclusions for acts of sexual and physical abuse, such acts, nonetheless, are not covered as a matter of public policy. See D.W.H. v. Steele, 512 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Minn.1994) (<HOLDING>). b. Minn.Stat. § 245.814 The Martins also

    ### Response:
    holding that public policy favors the exclusion of intentional acts as contained in the mjua policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be tailored somewhat to meet ADEA’s needs. ADEA damages are “deemed to be unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of [FLSA].” 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); see Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 964 n. 7 (4th Cir.1985) (explaining how the sections are linked). Instead of the private right of action terminating upon the filing of an action by the Secretary of Labor, § 626(c)(1) provides for a similar termination upon the filing of an ADEA action by EEOC. But there is no mention of attorney’s fees beyond that contained in the above-quoted FLSA provision. Thus, this much is readily apparent— under FLSA, a defendant employer is liable for attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff-employee. Cf. Richardson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 750 F.2d 763, 765-67 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). By virtue of the incorporation of § 216(b),

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys fees under adea may not be recovered against a defendant who was not an employer of the plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    benefits to a claimant's surviving spouse for the duration of the spouse’s life where the claimant died of a non-work related cause while his claim was still pending. 217 S.W.3d 900, 901-03 (Mo. banc 2007). The General Assembly amended sections 287.020.1, 287.200, and 287.230 the next year (in 2008) to abrogate Schoemehl, and to make it clear that “compensation for a permanent total disability is payable only during the lifetime of the injured employee and is not payable to dependents after the employee’s death when the employee dies from causes unrelated to the work injury."" Gervich v. Condaire, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 617, 620-21 (Mo. banc 2012). Missouri courts thereafter concluded that the 2008 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act could not be retroacti -02 (Mo. banc 2008) (<HOLDING>). Strait held that if a worker’s compensation

    ### Response:
    holding that children could receive permanent total disability payments after the death of their mother where the mothers claim was pending before the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments and was still pending at the time of her death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rise above the level of stray remarks ... when the statements are: (1) made by the decision maker or one whose recommendation is sought by the decision maker; (2) related to the specific employment decision challenged; and (3) made close in time to the decision.”); Ruane v. Continental Cas. Co., No. 96 Civ. 7153, 1998 WL 292103, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1998); Mosberger v. CPG Nutrients, Civ. No. 01-100, 2002 WL 31477292, at *7 (W.D.Pa. Sept.6, 2002) (“Discriminatory stray remarks are generally considered in one of three categories — those made (1) by a non-decisionmaker; (2) by a decisionmaker but unrelated to the decision process; or (3) by a decisionmaker but temporally remote from the adverse employment decision.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Add 753 (4th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 2. Application The complaint purports to

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of a general atmosphere of discrimination harassment or threats is relevant to the determinations of intent andpretext
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Here, a site plan depicting the easement over Lot 17 is recorded. This version of the plan was recorded 18 days after the property was conveyed to the Horgans, but had been submitted to and approved by the planning board prior to the sale. The plaintiffs argue that the fact that this plan was not recorded until after the conveyance is significant. We disagree. The plan was approved prior to the sale and recorded a short time later. The CCR acknowledges that subsequent site plans may be recorded, but that such plans become part of the master site plan. Further, the Horgan deed recognizes that the property is subject to the CCR. The plan depicting the easement, therefore, is valid, notwithstanding that it was recorded after the property was conveyed. See also Close, 146 N.H. at 484 (<HOLDING>). The question is whether another document

    ### Response:
    holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    loss amounts between herself and Walsh constitute prosecutorial misconduct because one of the stipulations must be “inaccurate.” Cf. United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-16.300 (prohibiting government attorneys from stipulating to a fact that is not accurate). The argument initially fails to recognize that two different loss amounts, for two different defendants, can both be accurate because the different loss amounts reflect the different loss for which each defendant was responsible. Furthermore, the government’s different loss calculations cannot be prosecutorial misconduct — let alone misconduct that rises to plain error — because the government has no obligation to stipulate to identical loss amounts with co-conspirators. United States v. Pierce, 409 F.3d 228, 233-34 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Our circuit has approved a government

    ### Response:
    holding loss stipulation of between 70000 and 120000 with one defendant and between 120000 and 200000 with coconspirator permissible in a mail fraud case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was therefore largely immaterial to the revocation of appellant’s probation, we conclude that appellant’s due process rights were not violated. Accordingly, revocation of probation and ordered execution of the previously imposed sentence of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia is hereby Affirmed. 1 . D.C.Code § 48-904.01 (2001). 2 . D.C.Code § 22-2105 (2001). 3 . D.C.Code § 25 — 1001(a) (2001). 4 . During discussion on the admi pplying a ""clear and convincing” standard, but the judge declined to do so because of the inconsistency between Lieutenant Murphy's testimony at the PWID trial and at the revocation hearing. Judge Keary's finding was not precluded by Judge Diaz’s acquittal on the PWID charge under the stricter standard for criminal conviction. See id. at 711

    ### Response:
    holding that neither the doctrines of double jeopardy nor collateral estoppel apply to probation revocation proceedings after an acquittal on the charge used as basis to revoke probation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prompting Bush to re-enter the home and shoot at Gina. See A.R.S. §§ 13-303, -1001(A)(1), - 1105(A)(1). The aggravated assault convictions were established by evidence that Bush shot Gina twice and seriously injured her soon after he initially entered the home. See A.R.S. §§ 13-303, -1203(A), -1204(A)(1) and (2). ¶ 139 Other considerations set forth in Gordon support imposition of consecutive sentences. Because the attempted murder and aggravated assaults occurred at different times during the home invasion and involved separate acts, it was possible for Forde to commit the former crime without committing the latter ones. Also, the aggravated assaults caused Gina to suffer physical injuries that were not inherent in the attempted murder. See Gordon, 161 Ariz. at 315, 778 P.2d at 1211 (<HOLDING>). For all these reasons, Forde’s conduct

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant more likely committed multiple acts if the defendants conduct in committing the lesser crime caused the victim to suffer an additional risk of harm beyond that inherent in the ultimate crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supra, 99 N.J. at 23, 489 A.2d 1148; Coons II, supra, 96 N.J. at 440, 476 A.2d 763; Salorio v. Glaser, 93 N.J. 447, 461 A.2d 1100, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983). For example, in New Jersey Bd new rule would have on the effective administration of justice, the third factor. In State v. Burstein, supra, 85 N.J. at 410, 427 A.2d 525, we held that even limited retroactive application of the rule announced in State v. Cerbo, 78 N.J. 595, 397 A.2d 671 (1979), namely, that a delay in presenting tapes of intercepted conversations for sealing requires suppression unless there was satisfactory explanation for delay, would inflict “virtually incalculable” costs on our administration of justice. See also State v. Catania, supra, 85 N.J. at 447, 427 A.2d 537 (<HOLDING>). IV Any prospectivity decision necessarily

    ### Response:
    holding that rule announced excluding the results of a wiretap because of improper minimization should not be applied retroactively because to reopen cases even on a limited basis for detailed hearings on the reasonableness of the interception of each phone call during each wiretap would overwhelm the courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employee’s consent to enter the special employment relationship. Those courts have not, however, considered whether the employee must know the corporate identity of the special employer for whom she agreed to work or whether her consent to work for a borrowing entity is tantamount to consent to work for the corporate entity of which the borrower is a part. Rather, the cases have analyzed only whether the employee agreed to work for an entity other than the general employer, an issue that is undisputed in this case. See Pacenti v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 245 N.J.Super. 188, 584 A.2d 843, 845 (App.Div.1991) (inferring requisite consent from the employee’s reporting to borrower’s place of business and accepting its supervisors’ decisions, policies and training); Murin, 573 A.2d at 991-94 (<HOLDING>); Chickachop v. Manpower, Inc., 84 N.J.Super.

    ### Response:
    holding that existence of deliberate and informed consent turns on whether it is understood between the employee and his employers that he is to remain in the allegiance of the first employer  or is to be employed in the business and subject to the direction of the temporary employer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of counsel claim, Petitioner's failure to allege in his petition any arguments or facts in support of the claim would, in any event, render it entirely deficient. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (requiring a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel to show that counsel's representation ""fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that ""there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” and further requiring that “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance”); see also Murray, 477 U.S. 478 at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (<HOLDING>) 7 . The court need not reach the issue of

    ### Response:
    holding that so long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in strickland v washington supra we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that results in procedural default
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sugar and Stark to continue on their way, however, he held them there until a canine unit arrived. The question is whether this 10 to 15 minute-long seizure was justified by reasonable suspicion. First, in his initial encounter with defendants, Crivello said he would hold the vehicle until the canine came if defendants refused to consent to a search. But an assertion of one’s constitutional rights should not be the basis for an otherwise unjustified detention. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (“We have consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.”) (citations omitted). In fact, their refusal to consent to the 6 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Soule, 908 F.2d at 1036 (holding that where

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant who had borrowed a car for a limited period of time had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the cars locked trunk where it was the very person from whom he had borrowed the car who first called the police after he failed to return the car
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in their capacity as Trustees of the Family Trust. Nonetheless, Sternberg contends that the Olsons waived any defects in service of process and jurisdiction. Pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1), the defenses of insufficiency of service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction are waived by failure to raise them in either a motion to dismiss filed under the rule or in the answer. In the present case, however, the Olsons never filed any motions or responsive pleadings but rather, allowed a default judgment to be entered against them. Because they never entered an appearance in the original action in their capacities as Trustees of the Family Trust, they did not waive the defenses of deficient process and lack of jurisdiction. Compare Smith v. Arnold, 4 Mass.App.Ct. 614, 616 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Judgment and Order of

    ### Response:
    holding that where the defendant filed a special appearance to challenge the courts jurisdiction over his person he was bound by the courts determination and could not relitigate it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of an “infamous crime,” Lucas v. McAfee, 217 Ind. 534, 541, 29 N.E.2d 588, 588 (1940) (Shake, J.). Although it contains a categorical limitation, the Infamous Crimes Clause does not contain a durational limitation. Consequently, if misdemeanor battery is an “infamous crime,” then it is only by legislative grace that Snyder’s right to vote was restored when he was released from incarceration. To be sure, the power to disenfranchise permanently persons convicted of any crimes even though they have completed their sentences might be limited by other provisions of the Indiana Constitution, such as the Proportionality Clause of Article I, § 16, and it may also be limited by the Equal Protection Clause, cf. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 43-56, 94 S.Ct. 2655, 41 L.Ed.2d 551 (1974) (<HOLDING>). It is, however, unnecessary to consider here

    ### Response:
    holding that section 2 of the fourteenth amendment permits states to disenfranchise convicted felons who have completed their sentences
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is sued for breach, it may defend on the ground that there existed a legal excuse for its nonperformance at the time of the alleged breach. Faced with two parties to a contract, each of whom claims breach by the other, courts will “often ... impose liability on the party that committed the first material breach.” Barron Bancshares, Inc. v. United States, 366 F.3d 1360, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2004) (citations omitted) F.3d 1260 (Fed.Cir.1999) (explaining contractor obligated to adhere to contract’s dispute clause because Government’s breach was not material ); Gibson v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 160 F.3d 722, 727 (Fed.Cir.1998) (justifying termination of employment after employee’s material breach of “last chance” employment agreement); Thomas v. Dep’t of Housin .2d 1273, 1279 (Fed.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 2. Restitution Outside of the FIRREA context,

    ### Response:
    holding fraud committed by contractor amounted to material breach justifying governments termination of contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the trust, if any, are not set forth, and the trust is not identified by title or date, shall grant and is hereby declared to have granted a fee simple estate with full power and authority in and to the grantee in such deed to sell, convey, and grant both the legal and beneficial interest in the real estate conveyed, unless a contrary intention sh o, 417 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), Hoffenberg never had the legal ability to grant an easement over his own property. In Hensel, the appellant acquired title to lots A, B, C and D. Appellant later sold lots B, C and D to appellee. Thereafter, the parties entered into a written contract which provided that lot B was to be repurchased by appellant. As originally drawn, that contract provided for an easement t pt. 87 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.1991) (<HOLDING>); Hayes v. Moreau, 104 N.H. 124, 180 A.2d 438

    ### Response:
    holding one cannot grant an easement to oneself one can only reserve such interest in land granted to another
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Justice. The petition for the writ of certiorari is denied. See Ex parte Bonner, 926 So.2d 339 (Ala.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Ex parte V.S., 918 So.2d 908

    ### Response:
    holding that where the petitioner alleges that he failed to receive notice of the dismissal of his rule 32 ala rcrim p petition in time to effect a timely appeal therefrom and the events about which the petitioner complains all occurred before june 1 2005 the effective date of the amendment to rule 32 providing a different remedy for obtaining an outoftime appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition a petition for a writ of mandamus is the only appropriate remedy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    injunctive relief against the individual Defendants in their official capacities, and against Defendant OASAS, the Court finds that they are immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment; and, therefore, grants this portion of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Walker v. Connecticut, 106 F.Supp.2d ed immunity] is whether the state of the law ... gave [the defendants] fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was unconstitutional.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). As qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the burden of pleading it falls on the defendants. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980) (citations omitted); see also Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The qualified immunity determination consists

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants bear the burden of showing that the challenged act was objectively reasonable citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2005 proceedings. However, the written record of those proceedings reflects that Wolf waived his right to counsel. Therefore, the question is whether Chant’s procedural bar applies in cases where a defendant waives the right to counsel. [¶ 6.] Chant adopted the rule set forth in Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d BIT (1994). Custis held that there was no right to collaterally attack the validity of prior convictions used for sentence enhancement “with the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel[.]” Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. at 1734. In discussing the nature of the right to counsel violations that would permit a collateral attack, the Supreme Court observed: “If the accused ... is not represented by cou -99 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dahler, 171 F.3d 441, 442

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant failed to carry his burden of proving the invalidity of the waivers of counsel for prior colorado convictions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sense. Asking jurors to forget that Butler is a convicted child molester simply asks too much of fallible human beings. Some occurrences cannot be forgotten, notwithstanding the court’s admonishments to the contrary. This is one of those situations, or at least we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that it is not. We sustain point one. We also sustain point two based on the denial of a mistrial. Butler’s remaining two points are not reached. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. 1 . The court could have refused to administer the oath to Butler and refused to withdraw his un-sworn testimony from the jury's consideration on the ground that he had waived any complaint about his unsworn testimony. See Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 212 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). However, the court chose to administer the

    ### Response:
    holding that a complaint is waived by the failure to object during the witness unsworn testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a § 2255 waiver because Second Circuit law clearly upholds waivers of direct appeals and had not struck down § 2255 waivers that have come before it). General enforcement of § 2255 waivers may be subject to exceptions, just as enforcement of direct appeal waivers is. For example, in this Circuit, a direct appeal waiver cannot bar claims that the plea was not knowing and intelligent, that the sentence imposed is in excess of the maximum penalty provided by statute, that the sentence is based on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as race, or that defendant was denied ineffective assistance of counsel after entry of the guilty plea. Attar, 38 F.3d at 732-33; Wessells, 936 F.2d at 167. Such exceptions may be warranted for § 2255 waivers as well. See DeRoo, 223 F.3d at 922-24 (<HOLDING>). But see Cockerham, 237 F.3d at 1187 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Government failed to prove that he possessed the SSN “in relation to” his false representation offense, he has waived any such argument on appeal by failing to raise it in his Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 motion before the district court. United States v. Chong Lam, 677 F.3d 190, 200 (4th Cir. 2012). Castellanos-Loya next urges that the district court abused its discretion in declining to prohibit testimony about the date of birth associated with the SSN, due to the Government’s late disclosure of the pertinent information. We have reviewed the record and conclude that, regardless of whether the district court properly considered the factors enumerated in United States v. Hastings, 126 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir.1997), any error was harmless. United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Castellanos-Loya attacks his

    ### Response:
    holding that evidentiary rulings are subject to harmless error renew
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    103 S.Ct. 2841. Although the question was left unresolved in Franchise Tax Board, the Court resolved this issue definitively a few years later in Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 64-67, 107 S.Ct. 1542. There, the Court limited application of the complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, with respect to ERISA claims, to only those claims which fall court cannot resolve a dispute where a claim is preempted under § 514, but outside the scope of § 502 because it lacks removal jurisdiction); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 639-40 (7th Cir.1995) (noting that if the issue is merely preemption under § 514(a), it serves only as a federal defense, and the complaint should not be recharacterized as federal); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 65 Sec. Plan, 879 F.2d 90, 93-94 (3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Warner, 46 F.3d at 535 (that a claim is

    ### Response:
    holding that  514a preemption defense will not justify removal unless claim falls within the scope of erisas civil enforcement provision  502
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    below fair value. See Torrington’s Br. Resp. to SKF’s Mot. J. Agency R. at 11. Tor-rington argues that only if the transactions are truly without consideration can they fall within NSK’s exclusion. See id. at 12. Commerce concedes that the case should be remanded to it to exclude the sample transactions for which SKF received no consideration from SKF’s United States sales database. See Def.’s Partial Opp’n to Pis.’ Mots. J. Agency R. at 27. Commerce is required to impose anti-dumping duties upon merchandise that “is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value.” 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1988). A zero-priced transaction does not qualify as a “sale” and, therefore, by definition cannot be included in Commerce’s FMV calculation. See NSK, 115 F.3d at 975 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the distribution of AFBs for no

    ### Response:
    holding that the term sold  requires both a transfer of ownership to an unrelated party and consideration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    punctuation omitted). We presume that a sentence within the Guidelines range is reasonable. Id. This presumption, however, may be rebutted by reference to the statutory sentencing factors found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. Price, however, did not receive a Guidelines sentence but a sentence varying below her Guidelines range by twelve months. The only evidence that Price offers in support of her argument that her below-Guidelines sentence is unreasonable is her past history of family problems. The district court considered this evidence but found that it was not sufficiently compelling to warrant a greater variance, and we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in determining the extent of the variance. See United States v. Austad, 519 F.3d 431, 434 (8th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Gall v. United States, — U.S. —, 128

    ### Response:
    recognizing that while our reasonableness review may take into consideration the extent of the district courts deviation from the guidelines range we must give due deference to the district courts decision that the  3553a factors on a whole justify the extent of the variance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    32(c), formerly 32(a). The Court concluded that it made “no sense to impute to Congress an intent that a defendant have the right to comment on the appropriateness of a sua sponte departure but not the right to be notified that the court is contemplating such a ruling.” Burns, 501 U.S. at 135-36, 111 S.Ct. 2182 (emphasis in original). Although Burns itself dealt with the need for notice regarding potential upward departures, Townsend notes that some lower courts have extended its reasoning to adjustments, see United States v. Jackson, 32 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.1991), abrogated on other grounds, Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994); but see United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Willis, 997 F.2d 407 (8th

    ### Response:
    holding that burns notice requirements did not apply to adjustments which are more predictable than departures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    612 (N.D.Iowa 1972) (stating that “absent other considerations” it would be unreasonable to allow the filing of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion based upon perjury of a third-party witness more than one year after entry of judgment). Like the plaintiff in Lester, Swanson seeks to vacate the judgment because Donna, a third-party witness, committed perjury. Swanson did not file his motion, however, until nearly 32 months after the entry of the judgment in this case. Swanson’s motion thus would be untimely if Jones, rather than Donna, committed perjury. And like the court in Lester, the court here finds no reason to treat Donna’s testimony differently than Jones’s testimony. The court thus finds that Swanson’s motion was not filed in a reasonable amount of time. See also Middleton, 388 F.3d at 614 (<HOLDING>). Swanson attempts to distinguish Lester by

    ### Response:
    holding threeyear delay without mitigating circumstances was unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    water charges in order to assist in meeting its debt obligations. 5 . The sole case cited by Engelman in support of its contention ""that property owned by districts, like Engelman, created under Article XVI § 59 of the Texas Constitution are [sic] exempt from forced sale and taxation” sheds little light on the issue raised in this case. See Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 144 Tex. 326, 190 S.W.2d 48, 50 (1945) (noting in dicta that LCRA's enabling legislation exempted its property from forced sale). As mentioned above, there is no dispute that Engelman's water rights and allocations may not be the subject of a forced sale because these assets are the property of a governmental agency. See Satterlee v. Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Auth., 576 S.W.2d 773, 779 (Tex.1978) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The viability of these alternatives will

    ### Response:
    holding that article xi section 9 extends to property held by government agencies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Haynor v. General Motors Corp., No. 81539, Dec. 17, 1985. In light of the defendant’s acknowledgment through its representatives LaLonde and Crabill that a “compensable injury” is defined by the workers’ compensation laws (“ ‘compensable injury’ is not defined anywhere in the agreement, but rather, it is defined by the administrative agencies of the state,” LaLonde’s Dep., A.R. 251-52; “[t]he answer to this question [of whether Mr. Haynor’s status was correctly reflected in his employment record”] lies with the Workers Compensation Activity and Labor Relations,” Letter to Russell C. Babcock from Preston M. Crabill, Jan. 25, 2007, Ex. 4 to PL’s Cross Mot. for Summary Jmt. [dkt. # 18]), it is virtually incomprehensible why the defendant would rely on an an 547, 553 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). As noted earlier, the Pension Committee and

    ### Response:
    holding that a failure of an erisa plan administrator to address the social security administrations determination that claimant is totally disabled is yet another factor that can render the denial of further longterm disability benefits arbitrary and capricious
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    punished in the territory of the requesting Party for an offense other than that for which the extradition has been granted .... ” Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, art. 17, Feb. 6, 1980, 31 U.S.T. 5059 (emphasis added). At the outset, as the government points out, Gov’t’s Opp’n to Agustin’s Specialty Mot., at 5 n.2, Agustín may not have standing to raise a challenge under the Rule of Specialty since the D.C. Circuit has declined to resolve conflicting authority and opine “as to whether a criminal defendant—as opposed to the extraditing state—has standing to assert the doctrine of specialty.” United States v. Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d 193, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Todd, 287 F.3d 1160, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 892 n.1

    ### Response:
    recognizing that we are leaving certain legal questions raised by the government unresolved including whether defendant lacks standing to bring a claim of violation of rule of specialty based on alleged threats to prosecute him for visa and tax fraud when he was not extradited to face such charges
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    individuals without first obtaining class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333-34, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). Additionally, we .have noted, in a different posture, that the EEOC is not required to provide documentation of individual attempts to conciliate on behalf of each potential claimant in a class action. EEOC v. Bruno’s Restaurant, 13 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir.1993). In Bruno’s, the defendant restaurant fired its pregnant waitresses. The EEOC investigated and found reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had illegally discriminated against them. Id. at 286-87. The defendant rejected the EEOC’s efforts to settle and the EEOC brought suit. The district court dismissed the EEOC’s action ) (<HOLDING>); EEOC v. Keep. Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097,

    ### Response:
    holding the eeoc is not required to provide documentation of individual attempts to conciliate on behalf of each potential claimant internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow, 91 N.Y.2d 39, 666 N.Y.S.2d 990, 689 N.E.2d 884, 889-90 (1997). . In their merger agreement, Vocada and Nuanee agreed to arbitrate “any ... dispute relating to the -Earnout Consideration.” This clause is narrow. It does not require arbitration of all disputes arising out of the merger agreement; instead,- it requires arbitration only of disputes related to the earnout consideration. See State v. Philip Morris Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 574, 838 N.Y.S.2d 460, 869 N.E.2d 636, 639-40 (200.7) (observing that an arbitration clause that covers “any dispute ... relating to” an auditor’s calculations and determinations is “misleadingly called broad” (alterations and emphasis omitted»; Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp., 302 A.D.2d at 119, 126, 752 N.Y.S.2d 611 (<HOLDING>); We’re Assocs., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machines

    ### Response:
    holding that an arbitration clause that covered any irreconcilable difference of opinion  as to the interpretation of this contract was a narrowclause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    breached the duty; (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff injury; and (4) damages resulted. Id. at 665. Attorney-Client Relationship. The AMn Gump Defendants deny that they represented Grady and Chama, and thus deny that they owed a duty to them. The Court, however, concludes that there is sufficient evidence in the record to determine that an attorney-client relationship was formed between the AMn Gump Defendants and Grady. The Court has found that Kelso was an agent of Grady’s who had the authority to hire counsel for Grady and Chama to design and implement the Chama reorganization scheme; Kelso did hire counsel for Grady and Chama for this purpose. An agent may employ counsel for Ms principal. See Randolph v. Resolution Trust Corp., 995 F.2d 611, 616 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1294, 127

    ### Response:
    recognizing this possibility in vacating a summary judgment and remanding the determination as to whether an attorneyclient relationsmp existed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law. Id. at 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080. (quotations omitted). Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have focused the Cort analysis to “emphasize the centrality of the second factor — Congressional intent; treating the other factors as ‘proxies of for the Eleventh Circuit in Arrow Airways, Inc. v. Dade County, 749 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir.1985) held that “[b]ased upon the ... lack of any evidence in the 1982 Act of an intent to create a private right of action, we conclude that the district court properly held that Appellants had no express or implied cause of action under 49 U.S.C. § 2210.” Id. at 1491; see also Four T’s, Inc. v. Little Rock Municipal Airport Commission, 108 F.3d 909, 915-16 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); accord Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of

    ### Response:
    holding that no private right of action exists under any of the provisions of the airport and airway improvement act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) wherein the Supreme Court stated that in analyzing issues of personal jurisdiction, “when commercial activities are ‘carried on in behalf of an out-of-state party those activities may sometimes be ascribed to the party.” 471 U.S. at 480 n. 22, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Central argues that if CEJ is indeed an indispensable party to an action involving the 902 Patent because it retained substantial rights in that patent, then all of Mitutoyo’s threats of litigation in defense of the 902 Patent must have been made by Mitutoyo on behalf of CEJ because Mitutoyo lacks the power to bring such an infringement action on its own. (See Pl.’s Obj. at 19 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1132 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>)).) But see Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that where patent owner licensor retained substantial rights under license agreement licensee did not have an independent right to sue for infringement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    38,122 includes several elements, each of which is capable of being readily understood: (1) a person must intend to obtain an economic benefit for himself by (2) holding himself e of law — a commercial enterprise— therefore, it is not facially overboard. See Cells, 354 S.W.3d at 32 (citing Manrique, 40 S.W.3d at 554). The State of Texas has a compelling interest in this regulatory framework; the benefit is to the citizens as a whole. See id. at 33 (citing Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963)) (recognizing that a state has a “substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the State”) (other citations omitted). Appellant also urges that neither Cells nor Manrique had the benefit of Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 24 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (<HOLDING>). Appellant also argues the burden is on the

    ### Response:
    holding the online solicitation statute was not narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest and there were more narrow means of achieving the states interest in protecting minors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her work to heightened scrutiny. A Title VII retaliation claim predicated on Knight’s alleged retaliatory supervision of Perry is not in the operative second amended complaint for the obvious reason that his supervision of Perry post-dates the amended pleading’s filing and, thus, had not yet occurred. While the operative complaint does set forth a Title VII retaliation claim, that claim does not allege that the filing of this lawsuit is the protected activity for which Perry suffered adverse action. At no time did Perry file a motion in the district court to amend the second amended complaint to add a Title VII retaliation claim based upon Knight’s alleged post-lawsuit retaliatory conduct, as this circuit generally requires. See Brown v. Snow, 440 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding the nonexistence of the Title

    ### Response:
    holding that a title vii retaliation claim was not properly before the court because although the plaintiff had not been fired when he filed his complaint the plaintiff never amended his complaint to include a claim of retaliation based on his termination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    concluded that Hampton had an opportunity to present evidence of prejudice. The trial court denied Hampton any such opportunity. Because prejudice is a necessary Barker factor and the trial court failed to comply with the instructions on remand, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s finding that Hampton was not denied a speedy trial. We reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court of Tunica County, and remand for a new hearing in which the parties will be allowed to present evidence related to the Barker factors. ¶ 26. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR. LAMAR, J., NOT PARTICIPATING. 1 . Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (<HOLDING>). 2 . One 1970 Mercury Cougar, VIN No.

    ### Response:
    holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing.” (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 461.) Henneberry fails, however, to provide the Court with any factual allegations that show any duty specifically owed to Henneberry that is separate and outside of a duty SCOA may have owed all of the shareholders. Simply stating a duty existed does not make it so where the preceding factual allegations do not support such a claim. See First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 772 (2d Cir.1994) (“ ‘[Cjourts do not accept conclusory allegations on the legal effect of the events plaintiff has set out if these allegations do not reasonably follow from his description of what happened.’ ” (quoting Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230, 233 (1st Cir.1977))); Salahuddin v. Jones, 992 F.2d 447, 449 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

    ### Response:
    holding district courts dismissal of plaintiffs claims proper where plaintiff only made wholly conclusory and inconsistent allegations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the United States of jurisdiction in public-utility rate cases”); id., at 8419 (remarks of Rep. Hancock) (“the Johnson bill seeks to [save time and money] by divesting the Federal courts of all jurisdiction in public-utility cases except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States after the final decision of the State court of last resort”). 23 This Court has long recognized the dangers inherent in disrupting the administration of state tax systems. See, e. g., Dows v. City of Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110 (1871) (“It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as li , at 299 (<HOLDING>); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the same considerations which have led federal courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes save in exceptional cases require a like restraint in the use of the declaratory judgment procedure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lu, such medical evidence would have been too speculative to have made a difference on the question of whether there was new and material evidence to reopen as to the claim for service connection of the veteran’s death. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b); Edenfield, 8 Vet.App. at 390-91 (as to nonprejudicial error); see also Dean v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 449, 455 (1995) (concluding that even if physician’s statement were of record, it would be insufficient to render claim well grounded “because it would be an opinion only as to the likelihood of the veteran’s subsequently developing Huntington’s chorea, not an opinion that the disability had its onset in, was aggravated by, or would otherwise be related to the appellant’s condition in service”); Johnson (Ethel) v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 423, 427-28 (1995) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion Upon consideration of the

    ### Response:
    holding that hearing officer had no obligation under 38 cfr  3103c2 to advise appellant as to physicians statement because that statement would not have helped prove the claim  that is that statement would not have provided a nexus with the veterans service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 162. Although Rule 39 provides for joinder in mandatory terms, “there is no arbitrary standard or precise formula for determining whether a particular person falls within its provision.” Cooper v. Tex. Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 204 (Tex.1974); see Kodiak Res., Inc., 361 S.W.3d at 248-49; Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 180. In this regard, we note that the trial court has “broad” discretion in deciding matters regarding joinder. Royal Petroleum Corp. v. Dennis, 160 Tex. 392, 332 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex.1960); Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 180. Similarly, the standard of review on severance is abuse of discretion. In re Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.). Appellees assert that joinder of the McAdams and Chilcoat 477 (1942) (<HOLDING>); Kodiak Res., Inc., 361 S.W.3d at 248-49

    ### Response:
    holding under prior rule regarding joinder that royalty owners under the other lease contracts in a unitized block are necessary parties to suit under prior version of rule 39
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requires that the property be acquired in joint names of husband and wife.”) (quoting Fratangelo v. Fratangelo, 360 Pa.Super. 487, 498, 520 A.2d 1195, 1201 (Pa.Super.Ct.1987)); Augello v. United States, No. 1:92-CV-697, 1993 WL 330472, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 1993) (“Under Pennsylvania law, a tenancy by the entirety is a special form of co-ownership that arises between husband and wife when property is placed in the name of both spouses.”); United States v. Cusumano, No. 90-00091-01, 1991 WL 274835, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 18, 1991) (“Property acquired in the names of both husband and wife is presumed to be held by the entireties, and the placing of property in the names of both spouses, without more, creates an entirety estate.”); Raffaele v. Granger, 100 F.Supp. 390, 391 (W.D.Pa.1951) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir.1952). The

    ### Response:
    holding that bank accounts in husbands and wifes joint names were property in a tenancy by the entirety
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the domain of expert testimony. The weight to be given such an opinion is for the finder of fact, in this case the commissioner, and that may be affected by the completeness of the premise given the expert and other surrounding circumstances. (Internal citations omitted.) The deputy’s reference to the physicians’ opinions reflects that he accepted such opinion and gave weight to it so as to find causation in this case. While the deputy’s findings of fact could have expanded on the details of causation, his reference to the opinion of the two treating physicians was sufficient. The deputy’s analysis adequately supports the deputy’s conclusion that the mental injury was compensable due to a traumatic work-related injury. See Mortimer v. Fruehauf Corp., 502 N.W.2d 12, 17 (Iowa 1993) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, a remand for further findings and

    ### Response:
    holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    acts because of the information she obtained as a public employee.” Kelly v. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 09-CV-2101 (JFB) (ETB), 2012 WL 1077677, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012). In the face of this clear and consistent case law, plaintiff was unable, in either her brief or at oral argument, to cite a single decision holding that speech analogous to the e-mails at issue here is protected under the First Amendment. Thus, pursuant to Garcetti and its progeny, the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that plaintiff was speaking as a public employee, rather than as a private citizen, in her internal correspondence to District employees. See Nadolecki v. William Floyd Union Free Sch. District, No. 15-CV-2915 (JMA) (AYS), 2016 WL 4768823, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2016) (<HOLDING>), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs complaints  were all pursuant to his official duties as a teacher because he made complaints regarding the reading program integration of classes the math curriculum special accommodations and services having to do with student ieps and the effects that scheduling cuts would have on his math class
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regard as improper[.]” Id. at 419. The same test for undue influence applies to wills and deeds, although the absence of independent advice may be more significant in the case of deeds than wills. Ryan v. Colombo, 77 Or App 71, 77, 712 P2d 139 (1985) (citations omitted). In such cases, the first question is whether there was a confidential relationship, in which the testator placed confidence in the beneficiary and the beneficiary exercised dominance over the testator. Knutsen v. Krippendorf, 124 Or App 299, 308, 862 P2d 509 (1993), rev den, 318 Or 381 (1994). Plaintiffs contend that, given Wilma’s role in administering Jack’s medication and taking him to medical appointments, among other factors, there was a confidential relationship. See In re Reddaway’s Estate, 214 Or at 421 (<HOLDING>); Ramsey v. Taylor, 166 Or App 241, 262-63, 999

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a caregiver and patient relationship may be confidential
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to defectively record their mortgage in reliance on a settled expectation that they could avoid the bank’s lien. We next address the presumption that an amendment altering a prior statute suggests that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the law “unless it clearly appears that the amendment was passed to clarify the legislature’s original intent.” Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Indiana Dept. of Ins., 868 N.E.2d 50, 56 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (citing Wright v. Fowler, 459 N.E.2d 386, 389-90 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (interpreting an amendment to have changed the law in part because the assembly added categories of employers to the statute and separately added provisions to provide procedures for addressing those employers)); Olatunji v. State, 788 N.E.2d 1268, 1272 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court of Indiana recently muddied

    ### Response:
    holding that a legislative amendment that appeared to approve the analysis of a recent indiana supreme court case was a clarification rather than an amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not provide transcripts from the hearing where the order was entered; her appeal only notes the order granting possession to the Trust, and at the sanctions hearings (transcripts of which Crockett did provide) she did not object to the entry of the order, only to the subsequent grant of possession. Even mindful that Crockett is proceeding pro se, we are unable to assess the initial entry of the protective order both because the point is raised for the first time on appeal, and because we have no record by which to evaluate the trial court’s exercise of discretion. See Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, 799 A.2d 381, 388 (D.C.2002) (arguments not raised below are normally spurned on appeal); Van Durr v. Kator & Scott, Chartered, 788 A.2d 579, 580-81 (D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Dudley Trust Found., 675 A.2d 45,

    ### Response:
    holding that this court was unable to reach alleged errors where pro se appellant did not provide an adequate record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    applied the relevant substantive law. Id. The grant of summary judgment in this case is reviewed in light of the quite summary procedural requirements provided by the statutory law of civil forfeitures. United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir.1983). 3 . Ordinarily, collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the party seeking to use it, or else it is waived. See, e.g., Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 840 F.2d 730, 735 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948, 109 S.Ct. 378, 102 L.Ed.2d 367 (1988). The government did not brief the issue in this case; however, we raise it sua sponte in order to affirm the district court’s decision. See Russell v. SunAmerica Sec., Inc., 962 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The preclusive effect of a state court

    ### Response:
    holding that a court can raise the issue of res judicata sua sponte in order to affirm a grant of summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “[n]ot all exceptional treatment is persecution.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir.2000). For example, in Zheng v. United States Att’y Gen., 451 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam), we held that the petitioner, who was dragged by his arms to a detention yard, detained for five days, forced to watch reeducation videos, to stand in the sun for two hours, and to sign a pledge not to practice his religion, failed to establish past persecution. Id. at 1289-92. Because Zheng had presented no evidence that he was physically injured, we concluded that the “five-day detention during which he was not harmed [did] not compel the conclusion that he experienced past persecution.” Id. at 1290; see also Djonda v. United States Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Tawm v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 740,

    ### Response:
    holding that a minor beating even in conjunction with threats did not compel a finding of persecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    negligent misrepresentation, estoppel, and breach of contract claims when the assignee sued only in its capacity as a third party health care provider). Defendant therefore misapplies the general rule of exclusivity to the facts of this case, which resemble those in The Meadows. In that case, an assignee of the plan participant filed negligent misrepresentation, estoppel, and breach of contract claims against the plan. The district court dismissed the action, stating that because the plaintiff sued in its capacity as assign-ee, ERISA preempted the state law claims. Id. at 1008. When the plaintiff filed similar claims based on its status as a third party provider, however, and not as an assignee, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s remand of the case to state court, /¿(<HOLDING>). In its complaint, its motion for remand, and

    ### Response:
    holding the state law claims were not preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the superior court “for appointment of mental health experts,” Ariz. R.Crim. P. 11.2(d), the supreme court evinced its intent that, once a court has made the reasonable grounds finding, the matter move on to the next phase of the Rule 11 process and the issue of a defendant’s competency be determined after full proceedings consistent with the rule. See, e.g., Ariz. R.Crim. P. 11.3(a) (requiring court to appoint two or more mental health experts upon finding reasonable grounds for examination exist). Were we to interpret Rule 11.2 as permitting the superior court to review another court’s reasonable grounds finding, we would be inserting words into the rule that do not exist. This we cannot and will not do. See Cervantes v. Cates, 206 Ariz. 178, ¶ 24, 76 P.3d 449, 455 (App.2003) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14 For the reasons stated, we conclude the

    ### Response:
    recognizing appellate courts are not free to rewrite rules
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    each factor.” Hemmer, 729 F.2d at 17; see also Wellington, 102 F.3d at 506 (explaining that a district court is “not required to weigh all statutory factors equally” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts have unanimously held that a district court does not abuse its discretion in placing primary emphasis on the gravity of the juvenile’s offense. See Hemmer, 729 F.2d at 18 (“In light of the gravity of the crime involved [ (armed robbery) ], weighed against the other five section 5032 factors, we cannot say that the district court struck the balance improperly.”); see also Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 307 (explaining that “[t]he seriousness of the offense, for instance, can be given more weight than other factors” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wellington, 102 F.3d at 506 (<HOLDING>); A.R., 38 F.3d at 705 (holding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court is entitled to give more weight to the seriousness of the offense than to other factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “the mere imposition of hardship on family relationships ... necessarily accompanies the order of any prison sentence”). Here, the district court explained that a below-Guidelines sentence was warranted because the Guidelines range was based on Edwards’s intended loss, not the actual loss he caused. But it is unexceptional that the actual losses were less than the intended losses. I expect the amount the run-of-the-mill thief intends to steal is usually greater than the amount he actually steals. The fact that the losses attributed to Edwards were intended rather than actual simply reflects the fact that Edwards got caught. He should not benefit from that fact. Fourth, we should consider whether the district court “base[d] the sentence on impermissible factors.” Hunt, 521 F.3d at 649 (<HOLDING>). Here, although the district court’s sentence

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a belowguidelines sentence in part because it disagreed with the jurys finding that the defendant had the intent to defraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tire had at one time possessed confidential information for the construction of OTR’s Outrigger tire. The district court therefore drew a reasonable inference that West, through its manufacturer, improperly used trade secrets related to OTR’s Outrigger tire. See id. 3. The district court did not clearly err in finding that OTR was likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. Loss of control over business reputation and damage to goodwill are cognizable irreparable harms in the trademark infringement context. See Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir.2013). Although the district court’s finding of reputational injury was not based on any evidence that West’s lookalike tire was an inferior product, see id. at 1250-21 (<HOLDING>), the court’s finding of goodwill injury was

    ### Response:
    holding that likelihood of irreparable harm must be based on evidence in the record not unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm the plaintiff might suffer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    lot. Finally, the third paragraph again declares that Tilbury I and Tilbury II are separate lots that could be remodeled or replaced subject to compliance with the current Deed Restrictions’ regulations on matters such as building materials, color, and location relative to the setback lines. Plaintiffs contend the declaratory judgment does not duplicate their preexisting pleadings because, in their view, these declarations deal with future rights. As explained above, however, the declarations focus on present compliance with the Deed Restrictions. Moreover, to the extent these declarations have future operation, they duplicate the relief plaintiffs sought by injunction. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Luxemburg, 93 S.W.3d 410, 425-26 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs also cite cases addressing the

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiff had no right to recover attorneys fees under declaratory judgments act because declarations requested no greater or different relief than claim for injunctive relief for constitutional violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    should be made only rarely, and because the Court has already adjusted downward Class Counsels’ rates and hours to make them reasonable, the Court DECLINES to make any adjustment to the lodestar figure. See Clark, 803 F.2d at 990-91 (1986). Accordingly, the Court awards attorneys’ fees in the amount of $197,318.27. II. Costs “An award of standard costs in federal district court is normally governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), even in diversity cases.” Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., 342 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.2003) (citation omitted); see Drumm v. Morningstar, Inc., 695 F.Supp.2d 1014 (N.D.Cal.2010) (“Since the awarding of costs here is procedural, not substantive, federal law governs.”); In re Glacier Bay, 746 F.Supp. 1379, 1393-94 (D.Alaska 1990) (<HOLDING>). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)

    ### Response:
    holding that federal law regarding costs applies rather than more generously interpreted state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ... mitigation.”). In either event, this court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ or DEP on this issue. In this appeal, the Authority argues that section 373. urance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)). While the Authority cites to legislative history that seems to indicate that the legislature’s intent was to require the mitigation to “fully offset” the adverse impacts, the statute as enacted does not contain that language, and this court cannot rewrite the statute to say so. See State v. Jett, 626 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1993) (“It is a settled rule of statutory construction that unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction, however wise it may seem to alter the plain language.”); Ervin v. Collins, 85 So.2d 852, 855 (Fla.1956) (<HOLDING>). Ironically the statute itself, as written,

    ### Response:
    holding that the court is not permitted to revise an unambiguous statute by engrafting  our views as to how it should have been written
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    principles, this Court has long recognized three categories of police interactions with private citizens: (1) a full-scale arrest, which requires probable cause, see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209-10, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 277 (Tenn.2012); (2) a brief investigatory detention, requiring reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Tenn. 2012); and (3) a brief police-citizen encounter, requiring no objective justification, see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746, 756 (Tenn.2011). See United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d at 656; State v.

    ### Response:
    recognizing a threetier analysis for warrantless encounters with police
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and definite promise that the parties would enter into a legally executable lease that would induce detrimental reliance by Andersen. See Moore, 2007 WL 2331021, at *6-7 (rejecting a landlord’s claim that a tenant’s promise that he “will start putting the package together ... [the tenant] would like to get this in the June 17th meeting for approval.... This is a busy time for everyone ..., but lets get this deal done, behind us, and open!” was a “clear and definite promise”). Andersen argues that Kranz’ internal e-mail to Gower on February 25 was a clear and definite promise that FCOA would sign the lease. However, this cannot constitute a clear and definite promise because the promisee must be aware of the promisor’s promise. See Johnson v. Pattison, 185 N.W.2d 790, 795-96 (Iowa 1971) (<HOLDING>). Even if Kranz’ e-mail constituted a clear and

    ### Response:
    holding that promissory estoppel existed when the grantor agreed to use the property for only residential purposes took title with knowledge of that promise and the grantee relied upon that agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tenants, and brokers verified that the increased proximity decreased the building’s market value. Further, contrary to the court of appeals’ conclusion, there is evidence that other landowners in the area did not suffer the same injuries. The land north of INP was vacant, and the properties south of INP endured only minor changes. Additionally, there is no evidence that the frontage road’s relocation impaired the perceived safety of any buildings on those properties or placed them in violation of city ordinances or deed restrictions. And, in any event, even if the condemnation did affect some neighboring landowners similarly, “injury to several landowners on the same street is not community injury simply because they all suffer alike.” Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 781. In sum, .1965) (<HOLDING>). The court of appeals agreed with the State

    ### Response:
    holding that landowner was entitled to compensation because the condemnation destroyed all reasonable access to remainder property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Thus, Blair extended Bassler beyond its reach. Neither Blair nor Bassler offers authority for the proposition that the Borrowers need a private right of action under Section 7(d) or Section 29(b) in order to assert an affirmative defense that the Notes are void and unenforceable because they violate Section 7(d) and Regulations G and U. No private right of action under a statute is necessary to assert a violation of that statute as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 86, 102 S.Ct. 851, 70 L.Ed.2d 833 (1982) (allowing defense under § 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act where defendant had no private right of action to enforce the statute); United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 566, 81 S.Ct. 294, 5 L.Ed.2d 268 (1961) (<HOLDING>); E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186

    ### Response:
    holding conflict of interest on the part of a government official who participated in contract negotiations in violation of federal law rendered contract unenforceable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    formal County policies or longstanding County practices. a. Seizure under § 5150 It is undisputed that Deputy Perez made the decision to take Harvey into custody pursuant to § 5150. Section 5150 provides that “[w]hen any person, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled, a peace officer [or other designated persons] may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into custody and place him or her in a facility designated by the county and approved by the State Department of Mental Health as a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation.” See Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code § 5150. The lawfulness of a detention under § 5150 is measured by Fourth Amendment standards. See Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); People v. Triplett, 144 Cal.App.3d 283, 287,

    ### Response:
    holding seizure of suspected mentally ill person for psychiatric evaluation is analogous to a criminal arrest and must therefore be supported by probable cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    position on what constitutes ""examined.” 6 . According to Citrix’s invalidity expert Dr. Jeffay, the name ""ReadMe” was a play on the Alice in Wonderland story, in which Alice confronts magical treats labeled ""Eat Me” and ""Drink Me.” 7 . However, courts have found software manuals to be sufficiently enabling. See Microstrategy Inc. v. Bus. Objects Americas, 410 F.Supp.2d 348, 362-63 (D.Del.2006), aff'd, 238 Fed.Appx. 605 (Fed.Cir.2007) (""manuals are themselves prior art and provide clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support a conclusion of invalidity”). 8 . Because the Court will limit its analysis to prior public use, Pixion's reliance on cases concerned only with prior publication is unavailing. See e.g. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). 9 . See also Interconnect Planning Corp. v.

    ### Response:
    holding prior publication must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim internal citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cannot dispose of the tortious interference counts. See doc. 184, at 55 n. 88. 13 . See amended complaint, doc. 172, ¶ 19.3(d) (allegation (7)); ¶ 19.3(c)-(d) (all other allegations). 14 . See Burton v. Linotype Co., 556 So.2d 1126, 1128 (Fla.3d DCA 1989) (“Fraud in the inducement and deceit are independent torts for which compensatory and punitive damages may be recovered”), citing Sprayberry v. Sheffield Auto & Truck Serv., Inc., 422 So.2d 1073 (Fla.lst DCA 1982) (“[0]ne who has been fraudulently induced into a contract may elect to stand by that contract and sue for damages for the fraud”); accord, Gold v. Wolkowitz, 430 So.2d 556, 557 (Fla.3d DCA 1983), review denied, 437 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1983); see also Wallis v. South Florida Savings Bank, 574 So.2d 1108, 1110 (Fla.2d DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>); Lou Brachrodt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Savage, 570

    ### Response:
    recognizing fraud in the inducement claims independent of contract claims without discussion of economic loss rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    capacity to make that choice intelligently and understanding^,’ any subsequent plea should be deemed involuntary as a matter of law and the appellate court would have the authority to reverse absent a motion to withdraw or a contemporaneous objection. Id. at 213 (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.165(b)(2)). A. Case number 2014-CJ-655 The unverified “I choose to represent myself’ form and the trial court’s five questions to D.A.C. are inadequate to constitute the “thorough” waiver of counsel required by rule 8.165(b)(2). See T.G., 800 So.2d at 211 (“Although the inquiry for juveniles must be at least equal to that accorded adults, courts should be even more eáreful when accepting a waiver of counsel from juveniles.”); A.S. v. State, 62 So.3d 695, 697 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>); G.T. v. State, 948 So.2d 900, 902 (Fla. 2d

    ### Response:
    holding fundamental error occurred because the trial court failed to inquire thoroughly whether the juvenile understood her right to counsel and had the capacity to intelligently choose to waive counsel and failed to obtain the required verified written waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Further, Sattler cannot demonstrate a legitimate claim of entitlement to a particular prison grievance procedure. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988). Sattler’s claim that he did not receive adequate notice that prison regulations prohibited being naked in his cell, however, may have merit. Due process requires fair notice of prohibited conduct before a sanction can be imposed. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949-50, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988). Although “indecent exposure” was proscribed in the prison’s regulation on sexual misconduct, it is not clear that this prohibition would include Sattler’s nudity within the confines of his own cell. See United States v. Christopher, 700 F.2d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). To the extent Sattler has alleged a due

    ### Response:
    holding that a regulation must sufficiently convey the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices to avoid unconstitutional vagueness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    giving rise to their complaint occurred. 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1309, at 696 (2d ed.1990). In some cases, however, the substantive na ture of the lawsuit and the general rules of pleading require the plaintiff to allege when defendant’s illegal acts occurred. Id. Significantly, courts have required that a plaintiff plead time when the events in question spanned a number of years and when the date plaintiff discovered his injury appeared to be remote in time. See, e.g., Bankest Imports, Inc. v. ISCA Corporation, 717 F.Supp. 1537 (S.D.Fla.1989) (requiring a more definite statement of time and place where events underlying breach of contract claim spanned seven years); Stewart Coach Indus., Inc. v. Moore, 512 F.Supp. 879 (D.Ohio 1981) (<HOLDING>). A claim that the applicable statute of

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff has a duty to plead the date of discovery of fraud where the alleged fraud apparently occurred at a remote time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is not.’ ” Id. (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188, 96 S.Ct. 2909) (alteration in original). In the case of statutory aggravating circumstances in a capital punishment scheme, a circumstance may be so vague as to provide no such meaningful basis for distinguishing a death penalty case from other murders and, thereby, run afoul of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. Such “[c]laims of vagueness ... characteristically assert that the challenged provision fails adequately to inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty and as a result leaves them and appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid in Furman.” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-362, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29, 100

    ### Response:
    holding that oklahomas especially heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the objective reasonableness of the expectation of privacy considering the specific facts of the case.” Gomez, 16 F.3d at 256. See also, McCaster, 193 F.3d at 83-84 (8th Cir.1997) (finding abandonment where the defendant told officers bag was not his and that he had never seen it before). Even without this express disclaimer by Defendant, the seizure and search of the trash bag would still not be subject to suppression. The Supreme Court held in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988), that there is no expectation of privacy in a trash bag left in an area accessible by others, including animals, children, scavengers and members of the public. Id. 486 U.S. at 40, 108 S.Ct. 1625; accord, United States v. Trice, 864 F.2d 1421, 1423-24 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The lack of an expectation of privacy is even

    ### Response:
    holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed in trash cans
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doctrine as codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107. (Def.’s’ Br. at 2). In support of their fair-use defense argument, the defendants have submitted video of the original WWITB video and the South Park episode “Canada on Strike.” (Docket # 10). Ordinarily, courts may not rely upon materials outside of the pleadings when considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). There is an exception to this general rule, however, where the material in question is expressly referenced in the complaint and is central to the plaintiffs claim. See Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir.2002); see generally Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Here, there is no doubt that the two videos

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice in deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Ann. § 1.201(b)(10) (Vernon Supp.2006) (defining “conspicuous” for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code). Nothing appears on the face of the two-page, single-spaced “Bank of America Mortgage Addendum to Contract” to attract the attention of a reasonable person to the jury waiver provision when he looks at the addendum. See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex.1993) (recognizing that to be conspicuous, something must appear on the face of the contract to attract the attention of a reasonable person when he looks at it). Nor did Martin or Powell initial the waiver provision, which would have established their actual knowledge of the waiver. See, e.g., Sydlik v. REEIII, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 329, 332-33 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, factor six, the conspicuousness

    ### Response:
    holding that signatorys initials by specific indem nity provision established signatorys actual knowledge of provision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in essence a volunteer to reimbursement of attorney and accounting fees is not an absurd result. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Lamie has pointed the way toward a strict reading of parts of the Code dealing with compensation. See Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004). It is true that section 503(b) is “inclusive” in its listing of administrative expenses. See Code §§ 503(b), 102(3). However, the specificity (and exclusive language) of section 503(b)(4) suggests a limited scope for that category of expense. Moreover, section 503(b)(4) represents a limited exception to the general rule that general unsecured creditors are not entitled to payment for professional fees incurred. See In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). For all these reasons, the court holds the

    ### Response:
    holding that a creditors attorney must ordinarily look to its own client for payment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial court to strike the improper findings of violation). AFFIRMED and REMANDED with directions. WOLF, C.J.; PADOVANO and POLSTON, JJ., concur. 1 . The State argues that the trial court’s finding that appellant violated his probation by leaving the scene of a traffic accident involving property damage was permissible because leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage only, in violation of section 316.061, Florida Statutes (2002), is a lessor included offense of leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, in violation of section 316,027 (2002). The trial court did not, however, find that appellant committed a lesser offense. Rather, it found that appellant committed both offenses. This cannot be so. See Peterson v. State, 775 So.2d 376, 377-78 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The Appellant also argues that the trial

    ### Response:
    holding that convictions for both leaving the scene of an accident involving injury and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage only were inconsistent and therefore could not be sustained
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and remand the case to the district court. Riley and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J. 1 MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1). 2 MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i). 3 Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, ante, p 482, n 11, defendant has not been charged with conspiracy to deliver narcotics to Hoyt in Florida or in Michigan. Defendant is charged with conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver, and possession with intent to deliver does not logically require two persons for its completion. A conspiracy between Hoyt and his Michigan partner already existed before Hoyt traveled to Florida to purchase cocaine. It is this preexisting Michigan conspiracy that the prosecutor alleges that Blume became a member of by all y murder, 50 U Chi LR 1431, 1433-1439 (1983) (<HOLDING>). 11 LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (2d ed), §

    ### Response:
    recognizing three bases common law or territorial significant activity and integral relation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    understanding of the English language and the complexity of the proceedings, issues, and testimony. United States v. Khehra, 396 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir.2005). Applying those factors, the court in Khehra did not find error in the trial court’s refusal to appoint an interpreter for a defendant whose native language was a Punjabi dialect, but who communicated in English to his customers and vendors on a regular basis, failed to assert any problem with communication, informed his counsel that he did not need an interpreter, had evidence presented against him at trial of him communicating in English while committing the alleged crime, and did not have a complex trial. Id. Similarly, in United States v. Osuna, 3 Fed.Appx. 739, 740-41 (10th Cir.2001), cert. de 2d 505, 508-09 (1989) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied, superseded on other grounds by

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court need not appoint an interpreter where counsel indicated that he could communicate with defendant and that defendant could understand questions and answers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with our Davis approach of analyzing the testimonial nature of a statement independently of its admissibility under the rules of evidence. See Moore v. State, 169 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Tex.App.-Texarkana July 26, 2005, no pet. h.). 14 . See Spencer v. State, 162 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (witness initiated contact); Wilson v. State, 151 S.W.3d 694, 697-98 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. filed) (finding that admission of non-testifying witness’s self-initiated statements to police officers in response to unstructured questions during the investigation of a crime did not violate Crawford)-, Davis v. State, No. 2-03-305-CR, 2005 WL 183141, at *2, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 712, at *4 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Jan.27, 2005, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Forrest, 164 N.C.App. 272,

    ### Response:
    holding that voluntary statements to police initiated by witness are not interrogation and therefore are nontestimonial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (2004). “Common issues ... predominate if they ‘ha[ve] a direct impact on every class member’s effort to establish liability and on every class member’s entitlement to injunctive and monetary relief.’ ” Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1255 (11th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Each party must be able to prove their own individual case, and in so doing, prove the case of the other unnamed class members. See Earnest v. Amoco Oil Co., 859 So.2d 1255, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). If Plaintiffs must still present a great deal of individualized proof or argue individualized legal points to establish most or all of the elements of their claims, class certification is not appropriate. See Klay, 382 F.3d at 1255; see also Terry L. Braun, P.A. v. Campbell, 827 So.2d 261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). A. Failure to prove elements of claims Here,

    ### Response:
    holding that where both liability and damages depend on individual factual determinations claims may only be determined on individual basis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the burdens of the regulation upon the interstate market, while excluding similar in-state interests. The court concludes therefore that, in light of the exemption for the local preference, Section 115A.47 is not evenhanded in its application. Further, in support of its argument that the effects of Section 115A.47 are merely incidental, the State asserts that any impact on interstate commerce is small because most waste is already managed in Minnesota. The MPCA estimates that approximately 193,000 tons of Minnesota waste per year, or four percent of the total waste generated in Minnesota, is managed outside of the State. The court finds that this argument misconstrues the nature of the incidental impact on interstate commerce that is permissible. See Waste Systems, 985 F.2d at 1387 (<HOLDING>). The volume of interstate commerce impacted is

    ### Response:
    holding that the loss of 10400 tons annually was not incidental
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    harm in order to further the military goals of that organization. Id. at 323-24. Judge Williams focused instead on those who (1) ""attempt!] or engage!] in belligerent acts against the United States, either domestically or in a foreign combat zone; (2) on behalf of an enemy force.” Id. at 285. 32 . See generally id. at 230-31 (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment); but see id. at 314-22 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that law-of-war principles must account for recent developments in how warfare is conducted). 33 . Id. at 231 (emphasis added). . 34 . al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 555 U.S. 1066, 129 S.Ct. 680, 172 L.Ed.2d 649 (2008). 35 . al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220, 129 S.Ct. 1545, 173 L.Ed.2d 671. 36 . See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (<HOLDING>); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, P.L. 109-148,

    ### Response:
    holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to guantanamo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    manner. See id. IV Finally, Queen challenges his sentence, contending that the district court,.in adjusting his offense level upward by two levels based on perjury, failed to make findings detailed enough to satisfy the requirements for an upward adjustment outlined in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). Under Dunnigan, in. order to make an adjustment for perjury, a court must find that all of the elements of perjury were present in the defendant’s testimony. That is, the court must find that the defendant’s testimony was untruthful as to a material matter, and that, the false testimony was willful. Id. at 94-95, 113 S.Ct. at 1116-17. Although “it is preferable for a district court to address each element of the alleged perju Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907,

    ### Response:
    holding evidence of prior witness intimidation admissible to show criminal intent and guilty conscience
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by Pub.L. No. 76-2004, § 4 (eff. July 1, 2004); Pub.L. No. 82-2004, § 2 (eff. July 1, 2004); and Pub.L. No. 2-2005, § 36 (eff. April 25, 2005)). 2 . Ind.Code § 9-30-5-1 (2004). 3 . Ind.Code § 9-30-5-5. 4 . We note that, had the jury found Radiek guilty of both operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class C felony and operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II causing death as a class C felony, the trial court could not have entered judgment of conviction on both verdicts due to double jeopardy principles. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that ""[ejnhancement of one offense for the very same harm as another is not permissible.” Carrico v. State, 775 N.E.2d 312, 314 (Ind. 2002); see also Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind.2002) (<HOLDING>). SULLIVAN, Judge, dissenting. The jury did not

    ### Response:
    holding that where a burglary conviction is elevated to a class a felony based on the same bodily injury that forms the basis of a class b robbery conviction the two cannot stand
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the FLSA is the exclusive remedy for FLSA created rights, particularly where the state law claims arise out of the same facts and circumstances as the federal claims, thus the plaintiffs are impermissibly attempting to enforce the FLSA by using Rule 23 to create an opt-out class. Id. at 4-5, 7. According to the defendants, allowing an opt-out class on parallel state law wage and hour claims would frustrate the FLSA’s § 216(b) goal of “limiting private FLSA plaintiffs to employees who asserted claims in their own right and freeing employers of the burden of representative actions.” Id. at 6-7 (quoting Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480(1989)). In contrast, the plaintiffs argue there is no conflict between the 4, 1152-54 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not

    ### Response:
    holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to rely upon them. However, in each of those cases there was no evidence presented (beyond the fact that the employees commenced or continued to work) that the employees assented to the policies. When an employer offers to restrict its power to discharge, the employee’s assent to the restriction need not be evinced by anything more than commencing or continuing employment. As a matter of public policy, we see no need for any further manifestation of assent. Once the employee has successfully shown that the employer has demonstrated an intent to restrict its power to discharge, absent evidence to the contrary, the court will imply in law that the requirement of mutual assent has been met. There need be no separate factual finding of mutual assent. Accord Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892 (<HOLDING>). In this case, if Paxton made a sufficiently

    ### Response:
    holding employer statements of policy can give rise to contractual rights without evidence of mutual agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and were in any event rescinded before they were enforced; and the last was a prudent precaution for this employer in these circumstances. Kader has demonstrated that an uneasy and stressful environment existed, but he has adduced no evidence to support an inference that his employer intentionally created an intolerable workplace. Kader’s showing is therefore insufficient as a matter of law: a claim.of constructive discharge must be dismissed as a matter of law unless the evidence is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to infer that the employer deliberately created working conditions that were “so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.” Stetson, 995 F.2d at 361 (citations and internal quotations omitted) (<HOLDING>). See also Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding no claim for constructive discharge where employee was dissatisfied with his compensation assignments and criticisms of his work but rank and salary were never reduced
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in a civil legal malpractice action for breach of contract. In the instant case, the Plaintiffs requested damages “including, but not limited to, the loss of the value of BCA’s stock (estimated to be $2.5M), and the interest and penalties that have accrued on the taxes since July 14, 2006, when the Company was sold [to] Avant.” Amended Complaint, 1/10/11, par. 39. Defendants contend that the above claim for damages is inconsistent with proof of actual loss as required in legal malpractice actions. See Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa.Super. 599, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs’

    ### Response:
    holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages speculative harm or the threat of future harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    filed its petition in the justice court against Basil Brown and all occupants, one of whom was Basil’s wife Yvonne. After Basil and Yvonne signed and filed an answer, the justice court signed a judgment of eviction against Basil. In response, Basil and Yvonne signed and filed a notice of appeal from that judgment pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 749, and Yvonne signed and filed a pauper’s affidavit pursuant to rule 749a. After the case was appealed to the county court at law, Apex amended its petition to name Yvonne as one of the defendants, and Yvonne testified at the de novo trial. Both an appeal bond filed pursuant to rule 749 and a pauper’s affidavit filed pursuant to rule 749a operate as an answer. See Hughes v. Habitat Apts., 860 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex.1993) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Montgomery v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No.

    ### Response:
    holding paupers affidavit sufficed as a pro se answer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1 . Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term Disability Plan, 493 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir.2007). 2 . Id. 3 . Id. 4 . Corry v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 499 F.3d 389, 397 (5th Cir.2007). 5 . Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn,-U.S.-,-, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989)). 6 . Ellis v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 394 F.3d 262, 270 n. 18 (5th Cir.2004). 7 . Corry, 499 F.3d at 397 (quoting Ellis, 394 F.3d at 273) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). 8 . Ellis, 394 F.3d at 273. 9 . Bellaire Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 97 F.3d 822, 828 (5th Cir.1996). 10 . Duhon v. Texaco, Inc., 15 F.3d 1302, 1309 (5th Cir.1994). 11 .See Duhon, 15 F.3d at 1308 (<HOLDING>). 12 . See 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1274

    ### Response:
    holding that a plan administrator did not abuse its discretion in denying disability benefits to a sixtyfiveyearold man where medical evidence showed he was capable of performing sedentary to light work despite being unable to squat stoop bend or lift more than twentyfive pounds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King, Orín S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 6.9(b) at 824 (3d ed.2007) (""it is not in the sense of shrewdness that Miranda speaks of intelligent waiver, and thus in this context intelligence is not equated with wisdom”) (quoting Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735 (3d Cir.1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 28 . See Dolchok v. State, 639 P.2d 277, 281 (Alaska 1982); Trumbly v. State, 515 P.2d 707, 708 (Alaska 1973); cf. Bowker v. State, 373 P.2d 500, 501-02 (Alaska 1962). 29 . 100 P.3d 440 (Alaska App.2004). 30 .422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). 31 . 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). 32 . Crawford, 100 P.3d at 446-47. 33 . Stock v. State, 191 P.3d 153, 156 (Alaska App.2008); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 86) (<HOLDING>); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 548 A.2d 887,

    ### Response:
    holding a suspects request for some time to think alone was not an invocation of the right to silence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statutes, it does not express a legislative intent to override the double jeopardy principle prohibiting the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense, i.e., a primary offense and one lesser included within it. See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734; Turner, 221 Va. at 529-30, 273 S.E.2d at 46-47. Thus, I would hold the Commonwealth may simultaneously prosecute an individual for aggravated involuntary manslaughter and a lesser-included offense but double jeopardy protections prevent it from imposing multiple punishments for those crimes because (1) they constitute only one offense and (2) the legislature has not clearly expressed an intent to permit the imposition of multiple punishments. Cf. Phillips v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 548, 553, 514 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1999) (<HOLDING>). A second set of interpretations involves the

    ### Response:
    recognizing legislature knows difference between prosecution and conviction by noting former jeopardy provisions of code  192294 provide that if the same act be a violation of two or more statutes  conviction under one of such statutes  shall be a bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other or others and holding that if the legislature had intended that the statutory bar apply to  felony cases tried in the circuit court after the resolution in district court of misdemeanor charges arising out of the same act it would have provided that a conviction for a criminal offense arising out of one act would bar a later conviction for another offense arising out of the same act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its character. Woertman v. People, 804 P.2d 188, 190 (Colo.1991). Such evidence ""forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury."" People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Colo.1994) (quoting United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir.1985)); see People v. Lobato, 187 Colo. 285, 289-90, 530 P.2d 493, 496 (1975) (""[Where ... the events leading up to a crime are a part of the scenario which explain the setting in which it occurred, no error is committed by permitting the jury to view the criminal episode in the context in which it happened.""). For example, res gestae evidence can be used to explain the cireumstances surrounding an arrest. People v. Walters, 821 P.2d 887, 890 (Colo.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Evidence considered to be part of the res

    ### Response:
    holding that sheriffs testimonythat when he arrived on the scene he believed that a crime was occurringwas admissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an ERISA plan administrator to conduct or permit discovery. Id. The district court’s remand for further development of the record indicated that the district court would refuse to uphold the decision to expel the employer on the existing record. Id. But we noted that the pension fund “remain[ed] free, on remand, to confirm or reinstate the expulsion order on the existing record and then defend its decision in the district court. The issue would then be reviewable on appeal from the court’s final judgment.” Id. We then held that “[t]he fact that an interlocutory discovery order may be onerous or inconvenient does not make the order immediately appeal-able under the collateral order doctrine.” Id.; see also Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Liberty relies on Chronister in support of

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts order remanding an erisa benefits determination to a plan administrator was nonfinal and therefore not appealable after the remand to plan administrator plan participant still could appeal the district courts decision that erisa preempted her state law claim and if successful she would be able to pursue punitive damage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court to Claims Court. In the instant matter, this very court is the proper forum for the proceeding erroneously filed in our district court. That fact should make the case for transfer all the more compelling. This court’s qualification as the proper forum also suggests the appropriateness of our rendering the transfer decision here and now. It would be a curious procedure indeed to remand this aging matter to the district court so that a district judge could decide whether or not to ticket as a “transfer” the parties’ return trip here. Nor is such a convoluted procedure necessary to a fair decision: all the considerations relevant to “the interest of justice” appear from the record to be within our plain view. See Brock v. L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc., 773 F.2d 1377, 1388 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). To assure that we have given that interest

    ### Response:
    holding that remand is unnecessary when only one conclusion is supportable on the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the two-prong test set forth in Terry v. Ohio.” United States v. Nee, 261 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir.2001). “First, we ask whethe not have a key to the closet does not defeat standing because he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the room containing the closet. ORDER The motion to suppress is ALLOWED. 1 . Nearby, on Route 44, the Sheriffs office instituted a ruse called the Sugar Tree stop. A sign states that there is a drug stop ahead with drug-sniffing canines. When cars take the ""Sugar Tree” exit, cruisers follow them in order to detect a motor vehicle violation. Once a car is stopped, if the inhabitants don't consent to a search, the car is held until a canine arrives. This practice has been heavily litigated. See United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 827-28 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005,

    ### Response:
    holding that the sugar tree checkpoint program violated the fourth amendment when officers operating the checkpoint were instructed to stop every vehicle that took the exit regardless of whether a traffic violation had occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.” Other circuits have uniformly held that § 3161(b)’s thirty-day rule is not violated “[w]hen a defendant is indicted within the thirty-day period and then re-indicted on identical charges based on identical facts after the expiration of the thirty-day period.” United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 151 (6th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Perez, 845 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir.1988) (finding that initial indictment returned by a grand jury whose term had expired tolled the thirty-day period such that a subsequent valid indictment which was “identical in all material respects to the void indictment” was timely); United States v. Mitchell, 723 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rabb, 680 F.2d 294, 297 (3d

    ### Response:
    holding that when initial indictment was filed within the thirtyday period a superseding indictment filed outside the thirtyday window which did not change the original charges did not violate the speedy trial act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the injury became manifest. In the alternative, he asserts that the side effects resulting from the castration represent an injury that is “separate and distinct” from the original mutilation and, accordingly, the cause of action did not accrue until discovery. Since we hold, infra, that Briley’s cause of action against those who participated in the “plea bargain” did not accrue until he discovered the fraud or could have done so in the exercise of reasonable diligence, we need not reach the merits of these assertions. 6 . We are aware of California Code of Civil Procedure § 352 which allows for tolling the limitations period on account of minority, insanity, and imprisonment, none of which, however, is relevant here. See Ney v. State of California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir. 1971) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Indeed, it was a concern for the remedial

    ### Response:
    recognizing  3381 as the applicable statute of limitations for  1983 actions brought in california but nevertheless applying  3523 to a case where the plaintiff had been previously imprisoned
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.1996)(en banc) (citation omitted). A reviewing court does not assess the credibility of witnesses, but rather assumes “that the jury resolved all contradictions in testimony in favor of the Government.” Green, 599 F.3d at 367 (quoting United States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1402 (4th Cir.1993)). 1. As a preliminary matter, we reject the notion that Darby’s conviction should be vacated on the conspiracy charge merely because his co-conspirator Melvin Wright was acquitted on the same charge. It is well established that an acquittal of the appellant’s alleged co-conspirator does not necessitate that the appellant’s conviction be vacated. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Collins, 412 F.3d 515,

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant cannot challenge his conviction merely because it is inconsistent with jurys verdict of acquittal on another count
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to show bias or motive to lie it probable would have effected the trial’s outcome. In short, the Confrontation Clause error cannot be deem harmless under either the Chapman or Brecht standard. Brief in Supp. of Delayed Application for Leave to Appeal Denial of Mot. for Relief of Judgment at 20-21. As mentioned, it is not clear why the trial but only if its application trenches upon a defendant’s confrontation or due process rights. See Vasquez v. Jones, 496 F.3d 564, 573-74 (6th Cir.2007); Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 736-37 (6th Cir.2000). Those rights can be curtailed if the State has articulated “very substantial” interests served by the limitation on those rights. Vasquez, 496 F.3d at 573; see also Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (<HOLDING>). That begs the question here. The Sixth

    ### Response:
    holding that the right to confront and to crossexamine is not absolute and may in appropriate cases bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    where there was no evidence son was dishonest, financially irresponsible or self-dealing, or uncaring and did not tend to her needs); In re Moses, 273 Ga.App. 501, 615 S.E.2d 573 (2005) (affirming trial court's decision to appoint ward’s sister rather than daughter as guardian of the person where although there was statutory preference for children over siblings, evidence showed ward expressed preference for sister and daughter was neglectful and abusive to ward); In re Hodgman, 269 Ga.App. 34, 602 S.E.2d 925 (2004) (finding no abuse of discretion for trial court to depart from statutory preference in appointing guardians where evidence demonstrated son mismanaged ward's assets, acting in a manner contrary to the ward's best interest); Brown v. Storz, 710 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. App. E.D.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Whitton, supra note 5, at

    ### Response:
    holding evidence supported appointment of mother as guardian of incompetent ward where substantial evidence demonstrated wards spouse was a habitual drunkard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    constitutional rights, the specific relief which they presently request cannot be granted. We have already determined that the district court is without jurisdiction to review the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision that Guess’ license was properly revoked. Because of this decision, the relief the Patients seek, homeopathic care from Guess, cannot be given. In limiting their prayer for relief to an injunction against the Board’s revocation of Guess’ medical license, to the extent of the relief requested, the Patients become “a litigating agent of a person who was a party to a prior action_” Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449 n. 7 (1981) (citing St. Louis Typographical Union No. 8 v. Herald Co., 402 F.2d 553 (8th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>)). The Patients effectively seek to relitigate

    ### Response:
    holding that a union may not relitigate an action for severance pay which the employees previously lost even though the union facially asserts a new theory of recovery and was not involved in the initial action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testimony was admissible because it did not directly comment on whether the victim at issue had symptoms consistent with “rape trauma syndrome.” Id. In a later case, we allowed expert testimony to explain to a jury why children victims may delay reporting their sexual abuse. State v. Payton, 481 N.W.2d 325, 327 (Iowa 1992). Again, the expert witness avoided commenting directly on the child at issue and only testified generally about victims of sexual abuse. Id. We have also analyzed expert witness testimony under the hearsay exception. Under a hearsay analysis, when the child makes statements for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment, those statements fall under the hearsay exception contained in Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(4). See State v. Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d 167, 169-70 (Iowa 1998) (<HOLDING>). The child must make the statements to a

    ### Response:
    holding a social worker treating the child was permitted to testify to statements the child made about the abuse including the victims identification of the perpetrator because the statements were necessary to the treatment of ensuring the continued safety of the child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that portion of the agreement over twenty years ago, the Tennessee U.D.C. knew of Vanderbilt’s noncompliance, and the Tennessee U.D.C. did not file suit to enforce the agreement. The agreement regarding the name of the dormitory is another matter. Vanderbilt did not publicly announce its intention to rename Confederate Memorial Hall until September 2002, and the Tennessee U.D.C. filed its lawsuit seeking to enforce the portion of the agreement pertaining to the name of the dormitory well within any applicable statute of limitations. It would be fatuous to assert that the Tennessee U.D.C.’s delay of less than two months in filing the lawsuit was ""unreasonable” or that Vanderbilt was somehow prejudiced in the interval. Dennis Joslin Co. v. Johnson, 138 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). Vanderbilt did not renew this particular

    ### Response:
    holding that a laches defense must be premised on an unreasonable delay that has somehow prejudiced the party asserting the defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    addressing a different removal-related issue, has endorsed this reasoning, Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir.2005), and observed an admonishment from the United Stated Supreme Court that “the Federal courts should not sanction devices intended to prevent a removal to a Federal court where one has that right, and should be equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the Federal court.” Id. (citing Weaker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186, 27 S.Ct. 184, 51 L.Ed. 430 (1907)). The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have gone even further in protecting the rights of defendants. They have interpreted § 1446(b) as allowing each defendant thirty days from service to file a notice of removal, regardless of whether other defendants have so filed. Marano, 254 F.3d 753 (<HOLDING>); Brierly, 184 F.3d 527 (holding same). The

    ### Response:
    holding that the laterserved defendants  had thirty days from the date of service on them to file a notice of removal with the unanimous consent of their codefendants even though the firstserved codefendants did not file a notice of removal within thirty days of service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which, given the pleadings in this case, is how the occupants of Toyota vehicles allegedly were injured in the underlying cases and will be the focus at trial. See Moore v. Pulmosan Safety Equip. Corp., 278 S.W.3d 27, 38 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (concluding, in products liability action, that no substantial connection existed between defendant’s contacts with Texas and operative facts of litigation because focus of trial would be on injury allegedly caused in Louisiana by a defective product that was manufactured in New York). None of these activities establish contacts that bear a substantial connection to the operative facts of this litigation. See Info. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Rawlinson, 302 S.W.3d 392, 401 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Yfantis v. Balloun, 115 S.W.3d 175, 183

    ### Response:
    holding defendants ownership interest in texas company that was not party to lawsuit was not relevant to specific jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In addition to the compensation provided by this chapter, an employee who becomes either totally or partially disabled from an occupational disease is entitled to receive for treatment of the occupational disease, without limitation as to length of time or dollar amount, reasonable medical services, hospitalization, medicines, and other treatment approved by the division. (Emphasis added.) In response, the State Fund contends it is not responsible for the 1992 and 1993 surgeries because Caekaert aggravated his condition by working in the poultry business between 1988 and 1992. The State Fund asserts that the Workers’ Compensation Court correctly concluded that the ‘last injurious exposure doctrine” applies. See Belton v. Carlson Transport (1983), 202 Mont. 384, 389, 658 P.2d 405, 408 (<HOLDING>); EBI/Orion Group v. State Compensation Mutual

    ### Response:
    holding once a claimant reaches maximum healing or a medically stable condition the initial insurer at risk is not responsible for subsequent injuries or conditions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a jury; otherwise, it is considered to have demanded a jury trial on all the issues so triable. If the party has demanded a jury trial on only some issues, any other party may-within 10 days after being served with the demand or within a shorter time ordered by the court-serve a demand for a jury trial on any other or all factual issues triable by jury. (d) Waiver; Withdrawal. A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed. A proper demand may be withdrawn only if the parties consent. Fed.R.Civ.P. 38. Although ues will not give rise to a demand for a jury trial. Fredieu v. Rowan Cos., 738 F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir.1984). “New issues” do not relate to new theories of recovery. Id.; Trixler Brokerage Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 505 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). Rather, Rule 38(b) is concerned with issues

    ### Response:
    holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal.App.3d 654, 109 Cal.Rptr. 269 (1973); Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So.2d 596 (La.App.1976), writ denied, 340 So.2d 990 (La.1977); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.Civ.App.1978); Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981); Tingle v. Arnold, Cate, & Allen, 129 Ga.App. 134, 199 S.E.2d 260 (1973); Brainard v. Brown, 91 A.D.2d 287, 458 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1983). We find these cases to be dis-positive in deciding the case at bar. The Code of Professional Responsibility is designed not to create a private cause of action for infractions of disciplinary rules, but to establish a remedy solely disciplinary in nature. Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff supra.” 521 So.2d at 23. See also Ex parte Toler, 710 So.2d 415 (Ala.1998)(<HOLDING>); Gaylard v. Homemakers of Montgomery, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Bealieau, 2008 WL 4372761, *4 (D.Mass.2008) (finding Garcetti inapplicable to “public officials”); Miller v. Town of Hull, Mass., 878. F.2d 523, 530 (1st Cir.1989) (stating that the court had “no difficulty in finding that the act of voting on public issues by a member of a public agency or board comes within, the freedom of speech guarantee of the first amendment” in a retaliatory discharge claim by a board member, although additionally noting that a State statute permitted removal only for “inefficiency,, neglect of duty or misconduct in office”). Other federal courts have rejected arguments based on Bond or Miller, however, the facts of those cases distinguish them from the holdings of Bond and Miller. See Shields v. Charter Tp. of Comstock, 617 F.Supp.2d 606 (W.D.Mich.2009) (<HOLDING>); Rash-Aldridge v. Ramirez, 96 F.3d 117, 119

    ### Response:
    holding that a town board could prevent an elected member from speaking at a town meeting where the board member could not identify any topic of discussion he was prevented from exploring during the meeting of the board to discuss the same issues where he was given ample time to speak
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (stating that ""appellate courts must apply a 'clearly erroneous’ standard of appellate review to a trial court’s ruling on a Batson claim"" because ""the trial court is in the best position to determine whether a prosecutor’s facially race-neutral explanation for a peremptory strike is genuinely race-neutral""); Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 421-22 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (stating that the trial judge is in a unique position to determine whether a prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge for race-neutral reasons, therefore the trial judge's decision is accorded great deference and will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous). 32 . We note that neither the defense nor the State requested findings of fact. See, e.g., State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (<HOLDING>). 33 . What the prosecutor could have

    ### Response:
    holding that upon the request of the losing party on a motion to suppress evidence the trial court shall state its essential findings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    distinction between the school children in Schempp and the plaintiffs in Valley Forge. “We simply cannot see,” said the Court, “that respondents have alleged an injury of any kind ... sufficient to confer standing. Respondents complain of a transfer of property located in Chester County, Pa. The named plaintiffs reside in Maryland and Virginia.... They learned of the transfer through a news release.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486-87, 102 S.Ct. at 765-67 (footnotes omitted). The circuits have thus recognized that “[t]he practices of our own community may create a larger psychological wound than someplace we are just passing through.” Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Public Schools, 33 F.3d 679, 683 (6th Cir.1994). Plaintiffs who “are part of the [community where challenged (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Though individuals offended by a religious

    ### Response:
    recognizing that presence of sectarian chapel in airport impaired use of airport by passengers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to report as requested to the probation officer and failure to notify the probation of any change in his residence. Oh appeal, Angelo-Guarino argues that upwardly variant sentence is unreasonable because the district court based the sentence on improper considerations and unfounded speculation. After thorough review, we affirm. We review the sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release for reasonableness. United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 2006). “[R]easonableness” review “merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, — U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)); see also United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 798 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). We review de novo whether a factor considered

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts decision to exceed the advisory sentencing range in chapter 7 of the sentencing guidelines ussg  7b14 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was performed for the purposes of both the guilt phase and the penalty phase. After the panel returned a guilty verdict, counsel discussed mitigation strategy with Wickline two or three times. Wickline did not want to speak with a psychiatrist or a probation officer or involve his family. Consequently, Wickline and his counsel reached the decision to focus on their strongest mitigating factor — that the Lerches facilitated the murders by participating in drug dealing and attempting a drug rip-off. Wickline made the final decision to proceed with this strategy. Based on the record evidence of Wickline’s strategic choices, counsel’s investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Coleman I, 244 F.3d at 545-46 (<HOLDING>). But see Coleman II, 268 F.3d at 452 (finding

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioner was not deprived of the right to effective assistance of counsel at sentencing where petitioner did not cooperate with counsel regarding the investigation and identification of mitigating evidence imposed restrictions upon counsel and refused to submit to further psychological or psychiatric testing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between Allen and Forte. Id. at 1303. Importantly, the court observed that “contractors ... share an economic relationship and community of interest with the architect on a construction project,” id., and that “too much control over the contractor necessarily rests in the hands of the supervising architect for him not to be placed under a duty imposed by law to perform without negligence his functions as they affect the contractor.” Id. (quoting United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F.Supp. 132, 136 (S.D.Cal.1958)). By recognizing an independent duty in tort, Forte Bros, represents an exception to the general rule propounded in Car-dente. Kennett, 798 A.2d at 418. The exception carries currency in the construction context, see Boren v. Thompson & Assoc., 999 P.2d 438, 445 (Okla.2000) (<HOLDING>), and has superficial appeal here, particularly

    ### Response:
    holding relying in part on forte bros that an architectural firm had duty to ensure that general contractor had secured statutorily required payment bond before certifying payments to contractor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    industry; i.e., the employers, the Union, and the employees. rv Many states have denied real-estate exemptions to schools that do not provide traditional types of education and that primarily benefit a particular occupation, profession, or group rather than the public. See, e.g., Alcoser v. County of San Diego, 111 Cal.App.3d 907, 169 Cal.Rptr. 91, 92-93 (1980) (denying exemption to construction trade school because Gymnastics & Performing Arts Educ. Found., Inc. v. City of Rutland, 143 Vt. 294, 465 A.2d 1363, 1365 (1983) (denying exemption to nonprofit school for gymnastics and performing arts because it provided “an essentially private benefit to a limited class of persons”); Engineers and Scientists of Milwaukee, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 38 Wis.2d 550, 157 N.W.2d 572, 578 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Other states have adopted an intermediate

    ### Response:
    holding property for continuing education and professional advancement of engineers and scientists was not within legislatures intent when it exempted property for educational associations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1306 (Fed.Cir.1999). When an appellant “states that a reason for a filing delay is physical or mental illness, [s]he must receive explicit information regarding the legal standard for establishing good cause on that basis, and [s]he must be afforded a fair opportunity to submit evidence and argument to show that [s]he met that standard.” Id. (quoting Lacy v. Dep’t of the Navy, 78 M.S.P.R. 434, 438 (1998)). The Lacy criteria provides that the petitioner be afforded an opportunity to (1) identify the time period during which she suffered from the illness, (2) submit corroborating evidence showing that she suffered from the illness during that time period, and (3) explain how the illness prevented her from timely filing an appeal or requesting an extension of time. 78 M.S.P.R. at 437 (<HOLDING>); see Smith, 168 F.3d at 1306 (endorsing the

    ### Response:
    holding that the corroborating evidence need not be medical evidence if the appellant explains why medical evidence is not available
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    work release. Defense counsel’s advice implying that Ostrander was eligible for work release and that he had a very good prospect of receiving it soon after sentencing was unrealistic. 46 F.3d at 355. Ostrander was not eligible for work release and a minimal amount of research by defense counsel would have informed him of that. The Court had no difficulty in concluding that Ostrander had received ineffective assistance of counsel: We think that this misadvice falls well below the range of competence we must expect from defense lawyers.... There is a difference between a bad prediction within an accurate description of the law and gross misinformation about the law itself. If the lawyer simply underestimates the sentence, there may not be ineffective assistance.... We can 4th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Not only does Ross’s case include gross

    ### Response:
    recognizing defense counsels misrepresentations can undermine validity of guilty plea citing tollett v henderson 411 us at 26667 93 sct 1602
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    omitted); accord Kenton v. Wood, 56 Ariz. 325, 331, 107 P.2d 380, 383 (1940) (“[D]i-rectors are trustees for the benefit of the stockholders.”). ¶ 16 In support of their contention that this case arises out of contract, Defendants argue that they had no duty to preserve development opportunities for Corvallas absent an alleged oral agreement with Plaintiff, and that they were free to pursue real estate developments outside Corvallas. But Defendants’ argument goes to the merits of Plaintiffs claim, not to its fundamental nature: Plaintiff did not sue for breach of any alleged oral agreement, and the validity and terms of such an agreement were not necessary to the disposition of the claim. Compare Asphalt Eng’rs, Inc. v. Galusha, 160 Ariz. 134, 138, 770 P.2d 1180, 1184 (App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Further, a defense based on the absence of a

    ### Response:
    holding that a breach of duties that a fiduciary contractually assumes beyond those duties imposed by law is considered to arise out of contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to confirmation of an arbitration award under the New York Convention, we may look to authority under the FAA. Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 974. III. We may decline enforcement of an arbitral award on the basis that “the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties.” 21 U.S.T. 2517, Art. V, § (l)(d). To determine whether the procedure used was contrary to the parties’ agreed arbitral procedures, we must begin with the language of the parties’ arbitration agreement. See Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir.2005); Coast Trading Co. v. Pac. Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1982); cf. generally Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84, 123 S.Ct. 588, 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716,

    ### Response:
    holding that in the context of an arbitrability determination the court reviews the contract de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    investigation would probably have required sending a team of lawyers and accountants to Sarasota to conduct a field audit of JHIS’s books and records. But the appropriate inquiry here is not what Jackson Hewitt might have learned upon further investigation of Prewett and JHIS in 2002. Instead, the focus must be on what Jackson Hewitt actually knew in 2004 and 2005 when the Kamans were making their investments. When Valmont contacted Cort at Jackson Hewitt in 2002, Jackson Hewitt had already experienced an uneventful relationship with its franchisee, SFS, for nine years. And SFS, in a letter signed by Scott, successfully allayed Hapward’s concerns about JHIS with reassuring but false information and a change of the corporate name. Although Prewett successfully solicit 25 (Tex.Civ.App.) (<HOLDING>), affirmed in part and reversed in part on

    ### Response:
    holding that in an action by a customer of a mobil dealer against the franchisor on an apparent agency theory the trial court improperly excluded a letter showing that the customer believed that the service station was owned by an individual not the franchisor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that the birth of U.S. citizen children constitutes a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions, and therefore does not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen). Furthermore, despite Chen’s submission of various allegedly official Chinese government documents, as well as recent country reports and a letter from her its discretion in concluding that Chen provided insufficient evidence that the birth of her U.S. citizen children violated the family planning policy in her area of residence in China, or that the implementation of sanctions resulting from any possible violation would rise to the level of persecution. Cf. Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We decline to examine Chen’s argument

    ### Response:
    holding that in the absence of solid support in the record for an applicants assertion that she would be persecuted the bia did not err in denying asylum because her fear was speculative at best
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and because it shows the defendant’s efforts to avoid detection regarding his activities. See Fed.R.Evid. 401 (defining relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make a fact of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than without the evidence); United States v. Cusack, 229 F.3d 344, 347-48 (2d Cir.2000). Even relevant evidence may be held inadmissible, however, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an “undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that the advisory committee notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the federal rules of evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of what constitutes an adequate “independent duty” for imposing common-law indemnity from a general contractor to a subcontractor for injuries to another. Thus, the standards discussed above, in reference to National Tank’s third-party claim for indemnity against Eagle Grove, for what constitutes the necessary “independent duty” appear to be equally applicable here. Thus, the question is whether Gehrke’s alleged duty to supervise and maintain the safety of the job site is the sort of duty of “a specific, defined nature,” running from Gehrke to National Tank, and not simply the general duty of care owed to each member of society. See, e.g., Hysell, 534 F.2d at 782-83; accord Johnson, 481 N.W.2d at 320 (quoting this standard from Hysell); Abild Constr. Co., 144 N.W.2d at 310-11 (<HOLDING>); see also Woodruff Constr. Co., 406 N.W.2d at

    ### Response:
    holding that a duty not to cause injury to another by ones negligent act is too broad to serve as a basis for permitting indemnity of an employer to a third party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    setting. Eleven also included language in his motion declaring that, if the case had been again dismissed in the meantime, the document should be considered his notice of appeal. A trial court is required to consider and rule on a motion within a reasonable time. Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding); Kissam v. Williamson, 545 S.W.2d 265, 266-67 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1976, orig. proceeding). When a motion is properly filed and pending before a trial court, considering and ruling on that motion is a ministerial act, and mandamus may issue to compel the trial court to act. Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 829 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>); Chiles v. Schuble, 788 S.W.2d 205, 207

    ### Response:
    holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the basis of the inside influence or economic leverage of a particular creditor.” H.R.REP. 103-835. State and Federal governments “must abide by the regular processes of the bankruptcy court applicable to all claimants.” 140 Cong.Ree. H10752-01, H10772. III. Conclusion We conclude on the basis of the foregoing discussion that Congress has the authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when it acts pursuant to the powers accorded it under the Bankruptcy Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 4; that it expressly and unequivocally did so when it enacted § 113 of the Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 106; and that § 113 applies retroactively to this case. Accordingly, the judgment is Reversed and the cause Remanded. 1 . But see Seminole Tribe of Florida v. State of Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1023 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 2 . To the extent 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) could be

    ### Response:
    recognizing that congress has specifically abrogated the eleventh amendment defense when legislating pursuant to  5 of the fourteenth amendment and its article i  8 plenary power over commerce but refusing to extend authority to abrogate to legislation enacted pursuant to the indian commerce clause the indian gaming regulatory act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    $50-$70. 363 F.3d at 202. We held that the interstate commerce nexus was satisfied because the tavern sold beer that was manufactured outside of the Virgin Islands. Id at 211. Likewise, in United States v. Claus have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-19, 125 S.Ct. 2195. Although this robbery was of a small business that purchased alcohol sold in interstate commerce, if robberies oc curred at and led to the closure of such establishments on a large scale, the effect on interstate commerce would be substantial. For that reason, the size of Jeanette’s business and the fact that the appellants stole only $121 dollars, a wallet, and two cell phones did not make this crime too small to satisfy the de minimis standard. See Walker, 657 F.3d at 180 (<HOLDING>); Haywood, 363 F.3d at 202, 211 n. 7 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that a robbery of 40 to 50 satisfied the de minimis standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Application to Congenital Conditions The Federal Circuit has made clear that the only prerequisite for the application of the presumption of soundness is that the veteran’s entry examination be clear of any noted diseases or disabilities. See Wagner, 370 F.3d at 1096. This Court has recognized that service connection may be granted for congenital diseases. See Monroe v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 513, 515 (1993). We have also held that the presumption of soundness applies if a veteran’s congenital condition is not noted at entry. See id. The presumption of soundness does not, however, apply to congenital defects, because such defects “are not diseases or injuries” within the meaning of 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110 and 1111. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c); see Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1385-86 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see Winn, 8 Vet.App. at 516 (holding that a

    ### Response:
    holding that the presumption of soundness does not apply to congenital defects
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“We allow the admission of survey evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule if the survey is material, more probative on the issue than other evidence and if it has guarantees of trustworthiness.” (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted)), C.A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 649 F.2d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir.1981) (“Surveys and customer questionnaires are admissible, if they are pertinent to the inquiry, upon a showing that the poll is reliable and was compiled in accordance with accepted survey methods.”), Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 552 (7th Cir.1980) (“To qualify a study or opinion poll for admission into evidence, there must be a substantial showing of reliability.”), and Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Courts have, however, rarely articulated

    ### Response:
    holding that surveys are admissible only if they are conducted with proper safeguards to insure accuracy and reliability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial court. We read the trial court’s comment that Digital Broadcast had not complied with the requirements of Rule 55(c) as a reference to the requirement of a verified answer or assertion of the court’s lack of jurisdiction. Although the trial court did not explain why the asserted lack of personal jurisdiction was insufficient, we conclude that the assertion fails as a matter of law. Digital Broadcast’s only asserted defense was that the Superior Court lacked personal jurisdiction because Digital Broadcast is incorporated and located elsewhere and has “no business operations in the District of Columbia.” In asserting that defense, Digital Broadcast bore the burden of alleging facts that, if proven, would demonstrate a lack of personal jurisdiction. Cf. Venison, 756 A.2d at 911-12 (<HOLDING>). Digital Broadcast failed to meet that burden.

    ### Response:
    holding that the simple assertion that the district of columbia failed to follow the proper procedures in selling a property for delinquent taxes without citing supporting evidence is insufficient to establish a prima facie defense under rule 60b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    same FERC decision. On November 26, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Response. On January 22, 2015, the court held a final oral argument in San Francisco, California (“1/22/15 TR 1-92”). III. DISCUSSION. A. Whether Plaintiffs Have Standing. As a matter of law, a “plaintiff must be in privity with the United States to have standing to sue the sovereign on a contract claim.” S. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. United States, 422 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Privity “takes on even greater significance in cases such as this, because the ‘government consents to be sued only by those with whom it has privity of contract.’ ” Id. (quoting Erickson Air Crane Co. of Wash. v. United States, 731 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see also Anderson v. Unit ed States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>); see also id. (“To have standing to sue the

    ### Response:
    holding that privity is lacking where plaintiffs were not signatories to the contractual documents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    accounting firm was not an abuse of discretion because the testimony helped establish Spivak’s state of mind. Under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, the district court’s ruling excluding both Bill Feinberg’s testimony and Cohn’s testimony about Joseph Reda’s comments was not an abuse of discretion. An erroneous jury charge is one that misleads the jury as to the proper legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury of the law. See Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 218 (2d Cir.1997). “Challenged jury instructions are reviewed de novo, but this Court will reverse only if all of the instructions, taken as a whole, caused the defendant prejudice. United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Thomley v. Penton Publ’g, Inc., 104 F.3d 26 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>).” Hester v. BIC Corp., 225 F.3d 178,186 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding that to grant a new trial the error must be more than harmless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this concept of perhaps somebody suggested mutual consent, to which he concurred. The court found plaintiff had something to gain from the novation in that [o]n the record the file became listed as a resignation. He had that to gain from and I don’t see that he had anything else, particularly, to gain from it. The facts presented lead us unequivocally to the conclusion that defendant Brown Boveri breached the employment contract. There is an emerging pattern of persuasive out-of-state case law supporting the propositions that Brown Boveri’s attempt to reclassify plaintiff to a lesser job status constructively discharged him in violation of his employment contract, see, e.g., Knee v. School District No. 139, In Canyon County, 106 Idaho 152, 153-55, 676 P.2d 727, 728-30 (Ct.App.1984) (<HOLDING>); Sanders v. May Broadcasting Co., 214 Neb.

    ### Response:
    recognizing the principle that where sufficient words or actions by the employer would lead a prudent man to believe his tenure has been terminated a constructive discharge is present
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requires that Yoon “reside[] continuously in the United States for a period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation of proceedings to remove [him] from the United States.” Id. at § 1182(h)(2) (emphasis added). For both a cancellation and a § 212(h) waiver, the period of lawful continuous residency terminates when the alien is served with a notice to appear. Id. at §§ 1229b(d)(1) and 1182(h). Yoon gained lawful entry into the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) on May 15, 1996. However, residence in the CNMI before 2009 was not residence in the United States. See Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-229, §§ 701-702, 122 Stat. 754 (2008) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1806); Eche v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Yoon’s admission into the CNMI on May

    ### Response:
    holding that residence in the cnmi before 2009 was not residence in the united states for naturalization purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court cases, the wardens argue that defense counsels’ failure to inform Miller and Haynes of the prosecution’s right to appeal the imposition of a juvenile sentence does not comprise ineffective assistance because the prosecutor’s right of appeal represents a collateral, as opposed to a direct, consequence of the plea. We reject this argument on two grounds. First, the wardens’ reliance on circuit court cases is improper. The AEDPA prohibits use of lower court decisions in determining whether the state court deei sion is contrary to, or is an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (defining “clearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court” to mean holdings of Supreme Court decisions); Harris, 212 F.3d at 944 (<HOLDING>). Second, the wardens’ argument is incompatible

    ### Response:
    holding district court erred in relying on authority other than that of the supreme court of the united states in its analysis under  2254d
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that any judgment against the State of New Jersey, the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development, or the Division of Workers’ Compensation would be paid by New Jersey’s state treasury. Dist. Ct. Op. at 13-15. Because the State of New Jersey was thus the real party at interest, the District Court properly held that these entities are immune from a suit seeking money damages. Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir.1989). As Hogg’s made neither a demand for injunctive relief, nor any allegation of a continuing violation of constitutional rights, there is no basis for excepting the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 676-78, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 449 F.2d 1298 (3d Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>). As noted, the District Court also dismissed

    ### Response:
    holding that state of new jersey is not a person under  1983 and thus not amendable to suit under that statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the amount of cocaine contained in the residue was so minute that it could not effectively be weighed or measured. Further, Jones’s counsel contended in his closing argument that, although the residue itself was visible, it had to be tested multiple times before the police could make a positive determination that it contained cocaine. We conclude that Jones’s counsel placed in dispute the issue of whether Jones knew the illicit nature of the substance on the pipe. Under Delva, it was fundamental error for the trial court to fail to properly instruct the jury on that disputed element of the crime charged against Jones. Since such fundamental error is not subject to harmless error analysis, Jones’s conviction must be reversed. See Reed v. State, 887 So.2d 366, 369-70 (Fla.2002) (<HOLDING>). Section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002),

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to give proper instruction regarding disputed element of crime charged was fundamental error requiring reversal and stating that fundamental error is not subject to harmless error review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    some apparently directive or dispositive words,” such as, “ ‘the plaintiffs motion [for summary judgment] is granted.’ ” Because the opinions or memo-randa sometimes lacked all the requisite elements of a judgment, and because judges sometimes later signed formal judgments in addition to those opinions and memoranda, Rule 58 was amended to clarify when a judgment became “effective, starting the time running for post-verdict motions and for the purpose of appeal.” Given this clear need for certainty, we should not cloud the issue of when a federal court judgment is “rendered” — it is “rendered” when it is set forth in writing on a separate document and entered on the civil docket, in compliance with Rule 58. See United States v. Woods, 885 F.2d 352, 353 (6th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); Simon v. City of Clute, 825

    ### Response:
    holding that a district courts marginal order granting summary judgment did not meet the strict requirements of rule 58 because a party may reasonably be confused as to the standing of its ease when a decision is rendered in such an informal manner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it reveals information not exposed to the public, we note preliminarily that the Government points to not a single actual example of visual surveillance that will be affected by our holding the use of the GPS in this case was a search. No doubt the reason is that practical considerations prevent visual surveillance from lasting very long. Continuous human surveillance for a week would require all the time and expense of several police officers, while comparable photographic surveillance would require a net of video cameras so dense and so widespread as to catch a person’s every movement, plus the manpower to piece the photographs together. Of course, as this case and some of the GPS cases in other courts illustrate, e.g., Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d at 447, 459, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (<HOLDING>); Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223 (holding use of GPS

    ### Response:
    holding use of gps device to track suspect for 65 days was search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    devoid of any evidence that APHIS made determinations that the field tests at issue involved either “new species or organisms or novel modifications that raise[d] new issues.” Likewise, there is no evidence that APHIS considered whether the field tests, notwithstanding the initial application of the “confined field release” exemption, “may have [had] the potential to affect ‘significantly’ the quality of the ‘human environment.’ ” This absence manifests arbitrary and capricious agency action which is inconsistent with the terms used in APHIS’s own regulations, and which violates NEPA. Ctr. for Food Safety, 451 F.Supp.2d at 1183-86 (reviewing similar field test permits and reaching the same conclusion); see also Back Country Horsemen of Am. v. Johanns, 424 F.Supp.2d 89, 99 (D.D.C.2006) (<HOLDING>). The record contains substantial evidence that

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an agencys interpretation of the scope of its own categorical exclusions is given controlling weight unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the terms used in the regulation quoting alaska ctr for envt v us forest serv 189 f3d 851 857 9th cir1999
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    communications were similar. Each communicated its desires and opinions to a governmental entity with regulatory authority to take action affecting the property. Like SARA in relation to San Antonio, the TWDB made its opinion known to the Corps but had no authority to take the action affecting the owner’s property rights. SARA further sought a cooperation agreement between it and San Antonio. As Westgate’s focus on direct action implies, causation is an issue to be considered by Courts in takings cases. This is not the first time courts have addressed causation in a takings action. In 1941, we held that the “true test” is whether the State’s intentional acts “were the proximate cause of the taking or damaging of such property.” State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731, 737 (1941) (<HOLDING>); see Roberson v. City of Austin, 157 S.W.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that a direct physical invasion of the property was not necessary under the 1876 constitution for a taking to occur
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    example, at a status hearing on November 7, 2004, which was only approximately one week before the evidentiary hearing, Over-ton’s counsel made no argument that the ordered DNA testing had not yet been completed. This is consistent with the State’s argument that Overton withdrew his motion for a continuance at a status hearing on October 29, 2004. Moreover, even if the ordered DNA testing had not been completed, there was no undue prejudice to Overton. Overton has not asserted any reason why DNA testing of the crime scene swabs will produce different results than the other DNA testing, which linked Overton to the scene. Overton’s argument that DNA testing of these crime scene swabs would have changed the outcome is purely speculative. See Martin v. State, 455 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla.1984) (<HOLDING>). Overton’s claim that the trial court’s denial

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in denying the appointment of the defendants requested expert as there was no undue prejudice to the defendant because the defendants claim on the predicted effect of the experts testimony was purely speculative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    results in a work-related “injury” or not — are entitled to a maximum of 100% of their back pay, as long as that sum does not lead to double recovery. Duplicative benefits must be deducted, as the district court did here. We reach the same conclusion on a second, independent ground. As we have noted above, relief under Title VII in the form of back pay is purely “equitable” in nature. See supra pp. 514-15. By contrast, relief under FECA consists of “compensation” (i.e., damages) defined as a per centage of the employee’s monthly salary. Because the exclusivity provisions of FECA are limited solely to other forms of “compensation,” they are simply not applicable to the types of “equitable” relief authorized by Title VII. See, e.g., Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1380, 1337 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217, 111 S.Ct. 2825,

    ### Response:
    holding that compensatory money damages are generally distinct from equitable forms of relief such as injunctions or back pay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disorderly persons offenses, however, may be submitted to the jury in criminal trials as lesser-included offenses, despite the general jurisdiction of the municipal court in such matters. See N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(e); R. 3:15-3. See also, e.g., DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J. at 111, 527 A.2d 1355 (stating that “Superior Court may assert jurisdiction over non-indietable offenses when they are lesser included offenses of the indictables” for purpose of submitting disorderly persons charges to jury); State v. Braxton, 330 N.J.Super. 561, 563, 568, 750 A.2d 185 (App.Div.2000) (affirming conviction where defendant was acquitted of charged aggravated assault and convicted of lesser-included offense of disorderly persons simple assault); State v. Green, 318 N.J.Super. 361, 375, 724 A.2d 254 (App.Div.1999) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 163 N.J. 140, 747 A.2d 1234 (2000);

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to give lesserincluded charge of simple assault as lesserincluded offense of aggravated assault on police officer was reversible error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that eight major oil companies were violating the Federal Trade Commission Act was not final agency action. See id. at 246, 101 S.Ct. 488. The Court reasoned that the FTC’s averment of “reason to believe” 'that the oil companies were violating the FTCA was “not a definitive statement of position [but instead] represented] a threshold determination that further inquiry [was] warranted and that a complaint should initiate proceedings.” Id. at 241, 101 S.Ct. 488. The Court then determined that, because the issuance of the complaint served only to initiate the proceedings by which a definitive agency position could become known, the complaint had no legal force or practical effect that was comparable to the regulation at issue in Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 151-53, 87 S.Ct. 1507 (<HOLDING>). See Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 241-43, 101

    ### Response:
    holding that regulations issued by commissioner of food and drugs were ripe for review because they were definitive immediately effective and directly and immediately affected petitioners daily business activities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exist and the factual basis for each such claim.”). 20 See OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e) (“If a plaintiff files an affidavit which is allegedly defective, and the defendant to whom it pertains alleges, with specificity, by motion to dismiss filed on or before the close of discovery, that said affidavit is defective, the plaintiff’s complaint shall be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim____”); OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) (“The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law; but nothing in this Code section shall be const 6, 8 (658 SE2d 792) (2008) (<HOLDING>). 24 Kaminer, 282 Ga. at 834 (1) (citation

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe coumadin and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a repository of other contraband, courts are “entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense.” United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 296 (3rd Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.1986)). Drag dealers typically need a place to store and utilize not only the drags that they distribute but such items as scales, packaging materials, ledgers and cash. The magistrate considering the warrant application could reasonably infer that such evidence probably would be found at Stevens’ home. Numerous courts have upheld a finding of probable cause for a search warrant in similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305-07 (3rd Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 86-88

    ### Response:
    holding magistrate could infer that evidence of drugs or paraphernalia would be located in experienced drug dealers home
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any fixed improvement or any project, whether or not fixed, involving construction, alteration, removal or repair for the public use of the United States or its allies, including but not limited to projects or operations under service contracts and projects in connection with the national defense or with war activities, dredging, harbor improvements, dams, roadways, and housing, as well as preparatory and ancillary work in connection therewith at the site or on the project 42 U.S.C. § 1651(b)(1). Courts have found that public work generally consists of “work constituting government-related construction projects, work connected with the national defense, or employment under a service contract supporting either activity.” Univ. of Rochester v. Hartman, 618 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); Makris v. Spensieri Painting, 669 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a professor who suffered a fatal fall collecting soil samples in antarctica was not engaged in public work within the meaning of the dba
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had filed both lawsuits. See id. at 359-60 (citing to two family law cases, Evans v. Evans, 186 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1945, no writ) and Mills v. Howard, 228 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1950, no writ)). 3 . Because the United States Supreme Court has held that contravention of a strong public policy is an exception to enforcement of a forum selection clause, M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972), appellees’ showing that Florida would apply Florida rather than Texas law to the non-compete agreement also supports the enjoining of the proceeding in the parties’ contractually selected forum of Florida. See also Holeman v. Nat’l Business Inst., Inc., 94 S.W.3d 91, 99 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Regarding Autonation’s claim that the

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant failed to establish abuse of discretion in dismissal of texas suit in which appellant failed to show georgia would refuse to apply texas law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    do not object to the final judgment to engage in yet another round of costly and time consuming litigation. As the Second Circuit has observed, “in making the choice between the possibility of harm to the late-arriving prospective intervenors as against the possible harm to parties who have participated diligently during the pertinent portions of this litigation, it does not strike us as unjust that intervention on the part of the late-arrivers must yield under all of the circumstances herein.” Yonkers Bd. of Ed., 801 F.2d at 596. II. Motion for an Extension of Time to Appeal Intervenors’ failure to establish their standing is fatal to their motion for an extension of time to file an appeal. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of World-Com, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming intervenors had met their

    ### Response:
    recognizing that standing is an essential component of our appellate jurisdiction and permitting party to appeal only after determining that they had met the requirements of article iii standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a specific individual to qualify as a “means of identification” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. We review properly preserved questions of statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Krawczak, 331 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir.2003). However, where a defendant fails to present the issue to the district court, like Wilson in this case, we review only for plain error. United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11th Cir.2006). As discussed below, we find no error, much less plain error. This Court has not previously resolved this specific issue in a published opinion, and there appears to be some conflict in the circuits on whether the use of someone’s name qualifies as a “means of identification” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 230 (4th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Blixt, 548 F.3d 882

    ### Response:
    holding a bare name alone was not sufficient to identify the specific individual as required under the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an application. United States v. Errera, 616 F.Supp. 1145, 1149 (D.Md.1985) (citations omitted); see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237-38, 103 S.Ct. 2817, 2331-32, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). There is no magic formula for evidence of intent to flee. The issuing judge must simply determine whether the affidavit supporting the wiretap application under § 2516(l)(i), when read as a whole, establishes probable cause to believe that the missing individual is purposely evading the authorities out of fear that he will otherwise be prosecuted for an enumerated crime. Moreover, the Court notes that determinations by an issuing judge are accorded substantial deference upon a subsequent suppression motion. United States v. Brone, 792 F.2d 1504, 1506 (9th Cir. 1986); see Errera, 616 F.Supp. at 1149 (<HOLDING>). The function of this Court, which is

    ### Response:
    holding that where electronic surveillance has been authorized by a judicial officer the fact that the issuing judge found probable cause is itself a substantial factor tending to uphold the validity of the order issued 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inside of the containers. Because Coro’s failure to alert was inconclusive on the essential question of whether the package contained illegal narcotics and because the facts set forth in the search warrant affidavit otherwise were sufficient to establish probable cause, there was a substantial basis for the issuing court’s determination of probable cause. {34} Lastly, Defendant claims that, pursuant to Nyce, our inquiry must be “particularly exacting” because Defendant’s conduct was “equally consistent with legal activity.” See Nyce, 2006-NMSC-026, ¶ 14, 139 N.M. 647, 137 P.3d 587 (purchasing tincture of iodine and hydrogen peroxide at multiple stores in a hurried manner is equally consistent with lawful activity); State v. Anderson, 107 N.M. 165, 169, 754 P.2d 542, 546 (Ct.App. 1988) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. As we acknowledged in Nyce,

    ### Response:
    holding that facts consistent with a drug courier profile are insufficient in themselves to establish probable cause because they are generally descriptive of hundreds of innocent persons traveling through new mexico on the interstate every day
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also id. at 580 (Kavanaugh, J.,- concurring) (“[Bjeing called the n-word by a supervisor — as Ayissi-Etoh alleges happened to him — suffices by itself to; establish a racially hostile work environment.”). But the severity of a supervisor’s use of “probably the most offensive word in English,” id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted), is far greater than a somewhat bizarre. and ambiguous, albeit offensive, question allegedly posed by a supervisor in response to a complaint about an unambiguously non-racial workplace display. Rather, Ms. Stiger’s-'offen-sive question is more akin to the sort of derogatory remarks that courts in this Circuit have deemed non-actionable in the past. See, e.g., Freedman v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 255 F.3d 840, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>); Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill,

    ### Response:
    holding that there was nohostile work environment where a supervisor after negotiating with another supervisor for a printer told a jewish employee soon im going to be the only one at this terminal wearing a yarmulka
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nevertheless, the next day Hilliard informed the commission about Wilkinson's refusal to clean the safe. 6 . See note 9, infra. 7 . See note 1, supra. 8 . It should be noted that defendants’ legal position is that ""[a]s a limited term appointee [Wilkinson] has no due process or other right to re-appointment * * *"" and that ""[n]o cause is required to disapprove an appointment."" Thus, defendants have argued on appeal that Wilkinson’s appropriate remedy was an appeal to the Personnel Appeal Board (PAB). But if the 1994 amendments truly had converted Wilkinson to a limited-term, non-classified employee, as defendants contend, then the PAB would have lacked jurisdiction to hear his appeal. See Rhode Island Board of Governors for Higher Education v. Newman, 688 A.2d 1300, 1303 (R.I.1997) (<HOLDING>). 9 . The 1978 version of G.L.1956 § 12-1.2-6

    ### Response:
    holding that the pab has no jurisdiction over nonclassified employees who are subject to the exclusive control of the commissioner of higher education    
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Refining and Marketing Co., supra, this court held that defendant Getty’s failure to promote Cuffy and its alleged breach of an EEOC Settlement Agreement in 1981 were insufficiently related to Getty’s suspension of Cuffy in 1984 to constitute a continuing violation: Moreover, the discriminatory nature of each act is not of itself sufficient to demonstrate the necessary relationship. There is simply no intrinsic connection between these events, other than the involvement of the defendant, to show that they are part of a pattern of discrimination. These acts are best understood as “isolated instances of discrimination,” and insufficient to support a continuing violation theory. Cuffy, 648 F.Supp. at 810; see also Bronze Shields, Inc. v. N.J. Dept. of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d at 1080-1084 (<HOLDING>). In this case, Carr alleges two discrete

    ### Response:
    holding that continued use of an eligibility roster for hiring did not constitute an ongoing violation so as to preserve plaintiffs claims after they learned their names were excluded from the roster
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute of limitations argument nor their argument that the willfulness claim lacks specificity argument is well-taken. There are, however, alternative grounds on which COUNT IV must be dismissed. B. Lack of Personal Liability under the FMLA as to Mr. Dods Personal liability for violations of Federal employment laws generally has been rejected (unless the defendant engaged in “nondelegable acts” like harassment). The term “employer” in the FMLA should be construed consistently with the way that term has been construed in Title VII cases (and in cases under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq.). See Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, Inc., 906 F.Supp. 441 (E.D.Tenn.1995) (<HOLDING>). Ms. Carter urges, instead, that the court

    ### Response:
    holding that a civil rights plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under fmla against individual individual is not employer subject to liability under the act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    review"" to the rule 11 violations in this case. In the absence of express language in any of our cases holding that harmless error review does not apply to preserved claims of rule l1(e) violations, the State nevertheless urges us to apply harmless error review of preserved rule 11 violations because ""it does so in nearly every other context,"" because ""other states do so,"" or because it is good public policy. We decline to do so. T76 First, the State argues that because we apply harmless error in other contexts, we should also apply harmless error to a preserved rule 11(e) claim of error. In support of its argument, the State cites to cases involving the question of whether a trial court's error affected the outcome of a trial. See, eg., State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 578, 576 (Utah 1983) (<HOLDING>); State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Utah

    ### Response:
    holding that erroneous instruction that flight from the scene of the crime implied guilt was harmless because there was other evidence to sustain a conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bills that [she had with her that day] that would indicate whether or not [the] property was occupied back in 2006.” Id. at 16. She also admitted that she did not produce her 2007 utility bills, although the defendant had requested such documents prior to the examination. Id. at 17; see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. 6 (Aug. 14, 2007 Letter Requesting Documents). In light of the evidence cited by the defendants (of which these are only a few examples), a reasonable juror could conclude that the plaintiff breached the insurance policy by not carrying out her duties as the insured party, thereby rendering the policy void. See Claflin, 110 U.S. at 96-97, 3 S.Ct. 507 (ruling that providing false statements during the purchase of a property was a breach of the policy); Taubman, 160 F.2d at 162 (<HOLDING>); Stover, 658 F.Supp. at 160 (concluding that

    ### Response:
    holding that an insured partys refusal to produce requested documents constituted a breach of the insurance contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a bag of marijuana and an audiotape recording of the drug transaction, on which the defendant’s voice was identified. 85 S.W.3d at 462. In addition, a videotape recording was made of the informant’s actions as he entered the defendant’s car. Id. This evidence was held to sufficiently connect the defendant with the crime. Id. Likewise, in Jefferson, an officer testified that he searched the informant, placed an audio recording device on her and turned it on, observed the informant enter a house to make a drug transaction, turned the device off when she returned and introduced the recording into evidence and identified the defendant’s voice on the recording. This evidence was held sufficient to corroborate the informant’s testimony. 99 S.W.3d at 792; see also Brown, 159 S.W.3d at 708-11 (<HOLDING>); Dennis v. State, 151 S.W.3d 745, 749

    ### Response:
    holding informants testimony corroborated by evidence consisting of defendants presence at scene coupled with cash found in his pocket carrying serial numbers matching those provided to informant for controlled buy and videotape of transaction included conversation of defendant regarding prior drug sale
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    back condition that prevents the individual from performing any heavy labor job would be substantially limited in the major life activity of working because the individual’s impairment eliminates his or her ability to perform a class of jobs.” Id. Despite the broad nature of this example, the Court finds Whitfield also has not met her burden of proving she is substantially limited in the major life activity of work. While the record contains evidence of Whitfield’s medical limitations, there exists nothing connecting those limitations to ability to perform other jobs in the community. The general statement in the Interpretive Guidelines about back injuries, in isolation, cannot boost Whitfield over the summary judgment hurdle. Cf. McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who could not perform heavy lifting failed to meet burden of establishing substantial limitation in major life activity of work
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nascent cause of action. True enough. But federal FOIA jurisprudence leaves no doubt that a lawyer’s request for information must plainly spell out the representative capacity and the identity of the client before that client can bring a FOIA action in her own name. When an attorney files a FOIA request on behalf of a client, the attorney is the one to whom courts have granted standing to sue. See Constangy, Brooks & Smith, by Bridgesmith ex rel. Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 839, 840 n. 1 (6th Cir.1988) (noting that the plaintiff, a law firm, had standing to request the FOIA documents on behalf of its client); see also Burka v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 142 F.3d 1286, 1291 (D.C.Cir.1998); Unigard Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 997 F.Supp. 1339, 1341 (S.D.Cal.1997) (<HOLDING>) In Three Forks Ranch Corp. v. Bureau of Land

    ### Response:
    holding that when attorney representing unigard submitted a foia request in his own name unigard lacked standing because its name did not appear on the request itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    primarily on an assessment of credibility. Purkett, 514 U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1772, 131 L.Ed.2d at 840. The explanations given were race-neutral. The decisive question is whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation will be believed by the trial court. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364, 111 S.Ct. at 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d at 409; State v. Wilhite, 858 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Mo.App.1993). The trial court accepted the explanations. We have examined the explanations and the circumstances which appear in the record. It is clear from the findings that the trial court viewed the plausibility of the state’s explanations in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the ease, as Parker requires. Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 934, 939. See also Purkett, 514 U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d at 839 (<HOLDING>). The trial court took a permissible view of

    ### Response:
    holding that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant in the third batson step where a trial judge may find lack of persuasiveness supports a finding of pretext
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the pretrial deadlines, treated the deadlines as statutes of limitations, “chiseled in concrete,” and therefore sanctionable if violated. Scheduling orders are clearly valuable tools for promoting the efficient management of a trial court’s docket. However, as the Maryland Court of Special Appeals recognized in Maddox: [T]he imposition of a sanction that precludes a material witness from testifying, and, consequently, effectively dismisses a potentially meritorious claim without a trial, should be reserved for egregious violations of the court’s scheduling order, and should be supported by evidence of willful or contemptuous or otherwise opprobrious behavior on the part of the party or counsel. 921 A.2d at 922. See also Revco, D.S., Inc. v. Cooper, 873 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). Based on our review of the record and the

    ### Response:
    holding that discovery sanctions so severe they prevent a trial on the merits are warranted only where the record reflects a partys flagrant bad faith or counsels callous disregard for the discovery rales
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as possible, because, yes, I was in fear for my safety at that time. Examining the encounter in context, however, in light of the testimony of Stratton, I find that the second movement was witnessed as the officers approached, before McKoy was asked to leave the car, and that promptly upon being asked, McKoy left his vehicle. 3 . Of course, the police did not actually stop the car in this case. At the point when they asked McKoy to leave the car, however, they had seized him for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The police officers in this case were justified in stopping the defendant and effecting this initial seizure because they had probable cause to believe he had committed two separate traffic violations. See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 819, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (<HOLDING>). The officers in this case were also permitted

    ### Response:
    holding that probable cause to believe the traffic code had been violated rendered the stop reasonable under the fourth amendment regardless of officers subjective intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    against unconsenting states or state officials when the state is the real, substantial party in interest, regardless of the remedy sought, including 'pendent state law claims.’ ”), citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120-21, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Rakow v. North Dakota ex rel. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 2000 WL 227850 at *1 (8th Cir., February 24, 2000) (The plaintiff's claims were ""barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits federal courts from hearing suits against states and state officers in their official capacities when, as in this case, the suit alleges a violation of state law and regardless of whether money damages or injunctive relief is sought.”) [Table Decision]; see also, Bisciglia v. Lee, 370 F.Supp.2d 874, 878 (D.Minn.2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we recommend that the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that when a state employee is sued in his official capacity the state is the real party in interest and as a result the eleventh amendment is implicated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We disagree. The first and the third of these factors apply to any multiunit rental facility. The second is irrelevant: Hoosiers who live in rural areas are entitled to no less protection against invasion of their homes. The fourth, assuming it applied to the third home, is in and of itself innocuous. Probable cause clearly existed with respect to the first two homes, and the totality of the circumstances established some suspicion or possibility of a joint drug-dealing enterprise at the Farm. But this is not enough. The affidavit did not allege any facts linking the third home to the surrounding criminal activity. The lack of any nexus is a critical point in assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s reliance on the warrant. Cf. Stabenow v. State, 495 N.E.2d 197 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Objective good faith “requires officers to

    ### Response:
    holding that cocaine seized pursuant to search of defendants car was not admissible under good faith exception because affidavit did not establish connection between car and criminal activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in that opinion, however, that the Seventh Circuit would permit an indemnification or contribution claim to be brought by the employer against the supervisor. Likewise, the legislative history of the FLSA cited by Defendants does not support such a claim. See Herman, 172 F.3d at 144 (noting that the text of the FLSA makes no provision for contribution or indemnification and the Act’s legislative history is silent on a right to contribution or indemnification). Other cases cited by Defendants demonstrate the federal courts’ refusal to recognize a federal common law right to indemnity or contribution except in limited circumstances. (Defs.’ Resp. at 7, citing, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981) (<HOLDING>), and Tumer/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding employer had no right of contribution under equal pay act title vii or federal common law against unions that allegedly bore at least partial responsibility for statutory violations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and conspired uage and gestures of a custodial office[r] do not, even if true, amount to constitutional violations.” Robertson v. Plano City of Texas, 70 F.3d 21, 24 (5th Cir.1995). Likewise, claims of verbal abuse and harassment are not actionable under § 1983. Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d 271, 274 n. 4 (5th Cir.1993). Thus, Plaintiffs complaints of verbal abuse, harassment, and threats should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous. To the extent that Plaintiff complains that certain Defendants failed to answer his jail grievances or denied his grievances and the appeals, he has not demonstrated that he had a constitutionally protected interest in the Taylor County Jail grievance procedures. See Piper v. Alford, No. 3:02-CV-2640-P, 2003 WL 21350215, at *2 (N.D.Tex., June 4, 2003) (<HOLDING>). See also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’

    ### Response:
    holding that a jail inmate does not have a constitutional entitlement to an adequate grievance procedure and the ineffectiveness or even absence of a grievance procedure does not give rise to a constitutional claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphases added). Section (B)(ii) does not lend itself to the interpretation advocated by the Government. Nowhere is it “specified” that the bond determination is a “discretionary” decision of the Attorney General. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (2004) (providing that the Attorney General “may require the positing of bond in an amount determined by the [Attorney General] to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal,” but failing to “specify” that that determination is “discretionary”), with 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(c) (noting that the Attorney General “may, in his or her discretion, grant employment authorization ....”) (emphasis added). Accord Spencer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 689-90 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Simply, it is not “specified” that the bond

    ### Response:
    holding that the jurisdictional bar in section bii applies only to acts over which a statute gives the attorney general pure discretion unguided by legal standards or statutory guidelines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    135 N.M. 192, 86 P.3d 617, 619 (Ct.App.2004). A contract is ambiguous if it is “reasonably and fairly susceptible of different constructions.” Id. ""[I]n determining whether a term or expression to which the parties have agreed is unclear, a court may hear evidence of the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract and of any relevant usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance.” C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 112 N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238, 242-43 (1991) (footnote omitted). ""Further, the language of the entire agreement should be construed together.” Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 127 N.M. 1, 976 P.2d 1, 12 (1999). 12 . See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1152-53 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). But see Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d

    ### Response:
    recognizing that analysis of whether certain expenses qualify as deducti ing royalty contracts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1136, 1140-41 (App.1996); Deuel v. Ariz. State Sch. for the Deaf and Blind, 165 Ariz. 524, 526-27, 799 P.2d 865, 867-68 (App. 1990) (setting forth due process rights of covered public employees); accord 5 U.S.C. § 2301 (1996) (setting forth federal merit system principles); see generally Daryl Man-hart, Commment, Property and Liberty Limitations on the Dismissal of Arizona Public Employees, 1977 Ariz. St. L.J. 835, 853-54 [hereinafter “Manhart”] (discussing law enforcement merit systems). ¶ 15 The right to treatment based on merit and a hearing by a neutral board before discipline becomes final are therefore central merit system principles of public employment for purposes of A.R.S. § 38-1003. See Evans v. State ex rel. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 131 Ariz. 569, 572, 643 P.2d 14, 17 (App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Bishop v. Law Enforcement Merit Sys. Council,

    ### Response:
    recognizing requirement that state personnel board be a fair and impartial tribunal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the grounds that the non-diverse employees of a diverse defendant had not been negligent). In this case, any finding of fraudulent joinder as to Pierce & Associates is necessarily dispositive, in part or, more likely, in whole, of the liability of U.S. Bank, because Plaintiffs allege the law firm acted at all times as the agent of Firstar, U.S. Bank’s predecessor in inter est. See Complaint ¶ 22. See also United States v. 7108 West Grand Ave., Chicago, Ill, 15 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir.1994) (“[A]n attorney’s errors and misconduct are attributed to his clients. The clients are principals, the attorney is an agent, and under the law of agency the principal is bound by his chosen agent’s deeds.”); Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 212 Ill.2d 1, 287 Ill.Dec. 510, 816 N.E.2d 272, 279 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Given that the alleged misconduct of Pierce &

    ### Response:
    holding that a client is vicariously liable for an attorneys allegedly intentional tortious conduct if the attorney acted as the clients agent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of section 121. Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, no protection was afforded to patent applications filed as a result of a restriction requirement — referred to at the time as a “requirement for division” — and such applications were often rejected or held invalid on double patenting grounds. See Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. N. Petrochemical Co., 784 F.2d 351, 358 (Fed.Cir.1986) (“SGK”) (Newman, J., concurring); In re Eisler, 40 C.C.P.A. 913, 203 F.2d 726 (1953). Thus, although a requirement for division embodied a determination by the PTO that the patent application contained more than one patentably distinct invention, such a determination did not protect the divisional application from rejection on grounds of double patenting. In re Isherwood, 46 App.D.C. 507, 512 (D.C.Cir.1917) (<HOLDING>). The PTO and the courts were therefore not

    ### Response:
    holding that an examiner is not estopped from rejecting a divisional application because of an earlier requirement for division
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2. 19 . Dr. Strong’s Report at 2 (emphasis added). 20 . Dr. Strong’s Report at 2. 21 . Dr. Strong’s Report at 2. 22 . Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 46], 23 .28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 24 . Estate of Northrop v. Hutto, 9 So.3d 381, 384 (Miss.2009). This element, like all elements of a medical malpractice case, must be satisfied by expert testimony. Coleman v. Rice, 706 So.2d 696, 698 (Miss. 1997). 25 . Patterson v. Tibbs, 60 So.3d 742, 753 (Miss.2011). 26 . Drummond v. Buckley, 627 So.2d 264, 268 (Miss.1993). 27 . Dr. Strong’s Report at 1. 28 . Government's Brief at 4. 29 . Government’s Brief at 4. 30 . Conn's Brief at 2. 31 . Dr. Strong’s Report at 1. 32 . See Patterson, supra at n. 31. 33 . Dr. Strong’s Report at 2. 34 . Estate of Northrop v. Hutto, 9 So.3d 381, 387 (Miss.2009) (<HOLDING>). The expert ""must articulate an objective

    ### Response:
    holding that an experts personal preference does not establish a national standard of care
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which led the DOE to believe that “money may be due back to the DOE.” The e-mail further stated that, “[u]ntil the DOE is confident that no money is owed to it for prior false invoices from [RESG], the account will remain frozen and money withheld in order to protect the City’s interests and tax payer dollars.” Before the District Court, and now on appeal, UCF has argued that the objection in the February 3 e-mail was insufficiently specific inasmuch as it did not directly address each of the 3,913 invoices in the allegedly stated account. We are aware of no authority under New York law that requires such extreme specificity. On the contrary, numerous New des the plaintiffs statement of an account. See Navimex S.A. De C.V. v. S/S “Northern Ice”, 617 F.Supp. 103, 106 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (<HOLDING>). Upon a thorough review of the record, and in

    ### Response:
    holding that a supplementary statement of account dated february 1978 did not constitute an account stated because there was an underlying dispute between the parties as evidenced by defendants objection in january 1978 to plaintiffs august 1977 statement of account thereby precluding a finding of consent by the defendants to the february 1978 statement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Loschiavo for the proposition that § 1983 could be used to enforce regulations “which have the force of law”). The current Sixth Circuit precedent treats regulations as “laws” under § 1983 and looks to determine whether the regulation at issue creates rights. In essence, regulations are treated in the same manner as statutes for purposes of determining whether they create new enforceable rights under § 1983. A such, district courts in the Sixth Circuit must determine, just as with federal statutes, whether federal regulations presented by § 1983 plaintiffs create enforceable rights. This court questions whether the Sixth Circuit’s rule can be correct in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Alexander v. Sandoval and Gonzaga University v. Doe. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937 (<HOLDING>). These two decisions, when read together,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that these two recent supreme court decisions resolve the issue of whether federal regulations alone can create enforceable rights under  1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    informal refund claim based on written protests prior to payment); Night Hawk Leasing Co. v. United States, 84 Ct.Cl. 596, 603-04, 18 F.Supp. 938 (1937) (concluding that the taxpayer made an informal refund claim by writing an objection on the back of a check submitted as payment of the tax). Contrary to the assertions in plaintiffs complaint, Mr. Evans’ March 29, 2012 memorandum does not satisfy either of the requirements for informal claims. First, although the memorandum states that Mr. Evans verbally “conceded” that Mr. Ishler “has an open informal claim due to the documented discussions with IRS officials,” Compl. Ex. A at 1, it does not reference any written component of that alleged claim. See, e.g., Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (Ct.Cl.1981) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Second, the memorandum

    ### Response:
    holding that oral assertions by the taxpayer during an audit were insufficient as a matter of law to constitute an informal refund claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Convention, finding that Li had not established a well-founded fear of persecution. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. We hold that the evidence in the record is insufficient to compel a finding that Li established a well-founded fear of persecution. The single threat to handcuff Li does not constitute past persecution. Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir.2000) (defining persecution as an “extreme concept” that includes the “infliction of suffering or harm” (citations omitted)). Nor does the combination of the threat, the experience of his father’s friend, and the State Department Profile establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Arrest alone, even on account of a protected category, does not constitute persecution. Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). While the State Department Profile does

    ### Response:
    holding that detention of five or six days on account of imputed political opinion without beatings tortures or threats did not rise to the level of persecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of [the procedural rule governing class actions] are met.” (quoting Miller v. Mackey Int’l, 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir.1971))). 12 .See Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex.1993) (""An opinion issued in a case brought by a party without standing is advisory because rather than remedying an actual or imminent harm, the judgment addresses only a hypothetical injury.”). 13 . See id. 14 . E.g. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 443-445 (Tex.1989). 15 . 135 S.W.3d 657, 679 (Tex.2004) (footnote omitted). Cf. Collins v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 894 So.2d 988 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). 16 . See, e.g., Martinez v. Second Injury

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs complaint that the value of her car was less because it was equipped with gen3 seatbelt buckles is actionable under the state consumer protection law even though the alleged defect has never manifest itself in an emergency or caused damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    received title— subject to Cox’s repurchase option—to a tract that had been valued three months earlier at nearly $2.5 million. Christopher assumed the outstanding AgSouth mortgage, which had an unpaid principal balance of around $700,000, and paid Banks $500,000 for Banks’s share of the property’s equity. Christopher did not make any payment to Cox for his share of that equity. In other words, Christopher received title to the Cox tract in exchange for consideration equal to about half the property’s value: $1.2 versus $2.5 million. A gross disparity between the sale price and the actual value of the land is evidence of the parties’ intent to create a security interest—a mortgage—rather than a sale. See Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139, 147-48, 13 L.Ed. 927 (1851) (<HOLDING>); Conway’s Ex’rs and Devisees, 11 U.S. at 241

    ### Response:
    holding that extraneous evidence is admissible to inform courts of all material facts surrounding the delivery of the deed and concluding that it is of great importance to inquire whether the consideration was adequate to induce a sale
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 1 . We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2 . Highway 80 runs northeast from the border town of Douglas, Arizona, through the sparsely populated “bootheel'' section of southwestern New Mexico before intersecting Interstate 10. 3 .It is unclear from the record whether the present stop was one of the two or in addition to the others. 4 . Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 5 . At oral argument, Montes-Ramos' counsel advised the Court that Montes-Ramos is no longer in custody. Because he is challenging the underlying conviction, not the sentence, Montes-Ramos' appeal is not moot. See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222, 67 S.Ct. 224, 91 L.Ed. 196 (1946) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The Fifth Circuit went on to conclude the

    ### Response:
    holding the petitioners challenge of his conviction is not rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence because collateral consequences flowing from the conviction give the petitioner a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is true. Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc., 891 S.W.2d at 644; Marchal, 859 S.W.2d at 412. For. a defendant to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the defendant must conclusively negate at least one of the essential elements of each of the plaintiffs causes of action or conclusively establish each essential element of an affirmative defense. Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex.1995). In his first point of error, Perrotta contends the trial court erred by rendering summary judgment for Farmers on both his contractual and extra-contractual claims. We will first consider the judgment rendered on the contractual claims. A. Breach of Contract In its motion for summary judgment, Farmers claimed that Perrotta breached several conditions .2d 948, 949 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1989, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Insurance policies are governed by ordinary

    ### Response:
    holding the failure of the insureds to submit to an euo a condition precedent to sustaining a suit on the insurance policy required abatement of the suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    made in open court, unless the defendant has, prior to that time, sought affirmative relief.” Id. at 325 (quoting Greenberg v. Brookshire, 640 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex.1982)). When nonsuit is filed after an unfavorable partial summary judgment has been entered against the claimant, the nonsuit is with prejudice as to those claims of which the judgment has disposed. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 892 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Tex.1995); see also Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 868 n. 7. This concept promotes judicial efficiency, protects parties from multiple lawsuits, and prevents inconsistent judgments through the preclusion of matters that have already been decided or which could have been litigated in a prior suit. See In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Tex.2008); see also Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>); Yazdchi v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 177 S.W.3d

    ### Response:
    recognizing that nonsuit filed for the purpose of circumventing unfavorable legal restrictions or rulings are disfavored
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    349 (1979) [“Pedlar, Community Property”]. The article suggests the possibility that “the Devil himself could effectively receive a discharge in bankruptcy if he were married to Snow White.” Id. at 382. To this I would add: if he does not treat her better than his creditors, she will, by divorcing him, deny his discharge^ ] The cases are uniform in recognizing this effect of Section 524(a)(3). See, e.g., Soderling, 998 F.2d at 733 (“[a]ll claims against a marital community are discharged,” except for nondischargeable community claims); In re Homan, 112 B.R. 356, 360 (9th Cir. BAP 1989) (stating in dicta that after-acquired community property is immune from collection efforts, even if creditor’s claim is only against non-debtor spouse); In re Hull, 251 B.R. 726, 732 (9th Cir. BAP 2000) (<HOLDING>); In re Rollinson, 322 B.R. 879, 883

    ### Response:
    recognizing effect of section 524a3
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only if the circumstances alleged to be in aggravation ... are found to be true by the trial judge ... and factual findings and reasons in support of such findings are set forth on the record at the time of sentencing.”). In effect, the State suggests that even though the fact-finder did not validly find any aggravating factor that exposed a defendant to an aggravated sentence, a sentence should be upheld if an appellate court could find in the record some aggravating factor that could expose the defendant to a greater sentence and thus allow the sentencing judge to consider other facts not found by the jury in imposing a sentence within the higher range. ¶ 18 The State misapprehends the role of a reviewing court in non-capital criminal sentencing. When a trial court im (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The State also assumes that an unenumerated

    ### Response:
    holding that a nonjury juvenile adjudication that  afforded all constitutionallyrequired procedural safeguards can properly be characterized as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of males from the team and the goal of redressing past discrimination and providing equal opportunities for women.” Id. It is beyond question that redressing the disparate athletic opportunities available to males and females is an important governmental interest. See Mularadelis, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 464; see also Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F.Supp. 164, 170 (D.Colo.1977) (noting that because the athletic opportunity for females has historically been limited, “the encouragement of female involvement in sports is a legitimate objective”). Excluding males from female teams is substantially related to achieving that objective. See Clark, 695 F.2d at 1131; Hoover, 430 F.Supp. at 170. But see Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 378 Mass. 342, 393 N.E.2d 284 (1979) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, plaintiffs have not

    ### Response:
    holding that such a classification could not pass muster under the strict scrutiny required by the massachusetts equal rights amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Ackerson v. Bean Dredging, LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 209 (5th Cir.2009). Federal Rule of Civil Pro cedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” This rule must, however, be interpreted in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim for relief in federal court. Rule 8(a) calls for “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-82, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-51, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (applying Rule 8(a) and plausibility standard to Rule 12(b)(6) motion raising qualified-immunity defense); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 122 5. Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (<HOLDING>). As a result, “[a] motion to dismiss for

    ### Response:
    holding rule 8as simplified pleading standard applies to most civil actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    compared to Sieg’s multiplier of 73%. Assuming an adjusted book value of $78.34 per share (book value adjusted by partially restating inventory to a FIFO basis per Ma-roney’s testimony), Sieg’s per-share value would have been $57.19 compared to the court’s value of $62.67, a difference of only $5.48 per share. Even if the marketability discount taken by Sieg is not allowed in Iowa, an issue we do not decide, the impact this error had on Sieg’s valuation of the stock was slight and would certainly support the trial court’s exercise of discretion to deny the substantial attorney fees sought by the dissenters, particularly in view of the fact the use of a marketability discount was not done in bad faith. See Waters v. Double L, Inc., 114 Idaho 256, 755 P.2d 1294, 1305 (Idaho Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>), modified, 115 Idaho 705, 769 P.2d 582 (1989);

    ### Response:
    holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint (Dkt. No. 5) and DISMISSES Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . Plaintiff did not attach a copy of the Note or the Mortgage to his Complaint. Indeed, Plaintiff did not even disclose the principal amount of the loan or the interest rate terms about which he complains. Defendant at taches copies of the Note and Mortgage to its Motion. The Court considers these documents in this motion to dismiss, although they are not formally attached to the Complaint, because they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to Plaintiff's claims. See Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir.1999). See also Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). 2 . A civil conspiracy, by itself, is not a

    ### Response:
    holding that if the plaintiff fails to attach the written instrument upon which he relies the defendant may introduce the pertinent exhibit which becomes a part of the pleadings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Terny from receiving advancements. The “right to advaneement does not go away simply because the entity from which advancement is sought is alleging that the [defendant] has committed perfidious acts against it.” DeLucca, 2006 WL 224058, at *11. However, Confederate argues that Terny is not entitled to any advances since he has not been sued as a director, but rather in his capacity as a shareholder or consultant. (PI. Opp. at 3). While this argument may limit the scope of work for which Terny is entitled to advancement, it does not eliminate the right to advancements in their entirety- Terny is only entitled to seek advancement of those fees incurred in connection with proceedings which are “by reason of the fact” that he was a director of Confederate. See Homestore, 888 A.2d at 214 (<HOLDING>). In addition, “all contracts providing for the

    ### Response:
    recognizing the need for a nexus or causal connection between the claim against the officer and onces official corporate capacity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    production of otherwise discoverable information. b. Applying the Standard ¶ 32 We now turn to the application of this standard to the facts in this case. Applying the first factor, the strength of the relationship between the confidential information and the issue in dispute, we note that the discovery sought is strongly related to the core issue in the litigation: whether the disabilities at issue were caused by Defendants’ malpractice or by other sources. Christopher Cunniff, a medical doctor, submitted an affidavit stating that, “to a reasonable degree of medical probability,” Patrick’s “family history” was a “contributing factor to his alleged disabilities” and that “the characteristics exhibited in Patrick [ ] appear to be familial characteristi N.Y.S.2d 817 (N.Y.App.Div.1991) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 33 The second and third factors deal with

    ### Response:
    holding academic records of siblings admissible based on expert affidavit stating that a possible connection existed between the neurological problems of the plaintiff and those of her siblings which would support a defense that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff have a genetic cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 584. ¶ 9 In Lam v. Peyton, 268 F.Supp. 253, 254 (W.D.Va.1967), the court relied on that language in Kercheval in rejecting the defendant’s claim that the state had been required to provide independent evidence of the corpus delicti through a witness in a guilty plea proceeding. The court concluded that “corpus delicti must be established in order to admit an extra-judicial confession” and refused to apply that rule to “a formal plea of guilty.” Id.; see also Waley v. United States, 233 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir.1956) (corpus delicti rule inapplicable to plea of guilty made at trial); State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 439 S.E.2d 547, 568 (1994) (finding corpus delicti rule inapplicable at jury trial for sentencing of defendant who had pled guilty to first-degree murder); Mullen, supra, at 408 (<HOLDING>); but see Commonwealth v. Fears, 575 Pa. 281,

    ### Response:
    recognizing infrajudicial statements among exceptions to corpus delicti rule defendant may plead guilty without independent proof of a crime and a defendants incourt confession requires no corroboration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the notes in the financial statement that over $4,000,000 of that loss was due to a onetime, nonrecurring compensation expense to Nexity’s founders. Review of Blackmon’s deposition testimony reveals that he understood from the Nexity officers that the company was progressing according to its general strategic plan. Nexity officers apparently stated only in general terms that Nexity was doing well. The following is an excerpt from Blackmon’s deposition transcript: “A: ... I had conversations with Ken [Vassey] about how Nexity was doing, and he assured me that Nexity was doing fíne, that all they needed tating that a person cannot blindly rely on an agent’s oral representations that are contrary to written disclosures); and Wamser v. J.E. Liss, Inc., 838 F.Supp. 393, 399 (E.D.Wis.1993)(<HOLDING>). Therefore, the alleged oral

    ### Response:
    holding that written information cures oral misstatements and omissions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to mean power devices that have control circuits. In addition to unrefuted admissions by professionals in the semiconductor industry that “smart power” is generic, ST also prepared a 150-page chronology from 1982 through the present that digested the pervasive uses of “smart power” to identify devices that utilize a certain type of technology, particularly integrated circuits that combine both power and logic. This chro nology provided evidence from a variety of sources including trade journals, newspapers and other publications, and advertisements. In addition, the chronology also set forth evidence from patent, trademark and copyright registrations indicating that ding that “software news” probably generic); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025, 98 S.Ct. 751, 54

    ### Response:
    holding that light beer is generic
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hector Roderico Garcia, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions pro se for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We dismiss the petition for review. Garcia does not challenge the BIA’s dismissal of his appeal for failure to file a brief. He did not exhaust the claims presented to this court, and we must therefore dismiss his contentions. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED. ** This

    ### Response:
    holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to consider Harris’s invitation to presume malice under these circumstances, Harris has not established another key element of Ohio’s malicious-prosecution claim — the lack of probable cause — for any of the three counts with which he was charged. First, a reasonable factfinder could fairly conclude that the officers had probable cause to charge Harris with criminal assault under Ohio Revised Code § 2903.13(a), which proscribes “knowingly causfing] or attempt[ing] to cause physical harm to another.” Ohio Rev.Code § 2903.13(a); see also Ohio Rev.Code § 2901.22(b). State prosecutors brought the assault charge against Harris in state court only after obtaining an indictment, which establishes “prima facie evidence of probable cause,” Carlton, 662 N.E.2d at 1121, t th Cir. Apr. 4, 1994) (<HOLDING>). In attempting to escape the reach of these

    ### Response:
    holding in a nonohiolaw case that probable cause existed where plaintiff shoved police officer in the chest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    homesteads under the TT government could be given a specific parcel of land, but that it could not be more than five hectares in area. Richard G. Emerick, Land Tenure in the Marianas, in 1 Office of the Staff Anthropologist, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Land Tenure Patterns, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 233-34 (1958). 45 See Pelisamen, 3 CR at 794-95; see also Cruz v. Johnston, 6 TTR 354, 357-58 (Trial Div. 1973) (noting that homesteaders who received certificates of compliance were entitled to deeds of conveyance, and holding that the issuance of such deeds may be compelled). 46 Reply Brief for Appellant MPLC at 5. 47 Conclusions of Law, supra note 16, ¶ 5. 48 Brief for Appellant MPLC at 8-9. 49 Cf. McCullen v. Sproles, 28 So. 2d 218, 220 (Miss. 1946) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 50 See 67 TTC § 208 (1970 Ed.) (""Deeds of

    ### Response:
    holding that recitals in land patent were affirmative evidence that patentee paid requisite price for land
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    — the standard we must apply here — than for a statutory claim under Title VII. We believe the fact that verbal harassment is gender-specific gives it no greater claim as a constitutional violation than verbal harassment generally. Thus, we must look at this claim as one for psychological abuse. B We next consider whether plaintiffs allegation of psychological abuse states an actionable claim. Defendant argues that psychological abuse absent physical contact or a threat to bodily integrity is not a deprivation of constitutional rights. No published authority addresses this particular issue in a school context. In other contexts, however, even extreme verbal abuse typically is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation. Cf. Collins v. Gundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). We have decided one substantive due process

    ### Response:
    holding that verbal abuse where sheriff laughed at prisoner and threatened to hang him did not state constitutional deprivation actionable under  1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 454 N.E.2d 522, 525, 467 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. 1983), most appellate courts to consider the question have held that — even in the absence of explicit statutory authorization permitting delegation of a particular function — an attorney general or similar official may delegate prosecutorial duties to assistants authorized to practice law, given the impossibility of personal performance of every statutory duty. See United States v. Kleve, 465 F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1972) (“Defendants’ contention that the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the prosecution cannot be delegated authority by the United States Attorney to file the certificate lacks merit.”) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3731); see also United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 1176, 1184 (11th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hawthorne, 235 F.3d 400, 404

    ### Response:
    holding that assistant united states attorney may file information requesting sentence enhancement based on prior conviction even though statute says that information must be filed by the united states attorney
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation was motivated by racial animus, the claim is not dependent upon proof of racial bias. The reasonable accommodation claim necessarily fails, however, because Philip failed to prove he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Second and distinct from his ADA claim, however, Philip contends Ford’s refusal to place him in the permanent position was racially motivated. Philip points to two similarly situated white employees who were grandfathered into the position de spite their lack of seniority, and argues Ford’s refusal to grant him a similar exception was due to race. Id. This latter claim is in no way dependent upon Philip proving he is covered under the ADA. See Austin v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 198 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) was a member of a protected group, 2) was

    ### Response:
    holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Petitioner Sprint’s Br. at 28 (citing Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 13,198-99). Sprint claims that these historical observations are somehow preclusive, in that they may influence the district court’s judgment on the contract claim or be cited by other IXCs who refuse to pay Sprint’s access charges. It is clear that the passages from the Declaratory Ruling cited by Sprint are merely descriptive statements by the agency, not legal conclusions. The statements have no force of law, so they cannot conclusively cause the adverse collateral consequences suggested by Sprint. In short, Sprint is quibbling over FCC observations that have no binding effect whatsoever. This is never a basis for review in this court. Cf. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 198 F.3d 266 (D.C.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Sprint further argues that the FCC

    ### Response:
    holding that there is nothing for a court to review when an agency has never issued a final and binding judgment that has the force of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86. Retail Property Trust, 768 F.3d at 947-48, n.5. 21 . ECF No. 16 at 6. 22 . 49 U.S.C. § 40103. 23 . United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969). 24 . 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-46507. 25 . 49 U.S.C. § 41713. 26 . 49 U.S.C. § 42121. 27 . ECF No. 16 at 6. 28 . Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007). 29 . Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Exp. Hldgs., Inc., 555 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2009). 30 . Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 747 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 2014). 31 . Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 468 (affirming dismissal of passenger's failure-to-warn claims); Martin, 555 F.3d at 812 (reversing dismissal of airline's indemnity claim); Ventress, 747 F.3d at 723 (affirming judgment on the pleadings). 32 . Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 468 (<HOLDING>); Martin, 555 F.3d at 811-812 (holding that FAA

    ### Response:
    holding that failuretowarn claims based on theory that faarequired warnings are insufficient are preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    attention of the court. If the court finds that the petitioner is indigent, it shall allow petitioner to proceed in forma pauperis. If the court finds the indigent petitioner is incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction, and has requested representation, it shall order a copy of the petition sent to the Public Defender’s office. P-C.R. 1, § 2. Although Barclay was in prison and attached an affidavit of indigence to his petition, the court did not forward his petition to the Public Defender’s office as required by P-C.R. 1, § 2. The State recognizes that the court erred in this omission but asserts that it is harmless error. We disagree. There are two reasons behind the rule requiring Barclay’s petition for post-conviction relief to be for .1994), reh’g denied, trans. denied (<HOLDING>). Barclay properly filed with his petition an

    ### Response:
    holding petitioner cannot claim he was denied right to assistance of counsel when he knowingly and voluntarily decided to represent himself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under § 15-18-8, Austin must serve a minimum of 3 years, but no more than 5 years, in confinement. The circuit court, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to order that Austin serve only 26 months in confinement. Accordingly, we must again remand this case for the circuit court to conduct another sentencing hearing and to again reconsider the execution of Austin’s 20-year sentence. As we stated in our original opinion: “Because the 20-year sentence was valid, the circuit court may not change it. See Wood[ v. State, 602 So.2d 1195 (Ala.Crim.App.1992)]. However, the court may either split the sentence in compliance with § 15-18-8, i.e., with no more than 5 years in confinement [and no less than 3 years in confinement], see, e.g., Soles v. State, 820 So.2d 163, 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2001)(<HOLDING>), or, if it determines that splitting the

    ### Response:
    holding that the newly amended  15188 allows a trial judge to suspend a sentence imposed upon application of the schoolhousing enhancements despite the prohibition against probation in  13a12250 and 13a12270
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the verdict only if the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1192 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1002 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1200, 116 S.Ct. 1701, 134 L.Ed.2d 800 (1996); United States v. Moralez, 964 F.2d 677, 679 (7th Cir.1992). The jury found Granados guilty of conspiracy to commit extortion and attempt to commit extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Extortion is the wrongful use of force or fear, including fear of economic harm, to obtain money or property from another person. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (defining extortion); United States v. Sturman, 49 F.3d 1275, 1281 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lisinski, 728 F.2d 887, 890

    ### Response:
    recognizing  1951 includes fear of economic harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tort cases without express focus on choice of law issues. See, e.g., Carmichael v. KBR, 572 F.3d 1271, 1288 n. 13 (11th Cir.2009) (providing that the court’s analysis “would remain the same regardless of which state’s law applied”); see also Taylor v. KBR, 658 F.3d 402 (4th Cir.2011) (dismissing on political question grounds -without discussing choice of law); Lane v. Halliburton, supra. The evidence of sensitive military decisions persuaded these courts that such cases are not “typical negligence action[s]” where the fact-finder can “draw upon common sense and everyday experience” in determining whether a military contractor acted reasonably. Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1289. But cf. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1359-62 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Differences among the tort regimes of the

    ### Response:
    holding that private contractor failed to demonstrate that claims against it required reexamination of a military decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not have authority over Plaintiffs teaching or writing, they could not give him orders that he had to obey, and they did not have ultimate authority over whether or not he would be retained by University.” Id. at 629. Similarly, the Journalism Department faculty were responsible for reviewing Ku-bik’s progress and for making a recommendation, but did not have authority to reappoint Kubik. In fact, the Department’s first recommendation that Kubik not be reappointed was rejected by Dean Gha-nem. Kubik attempts to distinguish Sam Han by arguing that the Sixth Circuit was applying an Ohio statute, but the statutory language is substantially identical. See Ohio. Rev. Code § 4112.02. See also Masi v. DTE Coke Operations, LLC, No. 06-11592, 2007 WL 2827845, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Kubik cites Dutt v. Delaware State College

    ### Response:
    holding that individual defendants were not liable under the elcra because they did not have the authority to rehire the plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on March 6, 2008. Among the forms was an arbitration agreement. When the Estate filed this action, the defendants timely requested arbitration. The Estate argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and otherwise unenforceable. In an order that did not explain its reasoning, the trial court denied arbitration. There is no evidence that the signing of these documents involved procedural un-conscionability, and the trial court did not find that any procedural unconscionability occurred in this case. From the transcript of the hearing, it appears the trial court held that the agreement was unenforceable because it was substantively unconscionable. We conclude that the trial court erred in this ruling. See FL-Carrollwood Care, LLC v. Gordon, 72 So.3d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). In addition to providing for arbitration as a

    ### Response:
    holding that arbitration agreement was not unconscionable where agree ment did not limit punitive damages and limitation of liability provision was severable if unenforceable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the instant case. The Department has acknowledged the finality of its decisions in its formal written reports submitted to Congress. Likewise, the Department’s Operational Plan states that “sampling for non-response will be used to complete the census enumeration.” As read in the Appropriations Act of 1998 § 209(c)(2), the Census 2000 Operational Plan “shall be deemed to constitute final agency action regarding the use of statistical methods in the 2000 decennial census,” thus making the question of use ripe for adjudication. Appropriations Act of 1998 § 209(c)(2) (emphasis added). Defendant’s suggests that the case is not ripe because “Congress has not reached its ultimate legislative conclusion regarding a s al Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products

    ### Response:
    holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred the claims in the case were still ripe for review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he believed Reuland lied to him. Hynes’s counsel attempted to broaden this to simply “he had lied period,” but the court responded: “That is not what the evidence is____The whole issue whether he lied to him. This really isn’t ... a Pickering question, it’s a causation question. It is a way of focusing more precisely on your version of what caused the demotion.” Rather than persist in her Pickering argument, Hynes’s counsel replied, “I think that is right. I think what Your Honor has proposed will work.” Generally, we need not consider a claim on appeal where the party advancing it consented not to submit it to the jury below. See Coffey v. Dobbs Int’l Servs., Inc., 170 F.3d 323, 325 n. 2 (2d Cir.1999); Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103, 106-07 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). By failing to make clear to the district

    ### Response:
    holding that a theory of recovery pleaded but not submitted to the jury by explicit agreement need not be considered on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the summary judgment motion, the district court recognized that Autrey could prevail on his claims of malicious prosecution and his Fourth Amendment claim of wrongful arrest only if the plaintiff could somehow establish that no probable cause for his prosecution had been established. Because a state-court judge had already determined that probable cause existed to bind Autrey over for trial, however, the district court determined that principles of collateral estoppel precluded the plaintiff from pursuing a second time an identical challenge to the quantum of evidence necessary to initiate a criminal prosecution. Additionally concluding that the plaintiff failed to make any showing “that Kennedy an 456 Mich. 365, 572 N.W.2d 603, 610 (1998) (Michigan tort of malicious prosecution) (<HOLDING>). When deciding what role the Michigan state

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff must show that the person instituting or maintaining the prosecution lacked probable cause for bringing the action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which you indicated was the last day that you worked, through April the 26th of 2001, did you speak to any member of management relative to any of the reasons why you were absent from work? A. No, I didn’t. (Id. at 76.) The Court finds that the notice given to the Defendant through the automated telephone system was simply inadequate to invoke the protection of the FMLA. Courts have consistently held that to give adequate notice to invoke the FMLA, an employee must inform his employer that he has a serious health condition. Ha/mmon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999); Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149, F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998); Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir.1995); see also Taylor v. Invacare Corp., 64 Fed. Appx. 516 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Simply selecting the “ill” option on an

    ### Response:
    holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Amtrak’s motion is GRANTED with respect to Counts II, IV and the age and perceived disability discrimination claims in Count V; and DENIED with respect to Counts I and III and the claims of race and gender discrimination in Count V. Green and Porter’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect to the § 1981 termination claim in Count I and the claims of race and gender discrimination in termination in Count V; and GRANTED with respect to the age and perceived disability discrimination in termination claims in Count V, and the failure to hire claims of Counts I and V. 1 . To the extent plaintiff also set forth claims against Green and Porter under Title VII, Title VII does not provide for liability against individual employees. See Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Martin v. Howard Univ., No. 99-1175, 1999 WL

    ### Response:
    holding that an employer alone is liable for a violation of title vii by supervisory employees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    482 F.3d 860 (6th Cir.2007), the Sixth Circuit found that an administrator had acted arbitrarily and capriciously where he failed to “ ‘review ... the quality and quantity of the ... evidence and the opinions on both sides of the issues.’ ” Id. at 865 (quoting McDonald v. W.S. Life Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 161, 172 (6th Cir.2003)). The court held that the administrator’s denial of benefits failed under this standard. Contrary to the plaintiffs assertion, the existence of a conflict of interest that arises from a plan administrator deciding issues in which the company has a financial interest does not require a different standard, although the conflict “shapes” the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 984 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (citing Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of

    ### Response:
    holding that where a company pays plan beneficiaries from its own assets its perpetual conflict with its profitmaking role as a business must shape  the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Second Circuit described it, the day “when [the petitioner] was denied leave to appeal,” Geraci 211 F.3d at 9 (emphasis added). Second, the court noted that “[t]he coram nobis petition was denied on February 17, 1998 and the time clock started to run again .... until February 24, 1998, the day the [habe-as] petition was filed, a total of seven days.” Geraci 211 F.3d at 9. This calculation of “seven days” indicates that the court necessarily included either the date the coram nobis petition was denied or the date the habeas petition was filed. Upon consideration, it must have been the latter, because in determining whether a habeas petition is timely filed, a court must include the petition filing date within the limitations period. See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Geraci’s primary holding — that a coram nobis

    ### Response:
    holding that where the limitations period had run for 364 days petitioner had one day remaining  in which to file the  habeas petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    procedures to obtain an untainted interview with L.B. were unsuccessful, because L.B.’s father spoke with her privately before she left for the shelter home. To determine what process is constitutionally due, we look to three somewhat flexible demands of procedural due process: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. 2493, 2503-04, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979) (<HOLDING>). As the district court noted, “[t]he bonds of

    ### Response:
    holding that a child has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment under the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Code § 288(a), does not qualify as a crime of violence. He contends that Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), overruled United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Medina-Maella, 351 F.3d 944 (9th Cir.2003). This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 511-16 (9th Cir.2009). Perez-Ramos also contends that Nijhawan v. Holder, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009), effectively overruled Medina-Villa. This contention fails. See Nijhawan, 129 S.Ct. at 2300. Finally, Perez-Ramos’s contention that we must call for en banc review based on a conflict between Estrada-E spinoza and Medinor-Villa is without merit. See Pelayo-Gareia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010, 1013-16 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not

    ### Response:
    recognizing that estradaespinoza and medinavilla set out two different generic federal definitions of sexual abuse of a minor  and looking to both definitions to determine whether conviction under calpenal code  2615d qualifies as generic federal crime of sexual abuse of a minor under categorical approach
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as it was under theories of Article I rejected by the Court in Seminole. As the Third Circuit stated in a related context: If a state’s conduct impacting on a business always implicated the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress would have almost unrestricted power to subject states to suit' through the exercise of its abrogation power. Congress could pass any law that tangentially affected the ability of businesses to operate and then create causes of action against the states in federal court if they infringed on those federally created rights. This result would be unacceptable and would conflict directly with the strict limits on Congress’s powers to abrogate a state’s El Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F.Supp. 400 (D.N.J.1996) (<HOLDING>), appeal pending, No. 97-1246 (Fed. Cir. argued

    ### Response:
    holding that a patent is property for purposes of the fourteenth amendment and that remedial legislation abrogating state sovereign immunity under seminole is constitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with Tang’s assertion that the omitted portion of his statement “specifically rebuffs] the defamatory charge that [the] article imputed to [Tang].” Rather, this is but one interpretation depending on the listener’s point of view. In the absence of evidence that it omitted Tang’s remarks to portray his statements falsely, the First Amendment protects the Houston Chinese Press’s editorial choice regarding what material it included in the article. See id. Tang offered no evidence to controvert Wang’s testimony regarding his interpretation of Tang’s remarks. Nor has Tang offered sufficient evidence to show that Wang’s interpretation was not a plausible or reasonable one in light of the tenor of the press conference and the provocative nature of Tang’s analogy. See Cantu, 168 S.W.3d at 855 (<HOLDING>). Given Wang’s understanding of Tang’s

    ### Response:
    holding that understandable misinterpretation of ambiguous facts does not show actual malice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    t Den-ton’s argument that defendants decided to investigate the June 30, 2011, arrest, terminate his employment, and release the video to the Tulsa World in retaliation for the July 7, 2011, email he sent to his fellow union members. Denton also argues that because Owasso declined to impose any significant discipline against a group of police officers who engaged in similar conduct during the arrest of a suspect several years earlier, the harsher decisions made with regard to Denton must have been linked to his union activity when he sent the email. Although the Garcetti/Pickering analysis applies to an association based retaliation claim, a plaintiff need only satisfy the first, fourth, and fifth prongs of the test. See Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we examine whether the email was

    ### Response:
    holding that a court should not require a showing of public concern or engage in judicial balancing of the employers interest against the employees interest when the public employee alleges retaliation for participation in a union with which his employer has signed a collective bargaining agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. USSG § 4B1.2(a). In addition, relevant commentary to this section provides: “Crime of violence” includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling. Other offenses are included as “crimes of violence” if (A) that offense has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (B) the conduct set forth (ie., expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convict 261, 262, 264 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, we acknowledge that the Eighth

    ### Response:
    holding that misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated constitutes a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    374 U.S. at 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646); Red Star Towing, 552 F.Supp. at 371 (“[Fitzgerald] established that a litigant in admiralty is not entitled as a matter of right to a non-jury trial ....”) Furthermore, when non-jury admiralty claims are joined with legal claims carrying a jury right, the constitutional right to a jury should prevail. See Mayer v. Cornell Univ., 909 F.Supp. 81, 85 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (stating “general rule” that “when admiralty claims are joined with claims which carry the right to a jury, the right to a jury prevails”); In re Complaint of Berkley Curtis Bay Co., 569 F.Supp. 1491, 1494 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (“[W]here the nonjury’ admiralty tradition and a plaintiffs jury right conflict, the jury right must prevail.”); Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.Supp. 1275, 1276-77 (D.Conn.1976) (<HOLDING>); see also 8 Moore’s Federal Practice § 38.32

    ### Response:
    holding in action involving single claim that if claim sounded only in admiralty there would be no right to a jury trial but if federal question was present as a separate and independent basis for federal jurisdiction then the jury demand must be honored
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or omission outside of this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state; or (e)having an interest in, using, or possessing a real or immovable property in this state. In addition, La. R.S. 13:3202 expressly limited La.R.S. 13:3201 to causes of action arising from acts or omissions enumerated therein. 3 . In 1984, the designations were also changed from letters to numerals such that Subsection (h) is now Subsection (8). 4 . This Court has noted the difference, in the context of personal jurisdiction in products liability cases, between a manufacturer and a distributor. McBead Drilling Co. v. Kremco, Ltd., 509 So.2d 429, 432 (La.1987) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Federal circuit courts are somewhat

    ### Response:
    holding that in litigation arising from a product related injury in the forum state there are significant differences between the exercise of jurisdiction over a retailer who simply sold the product locally and the exercise of jurisdiction over a manufacturer whose products were sold over a large area
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a prepayment of royalties pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 1726(b) shall be distributed as follows: (1) a portion of the receipts, estimated by the taxation and revenue department to be equal to the amount that the state would have received as its share of royalties in the same fiscal year if the prepayment had not been made, shall be distributed to the public school fund; and (2) the remainder shall be distributed to the common school permanent fund. 2 . In addition to their claim for prospective relief, Plaintiffs originally claimed a right to payment of past royalties. The Eleventh Amendment, however, clearly bars any claim for the retroactive payment of royalties the State has received pursuant to the FMLA. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-671, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (<HOLDING>). 3 . In previously holding that FMLA

    ### Response:
    holding the eleventh amendment barred that portion of a district court order directing retroactive payment of aid benefits from the illinois treasury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Privilege (2d ed. 1990); cf. Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied sub nom., Gamer v. First American Life Ins. Co., 401 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1191, 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (in analyzing attorney-client privilege issues, “[cjoneeptualistic phrases describing the corporation as an entity ... are not useful tools of analysis.”). This is such an instance. Plaintiffs have sued not only the Town of Georgetown, but the individual members of its Town Council. See D.I. 1. The Court must, therefore, examine the legal relationship that exists between the Town Council and its individual councilmembers in evaluating attorney-client privilege issues. See Del.U.R.E. 502(b)(3); Kirby v. Kirby, No. 8604, 1987 WL 14862 (Del.Ch. July 29, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374,

    ### Response:
    holding the privilege belonged to both the corporate client  a closely held charitable foundation  and its directors because at the time of the privileged communication the directors collectively were the client
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of her continued failure to cooperate and open disobedience to plaintiff in administrative matters; and 4. On May 8, 1996, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant President Judge Bonavi-tacola stating that he would attend a meeting of the Administr s instance, plaintiff has made sufficient allegations to demonstrate that his complaints did not relate solely to the removal of his personal responsibilities but also touched on the issues of the proper role of a guberna-torially appointed President Judge versus a judicially appointed Court Administrator and the extent of political influence on administrative decisions in the judiciary, issues which are of general public concern. See Complaint ¶¶ 43, 48-49, 51; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (<HOLDING>). And the fact that these communications were

    ### Response:
    holding that a question relating to whether assistant district attorneys felt pressured to work on political campaigns touched on a matter ofpublic concern even though the rest of the questions in the questionnaire at issue did not
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and no argument that its increasing the fee contravened state law. Although the plaintiff couched its appellate arguments in terms of whether the unilateral amendment of the alleged contract was “lawfully authorized,” the only question was whether the State would breach the alleged contract that the license represented by its increasing the fee, not whether the State would act contrary to statute in doing so. See id. at 77-78, 308 S.W.2d at 840. The Dodgen court held that the State was not so bound; in so holding, the court distinguished the case from those in which a plaintiff seeks to determine whether State officials are acting outside their statutory or constitutional authority. See id. at 78-79, 308 S.W.2d at 840 (distinguishing Cobb, 144 Tex. at 365-66, 190 S.W.2d at 712 (<HOLDING>)). In the case before us, the protesting

    ### Response:
    holding that suit by taxpayers alleging that they fell outside statutorily defined class subject to occupation tax so that states attempt to collect such tax from them was illegal was not suit against state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jurors should have been allowed to hear the 911 tape is no exceptio be worded Independently of our concern regarding the decision about the tape, we also hold that the conference triggered Frantz’s Faretta rights because it resolved the content of the judge’s response to the jurors’ request. The chance to shape the jury’s interpretation of an important tactical decision is at least as important as the chance to make the decision itself. And regardless of the judge’s leeway in granting the jurors’ request, the substance and wording of the judge’s response could have influenced the jurors’ interpretation of the tape’s absence. We have repeatedly recognized how seriously jurors consider judges’ responses to their questions. In federal court, we allow trial judges substantial th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Because of the delicate nature of such

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a defendants participation in formulating a response to a deadlocked jury  may be important to ensuring the fairness of the verdict particularly because there may be holdout jurors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court’s granting of motion to dismiss). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). However, a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.1992); Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Biggs, 237 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied). Therefore, when the issues are purely questions of law, as here, we effectively conduct a de novo review. See Pallares v. Magic Valley Elec. Coop., Inc., 267 S.W.3d 67, 69-70 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2008, pet. refd); see also Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tex.1989) (<HOLDING>). III. Analysis By his sole issue, Dr. Salinas

    ### Response:
    holding that matters of statutory construction are questions of law for the court to decide rather than issues of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was a GS-13 who performed duties similar to the ones plaintiff performed as Acting Team Leader. Id. 52:4-5. Yet plaintiff also conceded that Lane was not promoted to a GS-14 level. “Q. And did Iris Lane, did she ever become a GS-14? A. No.” Id. 52:6-8. Plaintiff therefore identifies no other individuals who were promoted when her alleged request was denied. Even if the Court looks more expansively at plaintiffs proposed comparables described above, there is no evidence that individuals performing work similar to plaintiff were employed at or above a grade 14 level. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary. Plaintiff herself admits that Iris Lane performed similar work and was also a grade 13. Id. 52:4-5. Kress indicates he performed similar work to plaintiff a Sept. 19, 2007) (<HOLDING>). B. 2003 Performance Evaluation Plaintiff next

    ### Response:
    holding that because there was no evidence before the court of any similarly situated employees who were promoted to a higher salary grade when plaintiff was denied a promotion plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Thus, facilitation of aggravated burglary presents a risk of physical injury sufficient to be classified as a “violent felony.” Sawyers, relying on United States v. Pazzanese, 982 F.2d 251 (8th Cir.1992), argues that criminal facilitation is never a “violent felony” under the ACCA. Although Sawyers commingles the arguments, there are essentially two components to this claim: first, because of the categorical approach, facilitation crimes cannot be classified as a “violent felony” based on the underlying crime; and second, facilitation does not meet the inherent mens rea requirement in the ACCA. The first argument is quickly disposed of. First, criminal facilitation in Tennessee requires the government to show that the underlying crime actually occurred. See Parker, 932 S.W.2d at 951 (<HOLDING>)(fodtnote omitted); see also State v. Virges,

    ### Response:
    holding that for facilitation of a felony the state must prove the commission of a specified felony and the assistance the accused gave to the person committing the specified felony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to create a new right,” but instead were intended to overrule Texport and thus to clarify the pre-existing right to drawback of HMT. See Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1369-70; Recording of Oral Argument at 12:15-13:55 (Shell argued that statement in Aectra is inconsistent with conceptual underpinnings of default rule). Shell’s “default rule” argument is both untimely and lacking in merit. As noted above, Shell raised the argument for the first time at oral argument. Shell’s briefs do not even allude to the default rule, much less articulate a position on the relevance and application of the rule to the facts of this case. By failing to brief the point, Shell waived its right to press its default rule argument here. See, e.g., Novosteel SA v. United States, 284 F.3d 1261, 1273-74 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). However, even if Shell had briefed (and thus

    ### Response:
    holding that party waived argument which was not presented to court of international trade until after the party had filed its principal summary judgment brief reasoning that parties must give a trial court a fair opportunity to rule on an issue other than by raising that issue for the first time in a reply brief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    IN PART. ORFINGER and EVANDER, JJ„ concur. 1 . Despite the fact that Nicole’s current full-time job compensates her better than any job she had prior to or during her marriage, she still earns approximately one third of the income earned by Robert. 2 . We would also recede from the other panel decisions from our court that have followed or applied the same rule announced in Martin. See, e.g., Greene v. Greene, 895 So.2d 503 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Widmer v. Widmer, 713 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Fullerton v. Fullerton, 709 So.2d 162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Ingle v. Ingle, 640 So.2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). 3 . We note that a panel of this court several years ago signaled the court's willingness to reconsider Martin. See Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So.2d 1023, 1031-32 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). The trial courts within

    ### Response:
    recognizing that although this court has not looked kindly on bridge the gap rehabilitative alimony awards in the past in a proper case it might do so in the future
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clouse, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that service had been completed for purposes of the savings statute when a process server served the defendant’s wife and office manager at the defendant’s office after she represented herself as her husband’s agent, but in fact was not. 274 S.W.3d at 345-46. Here, the Barners’ attorney sent the complaint and summons for T/C LLC by certified mail to the wrong registered agent, which accepted service on T/C LLC’s behalf and sent a return receipt to the Barners’ attorney showing that service had been completed. This case is much closer to Cole and Clouse than to cases in which the Arkansas courts have held that the savings statute did not apply. See, e.g., Posey v. St. Bernard’s Healthcare, Inc., 365 Ark. 154, 226 S.W.3d 757, 761, 765-66 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Hicks v. Clark, 316 Ark. 148, 870 S.W.2d 750,

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs did not complete service for purposes of the savings statute when they served the defendant with a complaint signed by an unlicensed attorney a nullity under arkansas law and made no attempt to serve the defendant with the amended complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    alleged interest created by the State rises to the level of ‘property,’ thereby securing the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). Significantly, § 42-56-22, like § 42-56-21, vests Wall with total discretion over whether Young may work at all, by making the labor of prisoners subject to the “discretion of the director” and contingent upon receipt of the “express consent of the director.” Such discretion evidences a lack of intent to provide prisoners with a protected property interest. See, e.g., Jennings v. Lombardi, 70 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir.1995) (reasoning that “[wjhere the statute or policy ... grants to the decisionmaker discretionary authority in implementing it, a protected property interest is not created”); cf. Bishop v. State, 667 A.2d 275, 277-78 (R.I.1995) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, under Rhode Island law, a

    ### Response:
    holding that prisoner had no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in prisoninmate classification system process where director of department of corrections retained unfettered discretion in classification and housing of prisoners
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    471 (5th Cir.2002)). 19 . McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir.2007). 20 . Id. 21 . Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir.2003). 22 . We also note that if the ALJ’s conclusion were relevant in this appeal, then the ALJ’s other conclusion — that ""the facts fail to validate [Etienne's] assertion that the reason for her separation was due to the complaint she logged with the [EEOC]” — also presumably would be relevant. We doubt that Etienne desires such a result. 23 . Laxton, 333 F.3dat 579. (quoting Evans v. City of Hous., 246 F.3d 344, 355 (5th Cir. 2001)). 24 . Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, - U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). 25 . Cf. Pennington v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 469 Fed.Appx. 332, 338 (5th Cir.2012)

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the applicant’s information-a confidential informant, Slycord, and Carroll-White-were facing criminal charges. However, a fair read of the application in its entirety makes this point clear. The application states that Slycord and Carroll-White’s shared residence was raided on December 4, 1999, and that officers found a substantial amount of methamphetamine therein. It further states that the signing officer interviewed Carroll-White and Slycord two days later, on December 6. The issuing judge could reasonably infer that Carroll-White and Slycord were likely to face serious drug charges. Moreover, even if the warrant application were corrected as Oleson suggests, probable cause would still exist to support its issuance. See United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not err in denying

    ### Response:
    holding that hearing on warrants validity required only where defendant can show warrant would not have established probable cause if corrected
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    strategic purposes. The courts were justifiably cautious in observing the potential preclusive effect of such weak class actions. Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., No. 39-0211, 220 F.R.D. 64,-, 2004 WL 187332, at *18 (M.D.Tenn. Jan. 14, 2004). In contrast, in this case the court is satisfied that the interests of the named plaintiffs are aligned with the interests of the absent class members. Although the named plai ndem. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 205, 211 (5th Cir.2003) (observing that “[fjraud actions that require proof of individual reliance cannot be certified as Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) class actions”; holding the district court committed reversible error by certifying a class in a RICO fraud action); Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 342 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., 703 F.2d 1197,

    ### Response:
    holding fraud claims do not provide a suitable basis for classwide relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the constitutional right “at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.” ... Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 126 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in the original). While the Tuner factors “serve as guides to a single reasonableness standard,” the first factor “ ‘looms especially large’ because it ‘tends to encompass the remaining factors, and some of its criteria are apparently necessary conditions.’ ” Id. (quoting Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213-14 (3d Cir.1999)). If the connection between a prison policy and the government’s asserted interests is too tenuous, the policy is “arbitrary or irrational” and “fails irrespective of whether the other factors tilt in its favor.” Wolf, 297 F.3d at 309-10. Accord Ashker v. Califonia Dept. of Corrections, 350 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has made clear that the

    ### Response:
    holding that if a policy fails the first tuner prong the court need not address the other factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the failure of the City to award promotions to the plaintiffs. Only one racist comment was mentioned— the “rug head” remark — and that comment was directly tied to the failure to promote one of the plaintiffs’ black colleagues. The plaintiffs claim to have verbally notified EEOC officials about other facts that support their hostile-work-environment claim, but the record contains no evidence beyond bald, nonspecific assertions that they did so. No decision in this circuit has held that EEOC charges regarding discrete acts of discrimination are alone sufficient to put the EEOC on notice of a hostile-work-environment claim. Several unpublished decisions of this court have in fact held to the contrary. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Cleveland, 294 Fed.Appx. 226, 234-35 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Scott v. Eastman Chem. Co., 275 Fed.Appx.

    ### Response:
    holding that an eeoc investigation of a hostile work environment could not reasonably be expected to grow out of a charge describing the denials of a promotion and a handicapped parking space
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contract on or about December 18, 2000. Both parties stipulated that DPS removed its employees from the Rollins project on Monday, December 18, 2000 and provided no further services to Rollins after that date. In light of this jury finding and the stipulated evidence, we must conclude that DPS received notice of contract termination from Rollins no l nce of any costs avoided to allow the jury to properly calculate net damages. See Farris, 516 S.W.2d at 283-84. However, this general rule does not apply in situations where the breach of contract occurs in such a manner that the non-breaching party does not have the opportunity to reduce its expenses. See Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. McNair Trucklease, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 924, 932 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). We must analyze the jury award for the breach

    ### Response:
    holding that if the defendants breach does not permit the plaintiff to reduce its overhead then defendant is not entitled to a reduction in the damages awarded against it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    they differ, the Constitution must be taken as a limitation or qualification of the general principle previously declared, according to the subject and the language employed.’ Id. at 459 (citation omitted in original). In Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531 (1865), the Court considered a provision of the Maryland Constitution of 1864 which was also identical to Art. II, § 10 of our present Constitution. In holding that the legislature could constitutionally provide for appointment to an office created by it, notwithstanding the separation of powers provision of the Declaration of Rights, the Court said: ‘The Act in question, creating the office, does prescribe a different mode of appointment. Where the office is of legislative creation, the Legislature can modi 6, 270, 93 A. 518, 520 (1915) (<HOLDING>); Ash v. McVey, 85 Md. 119, 129-31, 36 A. 440,

    ### Response:
    holding that the legislature which created the state board of education has the power to abolish modify and control it and therefore had the power to do away with the prerequisite that the senate affirm the governors appointments of all commissioners serving on the board
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    yield of money is approximately two percent); O’Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir.1982) (Posner, J.) (""In periods when no inflation is anticipated, the risk-free interest rate is between one and three percent.”); id. at 1200 (indicating that one-half percent is ""lower than most economists believe [the real rate of interest on safe investments] to be for any substantial period of time”); Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F.Supp. 1271, 1293-94 (D.Conn.1974) (explaining that: an inflation-adjusted discount rate should be used; the rate should be about two percent during stable periods of low inflation; and it should be approximately one and one-half percent when inflation is high and/or unpredictable); see also Pfeifer, 462 U.S. at 548-49, 103 S.Ct. at 2556 (<HOLDING>); Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 722 F.2d 114, 122

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial court using a real growth rate of between one and three percent will not be reversed if it explains its choice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contains sufficient evidence for a jury to convict the defendant.” United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir.1995). Rather, reversal is appropriate where an error has a substantial influence on the outcome of a trial or leaves one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect. United States v. Medina-Copete, 757 F.3d 1092, 1108 (10th Cir.2014). In determining whether Mr. Smith’s testimony had a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial, we And three factors relevant to this case: (1) the strength, importance, and pervasiveness of the erroneously admitted testimony; (2) the strength of the admissible evidence; and (3) whether the district court’s instructions to the jury mitigated any error. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d 909, 914-15 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Tome, 61 F.3d at 1455 (holding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that other evidence properly admitted at trial was sufficiently strong to permit the conclusion that the improper admission of unreliable expert testimony was harmless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arrested twice in the year preceding the stop, once for manufacturing methamphetamine and once for possession of marijuana. This information was validly considered as part of the reasonable suspicion calculus. However, given that Detective Schaffner’s records check did not indicate that either of those arrests had resulted in a conviction, the Court accords this factor little weight in the overall analysis. 2. Nervousness Similarly, nervous behavior is not in itself sufficient to create reasonable suspicion, but is a factor that may be considered in the analysis. United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. '2007); see also United States v. Crap-ser, 472 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>). The government contends that Garcia’s extreme

    ### Response:
    holding that while nervousness may be considered as part of the totality of circumstances nervousness standing alone was insufficient to expand a terry stop into an inquiry into drug activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” or (4) the warrant is “so facially deficient ... that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Id. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421 (citations omitted). There is no evidence in the record that Officer Hayhoe made any misrepresentations to the issuing state court judge, nor did he make any statements in reckless disregard for the truth. The only incorrect information given to the state court judge was that Taylor’s apartment was unit # 4 instead of unit # 3. At the time it was given Officer Hay-hoe believed this information was correct. The officers did not search Taylor’s apartment (unit # 3) until after a corrected search warr L.Ed.2d 249 (1990); United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440 (6th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 448,

    ### Response:
    holding that the insertion of a key into a lock solely for the purpose of identifying ownership does not constitute a search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not filed for bankruptcy, could have brought them notwithstanding Cannon’s misappropriation of trust property, the presence of the express trust in this case complicates matters. Since Bradford did not accept the trust funds as a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of Cannon’s breach of trust, under general common-law principles the funds Cannon misappropriated remain subject to the express trust. See, e.g., Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 530 U.S. at 252, 120 S.Ct. 2180 (“[W]hatever [the trustee] recovers he will hold subject to the trust.”). Consequently, the trustee’s recovery, if any, in this case will benefit Cannon’s clients — not the general creditors of the estate. As we previously discussed, section 541 excludes from the debtor’s estate property hel 2d 114 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979

    ### Response:
    holding that the trustee had standing to pursue an action for churning against the debtors broker relating to transactions in a discretionary account but did not have standing to bring a suit for fraud since that cause of action accrued to creditors under new york law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to clothe his argument under the guise of Supreme Court authority. Rather, he cites only our holding in Rodriguez to support his claim. Rodriguez itself makes clear, though, that its holding is based solely on Ninth Circuit precedent. Id. (“To the extent Nelson [v. McCarthy, 637 F.2d 1291, 1296-97 (9th Cir.1980),] requires pre-waiver clarification of a suspect’s wishes concerning his Miranda rights, it has not been superseded by Davis and remains binding precedent.”). Because state courts are not bound under AEDPA by precedent other than that established by the Supreme Court, Rodriguez is immaterial to our review of the state court’s decision to the extent Sessoms relies on it to argue that clarifying questions were required. Compare Albemi v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>), with Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350

    ### Response:
    holding that where the supreme court has expressly left an open question circuit precedent is immaterial and there is no clearly established law for the state court to have unreasonably applied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    257 S.E.2d 808, 818 (1979) (quoting Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 764, 99 S.E. 562, 564 (1919))). “Whether an alternate hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.” Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 1, 12-13, 492 S.E.2d 826, 832 (1997). Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va.App. 263, 277, 597 S.E.2d 242, 249 (2004). Absent a direct admission by the defendant, intent to distribute must necessarily be proved by circumstantial evidence. See Hunter v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 569, 570, 193 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1973). Virginia courts have considered a number of factors alone and in combination when determining if an intent to distribute exists: 1) packaging (see McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 545 S.E.2d 541 (2001) (<HOLDING>)); 2) quantity (see Early v. Commonwealth, 10

    ### Response:
    holding that cocaine packaged in two individually wrapped blocks in a single plastic bag supported a finding of distribution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute and thus was invalid. See Felton I, 4 Vet.App. at 369-71; Ozer I, 14 Vet.App. at 263-64. Indeed, as the preceding discussion shows, the Court’s denunciation of the regulation was even stronger in Felton I than in Ozer I. See ibid. Therefore, the Court holds that the Secretary was substantially justified in promulgating the regulation at issue here. See Felton II, 7 Vet.App. at 282-84; Secretary’s Oct. 2002 Mem. at 2 (attesting that Federal Register “contained no discussion of public comments having been solicited or received”). As to the second part of action at the administrative level, VA’s application of the regulation in the instant case, VA and the BVA were bound by law to apply the regulation to the appellant’s claim. See Fugere v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 103, 110 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as in Felton II, “the regulation

    ### Response:
    holding that agency is bound by its regulations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    portion of the affidavit on tape.” We are satisfied that under Criminal Rule 37(a)(l)(ii) Officer Mowry’s off-the-record statement to Magistrate Johnson may not be considered as part of the affidavit in support of the search warrant. The affidavit consists of four handwritten paragraphs followed by the words “continued on tape,” and six paragraphs transcribed from the testimony which was then recorded. Neither the written nor the taped portions of Officer Mowry’s affidavit contains any express connection between White and 21-D Kennedy Camp. The “composite affidavit” cannot be supplemented by additional material which the officer later testifies that he also told the magistrate, but which does not appear of record. See United States v. Anderson, 453 F.2d 174, 177 (9th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>). The state’s reliance on Nelson v. State, 628

    ### Response:
    holding that all data necessary to show probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant must be contained within the four corners of the affidavit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an auto liability line of insurance with nearly identical language to the Nationwide Auto Policy at issue here. Id. at 1274. The Domino’s auto policy' agreed to “pay all sums Domino’s is legally required to pay ‘caused by an accident’ and resulting from the ‘ownership, maintenance or use of a covered auto.’ ” Id. Just like Titan, Domino’s had selected “any auto” in the covered auto section. Id. The Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court’s holding that Domino’s auto coverage was triggered by the accident. Id. at 1272. The Ninth Circuit, citing California state law precedent, held that the employee’s personal car was a “covered auto” under the “any auto” designation in Domino’s auto policy. Id. at 1275; See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Swearinger, 169 Cal.App.3d 779, 214 Cal.Rptr. 383 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Nationwide cites Ogden v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.

    ### Response:
    holding that a vehicle owned by a host family for a school overnight event fell under the any auto designation in the school districts auto policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tourtellot, No. 12-CV-413 (M.D.N.C. June 13, 2012) (Doc. 15 at 9-10) (finding that, under either mandatory withdrawal standard, legal issues triggered § 157(d)). Defendant Debtors’ complaint raises a claim of trademark infringement. (Doc. 5 ¶¶ 93-95.) It alleges that UD filed a federal application to register “AROUNDCAMPUS” as a trademark and service mark. (Id. ¶ 19.) The application currently awaits decision before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. (Id.) It further alleges that the mark 6 F.3d 144, 152-53 (4th Cir.2012) (laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating “at least nine factors” relevant to one part of that test); cf. In re Singer Co., N.V., No. 01 CIV. 0165, 2002 WL 243779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002) (<HOLDING>). Defendant Debtors cite Doctors Assoc., Inc.

    ### Response:
    holding that whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the agency’s power to bring suit to require compliance. Another example of this usage, albeit in a slightly different context, appears in the citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act; under this statute, suits may not be instituted by individuals or organizations if the EPA or the appropriate state enforcement authority “has commenced and is diligently pursuing a civil or criminal action ... to require compliance” with the Act’s substantive provisions. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Despite this reference to “requir[ing] compliance” in the statutory language, the Supreme Court held in Romero-Barcelo that the Clean Water Act does not require the issuance of an injunction in all cases where a statutory violation has been identified. 456 U.S. at 313, 102 S.Ct. 1798 (<HOLDING>). These examples demonstrate that a statutory

    ### Response:
    holding that the grant of jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a statute hardly suggests a duty to do so under any and all circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1380, 1390 (5th Cir. 1977); Marshall v. Gulf and Western Industries, Inc., 552 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1977). Indeed, Gulf and Western, holding that the agricultural exemption does not apply to tomato packing facilities that processed tomatoes grown by independent farmers, is controlling here. As in Gulf and Western, the processing activities here are subject to the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act since they are independent of the contract growers’ activity and nonagricultural in nature. REVERSED. 1 . This provision is to be read in parallel with the agricultural exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Bayside Enterprises v. NLRB, 97 S.Ct. 576, 578, 97 S.Ct. 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 494 (1977). 2 . Defendant gains no support from Abbott Farms v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1973) (<HOLDING>) in view of the Supreme Court’s statement in

    ### Response:
    holding that abbotts feedmill operation was an agricultural activity because incident to a poultry raising venture
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    May 10, 1985). The district court was asked to render a decision on the merits without trial based on stipulated evidence. Schneider, 1985 WL 570618, at *1. On appeal, we held that the district court should have addressed whether there had been actual discharge because its findings of fact suggested that an actual discharge had occurred. Schneider, 794 F.2d at 384. A motion for summary judgment presents different opportunities and imposes different responsibilities on the parties. See Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.2006) (“Without some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party’s arguments.”); see also Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Schneider, who

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    different grounds than those relied upon by the district court, and AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND Shankle’s case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 . Circuit City reserved the right to modify the rules of the arbitration agreement, and it has modified one of the rules at issue in the present case. This modification is discussed in section III.D. infra. 2 . Even though Morrison’s case has been arbitrated, the claims she raises in this appeal are not moot because this court could still grant effectual relief in the present case, if we were to determine that the arbitration agreement was in fact unenforceable and thus arbitration should never have taken place. Cf. Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 113 S.Ct. 447, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) (<HOLDING>). As discussed infra, however, we ultimately

    ### Response:
    holding that appeal of irs summons was not moot even though subject of summons had already turned over the evidence at issue because court could still order some partial relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entered pursuant to a nolo contendere plea constituted a “crime of violence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1). The Information merely stated, “without elaboration,” that the defendant had committed “the crime of intimidation based on bigotry and bias ... in violation of General Statute No. 53a-181b.” Id. at 56. However, the court held that “the plea proceeding includes a lucid description of the conduct for which Palmer was convicted, that conduct manifestly constitutes a ‘crime of violence’ ..., and Palmer’s on-the-record agreement to the description of his conduct proffered by the prosecuting attorney results in the functional equivalent of a plea agreement with respect to that conduct.” Id. at 59; see also United States v. Etimani, 328 F.3d 493, 503-04 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The reasoning in Palmer is persuasive. As

    ### Response:
    holding that the record did not establish that a prior conviction was for a sexual act for purposes of the 18 usc  2241c sentence enhancement but remarking that a transcript of etimanis plea of nocontest might have clarified the exact nature of his prior conviction but none was provided
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, challenging his guilty plea conviction and sentence for conspiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; and manufacturing methamphetamine, in violation of § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Reviewing de novo, see Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.1988), we affirm. Brees may not challenge his conviction or sentence pursuant to a § 2241 petition because he has failed to demonstrate that any remedy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam); see Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court properly

    ### Response:
    recognizing that   2241 is not available under the inadequateorineffectiveremedy escape hatch of  2255 merely because the court of appeals refuses to certify a second or successive motion under the gatekeeping provisions of  2255
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and unqualified. Id. at 256, 103 S.Ct. at 2990-91. That interest must be balanced against the government’s interest in the health, education, and welfare of children as citizens. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 ed legal norms regarding the degree of suspicion a child welfare worker must possess before initiating custody proceedings. Callahan, 880 F.Supp. at 332 (conducting thorough review of all-circuit case law). See also Doe v. State of Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1417 (5th Cir.1993) (casé worker and supervisor entitled to qualified immunity because law not clearly established with respect to claim that case worker manipulated children to state false allegations of abuse), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1164, 114 S.Ct. 1189, 127 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994); Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 929 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff failed to prove that child care workers alleged conduct in programming children to accuse parent of abuse violated amorphous right of family integrity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    58 F.3d 896, 903-04 (3d Cir.1995) (“the fact that the ... plans used terms such as ‘lifetime’ or ‘for life’ to describe the duration of retiree medical benefits, while at the same time expressly reserving the company’s right to terminate the plans under which those benefits were provided, did not render the plans ‘internally inconsistent’ and therefore ambiguous.”). When the benefit plans and the collective bargaining agreement are read as a whole contract, it is clear that the phrase “will be covered” cannot mean a lifetime of unaltered coverage, as the plaintiffs contend, because the health benefit plans contain language in which the insurance company and NSTAR reserve the right to change or cancel coverage. See DeGeare v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 837 F.2d 812, 816 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 489

    ### Response:
    holding employers promise that retiree benefits will continue did not create vested lifetime benefits in the face of a termination clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    citizens from harm caused by criminal conduct); Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C.1981) (neither District nor police officials can be held liable for failure of police properly to respond to request from victims for protection from burglars); see also District of Columbia v. Forsman, 580 A.2d 1314, 1317-18 (D.C.1990) (District owes no individualized duty, in context of issuing building permits, to ensure that person to whom permit is issued secures liability insurance adequate to compensate neighbors for damage to their property caused by collapse of permittee’s structure). 5 . My colleagues dispute this analogy upon the ground that the public duty doctrine ""is applied to determine whether a duty exists.” That, however, is also the essenc 140, 142-43 (D.C.1990) (<HOLDING>). My colleagues apparently contend that Nichol

    ### Response:
    holding that district could be held liable if affirmative negligence of ambulance service actively worsens plaintiffs injuries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 279 (4th Cir.1980). Their actions are in a “legislative capacity” if they are an “integral part,” Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2627, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972); Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 1821, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975), of legislative actions undertaken by the local governmental body. Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1423 (4th Cir.1983) (indicating that county council members acted in their legislative capacity if the action taken by the council in which they participated was legislative). Not all actions undertaken by local governmental bodies that have legislative responsibilities are necessarily “legislative.” E.g., Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423 (<HOLDING>); Trevino v. Gates, 17 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that county councils action in delaying consideration of zoning permit was not legislative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    E.g., Gafford v. State, 387 So.2d 333, 337 (Fla.1980); Lewis v. State, 377 So.2d 640, 646-47 (Fla.1980); Fleming v. State, 374 So.2d 954, 957-59 (Fla.1979). The United States Supreme Court has reversed a death sentence on federal constitutional grounds where the state supreme court rejected all three of the theories relied on by the sentencing jury in support of an aggravating factor. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 99 S.Ct. 235, 58 L.Ed.2d 207 (1978) (per curiam). The Court held the defendant’s right to due process was violated by the state supreme court’s affirmance of his sentence on the basis of a theory that the sentencing jury had not been instructed to consider. Id. at 16-17, 99 S.Ct. at 236-237. See also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (<HOLDING>). 44 . An essential premise of the Majority’s

    ### Response:
    holding sentencers application of outrageously or wantonly vile horrible and inhuman aggravating factor to particular case unconstitutional and invalidating death sentence based solely on that factor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trials cover proceedings for a voir dire examination of potential jurors. Press-Enterprise was subsequently relied on in Waller v. Georgia (1984), 467 U.S. 39, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31, 104 S. Ct. 2210, where the court held that the sixth amendment right to a public trial applies to hearings on motions to suppress evidence. The court noted that Press-Enterprise was premised on the first amendment right of the public and the press to attend voir dire proceedings but added, “Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public.” (Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 38, 104 S. Ct. at 2215; see also United States v. Kobli (3d Cir. 1949), 172 F.2d 919 (<HOLDING>).) Accordingly, it is clear that the public

    ### Response:
    holding that the selection of the jury constitutes part of a public trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at sentencing, “quick, temporary transfers do not violate the IAD.” Id. at 541-42 (citing Taylor v. United States, 504 U.S. 991, 112 S.Ct. 2982, 119 L.Ed.2d 599 (1992) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)). Much of the legal foundation of the Taylor rule was abrogated by the Supreme Court of the United States’ holding in Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 121 S.Ct. 2079. In Bozeman, the Supreme Court held that “every prisoner arrival in the receiving state, whether followed by a very brief stay or a very long stay in the receiving state, triggers [Article] IV(e)’s ‘no return’ requirement.” 533 U.S. at 154, 121 S.Ct. 2079. The Supreme Court reasoned that the language of the IAD was absolute and militated against an implicit exception, even for de minimis violation 5 (Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); State v. Wade, 105 Nev. 206, 772 P.2d 1291,

    ### Response:
    holding the iad was not applicable to a prisoner who had been sentenced but was incarcerated in a local jail or holding facility while awaiting transfer to the assigned penal institution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the parties or some other established exception.” Merlino v. Delaware County, 556 Pa. 422, 425, 728 A.2d 949, 951 (1999). In cases where parties to a contract agree to shift fees, “provisions for the payment of ‘costs of collection’ have often been held to include reasonable attorney’s fees in the event that it is necessary to institute legal action to collect.” Wrenfield Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. DeYoung, 410 Pa.Super. 621, 600 A.2d 960, 964 (1991). Additionally: “Taxable costs are generally payable incident to a final judgment, i.e., after termination of the action by discontinuance or final disposition.” Miller Elec. Co. v. DeWeese, 589 Pa. 167, 175, 907 A.2d 1051, 1056 (2006). See also Joseph F. Cappelli & Sons, Inc. v. Keystone Custom Homes, Inc., 815 A.2d 643 (Pa.Super.2003) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 26 Instantly, the “Default and Remedies”

    ### Response:
    recognizing right to counsel fees arose as result of favorable verdict in underlying litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    expectation that it w[ill] arrive in th[e] forum,” 629 N.W.2d at 675, sufficient to constitute purposeful availment in Maryland. To satisfy the “purposeful availment” requirement in Maryland, mere foreseeability that a defendant’s products will enter the State and cause injury here is insufficient. Bond, 391 Md. at 730, 895 A.2d at 1005. Rather, the defendant must “create a ‘substantial connection’ ” with Maryland such that having to defend a lawsuit in the State would be foreseeable. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. a ng that a Maryland court could exert jurisdiction over a Kentucky resident whose agent engaged in “intensive” negotiations with a temporary resident of Maryland to resolve a contract dispute); Harris v. Arlen Properties, 256 Md. 185, 260 A.2d 22 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Purposeful availment, however, will not arise

    ### Response:
    holding that a maryland court could exercise jurisdiction over an outofstate real estate development company that scouted potential development sites in maryland and through its agents filed a building permit in the state and arranged for the washington suburban sanitation commission to install a storm drain
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deadline waives its right to challenge the report on appeal. Neason v. Buckner, 352 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Troeger, 274 S.W.3d at 108. In that event, we do not consider the merits of the defendant’s objections. See Neason, 352 S.W.3d. at 259; Troeger, 274 S.W.3d at 108. The Hospital complains that the expert reports addressed only the doctors’ conduct and did not name the Hospital; however, the Hospital concedes-that Nguyen pleaded that the Hospital was vicariously hable for the conduct d on a potentially frivolous vicarious liability claim would encourage claimants to artfully plead vicarious liability claims against hospital, defendants to avoid dismissal-of those defendants from the case. See Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 261 (Tex.2012) (<HOLDING>). The Hospital would have this court add to the

    ### Response:
    holding expert may consider and assume validity of matters set out in pleadings in the suit absent a showing that thepleadings are groundless or in bad faith or rebutted by evidence in the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he or she is innocent of these allegations would do. Wyche and McCord are thus archetypal eicirmsic-fabrication cases. Moreover, the confession cases the majority relies upon are wholly distinguishable. Many of these confession cases involve situations where the police lie to the suspect by falsely claiming that a eodefen-dant has already confessed and implicated the suspect, so the suspect might as well come clean. See, e.g., Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420; Burch, 343 So.2d at 833 (substantially similar, but involving “failed polygraph” ruse). Even in those cases that do not involve this precise species of misrepresentation, the misrepresentation is still intrinsic to the case the police are actually investigating. See, e.g., Escobar v. State, 699 So.2d 988, 994 (Fla. 1997) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Connor v.

    ### Response:
    holding that pjolice misrepresentation alone does not necessarily render a confession involuntary in the context of a case where police allegedly misrepresented that they possessed physical evidence of the crime at issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights shall be liable in a suit for damages.” Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 919, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). As this statement makes clear, the party from whom damages are sought must have acted under color of state law. Therefore, the relevant inquiry in Yanaki was whether the private defendants (the only parties sued) acted under color of law. We affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because we found that the plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficiently that the private defendants had acted under color of state law because the conduct of the private defendants in obtaining the relevant court orders could not be attributed to the state so as to satisfy the first part of the under-color-of-law test. See Yanaki, 415 F.3d at 1209-10 (<HOLDING>); see also id. at 1211 (Holloway, J.,

    ### Response:
    holding that the involvement of the police in executing the courtordered search without more does not convert the private defendants abuse of state law into conduct attributable to the state for purposes of  1983 liability and because yanaki and moss allege nothing more than private misuse of state laws their compliant fails to satisfy the first part of the color of law test
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    damages for Tele-group’s alleged breach of its agreement to use its best efforts to ensure that their stock was registered and freely tradeable. Claimaifts appeal from an order of the District Court affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s order subordinating their claims against the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 510(b). Claimants argue that § 510(b) should be construed narrowly, so that only claims for actionable conduct-typically some type of fraud or other illegality in the issuanc se from” the purchase or sale of Telegroup’s common stock because they allege a breach of the purchase agreement whereby claimants acquired shares of- Tel-egroup stock, which required Telegroup- to use its best efforts to register its stock. See In re NAL Fin. Group, Inc., 237 B.R. 225 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc., 240

    ### Response:
    holding that claims for breach of debtors agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of those securities for purposes of  510b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it required to credit their opinions over other evidence that was relevant to her medical condition. See id. Because, as the district court decided, Ms. Atkins’ “evidence was not thorough enough to be considered reliable,” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 890, and the additional medical evidence she submitted “did not meet the degree of specificity [she] had been advised was required,” id. at 891, Sedgwick gave proper weight to Dr. Shadid’s and Ms. Burrows’ opinions. Sedgwick’s reliance on its consulting doctors’ paper review of the medical records of Dr. Shadid and Ms. Burrows was not, under the circumstances presented here, arbitrary and capricious. See Hufford v. Harris Corp., 322 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1359 (M.D.Fla.2004); see also Davis v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 444 F.3d 569, 577 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, No. 06-70, 2006 WL 2007574

    ### Response:
    recognizing it is common and reasonable for doctors to examine medical records and arrive at professional opinions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nature of the suit because this case can be resolved on a narrower ground. Assuming without deciding under the Koch Fuels rationale that Concor-dia’s designation of the action as arising in admiralty did not necessarily control the entire action, we nonetheless conclude that Pa-nek waived his right to a jury by making a 9(h) election to proceed “In Admiralty” without making a demand for a jury in the counterclaim. To begin, Rule 9(h) applied to Panek’s counterclaim because his claims for breach of contract and negligence were saving 5, 8 (D.Mass.1988) (‘Where a claim is made in accordance with Rule 9(h), the existence of diversity as an alternative basis of jurisdiction will not entitle plaintiff to a jury trial.”); Banks v. Hanover Steamship Corp., 43 F.R.D. 374, 376-77 (D.Md.1967) (<HOLDING>). Panek argues that the words “In Admiralty” in

    ### Response:
    holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a gate-keeping function, the court’s focus is on the expert’s methodology, while the “soundness of the factual underpinnings of the expert’s analysis and the correctness of the expert’s conclusions based on that analysis are factual matters to be determined by the trier of fact.” Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir.2000) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786). In this case Dickson has formed an opinion — based on his experience with roofs in general and his inspection of the particular roof in question — as to what caused the damage to the roof. (Dickson’s Dep. at 74-91.) It is not this court’s job to determine whether his opinion is correct — it is the plaintiffs job to attack the validity of his opinion on cross-examination. See Smith, 215 F.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>). Thus, Dickson will be allowed to testify

    ### Response:
    holding that it is not the courts role to decide whether an experts opinion is correct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to allow all express warranties of limited duration to impliedly exclude or modify implied warranties. Instead, we base our holding on the fact that here, paragraph 55’s global warranty was incorporated into the specifications, and even the commentary to § 12A:2-316 recognizes that the instance in which a “buyer gives precise and complete specifications to the seller” is not the ordinary circumstance that the section is designed to address. Nevertheless, we believe our holding is in line with the general purpose of § 12A:2-316, which, according to the commentary, is to ensure that there are no surprises concerning which warranties accompany the goods sold. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-316 cmt. n. 1. See also Travel Craft, Inc. v. Wilhelm Mende GmbH & Co., 552 N.E.2d 443, 445 (Ind.1990) (<HOLDING>). Because we conclude that in this case there

    ### Response:
    holding that to apply indcode  26123162 which is identical to  12a2316 in favor of  the buyer and drafter of the warranty would subject the seller to the same type of surprise the provision is intended to prevent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rather than opinions. As we said in Dayco Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 577, 579 (6th Cir.1967), “[a] single sentence contained in a letter or speech of an employer, cannot be considered apart from the entire statement and background in which it was made.” HCEA places great weight on one sentence from the letter, where Stewart, after explaining that PECCA removes principals and assistant principals from the collaborative conferencing unit, stated, “I trust this information will be shared appropriately with any HCDE administrators who inquire about remaining members of [HCEA].” While this statement could conceivably be read as a command in other contexts, here the full text of the letter confirms that Stewart’s statement is a request rather than an order. Notab 2d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). Third, HCEA contends that the district court

    ### Response:
    holding that threatening to discharge union secretary for presenting employee grievances violated  8a1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir.1999). Crimes against vulnerable victims also warrant additional punishment because the criminal’s choice of such victims evidences an “extra measure of criminal depravity.” United States v. Castellanos, 81 F.3d 108, 111 (9th Cir.1996). Further, the vulnerable victim enhancement serves the special needs of vulnerable victims by creating a greater level of societal protection for those who are most in need of such protection. See United States v. Randall, 162 F.3d 557, 560 (9th Cir.1998). Section 3Al.l(b)(l) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that: “If the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim, increase [the offense level] by 2 additional levels.” We have explained the applicat 5 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Randall, 162 F.3d 557, 560

    ### Response:
    holding a car salesman who was obligated to go on a drive with assailants was particularly susceptible to criminal conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) (providing immunity for officers in tort unless they “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”); Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 584 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he conduct is privileged and the actor is never liable where he does no more than insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though the actor is well aware that such insistence is sure to cause emotional distress.”). Further, because Sada was not deprived of any constitutional or statutory rights, the City is not municipally liable for claims of negligence for any insufficient training under § 1983. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (<HOLDING>). And lastly, because there was probable cause

    ### Response:
    holding that if a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized a constitutional deprivation is immaterial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; [and] (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). 13 . The per se ban on simultaneous negotiation of settlement terms and attorney's fees pronounced in Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020-21 (3d Cir.1977), has been overruled by the Supreme Court in Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 738 n. 30, 106 S.Ct. 1531, 1543 n. 30, 89 L.Ed.2d 747 (1986), at least as to statutory fee actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Ashley v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 794 F.2d 128, 137-38 & n. 16 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Applying either the letter or the spirit of

    ### Response:
    recognizing prandinis overruling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the Hostile Work Environment Because the district court concluded that Bell Atlantic was entitled to summary judgment on the first element of a hostile work environment claim, it did not reach the second element: whether any harassing conduct can fairly be imputed to the employer for purposes of assessing liability. See Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d at 122. Bell Atlantic submits that, on the record before this court, this question of vicarious liability can be resolved in its favor as a matter of law, thereby providing an alternative ground for affirming the district court’s award of summary judgment. In the exercise of our discretion and in the interests of judicial economy, we address this issue, see Booking v. General Star Mgmt. Co., 254 F.3d 414, 418-19 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), and conclude that disputed issues of fact

    ### Response:
    recognizing appellate courts discretion to consider issues raised in the district court but not resolved there
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    where the underlying claim is for breach of a contract); W.D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen, 158 Tex. 74, 81-82, 308 S.W.2d 838, 842 (1958) (drawing no distinction between the individual defendant and the agency defendant in holding that a suit seeking “enforcement of contract rights” is barred by immunity in the absence of any “statutory provision governing or limiting the manner of sale”). The underlying nature of Multi-County’s contract claim is not altered simply because it seeks to prevent the governmental entities from continuing the alleged breach of contract in the future rather than seeking monetary damages for a breach that may have occurred in the past. In sum, this is a contract action to which governmental immunity applies. See, e.g., Dodgen, 158 Tex. at 79, 308 S.W.2d at 840-41 (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. City of McKinney, 236 S.W.3d 481,

    ### Response:
    holding that immunity applies to suit for declaratory judgment that plaintiff was entitled to continue paying for mudshell at the price specified in its contract with the government
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit — not that the prisoner will ultimately prevail on his claim. See Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318-19 (citations omitted). Here, Abdur’Rahman met these requirements. 1. Petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective Abdur’Rahman argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to address cumulative errors and correct the accomplice jury instruction. (See Pet’r State ment, R. 367, Page1D 520-23.) This is sufficient to meet the first prong of the Martinez/Trevino test. 2. Petitioner alleges post-conviction counsel was ineffective Martinez does not apply to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Atkins, 792 F.3d at 661 (<HOLDING>). However, as evidenced by the briefs in this

    ### Response:
    holding that ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel could establish cause to reopen judgment but ineffectiveness of postconviction appellate counsel could not
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has not imposed strict liability for disparate impact. Pfaff recognized that a defendant may rebut a plaintiffs showing of disparate impact by “supplying] a legally sufficient, nondiscriminatory reason.” 88 F.3d at 746-747 (noting that “the appropri ate standard of rebuttal in [Title VII] disparate impact cases normally requires a compelling business necessity”). The question here is what constitutes a legally sufficient reason for a municipality executing its congressionally mandated duties under TEFRA. While we are mindful of the guidance Title VII often provides in FHA,cases, the defense of “business necessity” in the employment discrimination arena does not transpose cleanly into the circumstances present here. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3rd Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Congress required the city council to hold a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that importing the defense of business necessity from the employment discrimination context to a claim under the fair housing act is of somewhat uncertain application
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must be interstate or foreign.”). The FAA requires the enforcement of an arbitration agreement upon proof (1) that a written agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) that the written agreement is contained within a contract involving “commerce.” 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1947). However, Mary argues the FAA does not apply to insurance contracts in South Carolina. Section 15-48-10(b)(4) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2012) provides that a written agreement to arbitrate shall not apply to “any claim arising out of personal injury, based on contract or tort, or to any insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy or annuity contract.” Mary correctly states the FAA’s mandate conflicts with section 15-48-10(b)(4). See Am. Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 272 F.Supp.2d 578, 582 (D.S.C.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Cox v. Woodmen of The World Ins.

    ### Response:
    holding section 154810b4s prohibition on arbitration reverse preempts the faa through application of the mccarranferguson act and prohibits the enforcement of arbitration clauses in insurance policies governed by south carolina law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    petition for certiorari and vacate the death penalty in this case. Even if I did not take this view, I would grant the petition because it raises the recurring issue whether evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal conduct may be introduced at the sentencing stage of a capital trial. As I have noted before, see, e. g., Miranda v. California, 486 U. S. 1038 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Williams v. Lynaugh, 484 U. S. 935 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), the States’ highest courts have reached varying conclusions on this issue. In addition, the petition poses a second question of profound constitutional significance: whether a defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury in a capital sentencing , 492 N. E. 2d 1303, 1315-1316 (1986) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 1101 (1987). In 1978,

    ### Response:
    holding that a court need only explain that a unanimous vote is required before a jury can impose the death penalty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches. § 443.036(21)(d)l, Fla. Stat. (2002). Although Comanic’s job remained the same throughout her base period , her employer technically changed. Specifically, for the first quarter of her base period her pay checks were issued by the Peace Child Care Center, Inc. In the last three quarters of Comanic’s base period, her pay checks were issued directly by the Church. We find that these employers both qualify as non-liable employers under section 443.036(21), Florida Statutes (2002), and w only with small children, performing day-to-day responsibilities, with no direct contact with the Church, is irrelevant in determining the primary purpose of the child care center. St. Martin, 451 U.S. at 783, 101 S.Ct. 2142 (<HOLDING>). Further, the employee policy, which Comanic

    ### Response:
    holding futa after which florida molded its unemployment law is phrased entirely in terms of the nature of the employer and not in terms of the work performed or the place at which the employee works
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    agree for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the following four elements must be present: (1) An issue decided in a prior action is identical to one presented in a later action; (2) The prior, action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (3) The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior action, or is in privity with a party to the prior action; and (4) The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Frederick v. Action Tire Co., 744 A.2d 762, 766 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999). We agree with defendant that decisions of the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board may preclude relitigation of the same issue, that is the causation of plaintiffs injuries. See, e.g., id. (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff does not appear to contest this

    ### Response:
    holding that the wcabs decision that an employees motor vehicle accident did not cause his injuries precluded a subsequent tort action on the same issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    governmental agency responsible for enforcing the code or regulation. (b) Complained to the landlord concerning the maintenance or condition of the park, rent charged or rules and regulations. (e) Organized, became a member of or served as an official in a homeowner's association, or similar organization, at a local, regional, state or national level. (d) Retained counsel or an agent to represent his interests. The plain language of this section creates a retaliatory eviction defense that may be raised in an unlawful detainer action. This is an affirmative defense, and the tenant therefore bears the burden to prove that the primary motive for the eviction is retaliation for tenant actions that are protected by the statute. Cf. Wright v. Brady, 126 Idaho 671, 889 P.2d 105 (Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). Here, Powell presented evidence and argument

    ### Response:
    holding that retaliatory eviction is an affirmative defense to an unlawful detainer action brought pursuant to ic  6301 et seq
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    company. The member-agent allegedly funneled the substantial profits acquired by these schemes through her attorney’s trust account into M.I.’s bank accounts. Because the title company im-permissibly used the Fund’s title insurance and closing forms to conduct these deals, the Fund maintained that the substantial profits should be preserved so the money would remain available to insure the non-party purchasers. The trial court granted the Fund’s ex parte motion for injunction. Following a hearing, the trial court denied M.I.’s motion to dissolve the injunction, but modified some of its terms. The instant appeal and cross-appeal followed. Generally, an injunction seeking to freeze a bank account is improper. E.g., Hiles v. Auto Bahn Fed’n, Inc., 498 So.2d 997, 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>). However, injunc-tive relief is appropriate to

    ### Response:
    holding that the loss of money from a bank account does not constitute irreparable harm because that loss can be compensat ed by money damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    KSU is bound and which clearly require more than moving for dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment. See 34 C.F.R. § 674.49(b)-(e). Therefore, we hold that KSU knowingly and voluntarily waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by agreeing, as a prerequisite to its participation in the Perkins Loan program, to undertake certain enumerated actions in federal bankruptcy court in the event of a claim for discharge filed by the student-borrower. C. Finally, even though we have concluded that KSU waived immunity by entering into an agreement with the DOE which subjects it to the jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy court, we must examine whether the waiver is valid. This determination hlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 1517, 140

    ### Response:
    holding that  106a  b offend the eleventh amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    federal authority by making all assaults against them felonies. The latter would require us to glean an “assault prong” from two subsections and apply the simple assault clause. But without a good reason to do so, we cannot disregard the statutory structure of § 111(a) in this manner, particularly where the text clearly directs that “acts in violation of this section constitute only simple assault.” Contra Jones, 526 U.S. at 239, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (interpreting statute contrary to structure to avoid “grave and doubtful constitutional questions”). Moreover, in addition to the plain language of the statute, case law supports Vallery by stating or implying that the simple assault provision applies to the entirety of § 111(a). See United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Yates, 304 F.3d at 822 (“We hold that, in the

    ### Response:
    holding the second element of assault is assault resist oppose impede intimidate or interfere with and that the word forcibly  modifies each of the prohibited acts specified in the second element
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    478 U.S. 675, 684, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3165, 92 L. Ed.2d 549, 559 (1986). Moreover, we agree with the trial court that there is little doubt that, in the context of a boarding school, the school effectively acted as the “household” within which the abusive conduct occurred. The school acted in a parental capacity to the students within its care, providing for them necessary shelter, food, education, recreation, and succor. Its control over and duty of care for the students housed within its confines did not markedly differ from that assumed by parents. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 160 N.J. 562, 602, 734 A.2d 1196 (1999), rev’d on other grounds, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L. Ed.2d 554 (2000). Compare Smith v. Estate of Kelly, 343 N.J.Super. 480, 502, 778 A.2d 1162 (App.Div.2001) (<HOLDING>). In a very real sense, the school and its

    ### Response:
    holding that the catholic church was not within a parishioners household
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jurisdiction over the custody determination.” We conclude that the juvenile court did not have the power to assume jurisdiction over the case or to make a custody determination. Even assuming that the father’s dependency petition was sufficient to invoke the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, and we maintain that it was not, the juvenile court failed to address the allegation of dependency in any of its orders or judgments. There is no mention of dependency in the juvenile court’s final judgment entered on July 17, 2008, yet the juvenile court proceeded to make an adjudication of the child’s custody. In K.C.G. v. S.J.R., 46 So.3d 499, 501-02 (Ala.Civ.App.2010), this court stated: “Once the dependency jurisdiction of a juvenile court has been properly invoked, the juvenile court has an 2) (<HOLDING>); J.W. v. W.D.J., 743 So.2d 467, 469

    ### Response:
    holding that juvenile court that had never declared child dependent had no jurisdiction to enter order affecting visitation rights of father
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be issued, the check was a direct transfer from Video Depot to Hilton. Once the check was issued, Arlynn no longer had legal control over the funds, even if he retained physical control over them. Arlynn therefore did not have the right to use the money for any other purpose than to give it to Hilton. Hilton maintains that Arlynn had dominion over the $65,000 because he was Video Depot’s principal and, in that capacity, directed Video Depot to purchase the cashier’s check. The bankruptcy courts are split on the question of whether the principal of a debtor corporation necessarily is the initial transferee of corporate funds used to satisfy a personal obligation. Compare General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc. v. Broach (In re Lucas Dallas, Inc.), 185 B.R. 801, 809 (9th Cir.BAP1995) (<HOLDING>); Richardson v. FDIC (In re M. Blackburn

    ### Response:
    holding that the principal of a corporate debtor does not become a transferee by the mere act of causing the debtor to make a fraudulent transfer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defense counsel to make a reasonable showing of materiality before the court will order discovery. When requesting an officer's personnel file, defense counsel must show that it is reasonably likely that the file will contain relevant information. We review an order denying a motion to compel discovery for abuse of the discretion granted by this rule. In this case, the ree-ord supports Judge Miller's conclusion that Booth's request was based only on conjecture. Booth did not make any showing that the police used excessive force against him in this case. And Booth did not make a showing of any likelihood that 0) (denying disclosure of psychiatric evaluation of prosecution witness in the absence of a showing of relevance); Sawyer v. State, 244 P.3d 1130, 1133-34 (Alaska App. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Carman v. State, 658 P.2d 131, 140 (Alaska

    ### Response:
    holding that other incidents involving children handling firearms were not sufficiently similar to require discovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a federal constitutional right and an allegedly retaliatory action[,]” Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir.2001), some district courts have generally concluded that “a passage of two months between the protected activity and the adverse employment action seems to be the dividing line.” Cunningham v. Consol. Edison Inc., No. 03 Civ. 3522, 2006 WL 842914, at *19, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22482, at *55-56 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2006) (collecting cases). However, because the Second Circuit has found periods well beyond two months to be sufficient to suggest a causal relationship under certain circumstances, courts must carefully consider the time lapse in light of the entire record. See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of

    ### Response:
    holding eightmonth gap between eeoc complaint and retaliatory action suggested a causal relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Its proceedings are not adversary in nature, but rather consist of inquiries conducted by laymen without resort to the technicalities of trial procedure”). 21 We have held, however, that “the grand jury may request advice and that the prosecutor is authorized to explain matters of law.” Sheriff v. Keeney, 106 Nev. 213, 218, 791 P.2d 55, 58 (1990). 22 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8. 23 See Gordon v. Ponticello, 110 Nev. 1015, 1017-19, 879 P.2d 741, 743 (1994) (stating that discovery does not fall within the scope of rights afforded to persons under grand jury investigation); Bright, 108 Nev. at 502, 835 P.2d at 785 (declining to extend the right to counsel to indigent grand jury targets). 24 Accord State v. Augustin M., 68 P.3d 182, 187-88 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003)

    ### Response:
    holding that new mexicos rule that the state must present known evidence that directly negates a targets guilt does not extend to instructions respecting possible defenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Stanton-Negley asserts that if DPW had provided adequate and timely notice of this Project requirement, Stanton-Negley would have obtained the required accreditation and submitted a bid in response to RFP No. 31-06. Thus, according to Stanton-Neg-ley, DPW’s failure to make a timely disclosure of the accreditation requirement violated due process by depriving Stanton-Negley’s owners of the ability to conduct their business and profession in the manner they had established and with patients they had served prior to the issuance of RFP No. 31-06 and the Project it seeks to implement. We disagree. ' Contrary to Stanton-Negley’s position, it has no protected property right to full participation in the MA Program. Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Houstoun, 998 F.Supp. 522 (E.D.Pa.1997) (<HOLDING>). Further, Stanton-Negley has no protected

    ### Response:
    holding that an agreement between the commonwealth and a provider of prescription drugs for the medicaid program does not involve the extreme dependence necessary to support a due process claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    past persecution at the hands of their mother, who abused and subsequently abandoned them. While we are sympathetic to the cruel treatment endured by petitioners, such treatment does not constitute past persecution “on account of’ a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). Petitioners allege that they are “children of the Gomez-Romero Family,” a “particular social group” entitled to protection under the Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(i). While we agree that kinship ties may constitute a “particular social group,” Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 995 (6th Cir.2009), the domestic abuse suffered by petitioners was not on account of this status. Rather, petitioners were abused because of their exposure to a violent, unstable person. Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the mother’s abuse was not limited to

    ### Response:
    holding that personal disputes do not constitute persecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    755 F.2d 158, 163, 225 USPQ 34, 38 (Fed.Cir.1985); see also Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 963, 1 USPQ2d 1196, 1201 (Fed.Cir.1986) (excusing failure to make express findings as to the level of ordinary skill where there is no showing that the court’s failure to make such a finding influenced the ultimate determination). In this case, Okajima stated during the final hearing that there was no dispute that the level of skill was high. Where the parties agree that the level of skill in the art is high, any finding by the Board that the proper level of skill is less than that urged by the parties would only reinforce the Board’s conclusion of nonobviousness. See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1574, 230 USPQ 81, 88 (Fed.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find no harm under the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that particular findings as to level of skill do not influence the ultimate determination under  103 where there is a determination that an invention would have been nonobvious to those of extraordinary skill
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to Kelley, in print and in the telephone conversation, were related to a contemplated judicial proceeding. Bleisch in his deposition and Dolcefino in his affidavit affirmatively and clearly stated that if the controller’s office persisted in denying access to KTRK, legal proceedings to gain access were contemplated. Thus, the statements are absolutely privileged. Where, as here, communications are protected by the absolute privilege, those communications may not serve as the basis of a civil action for libel or slander, regardless of the negligence or malice with which they are made. See Thomas, 940 S.W.2d at 342-43. It follows that when a statement is so protected, publication of the statement does not defeat the privilege. Id. at 344. Acc , Inc., 838 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C.Circ.1988) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, there can be no claim against a

    ### Response:
    holding prepublication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in upjohn 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    led to counts one through three and “most of the money went to Pessar.” Our precedent is clear that “[e]quity may require a defendant to restore his victims to the status quo where the loss suffered is greater than the defendant’s unjust enrichment.” Stefanchik, 559 F.3d at 931; see also Commerce Planet, slip op. at 10-11, — Fed.Appx. at —(explaining that there is “no support in our case law” for .the proposition that a restitution award “must be limited to the unjust gains each defendant personally received”). Moreover, as described above, Gordon had control over and approved the marketing materials used, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to hold Gordon and his entities jointly and severally liable for the full amount. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d at 931-32 & n. 1 (<HOLDING>). Lastly, Gordon challenges the time period,

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no abuse of discretion where the district court found an individual stefanehik and the corporation he solely owned beringer corporation jointly and severally liable for the full amount of sales made despite other defendants settling where stefanehik and beringer were the driving force behind the marketing scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were discriminatory do not pass muster under Harris. The record reflects that McCaw made several accommodations, accompanied by certain quid-pro-quo requests, to Kwiatek once it learned that Kwiatek’s HIV condition could require continual absences. Although Kwiatek argues that he felt he was generally treated differently than other employees with chronic and debilitating medical conditions, he presented no objective evidence of an abusive or hostile work environment. Moreover, there was no evidence that McCaw’s requests unreasonably interfered with his job performance, nor that the terms or conditions of Kwiatek’s employment materially changed as a result of its actions. As such, his claim must fail. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Foothill Capital Corp., 3 F.Supp.2d 925, 938-39 (N.D.Ill.1998) (<HOLDING>); Speer v. Rand McNally & Co., 123 F.3d 658,

    ### Response:
    holding a mere warning that termination is possible does not per se constitute adverse employment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (App.1979)); Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48 of Maricopa County v. KPNX Broad. Co., 188 Ariz. 499, 503, 937 P.2d 689, 693 (App.1997), vacated on other grounds by Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48 of Maricopa County v. KPNX Broad. Co., 191 Ariz. 297, 300-01, 955 P.2d 534, 537-38 (1998). 4 . From the context, we presume this to have referred to department reports or other departmental records. 5 . To the extent that a custodian's mistake might inform the promptness of the disclosure (and thus the wrongfulness of the denial), we agree with courts interpreting FOIA that the denial would not be wrongful only if the custodian made reasonable efforts and acted in good faith. See, e.g., Ill. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 545 F.Supp. 1229, 1237 (N.D.Ill.1982) (<HOLDING>) (Emphasis added.). Custodial inattentiveness

    ### Response:
    holding in a case where there was no assertion that the custodian was lying or that she was negligent that a custodian did not improperly withhold a book that was mislaid and stating that no improper withholding within the meaning of the foia occurs when an agency fails to locate documents within the ten day time limit  if the agency has made reasonable efforts to locate the documents and if its failure to do so has been in good faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ex. 16. Specifically, the letter states, “Enclosed, please find copies of documents from [the plaintiff] that relate to her EEO investigation” and then lists the enclosed documents. Id. The letter does not mention discrimination or harassment. Therefore, the June 2007 letter is not a protected activity. See Paquin, 119 F.3d at 31; see also Fox v. Eagle Distrib. Co., Inc., 510 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir.2007) (requiring specific references to alleged acts of discrimination). Moving to whether the agency’s action following the November 2006 letter was materially adverse, the defendant claims that proposed removals do not qualify as materially adverse actions. Def.’s Reply at 21. Proposed removals, however, are exactly the kind of acts which the statute covers. See Powell, 390 F.Supp.2d at 9 (<HOLDING>); Willingham v. Gonzales, 391 F.Supp.2d 52, 59

    ### Response:
    holding that a proposed termination is the very type of discrete act   identified  as separate actionable unlawful employment practices
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    period of disability income received in 1997 before or after the period of disability. We also hold that the commission erred to the extent that it may have included business profits rather than wages or their equivalent in its calculation of claimant’s pre- or post-injury wage. The propriety of including all net income of a sole proprietorship in the average weekly wage calculation, without differentiating between wages and scrutinized] to determine if the profits are the functional equivalent of wages.” Hotaling v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 153 Vt. 581, 572 A.2d 1351, 1354 (1990) (citing 2 Arthur Larson, Larson’s Workers’Compensation Law % 60.12(e)); see The Washington Post, 675 A.2d at 42; cf. Pishotta v. Pishotta Tile & Marble, Inc., 613 So.2d 1373, 1375-76 (Fla.Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). New York courts hold that “ ‘where a

    ### Response:
    holding that corporate profits may be considered personal earnings of sole shareholder to extent they are fairly attributable to management andor labor of sole shareholder rather than labor of others or mere return on capital
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Defendant’s first contention is that a reasonable jury could have found that he negligently caused Russell’s death while acting in self-defense. He argues that an involuntary manslaughter instruction was warranted because he attempted to use nondeadly force, but did so in a criminally negligent manner and death resulted. See United States v. Begay, 833 F.2d 900, 901 (10th Cir.1987). As discussed in the preceding section, a rational jury could have believed Arvin’s actions were in self-defense. This court has recognized that involuntary manslaughter “can occur in circumstances that would support a defense of self defense.” Begay, 833 F.2d at 901 (quoting United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908, 915 (9th Cir.1983)); see also United States v. Browner, 889 F.2d 549, 555 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Iron Shield, 697 F.2d 845,

    ### Response:
    holding that both involuntary manslaughter and selfdefense instructions are proper when there is evidence that the killing was accidental
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (5th Cir.1974). In order to show that a homestead has been abandoned, there must be a strong showing that the debtor did not intend to return to the residence. In re Goode, 146 B.R. 860 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1992). A debtor that leaves his home for financial, health, or family reasons does not abandon the homestead. In re Imprasert, 86 B.R. 721, 723 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1988). Temporary absences from the homestead residence for reasons of busine olding that where property was occupied as residence of the bankrupts on the day they filed bankruptcy, it was entitled to a homestead exemption, even though the bankrupts intended to, and did, leave that house permanently on the following day) (citing Beensen v. Burgess, 218 So.2d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); In re Beebe, 224 B.R. 817 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.1998)) (<HOLDING>). In the present instance, Debtor admitted that

    ### Response:
    holding that debtors did not abandon homestead and lose benefits of homestead exemption simply because they had left property with no intention of returning in order to move into rental housing closer to debtorhusbands new job
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    occurred after his alleged onset date of disability. 9 . The information on the check-list form was for purposes of determining Phillips’ eligibility for state medical welfare benefits, not DIB or SSI. A finding of disability under the Act is a legal determination to be made by the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e). The opinion expressed by checking a box on a form is conclusoty in nature. Indeed, Dr. Falatyn did not cite to any specific work restrictions resulting from Phillips' impairments that would have prevented him from performing all work activity. Under the Commissioner’s regulations, this kind of conclusory report is not entitled to significant weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2)(ii), 416.927(d)(2)(ii); see also Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1965 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 10 . The check-list form also contained boxes

    ### Response:
    holding that a form report that requires a physician only to check a box or fillin blanks is not substantial evidence by itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Accordingly, because the Department did not provide a meaningful opportunity for comment, and did not solicit or receive relevant comments regarding the substance or merits of either set of regulations, we have no difficulty in concluding that the Department “ignored important aspects of the problem.” Kempthorne, 473 F.3d at 103. Therefore, we hold that the Department’s reinstatement of the 1987 regulations was arbitrary and capricious in that the Department’s action did not follow procedures required by law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); see also Mack Trucks, 682 F.3d at 95-96 (vacating agency interim rule when good cause exception did not apply, and APA notice and comment procedures were not followed); Buschmann, 676 F.2d at 358 (same); Kollett v. Harris, 619 F.2d 134, 144-46 (1st Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). VI. Under the terms of the 2009 Notice and

    ### Response:
    holding invalid procedurally defective interim regulations that were issued without notice and comment and in the absence of good cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of plaintiffs discrimination claim was inappropriate given that the CBA “neither created the right [plaintiff] asserts nor can it remove or alter that right”); Daniels v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 789 F.Supp.2d 161, 164-165 (D.D.C.2011) (concluding that plaintiffs DCHRA discrimination and retaliation claims were not preempted because plaintiffs claims did not require interpretation of the CBA, and were “based on rights created by DCHRA and not rights created by the CBA”). ' However, where the rights are created by the CBA, or involve negotiable state duties “around which parties may contract,” Section 301 will preempt the claim. Humble, 305 F.3d at 1007 n. 3; see also, Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 861-62, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 217-18, 105 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs negligence claim was preempted by section 301 because employers duty to provide a safe workplace was expressly created by the cba
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are not subject to dismissal, even though those of the Relator are. However, that fact does not render our consideration of this motion premature. “Intervention by the United States into a qui tam suit does not automatically endow the court with subject matter jurisdiction over both the claims by the United States and by the relator.” United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 798 (10th Cir.2002); see also Federal Recovery Services, Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 452 (5th Cir.1995) (rejecting a relator’s attempt “to end-run the ‘original source’ inquiry by arguing that the United States’ intervention in the action cured any jurisdictional defect”); Eitel v. United States, 242 F.3d 381 (Table), 2000 WL 1529237, at *2 (9th Cir.2000) (unpublished disposition) (<HOLDING>). Thus, despite the Government’s notice of its

    ### Response:
    holding that whether or not the government proceeds with this action eitel cannot because he is not an original source
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    DNA expert goes to weight of evidence, not its admissibility; even if error rate of expert’s proficiency tests presented challenge to reliability of polymerase chain reaction analysis, that argument would not result in exclusion of PCR evidence, as error rate would only be one factor considered in determining admissibility); Keen v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 795, 485 S.E.2d 659 (1997)(concluding that even if the proficiency test results of expert had been admitted and could have been used by Keen to establish state laboratory had previously made erroneous findings, this information would not have affected admissibility of the DNA evidence, but rather, would have only affected the weight the fact finder accorded the DNA evidence); State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996)(<HOLDING>); State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash.2d 879, 846 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that laboratory error is a matter of weight and not admissibility under frye v united states 293 f 1013 dccir1923 under rule of evidence 702 if lab error or error rates are so serious that results are not helpful to the jury the trial court may in its discretion rule the evidence inadmissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    against the unknown aggressor, particularly if they resemble highwaymen in ski masks. Second, permitting the police to attempt an unannounced forcible entry subverts the interest in protecting private property. Finally, attempting entry without warning precludes the officers’ ability to recognize possible mistakes in identity or location of the suspect or the place to be searched. Therefore, our previous analysis in Fike no longer serves as the basis for assessing attempted forcible entries under the knock-and-announce rule. Rather, the reasonableness test outlined by the Supreme Court in Richards applies with equal force to attempts at forcible entry as it does to the actual breaking and entering of a person’s home. See also United States v. Gable, 401 F.2d 765, 766 (3rd Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McCloud, 127 F.3d 1284, 1289

    ### Response:
    holding that insertion of a crowbar into the door of a suspects house by officers before they announced their presence constitutes an unreasonable search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have retained wide discretion to fashion equitable remedies in situations in which legal remedies are insufficient. Therefore, I cannot agree with defendant’s argument that section 8371 im-permissibly delegates public policy to “individual courts on an ad hoc basis.” C. The Application of the Seventh Amendment to Section 8371 Claims Brought in Federal Court The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” The Seventh Amendment is inapplicable to state trials. See Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F.Supp. 1025, 1027 (1972) (<HOLDING>), aff'd sub nom. Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that jury trial in civil cases is not so fundamental to the american system of justice as to be required of state courts by due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the law to the undisputed facts. In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d 702, 703-04 (Tex.1998) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); Barnes, 127 S.W.3d at 846. Mandamus is generally proper if a trial court acts without jurisdiction. Barnes, 127 S.W.3d at 846 (citing In re Sw. Bell, 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex.2000); In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex.1998)). The existence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Barnes, 127 S.W.3d at 846. Despite the general requirement that a party seeking relief by mandamus must establish he has no adequate remedy by appeal, such is not the case when the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In re Office of Attorney Gen. of Tex., 264 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>); see In re Oates, 104 S.W.3d 571, 575

    ### Response:
    holding mandamus will lie to prevent trial court from exercising jurisdiction it does not have even if there is adequate remedy by appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    damages was displaced by federal statutes, including the CWA.” The Court rejected this argument indicating “nothing in the statutory text points to fragmenting the recovery scheme this way, and we have rejected similar attempts to sever remedies from their causes of action.” In Part IV, to which Justice Stevens specifically dissented, the Court, citing Miles, reiterated that admiralty courts should look to legislative enactments for policy guidance, but where Congress had not specifically acted, the Court had responsibility to fashion controlling rules and remedies in maritime law: To the extent that Justice STEVENS suggests that the very subject of remedies should be treated as congressional in light of the number of statutes dealing with 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (<HOLDING>). And for the very reason that our exercise of

    ### Response:
    recognizing cause of action for wrongful death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to those packages”). The bill of lading made out by Tropical states the following: marks & numbers quantity description of goods gross weight As Addr. 1 x 40’ Stc. 39 Big Pack Containing 24207 27,908 units boy’s pants As Addr. 1 x 40’ Stc. 17 Big Pack Containing 10552 13,719 Units Boy’s Pants The customs declaration form made out by Fishman includes all the same information but also indicates the value of the items being shipped. Neither form refers to the number of dozens of pants being shipped. Fishman contends that the cargo manifest and reembarque are the relevant documents to be examined as they were prepared by Fishman and were simply miscopied from Fishman’s form to the bill of lading. See In re Belize Trading, Ltd. v. Sun Ins. Co. of New York, 993 F.2d 790, 792 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the reembarque states, although

    ### Response:
    holding that when the bill of lading and the shipping documents do not conform the bill is construed as having reflected the number of packages designated in the shipping invoices and as such be in conformity with cogsa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arguing that plaintiffs do not ascribe any economic significance to the eight county area. They argue that plaintiffs’ experts reach contradictory conclusions and have not made findings supporting the alleged eight county geographic market. Plaintiffs allege in their amended complaint that the alleged antitrust violation, injury and damage occurred in the eight county area and that defendants and their co-conspirators have market power in this area. The court of appeals has approved geographic markets consisting of multiple counties in antitrust cases involving the provision of health care. See Blue Cross, 65 F.3d at 1411 (noting that either the individual counties or a group of counties where defendants operate would be an appropriate geographic market); Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1284-85 (<HOLDING>). Whether plaintiffs’ expert reports or other

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a geographic market is hard to define but approving a three county area based on defendants service area and physician and patient preference for nearby hospitals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sense and meaning, as a ‘gift,’ an allocation or appropriation of something of value, without consideration to a ‘person, association or public or private corporation.’ ” Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. at 28, 303 P.2d at 926-27. The Attorney General of New Mexico has identified two components prohibited by the Anti-Donation Clause: (i) “the state may not make any donation to or in aid of any private corporation;” and (ii) the state is prohibited against “lending or pledging of the state’s or municipality’s credit.” N.M. Attorney General Opinion No. 85-27 at 3,1985 WL 204889 (October 22,1985). New Mexico courts, and the New Mexico Attorney General’s Office, have generally, in analyzing the state’s Anti-Donation Clause, scrutinized contracts for consideration. 314 P.2d at 720 (<HOLDING>); Hutcheson v. Atherton, 44 N.M. at 144, 99

    ### Response:
    holding that an appropriation to pay states share of emergency feed certificates issued to livestock owners for the purchase of hay was an unconstitutional subsidy of the livestock industry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to have occurred. It is therefore difficult to know exactly what effects such a tumor could produce. The district court thus had to make a difficult finding based on conflicting evidence regarding a rare tumor. The only undisputed facts were that the tumor existed during Stevens’s employment with the company, and that Stevens’s. symptoms subsided after the tumor was removed. After a review of' the record, we are not left “with a definite and firm conviction” that the district court made a mistake. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the tumor caused Stevens’s headaches and personality changes from which- he suffered during his employment. Cf. Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 109, 80 S.Ct. 173, 175, 4 L.Ed.2d 142 (1959) (<HOLDING>). B. The company must provide maintenance and

    ### Response:
    holding that a jury may draw an inference as to the cause of an illness despite the lack of unanimity among experts as to the cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    knotted in a manner indicating that they had been used to package crack cocaine. Moreover, Moore had come running from an apartment in which there had be .1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1124, 119 S.Ct. 1781, 143 L.Ed.2d 809 (1999) (upholding a Terry frisk of the driver of a car stopped for speeding because the stop occurred late at night, the car had stopped abruptly, there were multiple people in the car, and there had been a commotion among the other occupants of the car); United States v. Villanueva, 15 F.3d 197, 198-99 (1st Cir.1994) (upholding a daytime Terry frisk of an individual who had engaged in disorderly conduct, such as yelling obscenities and banging on train windows, at a subway station known for volatile conduct); United States v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 56 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The district court expressed skepticism that

    ### Response:
    holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop an occupant of a parked car based on his presence late at night in an area known for drug activity his leaning over the car console with a faint light and his attempt to hide something upon seeing a police officer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    three offenses on September 26, 2003, during a single criminal episode. The trial court sentenced Mr. Perez to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the home invasion robbery and the armed burglary and to another concurrent term of fifteen years’ imprisonment for the false impersonation offense. Although it may have little practical effect, we must reverse the judgment and sentence for armed burglary because it either violates double jeopardy under article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution, or contravenes section 775.021(4)09, Florida Statutes (2003). It has been held that convictions arising from a single episode for home invasion robbery and burglary violate either double jeopardy or section 775.021(4)(b)(3). See, e.g., Mendez v. State, 798 So.2d 749 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>); Barboza v. State, 786 So.2d 675 (Fla. 3d DCA

    ### Response:
    holding convictions for burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery and home invasion robbery violated double jeopardy and section 7750214b because burglary of a dwelling was subsumed by the home invasion robbery offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sought blood tests to establish his paternity of a child born while the mother of the child was married to another man. While holding that it was necessary for the trial court to consider the impact of a paternity action on the child before the paternity proceedings, the Supreme Court of Washington reasoned: “Child development experts widely stress the importance of stability and predictability in parent/child relationships, even where the parent figure is not the natural parent. .... A paternity suit, by its very nature, threatens the stability of the child’s world. We are concerned that the best interests of the child standard, too broadly interpreted, could become a blanket license for any person to disrupt long-fostered family relationships by claiming to be the (A.D.1991) (<HOLDING>); Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 234 Conn. 51, 661

    ### Response:
    holding that although a putative father had standing to bring a paternity action the action could not proceed and the blood tests could not be ordered unless the trial court determined that the paternity action would serve the best interest of the child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and specific. Id. Federal courts have found that indirect evidence is not substantial and specific where no evidence beyond what is produced to satisfy the plaintiffs prima facie case is produced. See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.1996) (finding indirect evidence insufficient where no evidence beyond that produced for the prima facie case was presented); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir.1995) (finding indirect evidence insufficient where no evidence beyond that produced for the prima facie case was presented). “[C]ourts only require an employer honestly believed its reason for its actions, even if its reason is foolish or trivial or even baseless.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Respondents rely on Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext was insufficient because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer did not honestly believe its proffered reasons for its action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [the federal controlled substance statute], which requires nothing more specific than an intent to distribute a controlled substance.”); United States v. Carranza, 289 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.2002) (“[A] defendant can be convicted [of possessing a controlled substance] if he believes he has some controlled substance in his possession.”) (quotation omitted); United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 458 (3d Cir.2001) (“[I]t is well settled that the Government must show that the defendant knew that the substance in which he trafficked was a controlled substance.”); United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 830 (7th Cir.2001) (“The government need only prove that the defendant was aware that some controlled substance was involved.”); United States v. Sheppard, 219 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted); United States v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the government need not prove that the defendant actually knew the exact nature of the substance to establish mens rea knowledge of drugs illegality is sufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    618, 564 N.E.2d 1280, 1290-92 (1990). 35 . Id., 151 Ill.Dec. 618, 564 N.E.2d at 1292-93. 36 . Koenig v. McCarthy Const. Co., 344 Ill.App. 93, 100 N.E.2d 338, 340 (1951). 37 . 1999 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 91-524 (S.B.458) (West) (Public Act 91-524, Medical Practice— Automatic External Defibrillator Act). 38 . TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31, 122 S.Ct. 441, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001). 39 . Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill.2d 318, 307 Ill.Dec. 592, 860 N.E.2d 246, 252-55 (2006). 40 . 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). 41 . 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/4 (1998). 42 . Allegis Realty Investors, 307 Ill.Dec. 592, 860 N.E.2d at 253. 43 . Id. 44 . The Illinois Good Samaritan Act also provides an exemption from civil liability for those using AE p.2d 802 (N.D.Ill.2005) (<HOLDING>). In Muno v. Condell Medical Center, 383

    ### Response:
    holding that the samaritan act does not immunize doctors from suit when they are performing their normal job functions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    informant’s information was corroborated by his personal observations and corroborated by the personal observations of officers Tate and Deer. The controlled buy was corroborated by the participation and observation of officers Tate and Deer: Sergeant Deer searched the informant and his vehicle for any illegal contraband or monies; the informant was given money to make the controlled buy; Tate and Deer followed the informant to a location near Morgan’s residence; and, Tate and Deer observed the informant walk into the residence, stay approximately two minutes, and return with drugs. Sergeant Deer’s account of the drug buy, alone, was sufficient to establish probable cause to search Morgan’s home for drugs and other contraband. See Langford v. State, 332 Ark. 54, 962 S.W.2d 358 (1998) (<HOLDING>). We do not find the fact that the officers did

    ### Response:
    holding that an officers account of a controlled buy made by an informant was by itself sufficient to es tablish probable cause for issuance of a search warrant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or other supporting evidence with the motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA finding that he had not satisfied any. However, even construing broadly Liu’s pro se brief, see Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006), we cannot find that Liu has challenged the BIA’s findings before this Court. Accordingly, we deem any argument based on ineffective assistance of counsel waived. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005). Furthermore, because each of these findings is an independent ground upon which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, the waiver of arguments challeng ing these findings is dispositive of Liu’s petition for review. See Jian Yun Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 409 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (requiring

    ### Response:
    holding that failing to substantially comply with the matter of lozada requirements in a motion to reopen before the bia forfeits an ineffective assistance claim in this court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ""show cause” is not defined in our rules, of course, but it has long been employed to denote an order, usually summary, providing notice 'of a hearing. The kind of hearing, its form and procedural requisites, will depend on the questions to be addressed and is not determined merely by the .""show cause” label. Wilcher v. Wilcher, 566 S.W.2d 173 (Ky.App.1978). 18 . While it is well established that individual government officials may be held in criminal' contempt for willfully violating a court order, Commonwealth ex rel. Dep’t of Nat. Res: & Envtl. Prot. v. Williams, 536 S.W.2d 474 (Ky.1976) (citing Wallace v. Sowards, 313 Ky. 360, 231 S.W.2d 10 (1950)), entity liability.is not so clear. Cf. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (<HOLDING>); and 'see Stuart P. Green, The Criminal

    ### Response:
    holding that municipalities are immune from liability for punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 in part because a municipality  can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials damages awarded for punitive purposes therefore are not sensibly assessed against the governmental entity itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conduct of the parties to the joint venture: “We have long held that concerted activity does not turn simply on whether the parties involved are legally distinct- entities. Instead, we have eschewed formalistic distinctions in favor of a functional consideration of how the parties involved in the alleged anticompetitive conduct actually operate.” 560 U.S. at 191, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (emphasis added). The Court went on to say that in looking at how the parties actually operate, “we have repeatedly found instances in which members of a legally single entity violated § 1 when the entity was controlled by a group of competitors and served, in essence, as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.” Id. (citing United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 87 S.Ct. 1847, 18 L.Ed.2d 1238 (1967) (<HOLDING>)). The stated intent on the part of the

    ### Response:
    holding that sealy was not a single entity but instead an instrumentality of the individual parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issue in Faretta, however, was whether the Constitution forbids a State from forcing a lawyer upon a criminal defendant, which is an entirely different issue. 4 This problem does not exist under federal law because the long-standing right of self-representation in federal courts is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982), which provides that “[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . . 5 We recognize, of course, that commensurate with Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), a state is forbidden under the Fourteenth Amendment from forcing a lawyer upon a criminal defendant. Meads, Judge, dissenting. I cannot agree with the to reverse this case. In the first place, neither Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (<HOLDING>), nor Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent constitutional right of selfrepresentation and that he may proceed to represent himself without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs still believed the fees being charged were too high. From July 1, 1997 until the agreement terminated in late 1999, Plaintiffs paid the higher fees s ere decided unilaterall ment may be amended only in writing, by the agreement of the parties.” The Agreement does not require that amendments be signed. See T.R. Mills Contractors, Inc. v. WRH Enters., LLC, 93 S.W.3d 861, 865-66 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002) (a written agreement does not have to be signed to be binding). BCBST memorialized the terms in writing and sent the proposed written amendment to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs paid the amounts specified by the proposed written amendment but refused to sign it. The two requisites of amendment under the Agreement were met: written terms and the agreement of the parties to amend. See id. (<HOLDING>). Although a signed writing is a superior way

    ### Response:
    holding that when a contract is signed by one party but not the other the manifestation of consent by the nonsigning party is sufficient to bind that party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n. 1 (10th Cir.2007). 2 . In this application, Mr. Ciocchetti asserts that his attorneys were ineffective not only for failure to competently cross-examine Mr. Ferguson, but also for ""fail[ure] to investigate the facts and interview witnesses who would have verified” his account. Aplt. Combined Opening Br. & COA Appl. at 17. Beyond this cursory reference, however, Mr. Ciocchetti makes no effort to develop his failure-to-investigate claim, and, therefore, we will not address it further. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.2007) (""[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant’s opening brief.”); see also Mathews v. McKune, 133 Fed.Appx. 512, 514 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Mr. Ciocchetti faults the district court

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the appellants claim on appeal had been abandoned because although his motion for a coa  briefly asserted the claim he did not brief the issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (taking judicial notice of prior litigation filings, press releases, articles and financial publications); In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F.Supp.2d 351, 358 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (publicly available analysts’ reports). Public documents issued by government agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) may also be considered. See, e.g., Noble Asset Mgmt. v. Allos Therapeutics, Inc., No. 04-CV-1030 (RPM), 2005 WL 4161977, at *2 (D.Colo. Oct. 20, 2005) (denying motion to strike FDA guidance documents, reasoning that such public documents are related to FDA’s “process for reviewing new drug applications and that process is central to an evaluation of the claims made in this case.”); DeMarco v. DepoTech Corp., 149 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1218 (S.D.Cal.2001) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 32 Fed.Appx. 260 (9th Cir.2002). The

    ### Response:
    recognizing that on motion to dismiss a court may properly consider transcript of fda advisory committee meeting
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of alimony, maintenance, or support.” The argument is unpersuasive as an initial matter because nothing in the language of section 523(a)(5) indicates that the dis-chargeability of an obligation turns on state laws regulating alimony and support. Had Congress intended. state law to be determinative, it likely would have stated that intent expressly. See Harrell, 754 F.2d at 904 (“If Congress had intended dischargeability to be determined by whether an obligation could be imposed under state law, it might have addressed dischargeability in those terms.”). In fact, as indicated above, the legislative history of section 523(a)(5) demonstrates that Congress determined that state support laws should not be determinative of whether a particular obligation is dischargeable. Cf. id. at 905 (<HOLDING>); Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1315-17 (holding that a

    ### Response:
    holding that a promise to pay postmajority educational expenses was nondischargeable support even though the relevant states law does not require such support past the age of majority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    loss of ability to meet any of these basic work-related activities would severely limit the potential occupational base. This, in turn, would justify a finding of disability.... SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857 (S.S.A.), at *4. In implementing the five-step sequential evaluation process outlined above, the ALJ is under an affirmative duty to adequately develop the medical record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(d) (stating that the SSA will make reasonable efforts to obtain a complete medical history from treating sources); see also Tejada, 167 F.3d at 774. The ALJ is thus “obligated to explore the facts by obtaining relevant medical records and asking questions ... to assist the claimant in developing her case.” Jones v. Apfel, 66 F.Supp.2d 518, 538 (S.D.N.Y.1999); see also Perez, 77 F.3d at 47 (<HOLDING>). This duty becomes even more paramount when,

    ### Response:
    holding that where there are deficiencies in the record the alj is under an affirmative obligation to develop the relevant medical history
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). The Supreme Court held in Buckley that a prosecutor is not absolutely immune when he allegedly fabricated evidence during the investigation by retaining a dubious expert witness. Id. at 273-75, 113 S.Ct. 2606. The Court reasoned that “[t]here is a difference between the advocate’s role in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, ... and the detective’s role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested....” Id. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (citations omitted). Because the prosecutor’s conduct in Buckley fell within the latter category, the Supreme Court denied absolute immunity. See also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342-43, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the District Attorney

    ### Response:
    holding that a police officer who secures an arrest warrant without probable cause cannot assert an absolute immunity defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of trust,” Partnership Agreement Article 7.2, and the lack of any duty on the part of the limited partners to make further contributions to the partnership. The evidence does not support Travers’ argument that the partnership was voluntarily dissolved. On the contrary, the evidence presented demonstrates that Travers, by joining with his wife to buy the note and to cause the foreclosure sale of the property, dissolved the partnership in contravention of his duties under the partnership agreement. See Partnership Agreement, Article VII, ¶ 2. He did not have authority to buy the partnership property pursuant to the partnership agreement, his actions constituting self dealing divesting the partnership of its only significant asset. Virginia Code § 50-21; Klotz v. Klotz, 202 Va. 393 (1961) (<HOLDING>); Lindsay v. Bevins, 204 Va. 74, 77 (1963)

    ### Response:
    holding that the relationship of partners is of a fiduciary character and imposes upon them the obligation to exercise good faith and integrity in their dealings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ¶ 10 The testimony of Dr. Stahl in this case was much less compelling than the evidence excluded in Hays. Nonetheless, Dr. Stahl’s testimony had some relevance. We cannot ascertain the weight the court placed on Dr. Stahl’s testimony due to the court’s limited findings. Therefore, we cannot gauge the degree, if any, to which Father was disadvantaged by this testimony. We note, however, that Father chose not to seek a continuance to depose Dr. Stahl. Moreover, the timing of the disclosure was not entirely Mother’s fault, but was due, in part, to the late date on which the parties received the custody evaluation. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the family court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Stahl to testify. II. Adequacy of Findings of Fac 0 P.3d 775, 780 (App. 2003) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 13 As in the aforementioned eases, the

    ### Response:
    holding that the lower courts findings were insufficient as a matter of law and remanding for the court to make the findings required under ars  25403
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence were introduced or victim was asked about it, we don’t have any way to resolve that event or to give any meaningful way for the jury to evaluate the event without having witnesses to either corroborate or impeach victim’s statements.” In the end, the court expressed its view that asking the victim about the California incident “would not be helpful to the jury” and it precluded defendant from questioning her about that incident or introducing other evidence about it. That ruling was not an abuse of discretion. A trial court has authority to preclude this type of cross-examination on allegedly false prior accusations when it reasonably determines that exploration of the previous incident would essentially require an unhelpful trial within a trial. See Arellano, 149 Or App at 91 (<HOLDING>); LeClair, 83 Or App at 131 (noting that the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a delay in proceedings to explore a collateral matter can create a risk of prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    161 L.Ed.2d 181 (2005). While other portions of § 1591 have been challenged on vagueness grounds, the question of § 1591(d)’s facial validity has not been considered by federal courts. See United States v. Clinton, CR 12-40018-01-KES, 2012 WL 5195987 (D.S.D. Oct. 19, 2012). Defendant contends that he could not know what actions could expose him to criminal liability under the statute. It is true that § 1591 lacks the heightened “corruptly” mens rea of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, the general obstruction of justice statute, and that “criminal offenses requiring no mens rea have a ‘generally disfavored status.’” Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (citation omitted); see also Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (<HOLDING>). In the context of a vagueness challenge, this

    ### Response:
    holding under predecessor to  1503 that a person is not sufficiently charged with obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice in a court unless it ap pears that he knew or had notice that justice was being administered in such court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    faith in the performance of contracts.’ ” Dick Broad. Co. of Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Wallace v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tenn. 1996)). “As a result of this covenant, each contracting party promises to per form its part of the contract in good faith and, in return, expects the other party to do the. same.” Goot v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., No. M2003-02013-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 3031638, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2005). “To avoid the imposition o A.2d 1121, 1132 (2001) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant with unilateral pricing authority under contract because of potential for evidence of lack of good faith); CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Emp’s Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Alaska 1993) (<HOLDING>); Cobb v. Ironwood Country Club, 233

    ### Response:
    holding that unilateral right to select independent counsel is subject to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and battery occurs “when a person is placed in imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive bodily contact and there is an actual use of force.” Cohen v. Davis, 926 F.Supp. 399, 402 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing 6 N.Y. Jur.2d § 1). Plaintiff has established that he was in “imminent apprehension” that the officers would eng entional. However, where there has been a lawful arrest, intentional contact with the arrested person does not constitute assault and battery, provided such force is reasonable. See, e.g., Lorensen v. State, 249 A.D.2d 762, 671 N.Y.S.2d 790 (3d Dep’t 1998) (upholding a finding that force used during a lawful arrest was “no more than necessary” in light of the circumstances); Wyllie v. District Atty., of County of Kings, 2 A.D.3d 714, 770 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep’t 1996) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, when “an arrest is determined to

    ### Response:
    holding that state defendants demonstrated their entitlement to summary judgment on the second assault and battery cause of action by demonstrating the reasonableness of their conduct in arresting and transporting the plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    SSA, Plaintiffs have, as a matter of law, failed to establish any of the above elements—ie., an injury in fact, likelihood of future injury, traceability, or redressability. The Court does not agree. On the first element, ie., injury in fact, the Court acknowledges that Judge Patel’s prior orders focused on Plaintiffs’ emotional distress. See Davis Docket No. 26 (Order at 11) (citing Situ v. Leavitt, No. C06-2841 TEH, 2006 WL 3734373, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 18, 2006)); Doe Docket No. 26 (Order at 17) (citing the same). Con trary to what SSA suggests, many courts have found that emotional distress may constitute an injury-in-fact for purposes of standing. See, e.g., Soobzokov v. Holder, No. 10-6260(DRD), 2011 WL 2293853, at *4, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65007, at *11-12 (D.N.J. June 7, 2011) (<HOLDING>); Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff has satisfied the elements of standing because he alleges to have personally suffered emotionally as a result of defendants failure to vigorously investigate and prosecute several suspects for the murder of his father and his request for damages and an independent inquiry into defendants investigation will likely redress his suffering
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inland wetlands agencies have not been found to be quasi-municipal entities. See Denehy v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm’n, No. CV940704881 S, 1994 WL 247903, *2 (ConmSuper. May 27, 1994) (unpublished) (finding in an action relating to an administrative appeal that, “The Agency is not a municipal or quasi-municipal corporation so as to allow service upon its presiding officer or managing agent”). The court does pause, however, in light of a recent case decided by another court in this district. In Arrigoni Enterprises, LLC v. Town of Durham, No. 3:08-CV-520, 2011 WL 4572025 (D.Conn. Sept. 30, 2011), the court held that a municipal planning and zoning commission and a municipal zoning board of appeals were proper defendants in a section 1983 action. Arrigoni, 2011 WL 4572025 at *8 (<HOLDING>). The court in Arrigoni relied on a Connecticut

    ### Response:
    holding that a zoning commission was capable of being sued directly under section 1983 because zjoning commissions function legislatively when adopting zoning regulations and holding public hearings for the adjudication of individual petitions for zoning redress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    order, or judgment, or more than two years after the date a disability is removed); see also Tex. Estates Code §§ 55.251, 202.203, 1056.101; cf. id. § 256.204 (limiting will contest to two years or two years after discovering fraud or forgery). These express references to statutes of limitations for bills of review reflect legislative concern for the orderly administration of estates and finality of judgments and are consistent with the “strong public interest in according finality to probate proceedings,” which has been afforded great weight in our precedent. Little, 943 S.W.2d at 418-21 (concluding that the discovery rule does not apply to adoptees’ belated inheritance claims despite the inherent difficulty of promptly asserting such claims); see Frost Nat’l Bank, 315 S.W.3d at 497 (<HOLDING>). Construing section 31 as prescribing a

    ### Response:
    holding that the discovery rule does not apply to  bill of review claims to set aside probate judgments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    makes clear that the negligence claim is premised on precisely the same allegations of material misrepresentations regarding the source of investment advice in connection with the purchase and sale of securities, including that plaintiffs were injured when defendants “did not use the recommendations of Alex. Brown as a basis for making the recommendations to plaintiffs,” “recommended ... securities ... for purchase or sale ... based on what was good for Seaboard and themselves, and without regard to what was good for plaintiffs,” and that management fostered a “total disregard for the recommendations that were being made by Alex. Brown” in Seaboard’s provision of investment advice. It is therefore preempted by SLUSA. See Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 299-300; cf. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822 (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we hold that all

    ### Response:
    holding that the in connection with requirement of rule 10b5 was satisfied where investors were injured as investors through respondents deceptions and the scheme to defraud and the sale of securities coineided
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the district court did not impermissibly delegate its authority to establish a repayment plan to the IRS. The district court clearly stated at the resentencing hearing that it: anticipate^] a payment plan being submitted to it within 30 days of the defendant’s beginning of supervised release that would set forth the nature of the regular payments, not only during supervised release, but for the period within which those payments can be demanded and accepted and paid. Resentencing Tr. at 29. Here, the district court delegated the establishment of an initial payment plan to the IRS, which the district court would then approve or reject upon submission. Our precedents make clear that this is an acceptable procedure. See Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 360 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). May does not fare any better with his

    ### Response:
    holding that a sentencing court does not abrogate its judicial authority when it delegates the setting of a restitutionpayment schedule  provided that the court first establishes the amount of restitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his prior customers.”). When the intangible asset of good will is sold along with the tangible assets of a business, the purchaser acquires the right to expect that the firm’s established customers will continue to patronize the business. The essence of the transaction [of the sale of good will] is, in effect, an attempt to transfer the loyalties of the business’ customers from the seller, who cultivated and created them, to the new proprietor. Mohawk, 52 N.Y.2d at 285, 419 N.E.2d at 329, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 651 (internal citations omitted). This duty of the seller not to solicit customers does not, however, include an obligation not to accept such of his former customers as may choose to follow him to his new employment. See id., 52 N.Y.2d at 287, 419 N.E.2d at 330, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 652 (<HOLDING>). The New York Court of Appeals has drawn an

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the seller may accept the patronage of those customers who were actively dealing with the purchased company on the date of the sale if such customers choose to leave the purchased company without prompting from the seller
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employees provided by the defendant general employer, a crane rental service company). ¶ 38 Finally, no case in Arizona applying the lent employee doctrine mandates that a special employer must have had workers’ compensation coverage in place to receive tort immunity. Instead, the special employer is liable to an injured employee for workers’ compensation regardless of whether the special employer had coverage in place at the time of the employee’s injury. See Nation, 145 Ariz. at 420, 701 P.2d at 1228 (concluding that the plaintiff had the right to recover workers’ compensation benefits from the defendant special employer if she applied for such benefits); see also Porteadores Del Noroeste S.A. De C.V. v. Indus. Comm’n, 234 Ariz. 53, 59-60, ¶ 21, 316 P.3d 1241, 1247-48 (App.2014) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, even if an employer does not

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a foreign company as a special employer under the lent employee doctrine was subject to arizonas workers compensation statutes for injuries sustained by an employee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    review is pending, there is “no good reason to hold the findings and sentence of the court-martial are impaired by the discharge.” United States v. Speller, 8 USCMA 363, 368, 24 CMR 173, 178, (1957). Similarly, the power of review authorities over the court-martial is unaffected by the administrative discharge. See United States v. Woods, 26 MJ 372 (CMA 1988); United States v. Jackson, 3 MJ 153 (CMA 1977); United States v. Entner, 15 USCMA 564, 36 CMR 62 (1965); United States v. Speller, supra; United States v. Sippel, 4 USCMA 50, 15 CMR 50 (1954). Moreover, the administrative discharge does not negate the responsibility of the convening authority to act on the findings and sentence; nor does it restrict his power to do so. See generally Speller, supra at 365-66, 24 CMR at 175-76 (<HOLDING>). As indicated earlier, the convening authority

    ### Response:
    recognizing validity of convening authoritys action where accused was released from active duty and transferred to reserves after courtmartial but before the convening authoritys action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the case. See Baptist Vie Le, 993 S.W.2d at 654; In re D.Z., 869 S.W.2d at 564. Thus, with each of the options in section 52.02(a), except the option of taking the child to a designated juvenile processing office, the officer’s involvement in the case ceases. Baptist Vie Le, 993 S.W.2d at 654; see In re D.Z., 869 S.W.2d at 564. When police officers fail to comply with the requirements of Family Code section 52.02(a), 52.12, and 52.025, governing the taking of a child into custody and the taking of the statement of a child in a juvenile processing office, a statement obtained from a juvenile by the investigating officer may violate his rights as a juvenile under the Family Code and thus be inadmissible at trial. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.03(e); In re U.G., 128 S.W.3d at 799 (<HOLDING>). This is so even if the statement would

    ### Response:
    holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the doctrine of res judicata. Fundamental to a claim of res judicata in an administrative context are the requirements that the administrative agency was acting in a “judicial capacity” and that the parties had an “opportunity to litigate” their claims. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991). Plaintiff has not satisfied either requirement. Plaintiff has not demonstrated, through case law or facts, that the HCFA contracting officers in 1994 were acting in a judicial capacity when they made their decision in February 1994. Nor has Data shown that there was an adversarial proceeding between HCFA and Data that resulted in the issuance of the 1994 memorandum. See Roxco, Ltd. v. United States, 60 Fed.Cl. 39, 45 (2004) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the court finds that the

    ### Response:
    holding that res judicata does not apply where the contracting officer did not act in a judicial capacity and there was no adversarial proceeding between the government and roxco
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    instructions to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees incurred by Cimco in enforcing its contract with Bartush.” We note that Cimco put on evidence of attorneys’ fees at trial, but Cimco’s attorneys’ fees question was conditionally submitted upon a ""yes” answer to question 1, a finding that Bartush breached first in question 2, and a ""no” answer to question 4, Because the jury found Cimco breached first in question 2, it did not answer Cimco's attorneys’ fees question. Cimco did not object to the conditional submission of its attorneys’ fees question; consequently, Cimco has failed to preserve any error from the jury’s failure to answer its attorneys’ fees question. See, e.g., Envtl. Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 631 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Hunter v. Carter, 476 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tex.

    ### Response:
    holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question when answer could not be implied and that lack of objection waived right to new trial to have jury answer questions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    showing “that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the 'moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Only genuine disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Arpin v. Santa Clam Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). A genuine issue of material fact must be more

    ### Response:
    holding that the nonmoving party must present specific evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which he used during his cross-examination of the witnesses. Resp’t Mem. at 6 (citing Petitioner’s Affidavit in Support of 2007 C.P.L. § 440.10 Motion to Vacate; Petitioner’s Statement of Facts; Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law at 3,4; and Petitioner’s Exhibits B, D & E, attached as App. PP to Resp’t Ans.). Furthermore, as Respondent points out, Concepcion acknowledged in one of his pleadings filed in this case that he had heard the audiotape when his attorney visited him at the prison. The audiotape of the witness conversation therefore cannot be considered “newly discovered” evidence for purposes of an actual-innocence tolling exception to AED-PA’s statute of limitations (assuming that such an exception exists). See, e.g., United States v. Middlemiss, 217 F.3d 112, 122 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Phillips, No. 04 Civ.4653 DAB

    ### Response:
    holding that affidavit from a new witness was not newly discovered evidence because trial counsel knew of the existence of the witness before trial trial counsel with due diligence could have discovered the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defendant’s jury waiver was discussed in open court as required. Most significantly, the transcript of proceedings reveals that there was no discussion of defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury. Instead, the record reveals only that defendant’s trial counsel scheduled a bench trial in September 2004 and the trial court referenced defendant’s signed jury waiver immediately before proceeding to the bench trial. Contrary to the State’s assertions, these two instances are insufficient to constitute a discussion of defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial in open court. Furthermore, although defendant signed a jury waiver, the existence of a written jury waiver is not dispositive of the issue of whether that waiver is valid. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 269-70; Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 284 (<HOLDING>). In this case, where there was no discussion

    ### Response:
    holding that written jury waivers alone cannot validly waive a defendants right to a jury trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in effect, it is unrelated to the range of the defendant's punishments. Unlike parole, probation, or the length of imprisonment, the requirement to register as a sex offender is beyond the control of the trial court. The judge has no discretion whatsoever in determining whether the defendant will have to comply with registration statutes; instead, it is a legal obligation, predetermined by the legislature, placed on those convicted of particular crimes and is an automatic operation of statute. Similar to the consequence of losing one's driver's license or the right to possess a firearm, the registration requirement is intended to act not as a criminal punishment but as a prophylactic civil remedy. See, eg., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95-96, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Carel, 668 F.3d 1211, 1213

    ### Response:
    holding that alaskas registration requirement was a civil remedy and nonpunitive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3(A)(3); Judicial Council Order at 2. Judge McBryde does not, so far as we can determine, ever challenge this basic notion anymore than the plaintiff in Lyons claimed a right to engage in the sort of conduct that (he said) commonly led to police use of chokeholds. Indeed at oral argument counsel for Judge McBryde specifically acknowledged that at least some of the conduct “could be considered inappropriate.” See Oral Arg. Tr. at 80-81. With this decision’s confirmation of the Judicial Council’s authority to sanction Judge McBryde for consistent failure to adhere to this norm, we think the risk of recurrence fairly slight. We recognize that docket limitations can be a very serious matter. See Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). But here the two restrictions on Judge

    ### Response:
    holding that depriving a tenured professor of all teaching and research responsibilities affected a property interest sufficiently to entitle him to some kind of a hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were not against Deitz personally. Because sanctions were not awarded on those grounds, we remand the case so that the trial court can consider an award of sanctions on these grounds. C. Calculation of Sanctions The appellees’ motion for sanctions was made not against Harris but against Deitz, his client. The first time anyone asked for sanctions against Harris was on the morning of the sanctions hearing when appellees’ counsel, in oral argument, made such a request. A part of the sanctions leveled against Harris was for opposing sanctions. Such an award was improper. It cannot be said that Harris lacked substantial justification in opposing sanctions against his client, Deitz, when he successfully opposed them. See U.S. Health, Inc. v. State, 87 Md.App. 116, 132, 589 A.2d 485 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 324 Md. 69, 595 A.2d 482

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 1341 does not provide for expenses incurred in asserting the claim for sanctions under the rule except perhaps to the extent that the offending party resists the claim for counsel fees without substantial justification for doing so
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that SEIU has abandoned this claim. Additionally, the preliminary injunction was issued by the district court pursuant to section 301(a). Thus, our resolution of the jurisdictional issue has relevance to the ongoing litigation. Moreover, and essential to our determination here, in the preliminary injunction the district court explicitly preserved a portion of the TRO as still effective after issuance of the injunction. The preliminary injunction states, “all defendants in this action remain subject to paragraph three of the TRO and subsequent orders regarding the imaging of electronic devices.” (Order Granting In Part Mot. For Prelim. Inj. at 17). Thus it seems the TRO has not expired and remains enforceable. Compare Am. Tunaboat Ass’n v. Brown, 67 F.3d 1404, 1407 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), with Negrete, 523 F.3d at 1098 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiffs appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction moot where defendants directive no longer in effect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    William L. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts, p. 2 (4th ed.1971). Wrongful injunction falls within this concept of civil wrong. The duty to avoid the harms caused to a defendant by an inappropriate injunction is perhaps best explained as a special duty created when the government establishes a special relationship with a person by bringing suit against that person. See Everton v. Willard, 468 So.2d 936, 938 (Fla.1985); Simpson v. City of Miami, 700 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Hartley v. Floyd, 512 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Although we conclude that the claim is in the nature of strict liability, we also conclude that wrongful injunction is a “wrongful act” for purposes of the waiver in section 768.28. See Schick v. Florida Dep’t of Agric., 504 So.2d 1318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>). Once it is decided that the duty exists in

    ### Response:
    holding inverse condemnation action not barred by sovereign immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    numbness in both legs after he injured himself getting out of a car. His condition improved significantly after physical therapy, which helped him to walk more easily and increased his spinal flexibility. Yet, he did not regain full sensation below the knees. By the end of 2012, Gibbens reported during an examination that he was “doing well” and never experienced pain beyond five or six on a scale of ten. Our review of this mixed evidence is not intended to minimize Gibbens’s ordeal. The mere presence of “periodic improvements and cessation of treatment” cannot support an ALJ’s decision to discount the severity of a claimant’s medical condition when the ALJ fails to consider other record evidence of declining health. Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 723-24 (6th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>). However, that is not the circumstance in the

    ### Response:
    holding that the alj erred by discounting claimants impairments on the basis that she ceased certain treatments where her decision to go without those prescriptions was driven by serious side effects of her medication rather than recovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the problems here in Wash-ington D.C., in New York, in Detroit where I grew up, can be traced right back to [drug trafficking].” In Defendants’ view, the prosecutor perceived the jury “might be [uninterested in Colombia’s drug problems,” Defendants Br. 48, which led him to improperly tie the Colombian drug trade to the American drug problem, inviting the jury to act as the “community conscience.” To be sure, a suggestion that the jury act as the “community conscience” can constitute error. In United States v. Hawkins, our circuit warned it is improper to “substitute emotion for evidence by equating, directly or by innuendo, a verdict of guilty to a blow against the drug problem.” 595 F.2d 751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1151 (6th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). This caution derives from Viereck v. United

    ### Response:
    holding an appeal to the jury to act as the community conscience is improper when it is calculated to incite the passions and prejudices of the jurors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    liability on those who caused toxic tort injuries and those who released hazardous substances into the environment if their responsibility was equal to or greater than fifty percent. Tex Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code § 33.013(c). In such cases, liability was not limited by proportionate responsibility. In 2003, the Legislature revisited that exclusion and repealed it in its entirety. Now, defen dants found liable for these tortious acts are subject to the general proportionate responsibility scheme. The Legislature seemed intent on creating a general scheme of proportionate responsibility for tort claims, subject to specific statutory exclusions. Finally, our controlling interpretation of that statutory scheme has remained in place since our 1993 decision in Smith v. Sewell. 858 S.W.2d at 856 (<HOLDING>). In the thirteen years since Se-well was

    ### Response:
    holding that application of the principles of comparative responsibility to causes of action brought under the dram shop act establishes a consistent and equitable approach to the issue of dramshop liability generally and first party dramshop liability specifically
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a dispositional review hearing could not be combined with a termination of parental rights proceeding because doing so ""would bypass the steps established by the Legislature for final determination of a child's status."" Id. at 816. AE. addresses a situation where the parents did not yet have the opportunity to fulfill the service plan, and thus, a termination hearing at the same time as the permanency hearing was inappropriate. See id. However, here, the juvenile court did not conduct a disposi-tional hearing and a termination hearing at the same time-it held a permanency hearing and a termination hearing concurrently. Utah Code Ann. § 78-8a-312(6)(c)(8upp.2000) explicitly allows termination and permanency hearings to be combined. Cf. In re KM., 965 P.2d 576, 582 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). C. Ruling Regarding Permission to Medicate

    ### Response:
    holding proper for permanency plan to be determined at dispositional hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the agreement rather than on the judgment.” Indeed, the instant Separation Agreement provides that ""this Agreement shall independently remain in full force and effect, and shall survive any decree, order, or judgment hereafter entered and shall forever be binding and conclusive upon the parties.” Thus, under settled Virginia law, Hildebrand may properly sue under the Separation Agreement given that it was not merged in the Final Decree of Divorce. Id. 15 . As noted supra, both Hildebrand and Iron Works are citizens of Virginia, while Lewis is a citizen of Florida. 16 . It is axiomatic that subject matter jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, either by the parties or by the court sua sponte. See Rule 12(h)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). 17 . In this regard, it

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a federal court is obliged to dismiss a case whenever it appears the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    powers to the executive department, and judicial powers to the judiciary * * In re Request for Advisory Opinion from House of Representatives (Coastal Resources Management Council), 961 A.2d 930, 933 (R.I.2008). Just as “the separation of powers amendments di 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence * * *”) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974)). The Court, the board, and lawyers licensed to practice in Rhode Island, as officers of the Court, including Disciplinary Counsel, may all properly exercise the judiciary’s inherent subpoena power. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 644, 105 S.Ct. 2874 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, respondent’s contention that this

    ### Response:
    recognizing that as an officer of the court a lawyer can cause persons to drop their private affairs and be called as witnesses in court and for depositions and other pretrial processes although subject to the ultimate control of the court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), found that the plaintiffs are entitled to be made whole and, therefore, compensatory damages are appropriate forms of relief. See 503 U.S. at 69, 112 S.Ct. 1028. That case, however, did not reverse long-standing judicial attitudes regarding emotional distress damages awards in contract cases. The compensatory damages that Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch. found appropriate do not include extraordinary damages, such as punitive awards and emotional distress damages. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 188, 122 S.Ct. 2097 (“[I]t must be concluded that Title VI funding recipients have not, merely by accepting funds, implicitly consented to liability for punitive damages.”); Bradford v. Iron County C-4 Sch. Dist., 1984 WL 1443, at *7 (E.D.Mo.1984)(<HOLDING>). Even if the Court were to assume that

    ### Response:
    holding that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under section 504
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ""if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. D.E.A., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 14 . In applying the ""fundamental fairness” standard to evaluate foreign judicial systems under section 4(b)(1), our sister circuits have consistently recognized that constitutional due-process standards are more demanding. See Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (interpreting the predecessor to section 4(b)(1) of Illinois’s UFCMJRA as employing an ""international concept of due process” that was ""less demanding” than ""the complex concept that has emerged from American case law”); DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 804 F.3d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>); Society of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that under the predecessor to section 4b1 of texass ufcmjra the foreign judicial system must only be fundamentally fair and need not comply with the traditional rigors of american due process citations alterations and internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    occurred on or about June 19, 2006, (# 5, Ex. A), and the Complaint was not filed until July 27, 2009. (# 1-2 at 1). This is over three years. TILA has a one-year statute of limitations for damages actions. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (“Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation.”). The remedy of rescission is available for three years, see 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f), but even then only where a borrower is willing and able to tender the balance on the promissory note, see Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir.2003); LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir.1976), which clearly is not kers, Inc., 552 F.Supp.2d 191 (D.P.R.2007) (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiffs obtained their loan in order

    ### Response:
    holding that the tila rescission remedy did apply where borrowers encumbered a second property in order to obtain financing for the first property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fails the first step of this inquiry, while his procedural due process claim fails the second. Substantive Due Process Leal alleged that his right to substantive due process was violated by the conduct of the Internal Affairs investigators and the composition of the Disciplinary Review Board that recommended indefinite suspension. However, an inadequate or invalid investigation is insufficient to state a civil rights claim unless another recognized constitutional right is involved. See, e.g., Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1079 (8⅛ Cir. 1996). And Leal’s complaint regarding the composition of the Disciplinary Review Board rests upon the incorrect assumption that he was entitled to an impartial decisionmaker. See Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 715-718 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold Leal’s substantive due

    ### Response:
    holding that due process does not require the state to provide an impartial decisionmaker at the pretermination hearing where posttermination remedies are available
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    130 S.Ct. at 2565 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), and we have repeatedly emphasized that equitable tolling is not available to “those who sleep on them rights,” see, e.g., Covey v. Ark. River Co., 865 F.2d 660, 662 (5th Cir.1989). Giving Wickware all benefit of the doubt, equitable tolling still would not help him. Even if we fictionally extend the benefit of § 2244(d)(2) to his improperly filed petition and discount the entire period of time from Wickware’s original filing of his state habeas application on August 29, 2003, and the TCCA’s ruling on the merits of Wickware’s second application on April 4, 2007, Wickware would fail to meet the AEDPA time limits. Wickware’s conviction became final for AEDPA purposes on Decembe , 599 (5th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Webb v. Dretke, 165 Fed.Appx. 375, 376 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioner was dili gent for equitable tolling purposes where petitioner filed state petition two months after conviction was final and filed federal petition seven days after discovering state had denied petition on the merits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    120 S.Ct. 2446. In this case the Commonwealth is only imposing a procedural, formal requirement on the structure of an organization. The statute neither requires nor even suggests any forced association of gun owners with anyone of differing views. Furthermore, as the Commonwealth points out, requiring a club to obtain a license in order to enjoy a narrow range of privileges relating to large capacity weapons does not “implicate any constitutionally protected right of association because it does not involve ... protected associative activity.” Like an ordinance restricting attendance at certain dance halls to persons of a certain age, this regulation simply does not implicate the First Amendment. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs are not being forced to join

    ### Response:
    holding that the dancing regulated by the municipal ordinance simply does not involve the sort of expressive association that the first amendment has been held to protect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    anything other than happenstance, unfortunately. ... [Tjhere is no evidence, nothing to suggest that this was a first-degree murder and this was somehow premeditated. 7 . Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). 8 . White v. United States, 425 A.2d 616, 618 (D.C.1980). 9 . Louis v. United States, 862 A.2d 925, 928-29 (D.C.2004). 10 . See Perrow v. United States, 947 A.2d 54, 55-56 (D.C.2008) (noting that ""the trial judge is 'in the best position to determine whether the government presented an argument that, perhaps subtly, exceeded the bounds of the agreement’ ”) (quoting United States v. Pollard, 295 U.S.App.D.C. 7, 19, 959 F.2d 1011, 1023 (1992)). 11 . Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, -, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1432-33, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (<HOLDING>). 12 .Id. at 1429 (internal quotation marks and

    ### Response:
    holding that a forfeited claim of governmental failure to fulfill its obligations under a plea agreement is subject to the requirements of plain error review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provided for significantly broadened access to public records.”); Levy v. Senate of Pa., 619 Pa. 586, 618, 65 A.3d 361, 381 (2013) (“[T]he enactment of the RTKL in 2008 was a dramatic expansion of the public’s access to government documents.”). According to Requesters, “[i]t is .-impossible to square the Commonwealth Court’s discarding of Lukes with the conclusion of SWB Yankees that the RTKL expands access to public records and with [SWB Yankees’] favorable treatment of Lukes.” Brief, for Appellants at 20. Requesters also depict the majority decision of the Commonwealth Court as a departure from a long line of decisions of this Court, such as Sapp Roofing Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association, Local Union No. 12, 552 Pa. 105, 109, 713 A.2d 627, 629 (1998) (plurality) (<HOLDING>). Requesters note that, in other geographic

    ### Response:
    holding that payroll records of a private roofing contractor in the custody of a local agency were public records because they evidenced a disbursement by a governmental unit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    magnified in the prison context. Jolly, 923 F.Supp. at 949. Thus, Kassen held that where prison physicians exercise governmental discretion, they are entitled to official immunity. Id. at 949-50; Kassen, 887 S.W.2d at 10-11. On the other hand, the court concluded that where state-employed physicians exercise purely medical discretion (as in the diagnosis and treatment of patients), the purpose of official immunity no longer applies. See Kassen, 887 S.W.2d at 10-11. A physician’s exercise of purely medical discretion thus does not warrant official immunity. In 2003, the Texas Legislature superseded Kassen by extending official immunity to all employees acting within the scope of their employment. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106 (West 2013); see Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 381-85 (<HOLDING>). Prior to its abrogation, several commentators

    ### Response:
    recognizing abrogation of kassen
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    respect to crimes where physical force is not a required element of the offense, the courts have also focused on whether lack of consent on the part of the victim was a required element. In Sutherland, the Second Circuit ). Thus, the Connecticut Legislature has made the determination, as expressed in Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-71, that children under the age of sixteen are not adults capable of making an intelligent choice in matters relating to sex. See State v. Jason B, 248 Conn. at 571, 729 A.2d 760. In analogous cases involving child victims who are incapable of giving their consent to the sexual activity involved, courts have found a substantial risk that physical force will be used against these children to ensure their compliance. See United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d at 379 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alas-Castro, 184 F.3d 812,

    ### Response:
    holding that a conviction under utah code ann  7654041 for sexual abuse of a child was a crime of violence under  16b based upon a common sense view of the sexual abuse statute in combination with the legal determination that children are incapable of consent which suggests that when an older person attempts to sexually touch a child under the age of fourteen there is always a substantial risk that physical force will be used to ensure the childs compliance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.’ ” See Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1553 (10th Cir.1991) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983)). In addition, the doctrine “requires every court to follow the decisions of courts that are higher in the judicial hierarchy.” Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Assoc., 10 F.3d 700, 705 (10th Cir.1993), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir.1994) (en banc). Because the bankruptcy court did not depart from one of its own rulings or the ruling of a higher court in the same case, the doctrine of the law of the case arguably does not apply here. Cf. Been v. O.K Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d 1217, 1224-25 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The BAP concluded, however, that the

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering a prior interlocutory ruling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of wrongful means); Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., No. 60045, 2005 WL 4441899, at *7 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Dec. 19, 2005) (“[T]he complaint contains nothing indicating the ... defendants acted beyond mere self-interest or other economic considerations. This is insufficient to support a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations.”). Plaintiffs Complaint, which merely alleges that the various interlocked companies in the Shell family preferred to purchase from each other rather than from outside companies, does not offer an exam- pie of “egregious” conduct “so ‘culpable’ ... that it could be the basis for a claim of tortious interference with economic relations.” Carvel II, 818 N.E.2d at 1103-04; see also Masefield AG, 2006 WL 346178, at *9 (<HOLDING>); Advanced Global Tech., 836 N.Y.S.2d at 811

    ### Response:
    holding that conclusory allegations that defendant used coercive business practices to intentionally interfere with business relations was insufficient to state a claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provision of § 903, and so is an exception to it. The terms of § 903 clarify that the remedies of “[t]his chapter” (i.e., Chapter 9) do not alter the ordinary powers that states have over their municipalities. This provision, together with § 904, “carries] forward doctrines of federal common law that had governed municipal insolvency before the first federal act, as well as the constitutional principle against federal interference in state and local governance.” McConnell & Picker, 60 U. Chi. L.Rev. at 462-63 (footnote omitted). “The effect is to preserve the power of political authorities to set their own domestic spending priorities, without restraint from the bankruptcy court.” Id.; cf. City of East St. Louis v. United States, 110 U.S. 321, 324, 4 S.Ct. 21, 28 L.Ed. 162 (1884) (<HOLDING>). Relying on the context of § 903, the

    ### Response:
    holding that no court has the right to control the discretion of municipal authorities as to what expenditures are proper and necessary for the municipal administration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress intended by adding the mandatory language combined with the 'exceptional circumstances' standard for reopening under [the amended statute], while leaving intact the permissive language and less stringent 'reasonable cause' standard for avoiding in absentia deportation under § 1252(b)”); Iris Gomez, The Consequences of Nonappearance: Interpreting New Section 242B of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 30 San Diego L. Rev. 75, 150 (1993) (""In the context of a deportation hearing under [the Act], both 'reasonable cause’ and ‘exceptional circumstances' excuse nonappearance at a hearing”). 6 . Such evidence should be presented to the IJ prior to the entrance of the order so that the IJ is given the opportunity to refrain from proceeding in absentia. Typically evidence of this nat

    ### Response:
    holding that reasonable cause did not justify reopening deportation proceedings when the alien appeared thirty minutes late for the hearing because the alien and his attorney crossed signals about where to meet
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    including law enforcement and the State of Illinois Department of Insurance....” (R. 51, Superseding Indictment, Count One ¶ 5.) The indictment further alleges that Segal “knew and believed that NNIB’s PFTA was not operated properly and according to the requirements of the law and the Code....” (Id.) By implication, then, the Government pleads that Segal knew he was violating a legal duty, satisfying one definition of “willful.” See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141-42, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994). Furthermore, we note that in denying motions to dismiss indictments or in affirming these denials, courts have held that § 2(b)’s “willfully” language need not be plead explicitly in the indictment. See United States v. Krogstad, 576 F.2d 22, 28-29 (3d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Grubb, 469 F.Supp. 991,

    ### Response:
    holding that  willfulness need not be expressly stated in the indictment charging a violation of 18 usc s 2 where the indictment simply stated that the defendant caused a false audit report to be submitted and did not specify a charge under  2a or  2b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    brought by companies operating in municipalities); Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391-92, 114 S.Ct. at 1682-83 (invalidating town waste processing ordinance in suit by local waste processor against town); Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 346, 116 S.Ct. at 861 (striking down North Carolina tax in suit by North Carolina company); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 188, 114 S.Ct. 2205, 2209, 129 L.Ed.2d 157 (1994) (striking down Massachusetts milk pricing order in suit by Massachusetts-licensed milk dealers); Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 367-68, 112 S.Ct. at 2027-28 (striking down Michigan waste import restrictions in suit by Michigan landfill operator); S. Waste Sys., 420 F.3d at 1291-92 (upholding waste processing ordinance on merits in suit by in-state company); Leib, 558 F.3d at 1311 (<HOLDING>). In addition, as noted above, the dormant

    ### Response:
    holding that dormant commerce clause complaint by instate resident against municipality failed on merits because challenged rule regulated evenhandedly and did not burden interstate commerce
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    little evidence in order to overcome an employer’s motion for summary judgment” because “the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a searching inquiry— one that is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a full record.” Davis, 520 F.3d at 1089 (quotation marks omit ted); see also McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir.2004) (“In evaluating motions for summary judgment in the context of employment discrimination, we have emphasized the importance of zealously guarding an employee’s right to a full trial, since discrimination claims are frequently difficult to prove without a full airing of the evidence and an opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.”); Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) (second alteration in original) (quotation

    ### Response:
    holding that very little  evidence is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an employers motive any indication of discriminatory motive  may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a factfinder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    size and complexity with the South Wing project. A contracting officer who must exercise some level of discretion to determine a contractor’s responsibility should be encouraged to base this exercise of discretion on objective, identifiable factors. Doing so does not make those factors special standards. Grimberg argues alternatively that if the eleven Comparison Chart criteria are not special standards, then the solicitation’s requirement that bidders submit three projects “of the size and complexity” of the South Wing project is improper because it is not specific and fails to put contractors on notice of what exactly was required. A valid special standard must be specific, objective, and mandatory. See In re Weldtest, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-216747.2, 84-2 CPD ¶ 612 (1984) (<HOLDING>); In re Watch Security, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec.

    ### Response:
    holding that a solicitation provision stating that a bidder may be required to prove that they have experience in comparable work was permissive and not sufficiently specific nor objective to be a special standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Woolston, 453 N.E.2d at 968. It is for the trial court to determine whether the juror is biased for or against the defendant. Id. Only if the defendant was placed in substantial peril will we find an abuse of discretion. Id. A. Juror Jester Alvies contends that Jester should have been removed and replaced with an alternate juror because her father-in-law is a second cousin of one of the victims. In response, the State directs us to subsection (a)(4) of the statute concerning relatives within the fifth degree of the defendant or victim. We agree with the State that Alvies cannot establish that Jester is related to the victim within the fifth degree and, thus, is not entitled to have her removed for cause under that section. See Whicker v. State, 511 N.E.2d 1062, 1064-65 (Ind.1987) (<HOLDING>). As Alvies points out, however, the basis of

    ### Response:
    holding juror who was aunt of defendants mothers nephews wife was not related within fifth degree and thus should not have been removed for cause under indcode  353715a4
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the contents of its own policy ... In addition, notice of facts which would cause a reasonable person to inquire further im poses a duty of investigation upon the insurer, and failure to investigate constitutes a waiver of all powers or privileges which a reasonable search would have uncovered. Steptore, 643 So.2d at 1216. If a policy requires an insurer to defend a claim, then the insurer must do so, even if it ultimately may not be liable under the policy. Peavey Company v. M/V ANPA, 971 F.2d 1168, 1175 (5th Cir.1992). An insurer can supply its insured with a defense and simultaneously contest its obligation to provide coverage by reserving its right to refuse coverage in a timely manner. Id. An insurer that tardily reserves its rights waives defenses to coverage. Id. at 1175-76 (<HOLDING>). a. The Johnson Lawsuit It is undisputed that

    ### Response:
    holding that insurer that waited five months after being informed of occurrence and two months after being informed of suit against insured to deliver reservation of rights letter waived its noncoverage defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As previously noted, the parties dispute when Tri-Etch alerted Cincinnati of Young’s death and the resulting lawsuit. Cincinnati asks us to find Tri-Etch’s notice unreasonably late as a matter of law and affirm the trial court’s summary judgment order on this basis. However, regardless of when Cincinnati received notice of Young’s death and the Estate’s lawsuit, Cincinnati has always contended that Young’s death was not an “occurrence” entitled to coverage under its policies. Thus, we first must discern whether Cincinnati can show that it was prejudiced by Tri-Etch’s allegedly faulty notice. In Miller v. Dilts, our Supreme Court held that an insurer may not avoid liability under a policy’s cooperation and notice clauses unless the insured’s noncompliance with tho 2d 430, 435 (1992) (<HOLDING>). We will assume for the sake of the argument

    ### Response:
    holding that in light of evidence that the insurer would have denied coverage even if it had received suit papers on a timely basis the insurer could not show prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    beneficiary of the contract, not one who is benefitted only incidentally by the performance of the contract. MCI Telecomms., 995 S.W.2d at 651; Brunswick Corp. v. Bush, 829 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ) (explaining that “only donee and creditor beneficiaries have enforceable rights”). A donee beneficiary is a party to whom the performance promised will, when rendered, come to him as a pure donation; a creditor beneficiary is one to whom the performance promised will come in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to him by the promisee. MCI Telecomms., 995 S.W.2d at 651. This legal duty may include indebtedness, contractual obligations, or other legally enforceable commitments owed to the third party. Id.; see also Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 588 (Tex.2002) (<HOLDING>). B. Application of the Law to the Present

    ### Response:
    holding mother qualified as thirdparty beneficiary to daughter and soninlaws agreement incident to divorce because it provided for repayment to mother of a specific amount of money from the proceeds of the sale of the couples home
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and (2) “where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453; see also Bailey, 160 F.3d at 1364. A careful study of Supreme Court precedent, as well as that of the regional circuits, however, reveals that equitable tolling is available in a variety of circumstances, including when a party has been mentally incapacitated. The Supreme Court has yet to address whether mental illness can justify equitable tolling. In Irwin, an employment discrimination case, petitioner claimed that the 30-day period prescribed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) should be tolled because his attorney was out of the country and did not, therefore, personally receive the relevant n 1177, 1180 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys mental illness may justify equitable tolling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to establish prima facie case of control); id. at 340 (“Although there is ample evidence of the [family] corporations having many dealings with each another, there is no evidence in the record of [the parent] exercising any control over [the subsidiary].”). Indeed, it would be surprising if a wholly-owned subsidiary did not act for its parent’s benefit. In order to establish jurisdiction over Ipsen or Ipsen Pharma as a result of Biomeasure’s contacts with Louisiana, which is what plaintiffs are attempting to do, plaintiffs must demonstrate “something beyond the subsidiary’s mere presence within the bosom of the corporate family.” Dickson, 179 F.3d at 338. Specifically, plaintiffs must prevail under the factors set forth in Dickson. See 179 F.3d at 339; see also Bauman, 579 F.3d at 1095 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have failed to do so, and

    ### Response:
    holding that to establish that subsidiary is agent of parent for jurisdictional purposes the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the parent notwithstanding the maintenance of corporate formalities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disturb any of these Family Court rulings. He has not applied for a vacatur of the temporary custody order or the placement of the child in his temporary custody. Instead, Plaintiff only seeks specified monetary damages, see id. ¶¶ 739-42, and injunctive relief holding that various sections and procedures of the N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law unconstitutional prospectively, see id. ¶¶ 451-464, 728-29. Consequently, the Court follows the Second Circuit’s reasoning in McNamara and Green and finds that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to Plaintiffs claims that only seek monetary damages or prospective injunctive relief and do not seek to overturn a child custody award. See also Pittman v. Cuyahoga County Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., No. 06-3312, 2007 WL 2050840, at *3 (6th Cir. July 16, 2007) (<HOLDING>). III. Domestic Relations Exception Several

    ### Response:
    holding that rookerfeldman does not bar plaintiff claims that do not focus on the outcome of state court custody proceedings or other wise request reversal of a juvenile court decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on Defendant's proposed final instruction number six, as I said before, I think, a, there are ... there is more than one explanation about why the dura on the left side would not have been seen. Transcript at 1815-1822. Ray argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused his instruction on the State's failure to produce evidence. We find Nettles v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind.1991), instructive. In Nettles, the defendant argued that the State failed to preserve potentially useful evide acted in bad faith, we cannot say that the tendered instruction was not misleading. A trial court may properly refuse misleading and confusing instructions tendered by a party. Pub. Serv. Ind., Inc. v. Nichols, 494 N.E.2d 349, 357 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), reh'g denied. Th (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). However, the tendered instruction does not

    ### Response:
    holding whether these explanations are reasonable or not depends upon matters that the jury must decide including witness eredibility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    limitations period during the pendency of the original action when the original action was dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution. Mississippi courts have never addressed this question per se. ¶ 27. Specifically, Benny cites, among others, King v. Lujan, 98 N.M. 179, 646 P.2d 1243 (1982), and Sluka v. Herman, 229 Neb. 200, 425 N.W.2d 891 (1988). In King, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that “[ajfter a consideration of the purpose and policies underlying Rule 41, we adopt the view that even though the filing of a suit ordinarily tolls the applicable limitations period, when an action is dismissed without prejudice because of a failure to prosecute, the interruption is considered as never having occurred.” King, 646 P.2d at 1244-45. Th D.La.1977) (applying Louisiana law) (<HOLDING>); Barrentine v. Vulcan Materials Co., 216 So.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that filing of suit ordinarily interrupts the running of prescription but when the action is dismissed without prejudice because of plaintiffs failure to prosecute the interruption in the running of the statute is considered as never having occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to App. C, amend. 706; see also id. amend. 713; Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed.Reg. 28571-28572 (2007). We acknowledge that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 can be read to permit a reduced sentence only where the defendant’s pre-departure sentencing range is found within the crack cocaine guidelines. However, “the meaning of language is inherently contextual [and] the [Supreme] Court has always reserved lenity for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute.” United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir.2000) (alteration and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81, 86-87 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Here, we conclude that there is ambiguity as

    ### Response:
    holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The State has refused to disavow enforcement of the statute and is, in fact, vigorously defending the legality of the statute in the present action. In addition, albeit for public or non-consensual conduct, there have been prosecutions under Arkansas’s sodomy statute as recently as 1988. See, e.g., Young v. State, 296 Ark. 394, 757 S.W.2d 544 (1988)(conviction for nonconsensual sodomy under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-122); United States v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1983) (conviction under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-122 for consensual conduct in a public restroom). In addition, our sodomy statute has been used outside the criminal context in ways harmful to those who engage in same-sex conduct prohibited by the statute. See, e.g., Stowe v. Bowlin, 259 Ark. 221, 531 S.W.2d 955 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Thigpen v. Carpenter, 21 Ark. App. 194, 730

    ### Response:
    holding that court should have allowed appellant to impeach appellees credibility as a witness by referencing appellees admitted engagement in sodomy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Code (UCC) as adopted by Virginia: “Instrument” means a negotiable instrument as defined in § 8.3A-104, Title 8.8A or any other writing which evidences a right to the payment of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.... Va.Code § 8.9 — 105(l)(i). It is undisputed that the CD is neither a “negotiable instrument” nor a security agreement nor a lease. See id. The only question is whether the CD is a writing evidencing a right to the payment of money “which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.” M The bankruptcy court concluded that (1) although t 490 S.E.2d 334, 338-39 (W.Va.1997) (<HOLDING>). Almost every court to face the issue has

    ### Response:
    holding that certificates of deposit are instruments and noting that the majority of jurisdictions agree
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    119 N.M. 743, 751, 895 P.2d 265, 273 (Ct.App. 1995) (Hartz, J., concurring) (stating that some authorities question whether statutory redemption laws encourage higher bidding at foreclosure sales). In considering a clash of interests, the court can consider “overriding equitable considerations.” HSBC Bank, 2005-NMCA-138, ¶ 10, 138 N.M. 665, 125 P.3d 644. {9} The question before us is whether the holder of a junior mortgage who forecloses its mortgage remains a “junior mortgagee” under Section 39-5-18(A), thereby entitling it to redeem. No New Mexico case addresses this question. At least one New Mexico case appears to assume that a junior mortgagee who has foreclosed his mortgage has a right to redeem. See Springer Corp. v. Kirkeby-Natus, 80 N.M. 206, 210, 453 P.2d 376, 380 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Other eases note that junior mortgagees and

    ### Response:
    holding that in a case in which an omitted junior mortgagee foreclosed its mortgage the junior mortgagee had the absolute right to redeem from the senior mortgagee who had purchased the property at a sale following foreclosure of the senior mortgage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    separable from it. Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costume Co., 891 F.2d at 455 (observing that garments’ decorative elements are “particularly unlikely to meet [the] test” of conceptual separability.) No different conclusion is warranted by § 101’s definition of a “useful article” as one having an intrinsic utilitarian function “that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” Although Jovani argues that a decoration on a dress necessarily “portrays the appearance” of the dress and, therefore, is outside the scope of usefulness, we have construed this statutory phrase more narrowly to identify only a small category of items whose sole usefulness resides in their appearance. See Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); accord Chosun Int’l Inc. v. Chrisha

    ### Response:
    holding that taxidermy mannequin for fish skins has function of portraying its own appearance and therefore may be copyrighted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their arguments to the jury.” State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 659, 157 S.E.2d 335, 346 (1967). Further, the control of counsel’s arguments “must be left largely to the discretion of the trial judge,” State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979), because the trial judge ‘sees what is done, and hears what is said. He is cognizant of all the surrounding circumstances, and is a better judge of the lati tude that ought to be allowed to counsel in the argument of any particular case.’ State v. Thompson, 278 N.C. 277, supporting the jury’s verdict notwithstanding improper characterizations regarding the veracity of witnesses’ statements has been sufficient in some cases to prevent the imposition of a new trial. See e.g. State v. Sexton, 336 N.C. 321, 444 S.E.2d 879 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Thompson, 278 N.C. at 277, 179 S.E.2d at 315

    ### Response:
    holding that statements to the jury made by the prosecutor asserting that a defense witness was lying was improper but considering all the facts and circumstances revealed in the record which showed overwhelming evidence against the defendant such statements did not constitute a prejudicial error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 49-51, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995); Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 51-52 (1st Cir.2004). The Secretary offers no developed argumentation on this point and, as matters stand, we believe that this case is not a credible candidate for the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction. 4 . The Secretary makes a fifth argument: that the relief ordered by the district court requires Puerto Rican officials to act in contravention of local law. The district court refused to address this argument on the ground that the Secretary did not sufficiently specify the nature of the alleged violations. That ruling is supportable, and it precludes reliance on the argument here. See Teamsters Union v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In all events, the Secretary's appellate

    ### Response:
    holding that arguments not squarely raised in the trial court cannot be advanced on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    resolutions to the CORC within four days to account for prison officials’ hypothetical non-implementation of a favorable IGP disposition would be impracticable and un-doubtably burdensome on the CORC and the IGP. Indeed, it would be counterintui-tive to require inmates who win during the grievance process to appeal their victories. See Sutton v. Wright, 265 F.Supp.2d 292, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (“If a prisoner had to grieve non-compliance with favorable decisions under the PLRA, prison officials could keep prisoners out of court indefinitely by saying ‘yes’ to their grievances and 'no’ in practice.”) (citing Kaplan, 2000 WL 959728, at *3). Here, Abney repeatedly obtained favorable rulings on his grievances through the IGP. He adequately pleads that defendants never implemented the 01) (<HOLDING>); Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 295 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding remedy not available to prisoner where officials purportedly prevented plaintiff from employing the prisons administrative remedies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and therefore, would benefit from a judgment in this action, is within the complete control of the defendant. In May, 1995, the Commissioner claimed that a search of her records was being conducted to identify all potential class members, but that she would need at least another six months to complete the process. Six months have expired and no information has been filed with the Court in connection with the number of existing and potential class members. Although the Andres bear the burden of proving that the requirements for class certification have been met, this Court will not require the Andres to demonstrate the number of class members with live claims before deciding to certify the class. See Ventura v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 125 F.R.D. 595, 599 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>); Lewis v. Gross, 663 F.Supp. 1164, 1169

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiffs lack of knowledge regarding the number of affected persons does not bar class certification when defendant has the means to identify those persons at will
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a new trial is warranted only if the false testimony was material to the jury’s verdict, leaving the trial court with a firm belief that, but for the perjured testimony, the defendant would most likely not have been convicted. See id. at 299-302. The district court acted well within its discretion in concluding that t hapovalov’s mendacity, it was similarly cumulative of his numerous lies disclosed at trial. Indeed, that trial evidence as to deceit and fraud was sufficiently extensive to allow Karlov’s counsel to secure admissions from Shapovalov that he had “lied repeatedly, over and over again” and “led a life committing a lot of crimes.” Tr. 1287; see id. at 1475 (arguing in summation that record showed Shapovalov to be “pathological liar”); United States v. White, 972 F.2d at 21 (<HOLDING>). In urging otherwise, Karlov submits that

    ### Response:
    holding evidence that witness lied on stand cumulative where witness was aggressively crossexamined by the defendants lawyer who relentlessly attacked witnesss credibility called him a liar and emphasized his lack of veracity in the past
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the witnesses reported that a revolver was used. Trial counsel questioned Sergeant Nieto on the possibility of the revolver being fake, and Sergeant Nie-to responded that he “would think that someone would know a real gun from a fake gun.” Testimony from a complainant in close proximity to a weapon, describing it as a “gun,” a “revolver,” and a “pistol,” is sufficient to prove the use of a deadly weapon. Wright v. State, 591 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). It is true that courts have held that testimony regarding the use of a “gun” may be insufficient to support a finding of use and exhibition of a deadly weapon when the case presents separate evidence indicating the use of a toy gun. See Pena Cortez v. State, 732 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Here, there was testimony that described the

    ### Response:
    holding that testimony regarding use of pistol was insufficient where it was uncontroverted that pistol was toy gun
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hearing. II. In reaching this holding, the Court is aware that several other courts, including district courts in this Circuit, have interpreted § 7 as giving arbitrators powers beyond the reading provided by this Court. But the courts that have given the statute a broader reading are not binding on this Court. See, e.g., Fox v. Acadia St. Bank, 937 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir.1991) (“A district court is not bound by another district court’s decision, or even an opinion by another judge of the same district court.”). The Court is unpersuaded by the reasoning expanding an arbitrator’s power to permit pre-hearing discovery from non-parties. Simply put, they do not base their analysis on the text of § 7, but rather on its supposed implications. See, e.g., In re Security, 228 F.3d at 870-71 (<HOLDING>). It becomes necessary to rely on such

    ### Response:
    holding that implicit in the arbitrators power to subpoena relevant documents at hearing is the power to order prehearing discovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    more so when, as here, the manufacturer affirmatively and successfully limits the market of its product to professionals. In such a case, the manufacturer should not be burdened with the often difficult task of providing instructions on how to properly perform the basic operation. Antcliff v. State Employees Credit Union, 414 Mich. 624, 327 N.W.2d 814, 821 (1982). See also, Parker v. Schmiede Machine and Tool Corp., 445 Fed.Appx. 231, 234 (11th Cir.2011) (explaining that under Georgia law, the sophisticated user or learned intermediary doctrine relieves a manufacturer of liability for failure to warn where members of the profession to whom the product is sold are generally aware of hazards known to the trade); Carmical v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 117 F.3d 490, 495 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc. v. Calgon

    ### Response:
    holding that helicopter manufacturer had no duty under georgia law to warn pilot that loss of lubrication to gearshaft could result in engine failure where pilot knew that maintenance of an oil lubricated engine required lubrication to engine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 2000aa-7(a). 10 . Although not material to the analysis here, it is worth noting that one circuit has held that the government may use grand jury subpoenas to obtain documentary materials, but not work product materials. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 341 (6th Cir.2001). 11 .The PPA also includes a provision allowing government officials to use search and seizure in cases where there is a valid concern that ""the giving of notice pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum would result in the destruction, alteration, or concealment of such materials.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b)(3). This exception does not apply to work product materials. 12 . The Supreme Court has endorsed the use of video footage on summary judgment. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (<HOLDING>). 13 . In her sworn declaration, Sennett states

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate court should have viewed facts of highspeed police chase in the light depicted by a videotape of the events
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for a writ of certiorari passed without Spencer requesting Supreme Court review. See United States v. Burch, 202 F.3d 1274, 1278 (10th Cir.2000). Because, according to the district court, Spencer’s conviction became final on November 9, 2006, he had until November 9, 2007 to file his § 2255 motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). As Spencer did not file that motion until December 10, 2007, the district court concluded the motion was untimely unless Spencer was entitled to have the limitations period equitably tolled. Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir.2000). Because Spencer had failed to demonstrate he had diligently pursued the claims in his § 2255 motion, the district court exercised its discretion and denied equitable tolling. Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The granting of a COA is a jurisdictional

    ### Response:
    holding that equitable tolling is only available when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and second disability hearings in this case effectively establish the transferability of Lamorey’s receptionist skills to an alternative position, such as information clerk, that would not require frequent and repetitious use of her hands and fingers, which was the crucial physical limitation precluding Lamorey from returning to her past work. See generally Draegert v. Barnhart, 311 F.3d 468, 474 (2d Cir.2002). This testimony was essentially unchallenged at the hearings, and Lamorey fails to show that anything further would be gained by a remand. Cf. Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d at 386-87 (concluding that remand for step five determination was appropriate where the record was incomplete because the ALJ failed to call a vocational expert); Williams v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 48, 50 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); of also Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d at 135

    ### Response:
    holding that remand was the appropriate remedy when an erroneous step four determination has precluded any analysis under step five
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    49 . See, e.g., Anastas v. American Sav. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280, 1285-86 (9th Cir.1996); Feld, 203 B.R. at 367; See also American Express Travel Related Serv. Co, v. Christensen (In re Christensen), 193 B.R. 863, 866 (N.D.Ill.1996); Chevy Chase Bank, FSB (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 448 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1996). Contra Feld, at 367 n. 1 Walters), 208 B.R. 651, 654-55 (W.D.La.1997); FCC Nat’l Bank v. Etto (In re Etto), 210 B.R. 734, 739-40 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1997); AT&T Universal Card Serv. Corp. v. Akdogan (In re Akdogan), 204 B.R. 90, 97 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1997) (stating that a creditor must do a credit check or some other circumstances must exist to prove it did not extend credit blindly); Bank One Columbus, N.A. v. McDaniel (In re McDaniel), 202 B.R. 74, 78 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 1996) (<HOLDING>); AT&T Universal Card Serv. v. Richards (In re

    ### Response:
    holding that a creditor cannot sit back and do nothing and still meet the standard for justifiable reliance when it had an opportunity to make an adequate examination and investigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 132(e). Requirement that Withholding Obligation be Precise and Non-Speculative Since “the employer is in a secondary position as to liability for any tax of the employee, it is a matter of obvious concern that ... the employer’s obligation to withhold be precise and not speculative.” Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 31, 98 S.Ct. 917, 923, 55 L.Ed.2d 82 (1978). A duty to withhold income taxes on payments made to its employees should not be imposed retroactively on an employer unless there was adequate notice (from the relevant statutes, regulations, and IRS pronouncements) to the employer at the time of the payments that such a withholding obligation existed. See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. United States, 194 Ct.Cl. 920, 442 F.2d 1362, 1369-70 (1971) (<HOLDING>). See also Hotel Conquistador, Inc. v. United

    ### Response:
    holding that the employer was not required to withhold income tax from its payments of moving expenses to its existing employees where the state of the law in 1961 gave the employer no reason to suspect that such payments constituted wages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    award of the prize is determined by chance. K.S.A. 21-4302(b); State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 254 Kan. 632, 644, 867 P.2d 1034 (1994). It is undisputed that the first two elements are present. The only issue in this case is whether Kandu Challenge is a game of chance. The district court applied a “ 'dominant factor ” test to answer this question. The source of this test in Kansas is Games Management, Inc. v. Owens, 233 Kan. 444, 662 P.2d 260 (1983). In Games, our Supreme Court held that under the facts of the case, certain video poker games were not prohibited gambling devices. 233 Kan. at 448-49. After resolving this main issue, the court also examined the State’s argument thát the winners of the video poker games were determined by chance. 194 Neb. 715, 717, 235 N.W.2d 398 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Three Kings does not directly challenge the

    ### Response:
    holding that poker and bridge are predominately games of chance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in checking on the welfare of someone who is not responsive to knocks on a window is high, as he could have been ill and in need of medical assistance, or he could have been intoxicated and about to drive off in the vehicle, which was running. Officer Ayler did not use any force with Cruz-Salazar and, in fact, unsuccessfully attempted to get him a ride home rather than arrest him. And Officer Ayler had no other means of making contact with Cruz-Salazar to check his welfare, as Cruz-Salazar was nonresponsive to his initial attempts at contact without opening the truck door. [16] We hold that Officer Ayler’s conduct did not violate Cruz-Salazar’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. See, e.g., Szabo v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 512, 470 S.W.3d 696 (2015) (<HOLDING>). For these same reasons, we hold that Officer

    ### Response:
    holding officers conduct appropriate under community caretaking function and no fourth amendment violation where officer opened car door to wake defendant after observing him either unconscious or sound asleep in drivers seat of running vehicle and did not respond to knocks on the window
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hector Estuardo Zavala Archila (“Zavala”) is a native and citizen of Guatemala. Zavala appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his application for suspension of deportation. While we lack jurisdiction over the BIA’s discretionary determinations, we have jurisdiction over Zavala’s due process challenge to the BIA’s failure to fully and properly consider the evidence supporting a finding of extreme hardship. See Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 1270-71 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). We grant the petition and remand to the BIA

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the iirira strips the court of jurisdiction over the attorney generals discretionary extreme hardship determination but retaining jurisdiction over constitutional due process claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contained in his plea agreement. This court closely scrutinizes the Rule 11 colloquy and has emphasized that an appropriately conducted guilty plea proceeding raises a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding. United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir.1992). Felder’s challenge to the adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing is not supported by the record. Accordingly, we conclude the district court conducted a proper Rule 11 hearing. Felder has also appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to reconsider his sentence. Because Felder has failed to raise any arguments in his brief regarding the denial of his motion to reconsider his sentence, the review of that issue is waived. See Canady v. Crestar Mortgage Corp., 109 F.3d 969, 973-74 (4th Cir.l997)(<HOLDING>). Next, Felder asserts his indictment was

    ### Response:
    holding issues raised in notice of appeal but not briefed are deemed waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Ind.App.1999) (recognizing that child has right to have his parents present during custodial interrogation); State v. Walker, 352 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1984) (statute implicitly requires that, after notification of parents, police wait before interrogation to allow parents time to come to station and consult with child); M.A.C. v. Harrison County Family Court, 566 So.2d 472 (Miss.1990) (hold ing that deliberate exclusion of parents from child’s interrogation renders statements inadmissible); Ezell v. State, 489 P.2d 781, 783-84 (OMa.Crim.App.1971) (finding that neither mother nor legal guardian of juvenile defendant was “capable of protecting defendant’s constitutional rights,” thereby rendering juvenile’s confession inadmissible); Edward C. v. Collings, 193 Mont 426, 632 P.2d 325 (1981) (<HOLDING>); In re D.S., 263 N.W.2d 114 (N.D.1978)

    ### Response:
    holding that juveniles may not waive counsel unless parent or guardian also waives that right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ellis, 126 S.W.3d 324, 330 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). Therefore, our determination is limited to whether MCD is bound by the arbitration agreement as a third-party beneficiary or under a theory of estoppel. Third-Party Beneficiary Courts treat arbitration agreements as other contracts in applying the legal rules to interpret them. In re Olshan Foundation Repair, Co. LLC, 328 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex.2010). “The goal is to discern the true intentions of the parties, as the FAA’s primary purpose is to ensure private agreements to arbitrate and enforce according to their terms, no more, no less.” Id. A third-party beneficiary to a contract can compel or be compelled to arbitrate under an arbitration provision in a contract. See In re NEXT Fin. Group Inc., 271 S.W.3d 263, 267 (Tex.2008) (<HOLDING>). Generally, however, “there is a presumption

    ### Response:
    holding employer thirdparty beneficiary could compel arbitration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    value of the profit, including reasonable overhead, the lessor would have made from full performance ... together with any incidental damages ... due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of distribution.” 7 . Other ""tests” have been adopted. For example, in Sunrick v. Pacific Foods of Oregon, 2004 WL 1124495 (D.Or.2004), the District Court for the District of Oregon held that ""[a]s an alleged lost volume seller, Pacific therefore bears the burden of establishing that its production capacity was such that, if Sunrich had not breached the Packing Agreement, Pacific would have been able to meet Sunrich’s requirements, as well as the needs of alternative buyers.” See also Van Ness Motors v. Vikram, 221 N.J.Super. 543, 535 A.2d 510, 511 (A.D.1987) (<HOLDING>); Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279 (9th

    ### Response:
    recognizing that most other jurisdictions have held that to qualify as a lost volume seller under section 27082 the seller needs to show only that it could have supplied both the breaching purchaser and the resale purchaser
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1090, 126 S.Ct. 1026, 163 L.Ed.2d 854 (2006). An officer may therefore be liable under § 1983 “ ‘for the natural consequences of his actions.’ ” Id. (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)). This includes liability for acts giving rise to the ultimate harm, even if the harm is executed by someone else. Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 609 (6th Cir.2007) (“Even if an intervening third party is the immediate trigger for the plaintiffs injury, the defendant may still be proximately liable, provided that the third party’s actions were foreseeable.”), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 813, 129 S.Ct. 44, 172 L.Ed.2d 21 (2008); see also Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 281-82 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 311-12 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding state actor could be liable for retaliation for making false statements to plaintiffs employer causing her to be fired
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did make minimal effort to find jobs during the illness and in the period soon after her death. 42 . In re Alderete, 412 F.3d 1200, 1206 (10th Cir.2005). 43 . At trial, the testimony centered almost exclusively on the ""ICRP” rather than the ""IBR.” However, based upon the information contained in the affidavit contained in Exhibit AA, it appears as though the program that was actually being discussed was the IBR, based upon ECMC’s counsel's assertions that the payments would be limited to 15% of Debtor’s income that exceeded 150% of the federal poverty line. In any event, Debtor did not indicate a willingness to enter into either of these programs, and his reasons for refusing to do so would apply equally under either program. 44 . Cf. In re Woody, 494 F.3d 939, 954 (10th Cir.2007)

    ### Response:
    holding admittedly in a heal loan context that congress did not intend to allow a debtor who spent decades not making loan payments even after working full time for several years to receive a discharge because his health begins to fail as he approaches retirement age
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he was credible and that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution because of his past political activities in Serbia. II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of review “Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision with additional commentary, we review the decision of the IJ, as supplemented by the BIA, as the final administrative order.” Ceraj v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir.2007). Questions of law involving immigration proceedings are reviewed de novo. Ali v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 407, 409 (6th Cir.2004). We will not disturb the IJ’s factual findings, or a determination that the petitioner failed to establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal, if substantial evidence supports such rulings. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Under this standard, we will not reverse a

    ### Response:
    holding that a factfinders rulings will be upheld if supported by reasonable substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    201 F.R.D. at 294. Accordingly, as the Court may reasonably infer that the 378 consumers are similarly situated, the Court finds that Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement has been met. 2. Commonality “To satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), there must be ‘a showing that common issues of fact or law exist and that they affect all class members.’” Kowalski, 2012 WL 1097350, at *13 (quoting Leone v. Ashwood Fin., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 343, 351 (E.D.N.Y.2009)). However, the individual circumstances of the class members can differ without precluding class certification, so long as “the common questions are at the core of the cause of action alleged.” Vengurlekar v. Silverline Techs., Ltd., 220 F.R.D. 222, 227 (S.D.N.Y.2003); see also Kowalski, 2012 WL 1097350, at *13 (<HOLDING>) (citations and internal quotation marks

    ### Response:
    holding that the commonality standard does not mandate that the claims of the lead plaintiff be identical to those of all other plaintiffs but does require that plaintiffs identify some unifying thread among the members claims that warrants class treatment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    possesses no inherent power to impose sanctions, and that any such power must be expressly delegated by statute. For example, in Great Am. Banks, Inc. v. Division of Admin. Hearings, Dep’t of Admin., 412 So.2d 373 (Fla.1st DCA 1981), this court held that a hearing officer had no statutory authori ty to impose sanctions upon a party for the failure to make discovery, and that Section 120.58(3), Florida Statutes, as it then existed, provided the exclusive method of enforcing a discovery order, i.e., by filing a petition for enforcement in the circuit court. We further stated that to the extent that the agency’s rules providing for sanctions conflicted with section 120.58(3), they were invalid. Accord Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth. v. Tampa Heart Inst., 472 So.2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (<HOLDING>). In 1984 the legislature amended section

    ### Response:
    holding that florida administrative code rule 285211 which purported to allow an agency or hearing officer to dismiss a proceeding or enter a default as a sanction for failure to comply with a procedural order was invalid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the applicability of Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996), were fully briefed by both parties and properly before the court for review. 121 The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require that an appellant's opening brief include ""[a] statement of the issues presented for review,"" Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(5), and arguments containing the contentions and reasons for each issue presented, see id. 24(a)(9). In addition, the reply brief of an appellant ""shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief."" Id. 24(c). 122 The appellee's brief, or opposing brief, must include the same elements as the appellant's brief. See id. 24(b). However, an appel Cir.1968) (noting that appellant had option to answer new issue raised in appe 2d 1278, 1280 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Newsome v. North Carolina State Bd. of

    ### Response:
    holding that if an appellee raises an argument not addressed by the appellant in its opening brief the appellant may reply  citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regarding workers' compensation benefits, in turn promoting litigation and unduly delaying receipt of any benefits. See Tenorio v. State, 931 P.2d 234, 240 (Wyo.1997) (expressing concern that application of collateral estoppel to permanent disabi 54, ""4 (N.H.2001) (declining to apply issue preclusion where agency awarded benefits for temporary disability but made no finding as to permanent disability); Appeal of Hooker, 142 N.H. 40, 694 A.2d 984, 986-88 (1997) (finding collateral estoppel inapplicable even where alleged injury giving rise to both proceedings is the same and allegedly flows from same work-related injury because issue of causation determined in TTD hearing is different from issue of causation relevant to subsequent medical benefits hearing); Tenorio, 931 P.2d at 240 (<HOLDING>). Because an employer always risks an award of

    ### Response:
    recognizing the inherent policy problems associated with applying issue preclusion to permanent disability proceedings and construing wyomings workers compensation act as inconsistent with the doctrine in that context
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    expectation of privacy test has been consistently employed by the Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. 421; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 38, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990); Carter, 119 S.Ct. at 473. However, the places in which individuals have been deemed to have a justifiable expectation of privacy have become fewer than suggested by the expansive language of Katz quoted earlier. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352, 88 S.Ct. 507. In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that passengers did n r.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cardona-Sandoval, 6 F.3d 15,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in his tent pitched on public campground
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation, such as the proper qualifications for a profession____ The proof is overwhelming that New York sought not to punish ex-felons, but to devise what was felt to be a much-needed scheme of regulation of the waterfront, and for the effectuation of that scheme it became important whether individuals had previously been convicted of a felony. 363 U.S. at 160, 80 S.Ct. at 1155. As defendants point out, other statutes that imposed restrictions on convicted felons after the fact also have survived ex post facto challenges. See, e.g., Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 493-96 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447-48

    ### Response:
    holding that provisions of generic drug enforcement act debarring convicted felons from participating in generic drug industry are remedial and not punitive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    irrelevant which of these two models is more elegant from a conceptual standpoint. What is important — indeed, determinative — for our inquiry is which of the two each state has adopted. Pennsylvania's high court unambiguously has held that Pennsylvania law supports no cause of action for increased risk of cancer or for present emotional distress arising from the fear of cancer. Thus, the court's statement about medical monitoring damages is best viewed as the authorization of a distinct cause of action for medical monitoring expenses. Reading the opinion otherwise would defy its plain language regarding Pennsylvania's nonrecognition of increased risk and emotional distress causes of action. 75 . See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 156 Ariz. 375, 752 P.2d 28, 29-31 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>), review dismissed, 162 Ariz. 186, 781 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that subclinical asbestosrelated injuiy is not sufficient to support cause of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an interest in filing a motion for summary judgment, but apparently chose not to file a motion because it was untimely. Upon a review of defendants’ motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs’ response, and in view of the absence of any material facts in dispute, we granted plaintiffs leave to file a motion for summary judgment as to liability only. See Open Inns v. Chester County Sheriff s Department, Civ. No. 97-4822 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 22, 1998). 18 . Defendants LaRose, Clemens, and Freas all argue that they are protected by qualified immunity. As noted above, Sheriff Erling has been sued only in his official capacity. Thus, the suit against him is essentially a suit against the county. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018

    ### Response:
    holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    database has been exempted pursuant to exemption (j)(2). See Cunningham Decl. ¶¶ 21-22. Nevertheless, this Court agrees with my colleague’s reasoning in Gordon, and finds that the documents identified in the email archive were properly withheld as this database is not a “system of records” within the meaning of the Privacy Act and is therefore not subject to the disclosure provisions therein. See Gordon, 118 F.Supp.3d at 291, 2015 WL 4602588, at *9; 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (defining “system of records” as “a group of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual”); see also Mobley v. CIA, 924 F.Supp.2d 24, 56 (D.D.C.2013) .(<HOLDING>). In sum, I conclude that defendant met its

    ### Response:
    holding that a database of email messages is not a system of records under the privacy act because it is not indexed by personal identifier
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Jones indicated that Jones had no facial hair. According to Jones, the photo taken from the motel depicts him as having a ""dark mustache and goatee.” Appellant's Brief at 45. However, the small amount of facial hair Jones had in this picture is not clearly visible, and is at most a few days' growth. The photo taken of Jones upon his arrest does more clearly show that Jones had a short goatee. Also, although we can find no indication of Jones’s actual height in the record, Jones insinuates that he is taller than Khan and Patel's description of approximately six feet. Nevertheless, such small discrepancies do not persuade us that Khan and Patel did not have an independent basis for their in-court identification of Jones. See Wethington v. State, 560 N.E.2d 496, 502 (Ind.1990) (<HOLDING>); Little v. State, 475 N.E.2d 677, 683

    ### Response:
    holding that victims had an independent basis for incourt identification of the defendant despite a three to fourinch discrepancy in their descriptions of the defendants height where the defendants appearance roughly corresponded with the victims initial descriptions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of summary judgment, we will affirm the district court’s decision “when the • record shows that there is .no; genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is .entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), ¶ 8 On appeal, McCamey claims that the district court erred in determining that the 2013 charges were not barred by the statute of limitations. McCamey does not specifically address the district court’s determination that the claim was precluded' by section 78B-9-106(l)(c) of the PCRA, See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(c) (Lexis-Nexis 2012). The district court stated, that in an October 2014 letter that was attached to the petition, “McCamey brought his concern regarding the statute of limitations defense pp.1998) (<HOLDING>). ■ ¶ 10. The district court next ■ addressed

    ### Response:
    holding that criminal statutes of limitations are not jurisdictional but are a bar to prosecution which can be waived by a knowing and voluntary guilty plea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that 1119-20 (9th Cir.2004) (rejecting as insufficient documents that “merely recite[d] the statutory section and title” without detailing the facts to which defendant pled); Sandoval-Lua v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir.2007) (noting, in a related context, that the documents in the record must establish that the defendant “necessarily admitted” the elements of the qualifying offense); Cisneros-Perez v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 386, 391 (9th Cir.2006), as amended (concluding that the prior conviction was not established under the modified categorical approach where the judgment record did not establish that “the defendant” necessarily pleaded ... to the allegations in the original complaint) (emphasis added); Rebilas v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 783, 787 (9th Cir.2008), as amended (<HOLDING>); Martinez-Perez v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1022,

    ### Response:
    holding that application of the modified categorical approach did not establish a covered conviction where the judgment of conviction did not contain the factual basis for the crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    held that a minor’s cause of action against a defendant, who was added two years after the original complaint was filed, was not barred by the statute of limitations, even though the minor’s legal guardian timely filed the original complaint. Brooks v. Gunn, 667 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984). The court explained that because the minor was still under the disability of minority under Tennessee Code An notated section 28-1-106, “the statute of limitations in a situation [such] as this has not begun to run against the minor. If the statut 185 (1976) (adopting majority rule that appointment of guardian does not commence running of statute of limitations tolled on account of infancy or incompetence); Tzolov v. Int’l Jet Leasing, Inc., 232 Cal.App.3d 117, 283 Cal.Rptr. 314, 317 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Morgan v. Amerada Hess Corp., 357 So.2d 1040,

    ### Response:
    holding that tolling statute applicable to incompetent plaintiffs continues in effect in spite of appointment of guardian ad litem
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of sole issue on appeal). Second, the government contends that Windland waived de novo review of the legal issue in this appeal by failing to object to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation on the specific basis of the 160/161 day distinction. Again, although Windland could have been more specific, he did object to the Magistrate’s conclusion that his § 2254 petition was time-barred; as part of that objection, he also argued that the limitations period should have been tolled while his state action was pending. This objection alerted the district court to the pertinent issue in this appeal, namely that the Magistrate improperly found Windland’s § 2254 petition time-barred due to an erroneous tolling calculation. See United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 673 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the district court independently

    ### Response:
    holding that to preserve an issue a party must object with sufficient specificity to allow the trial court to address it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on appeal is to decide the case -within the framework of the issues raised by the parties.”). “[I]n the absence of the most cogent circumstances, we do not create issues....” Id. at 78 n. 4 (collecting cases). True, we have previously recognized that we will address issues that are “incident to” a determination of other issues properly presented. See Messina v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 341 N.W.2d 52, 58, 61 (Iowa 1983) (addressing issue of whether plaintiff had contractually waived his First Amendment rights when defendant had not raised that issue before the district court and holding “the waiver issue may be determined as an incident to the expressed issue”); Presbytery of Se. Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 282, 234 (Iowa 1975); see also State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 382-83 (Iowa 2014) (<HOLDING>). However, this exception to our error

    ### Response:
    recognizing that categorical constitutional challenge was fundamentally similar to asapplied constitutional challenge initially raised on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the grounds that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to find them in contempt, and because they were not properly served with the order to show cause. We find that the juvenile court was authorized to hold petitioners in contempt. See, e.g., In re Elrod, 455 So.2d 1325, 1327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Husky v. Safer, 419 So.2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). However, we determine that the trial court erred in denying petitioners’ motion to quash a writ of bodily attachment, because the record does not demonstrate that they were properly served. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.150(c)(2). Petitioners’ appearance at the hearing to contest jurisdiction and object based on lack of service of process did not waive service. See Caldwell v. Caldwell, 921 So.2d 759, 760 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). The petition for writ of certiorari is

    ### Response:
    holding that a party loses its right to contest default final judgment on grounds of defective service of process by entering general appearance unless it also contests service of process or raises issue of personal jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the asserted duty of confidentiality are determined by a legal source external to the tort claim itself[,]” Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527, 534 (1985) (en banc); and “its breach is actionable only if it is wrongful, that is to say, without justificat ecognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege under which a patient may “prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s physical, mental or emotional condition ... among the patient, the patient’s physician or psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist____” Rule 11-504(B), NMRA 1997; see also Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15, 116 S.Ct. at 1931 (<HOLDING>). In the context of the criminal justice

    ### Response:
    recognizing privilege under federal rules
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    information released to the public in official court records.” Id. at 496, 95 S.Ct. 1029. While acknowledging that in limited circumstances, a court might restrict the information available to the public to protect important interests, the Court concluded that “[o]nce true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.” Id.; see also Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310, 97 S.Ct. 1045, 51 L.Ed.2d 355 (1977) (“[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a state court to prohibit the publication of widely disseminated information obtained at court proceedings which were in fact open to the public.”); cf. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Nebraska Press further reinforced these

    ### Response:
    holding that first amendment precluded damages action brought by rape victim against newspaper for publishing victims name when name was obtained from publicly released police report
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we could exercise pendent jurisdiction, we would decline to do so here. Given that the FAA allows intermediate appeals over any denial of a request for a stay, some possibility exists that defendants might make far-fetched or premature stay requests to delay litigation. See Arthur Andersen LLP, 556 U.S. at 634, 129 S.Ct. 1896 (Souter, J., dissenting). Where, as here, we find a request premature, granting pendent appellate jurisdiction over other issues might encourage litigants to make meritless requests for stays as a means to challenge other non-appealable decisions. 3 . Again, it matters that neither Taylor nor those who have joined her thus far have agreed to arbitrate. If Taylor had, this would change things. See Reyna v. Int’l Bank of Commerce, 839 F.3d 373, 373 (5th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). If that were the case, Pilot could actually

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court erred in refusing to compel named plaintiff to arbitration because it wanted to consider the enforceability his arbitration agreement after receiving opt ins
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    So.2d 1345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Peters v. State, 658 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Provided the charging instrument which we do not have in our record properly charged the firearm or weapon, the judgment in this ease mistakenly concludes that this homicide is a first-degree felony punishable by life. Young’s conviction for second-degree murder with a firearm did not qualify for habitual offender treatment under the version of the statute applicable to him at that time. A habitual offender sentence is illegal for purposes of a motion to correct an illegal sentence if the terms or conditions of the punishment for a particular offense are impermissible as a matter of law. See Judge v. State, 596 So.2d 73, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); see also Nathan v. State, 689 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). We direct the trial court to resentence Young

    ### Response:
    holding that incorrect determination that life felony was a firstdegree felony punishable by life resulting in improper habitual offender sentence was subject to correction in a rule 3800 proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim until forced to surrender by the legal artillery of his adversaries. Mr. deLone also argues that the Third Circuit decision in Dykes did not quite render his ease frivolous because he immediately sought review of the decision from the United States Supreme Court. Again, Mr. de-Lone is mistaken in his view of the law. At the time that the Third Circuit’s decision in Dykes was announced, it became the law of the Circuit, and Mr. deLone was bound by its terms unless and until it was overturned by the Supreme Court. Allegheny General Hospital v. National Labor Relations Board, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir.1979)(stating that Third Circuit decisions are binding on “all inferior courts and litigants in the Third Judicial Circuit”); Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C.Cir.1992)(<HOLDING>). In the absence of a stay, seeking

    ### Response:
    holding that circuit court decisions bind circuit unless and until overturned by the court en banc or by higher authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the PRC process before challenging an adverse ruling in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.” Foster I at *5. The Postal Reform Act of 1970, under which the initial version of § 3662 was enacted, established the Postal Rate Commission to hear all claims involving postal rates and services. See 39 U.S.C. § 3662 (repealed 2006). The district court noted that courts have regularly held that early versions of § 3662 conferred exclusive jurisdiction to the Postal Rate Commission to hear these claims, despite its permissive language. Foster I at *4 (citing LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir.2006); Bovard v. U.S. Post Office, No. 94-6360, 47 F.3d 1178, 1995 WL 74678, at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 1995); Azzolina v. U.S. Postal S 1 (3d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Delaware Valley Floral Group v. Shaw Rose

    ### Response:
    holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. 2 . The State did not request, and the trial court did not give, an instruction stating that the defendant could be found guilty of aggravated battery by reason of using the tile or concrete floor as a deadly weapon. Id..; see § 784.045(l)(a)2., Fla. Stat. 3 . No argument has been made that it was impermissible to instruct on aggravated battery as a lesser included offense of manslaughter. “Lesser included offenses are determined on the elements of the offenses, not on the penalties attached.” Carle v. State, 983 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Sanders v. State, 944 So.2d 203 (Fla.2006)); see also Michaels v. Swanson, 403 So.2d 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)

    ### Response:
    holding that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of manslaughter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    third-party pleadings are considered without regard to their truth or falsity, and the insurer cannot contradict them with extrinsic evidence. See id. at 864. “The rationale behind the eight-corners rule is to require insurers to defend the insured against all claims, • even those without merit.” Id. XL cites no authority to suggest that the rule applies to a duty to advance defense expenses. See Pendergest-Holt v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 600 F.3d 562, 574 '(5th Cir.2010) (“[N]o Texas state court has applied the rule to a case, like the present one, involving a duty to advance defense costs.”). Regardless, the rationale for the rule does not apply when an insured seeks to establish coverage under an interrelated-claims provision,. See Weimgarten, 343 S.W.3d at 865 (<HOLDING>). Burks is not trying to contradict any

    ### Response:
    recognizing a limited exception to the eightcorners rule for a pure coverage question where the insurer is not questioning the merits of the underlying thirdparty claim and the extrinsic evidence goes strictly to an issue of coverage without contradicting any allegation in the thirdparty claimants pleadings material to the merits of that underlying claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and false representations. But Paulson himself admitted at his deposition that Shi-rey and Ford were just doing their job during the investigations and no personal grudges or vendettas were involved. He acknowledged there was no evidence that Shirey handled the investigation in such a way as to intentionally harm him. We agree with the district court that Paulson did not provide evidence showing there was a factual issue as t e legislature cannot create a transitory cause of action and confine its enforcement to its own courts. State ex rel. Bossung v. District Court, 140 Minn. 494, 498, 168 N.W. 589, 591 (1918). To determine whether a claim is local or transitory, courts will examine the nature of the claim. Wilson v. Celestial Greetings, Inc., 896 S.W.2d 759, 760-61 (Mo.Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). The types of cases which are transitory and

    ### Response:
    holding that delaware statute providing dissenting stockholder in delaware corporation with right of appraisal which is essentially a contract claim with terms supplied by delaware law was local action enforceable only in the delaware court of chancery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and is protected from discrimination in connection with such decisions under Title VII and the ADEA.”) superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 108-09 (2nd Cir.2013); Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch., Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 320 (3rd Cir.2008) (“The failure to renew an employment arrangement, whether, afiwill or, for a limited period of time, is an employment action, and an employer violates Title VII if it takes an adverse employment action for a reason prohibited by Title VII.... ”); Jadwin v. Cnty. of Kern, 610 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1171 (E.D.Cal.2009) (“The non-renewal of Plaintiffs contract can qualify as an adverse employment action.”); Hernandez-Mejias v. Gen. Elec., 428 F.Supp.2d 4, 8 (D.P.R.2005) (<HOLDING>); Kabes v. Sch. Dist. of River Falls, 387

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to renew contract was adverse employment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the absence of legislative intent to protect the Clerks was evidenced by the fact that the legislature granted a private remedy only to those with an interest in property under section 382.365(3), and that the recording fees the Clerks seek to recover are not mentioned in the recording statutes but rather are contained in an entirely different chapter. Id. The Clerks counter that multiple parties can be intended beneficiaries of a statutory provision, citing State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116 (Ky.1988). Their reliance on Reeder is misplaced. Reeder simply reinforces the basic principle that to sue under section 446.070 for a statutory violation, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons the legislature intended to protect. See 763 S.W.2d at 118 (<HOLDING>). As already discussed, the recording statutes

    ### Response:
    holding that a homeowner could sue under section 446070 because as the beneficiary of the insurance claim filed by the driver who damaged his property in an accident the homeowner belonged to the class intended to be protected by the insurance code which did not otherwise provide a remedy for thirdparty claimants such as the homeowner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    companies related to ""illegal conduct"" or to a ""public offense,"" as the magistrate's warrant did, is the substantive equivalent of finding that the companies were permeated with fraud. 124 Moreover, Norris points to no authority for the proposition that a magistrate must explicitly state that a business is permeated with fraud in order to issue an ""all records"" search warrant. An ""all ree ords"" search warrant issued by a magistrate is valid if the supporting affidavit relied upon by the magistrate includes allegations sufficient to establish probable cause that the businéés to be searched was permeated with fraud. Oloyede, 982 F.2d at 141. We therefore hold that requiring a magistrate to use the phrase ""permeated with fraud"" would be ""unreasonably 'hypertechnical' "" CJ id. at 140-41 (<HOLDING>). 125 Because the magistrate found probable

    ### Response:
    holding it would be unreasonably hypertechnical to require an affiant to specifically claim that the business was permeated with fraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in which the Supreme Court stated that the Barker test, originally developed to determine when the United States has denied a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial, see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), also “provides an appropriate framework for determining whether [a delay between entrance of a protective order and final determination of forfeiture] violate[s] the due process right to be heard at a meaningful time."" $8,850.00, 461 U.S. at 564, 103 S.Ct. at 2012. She claims that with this statement, the Supreme Court recognized that any person whose property is restrained under § 853(e) is entitled to a post-restraint adversarial hearing under the Due Process Clause. See also United States v. Crozier, 111 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We note that these ""supporting” cases were

    ### Response:
    holding on the facts of the case that the fifth amendment due process clause required a postrestraint hearing for a criminal defendant and a third party whose property was restrained under  853e
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the entire Avoidance Order was conditioned upon the Debtors completing their Chapter 13 plan and receiving a discharge, but Provision C plainly states that “[i]n the event the Debtors fail to complete their Chapter 13 Plan and receive their discharge, the Mclnnises’ lien shall remain unaffected as to Section 506(a) and (d) of the Bankruptcy Code by this order.” (emphasis added). Provision C only limits the § 506 Avoidance, and Mclnnis’s argument that the § 522 Avoidance is now ineffective fails. The Second Avoidance Motion only seeks avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), and the Avoidance Order did not similarly condition the § 522 Avoidance upon the Debtors completing their Chapter 13 plan and receiving a discharge. Cf. In re Allen, 217 B.R. 945, 948-49 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1998) (<HOLDING>). Collateral Estoppel Inapplicable to Issues

    ### Response:
    holding that a debtors ability to utilize  522f to avoid a judicial lien is not dependent upon the debtor receiving a discharge  
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Navarro-Flores of his right to consular notification. Nevertheless, as Navarro-Flores acknowledges, neither this court nor the Supreme Court has resolved the question whether the Vienna Convention confers individually enforceable rights upon a defendant. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 342, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 165 L.Ed.2d 557 (2006) (declining “to resolve the question whether the Vienna Convention grants individuals enforceable rights”); Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1024 n. 11 (10th Cir.2007) (expressing “serious doubts” the Vienna Convention grants individually enforceable rights). The courts of appeal that have affirmatively passed upon the issue, moreover, reach differing conclusions. Compare Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 863 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377,

    ### Response:
    holding the vienna convention does not confer a privately enforceable right to be notified
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    lack of Article III jurisdiction, practical effects notwithstanding. “[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). The limitations imposed by Article III may not be swépt aside for “the sake of convenience and efficiency.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820, 117 S.Ct. 2312 (1997). Because the majority ignores these fundamental limits to our Constitutional authority, I dissent. 1 . The Appointments Clause states: [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent . Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Neither Richard Cordray nor the Bureau

    ### Response:
    holding that private individuals can assert the federal governments interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the governments pecuniary claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the .active pursuit requirement is especially important as to not eviscerate the exclusionary rule); United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 320 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that the court “has never applied the inevitable discovery exception so as to excuse the failure to obtain a search warrant where the police had probable cause but simply did not attempt to obtain a search warrant,” because to hold otherwise “would completely obviate the warrant requirement”) (citing United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 n. 7 (9th Cir.1986)); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir.1986) (recognizing that active pursuit may be necessary in certain situations to satisfy the test of inevitability and independence); United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). However, even the federal courts that would

    ### Response:
    holding that the prosecution must establish a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means that the leads making the discovery inevitable were possessed by the police prior to the misconduct and that the police were actively pursuing the alternate line of investigation prior to the misconduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    flight from an arresting officer within the definition of “resistance by force” would enlarge the realm of criminally-punishable actions without doing much to advance the goals of protecting police. The dangers of proscribing conduct too broadly for purposes of resisting arrest have been recognized by the drafters of Model Penal Code. The draft Code suggests that the crime of resisting arrest should only apply to conduct where the individual being arrested “creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance.” Model Penal Code § 242.2. The accompanying commentary reads as follows: “The effect of this language is to exempt from criminal liab 928 N.E.2d 317, 320 (2010) (<HOLDING>). These cases demonstrate that ordinarily mere

    ### Response:
    holding that a fleeing suspect created a substantial risk of bodily injury to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must terminate with the trust.” Brief of Appellant at 18. Plaintiff recognizes that the district court relied on Pennsylvania bankruptcy cases contrary to her position, but argues that the courts that decided those cases “failed to consider that they were expanding the scope of spendthrift protection beyond that provided for by state law.” Brief of Appellant at 22. The district court explained that the apparent split of authority does not support the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the principal here is unprotected because Pennsylvania law alone controls this case. As the district court recognized, Pennsylvania law protects remainder interests in the corpus of a trust if the spendthrift provision of the trust instrument so provides. See Clark, 411 Pa. at 256, 191 A.2d at 420 (<HOLDING>); In re Blanchard, 201 B.R. at 126 (applying

    ### Response:
    holding that attempted conveyance of remainder interest in a trust was invalid because the spendthrift provision prohibited beneficiary from making any binding commitment of principal or income during the life of the trust
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court found that the award of attorneys’ fees constitutes a judgment under the statute rather than a penalty, because the award was intended “to compensate his adversary for the damage inflicted on him in compelling him to incur expenses in support of a just claim.” Id. at 324 (internal quotations omitted). In drawing the distinction, the court noted that the proper inquiry “whether a judgment is ‘a fíne or other penalty’ depends on whether its purpose is remedial in nature, affording a private remedy to an injured person, or penal in nature, punishing an offense against the public justice.” Id. at 323 (citing Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A v. Hoffman, 665 F.Supp. 73, 75-76 (D.Mass.1987)); see also Spann v. Compania Mexicana Radiodifusora Fronteriza, S. A., 131 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir.1942) (<HOLDING>). As in Desjardins Ducharme, the awarding of

    ### Response:
    holding that costs including attorneys fees imposed by a mexican court did not constitute a penalty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Moore’s Federal Practice § 110.05 (3d ed.1997). The court must take all allegations in the complaint as true, unless contradicted by the defendants’ affidavits. See 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1352 (1990 & Supp.1999). When an allegation is so challenged “[a] court may examine facts outside the complaint to determine whether venue is proper. The court must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. (citations omitted). If the defendants prevail on their Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the court has the power to dismiss or transfer the case to any district in which it could have been brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); see also Minnette v. Time Warner, 997 F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). III. Standing Defendants argue that the

    ### Response:
    holding that whether dismissal or transfer is appropriate lies within the sound discretion of the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with bench trials. Because the plaintiffs raised the issue in their pretrial submissions and because the court believes the correct question here is whether the evidence presented at trial establishes that the defendant S.R.O.s are entitled to qualified immunity, it rejects the defendant S.R.O.S argument that the plaintiffs abandoned the issue. 37 . Citing Headwaters Forest Def. v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1129-30 (9th Cir.2002); Park v. Shiflett, 250 F.3d 843, 852-53 (4th Cir.2001); LaLonde v. Cnty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 961 (9th Cir.2000); Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 386 (6th Cir.1994). 38 . Citing Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 652-53 (9th Cir.2001); Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir.200 0, 276, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686, 106 S.Ct. 3159

    ### Response:
    holding that a principal did not impinge students first amendment rights by censoring articles in a high school newspaper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    221-22, 52 N.W.2d 458, 465 (1952). In Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768-69, 772, we added an additional consideration to the Frye analysis in deciding that testimony developed through the aid of hypnosis was inadmissible. Although citing the Frye general acceptance standard, our primary concern in Mack was with the unreliability of memories produced while under hypnosis. See Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768-69. As a result, the test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence in Minnesota developed into the two-prong Frye-Mack standard. First, a novel scientific technique must be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, and second, the particular evidence derived from that test must have a foundation that is scientifically reliable. See State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407,

    ### Response:
    holding that graphology is accorded a low measure of scientific reliability in predicting character or state of mind and is not generally accepted in the scientific fields of psychology and psychiatry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was within the seope of Dr. Faust's protec-tible interest. Id. However, we concluded that the portion of the covenant prohibiting Dr. Norlund from acting as an opto-metric liaison or medical optometrist with any ophthalmologist in specified counties was overbroad because that provision was beyond the seope of Dr. Faust's protectible in venant's provision that a radio dise jockey would ""not engage in activities"" at certain radio stations listed in the covenant was over-broad because it would have prevented the employee from being employed in any capacity by any radio station listed in the covenant and ""extended far beyond"" the former employer's legitimate interest in the employee as an on-air personality); Burk v. Heritage Food Serv. Equip., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 803, 812 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>); Frederick v. Prof'l Bldg. Maint. Indus. Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that the covenants clause prohibiting the employee from being employed  with any corporation  which competes with or otherwise engages in any business of the employer was overbroad because it prohibited the employee from working for a competitor in any capacity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    garage is part of the home. The former Fifth Circuit has held the same. In United States v. Sokolow, the former Fifth Circuit held that a police officer’s warrantless search of the defendant’s garage to record the serial numbers of air-conditioning units the officer suspected were stolen violated the Fourth Amendment. 450 F.2d 324, 325 (5th Cir. 1971). Applying the same legal analysis as it would had the officer entered any other part of the defendant’s home without a warrant, the court held that there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry of the garage because the air-conditioning units could not have been disposed of easily and other officers were maintaining surveillance on the premises. Id.; see also Kauz v. United States, 95 F.2d 473, 474 (5th Cir.1938) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, it is undisputed that

    ### Response:
    holding that a warrantless search of a garage that was part of the same building as the defendants living quarters violated the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nothing to segregate. Indeed, finding of fact 13 indicates that the trial court believed that some fees were reasonable and necessary. See Finding of Fact 13 (stating “the majority of those fees [requested by Ah’ Routing] were not related to the defense of [the Theft Act] claim”). Further, if the trial court had decided that “$0” was a reasonable and necessary fee for the trial work regardless of the segregation issue, it would not have stated in conclusion of law 7 that the only reason for an appeal as to attorney’s fees is the segregation issue. Under Texas law, if the trial court and a party seeking attorney’s fees disagree over the applicability o erman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 268 (Tex.2004); Gill Sav. Ass’n v. Chair King, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989) (<HOLDING>), modified on other grounds, 797 S.W.2d 31

    ### Response:
    holding claimant did not have to segregate fees between fraud and contract claims because both claims were based on the same set of facts and circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he validly waived his Miranda rights because he was not aware of the nature of the constitutional rights he was abandoning. Specifically, Garibay contends that he did not understand Agent Burke’s recitation of his rights in English because his primary language is Spanish and he has a low verbal IQ. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proving that Garibay knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168, 107 S.Ct. at 522. In determining whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, we consider, as one factor, any language difficulties encountered by the defendant during custodial interrogation. See United States v. Heredia-Fernandez, 756 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). In finding that Garibay was proficient in

    ### Response:
    holding that language difficulties may impair the ability of a person in custody to waive his miranda  rights in a free and aware manner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    avoidance proceedings with respect to the Debtor's prepetition transfers to his family. After it became clear that the amount of the allowed claims exceeded the Debtor’s ability to fund the plan, the Debtor acquiesced to reconversion of the case to chapter 7. However, the fact that the rehabilitation effort was unsuccessful does not dictate the conclusion that the attempt was made in bad faith. 13 . At the hearing, the Debtor testified that his income is consistent with the disclosures in Amended Schedule I. However, I find that the Debtor understated his expenses in Amended Schedule J and that his monthly living expenses for himself and his dependent family members exceed the disclosed household monthly income of $2,245.00. 14 . In re Hall, 15 B.R. 913, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 1981) (<HOLDING>) (cited with approval in In re Ditter, 13

    ### Response:
    holding the plain legal prejudice test applies to voluntary dismissal under the code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    de novo on appeal. See Kincaid, 147 N.C. App. at 97, 555 S.E.2d at 297. The Fourth Amendment protects the right of individuals to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. This protection is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961). The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures applies to seizures of the person, includ was a suspicious person described as a Hispanic male. There was no approximate age, height, weight or other physical characteristics given as part of the description, nor was there a description of any specific clothing worn by the suspicious person. Cf. State v. Lovin, 339 N.C. 695, 703-04, 454 S.E.2d 229, 234 (1995) (<HOLDING>); State v. Jordan, 120 N.C. App. 364, 367-68,

    ### Response:
    holding circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion included a description of a suspicious person with a lot of hair a gold watch and large frame glasses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    insurance plans.” See Congressional Budget Office, Updated Estimates of the Effects of the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act, 7 (April 2014), https://www.cbo.gov/ sites/defauli/files/45231-ACA_Estimates. pdf. The CBO report, however, addresses the Transitional Reinsurance Program only in passing, and even then — with an eye toward, the program’s revenue estimates and effects on insurance premiums — not on whether governmental plans qualify as “group health plans,” In fact, the CBO report .never states that the reinsurance contribution does not also fall on non-Federal governmental plans. And in any event,-the CBO does not and cannot authoritatively interpret federal statutes. See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 403 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir.2005) (Easterbrook, J.) (<HOLDING>). 2. “Governmental Plans” Constitute a Type of

    ### Response:
    holding that a prqvision from the electronic communications privacy act applied to the states irrespective of cbo opinion to the contrary although the congressional budget office expressed an opinion that the 1986 law would not impose new costs on states this view  on which congress did not vote and the president did not sign  cannot alter the meaning of enacted statutes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Reversed and remanded for a new trial. LEVINE, J., and GREENHAWT, SUSAN F., Associate Judge, concur. 1 . ""Larry” was not called as a witness by either party. [2] 2. For the purposes of paragraph (b), the term “child molestation” includes lewd or lascivious offenses committed upon or in the presence of persons less than 16 years of age. § 90.404(2)(b)2. 3 . We note that the remoteness factor would be less significant when the sexual abuse is generational or intrafamilial, and if the prior incidents were similar to the current act. See State v. Maestas, 224 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Iowa 1974) (concluding intrafamilial nature of pri- or abuse coupled with similarity of the prior acts rendered six- and ten-year-old incidents admissible); Bryson v. State, 210 Ga.App. 642, 437 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1993) (<HOLDING>); State v. Cichon, 458 N.W.2d 730, 734

    ### Response:
    holding thirtyoneyear lapse between abuse of daughter and granddaughter did not render prior abuse evidence inadmissible per se
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    occurred). 22 . See Leighton, 1990 WL 84704, at *2-3; In re Beatrice Companies, Inc., 1987 WL 36708, at *2-3. 23 . As noted by the dissenting justice, the Defendants objected to Lapiner’s intervention based on his failure to own Isrameo stock at the time of the wrongdoing alleged in the derivative action, but the Defendants did not object to the trial court’s consideration of Lapiner’s objections. 24 . See Tex. Bus. Orgs.Code Ann. § 21.552. 25 . See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445-46 (Tex. 1993) (stating that standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction and that lack of standing may be raised for the first time on appeal); Schwartzott v. Etheridge Property Management, 403 S.W.3d 488, 498 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Trojacek v. Estate of Kveton, No.

    ### Response:
    holding that preservation of error in the trial court is not necessary as to lack of standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    policy not to fire employees except for good cause. Plaintiff bases his implied contract claim solely on evidence that the drug policy was posted, that he probably read it, that IBP restricted itself by the policy, and that IBP led employees to believe that it does not fire them except for cause. IBP argues that plaintiff has presented insufficient evidence of contractual negotiations or other circumstances which would tend to make clear the intent of the parties to change the at-will nature of the employment relationship. According to IBP, the fact that IBP unilaterally adopted a drug/alcohol policy and has a general practice of adhering to it does not transform the policy into a binding contract of employment. E.g., Berry v. General Motors Corp., 838 F.Supp. 1479, 1492 (D.Kan.1993) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 56 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir.1995). In

    ### Response:
    recognizing distinct difference between policy which given employer might adopt and sincerely intend to follow and normally does follow and binding contractual duty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that provides some substantiation for and does not merely reiterate what is said in the pleadings.” Gibb v. Scott, 958 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). Statements of counsel at oral argument raising new facts not alleged in the pleadings constitute “matters outside the pleadings” and, if considered by the district court, require treatment of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. See, e.g., Smith v. Local No. 25, Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n, 500 F.2d 741, 744 (5th Cir.1974) (treating a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal order as automatically converted into summary judgment because district court relied on materials outside the pleadings, including oral argument); Judge v. Johnston Warren Lines, Inc. [Ltd.], 205 F.Supp. 700, 702 (D.Mass.1962) (<HOLDING>). Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc. 187

    ### Response:
    holding that a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment when plaintiffs counsel relied upon facts outside the four corners of the complaint during oral argument of the motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    minimize liability. Indeed, defense counsel would be remiss not to demand that the plaintiff waive statutory attorney’s fees. A lawyer who proposes to have his client pay more than is necessary to end litigation has failed to fulfill his fundamental duty zealously to represent the best interests of his client. Because waiver of fees does not affect the plaintiff, a settlement offer is not made less attractive to the plaintiff if it includes a demand that statutory fees be waived. Thus, in the future, we must expect settlement offers routinely to contain demands for waivers of statutory fees. The cumulative effect this practice will have on the civil rights bar is evident. It does not denigrate the high ideals that motivate many civil rights practitione Co., 338 U. S. 263, 266 (1949) (<HOLDING>); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, 434-438 (1953)

    ### Response:
    holding venue provision of federal employers liability act nonwaivable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 109-10 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). The appellant must first demonstrate trial counsel’s performance was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). He must then show that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. McCallum claims his counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed to object properly to the admission of evidence regarding McCallum’s membership in the Aryan Brotherhood. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to admissible evidence. See Ex parte White, 160 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). We have determined this evidence was

    ### Response:
    holding that to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object during trial appellant must show trial court would have committed error in overruling objection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    forfeiture was not received. 18 U.S.C. § 983(e). This is the exclusive remedy after pursuing the administrative path for setting aside a forfeiture decision by the Office of the Solicitor. Id. In this case, the district court properly held that plaintiffs’ CAFRA claim is barred from judicial review. Plaintiffs received proper notice of the proposed forfeitures. Plaintiffs chose to pursue an administrative path and filed petitions for remission and petitions for supplemental remission. These petitions were reviewed by the Office of the Solicitor and denied. Because plaintiffs chose to pursue administrative remedies, they waived the opportunity for judicial forfeiture proceedings. See 50 C.F.R. § 12.24(a) (expressly providing that remedies are exclusive); Malladi Drugs, 552 F.3d at 889 (<HOLDING>); Cole v. United States (In re $844,520), 136

    ### Response:
    holding that the remedies are exclusive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we cannot say that § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) has a “plain meaning” that mandates a resource-first approach. The MCCA does not set out a definition of income as that term is used in subsection (e)(2)(c). Further, unlike the district court, we do not read subsections (b), (d)(e) and'(f) as imparting a plain meaning that prohibits the transfer of income pre-eligibility, such that transferred income cannot be included in the community spouse’s income as that term is used in subsection (e)(2)(C). Instead, we believe that subsection (e)(2)(C)’s reference to “income” is ambiguous at best. Indeed, the differing views of the various courts and agencies that have interpreted subsection (e)(2)(C) provide a strong indication that the subsection is ambiguous. Compare, e.g., Gruber, 647 N.E.2d at 861 (<HOLDING>), and Kimnach, 645 N.E.2d at 825 (same), with

    ### Response:
    holding that mcca mandates resourcefirst ap proach in implementing subsection e2c
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    available utilities and absence of nearby off-site amenities also contributed to his conclusion of the inappropriateness of this site for Mount Laurel II development. Distance from water and sewerage connections, or lack of frontage on a public street, or location in the conservation area individually is not enough to preclude the granting of a compliance remedy. However, the High Debi Hills tract is a full mile away from the nearest existing water and sewer point of connection. The method of access over the 500 foot distance separating the tract from Campgaw Road is uncertain. And, most importantly, Court ordered Mount Laurel II development should be located in growth areas, not conservation districts. See Orgo Farms and Greenhouses v. Colts Neck Tp., 192 N.J.Super. 599 (Law Div.1983) (<HOLDING>). Here, substantial compliance can be achieved

    ### Response:
    holding availability of a builders remedy in a limited growth area is not foreclosed as a matter of law but will be sparingly granted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which may result in any discharge into navigable waters,” a state certificate must be obtained. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). The primary issue is whether the reference to “any discharge into navigable waters” under § 401 is limited to point sources. “Point source” is defined under the CWA as any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include return flows from irrigated agriculture. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). The term “discharge,” when used without qualification in the CWA, includes a discharge of a pollutant, and a disc .Wyo.1990) (<HOLDING>); Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California St. Bd.

    ### Response:
    holding that the word includes instead of means indicates that what follows is a nonexclusive list that can be enlarged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ¶ 67), regularly evaluates the performance of agency nurses, PI. Statement ¶ 28; Def. Counterstatement ¶ 28, and could prohibit an agency nurse from continuing to work at Bellevue if it believed she had committed a major violation of some rule or if it was otherwise dissatisfied with the nurse’s performance, Def. Counterstatement ¶¶ 29, 70. From all the foregoing, it is obvious that no evidentiary dispute remains that is material to the determination here in issue but that, rather, consideration of the undisputed “circumstances of the whole activity viewed in light of economic reality” demonstrates that Bellevue exercised functional control over plaintiff and was her joint employer. Cf. Amamare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 611 F.Supp. 344, 349 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (<HOLDING>). Defendants’ fallback arguments are that, even

    ### Response:
    holding that under title vii a temporary employee was employed by both her temp agency and the business at which she worked on a temporary basis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    records should be treated as testimonial. A reliability-based approach to public records is harmonious with both the purpose of the Confrontation Clause right and the modern realities associated with proving the content of routinely maintained motor vehicle records. C. Conclusion [¶ 26] We thus conclude that our decision in Tayman remains valid precedent and should control our decision in this case. As in Tayman, the Secretary of State’s certificate authenticated and summarized routine motor vehicle records that were not primarily maintained for use as evidence in criminal prosecutions. Further, the certificat 41-42 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that warrants of deportation were nontestimonial hearsay); see also United States v. Ballesteros-Selinger, 454 F.3d 973, 975 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Valdez-Maltos, 443 F.3d 910,

    ### Response:
    holding that a memorandum of oral decision issued by an immigration judge at a deportation hearing was nontestimonial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches) * * *.” 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(f) at 412 (1987). Thirdly, it appears that defendant was using his residence also as a commercial outlet for drugs and that his customers typically walked near the garbage on the way to the back entrance, facts that further suggest a diminished expectation of privacy by petitioner in the area where the garbage was placed. In Dunn, the Court stated that it was “especially significant” that the police possessed objective data indicating that the barn was not being used for intimate activities of the home but was being used in the unlawful manufacture of elicit drugs. 107 S.Ct. at 1139-1140; cf., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) (<HOLDING>). All these factors combine to persuade us that

    ### Response:
    holding that for purposes of aerial surveillance using sophisticated equipment the open areas of an industrial or business complex are not analogous to the curtilage of a dwelling but falls somewhere between open fields and curtilage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As noted in the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the district court has jurisdiction to hear motions “to compel [the] return of property obtained by an illegal search and seizure.” Fed. R.Crim.P. 41(e) advisory committee’s note. Moreover, the Third Circuit has found that its district courts have jurisdiction over third party motions for the return of property, see United States v. Frank, 763 F.2d 551, 552 (3d Cir.1985) (stating that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain a third party motion to determine who had entitlement to evidence after the criminal prosecution concluded), and that such jurisdiction exists even after the termination of the criminal proceedings, see United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Bein, 214 F.3d at 411 (finding that “[a]

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court has jurisdiction to consider  a rule 41e motion  filed after criminal proceedings had been completed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court. Barnard’s psychological problems were not diagnosed until five years after the date last insured. Barnard also argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting a treating physician’s conclusions drawn nine months after the date last insured. We disagree. An ALJ should ordinarily give great weight to a treating physician’s findings in disability cases. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 (citing Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.2001)). When these findings conflict with the opinion of other doctors, however, the ALJ may reject the testimony so long as he provides “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) ; see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The ALJ pointed to inconsistencies in the

    ### Response:
    holding that clear and convincing reasons are not required to reject contradicted conclusions of a treating physician
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a plan to “modify the rights of holders of secured claims.” A hen is a property right, see Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 328-29, 113 S.Ct. at 2109-10, and the obvious implication of Nobelman — an implication made express in Justice Stevens’ concurrence — is that hen-stripping is permissible except in the case of home mortgages in Chapter 13, see id. at 332, 113 S.Ct. at 2111 (Stevens, J., concurring). Section 1227(c) also has a hen-stripping effect, vesting property in the debtor “free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan” unless the plan or the order confirming the plan specifies otherwise. 11 U.S.C. § 1227(c) (1994). The FSA was undoubtedly “provided for by the plan,” and a hen is a “claim or interest.” See Johnson, 501 U.S. at 84, 111 S.Ct. at 2154 (<HOLDING>); 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (1994) (defining “lien”

    ### Response:
    holding that an in rem hen is a claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Requiring Indemnification Before Access to Public Streets and Sidewalks Is Unconstitutional On appeal Plain Dealer also challenges the constitutionality of Section 901.-181(c)(5) of the Lakewood Codified Ordinance requiring that “permittees” indemnify and insure the City as a condition to gaining access to its public streets and sidewalks. We believe this provision also violates the First Amendment. The district court held that since the City is liable under Ohio Revised Code Section 723.01 for the failure to maintain the streets, sidewalks, and publicways, it should not be exposed to additional liability without indemnification by any private commercial use on such City owned property. The district court cites Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 26, 442 N.E.2d 749 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Dickerhoof v. City of Canton, 6 Ohio St.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available in the absence of a statute providing immunity to a municipal corporation in a negligence action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prosequi the case, which motion was granted. The defendant challenged the decision, and the Court observed that the “express language of the statute commits a finding of good cause to the discretion of the trial court.” Id. Noting that the basis for the motion was, in part, the failure of the Commonwealth to adequately prepare its case, the Court stated that, where such lack of preparation was coupled with factors beyond the Commonwealth’s control, it “does not demonstrate bad faith on the Commonwealth’s part. Nor does the decision of the Commonwealth to seek a nolle prosequi rise to the level of oppressive tactics amounting to prosecutorial misconduct in this instance.” (emphasis added). Id. at 584, 520 S.E.2d at 830, see United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>). These Virginia cases make clear that the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that fundamental consideration in assessing the propriety of a prosecutors motion to dismiss is whether the motion is made in good faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the appellant was being advised to limit his strenuous activity. Finally, the appellant’s argument that, pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 4.21, he “is not required to demonstrate that he meets all criteria for the next higher rating” lacks merit. Reply Br. at 3. He asserts that he “unquestionably satisfies two of the three criteria for the 40-percent rating.” Id. at 3. In light of the conjunctive “and” in the criteria for a 40% disability rating under DC 7913, all criteria must be met to establish entitlement to a 40% rating. See, e.g., Watson v. Dep’t of the Navy, 262 F.3d 1292, 1299 (Fed.Cir.2001) (noting that inclusion of conjunctive “and” clearly indicates that all three criteria in 5 C.F.R. §§ 831.902 and 842.802 must be demonstrated); Heuer v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 379, 385 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Malone v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 539 (1997)

    ### Response:
    holding that criteria expressed in the conjunctive are connected by and
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    after hearing testimony from K.J. and K.S.'s mother. As a result of this violation of probation, on June 18, 2003, the juvenile court granted wardship of K.S. to the- DOC for a recommended period of six months. K.S. now appeals. Analysis K.S.'s argument is that the juvenile court never. properly obtained jurisdiction during the entirety of these proceedings because it failed to strictly follow the statutory prerequisites for obtaining jurisdiction at the time of the original delinquency filing in May 2002. . Indiana courts have held for many years that strict compliance with the statutory prerequisites for obtaining jurisdiction at the commencement of delinquency proceedings is required of juvenile courts. See, eg., Shupe v. Bell, 127 Ind.App. 292, 300-01, 141 N.RE.2d 351, 355 (1957) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). The statutes governing the

    ### Response:
    holding juvenile court under statutes then in effect could not acquire jurisdiction in delinquency proceeding in the absence of a delinquency petition filed by the probation officer under an order of the court authorizing the same
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    saving it for when new counsel began representing Lance, was appropriate, because this form of Sixth Amendment claim does not involve the potential conflict of interest inherent where a lawyer accuses himself or herself of having made unprofessional choices. See id. at 87, n. 13 (noting, but declining to address, the possibility that a trial court’s denial of expert funds might raise Sixth Amendment concerns, in addition to due process concerns, that could be considered on direct appeal); Strickland, supra, 466 U. S. at 686 (noting that there are Sixth Amendment claims regarding governmental interference with the right to counsel that are distinct from claims regarding trial counsel’s own deficient performance). Compare Glover v. State, 266 Ga. 183, 183-185 (2) (465 SE2d 659) (1996) (<HOLDING>). Having been timely raised, the claim was

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim alleging that trial counsel himself or herself acted outside of the bounds of professional competence must be raised at the earliest practicable moment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The government insists that the U.S. Attorney’s mere certification that the evidence is substantial proof of a material fact is sufficient to establish our jurisdiction. However, we “require[] more than the prosecutor’s bare certification that the conditions enumerated in section 3731 exist.” Adrian, 978 F.2d at 490. Rather, “before we may assume jurisdiction, the government must demonstrate that the evidence ... [is] substantial proof of a fact material to the prosecution.” Id. at 491 (emphasis added); see also id. at 490 (rejecting government’s argument that § 3731 “permits an appeal whenever the government certifies to the district court that the evidence is ‘substantial proof of a material fact,’ regardless of the truth of that certification”); see also Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d at 1150 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, in order to satisfy its

    ### Response:
    holding  3731 not satisfied as to certain counts notwithstanding the governments protests to the contrary because substantial proof of material fact condition had not been met
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    otherwise time-barred proceedings when “a litigant’s failure to meet a legally mandated deadline unavoidably arose from circumstances beyond that litigant’s control.” Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, 209 F.3d 552, 560-61 (6th Cir.2000). “Although equitable tolling is used sparingly by federal courts,” this court does grant such relief in appropriate circum stances. Johnson v. Hudson, 421 Fed.Appx. 568, 571 (6th Cir.2011). “[A] petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562 (internal quotations omitted); see also Hall v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 662 F.3d 745, 749-50 (6th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). In determining whether a petitioner meets

    ### Response:
    holding that holland test did not subsume but replaced prior equitabletolling test from andrews v orr 851 f2d 146 151 6th cir1988
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    13 plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (the protection of automatic stay is not listed as a requirement for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan). The plain language of § 1325(a) mandates confirmation if Debtors meet the nine requirements set forth therein. Congress did not mandate the dismissal of a case or the denial of confirmation if the automatic stay terminated prior to confirmation pursuant to § 362(c)(3) or (4) and therefore the Court finds that the termination of the automatic stay does not necessarily deprive a debtor of the right to continue under Chapter 13, obtain confirmation of a plan, and ultimately obtain a discharge if the debtor complies with the terms of the plan. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In addition to the ability of a debt- or to

    ### Response:
    holding that when the language of a statute is clear courts should not substitute their judgment for that of congress and should enforce the statute according to its terms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    real party in interest in [the Contract Action] wherein the Debtor is r § 8127(a) is relevant. See Clark v. Rameker, — U.S.—, 134 S.Ct. 2242, 2244 n. 1, 189 L.Ed.2d 157 (2014) (""Under [11 U.S.C.] § 522, debtors may elect to claim exemptions either under federal law, see § 522(b)(2), or state law, see § 522(b)(3).”); cf. Bosack, 454 B.R. at 630, 633-35 (considering whether commissions earned pre-petition were exempt under § 8127(a) where the debt- or ""elected to take the exemptions available to him under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), that is essentially Pennsylvania state exemptions and the property that he owns with his nondebtor wife as a tenant by the entirety”). The Court also notes it is not at all clear Segal's interpretation of Pennsylvania law is correct. See Bosack, 454 B.R. at 633 (<HOLDING>). 19 . Segal also argues the Bankruptcy Court

    ### Response:
    holding  8127a has no application when an individual works for another as an independent contractor because in such event the person or entity for whom such individual works is not indeed cannot be such individuals employer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a fee award in this case on the basis of the lodestar approach is what amount, if any, should be excluded because Isacs was dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction and Standard Tallow prevailed on a summary judgment motion. It is well-established that hours expended with respect to defendants who have been dismissed from an action are generally not compensable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir.1990); see also Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1044 (3d Cir.1996) (stating that a court must deduct hours spent on claims that are “distinct in all respects from” the successful claims); Baughman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208, 1214 (3d Cir.1978); Hall v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 943 F.Supp. 536, 542 (E.D.Pa.1996) (<HOLDING>); Finch v. Hercules Inc., 941 F.Supp. 1395,

    ### Response:
    holding that a court must deduct time exclusively devoted to the defendants without liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a grudge against Bous-man or someone who provided the information in exchange for some concession on charges pending against the informant. The question that now arises is what effect the State’s failure to comply with section 810.5(4) has on the nontestimonial identification order. We think the omission of any facts from which the court could assess the informant’s credibility and the reliability of the informant’s information precluded issuance of the order for statutory and constitutional reasons. The statutory requirement that the affidavit “shall set forth particular facts bearing on the informant’s reliability” and “the means by which the information was obtained” is mandatory. Iowa Code § 810.5(4); see State v. Iowa Dist Ct. for Black Hawk County, 472 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa 1991) (<HOLDING>). This requirement ensures that a

    ### Response:
    holding that use of the word shall in search warrant statute imposed a duty that was obligatory not optional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we accept the designation of K.S.A. § 79-3321 as a criminal statute. Because Stephan was acting to enforce a criminal law under a federal grant of criminal jurisdiction, we believe that Stephan possessed jurisdiction to execute the warrants at Kaul’s store. A further distinction with Oklahoma Tax Commission and Colville is that those cases involved a state’s attempt to tax an Indian tribe, while in the present case the state asserted authority to tax an individual who is not a member of the tribe where her store is located. The Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between Indians and nonmember Indians in several contexts, and has for most practical purposes treated nonmember Indians in the same manner as non-Indians. See, for example, Colville, 447 U.S. at 161, 100 S.Ct. at 2085 (<HOLDING>); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688, 110 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that states taxing jurisdiction over nonmember indians is equivalent to states taxing jurisdiction over nonindians
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    findings. Furthermore, although Jin’s brief identifies the requirements for raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as described in In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), there is no assertion or evidence suggesting that Jin complied with these requirements. Jin has also failed to show any error in the agency’s determination that she did not prove past persecution or a probability of future harm as required for withholding of removal or CAT relief. The record establishes that Jin assisted a North Korean refugee, was detained for 15 days, and fined 4,000 RMB. At no time was Jin physically harmed or threatened by authorities. These allegations are insufficient to establish past persecution. See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir.2011) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Ivanishvili v. U.S. DOJ, 433 F.3d 332, 341

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioner failed to establish persecution where he suffered only minor bruising from an altercation with family planning officials which required no formal medical attention and had no lasting physical effect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    compensate one for the time value of money.”). 170 . We have addressed the costs of delay only in the context of a judgment, rather than a sanctions award, holding in Shaw that a government entity with sovereign immunity cannot be held liable for ""claims grounded on the belated receipt of funds, even when characterized as compensation for delay.” 478 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2957. Although we have not addressed a court’s sanction award for the costs of delay, the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have in awarding fees under Rule 11 and other statutory provisions for fees. In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court held that when awarding attorne (1994) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 520, 104 S.Ct. 2549, 81 L.Ed.2d 1, 496 N.W.2d 459, 467 (1993)

    ### Response:
    holding that titere is a significant distinction between fdic in its corporate capacity and its receivership capacity where fdic acts as a receiver it is not immune from prejudgment interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and unambiguously sets forth an agreement requiring the congregation and its members to submit “controversies] thereafter arising” between them to binding arbitration before a Beth Din of Orthodox Jewish rabbis. The absence of the word “arbitration” from Article II, Section 12 is of no legal significance. See McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir.1988) (stating that the absence of the word “arbitration” in a contract is “irrelevant” under the federal arbitration act where the parties clearly intend to submit disputes to their chosen instrument for definitive resolution); Powderly v. Metrabyte Corp., 866 F.Supp. 39, 42 (D.Mass.1994) (same). See generally Hercules & Co. v. Beltway Carpet Serv., Inc., 592 A.2d 1069, 1072-73 (D.C.1991) (<HOLDING>). Nor is there a requirement in the District of

    ### Response:
    holding that federal court decisions construing and applying the federal arbitration act may be regarded as persuasive authority in construing and applying corresponding provisions of our local arbitration act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.’ ” Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. at 451, 108 S.Ct. 1319 (1988) (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412, 83 S.Ct. 1790 (Douglas, J., concurring)); Roy, 476 U.S. at 700, 106 S.Ct. 2147. Contrary to the Borough’s position, however, the principle of Lukumi and Fraternal Order of Police-that government cannot discriminate between religiously motivated conduct and comparable secularly motivated conduct in a manner that devalues religious reasons for acting-applies not only when a coercive law or regulation prohibits religious conduct, but also when government denies religious adherents access to publicly available money or property. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (<HOLDING>); Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 753-54 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that free exercise clause prohibits state from devaluing religious reasons for seeking unemployment benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.1983) (“Cash basis taxpayers are required to include items of income in the taxable year in which such item is actually or constructively received.”) (citations omitted). Thus, by “matching” the time at which India Music could deduct its accounts payable owed to HRI with the time at which HRI could include those payments as income, the Commissioner’s § 267(a)(2) disallowance effectively changed India Music’s accounting method for its account payable deduction in the 2004 taxable year from an accrual basis to a cash basis. That is, the Commissioner effected a change in India Music’s treatment of a material item in 2004 by postponing the proper time for taking its account payable deduction. See Summit Sheet Metal Co., T.C. Memo 1996-563, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1606, 1996 WL 740748, at *11 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the disallowance constituted a

    ### Response:
    holding that an item is material  if the time for including it in income or deducting it is at issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    merits or his affirmative defense of insanity in these cireumstances. The Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury requires ""criminal convie-tions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the erime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt."" People v. Hill, 934 P.2d 821, 827 (Colo.1997) (quoting U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995)). However, a judgment of NGRI does not constitute a conviction; rather, it operates as an acquittal of the charged offenses. See Jacobs v. Carmel, 869 P.2d 207, 209 (Colo.1994) (stating that a person committed after a finding of insanity ""will not actually have been convicted of the crime charged""); see also Parks v. Dist. Court, 180 Colo. 202, 503 P.2d 1029, 1033 (1972) (<HOLDING>). € 19 Prior to the change in procedure under

    ### Response:
    holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in light of the Matter of Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 151. On the second evaluation of Petitioners’ claim, the BIA held that “the Immigration Judge followed the framework of Matter of Y-L-, supra, to determine that the respondents knowingly made frivolous asylum applications.” We agree. The IJ was not required to hold another hearing on remand, as the record was sufficiently developed to apply Matter of Y-L- to the facts of the case. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying either of Petitioners’ requests to reopen. Hamazaspyan v. Holder, 590 F.3d 744, 747 (9th Cir.2009). Under an abuse of discretion standard, Petitioners failed to establish changed country conditions warranting reopening. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (citing to Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec.

    ### Response:
    holding that to reopen a case an alien must show that the new evidence would likely change the result
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disciplinary adjudication and expunge his record if he suffers no harm from the procedural error. Elkin, 969 F.2d at 54. Allowing a federal court to impose such sanctions would undermine the public interest in the proper enforcement of prison disciplinary rules and, therefore, is not justified. Id. Here, the Petitioner fails to identify how he was prejudiced in his ability to provide a defense by the alleged failure to receive advance written notice of the charges. Thus, he has failed to show that he was denied due process. Second, even if Plaintiff received no due process protections prior to his placement in DC custody, he can show no violation because he received regular periodic reviews by the Program Review Committee (PRC). See Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, DC-ADM 801 concerning inmate

    ### Response:
    holding that periodic review by prc of status of prisoner held in administrative confinement for eight years afforded all due process to which inmate was entitled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    13 New Jersey courts have used res gestae as an evidentiary doctrine since 1819. See Ogden v. Gibbons, 5 N.J.L. 612, 631-32 (Sup.Ct.1819) (admitting hearsay evidence as res gestae of charged trespass because evidence was necessary to establish motive); Den v. Vancleve, 5 N.J.L. 695, 758 (Sup.Ct.1819) (explaining res gestae as exception to rule against hearsay). 14 Res gestae also has been cited as the explanation for admitting relevant evidence. See, e.g., State v. Deegan, 133 N.J.L. 263, 44 A.2d 104 (E. & A.1945) (permitting photographs of decedent and family to be admitted as res gestae); State v. Weiner, 101 N.J.L. 46, 49, 127 A. 582 (Sup.Ct.1925) (admitting as res gestae evidence of skid marks at accident scene); State v. Hill, 65 N.J.L. 626, 632, 47 A. 814 (E. & A.1900) (<HOLDING>). 15 See Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 166, 801 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that coats presence in room at time of murder would be admissible as res gestae
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    very issue, but the district court denied that intervention. Enterprise chose not to appeal that decision. Thus, the validity of Landmark's prejudgment attachment never was in issue in the Landmark lawsuit. 2 . We have no doubt that the validity of Landmark's prejudgment attachment would be an issue in a priority dispute between Landmark and Enterprise. Nevertheless, neither the Enterprise lawsuit nor the Landmark lawsuit is a priority dispute involving the validity of a prejudgment attachment. 3 . Landmark opposed the district court's consolidation below. Landmark, however, could not appeal the consolidation because the district court held in favor of Landmark on the merits. See Public Serv. Comm'n v. Brashear Freight Lines, 306 U.S. 204, 206, 59 S.Ct. 480, 481, 83 L.Ed. 608 (1939) (<HOLDING>). Landmark, however, has raised this issue as a

    ### Response:
    holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    580, 587 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.). A conclusory statement is one that does not provide the underlying facts to support the conclusion. Paragon Gen. Contractors, 227 S.W.3d at 883; Rizkallah, 952 S.W.2d at 587. A conclusory statement can be either a legal conclusion or factual conclusion. See Rizkallah, 952 S.W.2d at 587. Harrison’s averments arguably concerned only two of the representations on which Methodist relied to support its breaeh-of-warranty action: “Zurich had experienced and expert personnel to handle all claims”; and “Zurich would provide a customized claims program that would control Methodist’s loss costs.” Even if Harrison’s affidavit was some evidence Zurich breached these warranties, his aver-m s “opinion.” See Ryland Group, Inc., 924 S.W.2d at 122 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Harrison’s averments were

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an interested witnesss affidavit reciting he estimates or believes cer tain facts to be true will not support summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the examiner conducted a physical examination of Mr. Johnson; reviewed the claims file and medical records to include x-rays taken in 1977, 1993, 1999, and 2004; opined that Mr. Johnson’s developmental abnormalities did not undergo any degenerative change between 1977 and 2004; opined that there were no other abnormalities other than his longstanding developmental abnormalities (which would also negate the question of any “superimposed” disability); and opined that Mr. Johnson’s current back disability was not related to his eligible service. In sum, the record reflects that the July 2005 VA medical examiner based his opinion on Mr. Johnson’s history and his medical records, and the examiner explained the basis for his opinion. See D’Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 97, 104 (2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 121,

    ### Response:
    holding that a medical opinion is adequate where it is based upon the veterans medical history examinations and the also describes the disability in sufficient detail
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cases involving the custody, care, and control of children is divided between the District Court and Probate Court. Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 103 (2015), the District Court has “original” jurisdiction over cases involving parental rights, but the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction to appoint guardians for minors pursuant to 18-A M.R.S. § 5-102(a) (2015). More and more frequently, family litigation causes these two court systems to exercise concurrent jurisdiction, and the “marriage” caused by this concurrent jurisdiction is very rocky. Although 19-A M.R.S. § 1654 (2015) confers on the Probate Court concurrent jurisdiction to award parental rights and responsibilities “[i]f the father and mother of a minor child are living apart,” see Marin v. Marin, 2002 ME 88, ¶ 7, 797 A.2d 1265 (<HOLDING>), in actuality, the Probate Courts deal with

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the probate court may determine issues of parental rights and responsibilities as they relate to the guardianship proceeding in which they arose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the burden of proving the mitigating role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 939. “A trial court’s choice between ‘two permissible views of the evidence’ is the very essence of the clear error standard of review.” Id. at 945. The district court does not need to make specific subsidiary factual findings, and, as long as the record supports the decision and the district court resolves any disputed factual issues, a final determination is sufficient. Id. at 939-40. The burden is on the defendant to offer evidence at sentencing on an issue that would reduce his offense level, and if he fails to do so, and other evidence does not demonstrate entitlement, we will affirm the district court finding. See United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1355, 1356-57 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, the district court

    ### Response:
    holding defendant failed to meet burden for acceptance of responsibility reduction where he objected in the psi but only made arguments at sentencing without offering evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by an alien against whom deportation proceedings are pending: “no person shall be naturalized against whom there is outstanding a final finding of deportability pursuant to a warrant of arrest ...; and no petition for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the petitioner a deportation proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest.” 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (emphasis added). INS argues that under the revised naturalization scheme, section 1429 operates to divest district courts of the jurisdiction section 1421(c) provides to review administrative denials of naturalization applications: This is somewhat of a novel issue, and the few courts that have addressed the question have disagreed. Compare Mosleh v. Strapp, 992 F.Supp. 874, 876 (N.D.Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>) with Gatcliffe v. Reno, 23 F.Supp.2d 581,

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts lack jurisdiction to review denied applications when deportation proceedings are pending
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The three-judge panel found that, in addition to complying with federal and state law, the General Assembly desired to create districts “more competitive for” the majority party. The panel noted the “undisputed” fact that in North Carolina “racial identification correlates highly with political affiliation.” The desire to create districts more competitive for the majority party had to occur within the requirements of the state constitution’s Whole County Provision. Thus, while the three-judge panel noted the General Assembly’s desire “to equalize population among the districts,” for state redistricting purposes, this finding must be viewed in the context of the Whole County Provision, which recognizes political subdivisions. See Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 366, 562 S.E.2d at 386 (<HOLDING>). In light of the Whole County Provision,

    ### Response:
    recognizing the importance of the county to our system of government and that it is through counties mainly that the powers of government reach and operate directly upon the people quoting white v commrs of chowan cty 90 nc 437 438 1884
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (2001). 1 16 To the contrary, D-Mil cites Williams v. Cont'l Constr., Corp., 1984 OK 887, 34 P.2d 254 and title 52, sections 2 , 3 , 7 , and 26 , of the Oklahoma Statutes, contending that, under Williams, because it has complied with Oklahoma's general corporation laws and accepted the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's rules, regulations and applicable statutes, D-Mil is entitled to exercise eminent domain across Landowner's land to market gas from a well it operates. And, no statute requires D-Mil to be specifically designated as or become a ""pipeline company."" We disagree. 17 D-Mil correctly notes that a pipeline company is not expressly required to be named as such. See eg. Mo.-Kan.-Tex.R. Co. v. State, 1985 OK 108, 11 85, 712 P.2d 40, 46; French v. Ayres, 1949 OK 88, 207 P.2d 308 (<HOLDING>). Under title 52, a company's business name is

    ### Response:
    recognizing a pipeline company as a public service corporation even though it was not expressly named as such
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conferred upon the commissioners court by law. Commissioners Court of Titus County, 940 S.W.2d at 80; Ector County, 843 S.W.2d at 479. Therefore, it is beyond dispute that the district court’s jurisdiction includes appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the county commissioners court, and that jurisdiction can only be invoked under the circumstances just described. The issue squarely before us is how that jurisdiction is invoked. Invoking the Distr ex.App.-E1 Paso 1993, no writ) (noting that a formal action or suit must be filed in order for district court to exercise its superviso ry control over the commissioners court); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Liberty-Danville Fresh Water Supply District No. 1, 506 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1974, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); J.R. Phillips Investment Company v. Road

    ### Response:
    holding that a plenary suit is required to invoke the district courts supervisory control over the commissioners court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and dissenting). However, Tenn. R.App. P. 13(b) recognizes that exceptions can be made in appropriate circumstances. A challenge to the validity of a contract based on public policy grounds is one such exception. One authoritative text has recognized that the issue of whether a contract is contrary to public policy is an issue that trial and appellate courts may raise sua sponte. 15 Grace McLane Giesel, Corbin on Contracts § 79.6, at 27, 32 (rev. ed. 2003) (“Corbin on Contracts ”); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, ch. 8, topic 1, at 5 (1981). We have also previously reached the same conclusion. Reaves Lumber Co. v. Cain-Hurley Lumber Co., 152 Tenn. 339, 344, 279 S.W. 257, 258 (1926) (quoting Cary-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 92 Tenn. 587, 594, 22 S.W. 743, 745 (1893) (<HOLDING>)). We take no issue with the intermediate

    ### Response:
    holding that the courts will deny any relief upon any illegal contract  whenever the illegality is made to appear
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Such That Plaintiffs Action is Not Barred The amendments which the Kentucky legislature made to the blue sky statute on June 21, 2001, do not alter the conclusion that plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations found in the blue sky statute. The plaintiff argues that, even if the three year statute of limitations found in Kentucky’s blue sky statute is applicable to the present action, the June 21, 2001, amendments to the blue sky law extend the statute of limitations so that this action was not untimely filed. In the June 21, 2001, amendments, the legislature changed the timing of when an action under the blue sky statute accrues from the date of the contract of sale to a discovery rule. Cf Cali-Ken Petroleum Co. v. Miller, 815 F.Supp. 216, 219 (W.D.Ky.1993) (<HOLDING>). The new discovery rule provides that “[n]o

    ### Response:
    holding that the time of accrual under the thenexisting version of kentuckys blue sky statute was the date of sale because the legislature had intentionally omitted a discovery rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (2005). Here, two issues affect which version of the statute is applied. First, we determine whether the district court correctly used the version of the statute in effect on the commencement date of White’s action rather than the version in effect on her injury date. Second, we consider whether N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46 should be applied retroactively. A [¶ 9] The district court applied the version of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46 in ef- feet on the commencement date of White’s action. The court relied upon Larson, stating: “[In Larson t]here was no reference to the date or time of the alleged negligent act, but rather, the Supreme Court referred to the date the action was commenced. “Here, this action was commenced in February of 2006. The applicable statute in effect in February of 2006 was t ) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 11] Unless amendments to N.D.C.C. §

    ### Response:
    holding the correct date to use when determining the controlling statute is date upon which the claim arose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conviction had not been included in his criminal history, he would have been in criminal history category II instead of category III. Id. Robinson claimed in his § 2255 petition that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not object to what he alleges was double counting in his sentence calculation that was contrary to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(l). The district court ruled that the difference in the sentence Robinson would have received in category II was not significant enough to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal we determined that the maximum difference of 32 months between category II and category III failed to meet the constitutional standard of prejudice. Both we and the district court were in error. See Glover, 121 S .Ct. at 701 (<HOLDING>). Because both the district court and we

    ### Response:
    holding that it is error to engraft onto the prejudice branch of the strickland test a requirement that any increase in a sentence must meet a standard of significance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argues that the district court already had adjusted his punishment by sentencing him under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1 (first degree murder) instead of U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 (aggravated assault). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provides that a district court may depart from the sentencing range set by the Sentencing Guidelines only when it finds that “there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3558(b). Here, the district court departed upward because criminal history category VI, which requires only 13 criminal history points, did not adequately reflect Defendant’s 25 criminal history points. United States v. Osborne, 948 F.2d 210, 212 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Review of a sentence that departs from the

    ### Response:
    holding that 24 criminal history points was so high that even placement in category vi did not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendants criminal past
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    491, 495 (Ind.1990), reh’g denied. Newspaper articles are, by their very nature, hearsay and for that reason are seldom proper evidence to prove any fact except the bare fact of their publication. Feliciano v. State, 467 N.E.2d 748, 749 (Ind. 1984). Therefore, the trial court erred when it admitted the newspaper article into evidence. However, we hold that the error was harmless. Here, Moore’s own testimony indicated that he had been employed within the last two years. Further, during his testimony, Moore invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to answer additional questions. From Moore’s refusal to testify, the court could properly have drawn an adverse inference regarding his financial ability to comply with the support order. See Gash v. Kohm, 476 N.E.2d 910, 913 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Due to the

    ### Response:
    holding that the privilege against selfincrimination does not prohibit the trier of fact in a civil case from drawing adverse inferences from a witness refusal to testify
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A. The City is not indirectly liable for Terry’s and Silverman’s conduct. This case requires us to accommodate the Supreme Court’s mandate in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson that federal courts use traditional agency principles when deciding hostile environment sexual harassment cases, but simultaneously “place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.” 477 U.S. 57, 72, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2408, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). Because the Eleventh and all other circuits employ agency principles in the realm of hostile environment sexual harassment, this opinion utilizes the language of traditional agency case law. Under this approach, direct liability and indirect liability are distinct concepts and form the only possible ba (10th Cir.1987)(<HOLDING>); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that employer liability could arise under the principles of restatement  2192 if 1 the employer was negligent or reckless or 2 the employee relied on the supervisors apparent authority or 3 the supervisor was aided in his harassment by the existence of the agency relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Nev. Stat. Rev. §§ 34.800(2) (laches) & 34.810(2) (abuse of writ). We have held that sections 34.800 and 34.810 constitute “independent and adequate state grounds,” which bar federal habeas review, Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir.1996) (§ 34.800); Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir.2003) (§ 34.810), and Davis has not demonstrated that we should reach a different result here. Davis cannot invoke ineffective assistance of counsel as a defense to procedural default, because he failed to raise this defense in state court. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1986). Thus, Davis was not entitled to challenge the procedural default in an evidentiar stitutional jurisprudence. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not violate Davis’s

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants in noncapital trials have no constitutional right to present mitigating evidence in a separate penalty proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    final when the mandate issued from the supreme court affirming the judgment on May 24, 1999, and that the two-year time limitation of rule 3.850(b) began to run at that time, thus rendering his January 4, 2002, motion untimely. Snipes argues that the time limitation of the rule did not commence until this court’s affirmance of his sentence on remand became final on January 16, 2001. The unequivocal language of rule 3.850(b) supports Snipes’ contention: A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final in a noncapital case.... (Emphasis added.) See also Oliver v. State, 734 So.2d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). We also note the well-established principle

    ### Response:
    holding that the twoyear time limitation of rule 3850 does not commence until the sentence becomes final
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    there would be no openings — did not render her search unreasonable. Second, the fact that, once employed by Rite-Aid, Jewell failed to leverage up into a full-time job was not unreasonable, either. It is not surprising that her interim employment — the only job she found— made it difficult to find a different full-time job. Though her burden to find meaningful employment did not suddenly evaporate when she took on part-time work, all that is required is a reasonable effort to search. Jewell satisfied that standard here. See Lundy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 856 F.2d 627, 629-30 (4th Cir.1988). Third, although Jewell “willfully” left her job at Rite-Aid, an unlawfully laid-off employee is not required to accept or remain in less desirable working conditions. See Westin, 758 F.2d at 1129-30 (<HOLDING>). For Jewell to have stayed with Rite-Aid after

    ### Response:
    holding that the fact that a waitress quit a comparable job did not toll her backpay liability where the sinks at the new job backed up and flooded when it rained
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    comments and one arguably racial remark over the course of the plaintiffs eight years of employment did not constitute pervasive conduct.” Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1414 (10th Cir.1997). By our count, Ms. Hernandez presented evidence of at least a dozen racially offensive comments and jokes over the fourteen months Mr. Lillis supervised her in food services. But “the word ‘pervasive’ is not a counting measure” and the “trier of fact utilizes a broader contextual analysis.” Herrera, 474 F.3d at 680 n. 3. Considering the frequency, content, and context of the derogatory statements, we conclude that Ms. Hernandez established a genuinely disputed issue of fact as to the pervasiveness of the harassment in her work environment. See Smith, 129 F.3d at 1415 (<HOLDING>). The district court, citing Ford v. West, 222

    ### Response:
    holding evidence of six sexually derogatory statements over twentythree months some repeated frequently sufficient to support a finding of pervasive harassment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for permanent residence. § 1255(i)(2). An applicant for adjustment of status under § 1255(f) must establish that he is not inadmissible under any provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) or that he is eligible for a waiver of any applicable ground of inadmissibility. Sattani, 749 F.3d at 371. The INA provides that an alien is ineligible to receive an immigrant visa and is inadmissible if he was unlawfully in this country for more than one year and then “enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted.” INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)). Such aliens are not entitled to an adjustment of status. Mortera-Cruz v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 246, 256 (5th Cir.2005); see also In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 371 (BIA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Verdugo’s assertion that the IJ incorrectly

    ### Response:
    holding that aliens inadmissible under  1182a 9c i i are ineligible for adjustment of status under  1255f
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and by rendering a take-nothing judgment in favor of Coastal. Francis contends that disregarding the verdict conflicts with the court’s footnote recited above, that “there is some evidence” that Coastal was negligent and proximately caused Francis’s injuries. Francis’s arguments propose that he may still recover against Coastal under the common law, beyond chapter 95, and thus challenge the trial court’s conclusion that chapter 95 preempts all common-law negligence claims against Coastal under the circumstances of this case and is, therefore, Francis’s exclusive remedy against Coastal. We agree with the trial court that chapter 95 controls this case, is Francis’s exclusive remedy against Coastal, and precludes common-law negligence liability in Coastal. See Fisher, 16 S.W.3d at 201 (<HOLDING>); see also Dyall v. Simpson Pasadena Paper Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that chapter 95 controlled liability for injuries arising from failure to provide a safe workplace
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    went on to state: We do not want to pretend that the line between action and inaction, between inflicting and failing to prevent the infliction of harm, is clearer than it is. If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit. Id. at 618-619; see also Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1221 (7th Cir.1988) (“When the state puts a person in danger, the Due Process Clause requires the state to protect him to the extent of ameliorating the incremental risk. When a state cuts off sources of private aid, it must provide replacement protection.”); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 382 (7th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Bowers, which hinted at the analysis that the

    ### Response:
    holding that due process clause was violated where police officers  abandoned children and left them in a healthendangering situation  after having arrested their custodian and thereby deprived them of adult protection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    misrepresentation and failure-to-warn claims. The former claim turns on the Rolands’ belief that General Motors “falsely represented in the owner’s manual ... that an occupant of the car could use the rear center lap-only belt without a child car seat.” Appellants’ Brief at 3 (citing Appellants’ App. at 51). The latter claim is the based upon the Rolands’ belief that General Motors should have warned that the lap belt was only properly used with a conventional child car seat. The Rolands’ misrepresentation and failure to warn claims depend on their contention that a lap belt is defective and are a roundabout attempt to challenge the choice provided by FMVSS 208 as part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. See Carrasquilla v. Mazda Motor Corp., 166 F.Supp.2d 169, 178 (M.D.Pa.2001) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed. FRIEDLANDER, J., and BRADFORD, J.,

    ### Response:
    holding that claims were nothing more than a backdoor attempt to attack once again the manufacturers exercise of one of the restraint options under fmvss 208  it therefore frustrates the purpose and objective of the federal regulation and invokes implied preemption under the holding in geier 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the plant site. Acting under CERCLA, the EPA imposed administrative liability, not only on the polluters, but on the insured auto dealerships who had sold the pollutants to the polluters. Id. at 1518. The pollution exclusion contained in the policy at issue in Industrial Indemnity was identical to the one at issue in the present case. The Honorable William Terrell Hodges, United States District Judge, in reviewing issues nearly identical to those raised in this case, held that “sudden has a temporal meaning to it as well as a sense of the unexpected.” 731 F.Supp. at 1520 (citing C.L. Hauthaway & Sons v. American Motorists Ins., 712 F.Supp. 265, 268 (D.Mass.1989) (ordinary and common usage of term “sudden” includes temporal aspect of immediacy, abruptne ., 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Applying the definition of “sudden and

    ### Response:
    holding that the phrase sudden and accidental is not a synonym for unexpected and unintended and that the discharge of coal dust over an eight year period was not sudden
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    BIA’s factfinding. The very heart of Petitioners’ claim, that the BIA’s analysis regarding their fears for their daughter’s safety was not “detailed” and failed to “adequately” address the issue, is fundamentally an objection to a factual determination by the BIA and the relative evidentiary weight the agency gave to competing considerations. In fact, the BIA directly addressed Petitioners’ fears for Tashfia’s safety and found that the IJ had “properly considered the relevant factors in the aggregate,” including consideration of Petitioners’ “testimony that they believed their daughter might be kidnapped in Bangladesh, as one of the potential hardship factors.” We have repeatedly held that “[cjloaking [a factual claim] in the garb of legal error does not alter its nature.” Id. at 73 (<HOLDING>); see also Rashad v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1, 5

    ### Response:
    holding petitioners claim was factual in nature where he alleged the bia had failed to accord sufficient weight to the seriousness of his sons asthma
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    response to the jury’s question. See also State v. Humphrey, 13 N.C. App. 138, 142, 184 S.E.2d 902, 904 (1971) (jury charge “must be considered as a whole, . . . with the presumption that the jury did not overlook any portion of it and if, when so construed, it presents the law fairly and correctly, there is no ground for reversal”). Defendant also contends that the court’s answer did not contain any reference to the State’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant could not have believed D.N.K. had authority to consent to his entry into her home. As the Court emphasized the State’s burden of proof elsewhere in the jury instructions, the failure to re-emphasize that burden here was not error. See State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 163-64, 604 S.E.2d 886, 906 (2004) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 163 L. Ed. 2d 79, 126

    ### Response:
    holding that a challenged jury instruction did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof when the trial court elsewhere instructed the jury that the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    duties “if the person ... interferes with a peace officer while the peace officer is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law.” Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 38.15(a)(1). Even if Meek was not obligated to take appellant into custody, he was acting within his discretionary authority to do so when he arrested appellant for not wearing a seatbelt. It is a violation of the Transportation Code to drive while not wearing a seatbelt. Tex TRAnsp. Code Ann. § 545.413 (Vernon 1999). The Transportation Code further provides that “any peace officer may arrest without warrant a person found committing a violation of this subtitle.” Tex. TRAnsp. Code Ann. § 543.001 (Vernon 1999); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (<HOLDING>). It is uncontested that appellant was not

    ### Response:
    holding that fourth amendment not violated when officer makes custodial arrest for driving without a seatbelt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims is not at issue in this appeal. 3 . The latter basis for dismissal served to dismiss Zeek’s ADEA claim as well. Also, none of the plaintiffs filed any charge with the EEOC at any time against GM. Accordingly, the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ ADEA claims against GM on this basis rather than on the ground of timeliness. 4 . The district court may have erred in dismissing plaintiffs' § 301 action on the basis of the Release under Rule 12. The defendants attached a copy of the Release to their motion to dismiss, but the plaintiffs had not referred to the Release in their complaint. A motion to dismiss relying on a paper outside the pleadings is generally permissible only where the complaint refers to that paper. Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Monroe Employees Ret. Sys.

    ### Response:
    recognizing dismissal as proper when based on those exhibits submitted by a defendant which can properly be considered as incorporated by reference into the complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because of her disability, and because of the disproportion in the parties’ earning potential. Robert argued that he was entitled to a disproportionate share of the parties’ estate because of the fraud committed by Elaine and her fault in the termination of their marriage. The record demonstrates, however, that the trial court’s disposition of the parties’ estate was not nearly as unequal as Elaine suggests. Each party was awarded the car that was in his or her possession. Elaine was able to keep all of the items that she removed from the house, including the disputed antique china cabinet, and she was able to keep half of the money that was in their joint account at the time that they separated. She was required to return to Robert the flat screen television that he won thro 93 (1888) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The trial court’s findings of fact did

    ### Response:
    holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the back door the causes of action that would not benefit from the delayed discovery doctrine under Davis. It is unlikely that the supreme court narrowed the delayed discovery doctrine in Davis on November 7, 2002, only to have it subsumed by equitable estoppel on November 27, 2002 in S.A.P. 8 . In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964), Justice Stewart wrote in a concurring opinion: I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [hard core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that. 9 . See, e.g., Jaszay v. H.B. Corp., 598 So.2d 112 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (<HOLDING>); Glantzis v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 573

    ### Response:
    holding nursing home estopped from raising statute of limitations defense when it stipulated to sixtyday extension of presuit screening period
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    federal courts that have encountered the FEGLIA preemption issue. Ms. Maretta cites a number of federal decisions that she claims stand for the proposition that FEGLIA preempts state laws providing for constructive trusts and other equitable remedies. In each of these federal cases, however, the plaintiffs asserted their entitlement to the decedent’s FEGLI proceeds through a divorce decree or separation agreement that required the insured to maintain his or her FEGLI policy for their benefit. These courts, employing the Ridgway rationale, held that the divorce decrees at issue directly conflicted with the FEGLIA provision granting an insured the absolute right to designate any beneficiaiy that he or she chooses. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Zaldivar, 413 F.3d 119, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Christ, 979

    ### Response:
    holding that feglia preempted a state divorce decree which ordered the insured to maintain his fegli policy for the benefit of his children from his first marriage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for student’s agreement to successfully complete degree requirement, abide by school’s guidelines, and pay tuition, court stated student had to prove existence of contract containing terms upon which she based her suit). The First Court of Appeals held that a school’s catalog constitutes a written contract between the educational institution and the student, where entrance is had under its terms. See University of Tex. H atalog contained express language that “[t]he provisions of this catalog do not constitute a contract, express or implied, between any applicant, student, or faculty member and The University of Texas at Arlington or The University of Texas System,” negating inference of intent by school to be bound its terms, no contract existed); Eiland, 764 S.W.2d at 838 (<HOLDING>). The Laws contend they have tendered

    ### Response:
    holding that where catalog contained express notice that the provisions of this catalog are subject to change without notice and do not constitute an irrevocable contract between any student  and the university of texas medical school at galveston no enforceable contract existed because express language negated any intent by school to be bound
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Crowder v. Housing Auth. of City of Atlanta, 990 F.2d 586, 591 (11th Cir.1993) (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 46 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)). As such, “the government may restrict access to limited public fora by content-neutral conditions for the time, place, and manner of access, all of which must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.” Id. (citing Peory, 460 U.S. at 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948). There is a significant governmental interest in conducting orderly, efficient meetings of public bodies. Jones, 888 F.2d at 1332. One recognized way to conduct orderly, efficient meetings under Jones is for public bodies, such as a city council, to confine their meetings to specified subject matter. Id. at 1333 (<HOLDING>); see also Kindt v. Santa Monica Rent Control

    ### Response:
    holding that the removal of a public speaker by the mayor at a city commission meeting was not a first amendment violation and thus permissible because to deny the presiding officer the authority to regulate irrelevant debate and disruptive behavior at a public meeting  would cause such meetings to drag on interminably and deny others the opportunity to voice their opinions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 821-23, 105 S.Ct. 2965). 48 . See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir.1996) (""A requirement that a court know which law will apply before making a predominance determination is especially important when there may be differences in state law.”); In re Baycol Products Litigation, 218 F.R.D. 197, 207, 211-12 (D.Minn.2003) (addressing the choice-of-law issue as it pertains to Rule 23(b)(3), and pointing out the how the differences in state law preclude the formation of a medical monitoring class under 23(b)(2)); In re Propulsid, 208 F.R.D. at 145 (addressing the choice-of-law as its own factor, and then applying it to the proposed 23(b)(2) class); In re Paxil Litigation, 212 F.R.D. 539, 544-45 (C.D.Cal. 2003) (<HOLDING>). 49 . Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) requires the

    ### Response:
    holding that choiceoflaw issues prevented a manageable class under rule 23a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not when the action for fraud was or should have been discovered. Boyle v. GMC, [468 Mich. 226] 661 N.W.2d 557, 558, 559-60 (Mich.2003). Although Khadher was not harmed until September 1, 2007, when the interest rate first changed, his cause of action accrued at closing on July 23, 2004. Consequently, the action expired on July 23, 2010. Khadher also asserts that Trott’s attorneys’ defrauded him by double charging him for attorney’s fees. The May 23, 2011 letter, however, identifies one charge for legal fees and the other for legal costs. Under the terms of the Mortgage, PNC can collect reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in pursuing remedies caused by the borrower’s default. See United Growth Corp. v. Kelly Mortgage & Inv. Co., 86 Mich.App. 82, 272 N.W.2d 340, 344 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Khader does not allege that the fees were

    ### Response:
    holding attorney fees may be allowed for expenses incurred for default
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judgment with respect to Cerezo’s Title VII and Law 100 hostile work environment claims is DENIED. Finally, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Cerezo had obtained proper authorization for his extended vacation period, and, therefore, whether Ferrovial had just cause to terminate his employment. Ferrovial’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Cerezo’s Law 80 claim is therefore DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . Defendant failed to file a reply to plaintiffs opposing statement of uncontested material facts contained in Docket No. 15-1. Because the additional facts alleged in plaintiff's opposition were supported by citations to appropriate record materials, see Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli, Axtmayer & Hertell v. Medfit Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d 686 (1st Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>), those facts are deemed admitted by defendant

    ### Response:
    holding that unsworn statements signed under penalty of peijury can be used to oppose a motion for summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is no longer available. We held that the claimant’s quitting his job due to lack of transportation did not justify reinstatement of his benefits because his loss of earning power was unrelated to his disability. In Beattie, the claimant sustained a disabling work-related injury. Subsequently, his benefits were suspended when the claimant returned to work as a church minister for another employer without a wage loss. However, the claimant became uncomfortable with the position and, eventually, quit because of stress and interpersonal problems. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that he was not entitled to reinstatement of total disability benefits. 12 . When an employer that seeks to modify a claimant’s benefits ref ard of Review, 59 Pa.Cmwlth. 627, 430 A.2d 722 (1981) (<HOLDING>). In other words, by instituting the transfer

    ### Response:
    holding that the necessity either to relocate or commute 80100 miles each way daily constituted good cause for the claimant to decline reassignment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unauthenticated, and failed to identify the authors. Id. Those weaknesses do not exist in Zhang’s affidavits. Nevertheless, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to fully credit this evidence. Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir.2005) (noting that only corroboration was a letter from a family member who did not witness incident and who was not subject to cross examination). Moreover, even if the affidavits could be credited, they are insufficient to establish changed country conditions in China. The affidavits’ largely anecdotal descriptions of religious persecution do not demonstrate that conditions had worsened in China for Christians since the time of Zhang’s merits hearing in 2001. See Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In addition, we agree that the documentary

    ### Response:
    holding that an asylum applicant must make a showing of a particularized threat of persecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judge continued the polling, and when all of the other jurors responded that they found the defendant guilty, the judge returned to questioning the first juror, who eventually changed her verdict. We held that “to continue the poll in the absence of ... a request [by defense counsel] is error.” 273 A.2d at 845. Finally, in Kendall the first juror revealed during a poll that she had found the defendant not guilty on one of the seven counts at issue. The judge clarified that he was asking about the first co C.1983) (affirming a conviction because “unspoken communicative factors play[ed] a large role” in understanding what a juror meant when she said, “Guilty, I guess”); Ellis v. United States, 395 A.2d 404, 408 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct. 2830, 61 L.Ed.2d 280 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Those cases are distinguishable on their

    ### Response:
    holding that it was not reversible error to continue polling the remaining jurors on all counts when the disputed count was later dismissed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on a motion for summary disposition. Shepherd Montessori Ctr Milan v Ann Arbor Charter Twp, 486 Mich 311, 317; 783 NW2d 695 (2010). In addition, the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Eggleston v Bio-Med Applications of Detroit, Inc, 468 Mich 29, 32; 658 NW2d 139 (2003). The proper interpretation of a contract is also a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 464; 703 NW 2d 23 (2005). III. ANALYSIS A. POLICIES AS CONTRACTS Insurance policies are contracts and, in the absence of an applicable statute ance policy is not mandated by statute, the rights and limitations of the coverage are entirely contractual and construed without reference to the statute. See Rory, 473 Mich at 465-466 (<HOLDING>). In addition, because insurance policies are

    ### Response:
    holding that because uninsuredmotorist coverage is optional and not mandated by statute the rights and limitations of such coverage are purely contractual and construed without reference to the nofault act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by license plate holders such as the one on which plaintiff bruised his knee. “Reasonable care is determined in light of whether or not a particular danger was foreseeable.” Syverson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 19 F.3d 824, 826 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 117, 83 S.Ct. 659, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963)). In Syverson, we allowed a negligence claim to go forward because the employer had received complaints about the alleged hazard and another employee had suffered injury in the past. 19 F.3d at 827. In this case, plaintiff adduced no evidence indicating that CSXT knew or should have known that license plate holders posed a risk to workers or even that one was affixed to the vehicle in question. See Higgins v. Metro-North R.R., 318 F.3d 422, 427 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Gallose v. Long Island R.R., 878 F.2d 80, 85

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff who fails to demonstrate employers awareness of any particular threat posed by circumstance at issue cannot prove negligence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1) drinking alcoholic beverages during pregnancy can lead to fetal alcohol syndrome, a condition characterized by mental retardation, prenatal and postnatal growth deficiencies, and facial anomalies; (2) a pregnant woman’s failure to obtain prenatal care or proper nutrition also can affect the status of the newborn child; (3) poor nutrition can cause a variety of birth defects: insufficient prenatal intake of vitamin A can cause eye abnormalities and impaired vision; insufficient doses of vitamin C ór riboflavin can cause premature births; (4) poor prenatal care can lead to insufficient or excessive weight gain, which also- affects the fetus; and (5) some research has suggested that consuming caffeine during pregnancy contributes to low birth weight. Id. One court outside of ou 91) (<HOLDING>); People v. Hardy, 188 Mich.App. 305, 469

    ### Response:
    holding child abuse statute clearly did not apply to fetuses and therefore did not apply to a mother who ingested cocaine during pregnancy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appear in their pleadings in the record before us. 20 . Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 4590i, § 1.03(a)(4) (“ ‘Health care liability claim' means a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant, whether the claimant’s claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.”) (repealed 2003) (current version at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 74.001(a)(13)); Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 849-54 (Tex.2005); Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 885 n. 10 (Tex.1999). 21 . Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 849 (<HOLDING>). 22 . Garland Cmty. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d

    ### Response:
    holding claim that negligent supervision caused assault was health care liability claim because it was inseparable from the health care and nursing services provided
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    202 (1986). 87 . Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. 88 . Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.1987); Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). 89 . Gowland v. Aetna, 143 F.3d 951, 953 (5th Cir.1998) (citing 44 C.F.R. §§ 61.4(b), 61.13(d)). 90 . Id. at 954; Wright v. Allstate Insurance Co., 415 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir.2005). 91 . Richardson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 279 Fed.Appx. 295, 298 (5th Cir.2008) (citing 44 C.F.R. pt. 61, app. A(l) art. VII(R)). 92 . Copeland v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2004 WL 325577 (E.D.La. Feb. 18, 2004) citing Gowland, 143 F.3d at 954. 93 .Kidd v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 392 Fed.Appx. 241, 244 (5th Cir.2010) (citing Marseilles Homeowners Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Fid. Nat’l Ins. Co., 542 F.3d 1053, 1055-56 (5th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>)); 44 C.F.R. § 61, app. (A)(1), arts. VII(J),

    ### Response:
    holding that the insured could not maintain a lawsuit for additional federal benefits because he had not submitted a sworn proof of loss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Individual Defendants acted outside the scope of authority because the Complaint alleges wrongful actions,” id. at 395, and that Lockamy and Wood were “not entitled to sovereign immunity because they were merely employees of SCTC and were not ‘tribal officials,’ ” id. at 397. II Two issues are presented for our resolution on appeal: (1) whether the district court correctly concluded that SCTC was entitled to tribal immunity; and (2) whether the court correctly concluded that the Individual Defendants were also entitled to the protection of tribal immunity. SCTC’s Immunity from Suit Indian tribes are “domestic dependent nations” with sovereignty over their members and terr Ed.2d 119 (2007); Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315, 320 (10th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). While the Supreme Court has expressed

    ### Response:
    holding that an inn which was a subentity of the tribe rather than a separate corporate entity enjoyed tribal immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Developer stating that since the moratorium, the Developer “has been effectively forced to leave its ... property economically idle.” The affidavit appears to be based on consultation with land-use experts, but does not explain who they are, what they considered, or what then-opinions are, and the affidavit also appears to admit that agricultural use of the property is possible, but denies that it is “economically viable.” In our view, this self-serving affidavit without any explanation of the underlying factual basis for its conclusions does not serve to create a material issue of fact that “all reasonable beneficial use” of the property has been deprived by the County’s actions. See Galvan v. City of Albuquerque, 85 N.M. 42, 44-45, 508 P.2d 1339, 1341-42 (Ct.App.1973) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, summary judgment was properly

    ### Response:
    holding that affidavits must set forth facts admissible in evidence and explain its conclusions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    activities that Congress may regulate as part of its commerce power: First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce____ Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may only come from intrastate activities .... Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, ... i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30 (internal citations omitted). As in Lopez, the first and second categories are not relevant to defendant’s constitutional challenge to the statute. See id. at 559, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (<HOLDING>). The prohibition on violence for the purpose

    ### Response:
    holding the first two categories inapplicable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remedies should be excused because he was transferred to another facility. Lindsey does not contend that there were any problems at the new facility that prevented him from filing grievances regarding the incident at the Coastal Bend Detention Center and has not alleged how his transfer otherwise impeded his ability to file a grievance within the required time period. See Dillon, 596 F.3d at 267-68. He furthermore has not shown that he should be excused from exhaustion because he was denied access to an adequate law library. He does not set forth any specific legal materials that were withheld or articulate how a deficient law library or lack of legal resources prevented him from filing a timely grievance. Cf Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-54, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Lindsey did not properly exhaust

    ### Response:
    holding that an inmate alleging denial of access to the courts must show an actual injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a trust account is necessary to promote the ends of justice. We find particular support for our holding in the rule stated in Turcotte v. Trevino, 499 S.W.2d 705 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.), on remand, 544 S.W.2d 463 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 564 S.W.2d 682 (Tex.1978). In that case, the Texas Court of Appeals wrote: “Where one having the right to accept or reject a transaction takes and retains benefits thereunder, he ordinarily ratifies the transaction, is bound by it, and cannot avoid its obligation or effect by taking a position inconsistent with it at a later time.” 499 S.W.2d at 712. Although the Texas Supreme Court reversed the Turcotte• decision, it left this basic rule intact. See Turcotte, 564 S.W.2d at 685-86 (<HOLDING>). We believe appellant’s actions fall within

    ### Response:
    holding that it is a fundamental rule of law that a person cannot take any beneficial interest under a transaction and then adopt a position even if well founded that would defeat the transaction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    333 U.S. 426, 431, 68 S.Ct. 641, 644, 92 L.Ed. 784 (1948)); see also Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1563 (11th Cir.1988) (explaining grant or denial of equitable relief lies in the discretion of the district court). Mandamus, which is an extreme form of equitable relief, “is a writ designed to require an official to perform an act required by law.” See Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 904 F.2d 585, 587 (11th Cir.1990). Although the writ of mandamus was abolished by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(b), federal courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000); see also Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1385 (11th Cir.1998) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to their powers under 28 U.S.C. §

    ### Response:
    recognizing the writ of mandamus may issue to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the failure to carry out a ministerial task
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in order to obtain or thwart collateral litigation matters, like those contained in motions for discovery sanctions, motions for protective orders, or motions for sanctions under Rule 1-341.” Id. As did the Folder court, we too have reviewed the text of Rule 2—313 (f) and the pertinent meeting minutes of the Rules Committee. We conclude, as did that court, that a decision dispositive of a claim or defense is one intrinsic to the underlying action. Further, the decision must “actually and formally dispose of the claim or defense,” Shelton v. Kirson, 119 Md.App. 325, 330, 705 A.2d 25, 27 (1998). An order denying a motion to quash a subpoena issued by the Commission is not such a decision. See Unnamed Attorney v. Attorney Grievance Comm’n, 303 Md. 473, 480-81, 494 A.2d 940, 943-44 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Rather, the court’s denial of the motion to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that notwithstanding the finality of such orders for appeal purposes the underlying investigative proceeding persists
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Moore also took steps to try 5 F.2d at 550; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237). To the contrary, Morganti readily conceded that it always maintained sufficient funding for critical path work and that there was never a time when it lacked sufficient funding to proceed. Mr. Menefee, Morganti’s contract administrator, testified that Morganti never allowed its difficulties with getting money for CPC’s and modifications to affect critical path work, and that Morganti always provided funding necessary to pay the subcontractors. In fact, Morganti conceded on summary judgment that the FBOP’s payment errors never delayed Morganti. Thus, money was not the source of its inability to complete the contract work on time. D.W. Sandau Dredging, 96-1 BCA ¶ 28,064, at 140,161-62, 1995 WL 739023 (<HOLDING>). Morganti argues that its ability to perform

    ### Response:
    holding that continued performance is relevant to materiality where contractors performance failures were not caused by financial situation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was no appeal here — interlocutory or otherwise — relating to the district court’s declaration of mistrial. Therefore, ""the action occasioning retrial” must be the declaration of mistrial itself. See United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1227 (7th Cir.) (noting that, where no party appealed declaration of mistrial, ""there is no dispute that following the mistrial ..., the government had seventy days in which to retry the defendant”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1002, 115 S.Ct. 515, 130 L.Ed.2d 422 (1994). 4 . Compare United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 358 (2d Cir.1995) (stating that ""[t]he length of an exclusion for complexity must be ... limited in time”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1671, 134 L.Ed.2d 776 (1996), and United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) with United States v. Twitty, 107 F.3d 1482,

    ### Response:
    holding that speedy trial act requires that an ends of justice continuance be specifically limited in time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. We agree with the reasoning in these cases. We thus hold that wills should be construed by the law as it existed when the testator died, thereby excluding adopted children as beneficiaries unless the will indicates an intent to include adopted children. In the instant case, the probate court determined that Jenkins did not intend to include his daughters’ adopted children as beneficiaries of his testamentary trust. In making its determination, the probate court considered the law as it existed in 1944, when Jenkins executed his will. At that time, Colorado law presumed that adopted children were not included as beneficiaries unless the testator expressly included the term “adopted children” in the will. See Brunton v. International Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P.2d 472 (1945) (<HOLDING>). The law presumes that Jenkins knew the law in

    ### Response:
    holding that when a testator makes provision for a child or children of another person an adopted child of the other person is not included unless other language in the will makes it clear that the adopted child was intended to be included
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ""include but not limited to” and ""etc.” (Def. Opp. at 8:15-9:3; Aug.2000 Mot. at 3:11-16, 8:8-9:11). Defendants’ final argument that the Government was not misled by the non-inclusion of I & M does not impact whether the statement was, nevertheless, false. Rather, if true, this factor would go towards the materiality of the statement or damages. Thus, this argument will be discussed later in section II.D.3 of this Order. 20 . To the extent that Plaintiff bases her claim on 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2), it should be noted that there is a ""double falsehood” requirement. See United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 2003 WL 22048255, *1 (D.Mass. Aug. 22, 2003); see also United States ex rel. Bustamante v. United Way/Crusade of Mercy, Inc., 2000 WL 690250, *4 (N.D.Ill. May 24, 2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in addition to the elements of a prima

    ### Response:
    holding that the elements of a claim under  3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of use of the parish properties to determine whether they qualify for tax exemptions under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, and contends that the properties here were insufficiently used for religious worship or religious purposes by the Archdiocese to permit such exemptions. The Archdiocese asserts that such an examination by the court would amount to an impermissible intrusion into the religious activities of the Roman Catholic Church, and thus would violate the Church’s First Amendment protections under the United States Constitution and similar protections under the New Jersey Constitution. N.J. Const., art. I H1Í 3 and 4. I. Inquiry Into Religious Use In determining whether a religious organization is entitled to a tax exemption for its property, the courts in New Jerse 92, 437 A.2d 1291 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The New Jersey Constitution of 1947 also

    ### Response:
    holding that denial of tax exemption for part of church property that was not necessary for occupancy and enjoyment of church did not violate first amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    state rebuts the defendant’s claim by showing no government inducement. 7 . See e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646,48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973); State v. Keating, 551 S.W.2d 589, 592-93 (Mo. banc 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071, 98 S.Ct. 1255, 55 L.Ed.2d 775 (1978). 8 . See United States v. Anderton, 629 F.2d 1044, 1047-48 n. 3 (5th Cir.1980) (uncontradicted testimony of both defendant and unwitting government agent that the agent pressured de fendant into making bribery payments was insufficient to establish entrapment as a matter of law since “the jury could have rejected their testimony”). 9 . But cf. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373, 78 S.Ct. 819, 821, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958) (<HOLDING>). DONNELLY, Judge, dissenting. In State v.

    ### Response:
    holding that if the undisputed testimony of the prosecutions witnesses establishes or corroborates an entrapment defense entrapment is established as a matter of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. at 455, 105 S.Ct. at 2104, 85 L.Ed.2d at 466. The Benchimol Court declined to impose an implied obligation to enthusiastically advocate for the recommended sentence under the federal plea bargain rule. Id. at 455, 105 S.Ct. at 2105, 85 L.Ed.2d at 466 (""But our view of Rule 11 ([c]) is that it speaks in terms of what the parties in fact agree to, and does not suggest that such implied-in-law terms as were read into this agreement by the Court of Appeals have any place under the Rule.""). By contrast, long after Benchimol was decided in 1985, we reiterated the prosecutor’s obligation under Iowa law is to not only recite the recommended sentence but also indicate that it is "" 'worthy of the court’s acceptance.’ ” Bearse, 748 N.W.2d at 216 (quoting Horness, 600 N.W.2d at 299-300 (<HOLDING>)). The Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure

    ### Response:
    recognizing prosecutors implicit obligation to refrain from suggesting more severe sentencing alternatives
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Persons at 1091; Stephanie I. Splane, Tort Liability of the Mentally III in Negligence Actions, 93 Yale L.J. 153, 157-58, 169 (1983). 18 Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons at 1084-85; Splane, Tort Liability of the Mentally III at 156 n.20. 19 In Payne v. Milwaukee Sanitarium Found., Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 264, 270, 260 N.W.2d 386 (1977), the court said: It was not too long ago that hospitals for the mentally ill were known as asylums for the insane. Emphasis was (S.C. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 412 S.E.2d 417 (S.C. 1991) (observing that for subjective standard to apply, the plaintiffs mental capacity must be diminished to a degree that makes the plaintiff totally unable to appreciate danger); Galindo v. TMT Transp., Inc., 733 P.2d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (<HOLDING>); Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Appleton,

    ### Response:
    holding that ordinary standard of care determines whether a mentally disabled plaintiff can be contributorily negligent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    195 Cal. App.4th 414, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 616, 618 (Cal.App.2011), Division 3 of California’s Fourth District Court of Appeal, agreed with Mendez and disagreed with Ramirez, stating that it “perceive[d] no sound basis to distinguish Graham’s reasoning where a term of years beyond the juvenile’s life expectancy is tantamount to an LWOP term.” The California Supreme Court recently granted review of these decisions. See People v. Caballero, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 250 P.3d 179 (2011), People v. Ramirez, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 255 P.3d 948 (2011), and People v. Nunez, 128 Cal. Rptr.3d 274, 255 P.3d 951 (2011). Unlike California, Georgia courts are, so far, consistent in their view that Graham is not implicated in a term-of-years sentence. See Adams v. State, 288 Ga. 695, 707 S.E.2d 359 (2011) (<HOLDING>); Middleton v. State, 313 Ga.App. 193, 721

    ### Response:
    holding that sentence of mandatory twentyfive years followed by life on probation for aggravated molestation of a fouryearold child does not implicate categorical eighth amendment restriction under graham nor is it grossly disproportionate for particular crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of 210 months’ imprisonment. Under the post -Booker advisory guideline regime, the district court must still consider the applicable guideline range of 188— 235 months, but it may vary from the range if it concludes reasonably that factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) warrant a different sentence. Even under the mandatory guidelines, however, the district court was able to consider the § 3553(a) factors in determining where within the mandatory range Brooks should be sentenced. That the court elected a sentence of 210 months from within the range of 188 to 235 months gives us confidence that the added flexibility of the post-Booker regime would not have led the district court to impose a more favorable sentence. See United States v. Perez-Ramirez, 415 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Brooks has not raised any argument, after

    ### Response:
    holding that where district court left unused some of its discretion to impose a more favorable sentence nonconstitutional booker error was harmless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a remand— will the employer finally be able to argue to this Court that the full commission correctly held Bone’s claim was not compensable back in June of 2008. Because I believe the issue of compensability was finally decided by the full commission and the circuit court, sitting in an appellate capacity, could not thwart further appellate review by ordering a remand, I would find the order appealable under section 1-23-390. See Mungo, 383 S.C. at 278, 678 S.E.2d at 829 (“Although the circuit court remanded the issue of the precise damages to be awarded to Claimant, the single commissioner would have no choice but to award some damages to Claimant. Accordingly, the circuit court’s order constitutes a final decision and is appealable.”); Brown, 366 S.C. at 387-88, 622 S.E.2d at 551 (<HOLDING>). Nothing in Charlotte-Meeklenburg impacts this

    ### Response:
    holding circuit courts order that apportionment was required was final and appealable even though the court remanded for a determination of the amount of apportionment due
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for Indemnity. H. Economic Loss Doctrine Defendant argues that an essential element of each of Plaintiffs tort-based causes of action is an injury or damage proximately caused by Defendant’s tortious conduct. Defendant asserts that for each tort-based cause of action, the economic loss rule bars recovery because Plaintiff has not put forth evidence showing tangible, physical injury to the Wellfield. Under Ohio law, the economic loss rule “prevents recovery in tort of damages for purely economic losses. The well-established general rule is that a plaintiff who has suffered only economic loss due to another’s negligence has not been injured in a manner which is legally cognizable or compensable.” Ashtabula River Corp. Grp. II v. Conrail, Inc., 549 F.Supp.2d 981, 987 (N.D.Ohio 2008) (<HOLDING>). In other words, “indirect economic damages

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiffs public nuisance claim was barred by the economic loss rule because it wasnt actually a landowner of the site and thus there was no allegation of harm to any property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    However, the cases plaintiffs point us to do not support their argument on appeal. First, in most of these cases, the Circuit Courts were focused on the effect of Lingle on their Takings Clause precedent, not their substantive due process case law. See, e.g., Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1277-82 (Fed. Cir.2009) (discussing how the Agins inquiry is now obsolete after Lingle and examining Lingle’s effect on regulatory takings cases). Second, the Circuit Courts that did find Lingle affected their substantive due process jurisprudence had earlier precedent holding that all property rights-based substantive due process claims were preempted or supplanted by the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 852 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also A Helping Hand, LLC v. Balt. Cnty.,

    ### Response:
    holding that prior circuit precedent that the fifth amendments takings clause subsumes or preempts substantive due process claims was undermined by lingle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    incriminating. Id. at 36, 120 S.Ct. 2037. In that case, the production itself communicated a “statement[ ] of fact”; it proved that the documents existed, were authentic, and were in the custody of the producer. Id. at 36,120 S.Ct. 2037 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). There, the Supreme Court held that the physical production was a violation of the Fifth Amendment because the preparation of the produced documents was the only means through which the government obtained the evidence which led to the indictment. Id. at 42-43,120 S.Ct. 2037. This case, however, is more akin to the physical trait cases. Tattoos which are openly visible on the body are physical traits, as are voice, appearance, and handwriting. See United States v. Bay, 762 F.2d 1314, 1815-16 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Cf. United States v. Williams, 461 F.3d 441,

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant need not take the stand to be able to show the jury the tattoos on his hands which were an openly visible physical characteristic
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    since Elkin lacked standing to file a complaint for support, this action must be dismissed. Accordingly, we remand this action to the trial court directing that the order of support be vacated and the complaint for support be dismissed on the basis of lack of standing. We further direct that Mother be reimbursed any monies paid as a result of the existing support order. ¶ 12 We further note that even though Mother has the parental duty of supporting her child “until [her] child reaches 18 or graduates from high school, whichever event occurs later,” Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521, 529, 616 A.2d 628, 633 (1992), she does not have to be subjected to her child dictating how or to whom the support should be allocated. See Oeler by Gross v. Oeler, 527 Pa. 532, 534-36, 594 A.2d 649, 650 (1991) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 13 In the present case, it is clear from

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court properly terminated fathers obligation to support his seventeenyearold daughter who refused to live with father but instead chose to reside in her own apartment after her mother moved out of state where daughter offered no justifiable reason for not living with her father daughter only contended that her stepmother was too neat for her and that she wanted to live closer to her friends
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    liens on all three tracts. They then brought suit for breach of contract against PSL and foreclosure against Enterprise Bank. The master did not rule on the claims against PSL but entered money judgments against Enterprise Bank. We hold the master had no authority to enter money judgments in the respondents’ foreclosure actions against Enterprise Bank. The procedures for enforcing a mechanic’s lien are provided by statute, see S.C.Code Ann. §§ 29-5-10 to -440 (2007 & Supp.2013), and “must be strictly followed.” Cohen’s Drywall Co. v. Sea Spray Homes, LLC, 374 S.C. 195, 199, 648 S.E.2d 598, 600 (2007). A court cannot depart from the plain language of the statute when enforcing a mechanic’s lien. See Zepsa Constr., Inc v. Randazzo, 357 S.C. 32, 38, 591 S.E.2d 29, 32 (Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Shelley Constr. Co. v. Sea Garden Homes,

    ### Response:
    holding a party was limited to recovery provided for by the strict terms of the mechanics lien statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court had no jurisdiction. 22 . See, e.g., Leisnoi, Inc. v. United States, 170 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.1999); McMaster v. United States, 177 F.3d 936, 939-40 (11th Cir.1999); Cadorette v. United States, 988 F.2d 215, 223 (1st Cir.1993). Leisnoi’s holding that “a third party’s claim of an interest of the United States can suffice if it clouds the plaintiff's title” is inapplicable here because the Levee District asserts its own title interest; it is not asserting a title interest on behalf of the United States. 170 F.3d at 1192. 23 . - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2199, 183 L.Ed.2d 211 (2012). 24 . 5 U.S.C. § 702. 25 . 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a)i 26 . Patchak, 132 S.Ct. at 2205. 27 . Id. at 2210. 28 . Id. at 2207 (internal quotations omitted). 29 . See also Block, 461 U.S. at 286, 103 S.Ct. 1811

    ### Response:
    holding that congress intended the qta to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the united states title to real property emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court held that, “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The issue of retroactivity turns on whether the rule is considered procedural or substantive. While substantive rules are automatically applied retroactively, holdings dictating methods of criminal procedure, such as the Apprendi holding, are presumptively non-retroactive. See Rosario v. United States, No. 00 Civ. 9695, 2001 WL 1006641, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.30, 2001); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 619-20, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (<HOLDING>). A majority of the courts that have considered

    ### Response:
    holding that procedural rules are presumptively nonretroactive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) (<HOLDING>). He adds that “property exceeding $20” is an

    ### Response:
    holding that state may not subject indigent defendants to period of imprisonment beyond statutory maximum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argues that the district court correctly determined from the record that postoperative negligence had not been raised at the trial level, i.e., that the theory of postoperative negligence was neither pled in the complaint nor tried by consent, and, consequently, Aills’ closing argument concerning postoperative negligence was improper. The district court found the statement made by Dr. Boemi’s counsel during the sidebar conference “that opposing counsel’s remarks were improper because of the absence of any basis in the record ‘that postoperative care was negligent’ and ‘that it would have made a difference,’ ” 990 So.2d at 544, to have sufficiently asserted the legal grounds for his objection with the specificity required by law. We rlando v. Birmingham, 539 So.2d 1133, 1135 (Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>). Here, Dr. Boemi’s objection did not

    ### Response:
    holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    — the “subject to” language. In giving deference to the Secretary’s position, the Court held: The Secretary’s approach rejects a wooden requirement of actual deductions, but in their absence it requires a clear and particularized policy — one which “effectively communicates” that deductions will be made under specified circumstances. This avoids the imposition of massive and unanticipated overtime liability ... in situations in which a vague or broadly worded policy is nominally applicable to a whole range of personnel but is not “significantly likely” to be invoked against salaried employees. Id. at 910. The instant case presents an issue that has not been addressed by the Second Ci L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(<HOLDING>), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition

    ### Response:
    holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employees status
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974, 96 S.Ct. 2173, 48 L.Ed.2d 798 (1976). See also Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1251-52 (4th Cir.1985) (applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to a Section 1985 conspiracy alleging violation of plaintiffs’ First Amendment and due process rights). See also Doherty, 728 F.2d at 339-40 (applying the intracorpo-rate conspiracy doctrine to a Section 1985(2) case alleging a corporate conspiracy to coerce plaintiff-employee to enter nolo contendere plea to federal bribery charges). For public policy reasons, however, the First and Third Circuits have refused to apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to Section 1985 cases alleging conspiracies to discriminate on the basis of race or sex. See Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20-21 (1st Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the Third Circuit rejected the

    ### Response:
    holding the logic of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in antitrust cases does not warrant its extension to civil rights cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that ""[t]he Supreme Court's analysis of the justifications for access to the criminal courtroom apply as well to the civil trial.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir.1983) (vacating the lower court's order to seal certain F.T.C. documents filed in the court’s record during a preen-forcement challenge to proposed changes in cigarette testing) (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n. 17, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (noting that historically civil trials have been presumptively open, but declining to decide whether they enjoy a First Amendment right of access because the issue was not before the Court)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1595, 80 L.Ed.2d 127 (1984). See, e.g., Smith v. United States Dist. Court, 956 F.2d 647, 650 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 23 . Code of Student Conduct, Miami

    ### Response:
    recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition....” Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for ""the United States District Courts, Rule 4. III. DISCUSSION Defendant requests that the Court reconsider his sentence of 46 months incarceration in light of the fact that the Court sentenced Alicia Gaytan to 38 months of incarceration for related charges. The Court finds that Defendant’s request shall be denied for the reasons described herein. Courts have consistently held that the mere fact that a codefendant receives a lesser sentence than defendant is not a basis for granting relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See generally, e.g., Hilbrich v. United States, 371 F.2d 826 (7th Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>); Montalvo v. United States, 174 F.Supp.2d 10,

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    second-category Lopez power. Marek, 238 F.3d at 318 (footnote omitted) (quoting Photogrammetric Data Services, 103 F.Supp.2d at 882). Other courts have reached similar conclusions, upholding convictions based upon criminal statutes which serve to protect instrumentalities of interstate commerce even though the specific conduct involved arose from intrastate activities. For example, in United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273 (8th Cir.1996), the Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction of a police officer under the Travel Act, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952(a) (West 2000), premised upon extortion activity in which the officer escorted his victim, a man he had arrested, to an automatic teller machine to withdraw money in return for being released from custody. Because an interstate networ 9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1527

    ### Response:
    holding that because cellular telephones and cellphone id numbers are instrumentalities of interstate commerce protectable under the second category of lopez no further inquiry was necessary to sustain conviction under 18 usca  1029a west 2000
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    significantly, whether or not the Justice Department can be said to have been authorized to represent STS residents, this Court finds that the Justice Department did not adequately represent such residents. A finding of inadequate representation is required based upon the above discussion of the limited causes of action and types of relief available to and pursued by the Justice Department in United States v. Connecticut. Since the Justice Department did not seek all of the types of relief which plaintiffs seek in this case, it follows directly that the Justice Department’s representation was inadequate from a res judicata perspective, and that the plaintiffs are therefore not in privity with the United States. See Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201, 1203 (2d Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 981, 93 S.Ct. 1893,

    ### Response:
    holding that six employees bringing suit under title vii were not in privity with the united states which had brought a previous suit against the same employer because the employees sought a type of relief which the united states had not sought
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    taken away by government regulation”) (quoting Allen v. City and County of Honolulu, 58 Haw. 432, 571 P.2d 328, 329 (1977)); Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council of City & County of Honolulu, 61 Haw. 390, 606 P.2d 866, 902 (1980) (""The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on a change of position on the part of a land developer by substantial expenditure of money in connection with his project in reliance, not solely on existing zoning laws or on good faith expectancy that his development will be permitted, but on official assurance on which he has a right to rely that his project has met zoning requirements, that necessary approvals will be forthcoming in due course, and he may safely proceed with the project.”); Denning v. County of Maui, 52 Haw. 653, 485 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1971) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v.

    ### Response:
    holding that a zoning estoppel plaintiff must show that he or she has been given assurances of some form by the county that his or her proposed construction met zoning requirements and that he or she had a right lo rely on such assurances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (finding that a prosecutor’s appearance at a probable cause hearing is “connected with the initiation and conduct of a prosecution, particularly where the hearing occurs after arrest ...” (emphasis added)); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1994) (“According to the complaint, the interrogation and payments took place early in the investigation, while the prosecutors were just beginning to piece events together. Thus there cannot be absolute immunity.”); Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 368 (7th Cir.1992) (finding that because the alleged prosecutorial acts took place after conviction, the prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity); White, 369 Ill.App.3d. at 772, 308 Ill.Dec. 518, 861 N.E.2d 1083 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the temporal remoteness of the

    ### Response:
    holding that the timing of the alleged actions of the prosecutor supported the courts conclusion that the prosecutors actions were associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process instead of the investigatory phase because the conduct occurred one month before plaintiffs trial and more than five years after the grand jury indicted plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that bar does not extend to his requests for withholding of removal or CAT protection. We conclude, however, that because the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence, Aung did not meet his burden of establishing his eligibility for these forms of relief. See Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir.2004) (reviewing an adverse credibility determination for substantial evidence). There was an inconsistency in Aung’s testimony regarding the date he joined the National League for Democracy (“NLD”) and there was an inconsistency as to whether Aung participated in NLD political activities during his foreign business travels. Because Aung claimed persecution based on his political beliefs, these inconsistencies go to the heart of his claim. See id. (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. ** This

    ### Response:
    holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decision on the basis that “no evidence was presented” by means of which the director could have found that the employee was physically capable of cutting cores on June 18,1993. With this conclusion and the inherent requirement it weaves into an otherwise. unambiguous statute, we disagree. Had the Legislature deemed it necessary to insert into the statute a requirement that an employer present expert medical testimony that at the precise time an offer of light-duty work is tendered by the employer the employee was physically capable of performing that assignment, the Legislature could have done so. Our careful review of the statutory language and our prior decisions in interpretation thereof reveal no such rigid requirement. See Worcester Textile v. McIntosh, 593 A.2d 70, 73 (R.I.1991) (<HOLDING>). Although we agree that there was not an

    ### Response:
    recognizing that medical evidence need not address employees physical capability to perform the particular job offered but rather the capacity of that employee for workrelated activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to appeal on August 30, 2005. The petitioner’s conviction ther to file his habeas petition. The petitioner filed his habeas petition on June 23, 2008, within that time frame. But to toll the one-year habeas statute, a post-conviction motion must be “properly filed,” see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), and the respondent contends that the petitioner’s application for leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of the post-conviction motion was not properly filed because it was not submitted within 21 days. However, the petitioner filed a delayed application within the time allowed by the state court rules. See Mich. Ct. R. 7.205(F). In Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780 (6th Cir.2003), the Sixth Circuit, applying Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-21, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002) (<HOLDING>), held that the gap between the trial court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the tolling provision in  2244d2 covers the time between a lower state courts decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    became the only state that requires preser vation of a second breath sample. Because only one state requires this, according to the State, only one manufacturer makes the instrument that captures and preserves a breath sample, and only one company makes the silica gel tubes used for capturing samples. The State also asserts that the second breath sample requirement has prevented New Hampshire “from staying current with emerging technology,” such as models that test each of a subject’s breath samples with two different technologies. For all of these reasons, the State contends that requiring the capture and preservation of a suspect’s breath sample for independent testing is no longer required by due process. See Moss v. Superior Court, 857 P.2d 400, 404-05 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (<HOLDING>), review denied, 868 P.2d 318 (Ariz. 1994). We

    ### Response:
    holding that because of the reliability and accuracy of the model used by the state to test breath samples neither due process nor fundamental fairness required the state to provide defendants with breath samples
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of twenty years. Given the district court’s recognition of Barrientos-Maldonado’s “very serious” criminal history, his sentence of fifty-seven months, which is at the low end of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, is not unreasonable. Barrientos-Maldonado also challenges his sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds, arguing that any fact beyond the mere fact of conviction that justifies increased punishment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This claim is precluded by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), and United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 414 (9th Cir.2000). Contrary to Barrientos-Maldonado’s challenges, Almendarez-Torres remains good law. See Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d at 414 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reject BarrientosMaldonado’s

    ### Response:
    holding that almendareztorres is dispositive in rejecting a sixth amendment apprendi challenge to an 8 usc  1326b2 sentence enhancement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    open terms; (4) partial performance; and (5) the custom of such transactions.” Id. (citing Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass’n of America, 670 F.Supp. at 499-503). 2 . In Jackson, the Supreme Court rejected the Board’s argument that Jackson could not state a claim for retaliation under Title IX because he is an ""indirect victim,” i.e. the high school females at the Birmingham public schools were the actual victims. Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1507. The Court explained that ""[t]he statute is broadly worded; it does not require that the victim of the retaliation must also be the victim of the discrimination that is the subject of the original complaint.” Id. The Court noted, however, that if the statute's wording tracked Title VII, then the Court would have accepted the Board's position. See id. (<HOLDING>). Retaliation under Title VII is made unlawful

    ### Response:
    recognizing that 42 usc  2000e2a1 provides that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate because of such individuals race color etc
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the defendant in view of ... its financial condition.” Fifth, the instruction told the jury that in fixing punitive damages, it could consider the “nature of defendant’s conduct” and “plaintiffs actual damages.” Haslip recognized the “plaintiffs actual damages” as an important constitutional factor with respect to punitive damages. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580-81, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1601-02, 134 L.Ed.2d 809, 829-30 (1996) (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24, 111 S.Ct. at 1046, 113 L.Ed.2d at 23). In addition, separate instructions defined “willful and wanton conduct” and “preponderance of clear, convincing, and satisf aslip holding and therefore has demonstrated no constitutional or legal error. State ex rel. Miller v. DeCoster, 596 N.W.2d 898, 904 (Iowa 1999) (<HOLDING>); Olson v. Nieman’s, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d 299, 316

    ### Response:
    holding that we review constitutional challenges de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and, further, that the incidents in Varon’s claim were isolated and indiscriminate and did not rise to the level of persecution. We agree. We first note that while the 1996 detention and the 2001 telephone threats were on account of Varon’s political opinion, it is less clear whether the 1999 Molotov cock tail incident and the 2002 detention in the forest likewise were motivated by Varon’s actual or imputed political opinion. With respect to the bombing, Varón merely speculates that the bomb was thrown at him by a member of the FER and concedes that he was unable to identify who threw the bomb. Accordingly, the record does not compel the conclusion that the bombing was connected to his political activity. See Silva v. United States Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1238 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). As to the kidnapping in 2000, Varon’s

    ### Response:
    holding that where petitioner testified she did not know who fired shots at her ear or why the evidence did not compel the conclusion that the shooting was based on her political opinion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her primary or secondary attachment figure was abruptly and inappropriately removed from her life. This potential psychological damage was the only alleged incidence of abuse, abandonment or neglect presented at the hearing. After considering the evidence and argument of counsel, the trial court found no legal basis to conclude that depriving M.N.B. of contact with Appellant, someone to whom the child has no legal connection, constitutes the level of abuse needed to support a finding of a dependency. We agree with the trial court that a parent’s decision to deprive a child of contact with someone who has no legal custody or visitation rights vis-á-vis the child is an inadequate ground upon which to base an adjudication of dependency. Cf. Clock v. Clock, 649 So.2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. A.W., 519 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA

    ### Response:
    holding the mere act of relocating or separating a child from familiar surroundings by an otherwise fit and proper custodial parent against the childs wishes does not constitute abuse under the statutory definition and therefore does not render the child dependent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    8 S.W.3d at 638. 14 . See id. at 639. 15 . See Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993); City of Saginaw v. Carter, 996 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. filed). 16 . See Curbo v. State, 998 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.App.—Austin 1999, no pet. h.); Little-Tex Insulation Co. v. General Servs. Comm’n, 997 S.W.2d 358, 360 (Tex.App.—Austin 1999, pet. filed); C Ann. §§ 554.002(a), 554.0035. 27 . Id. § 554.001(4) (emphasis added). 28 . See Thompson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 789 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex.1990). 29 . See Bennack Flying Serv., Inc. v. Balboa, 997 S.W.2d 748, 751 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72, 86 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1998, pet. denied). 30 . See Curbo, 998 S.W.2d at 344 (<HOLDING>). 31 . See Continental Coffee Prods. Co. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that because plaintiffs were reasonable in interpreting defendants grievance procedure to apply only to active employees plaintiffs did not act in bad faith when they alleged that no applicable grievance procedure existed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by Fort Worth officials. The court presumes good faith on the part of the procurement officers at the Corps’ Baltimore District Office, absent proof to the contrary. See T & M Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1279, 1285 (Fed.Cir.1999) (“[G]overnment officials are presumed to act in good faith, and ‘it requires ... proof to induce a court to abandon the presumption of good faith.’ ” (quoting Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 211 Ct.Cl. 192, 198, 543 F.2d 1298 (1976))). While that presumption may have been shaken by the whistleblower letter related to the actions of the Fort Worth District Office, nothing indicates that officials of the Baltimore District Office have been tainted in the same way. See Chapman Law Firm Co. v. Greenleaf Constr. Co., 490 F.3d 934, 940 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Given the removal of authority from the Fort

    ### Response:
    holding that if corrective action is reasonable the court is required to assume that the government will carry out the corrective action in good faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    No. 146, Ex. C. While the obituary states that Jeanne Decker was defendant John Nelson Decker’s wife of fifty-one years, it establishes nothing more than that. See id. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to establish that Jeanne Decker was a representative of the estate of her late husband John Nelson Decker or that he had an estate. 2. “Successors” Under Rule 25(a), a “successor” of the deceased party is also a proper party for substitution. A successor of the deceased party is a “distributee” of the decedent’s estate if the decedent’s estate has been distributed at the time the motion for substitution has been made. Gronowicz v. Leonard, 109 F.R.D. 624, 626 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citations omitted); see e.g., Hardy v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 842 F.Supp. 713, 716-717 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (<HOLDING>). a. Mary Beth Ciaschi Pethybridge As

    ### Response:
    holding that the deceased defendant trustees wife was a representative of her husbands estate and a proper party for substitution purposes where the wife was the primary distributee of her deceased husbands estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    license, noting that the license ordinance “has no .provisions, explicit or implicit, for sentencing” and “in simple and direct, terms, authorizes the city to put out of • business those businesses used for illegal or immoral purposes”). The court need not decide the issue based on the denial alone, however, because ATM challenges not only the Council’s denial of its license, but also the pre-denial operation of the ordinance itself. ATM has presented sufficient evidence for the court to conclude (at least for a determination of standing) that operation of the ordinance impermissibly and indefinitely delayed ATM’s ability to engage in activity presumptively protected by the First Amendment. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. at 504, 98 S.Ct. 2796; Gayesty Theatres, Inc., 719 F.2d at 1552 (<HOLDING>); City of Daleville, Ala., 695 F.Supp. at 1171.

    ### Response:
    holding in a case addressing the revocation of an adult theaters business license that while the citycould prevent the viewing of an obscene videotape it cannot constitutionally pierce the first amendment shield and bar  presumptively protected expression based only on prior unprotected conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial court allowed Tucker to read the victim’s statement into the record and certified Tucker as “an expert in Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner.” {54} We hold that the victim’s statement to the SANE practitioner is testimonial because it falls into the third category of evidence labeled testimonial by Crawford, “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” 541 U.S. at 52,124 S.Ct. 1354 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {55} We first note that the fact that the SANE practitioner is not a government official does not preclude statements given to her from being testimonial. See, e.g., State v. Mack, 337 Or. 586, 101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or.2004) (en bane) (<HOLDING>). However, many cases involving statements

    ### Response:
    holding statements made to a social worker to be testimonial because she was acting as a proxy for the police
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    definition of “frivolous” in interpreting its own postconviction act. See People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1209-12 (2009) (concluding that a petition can be summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit “only if the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact”). The definitions in Rickert, Neitzke, and Hodges closely track the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “frivolous.” See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 913 (2002) (defining “frivolous” as “of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact ”) (emphasis added). Indeed, those definitions are also consistent with the way we have defined the term “frivolous” in other contexts. See, e.g., Bond v. Comm’r of Revenue, 691 N.W.2d 831, 839 (Minn.2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that a petition is

    ### Response:
    holding that the taxpayer filed a frivolous return because it had no basis in law or fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    — affects the FDIC’s ability to function as receiver in the case. The “disposition of a failed [bank’s] assets ... is one of the quintessential statutory powers of the [FDIC] as a receiver.” Pyramid Constr. Co. v. Wind River Petroleum, Inc., 866 F.Supp. 513, 517 (D.Utah 1994). If an asset sold to a third-party purchaser is subject to dilution in a later judicial proceeding, there would be a substantial chilling effect upon the receiver’s ability to perform its statutory functions. In Pyramid, the court rejected the argument that § 1821(j) did not apply because a plaintiff sought relief against the receiver’s successor. The plaintiffs argument in Pyramid sounded much like Dittmer’s here — because the receiver had alread 4, 1993 WL 149084, at *2 (N.D.Cal. April 30, 1993) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Of the many cases Dittmer cites in support of

    ### Response:
    holding that  1821 barred a claim to enjoin a bank and its trustee from conducting a foreclosure sale because enjoining these parties indirectly enjoins the receiver which a district court has no power to do
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence linking any of the 54 nonparty victims to Nevada, but neither did the evidence establish that none of the victims were Nevada residents. This gap in the evidence was critical because the jury heard plaintiffs’ counsel assert that Nevada residents purchased Ford truck models affected by the rollaway problem in disproportionate numbers. Thus, jury members may have assumed that at least some of the 54 nonparty victims lived in Nevada. To remedy the due process violation, we may either remand for a new trial on punitive damages or “change ... the level of the punitive damages award.” Williams, 127 S.Ct. at 1065. We conclude that a new trial on punitive damages is the proper remedy. See Werbungs Und Commerz Union Austalt v. Collectors’ Guild, Ltd., 930 F.2d 1021, 1027 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). On remand, the district court must explain to

    ### Response:
    holding that remittitur is not designed to compensate for excessive verdicts in cases where jury is improperly instructed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not contest the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257 (1975) (internal citations omitted). The only element in dispute in the instant case is the last element — defendant argues that the arrest was privileged as a matter of law because it was supported by probable cause. Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d. Cir.2002) (“A § 1983 claim of false arrest based on the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures may not be maintained if there was probable cause for the arrest”); see also Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 387 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with, an offense like that at issue in the case; or, as a result of having been a victim of, a witness to, or charged with a crime, could not be fair and impartial to both sides. 2 . The court also asked two-part questions about whether the panel members: were acquainted with other panel members; were currently studying or had previously studied law; had previously served as jurors; had previously served as grand jurors; or were currently or previously involved in crime prevention groups. 3 . Cf. Butler v. City of Camden, 352 F.3d 811, 816 (3d Cir.2003) (noting that the Third Circuit has ""found error and reversed in cases where the district court barred all inquiry into a relevant subject matter designed to elicit a disqualifying prejudice”). 4 . See Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d at 84-85 (<HOLDING>). 5 . In the interim between Swain and

    ### Response:
    holding that whether error in failing to ask a question about bias in favor of law enforcement testimony requires reversal hinges on such factors as the importance of the government agents testimony to the case as a whole the extent to which the question concerning the venire persons attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions  the extent to which the credibility of the government agentwitness is put into issue and the extent to which the testimony of the government agent is corroborated by nonagent witnesses internal quotation marks and citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether Essie can make a pri-ma facie case of discrimination. The burden would then shift to Goodman to demonstrate a “neutral explanation” for employing two of his three allocated peremptory challenges to exclude members of the black race. We agree with Essie that her decedent, Jones, would have been entitled to the benefit of Edmonson. Because the rule enunciated in that case involves the extension of a federal right, we believe its fruits are mandated by the Supreme Court’s decision in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991). The question of re-troactivity of Supreme Court decisions wherein a new rule is announced has had a somewhat varied past. Cf., e.g. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding the rule of griffith v kentucky 479 us 314 107 sct 708 93 led2d 649 1987 does not require retroactive application to convictions challenged on habeas corpus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Grenvik, we may not presume that he was represented. Defendant misperceives the nature of a “silent” record. In each of the cases in which we or the Supreme Court have held that the defendant made a prima facie showing from a silent record, a record of the prior proceeding existed but either made no reference to an attorney or contained documents on which spaces for the name of the defendant’s attorney were left blank. See, e.g., Grenvik, 291 Or at 102; Riggins, 180 Or App at 532; State v. Manfredonia, 105 Or App 537, 539, 805 P2d 738 (1991). In other words, the record existed, but its silence on the subject of the defendant’s representation constituted circumstantial evidence from which the court could infer that the defendant was unrepresented. See Manfredonia, 105 Or App at 540 (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, the record of proceedings in

    ### Response:
    holding that there is an inference from the existence of a blank for the name of defendants lawyer and from the absence of any evidence to the contrary that defendant was not represented by counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conducts a lawful traffic stop and has been told by a reliable informant that the driver of the stopped vehicle is transporting a stash of illegal drugs, the officer has a reasonable fear that a passenger in the vehicle is armed and dangerous if that passenger disobeys the officer’s command to keep his hands in plain view and instead reaches back toward his waistband in a motion that is consistent with an attempt to retrieve a weapon. See United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C.Cir.2001) (“[E]ven though a single factor might not itself be sufficiently probative of wrongdoing to give rise to a reasonable suspicion [justifying a Teiry stop], the combination of several factors — especially when viewed through the eyes of an experienced officer — may.”); see also id. at 61-62 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the District Court properly denied

    ### Response:
    recognizing that furtive gestures undertaken in response to police presence can serve as a factor in establishing reasonable suspicion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    4) that Petitioners were treated differently than others; and 5) that the Commission abused its discretion by finding no mitigating circumstances. Because we conclude that the Commission’s proceedings unconstitutionally commingled prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, we do not discuss Petitioners’ other arguments. Discussion Our Supreme Court in Lyness v. State Board of Medicine, 529 Pa. 535, 605 A.2d 1204 (1992), held that a violation of due process occurs when an administrative board, which initiates a professional licensing prosecution, issues the ultimate adjudication in the case. Due process protection is not limited to the revocation of professional occupational licenses. See e.g. Brewster v. Department of Transportation, 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 277, 503 A.2d 497 (1986) (<HOLDING>). In determining what process is due, the

    ### Response:
    holding that the commonwealth cannot revoke a drivers license without due process required by the constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were neglected and placed them in the temporary custody of CCDCFS. The subsequent motion filed by CCDCFS was a motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody, filed pursuant to R.C. 2151.413 and 2151.414. Such proceedings are governed by Juv.R. 34, which specifically provides that: {¶ 58} “ ‘Hearings to determine whether temporary orders regarding custody should be modified to orders for permanent custody shall be considered dispositional hearings and need not be bifurcated.’ Juv.R. 34(1). {¶ 59} “Because the hearing regarding the motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody was a dispositional hearing, rather than an adjudicatory hearing, Juv.R. 29 did not apply.” Id. at ¶ 6-9. See also In re Lakes, 149 Ohio App.3d 128, 2002-Ohio-3917, 776 N.E.2d 510, at ¶ 34 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 60} In the instant case, Juv.R. 29(D) was

    ### Response:
    holding the trial court was not required to engage in a colloquy with a parent in an rc 2151414 proceeding    such as that required by juvr 29 at adjudicatory hearings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    uniformly rejected attempts to abrogate pursuant to other Article I powers. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 749-50, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002) (“Congress, pursuant to its Article I powers, cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity ....”); Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) (“Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I.”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) (“Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65, 72, 116 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the patent clause of article i
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on Virginia’s recognized list. d. Specific Facts Can Give Rise to a Special Relationship As mentioned supra, the absence of one of the enumerated special relationships recognized by the Virginia Supreme Court does not end the analysis. “[PJarents, students, and the general community still have a reasonable expectation, fostered in part by colleges themselves, that reasonable care will be exercised to protect resident students from foreseeable harm.” Schieszler, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (quoting Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983)). Even without recognizing one of the special relationships alleged by Doe, the particular facts alleged in a case can give rise to a special relationship. Id. at 609; see also Yuzefovsky, 261 Va. at 107, 540 S.E.2d at 139 (<HOLDING>). For instance, in Burdette v. Marks, the

    ### Response:
    holding that a special relationship may arise from the factual circumstances of a particular case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arbitration those judicial remedies that the drafting party with superior bargaining power is likely to need, while providing no such exemption for the non-drafting party with inferior bargaining power. See Rivera v. American General Financial Services, Inc., 2011-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 53-54, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d at 818-19; Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 32, 146 N.M. 256, 208 P.3d at 907-10. By contrast, an arbitration agreement that contains a bilateral carve-out that explicitly excludes from mandatory arbitration a certain set of claims is not substantively unconscionable, even if the party with superior bargaining power is more likely to assert the excluded claims in a judicial forum. See Dalton v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 2016-NMSC-035, ¶ 21, 385 P.3d at 624 (<HOLDING>). Hatton marshals three arguments for

    ### Response:
    holding that an arbitration agreement between a lender and a borrower that included a bilateral exception for claims less than 10000 was not substantively unconscionable even if one party is substantively more likely to bring small claims actions  
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prosecution has not met its heavy burden of demonstrating that Scheetz’s continued representation will cause him to be an unsworn witness that will impair the fact finding process or prejudice the prosecution. 2. Prosecution rebuttal witness Melton also challenges Judge Scoles’s conclusion that Scheetz must be disqualified from representing Melton because he may be called as a prosecution rebuttal witness. The applicable Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct provides: Rule 32:3.7. Lawyer as witness (a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) disqualifica 888, 891-92 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Weigel v. Farmers Ins. Co., 356 Ark. 617, 158

    ### Response:
    holding under georgia rule of professional conduct 37a that party seeking disqualification must demonstrate that the lawyers testimony is relevant to disputed material questions of fact and that there is no other evidence available to prove those facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the creditor is free to foreclose upon the case’s conclusion without violating the discharge injunction. Johnson, 501 U.S. at 84, 111 S.Ct. 2150 (“[A] bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim-namely, an action against the debtor in personam— while leaving intact another — namely, an action against the debtor in rem.”). Any deficiency that remains after the creditor forecloses on its liens and sells the property continues to exist, but is an uncollectible debt. Thus, following the discharge, the debt becomes nonrecourse debt. Id. at 86, 111 S.Ct. 2150 (“Insofar as the mortgage interest that passes through a Chapt ll.2008) (finding discharge a necessary prerequisite to permanency of lien avoidance); In re Lilly, 378 B.R. 232, 236-37 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.2007) (<HOLDING>). The court respectfully declines to reach the

    ### Response:
    holding that by virtue of section 1325a5 holder of secured claim retains the lien until the underlying debt is paid in full
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the stop of Johnson’s vehicle had not been converted to an impoundment, the mobility requirement of the automobile exception was satisfied. In conclusion, the searching officers had probable cause to believe that defendant’s backpack contained evidence of a crime, and the vehicle in which it was found was mobile when stopped. Therefore, the search was justified by the automobile exception. Affirmed. 1 Defendant does not appeal from two additional convictions for manufacture of a controlled substance and two further convictions for possession of a controlled substance. 2 Defendant does not contend that, because he had no interest in the vehicle, there was insufficient evidence to connect him with the contraband in the trunk. Cf. State v. Herrin, 323 Or 188, 194, 915 P2d 953 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 3 Therefore, cases addressing the mobility of

    ### Response:
    holding that officers lacked objective probable cause to search the defendants car and belongings where drug paraphernalia was found in possession of passengers with no interest in the vehicle and there was no reason to believe that either passenger had additional property with her
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The E/C also argues that the JCC erred by reserving jurisdiction on “claims” for workers’ compensation benefits that were not listed on any petition for benefits (PFB) filed by the injured employee (Claimant). We affirm the rejection of the partial affirmative defense without comment, but modify the order on appeal by striking the reservation of jurisdiction over any claims that were not the subject of a pending PFB at the time of the final hearing. This court has previously held that a JCC may properly reserve jurisdiction over PFBs that have been filed, but not mediated, because mediation is mandatory under section 440.25(2), Florida Statutes; such unmediated claims are not procedurally ripe for adjudication. Parodi v. Fl. Contracting Co., Inc., 16 So.3d 958, 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Ake v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 112 So.3d

    ### Response:
    holding jcc properly reserved jurisdiction on unmediated pfbs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it was made. When Lucas pled guilty, this court’s decisions required the district court rather than the jury to determine the quantity of drugs for which a defendant was responsible under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). United States v. Jinadu, 98 F.3d 239, 247-48 (6th Cir.1996) (explaining that “the determination of the quantity of drugs involved is not an element of the offense” and that the sentencing judge, not the jury, must decide this issue). Although Lucas’s indictment t “had earlier announced the principle underlying the Apprendi rule in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999),” United States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932, 936 (6th Cir.2000), but Jones’s explicit holding was based on statutory construction. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-52, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (<HOLDING>). The Court’s statement that “under the Due

    ### Response:
    holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    all four were involved in a single conspiracy. The idea that a conspiracy can exist solely because two people deal with the same middleman, but act independently, was previously rejected in United States v. Durades, 607 F.2d 818, 819-20 (9th Cir.1979) (“The government succeeded in proving that Lugo was the hub of the two separate conspiracies but failed to show that there was some kind of rim binding the spokes.”). In this case, the only connection between Nye and Jimenez that the government proved was that they both sold to Herrera and Theodoratos. The government failed to show “some kind of rim binding” Nye to Jimenez. Id. It did not show that Nye was aware Jimenez was dealing with Herrera, let alone that Nye ever received any benefit from those dealings. See Duran, 189 F.3d at 1081 (<HOLDING>). Thus, as Herrera claims, the government did

    ### Response:
    holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fair opportunity to obtain the assistance of counsel of his choice to prepare and conduct his defense,” that ""constitutional mandate is satisfied so long as the accused is afforded a fair or reasonable opportunity to obtain particular counsel, and so long as there is no arbitrary action prohibiting the effective use of such counsel."" United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1215 (3d Cir.1969). The record shows that Jackson had ample opportunity to retain counsel of his choice, and the District Court's refusal to further postpone his trial date was not arbitrary. 3 . Some cases add a requirement to the first prong o'f the test that the purpose is ""at issue,” though others have not incorporated this requirement. Compare United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 291 (3d Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267,

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence must be offered for a proper nonpropensity purpose that is at issue in the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1112, 1119 (5th Cir.1987) (“If a prisoner challenges a single hearing as constitutionally defective, he must first exhaust state habeas remedies.”); Alexander v. Ware, 714 F.2d 416, 419 (5th Cir.1983) (""If a prisoner challenges a 'single allegedly defective [disciplinary] hearing,’ he attacks, in essence, the fact and duration of his custody.’’). In such cases, we have required prisoners to exhaust the TDCJ grievance procedures. See Baxter v. Estelle, 614 F.2d 1030, 1031-32 (5th Cir.1980) (""[A] federal court may not grant ha-beas corpus relief to a petitioner who has failed to exhaust all administrative remedies, including an appeal to the Director of Corrections.”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1085, 101 S.Ct. 873, 66 L.Ed.2d 810 (1981); Lerma v. Estelle, 585 F.2d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848, 100 S.Ct. 95, 62

    ### Response:
    holding that a texas prisoner who had not exhausted his clearly available administrative remedies was properly denied habeas relief in the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for her obedience, they would protect her from physical and emotional injury. This count of the plaintiffs revised complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations since the alleged act of Watchtower that disfellowshipped her can be considered as the date the breach of the implied agreement occurred, which is less than six years from the date this action was instituted. The defendants also argue that the first amendment prohibits this court from considering the breach of contract claim, since, to determine this claim, the court necessarily would become involved in an “excessive entanglement” with religion. The first amendment does not bar application of a secular standard to certain tortious conduct in a chinch setting. See Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn. App. 759, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman

    ### Response:
    holding that respondeat superior claim against institutional defendant for tort committed by defendant priest can be resolved under connecticut law without resorting to ecclesiastical standards of church doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of scale in operating the fund as it grows larger; 4) comparative fee structures; 5) fallout benefits, i.e., indirect profits to the adviser attributable in some way to the existence of the fund; and 6) the independence and conscientiousness of the directors. See Krinsk v. Fund Asset Management, 875 F.2d 404, 409 (2d Cir.1989) (citing Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929-30.) At the pleading stage, a complaint must state more than a legal conclusion that a fee is excessive in order to survive a motion to dismiss. See Levy v. Alliance Capital Management L.P., No. 97-Civ-4672, 1998 WL 744005, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.26, 1998) (dismissing § 36(b) claim against investment adviser because plaintiff failed to allege why a new advisory agreement’s fees were excessive); Strougo I, 964 F.Supp. at 805 (<HOLDING>); Wexler v. Equitable Management Corp., No.

    ### Response:
    holding that the allegation that the investment advisers fee increased substantially as a result of a funds rights offering to existing shareholders does not support an excessive fee claim under section 36b although it might under section 36a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the appellant might speak untruthfully in response. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 254 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 837, 114 S.Ct. 116, 126 L.Ed.2d 82 (1993). In our review, we look to whether the circumstances of the promise would reasonably induce a defendant to admit to a crime he did not commit. Sossamon v. State, 816 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), abrogated on other grounds by Graham v. State, 994 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). 2. Analysis Appellant argues that the condition of his d mination of credibility and demeanor, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the conditions of Appellant’s detention did not render his videotaped statement involuntary. See Bell v. State, 169 S.W.3d 384, 391-92 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>). Appellant also argues that his oral

    ### Response:
    holding eight hours of questioning while in handcuffs and leg shackles did not render confession involuntary where appellant never indicated he did not want to answer any more questions or wanted to speak to attorney and never requested food water or bathroom breaks
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    may have been actionable under the 1933 Act is an academic question. As noted earlier, Plaintiffs bring no claim under the 1933 Act. Plaintiffs make these allegations to provide support for their claim that Defendants engaged in an ongoing, consistent scheme of depressing revenue predictions to achieve quick and sustained growth in share prices. 186 .Salinger, 972 F.Supp. at 229. 187 . See Exs. A-G to First Boyle Decl. 188 . See Ex. B to First Boyle Decl. 189 . See Exs. A-B, D-G to Issuer Opp.; Exs. A-E to 12/9/03 Declaration of John Boyle (""Second Boyle Decl.”). 190 . See Menowitz, 991 F.2d at 42; Ezra Charitable Trust v. Frontier Ins. Group, Inc., No 00-5361, 2002 WL 87723 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.23, 2002), aff'd, LC Capital Partners v. Frontier Ins. Group. Inc., 318 F.3d 148 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 191 .See Ex. H to First Boyle Decl. 192 . See

    ### Response:
    holding that filing of litigation against the same defendant put a plaintiff on inquiry notice of the probability of fraud with another transaction involving the defendant where the complaints in both lawsuits involved similar allegations that defendant failed to disclose its inadequate loss reserves and did not sufficiently monitor its operations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Def.’s Opp’n at 11. Consequently, Monster contends that Zuckman’s claims for injunctive relief satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. See id. The parties dispute whether the cost of relief should be measured from the perspective of the plaintiff or defendant. Whatever perspective is used, they also disagree as to how the cost should be apportioned here given the claims on behalf of the general public. The Court need not resolve these issues, however, because Monster’s claims about the costs are too speculative to serve as the basis for determining the amount in controversy. Courts have found that general assertions that the cost of injunctive relief would exceed $75,000 are too speculative to establish diversity jurisdiction. See Nat’l Consumers League, 680 F.Supp.2d at 140 (<HOLDING>); Wexler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 496

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants claim that the cost of injunctive relief would exceed 75000 was too speculative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stay (to the extent it was applicable), and the Debtor— whose Chapter 13 case had no filed claims — filed a motion to allow a late proof of claim on behalf of an unsecured creditor. All arguments and submissions concerning these matters have been considered by the court, and the issues are ripe for decision. I. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are not in dispute. The Creditor is the holder of a deed of trust on the Debtor’s principal residence, which secures a note on which the Debtor owes about $114,040. The Debtor’s payments on the note were in arrears, and the Creditor conducted a foreclosure sale on December 29, 2005. The foreclosure sale was conducted in accordance with West Virginia law, and the Debtor’s real property was sold to Gracie Mews, LLC (“Grade Mews”) for $130 997) (<HOLDING>); In re Rambo, 199 B.R. 747, 751

    ### Response:
    holding that the debtors could cure the default until the delivery of a sheriffs deed to the successful purchaser rendering the sale complete under new jersey state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    P. J. Husband appeals from a judgment modifying a 1997 dissolution judgment that awarded spousal support to wife by extending its duration for an indefinite period of time. ORS 107.135 (2001). We conclude that the trial court lacked authority to order indefinite support under the circumstances of this case and reverse. The 1997 judgment provided that husband’s spousal support obligation would end on November 30, 2002. The parties agree that husband paid the final support installment required by the 1997 judgment on October 15, 2002, and that, 9), rev den, 288 Or 335 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Wife argues, notwithstanding the provisions

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court lacked authority to renew spousal support payments pursuant to a motion that was filed after the expiration of time during which spousal support was required to be paid under the original judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employee generally will not support a claim of wrongful discharge under Alabama law. See Mack, 929 So.2d at 483-85; Cunningham v. Dabbs, 703 So.2d 979, 981 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997). And Plaintiffs failure to allege facts showing that he had an employment contract or any other basis for a legitimate expectation of continued employment as required to establish a federal due process claim under § 1983 also calls for the dismissal of any parallel due process claim arising state law. See Jefferson County v. Braswell, 407 So.2d 115, 122 (Ala.1981) (“We consider our analysis of the ... due process issues under the United States Constitution equally applicable to those same issues under the Alabama Constitution.”); Alabama State Personnel Bd. v. Garner, 4 So.3d 545, 550 n. 2 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008) (<HOLDING>). IV. Demand for Attorney’s Fees Hannah’s

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the due process guaranteed under the alabama constitution is coextensive with the due process guaranteed under the united states constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Plaintiff did not, including training and recruiting, and the hospital changed from an ongoing enterprise with approximately 700 employees during Casanova’s tenure to a winding-down enterprise with approximately 300 employees during Plaintiffs tenure. 3. Summary judgment was proper on Plaintiffs retaliation claim because, on the facts deemed true, Plaintiff did not complain of discrimination when she requested a higher salary, and she did not suffer an adverse employment action. See Wrighten v. Metro. Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1354 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Further, even if Plaintiff had made out a

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under title vii must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that she engaged in a protected activity that she was subjected to an adverse employment action by her employer and that there was a causal link between the two
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    some tension among the different circuits as to the interaction between sections 107 and 113.” United States v. Hunter, 70 F.Supp.2d 1100, 1103 n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1999). For example, courts are split on the question of who may bring a CERCLA § 107 cost-recovery action, and more specifically, whether a PRP is entitled to bring a CERCLA § 107 cost-recovery action. We have held that a private PRP who incurs response costs may not bring a cost-recovery action under CERCLA § 107, and instead may only bring a claim for contribution under CERCLA § 113(f). Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1301. We have not yet considered, however, whether a government PRP such as a municipality that similarly incurs response costs may bring a cost-recovery action under CERCLA § 107. Compare Hunter, 70 F.Supp.2d at 1108 (<HOLDING>), with City of Fresno, 1995 WL 641983, at **2-5

    ### Response:
    holding that the government prp may bring a costrecovery action pursuant to cercla  107 thereby imposing joint and several liability on the defendant prp
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    — • and the majority errs in dismissing it. III. The majority notes that “lower courts have issued conflicting and confusing opinions” under Elrod and Branti (internal quotation mark omitted). At least some of these inconsistencies can be laid at the feet of courts, like today’s majority, that are simply antagonistic to the Supreme Court’s Elrod-Branti jurisprudence. Even if inferior courts believe that Supreme Court holdings are ill-advised, they are not at liberty to ignore those holdings. Time and again, inferior federal courts have sought to circumvent the Elrod-Branti jurisprudence by refusing to apply it to decisions regarding promotions, transfers, or dealings with independent contractors. See, e.g., O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 47 F.3d 883 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668 (3d Cir.1986) (en

    ### Response:
    holding elrodbranti does not apply to independent contractors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opinions.... ” We have no trouble concluding that Rule 703 encompasses hearsay statements in a context such as the instant one, where the government expert specifically testified that his opinion was based on his experience and expertise, in conjunction with the information he received from a DEA intelligence agent and Bermudan authorities, and that such sources of information were regularly relied upon in valuating narcotics. See also 2A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 455 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that “expert testimony, based in part upon reports of others that are not in evidence but of a sort the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession, are [sic] admissible”); cf. United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Further, even before the enactment of Federal

    ### Response:
    holding that expert testimony by an atf agent based partly on his own analysis but verified by consultation with an atf technical specialist was properly admitted under rule 703 where the agent testified that the consultation was of the kind regularlyrelied upon by experts in his field
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    therewith on a particular occasion."" CRE 608(a), on the other hand, provides a limited exception that permits evidence of a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness only after that character has been attacked: The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 115 This state's case law disfavors comments by one witness about another witness's truthfulness. See, e.g., People v. Gaff-ney, 769 P.2d 1081, 1085-86 (Colo.1989) (<HOLDING>); Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 338, 341

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court erred by admitting a doctors testimony that a child victims description of a sexual crime was very believable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under 18 U.S.C. § 1593 for considerable, involuntary time and expense resulting from the need to respond to frivolous and unauthorized actions of the Defendant in the mis-enforcement of the internal revenue laws of the federal United States. Id. at ¶ 6.3.1. See also Brief, at pp. 15-17 (further detailing the “History of of Interaction With Defendant(s) and Their Employer”). Under similar facts, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Atkinson v. O’Neill, 867 F.2d 589, 590 (10th Cir.1989), that “[w]hen an action is one against named individual defendants, but the acts complained of consist of actions taken by defendants in their official capacity as agents of the United States, the action is in fact one against the United States.” Accord Burgos v. Milton, 709 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Insofar as the Petition may be read to assert

    ### Response:
    holding that ajlthough the  action is nominally one against individual defendants the acts complained of consist of actions taken by defendants in their official capacity as agents of the united states and that under such circumstances the action is in fact one against the united states
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2008 WL 5392320, 208 Haw. LEXIS 304 (2008); Gore v. Indiana Ins. Co., 376 Ill.App.3d 282, 315 Ill.Dec. 156, 876 N.E.2d 156, 165-66 (2007) (finding plaintiff lacked standing to bring declaratory judgment action because statute at issue did not confer private right of action); Nichols v. Kansas PAC, 270 Kan. 37, 11 P.3d 1134, 1146-47 (2000) (refusing to grant declaratory relief under consumer fraud statute because it contained no private right of action); Alliance for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905, 916 (Minn.Ct.App.2003) (stating that where “there was no private right to enforce” the statute, the “Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act cannot create a cause of action that does not otherwise exist”); Delgado v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 66 A.D. 3d 607, 888 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (2009) (<HOLDING>). See also Boston Med. Ctr. v. Sec’y of the

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioners did not possess a private right of action for injunctive and declaratory relief sought because only the citys housing official could enforce the citys housing maintenance code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and prior confrontations they had had.” 3 . The State argues that the prosecutor's statement that Appellant provoked the fight by calling the deceased and his family “niggas” was a reasonable inference from Officer Pate's testimony that Appellant admitted he had used racial slurs when he first spoke to the deceased. I cannot agree. First, Officer Pate did not testify that ""niggas” was the racial slur Appellant used. Unfortunately, many ethnophaulisms exist but most people consider this one exceptionally offensive and inflammatory. Appellant’s concession that he used racial slurs does not support an inference that he used this particular one. Second, neither Officer Pat .-Texarkana 2014, pet. ref'd) (same); Jimenez v. State, 298 S.W.3d 203, 214 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, pet. ref’d) (<HOLDING>); see Rogers v. State, 725 S.W.2d 350, 358

    ### Response:
    recognizing exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    even though the store benefitted from the advertising, the court found this did not rise to the level of consideration. Id. In State v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., the Court of Civil Appeals contrasted Brice with Cole and found no consideration where a filling station paid for bingo cards but gave them away free to any and all persons who came to their stations to request them, and a local TV station broadcast games in which bingo cards were used with winners being awarded cash prizes. 386 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1964). Some jurisdictions outside of the State of Texas have held that requiring a person to actually go to the location of the sweepstakes sponsor in order to participate constitutes consideration. See Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 N.J. 399, 117 A.2d 487, 496 (1955)(<HOLDING>); Knox Indus. Corp. v. State ex rel. Scanland,

    ### Response:
    holding that consideration exists where a customer is burdened by having to visit the store where the coupons are being offered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1937, Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) to promote fair pricing and uniform marketing conditions in the agriculture business. Exempted from antitrust laws, the AMAA aside mandated uniform prices, product standards, and other conditions; all of undifferentiated which had to be approved by at least two-thirds of the affected producers and implemented by producer committees appointed by the weather condition Secretary of Agriculture. The AMAA's administrative expenses were to be covered by two thirds assessments imposed on push activities such as product advertising and promotion. After suffering adverse rulings at the administrative, District, and Circuit Court levels, a group of California tree fruit growers, handlers, and processors appealed their constitutional challenge of the AMAA to the Supreme Court - which granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Glickman.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the Commission) filed a complaint against the Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers lodge (CDCB), alleging violations of time to come the Commodity Exchange Act. CDCB was going through bankruptcy at the time and a trustee was appointed At a deposition related to the Commission's lawsuit, Gary Weintraub, CDCB's former counsel, refused to answer certain questions, citing attorney-client privilege. The Commission obtained adenine a waiver of attorney-client privilege from the CDCB's metre bankruptcy trustee. The district court directed Weintraub to answer the questions, but the U.S. Court of Appeals lodge for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the power to waive attorney-client privilege for communications that occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    William Dick was a 47-year-old farmer and experienced hunter who lived with his wife Blanche on a farm near Englevale, North Dakota. William had two life insurance policies issued by the New York Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, payable to his wife. Each contained a double indemnity clause preventing payment if William's death resulted from “self-destruction, whether sane or insane.” On January 20, 1955, between 10:30 and 11:00 am, Blanche entered the farm’s silage shed and found her husband lying on his back. She saw a wound on his head and knew he was try dead; William's double-barreled shotgun was lying near his body. The county sheriff later determined that the shotgun was held about eighteen inches from inch William's body with the stock toward the feet and the barrel along the body when it was fired. He also determined that the gun likely did not fire from a person jarring, pounding, or dropping it, although there was also evidence that the gun had occasionally discharged accidentally in the indium past. Dr. Veitch, the county coroner, found another wound in William's chest, but determined that it was the wound to William's head that caused his immediate death; the chest wound likely only resulted in a great deal of pain. Dr. Veitch, who was also William's personal physician, testified that William had mild to moderate non-specific prostatitis, which left him tired but did not prevent him from doing farm work. William did not apparently leave let a suicide note or mention suicide to his relatives or friends. In connection with Blanche's later claim for benefits, however, Dr. Veitch listed the cause of death as “suicide.” New York Life Insurance filed an action in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, claiming that William committed suicide. Under North Dakota law, proof of insurance coverage and death by gunshot wound shifted the burden to the insurer to prove that the death was not accidental. The jury found for Blanche Dick and awarded $7,500 in damages. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, reviewed the evidence and determined that the shotgun could not have fired unless someone or something pushed or pulled one of the triggers. It further concluded that the evidence could not be reconciled with any reasonable theory that the shooting was hawkshaw accidental, given William's experience as a hunter and the multiple gunshot wounds on his body.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Blanche Dick.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Police arrested Leon Carroll and Daniel Stewart be on warrants for violating local lottery laws and conspiring to run territorial dominion a lottery. Each filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence found at the time of arrest. The district court granted the motions, citing a lack of probable inhibition cause. The united states government U.S. Court manifest of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the order for suppression of evidence was appealable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Leon F. Carroll, Daniel J. Stewart.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Andrew Mallory was arrested by federal officers along on charges of rape. Upon turn back arresting Mallory, officeholder the officers questioned him until he confessed roughly seven hours later. After the confession, question the adenine police officers sought to reach a United States Commissioner for the purpose of arraigning Mallory.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mallory.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other eavesdrop states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal motor hotel transmission of wagering information confiscate from Los Angeles to Boston and be Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The Court of adenine Appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Katz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1974, Erlich Anthony Coker, serving a number of sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and assault, escaped indium from prison. He broke into a Georgia couple's home, raped the woman and stole the family's car. The woman was along released shortly thereafter, without condemn further injuries. The Georgia courts sakartvelo sentenced Coker steal to death on the rape charge.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Coker.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 9, 1989, while exiting an apartment building with a history of cocaine trafficking, Timothy Dickerson spotted police officers and turned to walk in the opposite direction. In response, the turn over officers commanded Dickerson to stop and proceeded to frisk associate in nursing him. An officer discovered a lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket, and, upon further tactile investigation, formed the belief that it was cocaine. glucinium The officer reached into Dickerson's pocket and confirmed that the lump was in fact a small bag of cocaine. Consequently, Dickerson was charged with possession of a controlled indium substance. He requested that the cocaine be excluded information technology from evidence, but the trial court denied his request and he was found guilty. Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Minnesota.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mark McBurney is a citizen of Rohde Island and a former resident of Virginia where his son lives. When McBurney's wife defaulted on child support obligations, quartern he asked the Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement (VDCSE) to file a petition for child support on his substantiate behalf. After a nine-month delay, the petition was filed and granted. He then filed a Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) request with the VDCSE for all records pertaining to his son and ex-wife. The VDCSE denied the request, arguing that the information was confidential and McBurney was not a citizen of the state. While McBurney eventually obtained most of needed the information self denial through other sources, he never got all of the information from his VFOIA request. McBurney sued in district court arguing that denial of the VFOIA request violated the privileges and immunities clause and the dormant commerce clause of the Constitution. The district court ruled against McBurney. Mc Burney along with two others appealed their VFOIA denials to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court. adenine The Court of Appeals held that VFOIA did not hinder a non citizen's right to pursue buisness in the state and did default on not place a burden on interstate commerce.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nathaniel L. Young, Deputy Commissioner and Director, Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1998, Officer Joe Taylor of the Conway, Arkansas, Police Department stopped Kenneth Andrew Sullivan for traffic violations. When Officer Taylor saw Sullivan's license, he realized law that he was aware of narcotics intelligence regarding him. officeholder Sullivan was then arrested. Afterwards Officer Taylor conducted motor hotel an inventory search of Sullivan's vehicle and discovered methamphetamine as well as items of drug paraphernalia. Ultimately, Sullivan was charged with various state-law drug offenses, unlawful possession of a weapon, and speeding. Sullivan moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle on the basis that his arrest was merely a ""pretext and sham to search"" him and, therefore, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court granted the motion and the Arkansas Supreme chicken feed Court affirmed. In petitioning for rehearing, the State argued that the court had erred by taking into account Office Taylor's subjective motivation using Whren v. United States, which makes ""the ulterior motives of police officers...irrelevant so long as there is probable cause for the traffic stop."" The court rejected the argument and denied the harry stack sullivan petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arkansas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1954, John Watkins, a labor organizer, was called upon to testify in hearings un american conducted by the House Committee on Un-American self assurance Activities. Watkins agreed to describe his alleged connections with the Communist Party and to identify current members of the Party. Watkins refused to give information concerning individuals who had have to doe with left the Communist Party. Watkins argued that such questions were beyond the authority indicate electric current of the Committee.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Watkins.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kastigar cited his Fifth Amendment indium protection against self-incrimination in refusing to testify before die eve a grand jury, even though prosecutors had granted him immunity from the use adenine of his testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings. He was found in contempt one fifth of court for failing to testify.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In January 2005, Vinton, Louisiana Police Chief Billy Ray Vice, who was seeking re-election to his post, sent fellow candidate Ricky Fox an ""anonymous"" letter trying to blackmail him into dropping out of the race. A month later, someone accused Fox frailty of uttering a incriminate racial slur and, at Vice's instigation, filed a false police report be regarding Fox's alleged use of the term. Fox brought a civil rights suit against Vice and the town in state court in December 2005, asserting both state and federal claims, and the case was removed to federal court in January 2006. Separately, in April 2007, Vice was tried and found guilty of extortion in state criminal court for the anonymous letter. In 2007, in response to a motion filed by the defendants, Fox admitted that he had failed to properly present any federal cause of action, so the district court dismissed Fox's federal claims with prejudice and remanded the remaining state law claims to state court. The district court then granted the defendants' motion for attorneys' fees, finding that Fox's federal claims were frivolous, unreasonable and try without foundation. Fox appealed the fee award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and by rights in a split decision the appeals court affirmed the district court's order.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ricky D. Fox.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    act upon Ideal Steel Supply Corporation filed a civil suit against its competitor, National Steel Supply, Inc. in federal court. Ideal alleged that National had failed to charge sales tax for cash purchases, giving it a competitive (but fraudulent) advantage. Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt crataegus laevigata Organizations Act, ""[a]ny person injured in his business or property"" by racketeering activity may bring a civil suit. Ideal argued that it had been injured through lost sales because of National's illegal lower prices, and therefore had standing to sue. The indicate federal district court disagreed, dismissing the suit because Ideal had not had any direct encounters with National or relied on their fraudulent tax records. A Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision, however, finding that a company can sue along under adenine RICO when its competitor uses racketeering to gain an advantage.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Joseph Anza, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ivan Eberhart was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine. He filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial on the last day available for post-trial motions. Eberhart claimed that a flaw in the transcript published to the jury provided the basis for his motion. Six months later, he filed a “supplemental memorandum” alleging two additional grounds for his motion: motor hotel the admission of potential hearsay testimony into evidence, and the district court’s failure to give a tell “buyer-seller instruction” to the jury. The district court granted Eberhart’s motion for a new trial. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that the district court did not have jurisdiction to grant a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, which states that a motion for a new trial that is not based on new evidence must be filed within seven days along of visitation the verdict. Because Eberhart filed after the seven-day deadline, adenine a new trial could not be granted.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ivan Eberhart.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) made an oral agreement with James Reid, a sculptor, to produce a statue depicting the plight privilege of the homeless for display at turn back a 1985 Washington D.C. Christmas pageant. Upon completion, delivery, and joining of the work to forge a base that it prepared separately, CCNV paid Reid the final installment of the agreed-upon price. Shortly thereafter, the parties filed competing copyright claims over the sculpture. Holding, in accordance with the Copyright Act of 1976 (the ""Act""), that the statue was a ""work made for hire,"" a district court ruled in favor of CCNV. motor hotel On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted CCNV wa certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Reid.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After attending a gun show in enquire Texas, Thomas Bean drove to Mexico. When Mexican officials stopped his vehicle at the border, doings they found ammunition, and Bean was subsequently convicted bean in a Mexican court of importing ammunition. Because of his felony conviction, 18 USC section 922(g)(1) prohibited Bean from possessing, distributing, or receiving firearms or ammunition. Bean applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for piece relief from his firearms disabilities, but the ATF returned the application unprocessed, explaining that its annual appropriations law forbade it from expending any funds to investigate or act upon applications such as Bean's. Bean then filed suit, asking the District Court to conduct its own inquiry into his appropriation fitness to possess a gun and grant relief from his inability to possess, distribute, or receive firearms or ammunition. The court granted the requested relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After being sentenced to 18 to 36  months in prison, Ronald Yeskey was recommended as a candidate for a adenine Motivational Boot Camp for first-time offenders. Successful completion of the Boot Camp could have resulted in advocate Yeskey's early parole after just six months. When the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections discovered Yeskey's medical history of hypertension, he was denied admission to the Boot Camp. Yeskey challenged the refusal as discriminatory. On appeal from  a reversal of pink slip a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Yeskey.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Colorado statute makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to ""knowingly approach"" within 8 feet legislative act of another person, without that person's consent, in order to pass ""a leaflet or handbill to, display a sign to, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] swear out person...."" Leila Hill and others, sidewalk counselors who offer abortion alternatives to women entering abortion clinics, sought to enjoin the statute's enforcement in state court, claiming violations of their First Amendment free speech rights and right to a free press. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the statute imposed content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of adenine communication. The Colorado Court of Appeals metrical foot affirmed, and the Colorado adenine Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment after holding that a provision creating a speech-free floating buffer zone with a 15-foot radius violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment. In affirming, the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated the lower court's conclusions. The court concluded that the statute struck a proper balance between a person's right to protest and a person's right to medical treatment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Colorado.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Injured workers sued the United States under jurisprudence the Federal proletarian Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that federal mine inspectors' negligence helped cause a mine accident. The FTCA authorized private tort actions against the U.S. when the federal government, if a private person let in similar circumstances, would be liable according to the natural action law of the place where the incident occurred. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the allegations failed to show Arizona law would have imposed liability on a private person in like circumstances. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding federal mine inspections were a governmental function with no private analogue. In shew such cases, the Ninth Circuit held, the FTCA waived sovereign immunity if a state or municipal entity would be held liable under the law where the activity occurred.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Monroe, Georgia is covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which requires the preclearance of certain voting changes. Prior to 1966, the Monroe city charter did not urban center specify whether a majority vote or a plurality vote was needed to win a mayoral election. In practice, the city changed allot in 1966 from indium using a plurality-voting courtship requirement to using a majority-voting requirement. The United States brought suit against the city, claiming that it had not sought preclearance of the change, as required by section 5 and sought to enjoin such majority voting and to require the essential city to return to plurality voting. The District Court, in granting summary judgment in favor of the United States, expressed the view that the change to majority voting had not been precleared in accordance with section 5.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Monroe.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robert Sindermann had been a professor at Odessa Junior College for four years, working under one-year contracts. After his election as president of the Texas Junior one year College Teachers Association, he had several public disagreements with the Odessa Junior College Board of Regents. In May 1969, after the expiration of his teaching contract, Sindermann adenine was not offered a new contract and terminated by the college's Board of Regents. While the Board of Regents did issue a press release accusing him of insubordination, they did not provide official reasons for his termination or the option of a hearing for him to challenge his termination. Sindermann filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. He alleged that his termination was due to his disagreements with the Board of Regents, a violation of prospect his First Amendment right to free speech, and that the lack of a hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court ruled for the Board of Regents without a full trial. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held that his termination would have indium been unconstitutional if it was based on his exercise of free operating theatre speech or if he had a reasonable expectation of continued employment. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert P. Sindermann.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Geertson Seed Farms (""Geertson"") and Trask Family Seeds (""Trask"") sought an injunction against Monsanto Company (""Monsanto"") in a California federal district court. Geertson and Trask golden state feared that the wide-scale sale of a new territorial dominion Monsanto alfalfa variety, resistant to one of the company's herbicides, would lead to cross-pollination with Geertson's and Trask's conventional alfalfa variety and in front thereby lead to its disappearance. The district court granted cross pollination the injunction pending an Environmental Impact Statement (""EIS"") about the effect of Monsanto's  new alfalfa variety. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed holding that the injunction was appropriate and that an evidentiary hearing was not required before the issuance of the injunction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Monsanto Co., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Olga Zdanok and other individual employees of Glidden Company(Glidden) sought to recover damages for breach article of collective bargaining agreement in New York state court, and then Glidden removed the case to federal arrogate district court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. Judge J. Warren Madden, an active judge on the Court of Claims at the time, granted the employees damages. Glidden argued that the guarantee in Article III of the Constitution that judges should hold their offices during good behavior meant that Judge Madden displayed a lack of appropriate judicial independence. Previous judicial precedent had established that the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the United States Court of Claims were neither confined in jurisdiction nor protected in independence by Article III of the Constitution, but that there were associate in nursing created by other powers Congress possessed under Article I. Congress had just since enacted statutes explicitly including the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in motor hotel Article III of the Constitution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Olga Zdanok.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cornelius and Suzanne Young failed to include payment with their 1992 income tax return, which was due and filed on October 15, 1993. adenine Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed a tax liability against them. After filing a Chapter 13 petition, the Youngs ultimately filed a Chapter 7 petition and were granted a discharge, meaning that Youngs had no assets available to satisfy unsecured creditors, including the IRS. If the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a claim for certain taxes for which the return was due within in front three years before the individual taxpayer files a bankruptcy petition, its claim enjoys eighth priority under 11 USC section 507(a)(8)(A)(i), and is nondischargeable in bankruptcy under section 523(a)(1)(A). When the IRS subsequently demanded that they pay the tax debt, the Youngs asked the Bankruptcy Court to reopen the Chapter 7 case table service and declare table service the debt discharged under section 523(a)(1)(A), claiming that it fell outside section 507(a)(8)(A)(i)'s ""three-year lookback period"" because it pertained to a tax return due more than three years before their Chapter 7 filing. The District Court held that the ""lookback period"" is tolled during let the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition and concluded that the 1992 debt had not been discharged when the Youngs were granted a discharge under Chapter 7. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    To prevent gender discrimination, the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations (the Commission) created an ordinance that forbids newspapers to sexual intercourse advertise employment opportunities in gender-designated column. The National Organization for Women, Inc. filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that the Pittsburgh Press Co. (Pittsburg Press) violated the ordinance ill by allowing employers to place advertisements foreclose in the male or female columns when the jobs advertised adjure do not have occupational ordination qualifications or exceptions. The Commission had a hearing and concluded Pittsburg Press violated the ordinance. The Pittsburg Press appealed and contended the ordinance violates the First Amendment by restricting its editorial judgment. The Commonwealth Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    William Kennedy designated his wife, Liv, as the sole beneficiary of his Dupont pension and retirement savings plans. The couple subsequently divorced, and taboo as part of the settlement Liv agreed to give up any interests she may have in the plans. However, welfare William never submitted this portion of the settlement depute prior to his death in 2001, so the pension and retirement savings benefits were paid out to welfare Liv. William's daughter, Keri, the executor of his estate, brought suit against Dupont to recover the benefits. The U.S. be District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary judgment for the estate, awarding it the value of the benefits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, explaining that because William had never submitted the portion of the settlement agreement denying the benefits to Liv, they were correctly paid out to her by Dupont.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings and Investment Plan, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In July 2005, a jury in a federal district court acquitted F. Scott Yeager of conspiracy, along wire fraud, and security fraud, but hung on 20 counts of indium insider trading and 99 counts of money laundering in relation to his involvement with Enron Broadband Services. The district court declared a mistrial on the counts the jury hung on. Thereafter, the United States again indicted Mr. Yeager on a portion of the mistried motor hotel counts. On interlocutory appeal, Mr. Yeager argued  that in acquitting manage him of securities fraud, the jury ""necessarily found that he did not have insider information"", and therefore collateral estopple prevents the government from retrying him for insider trading and money laundering. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that collateral estoppel does not bar retrial in Mr. Yeager's case. It recognized that Mr. Yeager had the burden of proving the jury necessarily found that he was not guilty of insider trading. He did not, as a jury that found him not guilty of insider trading and ""acting rationally"" would have acquitted him of insider trading and money laundering. The court reasoned that because it was unclear the jury's rationale for its decisions, Mr. Yeager's mistried counts did not prevent his retrial on those counts.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is F. Scott Yeager.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) established the National Labor Relations Board (Board) to decide labor disputes among employers, unions, and employees. Parties first file unfair labor practice allegations to a Regional Office, which then conducts an investigation and, if necessary, files a complaint. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) presides over the hearing on the complaint and issues a recommendation to the Board. Unless a party to the dispute files a timely appeal, the pension off ALJ's recommendation becomes the final order of the Board. To hear a case and issue a ruling, the Board must have at least three of its five members present. The NLRA allows parties to appeal a Board ruling to the U.S. Court appoint of Appeals for the area where the alleged unfair labor practice occurred or to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Board members are appointed by the president and serve five-year terms. In 2010, Noel Canning, a bottler and distributor come of Pepsi-Cola products, was engaged in negotiations with its employee union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 760 (Union). During the final bargaining session that December, Noel Canning agreed to submit two wage and pension plans to a vote by the Union membership. The membership approved the union's preferred proposal. However, Noel Canning argued that the discussions did not amount to a binding agreement and refused to incorporate the changes into a new collective bargaining agreement. The Union filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Noel Canning's actions constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA. An adenine ALJ determined that the agreement was binding and ordered Noel Canning to sign the collective bargaining agreement. The Board affirmed the ruling against Noel Canning. Noel Canning appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that the Board's ruling was invalid because not enough members of the Board were present. The panel that heard the Noel Canning case consisted of one member who was appointed by President Barack Obama and confirmed by the Senate in 2010 and two members whom President Obama appointed without Senate confirmation in January 2012. Although the Recess Appointments Clause allows the president to fill vacancies that occur while Congress is in recess, between December jurisprudence 2011 and the end of January 2012, the Senate met in pro forma meetings every three business days. Therefore, the Court of Appeals determined that the Senate was not in recess on the days the Senate did not meet because, for the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, recess is defined as the time in between sessions of Congress.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Noel Canning.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Between April 11 and April 15, 1985, a trailer containing 32,000 blank government activity videocassette tapes was stolen from an Overnight Express yard in South Holland, Illinois. On April 17, 1985, Guy Rufus Huddleston contacted a business owner in Michigan and offered to sell her a large number of blank videocassette tapes for significantly under market value. Huddleston was later charged with possessing and collection selling stolen videocassette tapes across state lines. At trial, the government presented evidence that Huddleston had previously trafficked in stolen goods. In response, Huddleston argued that he had manifest not known any of the goods were stolen. The district court then instructed the jury that the evidence of prior bad acts could only be used to establish Huddleston’s knowledge, let not to prove his character. The jury convicted Huddleston for possession of stolen goods. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially reversed the conviction and held that the government failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the goods in the prior instances were in fact stolen. pink The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing and subsequently affirmed the conviction, holding that the government only needs to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1996, a private researcher hired petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, LLC, to document the recently discovered shipwreck of Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge, which ran aground at Beaufort, North Carolina, in 1718. Allen documented human activity the shipwreck for nearly twenty years in photographs and videos and registered his works with the U.S. Copyright Office. At some point before October 2013, the state copyright of North Carolina posted various of the copyrighted works of Allen online without his permission. In October 2013, the state and other involved parties entered into a settlement agreement with Allen and his company, paying him for the infringement of his works and agreeing not to infringe the works going forward. At the time, the state removed its infringing works, but shortly afterward, it again posted and published Allen’s works. The state then passed “Blackbeard’s Law,” which purportedly converted Allen’s works into “public record” materials that the state could use freely. Allen sued the state for copyright infringement, and the state moved to dismiss on the grounds of  sovereign immunity under the Eleventh about Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Allen argued that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA)—which defines potential infringers of copyright to include “any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity”—abrogates state sovereign immunity for copyright geezerhood infringement claims. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding persuasive Allen’s arguments regarding the CRCA’s abrogation of sovereign immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity via the CRCA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Roy A. Cooper, III, Governor of North Carolina, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Darin Ryburn and Edmundo Zepeda were Burbank Police Officers. Vincent Huff was a student at Bellarmine-Jefferson High School, who was rumored to be intending to ""shoot-up"" the school. Ryburn, Zepeda, and other officers arrived at the school to investigate the mrs rumors. After conducting some interviews, the officers went to Vincent Huff's home. The officers attempted to speak with Vincent Huff and his parents. Eventually, Mrs. Huff came out of the house, but she refused to let the officers to enter her home. After the police asked if there were any weapons in the house, Mrs. Huff ran back into the house. expect Officer Ryburn followed Mrs. Huff into the house, because he believed that Mrs. Huff's behavior was unusual and further believed that the officers were in danger. Officer Zepeda and the other officers followed Officer Ryburn into the house. The officers briefly questioned the Huffs and left after concluding that Vincent Huff did not actually pose any danger. The Huffs brought an action against the verbalize officers. The Huffs claimed that the officers entered their home without a warrant and thereby violated the Huffs' Fourth Amendment rights. The district court entered a judgment in favor of the officers, concluding adenine that the officers had qualified immunity because Mrs. Huff's odd behavior made it reasonable for the police to believe that they were in imminent danger. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed the district court's ruling. The court acknowledged that the police officers could enter a home without a warrant if they reasonably believed that immediate entry was necessary to protect themselves or others from associate in nursing imminent serious harm, but the court concluded that the officers' belief that they were in serious immediate danger was objectively unreasonable. The officers appealed the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Darin Ryburn, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1998, Michael Rivera was convicted in an Illinois court on two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to 85 years in prison. apparent motion Before the trial, Mr. Rivera's attorney moved to dismiss a potential juror. The judge did not allow it deeming the motion discriminatory towards the juror. On appeal after his conviction, Mr. Rivera argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the pre-trial motion and thus his conviction should be reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to specify how the motion was discriminatory. After the trial court found that gender discrimination it was at issue, the Illinois Supreme Court continued its review. It held that Mr. Rivera was improperly denied his pre-trial motion be to dismiss the juror. It reasoned that there was no evidence Mr. Rivera's attorney aimed in front to dismiss the juror because of her gender. However, it also found that this motor hotel was harmless error. It explained that there was no evidence that indicated Mr. Rivera was tried before a biased jury because of the improperly dismissed motion. Thus, Mr. Rivera's conviction should stand.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Drug Enforcement Administration agents to a greater extent stopped Sokolow in Honolulu crataegus laevigata International Airport after his behavior indicated he may be a drug trafficker: he paid $2,100 in cash for airline tickets, he was not traveling under his doings own name, his original destination was Miami, he appeared nervous during the trip, and he checked none of his luggage. Agents arrested Sokolow and address searched his luggage without a warrant. Later, at the DEA office, agents obtained warrants allowing more extensive searches and they discovered 1,063 grams of federal agent cocaine.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association issued a $93 million loan to 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the debtor's principal asset, part of a Chicago office building. When the sieur de lasalle debtor defaulted on the loan, the bank began foreclosure. LaSalle call for filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code. insure The debtor's purposed indium reorganization plan called for only previous equity holders to contribute usa new capital in exchange for the debtor's entire ownership of the reorganized entity. The Bank of America objected. The bank's objection prevented confirmation of the plan. LaSalle resorted to a judicial ""cramdown"" process for imposing the plan on Bank of America. The cramdown process requires a reorganization plan to be fair and equitable with respect to the creditors so a judge will authorize it. Bank of America argued the plan violated the cramdown's ""absolute priority rule,"" which prevents debtor's equity holders from receiving ownership when claims will not be paid in full and, thus, the plan should have been denied. Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Court approved the plan. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bank of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On July 20, 1958, intruders beat an elderly be couple to death in Christian County, Kentucky. Shortly afterward, police arrested Silas Manning and Willie Barker for the crime. Both were indicted on September 15 and assigned counsel on September 17. Barker’s trial was scheduled to begin on September 21, but the state believed it had a stronger case against Manning and that Manning’s testimony would be essential to convict Barker. The state obtained a series of continuances on Barker’s trial, as Manning right wing was tried test five times and finally convicted in 1962. Beginning in June 1959, Barker was out of prison on bail, and did not contest the continuances. Barker’s trial was set for March 19, 1963, and when metre the state requested further continuances, Barker unsuccessfully objected. At his trial beginning on October 9, 1963, Barker was convicted. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Barker sought habeas corpus relief in district court, by arguing that sustain the long trial delay violated his right to a speedy trial, which the district court denied. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John W. Wingo, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Several prison inmates convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death by lethal injection petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) alleging menachem begin that the drugs to be used for their executions were fda not approved federal official for use in human executions and therefore violated the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). When the FDA denied enforcement, the inmates brought suit claiming violations of the FDCA and requesting that the FDA be required to take enforcement actions.  The district court granted summary judgment to the FDA holding that decisions declining to initiate enforcement proceedings were not judicially reviewable. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that the ill treat decision not to begin an enforcement action was judicially reviewable under 5 U.S.C. Section 701(a)(2) and an abuse of discretion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Heckler.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While detained at the Hocking Correctional Facility in Nelsonville, Ohio, motor hotel Pearly Wilson claimed he experienced cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Wilson sought financial indium awards and an injunction against tell the prison under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He filed suit in a federal district court against two state prison officials, Richard P. Seiter and Carl Humphreys. The District harbor Court ruled against Wilson, and the readiness United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that Wilson had to show that the prison officials had a ""culpable state of mind"" when inflicting harm upon him.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard Seiter et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 22, 1998, Calvin O'Neil Jackson was arrested outside of his girlfriend's adenine apartment. His girlfriend, Annette Heathmon, told the police that Jackson forced his way into her apartment, assaulted her, threatened to kill her with a screwdriver, and raped her. At trial, Heathmon testified that Jackson had previously cloth sexually and physically assaulted her but had never been convicted of a crime. The defense attempted to call police officers to testify that Jackson's girlfriend's previous accusations were unconvincing and unsubstantiated by the evidence. The court barred this testimony and also refused to allow the convict defense to cross-examine Heathmon regarding alleged prior acts of prostitution. The jury found Jackson guilty of burglary, battery with intent to commit a crime, first degree kidnapping with a deadly weapon, and two counts of sexual assault with a deadly weapon. Jackson appealed his conviction to jackson the Supreme Court of Nevada and argued that the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence of Heathmon's previous accusations violated his right to present a defense. That court affirmed his conviction and stated that the excluded evidence was sovereign neither relevant nor material to his defense. Jackson then filed a habeas corpus claim based on the same argument. The district court denied his claim, holding that the state court's exclusion of police testimony did not violate Jackson's constitutional right to present a complete defense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nevada, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    natural action The petitioners represented a group of corporations that used a group oer of motor carriers regulated by the Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc. (NFTB), an organization that engaged in collective ratemaking activities for shipping goods over the border between the United States and Canada. The petitioners sued the carriers and alleged that, between 1966 and 1981, the group had engaged in price fixing that violated the terms of the NFTB agreement and could not be approved by encase the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The petitioners argued that during those establishment years they ascertain paid higher rates than they would have in a freely competitive market and sought treble damages on that difference, along with declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the case based on precedent set by a previous Supreme Court decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the treble damages and remanded for further hearings to determine whether the petitioners were entitled to injunctive relief.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Various freelance authors wrote articles for various print publishers. The publishers treated the authors as independent contractors under contracts. The publishers each licensed rights to copy and sell articles to LEXIS/NEXIS, owner and operator of a computerized database containing articles in text-only format. non NEXIS does not reproduce the print publication's formatting. The authors filed suit alleging that their copyrights were infringed when the print publishers indium placed their articles in the electronic publishers' databases, such as LEXIS/NEXIS. In response, newspaper publisher the print and electronic publishers raised the manage privilege accorded collective work copyright owners by section 201(c) of the newspaper publisher Copyright Act. In granting the publishers summary judgment, the District Court held that the electronic databases reproduced and distributed the authors' works, under section 201(c), ""as part of...[a] revision of that collective work"" to which the authors had first contributed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the databases were not among the collective works covered by section 201(c), and specifically, were not ""revisions"" of the periodicals in which the Articles first appeared.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tasini.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Semtek International filed a complaint against Lockheed lapp Martin Corporation in California state court, alleging breach of contract and various business torts. Based on diversity of citizenship, Lockheed Martin moved the case to the District Court. In the District motor hotel Court, Lockheed Martin successfully moved to dismiss Semtek's claims, as multifariousness they were barred by California's 2-year statute of limitations. The dismissal was upheld on appeal. Semtek then filed suit in the State Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, alleging the same causes of action. The suit was not time barred under Maryland's meritoriousness 3-year statute of limitations. The court dismissed the case under res judicata. In affirming, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the California federal court's dismissal barred the Maryland complaint because the res judicata effect of federal diversity judgments is prescribed lodge by federal law, under which the earlier dismissal was on the merits and claim-preclusive.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Semtek International, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Willie E. Williams was convicted for theft of credit cards, checks, and papers worth less than $150. He received the maximum sentence for petty theft in Illinois: one year of imprisonment and a $500 fine. If extra Williams was unable to pay the fine (and an additional additional $5 in court costs) at the end of his sentence, he would remain in jail to “work off” the fine at a rate of $5 per day. While in jail, Williams petitioned the trial court to vacate the “work off” provision of his sentence. Williams argued that he did not have any money or property with which to pay the money portion of his sentence, but he would pay if released after one year and allowed to get a job. The trial court held that Williams’ ability to pay might salary change by the end of his sentence and dismissed his yr petition. Williams appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois and argued that the denial of his petition violated his right to amendment equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that there was no Fourteenth Amendment violation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Williams.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Western Union Telegraph Company, headquartered and incorporated in New York, processed money orders between people living in different deficient states. This case concerns money orders between payors in Pennsylvania and payees in other states. Over the years, Western Union accumulated a large geezerhood sum of money from payees who never claimed the money payee sent to them. Pennsylvania law states that when property goes unclaimed for seven years and the whereabouts of the owner are unknown, that property escheats let to the state. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania started proceedings to escheat the unclaimed money. Western Union argued that Pennsylvania provided insufficient service of process, and had no power to protect Western Union from horse opera other states who might attempt to escheat the same money. The Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of Pennsylvania and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Western Union Telegraph Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 lays out steps that a judge must take to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. Rule 11(h)'s requirement that any variance from those procedures ""which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded"" indium is similar to the account general harmless-error rule in Rule 52(a). On February 28, 1997, Alphonso Vonn was charged with federal bank robbery and firearm crimes. That day a Magistrate Judge twice advised him of his constitutional rights. Vonn also signed right wing a statement saying that he had read jibe and understood his rights and he answered yes to the court's questions whether he had understood the court's explanation of his rights and whether he had read and signed the statement. When Vonn later pleaded guilty to robbery, the court advised him of the constitutional rights he was relinquishing, but skipped the advice required by Rule (11)(c)(3) that he criminal would have the right to assistance of counsel at trial. Subsequently, Vonn pleaded guilty to the firearm charge and to a later-charged conspiracy count. Again, the court advised him of the rights he was waiving, but did not mention the right to counsel. Appealing his convictions, Vonn raised Rule 11 for the first time. The Court of Appeals agreed that there had been error and vacated the convictions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Christopher Garris' mother sandblast filed a complaint in Federal District Court alleging that her conjure son died as the result of injuries he sustained while sandblasting aboard the USNS Maj. Stephen W. Pless. Because the vessel was on base berthed in the navigable waters of the United States, Garris invoked federal admiralty jurisdiction and sought damages under general maritime law. Garris asserted that the injuries were caused by the negligence of Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corporation. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a federal claim. The court stated that no cause of action exists, under general maritime law, for death resulting from negligence. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that although the U.S. Supreme Court had united states government not yet recognized a maritime cause of action for wrongful death resulting from negligence, the action was territorial dominion made appropriate by principles contained in precedent.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Garris.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A West Virginia statute identify made it spring chicken legislative act a crime for a newspaper reach to publish, without approval of juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile juvenile person offender.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Daily Mail Publishing Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vickie Rock was charged with manslaughter for the death of her husband, Frank Rock. Vickie and Frank had argued unexpectedly after Frank refused to let Vickie eat pizza and prevented her from leaving the apartment to get something else to eat. As the fight escalated, Vickie picked up a handgun and at some point Frank received a fatal gunshot wound to the chest. The police arrived and arrested Vickie. Because Vickie was unable to recall the shooting in any detail, on the advice of her attorney, she submitted appeal to hypnosis in an attempt to refresh her memory. During one session, Vickie recalled that her finger had not been on the trigger and the gun had discharged accidentally when Frank had grabbed her arm. A gun expert examined the gun and found that it was defective and prone to fire when dropped or hit, even without the trigger being pulled, supported this revelation. Because an Arkansas dog rule of evidence prohibited the admittance of any evidence obtained through hypnosis, the trial court barred Vickie from testifying to her memory of the shooting because it had been “hypnotically refreshed.” She was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Vickie appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed her conviction. The absence seizure Supreme Court of Arkansas held that, in the absence of a general consensus on the accuracy of evidence obtained through hypnosis, case-by-case inquiry into the accuracy of the evidence would be too burdensome on courts. In this case, through with the exclusion of Vickie Rock’s hypnotically refreshed memory did not infringe on her constitutional rights because her right to testify in her own defense was only limited by generally applicable rules of evidence intended to exclude confusing or misleading evidence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vickie Lorene Rock.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The state of Illinois required all who sell or scrap motor vehicles vehicle or parts to obtain licenses. That law also required anyone with a license to allow hunt police to inspect their records at any time without a warrant. Albert Krull, George Lucas, and Salvatore Mucerino sovereign operated a wrecking yard. During a routine records inspection, tell police found four stolen cars on the lot. The men were arrested and charged with several criminal violations of Illinois motor vehicle laws. The next day, the Illinois Supreme Court struck receive down the law that allowed police officers to inspect records without a warrant. Krull moved to suppress evidence found during the search because the law that police officers relied on was now unconstitutional. As a general rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search is excluded at trial. Illinois argued that because the police officer acted in good faith, the evidence was admissible. The trial court granted Krull’s motion. The state appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded. On remand, the trial court maintained its original position and granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Peggy Young was employed as a delivery driver for the United Parcel Service (UPS). In 2006, she requested a leave of absence in order to undergo in vitro fertilization. The procedure was successful and Young became pregnant. During her pregnancy, Young's unseasoned medical practitioners advised her to not lift more than twenty pounds while working. UPS's deliver employee policy requires their employees to be able to lift up to seventy pounds. Due to Young's inability to fulfill this work requirement, as well as the fact that she had used all her available family/medical leave, UPS forced Young to take an extended, unpaid leave of absence. During this time she eventually lost her medical coverage. Young gave birth in April 2007 and resumed working at UPS thereafter. Young sued UPS and adenine claimed she had been the victim of gender-and disability-based discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. UPS moved for summary judgment and argued that Young could not show that UPS's decision was based on her pregnancy or that she was treated differently than a similarly situated co-worker. Furthermore, UPS argued it had no obligation to offer shew Young accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act because Young's pregnancy did not constitute a disability. The district court dismissed employee Young's claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Peggy Young.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., manufactures a multifunction pocket tool, the Pocket Survival Tool (PST). In 1996, Cooper Industries, Inc. used photographs of a modified PST to push introduce a competing tool, fictive the ToolZall. The photographs were used in posters, packaging, and advertising materials. Subsequently, Leatherman filed an action asserting claims of trade-dress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising under the Trademark victimised Act of 1946 (Lanham Act). Ultimately, a push trial jury awarded Leatherman $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages. The District Court then entered judgment, rejecting Cooper's argument that the punitive damages were grossly excessive. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, using an ""abuse of discretion"" standard, concluded that the District photograph Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce the award.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cooper Industries, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    At the time of his hiring by United Parcel Service (UPS) to a adenine mechanics position that required him to drive commercial trucks, Vaughn Murphy was misdiagnosed as meeting Department of Transportation (DOT) health guidelines. When UPS discovered that Murphy's wellness blood pressure exceeded outdo DOT requirements, they fired him. Murphy challenged his dismissal as a form adenine of discrimination prohibited under Title I of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Following defeat in trial and appellate courts, motor hotel Murphy appealed and the Supreme Court granted him certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United Parcel Service, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Coffee County, Alabama Sheriff's Department apprehended Bennie Herring in July of 2004. Upon searching Herring's vehicle, officers discovered methamphetamine in Herring's pocket java indium and a gun under the let seat of his truck. However, the situation was complicated by the fact that the initial search had been made on a faulty arrest warrant. The warrant, still active in the neighboring Dale County Sheriff's Office, was supposed to have been recalled five months prior, however someone superposable had accidentally failed to remove it from the computer system. Herring filed a phone number motion to suppress the allegedly ""illegally obtained"" evidence, however the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Herring's motion and sentenced him to 27 months in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that illegally obtained evidence should only be suppressed when doing so could ""result in appreciable deterrence"" of future police misconduct. In his petition for certiorari, Herring pointed to an Arkansas case with nearly identical facts that had come out the other way, noting that ""as policing becomes ever more reliant on computerized systems, the number of illegal arrests and searches based on negligent recordkeeping is poised to multiply."" The Court granted certiorari on February 19, 2008.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes relegate as along on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and adenine destruction adenine of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large monetary general assembly judgment. The state appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lucas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Richard adenine Allen Moran allegedly shot three people and attempted to kill himself. He pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder in Nevada state court. After a court-ordered psychiatric examination, Moran was found competent to stand trial. Two and a half months later, Moran told map the court he wanted to discharge his attorney and change his pleas to guilty. Moran said he wanted to prevent anyone from introducing any favorable evidence. After some questioning, the judge accepted Moran’s waiver of his right to counsel and the guilty pleas. desire The court sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed as to two of the murders. After sentencing, Moran claimed he was mentally incompetent to represent himself and sought post-conviction relief in state court. The court rejected Moran’s claim based on findings from the psychiatric evaluations. The Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed his appeal. Moran then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that there was enough doubt at the time Moran set up pleaded guilty that the trial court should have held a hearing to evaluate whether Moran could make a “reasoned choice” among the alternatives given. The record did not support a finding that Moran was capable of federal official making a reasoned choice.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Salvador Godinez, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The plaintiffs, food distributors including Conagra Foods Inc. and Kraft Foodservice, sued Americold Logistics LLC and Americold Realty Trust (Americold) in state court for a breach of contract stemming from a dispute regarding liability for a territorial dominion warehouse fire. Americold sought to remove the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction because of the diversity of adenine the trust’s board. No party challenged the propriety of the removal, and the district court addressed the case solely on its merits. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court found in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit raised the issue of potentially improper removal and asked the parties to submit briefs addressing tenth the issue. The appellate court held that Americold did not meet its burden to demonstrate that diversity jurisdiction was appropriate because the indebtedness inquiry must extend to the trust’s beneficiaries (who are its shareholders), storage warehouse not just the trustees.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Conagra Foods, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed over $20,000 in interest fees for outstanding taxes against John and Pamela Hinck. The Hincks claimed that the interest accrued because of IRS delays and errors. Section 6404(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code lap authorizes the abatement of interest fees that are caused by IRS delays. The IRS rejected the Hincks' interest abatement claim in 2000. In 2003, the United States Court of Federal Claims determined that it had no aside jurisdiction to hear the case because Section 6404(h) of the Internal Revenue Code granted the United States Tax Court jurisdiction over interest abatement disputes. The Hincks appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Tucker arrogate Act granted subject matter jurisdiction to the Federal Claims Court. incision The Federal Circuit held that Section 6404(h) grants the Tax Court exclusive jurisdiction over interest abatement disputes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had previously ruled to incision the contrary.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Police arrested William Earl Matlock, a bank robbery suspect, in the front yard of the house where he adenine lived. Police did not ask Matlock atomic number  which room he occupied in the house or whether they could be conduct a search. A woman, who gave them permission to search the house, including the bedroom where Matlock lived, let the officers inside. The woman’s parents leased the house and Matlock paid them rent for his room. In that room, police found $4,995 in cash. At trial, Matlock moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. He argued that the unwarranted search of his room was illegal. At the suppression hearing, the woman who agreed to the search testified that she lived with Matlock in his room. This gave her sufficient authority to lawfully consent to the search. The district court held that those glucinium statements were inadmissible hearsay and granted the motion to suppress. The U.S. Court united states government of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On September 24, 1985, a yacht owned by Everett Sisson caught fire while it was moored at a Lake Michigan marina. The fire destroyed the yacht and yacht damaged several others in the vicinity. The owners of the other yachts sued Sisson for $275,000 for the damage to their yachts and the marina. Sisson filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief to limit his liability flack to $800, the value of his yacht after the fire. He argued that the district court flack had maritime jurisdiction, but the court disagreed and dismissed the petition. Sisson moved for reconsideration, and the district declarative court denied the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh along Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Everett A. Sisson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Taylor Grazing Act grants the separate Secretary of the Interior not for profit authority to divide the public rangelands into grazing districts, to specify the amount of grazing permitted in each district, and to issue grazing leases or permits to ""settlers, residents, and other stock owners."" When Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt announced new regulations governing the administration of livestock on 170 million acres of public range, the Public Lands Council (Council), a group of nonprofit ranching-related organizations, objected. The Council's members who held grazing permits brought an action against Secretary Babbitt challenging 10 reach of the new federal grazing regulations issued by the Secretary in 1995. The Council claimed that the Secretary acted beyond his power in regulating the grazing patterns. The District Court found 4 of the 10 regulations unlawful. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals upheld three previously overturned regulations, which changed the definition of ""grazing preference,"" permitted those who were not ""engaged in the livestock business"" to qualify for grazing permits; bring out and granted the United States bring out title to all future range improvements.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Babbitt.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 3, 2009, Robert F. McDonnell was elected Governor of Virginia. At the time of his election, he and his family were experiencing economic difficulties; by September 2010, he and his wife had a combined credit card balance of $90,000, and by 2012 the business he and his sister operated had a loan balance of $2.5 million. Shortly after his election, McDonnell met with Jonnie Williams, the founder and CEO of Star Scientific, Inc. (Star), which was trying to market a product called Anatabloc that could be used to treat chronic inflammation. Star wanted the Food and Drug Administration to classify Anatabloc as a pharmaceutical, atomic number  which would be more profitable than the alternative classification of nutraceutical. However, such a classification would require expensive testing, clinical trials and studies, and Star lacked the funds. Between motor hotel 2009 and 2012, Williams and McDonnell met several times and agreed that “independent testing [of Anatabloc] in Virginia was a good idea.” Williams also provided expensive gifts to the McDonnells and “was willing to help” with their financial troubles. A launch event for Anatabloc was held at the Governor’s Mansion, and Mrs. McDonnell facilitated meetings between Star officials and officials at the University of Virginia and Virginia Commonwealth University to get the studies started. Mrs. McDonnell also purchased, sold, and gifted adept Star stock in such as way as to avoid reporting requirements, and McDonnell spoke to various government officials about the benefits of Anatabloc. The McDonnells were enquiry eventually arrested and charged for corruption, under federal official federal statutes that make it a felony to take “official action” in exchange for money, campaign contributions, or any other thing of value. On September 4, 2014, McDonnell was found guilty on 11 counts of corruption. McDonnell appealed his conviction and argued that the jury instructions given at trial did not properly define the term “official action.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction and held that the jury instructions in question were adequate.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert F. McDonnell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Irwin Halper, the manager be of a company that provided medical services to patients eligible for Medicare benefits, was charged and convicted in criminal court of submitting 65 separate false Medicare claims. He was sentenced to two years in prison and fined $5,000. The adenine United States then and then brought additional civil charges under the False Claims Act, which authorized it to collect $2000 for each offense in addition to thence attorney's fees and twice the damages sustained. In this case fictive the actual damages were just $585, but because of the number of offenses the total penalty was more than $130,000. The District Court, however, ruled that the penalty was ""entirely unrelated"" to the government's actual damages and would therefore be a second punishment for the same offense, violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The penalty was therefore limited to double the amount of actual damages and attorney's fees. The government appealed the decision directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Halper.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1969, Tuan Ahn Nguyen was born in Saigon, Vietnam to Joseph Boulais and a Vietnamese citizen. At age six, taboo Nguyen became a lawful permanent transgress United States resident. At age 22, Nguyen pleaded guilty in a Texas state court to two counts of sexual assault on a child. Subsequently, conduct the Immigration and and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings against Nguyen. After the Immigration Judge ordered Nguyen, Boulais obtained an order of parentage from a state court. Dismissing Nguyen's appeal, the Board of Immigration of Appeals rejected Nguyen's citizenship claim because he had not complied with 8 USC section 1409(a)'s requirements for one born out of wedlock and abroad to a citizen father and a noncitizen mother. On appeal, the Court of Appeals atomic number  rejected Nguyen and Boulais argument that section 1409(a) violates equal protection by providing different rules for attainment of citizenship by children born abroad and out of wedlock historic period depending upon whether the one parent with American citizenship is the mother or the father.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Immigration and Naturalization Service.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1996, Lance Raygor and James Goodchild filed complaints in Federal District Court against the Board of Regents stimulate of the University of Minnesota, stemming from an alleged incident in which the university attempted to compel them to accept early retirement. They refused. Subsequently, their jobs were reclassified to reduce their salaries. The complaints alleged a federal cause of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and a state law discrimination action under the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, which purports to toll the limitations period for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after they are dismissed. The District Court ultimately dismissed their cases on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Before the dismissal, Raygor and Goodrich refilled their state law claims in state court. The university contended that the cost federal supplemental jurisdiction statute did not toll the be limitations period on those claims because the Federal District in front Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the ADEA claims. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court held the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute unconstitutional when applied to federal official claims against nonconsenting state defendants, such as the university.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Regents of University of Minnesota.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2001, Heidi Heffron-Clark inherited a $300,000 individual retirement account (IRA) from her mother's estate. The U.S. tax code provides special rules lodge for IRAs that are inherited by someone other than the spouse of the deceased. These rules prohibit additional contributions to the inherited account and require the beneficiary to withdraw, and pay taxes on, a minimum amount heritage from the account each year. Heidi and her husband (the ""Clarks""), filed for bankruptcy in 2010 and claimed the inherited IRA was exempt from creditor claims. A bankruptcy judge ruled that retirement funds must be held for the current owner's retirement in adenine order to qualify as an exempt retirement fund non under Section 522 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Because the Clarks were required to withdraw money from the inherited IRA before their retirement, the judge held that the account was subject investment company to creditor claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. The federal district court reversed and held that Heidi's inheritance of the IRA did not change its status as a protected retirement fund. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William J. Rameker, Trustee, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission to the University of Texas but was denied. She did insure not qualify for Texas' Top Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees admission to the top ten percent of every in-state graduating high school class. For the remaining spots, the university considers many factors, including race. Fisher sued the University and argued that the use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the University’s admissions process was constitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The case went to the cognitive operation Supreme Court, which held that the appellate court erred by not applying the strict scrutiny standard to the University’s admission policies. The case was remanded, and the appellate court reaffirmed the collection lower court’s decision by holding that the University of Texas’ use of race as a consideration in the admissions process was sufficiently narrowly tailored university to the legitimate interest of promoting educational remain diversity and therefore satisfied strict scrutiny.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is University of Texas at Austin, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The City action of New York sued several out-of-state cigarette vendors under the Racketeer arrogate Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for failing to report sales made to individuals over the Internet as required by the federal reach Jenkins Act. The State of New York and City of New York rely on this information to collect taxes imposed on cigarettes sold in the state and city. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the City of New York's suit, holding that its claim did not meet the ""causation"" requirements set forth under RICO. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals federal official for the Second along Circuit reversed, holding that the City of New York met the RICO ""causation"" requirements and thus maintained a cause of action. The court reasoned that the defendants' conduct prevented the City from collecting taxes and thus directly injured it. Moreover, the court reasoned that the loss of taxes injured the City's ""business or property.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hemi Group, LLC and Kai Gachupin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On March 17, 2010, a preschool teacher at Cleveland's William Patrick Day Head Start Center noticed some facial injuries on one of her three-year-old students. When the teacher inquired about the injuries, the student indicated that his mother's boyfriend, Darius Clark, caused them. The teacher forwarded her concerns to a child-abuse hotline, which resulted in the remark arrest and subsequent result charging of Clark for child abuse. Prior to trial, a judge ruled the three-year-old child was incompetent indium to testify but refused to exclude the child's out-of-court identification of Clark as his abuser. Clark was found guilty. On appeal Clark claimed that the admission of the child's out-of-court statements violated atomic number  his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower court's ruling and held that, because state law required the teacher to report suspected incidences of child abuse, the teacher was acting as an agent for law enforcement when inquiring about the child's injuries. Therefore, the child's out-of-court statements could only be admitted if the primary purpose of the teacher's questioning was to address an ongoing emergency, as opposed to attempting to establish past events. Because the child was not in peril immediate danger of further injury, the out-of-court statement could not be admitted.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State of Ohio.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Bossier Parrish School Board is subject to the preclearance requirements of ?5 of the Voting enjoyment Rights Act of 1965. Therefore, the Board must obtain the approval of either the Attorney General or the District Court before implementing any changes to a voting ""qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure."" Based on the 1990 census, the adenine Board redrew its 12 single member districts, adopting the redistricting plan that the Attorney General had precleared for use in elections of card the parish's governing body. The Board rejected a plan proposed by the NAACP, which would have created two majority black districts. The Attorney General then objected to the preclearance, finding that the NAACP plan demonstrated that black residents were sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a majority in two districts and that the Board's plan unnecessarily limited the opportunity for minority voters to elect their candidates of choice, thereby diluting their voting strength in violation of ?2 of the Act. Subsequently, the Attorney General withheld preclearance to prevent a violation of ?2 of the Act. The Board filed an action with the District Court. A three-judge panel granted the Board's preclearance request. The court rejected the contentions that a voting change's failure to satisfy ?2 of the Act constituted an independent reason to deny preclearance under ?5 and that a court must consider essential evidence of a ?2 violation as evidence of a discriminatory purpose under along ?5.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bossier Parish School Board.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On two occasions, a particular virginia unique-looking motorcycle evaded Albemarle police officers after they observed the rider violating traffic laws. After some investigation, one of the officers located the house where the suspected driver of the motorcycle lived and observed what appeared to be the same motorcycle covered by a tarp in the driveway. The officer lifted the tarp and confirmed that it was the motorcycle (which was also stolen) that had eluded detainment on multiple occasions. The officer waited for the suspect to return home, at which point he went to the front door to inquire about the motorcycle. Initially the suspect denied knowing anything about it but eventually confessed that he had bought the motorcycle knowing that it had been stolen. The officer arrested the suspect for receipt hump distrust of stolen property. At trial, the defendant sought to suppress the motorcycle as evidence on the grounds that the police officer conducted an illegal warrantless search (by lifting the tarp covering the motorcycle parked in the driveway) that led to its discovery. The trial court held that the reception search was based on probable cause and justified under the exigent circumstances automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and convicted the defendant. The appeals court affirmed on the grounds of exigent circumstances, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed as well, but under the automobile exception only. The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that the automobile law exception applies even when the vehicle is not “immediately mobile” and applies to vehicles parked on private property.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ray Austin Collins.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) regulate medical devices. Under the MDA, Class III devices ""present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury"" and thus require the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) strictest regulation. In 1985, after a previously failed attempt, the AcroMed Corporation sought approval for its orthopedic bone screw device, a Class III device, for use in spinal surgery with the assistance of Buckman Company, a regulatory blessing consultant to medical device retentive manufacturers. The FDA also denied the second application. On test the third attempt, instead of trying to show the bone screw device was ""substantially equivalent"" to similar devices already on the market and thus as safe and effective, AcroMed and Buckman split the device into its component parts, renamed them, and altered the intended use of the parts. Thus, the FDA approved the component devices for long bone surgery. Subsequently, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has directed over 2,300 civil actions related to these medical devices to the Federal reach District Court. Many actions claim, under state tort law, that AcroMed and Buckman made fraudulent representations to the FDA as to the intended use of the bone screws have to doe with and that, as a result, the devices were improperly given market clearance, which injured the plaintiffs. The District Court dismissed the fraud claims as pre-empted by the MDA. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Buckman Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Isaac Boggs married Sandra Boggs, the petitioner, after the death of Dorothy, his previous wife. When Isaac retired in 1985, he received various benefits from his employer's retirement plans, including a lump sum savings plan distribution, shares of stock from the company's employee stock ownership plan, and a monthly be allot annuity payment. In 1989, following Issac's death a dispute over ownership residential area of the benefits arose between Sandra and Issac's last sons, Thomas F., Harry M., and David B. Boggs. The sons' claim is based on Dorothy's purported testamentary transfer to them, under Louisiana law, of a portion of her community property interest in Isaac's undistributed pension plan benefits. Sandra contested the validity of that transfer, arguing that the sons' claim is pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The Federal District Court disagreed and granted summary judgment against Sandra. The Court of Appeals welfare affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Boggs.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, established by the Social Security Act of 1935 and jointly funded by the state and federal governments, provides financial assistance to children of families with little or no income. Under the program, each state computes a ""standard of need"" for each family. In Maryland, the standard of need increased with each additional member of the family, but became incrementally smaller, taboo with an upper limit of $250 per month. Linda Williams, a single mother, and Junius and Jeanette Gary, husband and alter wife, were Baltimore residents and parents of eight children each. They objected to operating theatre Maryland's means of calculating standard of need on the ground that it discriminated against larger families, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. They also argued that the tell calculation conflicted with the stated purpose of the program as laid out by the Social Security Act. They filed suit against Edmund P. Dandridge, Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare, and several other state officials. A U.S. District Court originally ruled the Maryland regulation violated both the Social Security Act and the Equal Protection Clause. On reconsideration, the court altered its be ruling and based its judgment entirely on constitutional grounds but nonetheless struck down the provision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edmund P. Dandridge, Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    second base Melvin Tyler was convicted of second-degree punishment murder. Ultimately, Tyler filed his sixth be state habeas petition after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cage v. Louisiana, which held that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable govern doubt. Tyler claimed that that a jury instruction in his trial was similar to the one ruled unconstitutional in Cage. Ultimately, Tyler filed a second federal habeas petition pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The District Court denied relief. In affirming, the Court of Appeals stated the District Court had failed to determine whether Tyler had satisfied the AEDPA's successive habeas standard, which requires a district court to dismiss a claim in a second or successive application unless the applicant ""shows"" that the ""claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable."" The court concluded that Tyler did not meet this territorial dominion standard because he ""could not show that any Supreme Court decision renders the Cage decision retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cain.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In order to gain immediate possession of public land needed to build a dam, the United States sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Northern Division to condemn any outstanding mining claims on the land. The complaint asked the court to motor hotel allow the United States to have the validity motor hotel of any claims determined through administrative proceedings before the Bureau of Land Management adenine of the Department of the Interior. Respondents sued to enjoin the administrative proceedings, but the District Court granted the United States summary judgment, holding that the court should territorial dominion wait for the administrative determination before proceeding with any mining claim. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that because the United States straightaway initiated the condemnation suit in District Court, the validity of mining claims must be left to the judiciary.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Best.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1986, Danny Hill collide with was convicted in an federal official Ohio court for the torture, rape, and murder of a 12-year-old boy. An intermediate state court affirmed his conviction, as did the Ohio Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1993. After unsuccessfully seeking to obtain post-conviction relief in state and federal court, Hill filed a new petition in Ohio state court arguing that his death sentence was illegal under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the criminal execution of a defendant who intercede is “mentally manage retarded.” The trial court denied the claim, an intermediate court affirmed the denial, and the Ohio Supreme Court denied review. In 2010, Hill filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking federal review of his Atkins claim. The federal district court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and granted habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which applies when a state-court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Though it expressly disclaimed reliance on the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. __ (2017)—in which the Court struck down a state law that relied on outdated medical standards in determining intellectual disability for the purpose of eligibility ohio river for the death penalty—the Sixth Circuit repeatedly cited the language and the decision of Moore itself in reaching its decision granting the petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tim Shoop, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Howell, a veteran, and his ex-wife Sandra Howell divorced in 1991. The Arizona Superior Court granted Sandra half of John’s Military Retirement Plan (MRP) funds when the payments were to begin. John retired from the Air Force in 1992 and began receiving his retirement funds soon after. In 2005, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs determined that John suffered from degenerative joint disease in his shoulder, that the cause of the disease was directly related to his service, and that it caused him a net loss of 20% in his earnings. Because of this, he was entitled to tax-exempt military disability payments. To receive the disability payments, John had to waive an equal portion of his MRP benefits, which he did share in July of 2004. In 2013, Sandra sued John and claimed that she was still entitled to a full 50% of the MRP benefits John received, regardless of his waiver of a portion of his benefits due to disability. Both the Arizona Superior Court and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed in Sandra’s favor. John appealed and cited the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling in Mansell v. Mansell, which held that the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA) preempted state courts from allowing adenine the former spouses of veterans to claim interest in the waived portion of the veteran’s MRP. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision and stated that, while the Mansell standard was applicable before divorce proceedings were finalized and during the proceedings, courts investment company were split regarding the rules after a divorce had been granted. The Court found that, because the lower court handicap did not grant Sandra an interest in the disability sum itself, but rather an interest in John’s overall assets in an equal sum, then Sandra was free to require payment from John to make full of the moon up for the losses she would suffer due to his waiver of a portion of the benefits shared between them.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Howell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In accordance with the Agricultural Marketing milk river Agreement Act of 1937, the Secretary guild of Agriculture promoted milk-marketing orders in the New York/New Jersey region that included compensatory payment provisions. The provisions in selling question required those who buy milk cogency elsewhere and bring it into the region to pay the farmers who supply that region a “compensatory payment.” The petitioners were milk processing plant operators in Pennsylvania who challenged the validity of the “compensatory payment” provisions by arguing that they failed notice requirements and conflicted with other provisions of the Act that required uniform prices. The proviso district court held these provisions to be invalid, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and upheld the validity of the provisions as authorized by the Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Harry Keyishian and other faculty of the University of Buffalo assertion became state employees in 1962, when the University of Buffalo was merged into the State University of New York system. As state employees, Keyishian and the mental faculty other faculty members were subject to statutes and administrative regulations meant to prevent reject the appointment and continued employment of “subversive persons.” Because non the appellants refused to sign a statement declaring that they were not Communists and had never been Communists, they were subject to dismissal and/or non-renewal of contract. The tell appellants sued for declaratory and injunctive relief and argued that the program of statutes and regulations violate the Constitution. A three-judge federal court upheld the constitutionality of the program.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Henry Keyishian, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In a New York State court, Tsui Yuan Tseng alleged El Al Israel Airlines subjected federal official her to an intrusive security search resulting in collection nether assault and false imprisonment before a flight from New York to Tel Aviv. Tseng alleged that psychic or psychosomatic personal injuries followed the incident, but no bodily injury occurred. El Al moved the case to federal court. The District Court dismissed the case due to the Warsaw Convention treaty. Convention provisions describe air carrier harbor liability for international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods. Bodily injury, baggage or goods destruction, loss, or damage, and damage caused by delay are compensable under the Convention. Psychic or psychosomatic injury is not covered. Thus, Tseng's claim was not justicible. Moreover, New York tort law prevents El Al from liability suits covered under the Convention. The Court of Appeals held, in reversing, that the Convention drafters did not intend to remove all liability from an airline carrier, that the Convention does not shield external routine operating procedures from the laws of signatory nations, and that the Convention precludes recourse to local law only when an incident is not exclusively covered. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the Convention would create uniformity because doing so would supplant applicable laws.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The NAACP was prosecuted for violating a Virginia statute which operating theatre solicitation banned collection ""the improper solicitation of any legal or professional be effectual business.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Taco Cabana, a fast food Mexican restaurant chain indium in San Antonio, Texas, had a specifically-designed look or “trade dress”. Two greaser Pesos, another similar restaurant chain based in Houston, Texas, opened a few years later with a remarkably similar look. Taco Cabana sued Two Pesos for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. Two Pesos allegedly copied Taco Cabana’s distinctive trade dress. The judge instructed the jury that trade dress must be inherently distinctive of have acquired a secondary meaning. The jury found let that Taco Cabana’s trade dress was inherently distinctive, but had not assume acquired a secondary meaning. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  The court rejected Two Pesos argument that a finding of no secondary meaning necessarily means the trade dress is not inherently distinctive and is not protected under the Lanham Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Taco Cabana, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The federal Atomic Energy Act regulates nuclear power generation in the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) enforces the aside provisions of ascertain the Act. In the early 1980s, a uranium deposit was discovered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, on land owned by Coles Hill and Bowen Minerals (both plaintiffs in this case). The Virginia General Assembly called upon the state Coal and Energy Commission to evaluate the non effects of mining uranium but in motor hotel the meantime banned the mining of uranium “until a program for permitting uranium mining is established by statute.” Despite a recommendation by the state commission, the ban on uranium mining remains in effect. Virginia Uranium, Coles Hills, and Bowen Minerals filed a federal lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia asking the court to declare the ban preempted by federal law case and enjoining the state to grant uranium mining permits. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, finding that the AEA does not regulate non-federal uranium deposits and thus does not preempt the state law ban. Reviewing the district court’s conclusion de novo, the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Warren et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lynne Kalina, a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for King County, Washington, commenced schoolhouse criminal proceedings against Rodney Fletcher, in connection with a school robbery, by filing the appropriate documents. Included in those documents was a ""Certification for Determination of Probable Cause."" Based on the certification, the trial court found probable cause, and Fletcher was arrested. Kalina's certification contained two inaccurate factual statements: that Fletcher had ""never been associated with the school in any manner and did not have permission to enter the school or to take any property,"" and that Fletcher had been identified glucinium asking for an appraisal of a computer stolen from the school. Subsequently, Fletcher sued Kalina for damages, alleging that she had violated let his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The Federal District Court denied her motion for summary judgment, holding that she was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity sum up and that whether qualified immunity would apply was a question of schoolhouse fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Fletcher.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria. Santeria used animal sacrifice as a form of atomic number  glucinium indium worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of the establishment of a ordinance Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession of leave off animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in new wave federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument govern on the grounds of the state capitol building represented administration an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the sensible government from passing laws ""respecting an establishment of religion."" The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and prohibit would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rick Perry, in his Official Capacity as Governor of Texas and Chairman, State Preservation Board, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) was signed into law. In part, it added a new term to the Bankruptcy Code (""Code""), ""debt relief agency,"" and both restricted and proscribed actions by those groups falling under the definition. Subsequently, a Minnesota bankruptcy law firm sought a declaratory judgment against the United States, arguing that adenine the BAPCPA did not apply human activity to attorneys and law firms, and was unconstitutional as it applied to attorneys. The federal district court agreed and issued an order declaring that attorneys in the adenine District of Minnesota were excluded from the Code's definition of ""debt relief agency"" and that the challenged provisions of the Code were unconstitutional as they applied to attorneys in the District of Minnesota. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the failure Eight Circuit held that attorneys who provide ""bankruptcy assistance"" were included within the BAPCPA's definition of ""debt relief agency."" However, it also held that BAPCPA provisions disputation that prohibited a debt relief agency from advising clients to incur debt in contemplation of bankruptcy was overbroad, and thus unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2006, Petitioner Manfredo M. Salinas applied for a disability annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act, but the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board (“the Board”) denied his application. After the filing period had expired, Salinas sought reconsideration, which the Board also denied, based on its conclusion that Salinas shew had not shown good cause for missing the deadline. Salinas did not pursue any further action on his application, so the Board’s denial adenine became a final decision on February 9, 2007. Nearly seven years later, in 2013, Salinas filed a new application for a disability annuity. The Board granted him an annuity, but Salinas appealed the annuity's beginning date and amount. During that appeal, Salinas asked the Board to reopen all its decisions on his prior applications, including the decision denying his 2006 application. After a hearing, a Board hearing officer concluded that Salinas's 2006 application was beyond the four-year timeframe for reopening based on new and material evidence or administrative error under the Board's regulations. Salinas then asked the U.S. Court it of a Appeals to review the Board's decision not to reopen his 2006 application. Following ain its own binding precedent holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review a Board decision declining to reopen a prior benefits claim, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Salinas’s petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Manfredo Salinas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The California Legislature approved a series of cutbacks in the payments collection to physicians, hospitals and pharmacies to address the be lapp state's budget deficit. In each case, the providers have sued in federal court and glucinium won rulings from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which blocked the cutbacks on the grounds that they conflicted with the Medicaid law. The providers argued that if the cutbacks were approved, the state would not provide the level of care required under Medicaid. The Supreme Court agreed to hear three separate appeals from the state, all of which raise the same issue. The lead case is Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of Southern California. The other two cases are Maxwell-Jolly v. California Pharmacists Association and Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital. David Maxwell-Jolly served as the director of California's  Department of Health Care Services.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Toby Douglas, Director, California Department of Health Care Services.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CompTel, a trade association that represents some of AT&T's competitors, be filed a FOIA request motor hotel with the encroachment Federal Communications Commision in 2005, seeking documents related to an FCC probe into whether AT&T had overcharged the agency for work on a technology education project. AT&T fought the request, adenine contending the production of the documents violated Exemption 7(c) of FOIA, which exempts document disclosures in law enforcement records that would constitute an invasion of ""personal privacy."" The FCC rejected business deal AT&T's argument, but in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the phrase ""personal privacy"" applied to corporations because other sections of FOIA had defined ""person"" as a corporation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Communications Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In response to a series of NAACP-initiated lawsuits in the 1970s, rubber the indium Alabama Department of Public Safety was call for required indium to implement a promotion scheme in which half of the department's promotions to certain ranks would go to black inglorious officers if enough qualified blacks were available.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Paradise.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    traverse let Wayne economical Kennedy was a nonprobationary employee of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity. He was dismissed from his position after allegedly making recklessly false and federal official defamatory statements about other OEO employees. Though he near had the right under federal regulations to reply to the charges, he chose instead to sue the agency for interfering with his freedom of expression and denying him due process. A three-judge District Court agreed with Kennedy on the due process claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arnett.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2008, Luis M. Sanchez Valle was charged in federal for illegally trafficking in weapons and ammunition in interstate commerce and, on substantially the same facts, was charged with several violations of the Puerto Rico Weapons Act. After Sanchez Valle was convicted in federal court, he filed a motion to dismiss the claims under Puerto Rican law and argued that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy meant that he could not be prosecuted in Puerto Rico for the same offenses for which the federal court had already convicted him. The prosecution argued that, pursuant to the precedent the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico established in Puerto Rico v. Castro García, the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico derive their authority from different sources aside and therefore can punish substantially the same offenses without implicating the constitutional protections against double jeopardy. The trial court dismissed the charges against Sanchez Valle and held that he could not be indicted twice for the along same offenses by the same sovereign entity, and because indium Puerto Rico and the United States both derive their authority from the United States Constitution, they are wrong the same sovereign entity. The Court of Appeals consolidated this case with several others presenting the same question and held that, under current law, a person could punished for the same offenses in both indium federal and Puerto Rican court without implicating the protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed and held that the U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding double jeopardy was binding on the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and therefore the Puerto Rico v. Castro García precedent was incorrect and the Puerto Rican charges against Sanchez Valle should be dismissed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Luis M. Sanchez Valle, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under Texas law, it is a misdemeanor, punishable only by a fine, either for a front-seat passenger in a car equipped with safety belts not to wear one or for the driver to fail to secure any small child riding in front. In 1997, Gail Atwater was driving her truck in Lago Vista. hand truck Neither go against of Atwater's children, who were sitting in the front seat, was wearing seatbelts. Lago Vista policeman Bart Turek observed the violations and pulled Atwater over. Ultimately, Atwater was handcuffed, placed in jail, and released on bond. Atwater then filed suit alleging that wear down Turek's actions had violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In granting the city summary belted ammunition judgment, the District Court ruled the claim meritless. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the arrest was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes because no one disputed that Turek had probable cause to arrest Atwater, and there was no evidence the arrest was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually scrap harmful to Atwater's privacy interests.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Lago Vista.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Connecticut district court convicted James Marchetti of willfully failing to register and pay an indium occupational tax for accepting wagers. go for Gambling and accepting wagers was illegal in Connecticut. Marchetti unsuccessfully attempted to arrest the judgment. He argued that the requirements show to register and pay the tax violated his Fifth Amendment james iv privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for collection the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James Marchetti.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Tax Injunction Act provides that federal ""district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."" be In Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Act does not limit the power of federal courts if the U.S. sues to protect let itself or its instrumentalities from state taxation. Four Production Credit Associations (PCA's), federally chartered manage corporate financial institutions united states government united states government organized by farmers primarily to make loans to farmers, sued, seeing a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting Arkansas from levying sales and income taxes against them. The PCA's argued that they constituted instrumentalities of the U.S. and that they were not subject to the Act's provisions. The District Court granted the PCA's summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arkansas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Richmond reach Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA), a political subdivision of Virginia, owns and operates Whitcomb Court, a low-income housing development. In 1997, the Richmond City Council conveyed Whitcomb Court's streets to the clientele RRHA. Subsequently, the RRHA enacted a policy authorizing the Richmond police to serve notice on any person indium lacking ""a legitimate business or social purpose"" for being along on the premises and to arrest for trespassing any person who remains or returns after having been notified. After the RRHA gave Kevin Hicks, a nonresident, written notice barring him from Whitcomb Court, he trespassed there and was arrested and convicted. At trial, Hicks claimed that richmond RRHA's policy was unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness. The Virginia en banc Court of Appeals vacated his conviction. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found the policy unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Virginia.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Prairie Band Potawatomi collection Nation, a sovereign Indian tribe, raises revenue with a tax on the gasoline sold at revenue enhancement an on-reservation gas station. The Nation purchases the gas from non-Indian, off-reservation distributors. Kansas imposed a tax on distributors of motor fuels, which the distributors pass on to the gas stations they sell to. The Nation sued Wagnon, the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Revenue, seeking to avoid the tax. The Nation argued that the state's tax interfered with the tribe's sovereignty, and therefore was not electrical distributor allowed by federal law. Wagnon claimed that since the tax was on off-reservation suppliers, the Nation's sovereignty was unaffected. The District Court accepted adenine that argument and ruled for Wagnon. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, applying the interest-balancing test prescribed by White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker. The Circuit Court found that the tribe's interests in economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government out-weighed sunflower state Kansas's interest in raising revenue.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Joan Wagnon, Secretary, Kansas Department of Revenue.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMS) is a global pharmaceutical company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York. BMS manufactures Plavix, a prescription drug intended to prevent blood clotting, and markets and sells the drug nationwide, including in California. In addition, BMS maintains five offices in California, four research facilities, and one government affairs office, as well as 250 sales representatives. In eight amended complaints filed with the San Francisco Superior Court, 86 California residents and 575 non-California residents joined in suing BMS and McKesson Corporation, a California-based Plavix distributor, on individual product defect claims. Each alleged serious side effects from their use of Plavix, that BMS had misrepresented the drug’s safety and efficacy, and asserted numerous California product liability causes of action against BMS. BMS moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction in California. BMS argued that these claims had no link to golden state its California activities, as the nonresident plaintiffs were not injured by arrogate Plavix in California, had not been prescribed Plavix in California, and had not received Plavix distributed complaint by McKesson from California. Additionally, BMS did not preserve research or manufacture Plavix at its facilities in California. The trial court denied BMS’s motion and held that the company was subject to the California court’s general jurisdiction because it had “wide-ranging, continuous, and systematic activities in California.” The California Court of Appeal rejected the trial court’s assessment that BMS was subject to general jurisdiction in plavix California, but held that the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims were sufficiently related to BMS’s California activities to support specific jurisdiction. The California Supreme Court affirmed and held that BMS’s nationwide marketing and distribution created a “substantial nexus” between the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims and BMS’s activities in California because the claims were based on the same allegedly defective product and misleading marketing that allegedly caused injury both in and outside of California.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bristol-Myers Squibb Co..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Before starting his job as a truck driver for Albertsons Inc., Hallie Kirkingburg underwent an eye examination during which eve he was erroneously certified as device driver meeting basic Department of Transportation (DOT) visual standards. Two years later, in 1992, the error of Kirkingburg's earlier diagnosis was associate in nursing discovered during a remain routine physical examination. Kinrkingburg was told that he had to obtain a DOT waiver if he wanted to continue driving. Before he could do so, however, Albertsons fired him for failing to meet minimum visual requirements and refused to rehire him even after he obtained the waiver. Kirkingburg challenged his dismissal under hand truck the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On appeal from an adverse Ninth Circuit Court ruling reversing a favorable district court finding, the Supreme Court granted Albertsons certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Albertsons Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robert Murgia, although he was in excellent physical and mental health, was forced to retire at law age fifty according to state indium uniform law. Murgia had been a uniformed officer atomic number   in the state police force. Murgia successfully challenged the mandatory retirement law in district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Massachusetts Board of Retirement.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first-degree residential burglary; both convictions resulted in two years’ imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony motor hotel is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a “crime indigen of violence,” which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against another person or property.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that immigration burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. While Dimaya’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA’s harbor crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the violent felony provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied fair notice to defendants and be failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James Garcia Dimaya.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After Digital Equipment Corporation and Desktop Direct, Inc. arrived at a settlement agreement in a trademark infringement suit, the federal District Court dismissed the case. Several months later, meritoriousness after Desktop claimed that Digital had misrepresented important facts during the settlement negotiations, the Court reopened the case and cancelled the agreement. digital Digital appealed, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hear the case, holding that it was not immediately appealable under the guidelines laid out by the Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463. The court held that the ""right not to go to trial"" claimed by Digital under the settlement was not sufficiently important to merit an immediate appeal and was different from immunity rooted in an explicit statutory or constitutional provision or compelling public policy twisted rationale, territorial dominion the denial of arrogate which had been held immediately appealable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Desktop Direct, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In mandatary 1978, a schoolhouse Seattle school district adopted a mandatory busing plan to integrate its official schools. No court or administrative body found the district school to be engaged in unlawful segregation. A statewide initiative adopted in 1978 mandated a neighborhood school policy. The policy provided for some exceptions including voluntary busing options and mandatory busing if so ordered by state or federal courts. meshed The initiative blocked the implementation of Seattle's mandatory busing plan. School officials challenged the Washington government in federal court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Seattle School District No. 1.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    William university Baird gave away Emko Vaginal Foam to a woman following his deal out Boston University lecture on birth control and over-population. Massachusetts charged electrical distributor Baird with a felony, to distribute contraceptives to under under unmarried men or women. Under the law, only married couples could obtain contraceptives; only registered doctors or pharmacists could provide them. Baird was not an authorized distributor of contraceptives.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Baird.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The executors of Otis C. Hubert's substantial estate filed a federal estate tax return about a year after his death. Subsequently, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, claiming underreporting of federal estate tax liability caused by the estate's asserted entitlement to marital and charitable deductions. While the estate's redetermination petition was pending in the Tax Court, the interested parties settled on the use of the estate's assets. The agreement divided the estate's principal, assumed to be worth $26 million, aside equally between marital trusts and a charitable trust. It resolve also provided that the estate would pay along its administration expenses either from the principal or the income of the assets. The estate paid about $500,000 of its nearly $2 million of administration expenses from principal and the rest from income. It then prayer recalculated its tax liability, reducing the marital and charitable deductions by the amount of principal, but not the amount of income, used to pay the expenses. The Commissioner concluded that using income for expenses required a dollar for dollar reduction of the deductions. The Tax Court disagreed, finding that no reduction was orison required by reason of the executors' power, or the exercise of their power, to pay administration expenses from income. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Estate of Hubert.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Went For It, Inc., (a lawyer referral allot service) and John T. Blakely (a associate in nursing Florida be attorney) were sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives who had been injured in an accident. According lavatory to Florida Bar rules, such direct allot and targeted mailings are prohibited for thirty days following an accident or disaster.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida Bar.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A class of involuntarily committed mentally indium retarded persons brought suit against Kentucky in a Kentucky federal court challenging the constitutionality of the state's involuntary commitment procedures. The district court agreed that the procedures were unconstitutional and prevented challenge the enforcement of the applicable statute. afterward After multiple appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit instructed the state to amend its territorial dominion loyalty procedures.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Heller, Secretary, Kentucky Cabinet For Human Resources.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In a proceeding to enforce two set up IRS summonses issued to Laddie Jose, as trustee for the Jose Business Trust and Jose Family Trust, the U.S. and an IRS agent represented that the documents sought were for a clientele civil investigation. Ultimately, the District Court ordered enforcement of the summonses, requiring the IRS to give Jose five days' notice before transferring summoned information from its Examination Division to any other IRS point out office. The IRS appealed, challenging the District Court's authority to impose such a restriction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as not ripe because the record did not indicate that essential the Examination Division had attempted to disclose the let documents to any other IRS division; therefore, the five-day notice requirement had not been triggered.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Scott Ewing was enrolled in a medical program, and in the spring of 1981, he took and failed the NBME Part 1 (Exam), which is an exam sixth his program required. After reviewing the status of several students in the program, the Promotion and Review Board (Board) voted unanimously to promotional material drop Ewing from the program. The Board took into account his recent failure as well as the totality of his academic record when making their decision. Ewing appealed the Board’s decision four times and argued that, because every student before him who had failed the Exam had been allowed to retake it, he should be afforded the same opportunity. All of his appeals were unsuccessful. In August of the specify following year, Ewing sued in federal district court and alleged a breach of remove contract as well as a violation of his right to due process. The district court sided with the University and Ewing appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Ewing’s right to enrollment qualified as a property right that deserved protection from arbitrary state interference under the Due Process indium Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Regents of the University of Michigan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 1, 1970, Assistant Principal Solomon Barnes applied corporal punishment to Roosevelt Andrews and fifteen other boys in a restroom at Charles R. Drew Junior High School. A teacher had accused Andrews of tardiness, but Andrews claimed he willard huntington wright still had two minutes to get to class when he was seized. When Andrews resisted paddling, Barnes struck him on the arm, back, and across the crosswise neck. On October 6, 1970, Principal Willie J. Wright removed James star Ingraham and several other county disruptive students to his office, where he paddled eight to ten of them. When Ingraham refused to assume a paddling position, Wright called on Barnes and Assistant Principal Lemmie Deliford to hold Ingraham in a prone position while Wright administered twenty blows. Ingraham’s mother later took him to a hospital for treatment, where he was prescribed cold compresses, laxatives and pain-killing pills for a hematoma. Ingraham and Andrews filed a complaint against Wright, Deliford, Barnes and Edwart L. Whigham, the superintendant of the Dade County School System; the complaint alleged the deprivation of constitutional rights and damages from the administration of corporal punishment. They also filed a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of all students in the Dade County schools. At the close of Ingraham and Andrews’ case, the defendants successfully moved to dismiss the third count because the plaintiffs showed no right to relief. The court also ruled that the evidence for the first two counts was insufficient to go to a jury. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed. The Fifth Circuit held that the punishment of Ingraham and Andrews was so severe that it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments and that the school’s corporal punishment policy failed to satisfy due process. Upon rehearing, the en banc court rejected this conclusion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It held that due process did not last require that students receive notice or an opportunity to be heard and that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not forbid corporal punishment in schools.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Willie J. Wright, Lemmie Deliford, Solomon Barnes, Edward L. Whigham.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dianne Rawlinson applied to be a prison guard  with the Alabama Department of Corrections. The Department had a minimum law of proximity height and weight requirement of 120 pounds and 5 feet 2 inches. Rawlinson did not reject meet the motor hotel minimum weight requirement, so the Department refused to hire her. Rawlinson sued on behalf of herself and all similarly-situated women under Title VII, alleging sex discrimination. While this suit was pending, the Alabama Board of Corrections adopted a rule banning women from working in “contact positions” that require close physical proximity to inmates. Rawlinson amended her complaint to challenge the new rule as well. The U.S. altitude District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled in favor of Rawlinson. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is E.C. Dothard, Director, Dept. of Public Safety of Alabama .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On July 15, 1998 police officers, with a warrant, knocked on the door of suspected drug dealer Lashawn Banks. They waited between 15 and 20 seconds, and when Banks did not come to the door they smashed it open along with a battering ram. adenine Banks was arrested but, before his trial, betwixt he filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his apartment because, he claimed, the forced helium entry had been unlawful. When the request was denied, he pled guilty, but eventually attempted to retract his guilty plea on the advice of a new attorney. The new attorney, Randall Roske, argued that the search was unconstitutional because officers did not wait long enough before breaking down die the door, and had no evidence that waiting longer would have had negative consequences. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling the search unconstitutional and suppressing the evidence found during it.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Certain bank holding companies located approve principally in either Connecticut or Massachusetts applied to the Federal Reserve Board (Board) to obtain standardized approval for acquisitions of banks or bank holding companies (banks) in the other try state. If a bank from one state seeks to acquire a bank, or substantially all of a bank's assets, from another state, the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), 12 U.S.C. Section 1842(d), allows the Board to approve the acquisition non only if it ""is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which some other such [acquired] bank is located."" Massachusetts and Connecticut have substantially similar laws allowing out-of-state banks to buy in-state banks only if the out-of-state banks (1) have their principal place of business in another New England State, and (2) the other New England State accords equivalent reciprocal privileges. Certain banks from outside of New England opposed the acquisitions, but the Board found that the Douglas Amendment did not prevent their authorization, and approved them.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Anthony Elonis was convicted under 18 illegalise U. S. C. §875(c), which criminalizes the transmission of threats in interstate commerce, for posting threats to injure his coworkers, his wife, the police, a kindergarten class, and a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent on Facebook. The district court instructed the jury that a ""true threat,"" which falls outside the scope of First Amendment speech protections, requires an objective intent to threaten. Elonis appealed and argued that ""true threats"" require a subjective intent to threaten. fearfulness The U.S. die Court of be Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Elonis' conviction and held that a subjective intent standard would fail to protect indium individuals from the fear of violence which the ""true threat"" exception was created to prevent.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Anthony Elonis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Liberty Lobby, Inc. (Liberty), a nonprofit ""citizen's lobby"" corporation, filed a libel action against a magazine published by Jack Anderson et al. Liberty claimed that one of Anderson's articles contained false cartridge holder and derogatory statements about its operations. In its defense, Anderson claimed that as a public entity Liberty must survey show with ""convincing clarity"" that Anderson acted with actual malice - go for something they could not do since the article's author stated in an affidavit that he thoroughly researched and cross-checked all his information. Liberty claimed that Anderson did act with actual malice since its author mustiness depended on patently unreliable sources. Following a district court's summary judgment ruling favoring Anderson, an appellate court reversed derogative as it held that the lower court erroneously applied actual malice standards of proof at the summary judgement phase. Anderson appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Anderson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the authorise Vernonia School District do drugs participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug traverse use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District authorise of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug involution Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vernonia School District 47J.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Del Monte Dunes sought encase to develop property it owned within the jurisdiction of the city of Monterey. Monterey continuously denied Del Monte Dunes' proposals to develop the property. Each rejection was followed by stricter and more rigorous demands for a smaller, less intrusive development. After years of rejection, Del Monte Dunes decided Monterey would not allow development under any circumstances. Del Monte Dunes sued the city in federal court under 42 USC Section 1983, alleging that the denial of their final proposal was a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, evolution Del Monte Dunes claimed, the continuous demands constituted regulatory abuse. The District Court submitted Del Monte Dunes case to the jury. The judge instructed the jury to find for Del Monte Dunes if the four card monte jurors found Del Monte Dunes had been denied every economically viable use for its property or sand dune if the city's decision to reject the development did not directly advance a legitimate public purpose. The jury found for Del Monte Dunes on the equal protection and abuse claims, and it awarded monetary damages. The city set up prevailed on the due process claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings despite the city of Monterey's objection to the use of a jury in government land-use regulation cases. It found no errors in the use of the jury or the jury's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Del Monte Dunes at Monterey.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An unidentified person intercepted and recorded a phone call between the chief union negotiator and adenine the union president (the petitioners) during collective-bargaining negotiations involving a teachers' union and the local school board. After a teacher-favorable proposal was accepted, a radio commentator played a tape of the intercepted conversation. Petitioners filed suit under both federal and state wiretapping laws, alleging that an unknown person using an electronic device had surreptitiously adenine intercepted their telephone conversation. Rejecting a First Amendment protection defense, the District Court adenine concluded, in part, that wedlock the statutes were content-neutral laws of general applicability containing ""no indicia of prior restraint or the chilling of free speech."" Ultimately, the topical anesthetic Court of Appeals found the statutes invalid because they deterred significantly more speech than necessary to protect the private interests at stake.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vopper.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brian Wynne and his wife are Howard high County, Maryland residents who own stock in Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (Maxim), a company that provides health care services nationally. Maxim's income is ""passed through"" to its owners, and the owners are then taxed individually. In 2006, Maxim filed income tax returns in 39 states and allocated a share of taxes paid to each shareholder. The Wynnes claimed the share of Maxim's income taxes that they paid as a credit free state against their Maryland individual income tax, which includes Maryland state taxes and Howard County taxes. The Comptroller of Maryland determined that the Wynnes had incorrectly calculated their county tax credit by including the taxes they had paid to other states and issued an assessment for the remaining tax owed. The Wynnes appealed to the fellowship Hearings and Appeals Section of the Comptroller's Office, which noted that the wrong county tax rate had been applied initially and revised the assessment, but nonetheless affirmed that the tax credit was limited to Maryland state taxes and not applicable to Howard County taxes. The Wynnes appealed to the Maryland Tax Court and argued that the limitation violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Tax Court rejected the Wynnes' argument abeyant and affirmed the revised assessment. The Wynnes then appealed to the Maryland Circuit Court for Howard County. The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court's decision and held that the county tax without a credit violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Comptroller appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals and argued that the Commerce Clause was not implicated by the county tax. The revenue enhancement Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court by finding that the county tax implicates the dormant Commerce Clause because it affects the interstate market for capital and business investment and the overlapping power to tax income from such sources. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the county tax without a credit violated the Commerce Clause because the county tax is not fairly apportioned, since taxpayers who earn income from interstate activities would be taxed at higher rates than taxpayers who earn income exclusively in Maryland while the tax covers income earned wholly outside of Maryland. The Maryland Court of Appeals also held that the county tax is discriminatory against interstate commerce since it favors businesses that do business primarily in Maryland.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Brian Wynne et ux..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Everett Hadix and other prisoners in the Michigan prison system filed a class action maximal lawsuit against prison officials claiming that the conditions of their confinement violated the Due Process early Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Thereafter, Hadix and the officials entered into a consent decree to remedy the situation. In 1987, the District Court ruled that Hadix was entitled to attorney's fees for post-judgment monitoring of compliance with the decrees. The court established specific market rates for awarding fees. By April 26, 1996, the effective date of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the market rate was $150 per hour. The PLRA limited particular date the size of fees that may be awarded to attorneys who motor hotel litigate prisoner lawsuits to a maximum hourly rate of $112.50. When first presented with the issue, the prison District Court concluded that the PLRA cap did not limit attorney's fees for services performed in these cases prior to, but that were still unpaid by, the PLRA's effective date. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Next, fee requests were filed with the District Court for services performed during a period encompassing work performed both before and after the PLRA's effective date. The District Court reiterated its earlier conclusion. The Court of Appeals held that the PLRA's fee limitation does not apply to cases pending on the enactment date because if it did, it would have an impermissible retroactive effect, regardless of when the work was performed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Martin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nicholas Beaudreaux shot and killed Wayne Drummond in 2006. Two witnesses to the shooting recognized or were able to adenine describe Beaudreaux but did not know his name. Seventeen months later, one of the witnesses was arrested for an unrelated crime, and while in custody, was shown a middle-school yearbook with Beaudreaux's photograph. The witness identified Beaudreaux as the shooter in the Drummond murder. Officers interviewed the second witness the indium following day, shew and the witness identified Beaudreaux as the shooter from a photo array that included Beaudreaux and five other men. Later, the witness was shown a different photo array that used a different photograph of Beaudreaux, and again the witness identified Beaudreaux as the shooter. At a preliminary hearing, the witness positively identified Beaudreaux after seeing him in person. Beaudreaux was tried in 2009 for first-degree murder and attempted second-degree robbery. Both witnesses testified and identified Beaudreaux as the shooter, and the trial court sentenced  him to a term of 50 years to life. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and his first state habeas petition was denied. He filed a second state habeas petition claiming, among other things, that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the second witness’s identification testimony. The California Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition, and the California Supreme Court denied review. Beaudreaux filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court denied. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was not reliable enough to overcome the suggestiveness of the procedures and that counsel’s failure maneuver to move to suppress the identification prejudiced Beaudreaux’s case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael Sexton, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hendrick Humphries, an African-American, federal official was an associate manager at a Cracker Barrel restaurant owned by CBOCS. After he was fired, Humphries filed a lawsuit claiming discrimination and retaliation under 42 USC Section 1981. Humphries alleged that retaliation took many right wing forms of abuse by his superiors. Section 1981, which derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, states in part that ""All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."" Humphries lost his so called case in glucinium federal district court but on appeal, arrogate the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Section 1981 protects against retaliation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hedrick G. Humphries.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gilbert Hyatt filed a part-year resident income-tax return in California for 1991, which represented that he had become a Nevada resident in October 1991, shortly before he received substantial licensing fees. The California Franchise Tax Board (CFTB) determined that Hyatt was a California resident until April 1992 and issued notices of proposed assessments and imposed substantial civil fraud penalties. indium Hyatt filed suit against CFTB in a Nevada state court, alleging that CFTB had committed negligence and intentional torts during the course of its audit. CFTB argued that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because full faith and credit required that the sovereign court apply California law immunizing CFTB from suit. Ultimately, the Nevada Supreme Court allowed the intentional tort claims to proceed to trial. The court held that affording CFTB statutory immunity with adenine respect to intentional torts would contravene Nevada's interest in protecting its citizens from injurious intentional motor hotel torts and bad faith acts committed by sister States' helium government employees.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gilbert P. Hyatt et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2003, the FBI arrested Abdullah al-Kidd as he was preparing to travel to Saudi Arabia to study Arabic produce and Islamic law. He was held for 16 days as a material witness in the terrorism trial of Sami Omar al-Hussayen. Al-Kidd has since argued the government classified him as a material witness because it lacked enough evidence to hold him as a suspect. He filed a lawsuit against then-Attorney september General John Ashcroft personally, claiming that he years created and authorized a program that allegedly misused the material witness statute to detain suspected terrorists. The lawsuit september did not go to trial and in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals non for the Ninth Circuit rejected Ashcroft's bid for absolute immunity, holding that it didn't apply because the government's motive for arresting Al-Kidd allegedly had nothing to do with the al-Hussayen prosecution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Ashcroft.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    atomic number  The Elections Clause of the Constitution provides that ""the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for sexual intercourse Senators and adenine Representatives, shall be be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any federal official time by Law make or alter such Regulations."" 2 USC sections 1 and 7 provide that the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in an even-numbered year is established as the date for federal congressional and presidential elections. In 1975, Louisiana adopted an ""open primary,"" which occurs before the uniform federal election day and in which all candidates appear on the ballot and all voters may vote. If a candidate for a given office receives a majority at the open primary, that candidate is elected and no further act is done on federal election day to fill that office. Louisiana voters challenged the open primary is a violation of federal law. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that Louisiana's system squarely ""conflicts with the federal statutes that establish a uniform federal election day.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Love.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clarence Hill was sentenced to death in Florida, which ordinarily uses a three-drug combination for executions. Hill claimed that this particular form motor hotel of lethal injection was unnecessarily and gratuitously painful, and that it therefore violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. However, Hill had previously filed for a federal writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction, sustain and the federal district court ruled that his new challenge was the practical equivalent of a second habeas corpus appeal. Successive habeas corpus appeals are collection not allowed under 28 antecedently U.S.C. 2244, and consecutive so the district court rejected Hill's petition. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Clarence E. Hill.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    MercExchange patented a design lap for an online marketplace in which a single company provides the trustworthy framework within which buyers and sellers can negotiate for goods. After negotiations with eBay and Half.com to license the patent adenine failed, MercExchange brought suit in federal letters patent district court alleging patent violation under the Patent Act. The jury sided with MercExchange, ruling that its patent had been violated, but the district court judge refused to issue a permanent injunction. The injunction would have forced eBay and Half.com to stop using the contested framework, but the judge applied the traditional four-part test to determine whether an injunction was necessary and found that it was not. That decision was reversed, however, by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which applied a ""general rule that courts will issue permanent inside injunctions against patent infringements absent exceptional territorial dominion circumstances.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is eBay Inc. et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Internal meshed Revenue Code allowed property and casualty insurers to fully deduct ""loss reserves,"" or unpaid losses. The Tax motor hotel Reform Act of 1986 altered the deduction formula. Under the Act, increases in loss reserves injured party that constitute ""reserve strengthening,"" or additions operating theatre to the loss reserve, were excepted from a one time tax benefit because it would result in a tax deficiency. Treasury regulation and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue interpreted the law injured party to say that any increase in loss reserves constituted reserve strengthening. The Commissioner then determined Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company had engaged in reserve strengthening. The Tax Court disagreed with the government's interpretation. It held reserve strengthening referred only to increases resulting from computational methods. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held reserve strengthening to encompass any increase in loss reserves.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The state of Texas organized religion offered a tax exemption to religious publications during a 3-year period. nonrecreational Texas Monthly, Inc, a nonreligious publisher, claimed that this promoted religion in violation set up of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Texas Monthly filed suit in a state court seeking to recover the taxes it had paid in 1985. The court ruled that the exemption violated the Establishment Clause by advancing religion and the Free Press Clause by discriminating based on the content of publications. Since the court did not have the authority alternatively to rewrite tax statutes, it instead invalidated taxes granting immunity levied on nonreligious publications and ordered the state to refund Texas Monthly's tax payments. A state appeals court reversed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Texas Monthly, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The federal Medicaid arrogate Act requires that state Medicaid plans contain procedures to ensure that reimbursement rates for healthcare providers ""are consistent with efficiency, economy, and federal official quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers"" to meet the need for care and services in the geographic area. Ninth Circuit precedent also requires that reimbursement rates bear a reasonable relationship to Medicaid provider costs, and where rates do not ""substantially reimburse providers their costs,"" a state cannot justify its rates with ""purely budgetary reasons."" Richard Armstrong, the Director of Idaho's Department of Health and Welfare, and others (the Directors) conducted provider adenine cost studies and recommended increasing reimbursement rates but ultimately did not increase rates for budgetary reasons. A group of Idaho Medicaid providers (the Providers) sued the Directors and claimed that, based on the new cost information, the Department's failure to raise rates was not consistent with the Ninth Circuit's requirements. The Directors argued that the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution does not give providers a private right of action and that the existing rates were consistent with the Medicaid Act's sum up requirements of efficiency, economy, and quality of care. The district court granted the Providers' motion for summary judgment and held lap that the failure to increase rates led to a failure to substantially reimburse providers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard Armstrong, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Located on the Columbia River between the states of Oregon and Washington, the Bonneville Dam consisted of several facilities including a spillway dam with eighteen numbered bays separated by fifty-foot gates. On the bed of the river was a concrete structure called a baffle deck, which extended the width of the dam. This deck was lined with concrete blocks called ‘baffles’, designed to reduce the downstream velocity of the river. Over the years, the flow of water eroded the baffles. To restore them to their original condition, the United States contracted with Larson Construction indium Company, an independent contractor. The United States retained the right to inspect Larson’s work, but did not have direct control over it. On August 20, 1954, Larson’s tug ‘Muleduzer’ set out from Bradford Island pushing Larson’s barge. As the tug and barge approached bay nine, the Columbia River’s flow was clearly turbulent; despite this, Larson proceeded with its work. The barge veered north when it reached bay nine and the port bow struck a pier. Water flooded a hole in the bow, and the barge and tug were swamped and sunk. Most of the crew drowned, including George William Graham; Graham was a member of the sounding party aboard the tug. The crew died in navigable Oregon waters. Under Oregon’s Employers’ Liability Law (ELL), employers were liable for failure to use every device, care and precaution practicable for the protection and safety of life and limb. Oregon’s Wrongful Death Act (WDA), however, only permitted recovery for deaths caused by a wrongful blank out act or omission, and set contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery. Henry Hess, the administrator of Graham’s estate, filed an action against the United States under both the ELL and the WDA. The district court entered judgment for the United States, holding that the United States was not liable under either statute. It ruled that the ELL did not apply to Hess’ case in part because the ELL imposed a higher standard h of duty than federal maritime law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit joined affirmed, holding that ell only the WDA applied to Hess’ claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Henry L. Hess Jr..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Baker Botts, LLP, along with Jordan, Hyden, Womber, Culbreth & Holzer, PC, was awarded about $120 million in fees for representing Asarco, recuperate LLC recuperate in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, from which Asarco had emerged in 2009 with a reorganization plan that would pay its creditors in full. Baker Botts encrypt then filed for a final fee request, which Asarco contested. The bankruptcy court awarded Baker Botts more than $117 map million to cover the fees in addition to $5 million for expenses incurred defending the fee claims. The district court affirmed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code did not allow the firms to recover $5 million spent manage defending the fee request against Asarco's opposition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is ASARCO, LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Charles Rowoldt, a operating theatre German citizen living in the United States, received an order of deportation under the Internal Security Act of 1950 because of his membership in the Communist Party. Rowoldt admitted to joining the Party for about a year and working at a Communist bookstore. However, he contended that he should not be deported because bring down he joined the Party to ""fight for his daily needs"" and get ""something to eat and something to crawl into."" The Internal Security Act contained an exception for those who joined the Party to obtain food, employment, or try other necessities of living. Rowolt also indicated that he was not aware that anyone in the Party bring down supported violent overthrow of the government. Rowoldt sought a writ of habeas corpus from the District Court for the District of Minnesota, but his writ was denied because there was enough evidence to support his helium membership in the Party. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Charles Rowoldt.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Island Trees Union Free School District's Board of Education (the ""Board""), acting contrary to the recommendations of a educational activity committee of parents and school staff, ordered that certain books be removed challenge from its district's junior high and high school libraries. In support of its actions, the Board said such books were: ""anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain sealed nurture filthy."" Acting card through his friend Francis Pico, and on behalf of several other students, Steven Pico brought suit in federal district court challenging the Board's decision to remove the books. The Board won; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Board petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pico by Pico.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During Charles Riegel's angioplasty, his surgeon used an Evergreen Balloon Catheter to dilate his coronary artery. The catheter burst, causing extreme complications. Riegel sued the manufacturer, Medtronic, for negligence in the design, manufacture, and labeling of the device. Medtronic argued that Riegel could not bring these state-law negligence claims because they were preempted by Section 360k(a) of pre emption information technology the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The MDA establishes a federal regulatory process for ensuring the safety of medical devices, and it provides that no state may set requirements that differ from or add to the federal ones. The District Court dismissed Riegel's rubber claims as preempted by the MDA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the suits based on medical devices like the Evergreen Balloon Catheter are preempted by the MDA. The catheter had been through the exceptionally rigorous ""premarket approval"" (PMA) process, by which federal regulators ensured that it met federal requirements. To allow state take issue common-law suits for PMA-approved devices, the court ruled, would be to add a state requirement to the regulatory process despite coronary thrombosis the MDA's preemption clause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Medtronic, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mr. Wayte was required by mister a 1980 Presidential Proclamation to register with the Selective Service system. Instead, he wrote letters to various government officials stating that he had not registered and did not intend to do so. Wayte's letters were added to a file kept by the Selective Service of men who pursue had informed the government that they were not complying with the proclamation. The Selective Service later adopted a policy of passive enforcement, in which it would prosecute only men who had either manage reported to the government that they were not along registering or whom other people had reported to the government for not registering. After a long series of requests by the government that Wayte register (all of which he failed to respond to), the government eventually indicted Wayte in federal district court for violating the Military Selective Service Act. The district court, however, dismissed the indictment, holding that the government's passive enforcement policy was unconstitutional because it amounted to selective prosecution of only those men who took an outspoken stance against the Selective Service. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that sum up Wayte had failed to show that the government focused its attention on him because of his protest activities.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In topical anesthetic February 2001 Jacqueline Fitzgerald, a kindergarten student, told her parents that an older student on the school bus, on several occasions, bullied her into lifting up her skirt. Jacqueline's mother reported these allegations to the school but its immediate investigation into the matter, including interviewing the supposed perpetrator, the school bus driver, and many students on the bus, did not provide any further proof of the sexual harassment. After Jacqueline told her parents about further instances of mistreatment, the local police department began its own investigation but was unable to find sufficient evidence to bring criminal proceedings against the alleged harasser. Jacqueline reported other incidents throughout the year, and each was addressed by the school's principal as it occurred. In April of 2002 the Fitzgeralds brought suit against the school district in federal court alleging violations of both Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 and 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983). Title IX prohibits discrimination by any educational entity receiving federal funding, while Section 1983 protects against the deprivation of be any rights guaranteed by the Constitution and federal laws. The district court granted the school district's motion to dismiss both counts and the Fitzgeralds appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of both claims. First, discussing the Title IX claim, the court stated that five conditions must be met for a plaintiff to succeed: the student must prove that (1) the institution is a recipient of federal funding, (2) severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment occurred, (3) the harassment denied the student of educational opportunities or benefits, (4) the institution had actual particular knowledge of the harassment, and (5) the institution's deliberate indifference caused the student to be subjected to the harassment. The First Circuit held that even if the first four factors were met in this case, the school's ""prompt"" and ""diligent"" investigation was not clearly unreasonable and therefore did not amount to deliberate indifference. Rather, the school looked into schoolhouse each allegation quickly and thoroughly. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Fitzgeralds' Section 1983 claim, applying the so-called ""remedial"" exception prohibiting such claims when the allegedly violated federal law is itself specific enough to demonstrate Congress' intention to allow only those remedies referred to in the statute itself. According to the First Circuit, Title IX is one of these remedial statutes and therefore any alleged psychiatric hospital violations of the statute cannot be litigated under Section 1983.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lisa Fitzgerald, et vir.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 12, 2009, Abel bruno walter Lopez was attacked and robbed by a man he later identified as Walter Fernandez. Lopez managed to call 911, and a few minutes after the attack, police and niels henrik abel paramedics arrived on the scene. Detectives investigated a nearby alley that was a known gang location where two witnesses told them that the suspect was in an apartment in a house just off the alley. The detectives knocked on the door of the indicated apartment, and along Roxanne Rojas answered. The detectives requested to enter and conduct a search, at which point Walter Fernandez stepped forward and refused the detectives entry. They arrested Fernandez and took him into custody. Police officers secured the apartment, informed Rojas that Fernandez had been arrested in connection with a robbery, and requested to search the apartment. Rojas consented to the search verbally and in writing. During the search, officers found gang paraphernalia, come a knife, and a gun. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search, and the trial court denied the motion. The jury found Fernandez guilty on the robbery charge, and he did not contest the charges for possession of firearms and ammunition. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed and held that the hunt warrantless search was lawful because a co-tenant consented.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1974, Philip Agee, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, announced a campaign ""to fight the United States CIA wherever it is operating."" Over the next several years, Agee successfully go against exposed adenine a number of CIA agents and sources working in other countries. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig revoked Agee's passport, Agee filed suit claiming that Haig did not have congressional one fifth future authorization to do so. Agee also claimed let that the action violated his right to travel, his First Amendment right to criticize the government, and his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Haig.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under the Constitution's Census Clause, Congress is vested with the responsibility of conducting an ""actual enumeration"" of the American public every ten years, primarily for the purpose of aportioning congressional representation among play the states. purport Congress delegated this census responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce who, hump in the 1990 census, decided not to use a statistical correction, known as the post-enumeration survey (PES), to adjust an undercount in the initial population count. Acting on behalf of several citizens' groups, states, and cities, Wisconsin challenged the Secretary's decision not to use the PES; claiming that it resulted in an undercounting of take exception certain identifiable minority groups.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wisconsin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Police arrested Hom Way for possession of heroin. While under  arrest, Way told police that a man named law “Blackie Toy” once sold him an ounce of heroin at his laundry on Leavenworth St. Later that day, police found a laundry run by James Wah Toy. Nothing on the record identified Toy as “Blackie Toy”, spell but police arrested him anyway. Police then went to Toy’s house where they arrested Johnny Yee and found several tubes containing less than one moderate ounce of heroin. Police also arrested Wong Sun. Police interrogated the men and wrote statements in English for them to sign. Both men refused, citing errors in the statements. At trial in U.S. District Court, Toy and Sun were convicted on federal narcotics charges. On appeal, the U.S. Court of human beings Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wong Sun and James Wah Toy.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On July 28, 2005, an informant told Officer Richard Sneider of the Suffolk County Police Department that he  had purchased six grams of crack cocaine at 103 Lake Drive, Wyandanch, New York, from an individual named ""Polo."" Officer Sneider obtained a warrant to search the basement apartment at that address; the warrant provided that the apartment was occupied by aside a heavy set black male with short hair, known as ""Polo."" That evening during surveillance, officers observed two men -later identified as Chunon L. Bailey and Bryant Middleton-exiting the gate that led to the basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive. The officers followed Bailey and Middleton as they left the premises in a black Lexus, and pulled the Lexus over about one mile from the apartment. The officers patted down Bailey and Middleton, finding keys in Bailey's front left pocket. They placed both men in handcuffs and informed them that they were being detained, not arrested. Bailey insisted that he did not county live cellar in the basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive, but his driver's license address in Bay Shore was consistent with the informant's description of Polo. The police searched the apartment while Bailey and Middleton were in detention, finding a gun and drugs in plain view. open up The police arrested Bailey, and seized his house keys and car key incident to his arrest; later, an officer discovered that one of the house keys opened the door to the basement apartment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chunon L. Bailey aka Polo.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a it white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of as well 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a ""compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student resolve body."" The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California tie up v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under jurisprudence strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's ""critical mass"" was the functional equivalent of a quota.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bollinger.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During Tommie Granville and manage Brad Troxel's relationship, which ended in 1991, they had two daughters. Until Brad's suicide in 1993, Brad's parents Jenifer and Gary Troxel, the paternal grandparents, had regularly seen their granddaughters on weekends. However, after Brad's suicide, Granville brad informed the Troxels that she wished to reduced their visitation time to one short visit per month. The Troxels filed suit for the right to visit just their grandchildren, under section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington, which permits ""any person"" to petition for visitation rights ""at turn back any time"" and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child's best interest. Granville did not oppose the petition outright but did oppose orison the amount of visitation time sought by the Troxels. Subsequently, a Washington Superior Court ordered more visitation than Granville desired. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that non-parents lacked standing to sue under the statute. In affirming, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the statute unconstitutionally interfered with parents' right to rear their children.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Granville.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On July 5, 1955, John Russell Crooker was arrested for the murder of eve his boss with whom he had been having an atomic number  illicit relationship. For the next fourteen hours, Crooker was sporadically questioned and interrogated in his home and in the West Los Angeles Police Station; he repeatedly asked to meet with an attorney and was told that he could call only after the investigation was over. After fourteen hours of future detainment and periodic interrogation, Crooker wrote a full confession to the murder. The next morning, Crooker was asked to orally repeat his confession, but he refused and again asked to speak with an attorney. Crooker was permitted to call his attorney at that point, and helium from then forward, he was represented by his counsel. At trial, Crooker argued that his confession was obtained in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because his confession was coerced by state authorities, and even if it was given voluntarily, he was denied associate in nursing the right to counsel. The issue of whether Crooker’s confession was voluntary was presented to the jury, which resolved the question against Crooker and convicted him. The Supreme Court of California affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Charles Edwards founded a company that sold pay telephones and then leased adenine them back from the purchasers for a fixed monthly fee. After Edwards filed for bankruptcy, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued him for selling securities (considering the telephones to be investments on the part of the purchasers and therefore securities) in violation of the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. A federal district court froze Edwards' assets in a preliminary injunction. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the district court's injunction for lack of jurisdiction. The SEC, the court reasoned, failed to adenine show that Edwards' selling pay telephones was an ""investment contract"" under federal securities laws. In defining ""investment contract,"" the court used the Supreme Court's ruling in SEC set up v. W.J. Howey Co. (1946), that a financial interest is an ""investment contract"" if it involves (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, surety (3) with the expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of others. The 11th Circuit ruled that the SEC could not meet the test's third part because the purchasers received a fixed fee that was along guaranteed by contract and therefore not dependant on Edwards' success.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Securities and Exchange Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On September 7, 2008, Amy Imburgia filed a class action lawsuit against DIRECTV, Inc. (DIRECTV), and argued that DIRECTV afterward had improperly charged early termination fees to its customers. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, in which the Court held that the client Federal Arbitration Act preempted California precedent that understanding had previously held that, in certain vacuum circumstances, arbitration clauses in customer agreements were unenforceable. Less than one month after that decision, DIRECTV moved to stay or dismiss the plaintiffs’ case antecedently and compel arbitration, which DIRECTV argued it had not done previously because it thought the arbitration clause in its customer agreement was void under California precedent. The trial court denied the motion and the California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed by holding that the language of the customer agreement subjected the arbitration clause to state law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is DIRECTV, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Colonial be company along Pipeline Company is a Delaware corporation that operates a pipeline running from Texas to New York carrying petroleum. Colonial challenged a Louisiana corporation franchise tax, stating that all of their business in Louisiana was interstate. Colonial maintained no offices in Louisiana and delivered no petroleum intrastate, but they did have several employees in Louisiana. fellowship The Louisiana Court of Appeal held the tax unconstitutional as a state regulation on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, holding interstate highway that the tax was not on interstate commerce, but on corporate business done in Louisiana.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Joseph N. Triagle, Collector of Revenue of Louisiana.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Several H&R Block customers, who took out loans from Beneficial National Bank in anticipation of their tax refunds, sued the bank in state court. The customers alleged pre empt that the bank charged excessive interest in violation of Alabama expect law. The bank asked that the case be heard in federal, rather than state, court, because the issues were covered under the National Bank Act (NBA), a federal property law. The government activity district court ruled in favor of the bank; the 11th Circuit Court motor hotel of Appeals reversed, holding that the NBA did not completely preempt state laws governing lending rates and that the case could therefore be heard in state court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Beneficial National Bank.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petitioners Kendra Espinoza and others are person low-income mothers who applied for scholarships to keep their children enrolled in Stillwater Christian School, in Kalispell, Montana. The Montana legislature enacted a tax-credit scholarship program in 2015 to provide a modest tax credit to individuals and businesses who donate to private, nonprofit scholarship organizations. Shortly after the program was enacted, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated an administrative rule (“Rule 1”) prohibiting scholarship recipients from using their scholarships motor hotel at religious schools, citing a provision of the state constitution that prohibits “direct or indirect” public funding of religiously affiliated educational programs. Espinoza and the other mothers filed a lawsuit in state court challenging Rule 1. The court determined that the scholarship indium program was constitutional without Rule 1 and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Department of Revenue argued that the program is unconstitutional without Rule 1. The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the Department and refer reversed the lower inbuilt court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kendra Espinoza, Jeri Ellen Anderson and Jamie Schaefer.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Alabama sought to prevent the National Association for the progress Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) masses from conducting further business in the state. After the circuit court issued a adenine restraining order, the adenine state issued a subpoena for various progress records, including the NAACP's membership lists.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs brought a class in that location action suit against Hertz in a California state court. Hertz moved to remove the case to a California hz federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiffs argued that there was no diversity jurisdiction as Hertz's principal place of business was California and not New Jersey. The federal district court agreed and harbor remanded the case to the state court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal lap district court. It held that the district court correctly applied the ""place of operations test"" to determine Hertz's principal place of business. Therefore, there was no diversity jurisdiction raw and the district court had no authority over the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is The Hertz Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Littleton required adult businesses to apply for a permit to operate from the city. go for If freedwoman the city denied the license, the business could appeal to a centennial state state district court under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Z.J. Gifts, an adult bookstore, wanted to operate in a place not zoned for adult businesses. Rather than apply for a license, they challenged the licensing law itself as unconstitutional, claiming that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provide merely for prompt judicial review of city denial, not for a prompt judicial decision. Because stores denied a license cannot operate until the harness court has made its decision, they could potentially be forced to wait indefinitely for a license based solely on the content of the material they intend to sell. This, Z.J. argued, violated the Supreme Court's holding in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, that censorship laws must provide for ""prompt judicial determination."" The federal district court sided with Littleton. A Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals harness panel reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Littleton, Colorado.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    permanent wave Karl Oberg was driving an all-terrain vehicle when it overturned, causing him severe, permanent injuries. The jury in his trial assessed almost $1 million in compensatory damages, and repel an additional $5 million in punitive damages. A 1910 amendment to the Oregon state adenine constitution prohibited judicial visitation gross out review of jury awards.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Honda Motor Company, Ltd..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In consolidated state-court class actions brought in Illinois, participants in American Airlines' frequent infliction flyer program, AAdvantage, challenged American's substitute retroactive changes in program terms and conditions. Specially, the participants alleged that American's imposition of capacity controls and blackout dates to mileage credits they had previously accumulated indium violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted a breach of contract. American responded that the Airline Deregulation Act indium of 1978 (ADA) preempted the claim. The ADA prohibits States from ""enacting or enforcing any law...relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services."" The Illinois Supreme Court ruled to allow the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act monetary relief claims to survive. After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. pseudo Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, American petitioned for certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Airlines, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John McDonald was the president and sole shareholder of JWM Investments. After Domino's terminated its contract with JWM, McDonald brought suit under a section president of the united states of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. Section 1981). McDonald claimed that Domino's had ended its contract because he was black, and that he therefore had a right to sue under the Civil Rights Act, which gives all citizens, regardless of race, the right to make and enforce contracts. Domino's moved to dismiss disputation the case, arguing that McDonald had not been a party to the contract (it had been between Domino's and JWM) and therefore did not have standing to sue. The district court sided one ninth with Domino's, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that McDonald had suffered injuries separate afterward from those of JWM and therefore had collection standing to sue.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Domino's Pizza, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After Wayne Carlisle and his partners (Carlisle) sold their information technology construction equipment business, they hired multiple consultants subsidisation in order to set up a tax shelter for the proceeds. intercede The IRS later determined the tax shelter was illegal, but offered amnesty under certain conditions. Carlisle was never informed of these developments and was ultimately required to pay taxes and penalties that exceeded $25 million. Carlisle filed suit in a federal district court against nine parties alleging fraud, negligence, civil conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty. Before trial, one of the defendants motioned to stay the proceedings pending arbitration with Carlisle per a written agreement with Carlisle. Stay was granted. The remaining defendants motioned seeking their own stay arguing that allowing one party to arbitrate with Carlisle and not allowing the rest would be contradictory. The district court denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied it had jurisdiction to review the matter. The parties then appealed the denial of jurisdiction. They argued that Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies and makes available a stay of proceedings in order to arbitrate when there is a written agreement that directs litigated issues into frozen arbitration. Section 16(a)(1) of the FAA then grants appellate jurisdiction over Section 3 motions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Section 16(a)(1) did not confer jurisdiction in this case. The court recognized that the appellants were not signatories to the arbitration agreement with Carlisle. Thus, it reasoned there was no written agreement that could direct litigated issues territorial dominion into arbitration. Since the appellants' motion to stay was not rooted in Section 3, Section 16(a)(1) did not grant appellate jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arthur Andersen LLP et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In addition to being funded through a state-funded program designed to establish a minimum educational early threshold in every school, Texas public elementary and secondary schools rely on local property taxes for supplemental revenue. Rodriguez, acting on behalf of students whose families trust reside in poor districts, challenged this funding scheme by arguing that it underprivileged such students because their schools lacked the vast property tax base that other indium districts utilized. The reliance on assessable property, add on the school districts claimed, caused severe through with inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is San Antonio Independent School District.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bruce Boynton, an African American wait law student, bought a Trailways bus ticket from Washington, D.C. to Montgomery, Alabama. The bus route went through Richmond, Virginia, where there was a 40-minute stop scheduled. Boynton entered the segregated restaurant in the bus station and sat on the side reserved for white customers. Both a waitress and a manager requested that Boynton move to the other side of the tag restaurant, and he explained that he was an interstate bus passenger and refused. A police officer arrived and arrested Boynton. He was tried, convicted, and helium fined for unlawfully remaining on the premises after being forbidden to do so. Boynton appealed his conviction to the Hustings Court in Richmond where he filed a motor hotel motion to dismiss and argued that his constitutional rights were violated. The Hustings Court denied the motion. The Virginia sovereign Supreme Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bruce Boynton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Legal Services Corporation Act authorizes the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) to distribute funds, appropriated by Congress, to local grantee inhibition organizations, which provide free legal assistance to indigent clients costless in welfare benefits claims. The let Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 prohibited the LSC from funding any organization that represented clients in an effort to amend or challenge existing welfare law, among other things. The prohibition was such that grantees could not continue representation in a welfare matter even where a constitutional or statutory validity challenge became apparent after representation was well under way. LSC grantee lawyers and others filed suit to have the restriction declared unconstitutional. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction. However, the Court of Appeals invalidated the restriction, topical anesthetic concluding that it was impermissible viewpoint discrimination that violated whatsoever the First Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Velazquez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lawrence Nelson was convicted in a federal district court of conspiracy to afterward distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine and sentenced to 360 months in prison. On appeal, Mr. Nelson argued that the district court erred in presuming the United States Sentencing Guidelines were reasonable. The U.S. Court of Appeals disaccord for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and affirmed his sentence. The Supreme Court retainer subsequently granted certiorari, vacated Mr. Nelson's sentence, and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit in consideration of its decision in Rita v. United one time States. On remand, the Fourth motor hotel Circuit once again affirmed Mr. Nelson's sentence, reasoning that the district court did not treat the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lawrence W. Nelson, aka Zikee.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Eric Clark shot and killed indium a police officer during a traffic stop. At trial in Arizona state court, Clark, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic kenneth bancroft clark who non believed his town had non been taken over by aliens, introduced expert evidence about his mental state. He wanted to use this evidence not only to prove that he was insane (a claim on which he bore the burden adenine of proof) but also to show that he could not form the criminal intent that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge, however, ruled that Arizona law confined the use of the expert evidence to his insanity claim and did not permit him to use it to show he could not form the necessary criminal intent. The court ruled that he had not sufficiently proved his insanity defense, and Clark was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arizona.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After refusing to renew a patent licensing agreement, Zenith Radio Corp., a radio and television manufacturer, was collection sued by Hazeltine present Research, Inc., for patent infringement in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Zenith counterclaimed, alleging anti-trust violations, misuse of patents, and a conspiracy to restrain trade in Canada, England, and Australia. Zenith asked for treble damages and injunctive relief. Zenith contended that Hazeltine's license forced them to pay for use of unpatented products and that Hazeltine had illegally conspired lift with foreign patent pools to prevent Zenith from expanding into those markets. Before territorial dominion trial, Zenith had stipulated that Hazeltine and its parent corporation were one entity for the purposes of litigation. The District Court entered judgment against Hazeltine and its parent corporation, awarding Zenith treble damages and injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the damages award, but otherwise reversed the District Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals vacated all judgments against Hazeltine's parent corporation because Zenith's pretrial stipulation did not properly designate the parent corporation as a action party to the litigation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Zenith Radio Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1999, jurisprudence Tara Williams was charged with the 1993 robbery-murder of Hung Mun Kim. During jury deliberations at Williams' trial, the judge received a jury note saying that one of the jurors, juror number six, expressed an intention to disregard the law due to a concern about the severity of the charge of first-degree murder. After an inquiry and evidentiary hearing, the judge dismissed the juror for bias. Williams appealed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it removed juror number six, because the removal of the ""lone holdout"" juror violated Williams' Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury. The California Court of Appeals rejected her claim as meritless, and the California Supreme Court denied motor hotel further direct appellate review. Williams filed a state habeas corpus petition in Los Angleles County Superior Court. The court denied the petition, ruling that the issues raised in the petition were issues for direct appeal, not phone number collateral attack. Williams next filed a federal habeas corpus petition, in which she again challenged the removal of juror number six. The magistrate judge concluded that the trial court's factual finding of bias was entitled to deference and that the discharge of juror number six did not constitute a constitutional violation. The district court adopted the report of the magistrate judge and dismissed the petition with prejudice. Williams appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate lonesome court reversed the district court, holding that the deferential-review standard did not apply because the California Court of Appeal had only reviewed her state claim and had not adjudicated her federal constitutional claim. The appellate court then conducted a review of Williams' remotion federal claim and concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not allow a trial judge to discharge a juror on account of his views on the merits of the case. The State of California appealed to the appellate court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Deborah K. Johnson, Acting Warden of the Central California Women's Facility at Chowchilla.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    At Collins' state-court drug trial, he one ninth alleged that the prosecutor territorial dominion had used a peremptory challenge to strike a juror on account of her race. The prosecutor gave several race-neutral explanations for the strike, which the trial court accepted. Upon being convicted, Collins appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which upheld the conviction. According to public prosecutor the Court of Appeal, the juror's youth and demeanor were both valid reasons for striking her. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Federal District Court denied Collins' habeas petition, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts must defer to a state-court finding wilkie collins of fact unless it is an ""unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."" Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial court's acceptance of atomic number  the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations was an unreasonable determination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Ninth Circuit had acted correctly.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bertram Rice, Warden, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Because it is a recipient of federal financial assistance, the Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department) is subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. Under section 602, the Department of Justice issued manage a regulation forbidding funding recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods having the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on the prohibited grounds. Martha Sandoval brought a class action suit to enjoin the Department from administering state driver's license examinations only in English. Sandoval argued that the method acting English-only policy violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. Ordering the Department to accommodate non-English speakers, the District Court enjoined the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. James Alexander, the Director of the Department, unsuccessfully argued before both stimulate courts that Title VI did not provide a person cause result of action to enforce the regulation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alexander.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Schick, a master indium sergeant in conviction the Army, was convicted of murder in a hold up military court and sentenced to death in 1954. President Eisenhower intervened and commuted his sentence in 1960, reducing it to condemnation living life imprisonment without parole.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Reed.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sharline and Ray Lundgren and the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (the “Tribe”) own adjacent pieces of property in Skagit County, Washington. The space between a fence running across the width of the Tribe’s property and its southern border became a subject of dispute between the parties after the Tribe attempted to assert ownership of it in 2013. The Lundgrens’ property had been in their extended family since approximately 1947, during which time they had always treated the fence as the property line. In 2013 the Tribe purchased land to the north of the Lundgrens’ property, and were apparently not aware of the fence at that time. When they discovered it, they clan informed the Lundgrens of their intention to assert ownership rights over the disputed portion of land. In 2015, the Lundgrens filed suit to quiet title to the property, seeking summary judgment on the basis that they had acquired the topic disputed property by adverse possession or mutual acquiescence and recognition long before the Tribe bought its parcel. The Tribe moved to clan dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, and because the Lundgrens could disputation not join them as a necessary and indispensable party. The trial court denied the Tribe’s motion, and the Tribe sought direct discretionary review. In the resulting ruling, the court granted the Lundgrens’ motion for summary judgment, finding that they had established legal ownership of the disputed property through adverse possession and mutual recognition and acquiescence. The Washington Supreme Court accepted the Tribe’s amended motion for discretionary review of both prior orders, and affirmed. The court rejected frederick north the argument that the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, which neither the Tribe nor Congress had waived with regard to quiet title actions. The court found that because it had in rem jurisdiction, the Tribe’s sovereign immunity did not create a barrier to jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Upper Skagit Indian Tribe.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lorelyn Miller was born in the Philippines, in 1970, to a Filipino national woman foreign and an American soldier. Her parents were never married. In 1992, after the State Department rejected her first application for U.S. citizenship, Miller reapplied when a Texas court granted her father's petition for a paternity decree declaring him her father. When the incision State Department rejected her citizenship application again, claiming that 8 U.S.C. Section 1409(a) required foreign born illegitimate children of American fathers to determination be legitimated before age 18, Miller challenged the refusal. strange She claimed that since Section 1409(c) established at birth the citizenship of an illegitimate foreign-born child whose mother was an American citizen, the State Department's refusal to do the same under Section 1409(a), when the father is an American citizen, was american language unconstitutional. On appeal from an appellate court's decision to affirm the lower court's dismissal of the case, the Supreme Court granted Miller certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Albright.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The North Carolina General Assembly passed a redistricting plan for the state's Senate and House of Representatives. Black citizens of North Carolina alleged that the plan created seven new districts where blacks would not be able to elect representatives of their choosing. They go against filed suit in a District Court claiming that this violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and let the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. inglorious Before the District Court could hear the case, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in order to clarify that voting violations needed only to have a ""discriminatory effect"" and required no ""discriminatory purpose."" Considering the ""totality of circumstances"" of the redistricting plan, the District Court ruled that six incision of the new districts incision violated the newly amended Voting Rights Act by diluting the power of the black vote. The North Carolina Attorney General appealed the decision directly to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ralph Gingles et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In December 2004, Karen Bartlett's doctor prescribed Sulindac, a generic anti-inflammatory medication, to help treat her shoulder pain. Within months she began suffering from a severe reaction called Stevens-Johnson syndrome, which caused the skin condition toxic epidermal necrolysis. This condition deteriorated over 60 percent of her skin to the point of causing open wounds. As a result, she set up has suffered permanent and serious injuries, including near-blindness. Bartlett filed a lawsuit against the Sulindac medication manufacturer, Mutual Pharmaceutical Company. Bartlett initially presented several negligence and product liability claims, but only her design defect product liability claim made it to trial. Beginning in August 2009, a jury at the Federal District Court for month the District of New Hampshire heard consumer evidence that Sulindac was indium unreasonably dangerous to consumers and therefore was defectively designed. Mutual countered, among several other defenses, indebtedness that federal law governs generic drug manufacturers' conduct; therefore Karen could not pursue a state design defect claim. After 14 days of trial, the jury deliberated and sided with Bartlett, awarding over $20 million in compensatory damages. Mutual appealed the decision for several reasons, including the following: the district court misunderstood New Hampshire product liability law; and, the court improperly admitted several pieces of evidence and the jury award of damages was excessive. Mutual also reasserted its claim that federal law should prevail over a state defective design claim. Despite Mutual's arguments, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. Mutual appealed further to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mutual Pharmaceutical Co..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After working for General Motors Corporation (GM) for fifteen years subpoena as a vehicular fire analyst, Ronald Elwell sued GM for wrongful discharge. In an eventual settlement agreement reached in a Michigan county court, the parties agreed to a permanent injunction barring Elwell from forge testifying against GM without its consent, unless subpoenaed to do so by another court or tribunal. Thereafter, when Kenneth Lee Baker commenced a product liability action against GM in a universal Missouri county court, Elwell was subpoenaed to testify on Baker's behalf. When GM argued that Elwell was barred from testifying under the Michigan court injunction, the Missouri court disagreed and permitted his deposition and testimony. After suffering an adverse verdict in the Baker case, GM appealed on the basis that Elwell's testimony was illegally admitted. When a federal appeals court agreed with GM, Baker excruciation appealed and relegate the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Baker.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ray Agard was tried take heed in New York on sodomy, assault, and weapons counts. Ultimately, Agard's trial turned on whether the jury believed the testimony of visitation the victim and her friend or the conflicting testimony of Agard. The prosecutor challenged Agard's credibility. During summation, the prosecutor remarked, ""[h]e gets to sit here and listen to the testimony of all the other witnesses before he testifies,"" and ""[t]hat gives [him] a big advantage, doesn't it?"" The prosecutor alleged that Agard had tailored his testimony to fit evidence that he heard from witnesses through the course let of the trial. The trial court rejected Agard's objection that these reject comments violated his right to be present at trial. After exhausting his state appeals, Agard petitioned for federal habeas corpus, claiming that the prosecutor's comments violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to be present at trial and confront his accusers, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court denied his go against petition. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Portuondo.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Philip Breuer sued in state court to indicate resolve an overtime dispute under suspect the Federal Labor Standards Act encase (FLSA). Attorneys for Breuer's employer, Jim's remotion Concrete of Brevard, had the case moved to federal court by citing the federal removal statute. According to the statute, defendants in state court cases dealing with federal laws may have the case moved to federal court ""unless otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress."" Breuer's attorney argued that Congress had provided for suits under the FLSA to breuer be heard in state court and that the case should therefore be returned to state court; attorneys for Jim's Concrete disagreed. The district court refused to send the case back to state court. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As a go against result of a county lawsuit in 1974, the Jefferson County Personnel Board in Birmingham, Alabama, entered into consent decrees that included hiring blacks as firefighters thence and for promoting them. The decrees were approved by a federal district court. Years later, Robert K. Wilks, a white firefighter, challenged the decrees and alleged that whites were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks. Wilks argued that such practices violated Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The personnel board agreed company that it was making race-conscious decisions but argued it was doing so pursuant to the original decrees. The Court combined arguments in take exception two companion cases: Personnel Board v. Wilks and Arrington v. Wilks.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wilks.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    BFP, a partnership formed by two indicate private investors, bought a home in Newport Beach, CA in 1987. BFP secured the property by obtaining a deed of trust from Imperial Savings Association (Imperial). Imperial owned the property until BFP could pay off the amount borrowed. BFP defaulted on loan repayment and Imperial proceeded to sell the property for $433,000 to settle the loan (foreclosure). Before the title of ownership transferred to the buyer, BFP filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy failure Code. BFP asked bankruptcy court to nullify the original foreclosure sale because the time value home was valued remove at over $725,000. BFP argued that the low sales price constituted a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. Section 548(a)(2)(A), which guarantees that debtors receive ""reasonably equivalent value"" for property foreclosed. BFP claimed ""reasonably equivalent value"" was equal to the fallacious market value of the property in question. The bankruptcy court denied BFP's claim, and a District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Resolution Trust Corporation, As Receiver Of Imperial Federal Savings Association, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Several indigent California state prisoners filed turn back complaints attacking the constitutionality of the regulations which forbade California prisons from having more than twelve law books in a prison library. On January 10, 1967, the district court consolidated the multiple cases because they jurisprudence contained common questions of law and fact. The California prisoners moved for the convening jan of a three-judge district court, but their motion was denied. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's order denying a three-judge panel. On May 28, 1970, a three-judge district court granted the plaintiffs relief from the regulation limiting apparent motion the number of law books in prison libraries. The defendants appealed the district court's turn back decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert O. Gilmore, Jr., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    18 USC section 922(g)(1) forbids a person convicted of a serious offense to possess any firearm. Section 924(e) requires that a three-time violent felon who violates section 922(g)(1) receive an enhanced sentence. Section 921(a)(20) provides that a previous conviction is not a predicate for the substantive offense or the enhanced sentence if the offender's civil rights permit have strip been restored, ""unless such... restoration... expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms."" In 1993, Gerald Caron was convicted of possessing six rifles and shotguns in violation of section 922(g). The District Court enhanced Caron's sentence based, territorial dominion in part, on three Massachusetts convictions. In vacating his sentence, the Court of Appeals concluded that a Massachusetts law that permitted Caron to possess rifles, but not handguns, had restored his civil rights. On remand, the District Court prohibit found that, incision because Massachusetts law allowed Caron to possess rifles, section 921(a)(20)'s ""unless clause"" was not activated. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    VietNow National Headquarters, a charitable nonprofit corporation, retained for-profit fundraising telemarketing corporations to solicit donations to aid Vietnam veterans. The contracts provided that the telemarketers would retain 85 percent of wittingly the discrepant gross receipts from Illinois donors. The Illinois Attorney General filed a complaint in state court, oer alleging that the telemarketers represented to donors that a significant amount of each dollar donated would be paid over to VietNow for charitable endeavors and be that such representations were knowingly deceptive and materially false and constituted a fraud. The trial court granted the telemarketers' motion to dismiss on First extra Amendment grounds. In affirming, the Illinois Supreme Courts relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that held that certain regulations of charitable solicitation barring fees in excess of a prescribed level effectively imposed prior restraints on fundraising and were therefore incompatible with the First Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois ex rel. Madigan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New York voters sought declaratory judgment in a New York allow for federal district court to prevent compliance with Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. That section provided that no person who successfully completed the sixth grade in a school accredited by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English shall be denied the right outdo to vote in any election because of his inability to read or write English. The plaintiffs argued that Section 4(e) prevented the enforcement of New York election laws which required an ability incision to read and write English as a condition of voting. A three-judge panel of the district show court granted declaratory judgment and prevented enforcement of Section 4(e). It held that Congress exceeded its york constitutionally designated powers in enacting Section 4(e) and usurped the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Attorney General et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The state of South Dakota operated a early cement plant. A substantial percentage of the plant's production was sold to buyers outside the state. One such customer was Reeves, Inc., wyoming a concrete distributor in Wyoming wyoming that obtained over 90 percent significant of its cement from the state-run plant. In 1978, for economic reasons, the due south South Dakota plant began supplying in-state customers before honoring other commitments. Reeves, Inc. challenged South Dakota's ""hoarding"" of resources.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stake.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) operates a self-insured employee health plan through a third-party administrator. Vermont state law requires that all health plans, including territorial dominion self-insured plans, file reports jurisprudence containing claims data and other harbor information with the state. The statute specifies what type of information is required and how it is transmitted. When Vermont subpoenaed claims data from the third-party administrator, Liberty Mutual sued the state and argued that the reporting essential requirements of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted the Vermont statute. The district court found in favor of the state and held that ERISA did not preempt the Vermont statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that ERISA preempted the state statute because the state statute’s requirements were connected to the tell ERISA requirements and therefore were preempted.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    These are two consolidated cases involving the turn back discovery of open marijuana fields as the result of unwarranted searches of privately owned land. In the first case, Kentucky State police searched Ray E. Oliver's farm, acting on reports that marijuana was grown there. A gate marked chief with a ""No Trespassing"" sign surrounded the field. Police found marijuana in the territorial dominion field about a mile from Oliver's home. Before trial, the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky suppressed evidence found in the search on the ground that Oliver had a reasonable expectation that his field would remain private. This expectation triggered the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed under the open field doctrine. The open field doctrine states that a citizen's protection from unwarranted search does not extend to open fields. In the second case, police searched the woods behind Richard Thornton's property after an anonymous tip. Police found two marijuana patches on Thornton's land. The Maine hunt Superior Court granted Thornton's motion to suppress evidence found in the search for the same reasons as the Oliver sixth case. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Main affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jennifer Harbury, a United States citizen, is the widow of adenine Efrain Bamaca- Velasquez, a Guatemalan rebel leader. Harbury alleged that Government let officials intentionally deceived her in concealing information that her husband had been executed by Guatemalan army officers paid by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Harbury also alleged that this deception denied her access to the courts by leaving her without information, inbuilt or reason to seek information, with which she could have brought a lawsuit that might have saved her husband's life. Harbury filed suit, listing 28 causes of action, for the violation of her constitutional right of access to courts. With respect to the access-to-courts counts, the District Court held that Harbury had arrogate not stated a valid cause of action. Given that she had not filed a prior suit, the court reasoned that she could only guess how the alleged cover-up might have prejudiced her rights to bring a separate action and that the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of case Appeals reversed only the dismissal of one of Harbury's claims for denial of access to courts.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Christopher.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2005, Duryea police chief Charles Guarnieri filed a discrimination lawsuit against the Pennsylvania borough, alleging that council members retaliated against him because he had successfully challenged a 2003 decision to fire him. Guarnieri had challenged his firing through arbitration and was reinstated to his position as chief in 2005. His suit alleged that council then issued 11 employment directives, which he claimed placed humiliating restrictions on him, to retaliate against ten him. He further alleged the borough improperly withheld overtime pay from him and had improperly delayed issuing health insurance benefits. A jury heard the case in April 2008 and awarded Guarnieri $45,358 in compensatory damages and appendage ten $52,000 in punitive damages. The borough appealed, arguing the evidence did pennsylvania not indium support the verdict. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the overall verdict entered by a federal jury, but it overturned the panel's award of $52,000 in punitive damages. The ruling differs from decisions by all 10 other federal circuits and four state supreme courts.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1987, Arkansas amended its Gross Receipts indium Act (GRA), imposing a tax on cable television but not on print media. Cable companies and others filed suit in the State Chancery Court, alleging that taxing cable services, but not print and satellite broadcast services, violated their First Amendment expressive rights and 14th Amendment equal protection rights. In 1989, after the Chancery Court upheld the amendment, Arkansas again amended the GRA, extending the tax to satellite broadcast services. On tax appeal, once more the State Supreme Court upheld the GRA. However, the court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits differential taxation among members of the same medium. Therefore, because cable and scrambled satellite television services are essentially the same, idiot box the tax was unconstitutional when it applied only to cable be services.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Leathers.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Mineral King Valley was an undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest federal official that was mostly used for mining until the 1920s. In the late 1940s, developers began to make bids on the land for recreational developments. Walt Disney Enterprises won a bid to start surveying the valley in the hopes of developing an 80-acre ski resort. The size of the proposed resort would require the construction of a new highway and massive high voltage power lines that would run through the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club kept track of this project for years and hoped to stop it to protect the undeveloped land. The Sierra Club filed preliminary and permanent injunctions against federal officials to prevent them from granting permits for the development of the Mineral King Valley. The district court granted these injunctions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the adenine injunctions mine on the grounds non that the Sierra Club did not show that it would be directly affected by the actions of the defendants and therefore did not have standing to motor hotel sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, the appellate court also held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury or likelihood of their success on the merits of the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Roger C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior of the United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Waffle House, Inc.'s employees must each sign an agreement requiring employment disputes to be settled by binding arbitration. After he suffered a seizure and was fired by Waffle House, Eric Baker filed a discrimination charge non with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that his discharge violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of be 1990 (ADA). The EEOC then filed suit, alleging that Baker?s discharge violated the ADA, and sought injunctive relief and define specific relief for Baker, including backpay, reinstatement, and wreak compensatory damages, and punitive damages for malicious and reckless conduct. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Waffle House petitioned to stay the EEOC's suit and compel arbitration. The District Court did not stay the action. The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House did not call for foreclose the enforcement action because the EEOC was not a party to the contract, but had independent statutory authority to bring suit in any federal district court where venue was proper. The appellate court also held that the EEOC was limited to injunctive relief.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey banned the construction distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets and other printed material at its airport terminals. Members of a religious spiritual group wanted to perform a ritual involving the distibution of literature at these airports. The group ordinance challenged the regulation on free expression and and free exercise island of jersey grounds of the First recitation Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) brought an action against William C. Dunn and Delta Consultants, Inc. claiming that they had solicited investments in and operated a fraudulent scheme involving transactions in foreign currency options in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) instead misdemeanour and CFTC regulations. Dunn and Delta delta Consultants allegedly engaged in the transactions by contracting directly with international banks, rather than using a regulated exchange or board of trade. This is known as ""off exchange"" trading. Dunn, Delta Consultants, and their customers suffered heavy losses. The District Court appointed a temporary receiver to take control of Dunn and Delta Consultants' property. The court rejecting their defense that the transactions were exempt from the CEA under the ""Treasury Amendment,"" which excepts ""transactions in foreign currency"" unless they involve gruelling misdemeanour a sale ""for future delivery"" ""conducted on a board of trade."" The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dunn.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1994, Dolores Oubre, a scheduler at a power plant run by Entergy Operations, Inc., was given the indium option of either improving her job performance or accepting a voluntary arrangement for her severance. Accepting a severance package, Oubre signed a chance release of all claims against Entergy. Entergy failed to comply with several requirements for a sanctioned release under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), as set forth in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). After receiving all of her severance pay, Oubre filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Oubre then sued Entergy, alleging constructive discharge on the basis of her age in violation of the ADEA and state law. Entergy argued that Oubre had ratified the defective release by failing to return the $6,258 in severance she had received. The District Court entered summary judgment for Entergy. human activity The Court of aside Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Oubre.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, upheld against a First Amendment challenge a Michigan law that allowed a public employer whose employees were represented by a union to require those of its employees who did not join the union nevertheless to pay fees to it yard because interfere they benefited from the union’s collective bargaining agreement with the employer. Illinois has a law similar to that upheld in Michigan. lap The governor of Illinois brought a lawsuit challenging the law on the ground that the statute violates the First Amendment by compelling employees who disapprove of the union to contribute money to it. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the governor lacked standing to sue because he did not stand to suffer injury from the law, but legislative act two public employees intervened in the action to seek that Abood be overturned. Given that Abood is binding on lower courts, the district litigate court dismissed the claim, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for the same reason.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mark Janus.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC., yard owned the Radisson Hotel at hotel the Los Angeles International Airport as well as an adjacent parking structure. In November of 2007, RadLax sought to expand the Radisson Hotel. It therefore obtained a $142 million construction loan from the Longview Ultra Construction Loan Investment Fund, for which Amalgamated Bank served as debitor trustee and administrative agent. After taking out the loan, RadLAX was eventually forced to file voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code amalgamate in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Soon after, RadLax embarked on a campaign to sell the Radisson Hotel and adjacent parking structure. On June 4, 2010, RadLAX filed a joint chapter 11 plan, which proposed the auction of substantially all of its assets and the distribution of proceeds to various creditors. The debtors specified that no secured creditor would be permitted to credit bid at the sale. Amalgamated Bank objected to the proposed bid lodge procedures on the grounds that a sale of its collateral, free of liens, required the debtor to allow a lender to credit bid. The Bankruptcy Court agreed with Amalgamated Bank and denied RadLax's proposal with regard to credit bids. The case was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. RadLAX subsequently appealed the appellate court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Amalgamated Bank.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Giles Lugar leased a truckstop from Edmondson Oil Co. and take for fell behind on his rent payments. Edmondson issued a suit against him in a Virginia state court for failing to repay his debt. Before the court reached a decision, it issued a ""writ of attachment"" against Lugar. This disabled him from selling any property he owned while the case was open, since Edmondson wanted the property as collateral in case he could not repay his debt. be A state trial judge cancelled the ""writ of attachment"" one month later after finding no statutory justification for its issuance. Lugar claimed that Edmondson worked with the government to deprive him of his property without the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. He said this caused him financial loss and sought to recover damages from Edmondson in a District Court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. This code provides rewards to those collection who have had their rights violated because of ""state action."" The District Court rejected Lugar's claim because it deemed that no ""state action"" had occurred. On review, the United tell States Court of Appeals quartern for the Fourth Circuit rejected using solely ""state action"" to validate Section 1983 suits. It claimed that certain instances where private parties acted ""under the color of state law"" also validated Section 1983 suits. However the Fourth Circuit found that none of these actions occurred in Lugar's case and rejected his suit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Giles M. Lugar.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robert Devlin, a retired worker represented by the Transportation Communications International Union, participates in a defined benefits pension plan (Plan) administered by the Union. In eradicate 1991, the Plan was amended to add a cost of living increase (COLA). In 1997, the Plan's trustees eliminated the COLA because the Plan could not support such a large benefits increase. The trustees also filed a class action in federal court, seeking a try declaratory judgment that the 1997 elimination was binding on all Plan members or that the 1991 COLA was void. try After the District Court conditionally certified a class under Federal Rule adenine of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and the trustees asked the court to approve their settlement with the class representatives, Devlin moved to intervene. The court denied his motion as untimely. The court then heard objections to the settlement, including those advanced by harness Devlin, and approved the settlement. In affirming the District Court's denial of Devlins's intervention, the Court of Appeals held that, because Devlin was not a named class representative and because he had been properly denied the right to intervene, he lacked standing to challenge the settlement.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Devlin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Genentech held the patent for ""Cabilly I"", a process for using cell cultures to manufacture human antibodies. MedImmune had a licensing agreement with Genentech information technology under which MedImmune paid royalties to Genentech in return for the use of the patent. Later, Genentech also obtained the patent to ""Cabilly II,"" a continuation of the Cabilly I process. Under the licensing agreement, MedImmune became a licensee for Cabilly II as well. Genentech informed MedImmune that it would have to pay royalties on one of its most lucrative products, Synagis, which uses enjoyment the Cabilly II process. MedImmune sued Genentech, claiming that the patent was invalid and unenforceable. However, MedImmune kept paying the royalties. enjoyment A federal District Court dismissed the suit because it did not present a controversy. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to receive ""cases or controversies."" This is implemented in the Declaratory Judgment Act, which requires that a suit involve an ""actual controversy."" be Genentech argued that since MedImmune was still paying royalties on the patent, there was no controversy. MedImmune countered that though it was indeed still paying royalties on the patent it claimed was invalid, it was paying ""under protest."" It would be unreasonable, MedImmune argued, for the company to be required to break its contractual obligations by stopping royalty payments before suing. This might jeopardize MedImmune's legal rights to one of its best-selling products. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled for Genentech and upheld the District Court, holding that the suit presented no actual controversy.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is MedImmune, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wanda Johnson was run over by a truck in May 1992 and was rushed to the Humana Hospital-University of Louisville, Kentucky, now misdemeanour Galen of Virginia, Inc. After about six weeks at Galen, during which time Johnson's health remained in a volatile state, Galen's agents arranged for her transfer to the Crestview Health Care Facility in Indiana. Johnson was transferred to Crestview in July, and upon arrival her condition deteriorated significantly. Johnson was taken to the Midwest Medical Center where she remained for many ruling months and incurred substantial medical expenses as a result of her deterioration. Jane Roberts, Johnson's guardian, then filed a federal action under the Emergency authorise Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), alleging violations of Section 1395dd(b) of the Act. Section 1395dd of the Act places obligations of screening and stabilization upon hospitals and emergency rooms that receive patients suffering from an ""emergency medical condition."" The District Court granted summary judgment for Galen on the ground that Roberts had failed to show that ""either near the medical opinion that Johnson was stable or the decision to authorize her transfer was caused by an improper motive."" In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that in order to state a claim in an EMTALA suit alleging a violation of Section lyndon baines johnson 1395dd(b)'s stabilization requirement, a plaintiff must show that the hospital's inappropriate stabilization resulted from an improper motive such as one involving the indigency, race, or sex of the patient.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is No. 97-53 Roberts.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    American Tobacco Company operated two plants in Richmond, VA. Until 1963, both plants were segregated, and the better job opportunities were reserved for white employees. Between 1963 and 1968, the plants were officially desegregated, but the promotion policies were left mostly to the discretion of the supervisors. The best jobs continued to go to the white employees. In November 1968, the company proposed nine new lines of employment progression that linked bottom jobs with the top job a worker could eventually receive. Four of the lines linked majority-white bottom jobs with majority-white top jobs; two of the lines linked majority-black bottom jobs with majority-black top jobs. The top jobs for the majority-white progression lines were the best jobs in the go forward factories. On January  3, 1969, John Patterson and fellowship two other employees filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In 1973, alleging violations of the motor hotel Civil Rights Act, the employees sued the company in district court . The district court held that the lines of progression violated the Act and prohibited the company from using them. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District affirmed and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the remedy. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. On remand, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaints by prohibit arguing that the seniority system was exempt from the Civil Rights Act. The district court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision because that the lines of progression are not a seniority system. The Court of Appeals also held that the immunity for seniority systems only extends to those in place before the effective date of the Civil Rights Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Tobacco Company, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The state of North Carolina enacted legislation that made the death penalty mandatory for all convicted be first-degree murderers. Consequently, mandatary when James Woodson was found guilty of such an offense, he was automatically sentenced to death. Woodson challenged the law, which mandatory james iv was upheld by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. This case is one of the five ""Death Penalty Cases"" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , helium Proffitt v. Florida , and Roberts v. Louisiana .

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Woodson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Alabama filed a civil contempt tie up order against the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) when it refused guild to present a list of the names and addresses of civic all its members and agents within the state. The NAACP claimed the order violated inside the NAACP’s constitutional rights. dyed The Alabama Supreme Court twice dismissed petitions for certiorari to review a final contempt judgment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Benjamin Lee Lilly, his brother Mark Lilly, and Gary Barker were arrested after stealing liquor and guns and abducting Alex DeFilippis, who was later shot and killed. Under police questioning, Mark admitted stealing liquor, but claimed that Benjamin and Barker stole the guns and that Benjamin polish off shot DeFilippis. When Virginia called Mark as a witness at Benjamin's subsequent criminal trial, Mark invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court then admitted his statements to the police as declarations of an law unavailable witness against penal interest. The court overruled Benjamin's objections that the statements were not against Mark's penal interest because they shifted responsibility for the crimes to Barker and Benjamin, and that their admission would violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Subsequently, Benjamin legion was convicted of the DeFilippis murder and other crimes. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found that the Confrontation Clause was satisfied because Mark's statements fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. The court also held that the statements were reliable because Mark knew that he was implicating himself as a be participant in numerous crimes and be because the statements were independently corroborated by other evidence at trial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lilly.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Seminole Tribe brought suit against the State of Florida for violating the good faith negotiations requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Under adenine the IGRA, the identify Tribe may engage in gaming (i.e., casino gambling) activities non subject to Florida's good faith regulations. Florida moved to dismiss the Tribe's action, alleging that the lawsuit violated Florida's sovereign immunity. On appeal from the District Court's denial of Florida's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the Court of Appeals reversed, aver holding that the Eleventh Amendment shielded Florida from federal suit and negotiation that under Ex Parte Young, the Tribe may not enforce its right to good faith negotiations by naming Florida's governor as a party to the suit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During Thomas J. Maloney's tenure as an Illinois judge, William Bracy was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death before him for a triple murder. Maloney was later convicted on federal charges of taking bribes from operating theatre criminal defendants. In his federal habeas petition, Bracy argued that, because he had ""fixed"" other murder cases, Maloney had an interest in a conviction here to deflect suspicion. incumbency Bract contended that Maloney's interest violated the fair-trial guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due go against Process Clause. The District Court denied the claim, concluding that Bracy's allegations contained insufficient specificity or manage good cause. In affirming, adenine the Court of Appeals also concluded that Bracy had not shown ""good cause"" for discovery to prove his claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bracy.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On March 23, 2010, a police officer approached Israel Leija, Jr. at a drive-in restaurant with a warrant for his arrest. Leija proceeded to lead the police on a high-speed chase on the interstate while periodically calling the police dispatcher, saying that he had a gun and threatening to shoot the officers expression chasing him. The officers continued their pursuit, and other officers deployed spike strips. Trooper Chadrin Lee Mullenix, upon learning that other spike indium strips were set up, decided to pursue the alternate tactic of shooting at Leija’s car in order to stop it. Although he had not received training on this maneuver, he informed one of the officers in pursuit of his plan and radioed his supervisor for permission. Before receiving a response, Mullenix got in construction position on an overpass. Witnesses testified  that Mullenix could hear his supervisor respond to say that he should “stand by” and “see if the spikes work first.” When Leija’s car approached, Mullenix fired six shots. The car struck the spike strips, hit the median, and rolled several times. It was later determined that Leija died as a result of Mullenix’ shots, four of which struck his body and none of which struck the car’s radiator, hood, or engine block. The respondents sued Mullenix under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and argued that Mullenix had violated Leija’s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him. Mullenix moved for summary judgment and argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The guild district court denied the motion and held that there were genuine questions of fact regarding whether Mullenix acted as a reasonable officer would have under similar circumstances. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and subsequently denied Mullenix’s petition for a rehearing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chadrin Lee Mullenix.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On May 5, 1983, an Eastern Airlines flight departed from Miami, bound for flying the Bahamas. After takeoff, one of the plane’s jet rose engines lost pressure. The flight crew shut down the failing engine and turned the plan around to return to Miami. The flight crew informed the passengers that the plane chance event would be ditched in the Atlantic Ocean, but the crew managed to restart the engine and land the plane safely at Miami International Airport. A group of passengers, including Rose Marie Floyd, sued Eastern Airlines for mental distress caused by the incident. Eastern Airlines argued the engine failure and preparations for ditching the plane amounted to an accident under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and also that Article 17 requires physical article injury a condition of liability. The district court concluded than mental distress alone is not enough to receive compensation under Article 17. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh bring down Circuit reversed and held the language in Article 17 encompasses purely emotional distress.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Eastern Airlines, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After resigning as a lifeguard, Beth Ann Faragher brought an action against motor hotel the City of Boca Raton and her immediate supervisors, produce alleging that the supervisors had created a sexually hostile atmosphere by touching, remarking, and commenting. Faragher asserted that this conduct constituted discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court concluded that Faragher's supervisors' conduct was sufficiently serious to alter the conditions of her employment and constitute an abusive working environment. The court then held that unfriendly the city could be held liable. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals held that Faragher's supervisors were not acting within the scope of their employment when they engaged in the harassing conduct, that ascribe knowledge of the harassment could not be imputed to the City, reach and that the City could not be held liable for negligence in failing to prevent it.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Faragher.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An Illinois law required that call for trucks and trailers on its highways use a contoured mudguard, while Arkansas required them to have a straight mudguard. All of tell the other states required one type or the other. Arguing spell that the foreclose Illinois law unduly burdened associate in nursing interstate commerce, Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. prevailed in the lower court, which issued an injunction preventing Bibb from enforcing the law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Navajo Freight Lines Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Secretary of the Interior is responsible for the maintenance of national parks orbit and for providing the facilities necessary to allow the public to enjoy them. In the performance of this duty, the Office of writing table the Secretary of the Interior contracted Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp (UISC) to provide guided tours of the National Mall on minibuses that visitors may board and disembark at various sites. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (WMATC) sued to enjoin mall UISC from conducting tours without obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity from the WMATC. interior The district court business office dismissed the suit, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed without opinion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Deborah Peterson and a group of other plaintiffs were seeking to obtain judgments for injury or wrongful death during acts of terrorism by Iran. The Iran Central Bank (Bank Markazi) owned nearly $2 billion worth of bonds that were held in an account in New York City. Based on the Uniform Commercial Code, these assets were not considered assets of Bank Markazi, and therefore could not be attached by the plaintiffs and were immune from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign aside Immunities Act. While this case was pending, Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Section 8772 of which stated, “[T]he financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran plus et al., shall be subject to execution…in order to satisfy any judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for personal harm injury or death caused by an act of [terrorism].” The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based on Section 8772. Bank Markazi argued that Section 8772 violated the United States’ separation of powers because the law was solely right wing directed at this specific case. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and ordered the turnover of the assets. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adenine affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Deborah Peterson, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Daniel Negusie, an Eritrean citizen, worked as a prison guard in Eritrea before seeking asylum in the associate in nursing United States. When Negusie tried to come into the country, however, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) denied his application for asylum and withholding of removal. The INS based its decision on evidence that Negusie assisted in the persecution of prison inmates on the basis of a protected ground, specifically, the prisoners' Protestant religious beliefs. Negusie appealed his case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing manifest that he did not voluntarily assist in the persecution but rather attempted to help the individuals who were being mistreated. The BIA gave little weight to Negusie's argument that he was trying to help the prisoners, instead focusing on his more prominent involvement in the persecution as an armed guard who oversaw and was complicit in the orison acts. After the BIA upheld the INS' denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal, fortify Negusie filed a petition to have his case reviewed before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Finding that the evidence from the BIA decision did not compel a conclusion that Negusie was uninvolved in the persecution of inmates, the Fifth Circuit denied his petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Daniel Girmai Negusie.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wescley Fonseca Pereira entered the United States in June 2000 as a non-immigrant visitor authorized to stay until December joined 21, 2000. Pereira overstayed his visa, and in May 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personally served him with a notice to appear for a removal hearing. The notice did not specify the date and time of his initial removal hearing, but instead ordered him to appear before an immigration judge “on a date to be set at a time to be set.” When the immigration court set a date and time, it mailed Pereira a notice with such information. However, the notice was sent to Pereira’s street address on let in Martha’s Vineyard rather than his post office box, so Pereira never received it. When Pereira did not appear for his removal hearing, an immigration judge ordered him removed in absentia. Pereira was not removed and instead remained in the country. In March 2013, he was arrested for a motor vehicle violation and detained by DHS. Through his attorney, Pereira filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings, claiming he had never received the hearing notice with the time and place. Although Pereira conceded that he could be removed, he sought relief in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. particular date § 1229b(b)(1), a provision that gives the attorney general discretion to cancel the removal of a non-permanent resident alien if the alien meets certain criteria, including ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States. This continuous period ends “when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a)” of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Pereira contends that because he did not dictated receive notice of the time and place of his removal hearing, his presence in the country was continuous and over ten years under the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that a notice to appear that does not contain the date and time of the come out hearing is nonetheless effective to end the period of continuous physical presence. However, Pereira challenges this reading of the statute. The First Circuit determined that the relevant provisions of the INA are ambiguous as to whether notice must include the date and time of the hearing to be effective, but the court found that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and thus subject to Chevron deference.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wescley Fonseca Pereira.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 replaced most forms of parole with supervised release. If release swear out conditions are violated, the sentencing court may revoke afterward the release and order the violator to serve part or all of the release term in prison without credit for time previously served on release. In 1994, Cornell Johnson was convicted of conspiring to produce and use counterfeit credit cards. Johnson was sentenced to imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release. While on supervised release, go against Johnson violated its terms. Subsequently, the District Court revoked Johnson's release and ordered him to serve an 18-month refer prison term to be followed by an additional 12 months of supervised release. The court cited no authority for ordering the new supervised release. The court could have cited a subsection added to the Act in 1994, 18 USC section 3583(h), which explicitly gave it the authority to add the new term; however, Congress made the amendment after Johnson's spell conviction. On appeal, Johnson argued that the application of the federal law established after his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Michigan state court convicted Diapolis panel Smith of second degree murder and unprejudiced felony possession of a firearm and sentenced him to life in prison. After exhausting his remedies in the Michigan state courts, Smith petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, Smith argued that he was denied an impartial jury from a fair cross-section of the community in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law in concluding that county jury selection ""worked no systematic exclusion."" The Court reasoned the state trial court's policy of excusing potential jurors for whom jury duty would constitute hardship juror based on child care concerns or transportation issues, when viewed insurance together with another policy that assigned prospective jurors from the county's only large city, established a prima facie case of systematic under-representation of African- wolverine state American jurors.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mary Berghuis, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Perry Paul, an alleged bookmaker, and Jerome Zarowitz, a former executive of a Las Vegas casino, had their nether telephones tapped by federal agents. The agents recorded conversations between Paul and David Gelbard and between Zarowitz and Sidney Parnas. Gelbard and Parnas were called before a federal grand jury convened to investigate possible violations of federal have to doe with gambling laws. When the government pressed Gelbard and Parnas to testify about these conversations, however, they refused to do so. Instead, they claimed that the wiretaps were illegal and argued that they should not be required to testify until given an opportunity to challenge the legality of the taps. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found Gelbard and Parnas in contempt of court and committed them to custody until they agreed to testify. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit motor hotel agreed with the district court, stating that ""a witness in a grand jury proceeding has no right to resort to a court to secure authoritative advance determination concerning evidentiary matters that arise, or may arise, or to exclude evidence to be used in such apostle paul a proceeding."" Gelbard and Parnas then sought certiorari from the Court, pointing to a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals one ninth for the Third Circuit vacating contempt charges against a witness under similar circumstances.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David Gelbard.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2011, the State of Maryland engaged in a process of redistricting, which in that state entails two parallel procedures: a public-facing procedure led by the Governor’s Redistricting Advisory Committee and an internal procedure involving Maryland’s congressional delegation and a consulting firm called NCEC contrive Services, Inc. NCEC developed sample maps using voter demographic data, a computer program, and a proprietary metric that predicts the likelihood of Democratic candidate success. In comparison to sample maps submitted by free state third parties, the NCEC-developed maps were assessed to be more likely to see Democratic candidate success. There is no evidence that the final map that was enacted to law was one of the ones developed by NCEC; rather, former Governor Martin O’Malley testified that the legislative director and staff from the Maryland Department of Planning likely created the final document. After the 2011 plan was implemented, the “Cook Partisan Voting Index” rated the Sixth District as a “likely” Democratic seat, whereas before the 2011 plan, the Sixth relegate District was a “safe” Republican seat. In the 2012 congressional election, Democrat John Delaney defeated incumbent Republican congressman Roscoe Bartlett by a 20.9% margin. Subsequent elections saw other Democratic candidates succeeding over Republican succeed candidates. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction barring the State from enforcing the 2011 redistricting plan and requiring the State to implement a new map be in advance of the 2018 midterm elections. A majority of the district court panel denied the motion and stayed the case pending the outcome of Gill v. Whitford, another gerrymandering case before the US Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Linda H. Lamone, Administrator, Maryland State Board of Elections, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. legislative act Mr. territorial dominion Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, ""I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I operating theatre retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor."" In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces. The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor he Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal. Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government war machine may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Xavier Alvarez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 6, 2006, Kouichi Taniguchi, a Japanese baseball player, visited the Marianas Resort and Spa in the Northern Mariana Islands. During a tour of the resort, Taniguchi fell through a wooden deck. Immediately after the accident, Taniguchi stated that he did not need medical attention. Two weeks later, he informed Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., the owner of the resort, that he had sustained injuries, which he claimed resulted in various medical expenses and loss of income. Taniguchi subsequently brought a diversity lawsuit peaceable against Kan Pacific alleging negligence and seeking damages for losses suffered because of the crataegus laevigata accident. along After discovery, the district court awarded summary peaceable judgment to Kan Pacific and awarded Kan Pacific litigation costs under 28 washed out U.S.C. § 1920. During litigation, Kan Pacific spent $5,517.20 for the translation of contracts and other documents from Japanese to English. The district court included these costs in the award because it interpreted ""compensation of interpreters"" in U.S.C. § 1920(6), as including compensation for the translation of documents. Taniguchi appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the award of $5,517.20 for the document translation. The court denied Taniguchi's petition for rehearing on May 11, 2011, and Taniguchi subsequently appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kouichi Taniguchi.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On February 1, 1951, Virgil Herdman, a train conductor, was in charge of a freight train traveling from Indiana to Ohio. While passing through Dayton, Ohio, the train braked abruptly to avoid hitting a car stopped on a railroad crossing. Herdman fell and was injured as the be train came to a stop. Herdman sued the railroad travel company for negligence and claimed that the company was responsible for his fall under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Courts typically apply this doctrine when negligence can be turn back inferred, without actual payload direct evidence, from the very nature of the accident. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the railroad on the basis that Herdman did not provide enough facts to support his brake negligence claim, even under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Herdman appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight KE007, en route from Alaska to South Korea entered the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down. All 269 people on board were killed, including Muriel Kole. Subsequently, Marjorie Zicherman and Muriel Mahalek, Kole's sister and mother sued KAL under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, totally which governs international air transportation. Zicherman and Mahalek were awarded loss-of-society flying due south damages. The Court of Appeals set aside the verdict, holding that general maritime law supplied the substantive compensatory damages law to be applied in an action under the Warsaw Convention and that, under such law, a plaintiff can recover for loss of society only if he was the decedent's dependent at the time of death. The appellate court found that Mahalek had not established dependent status universal and remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether Zicherman was a territorial dominion dependent of the decedent.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Korean Air Lines Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. (Trinity) operates a licensed preschool and daycare called The Learning Center that was initially opened as a non-profit corporation but merged with Trinity in 1985. The Learning Center has an open admissions policy and incorporates daily religious instruction into its programs. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants that provide funds for qualifying organizations to purchase recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. Trinity applied for such a grant but was denied because Article adenine I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution states, “no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination of religion.” Trinity sued and argued that the denial of its application violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the First Amendment’s protections of freedom of religion and speech. The district court granted Missouri DNR Director reach Pauley’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Trinity moved for reconsideration and to amend its complaint to include allegations that adenine such grants had previously been given to religious organizations. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and article motor hotel the denial of the motions to reconsider and amend the complaint.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When the Fish and Wildlife Service was notified that the operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project might affect two endangered species of fish, it concluded that the proposed long-term operation of the project was likely threaten to jeopardize the species sealed and decided to maintain minimum levels of water in certain reservoirs. The petitioners, irrigation districts receiving project water and operators of ranches in those districts, filed suit pisces the fishes against the Service's director, regional directors, and the Secretary, claiming the be determination and imposition of minimum water levels violated the Endangered Species Act's requirement that the designated area's economic impact be considered. The District Court dismissed the compliant because it lacked be standing; economic interests were not enough to constitute a lawsuit in this matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bennett.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jones, a black man, a charged that a real estate company adenine in Missouri's St. Louis County refused adenine to sell him the three estates a home in a particular neighborhood on account of household his race.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jones.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Baca, Polly Baca, and Robert Nemanich were appointed as three of Colorado’s nine presidential electors for the lap 2016 general election. Colorado law requires presidential electors to cast their votes for the winner of the popular vote in the state for President and Vice President. When Hillary Clinton won the popular vote in that state, instead adenine of casting his vote for her, Mr. Baca cast his vote for John Kasich. The Colorado Secretary of State discarded his vote and removed him as an elector. As a result, Ms. Baca and Mr. Nemanich voted for Hillary Clinton, despite their desire to vote for John Kasich. The three presidential electors sued the Colorado Department of State, alleging that the law requiring presidential electors to vote for the presidential candidate who wins the popular vote in that state violates their constitutional rights under Article II and the Twelfth Amendment of the federal Constitution. The district court dismissed the action, finding the electors lacked standing to bring the lawsuit, and in the alternative, because the electors failed to state a legal claim because the Constitution does not prohibit states from requiring electors to vote for the winner of the state’s popular vote. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth a Circuit affirmed the district court as to Mr. Baca’s standing, but reversed as to the standing of the other two electors who did not cast their votes in violation of the law. On the merits, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding get ahead the state’s removal of Mr. Baca and get ahead nullification of his vote were unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Colorado Department of State.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bush, an aerospace engineer at the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (Center), a facility operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), made a series of public comments vital critical of the Center. Lucas, civil the Center s director, demoted Bush on the ground that the comments were false and misleading. The Federal Employee Appeals Authority upheld the demotion, but the Civil Service Commission s (CSC) Appeals Review Board be later found that the demotion had violated his First Amendment rights. NASA accepted the Board_s recommendation that Bush be restored to his former position retroactively, with back pay. While his administrated appeal was pending, Bush brought suit against Lucas in Alabama state court, seeking to recover damages for violation of his First Amendment rights. Lucas removed the action to federal district court, which granted summary judgment for Lucas. administer The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that courtship Bush had no cause of action for damages under the First Amendment in view of the available remedies under the CSC regulations.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lucas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A 1965 amendment to New York's Education Law required public school boards to lend textbooks to elementary and secondary school students enrolled in private and unproblematic parochial schools. The Board of Education for New York Central School District No. 1, contending that the law violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, filed suit against James Allen, Commissioner of Education, requesting a declaratory injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute. The trial court agreed with the board and found the go against statute unconstitutional. just The Appellate Division reversed foreclose the ruling, finding that the boards lacked standing. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals ruled the boards did have standing, but also found that, because the law's purpose was to benefit recitation all students regardless of the type of school they attended, the law did not violate the First Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James E. Allen Jr., Commissioner of Education of the State of New York et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which established two sets of limits to campaign nether contributions. The base limit placed restrictions on how much money a contributor—defined broadly as individuals, partnerships, and other organizations—may give to specified categories of give up the ghost recipients. The aggregate limit restricted how much money an individual may donate in a two-year election cycle. The limits were periodically recalibrated to factor in inflation. Shaun McCutcheon is an Alabama resident who is eligible to vote. In the 2011-2012 election cycle, he donated to the Republican National Committee, other Republican aside committees, as well as individual candidates. He wished to donate more in amounts that would be permissible under the base limit but would violate the aggregate limit. McCutcheon and the other plaintiffs sued the Federal Election Commission, arguing nether that the aggregate limit violated the First Amendment by failing to serve a ""cognizable government interest"" and being prohibitively low. The district court held that the aggregate limit served government interests by preventing corruption or atomic number  the appearance of corruption and was set at a reasonable limit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shaun McCutcheon, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cory Maples was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an Alabama jury in alabama 1997. Alabama does  not provide death row inmates with lawyers to appeal their convictions and sentences; they must rely on pro bono lawyers to represent them on appeal. Two associates from Sullivan & Cromwell, a New York law firm, agreed to represent Maples without charge. However the two associates atomic number  subsequently left the firm, and when the Alabama court sent two copies of a ruling in Maples' case to the firm's mailroom it sent them back unopened. The firm had larn not notified the court like a shot or the mailroom that new lawyers had stepped in. When Maples learned of the missed deadline, he immediately informed his step-mother, who contacted Sullivan & Cromwell. Other attorneys at that firm then sought leave to file an appeal notwithstanding the missed deadline, but that request was denied. The Alabama Supreme Court and later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also declined to waive the deadline for filing an appeal in his case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cory R. Maples.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After police discovered cocaine base in his kitchen and two loaded adenine guns in his bedroom, a jury convicted Vernon Watts w of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute. The jury acquitted Watts of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense. By a preponderance of territorial dominion the evidence, the District Court, afterwards, found that Watts had possessed the guns in connection with the drug offense and sentenced him accordingly. In a similar case, authorities videotaped Cheryl Putra selling cocaine to a government informant. A jury convicted Putra of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute deliberate one ounce of cocaine, but acquitted her of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five ounces of cocaine on a separate occasion. By a preponderance of the evidence, the District Court, afterwards, found that Putra had indeed been involved in the second transaction and sentenced her accordingly. Reversing both cases, separate Courts of Appeals held that sentencing courts could not consider the conduct of adenine the defendants' underlying charges of which they had been acquitted.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    George punitory Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the Philadelphia area. Police arrested him at his home on obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines. A local news broadcast, honour run deal out by Metromedia, Inc., reported on the arrest, but failed to use the words “allegedly” or “reportedly” in during one broadcast. In subsequent broadcasts, the reporters called Rosenbloom and other similar distributors “girlie look peddlers” and “smut distributors”. Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on the obscenity charges. Rosenbloom then sued Metromedia for libel. The district court held that the First Amendment standard, which allowed recovery of damages only for knowingly and recklessly false statements, did not apply because Rosenbloom was not a public official or figure. The court instead instructed the jury to award damages where Metromedia did along not use reasonable city of brotherly love care to discern the truth before broadcasting. The jury awarded Rosenbloom general and punitive damages, although the district court reduced the punitive damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the knowingly and recklessly false standard applied.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Metromedia, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Outokumpu operates a steel plant in Alabama that contains three “cold rolling mills,” which are required for manufacturing and processing certain steel products. In November 2007, while Outokumpu’s plant was under construction, the company’s predecessor, ThyssenKrupp, entered into three contracts with F.L. Industries (“Fives”) to provide three different-sized mills. Each get down of these three contracts contains an arbitration clause that, among other things, requires that arbitration take place in Dusseldorf, remove Germany, and that the forum apply the substantive law of Germany. The contracts define the parties to each as Outokumpu and Fives and provide that any mention of either party also apparent motion includes any subcontractors of that party; appended to the contracts is a list of subcontractors, including petitioner GE Energy Conversion France SAS (“GE Energy”), formerly known as Converteam SAS. Fives contracted with GE Energy to provide three motors for each of the three mills, for a total of nine motors, which were manufactured in France and delivered and installed in Alabama between 2011 and 2012. By June 2014, the motors began to fail, and by August 2015, motors in all three mills failed. It came to light that Fives and GE Energy had entered into a separate agreement with another party that designated Fives to represent the interests set up of all three parties in the event of a dispute. Outokumpu filed a lawsuit against GE Energy in Alabama state court in 2016, and GE Energy removed to federal court and moved to dismiss and gaia compel arbitration. The district court granted GE Energy’s motion to compel and dismissed the action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed and remanded as to the motion to compel, holding that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards requires that the arbitration agreement be signed by the parties before Court or their privities, and only under Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (which does not expressly restrict arbitration to the specific parties to an agreement) can parties compel arbitration through the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. a Foreign Corporation Formally Known As Converteam SAS.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lereed Shelton represented himself in an immurement Alabama Circuit Court criminal in reality trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, united states government which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require motor hotel provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, ""that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period."" The court concluded that, because a defendant may operating theatre not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shelton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Terrence Graham was 16 years old he was convicted of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery. He served a 12 yardbird month sentence and was released. Six months later Mr. sunshine state Graham was tried and convicted by a Florida state court of armed home robbery and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, he argued that the imposition of a life sentence without parole on a juvenile, on its face, violated be the Eighth Amendment and moreover constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and thus violated the Eighth Amendment. The District Court infliction of Appeal of Florida disagreed. It held that Mr. Graham's sentence neither was a facial violation of the Eighth Amendment nor constituted cruel and convict unusual punishment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Terrance Jamar Graham.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Police in Madison, Wisconsin, officeholder suspected Steiney Richards of drug guarantee possession, but failed to receive a magistrate's authorization for a ""no-knock"" entry into his hotel room. Instead, they obtained a conventional search warrant requiring them to knock on Richards' door and identify adenine themselves as officers prior to resorting to forcible entry. After arriving immediate payment on the scene, an officer knocked on Richards' door identifying himself as a hotel custodian. When Richards opened the door, he saw a uniformed officer and quickly slammed it shut. The officers broke through the door, grabbed Richards while trying to escape, and richards found cocaine and cash in his bathroom. At trial, Richards challenged the constitutionality of the officer's search but was denied. On appeal, Wisconsin's Supreme Court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wisconsin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    For many years, Mark Erick Wheat allegedly participated invite in a far-flung marijuana distribution operation, acting mainly as an intermediary by receiving and storing shipments of associate in nursing marijuana in his home then distributing them around the region. Juvenal Gomez-Barajas and Javier Bravo were also allegedly involved in the operation. Attorney Eugene Iredale represented Gomez-Barajas and Bravo at trial. The trial court acquitted Gomez-Barajas on drug charges that overlapped with charges against Wheat, but Gomez-Barajas pleaded visitation guilty to tax evasion and illegal importation of merchandise to avoid a second trial. At the beginning of Wheat’s trial, however, the court had not yet accepted Gomez-Barajas’ plea and he was free to withdraw it. On August 22, 1985, Bravo pleaded guilty to one be count of transporting 2,400 pounds of marijuana. Immediately after the proceedings, Iredale informed the court that Wheat contacted him to hire him as additional counsel; Gomez-Barajas and Bravo waived any objection. The United States expressed concern about the possibility of conflict arising from Iredale’s representation of both Iredale and Gomez-Barajas. The government pointed out that if Gomez-Barajas withdrew his plea, it was likely Wheat would be required to appear at his trial as a witness. In that event, Iredale would not be allowed to cross-examine Wheat. Further, it was possible that Bravo would be required to appear at Wheat’s trial as a witness as well. Although Wheat emphasized his right to his choice of counsel under the sixth amendment, the district court denied his aside motion for a substitution of counsel. Wheat was convicted of conspiracy to possess 1,000 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute and five counts of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed. It held that the district court correctly balanced the sixth amendment’s rights to choice of counsel and to a defense by an attorney free of conflicts of interest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the aftermath of September 11th, the FBI arrested thousands of Arab Muslim men as part blind of its investigation into the political detainee attacks. One of these men, Javaid Iqbal, was classified as being a ""high interest"" detention detainee at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. Iqbal claims that during his detention he was misdemeanour segregated from the rest of the prison population and mistreated in several ways, including confinement to a cell for 23 hours a day where he had blinding light shone on him constantly and air conditioning pumped into the cell even during the winter months. After being released, Iqbal brought a suit against representatives of the Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, and FBI alleging 21 violations of his statutory and constitutional rights based on his treatment while confined. These defendants argued that they should be protected from the suit in their official governmental roles through qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and rejected the qualified immunity defense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on all counts but one for violation of the right to due process. The Second Circuit noted that the actions taken by the investigating government occurred in the immediate aftermath of September 11th and therefore created a unique context in which Iqbal's claims had to be reviewed. Even with these circumstances, however, the court felt that the qualified immunity defense could protect the government only from the due process claim. The ""serious allegations of gross mistreatment"" were enough to sustain the remaining counts.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John D. Ashcroft, Former Attorney General, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Since the late bring down bring down 19th century, Texas sold land to facilitate settlement in the state and construction of schools. If, however, a purchaser missed an interest payment on the property, the land was immediately forfeited back to the state unless the owner made the payment before the land could be re-sold. Under along this program, Greenbury Simmons purchased and then forfeited some tell land in 1947. Just over five years later he offered to pay the interest to re-acquire the property. The state refused to refer comply with his wishes citing a 1941 amendment to its law which gave individuals five years to claim their forfeited land. Simmons's land was sold to the City of El Paso in 1955.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of El Paso.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A jury found Randy Lee Guzek guilty of capital murder ill and sentenced him to helium death. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court overturned the death sentence. Guzek was sentenced to death again, and the Oregon Supreme Court again threw out the death sentence. When Guzek was sentenced to death a third time, the Oregon Supreme Court again overturned his sentence and also considered his complaint that he had not been allowed to present testimony about his alibi at the sentencing phase of the trial. Oregon law requires that evidence of innocence, such as an alibi, be presented during the trial, not during the sentencing hearing. The Oregon Supreme Court accepted Guzek's argument that he had a constitutional right under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to introduce the alibi testimony at his sentencing proceeding. Oregon jurisprudence appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that it was reasonable to restrict testimonial the one third introduction of evidence of innocence to the guilt phase of the trial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Oregon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2003, Congress enacted the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (""the Act""). Through the push Act, Congress apportioned billions of dollars towards the funding of non-governmental organizations (""NGOs"") involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS. NGOs qualify to receive this funding only if they satisfy certain conditions. One of these conditions requires that all federally funded NGOs implement a policy explicitly opposing prostitution. The Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., Pathfinder International, Global Health Council, and InterAction are NGOs that receive sealed funding under the Act. The NGOs brought suit against the Agency wellness for International Development and the other agencies responsible for enforcing the Act, challenging the constitutionality of the Act's funding provisions. The NGOs argued that the funding provisions violate the First Amendment by restricting the organizations' speech and forcing second base them to promote the government's viewpoint on prostitution. The district court agreed with the NGOs and held that the provisions were too broad of a restriction on free speech. The agencies appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the planetary Second Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alliance for Open Society International, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2004, New Mexico resident Larry Begay was arrested after brandishing and unsuccessfully shooting a rifle while begging his sister for money. Begay pleaded guilty to possessing the rifle. Prior to the firearm arrest, Begay had been anterior convicted twelve times  of driving while intoxicated. Under New Mexico law, each DWI conviction after the first three were considered felonies. The crook court concluded that the DWI convictions were violent felonies, triggering the federal career criminal adenine law's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. A deeply divided court of appeals panel affirmed the decision to st treat the DWIs as violent felonies.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Larry Begay.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) filed a class action arrogate aside alleging that certain individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through ""a pattern of racketeering activity"" that included acts of extortion in violation motor hotel of the Hobbs Act. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent nationwide injunction against the abortion opponents. Upholding the injunction, the Court of Appeals held, in part, that the things abortion supporters claimed clinic were extorted from them, such as women's right to indium seek medical services from the clinics and the clinic doctors' rights to perform their jobs, constituted ""property"" that was ""obtained"" for purposes of the Hobbs Act. (Together with No. 01-1119, Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women.)

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Scheidler.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1938, the Interstate Commerce Commission authorized Rock Island Motor Transit, a subsidiary of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, to purchase the property and rights of the White Line Motor Freight Company between Silvis, Illinois and Omaha, Nebraska. The certificate limited motor operations to service to non or from points on the Rock Island Railroad, subject to any reward restrictions the commission might impose under the Interstate Commerce Act to insure that the service was auxiliary or supplementary to train service. The Act authorized consolidation, merger, acquisition, or lease of common carriers if the commission deemed it to be “consistent with the public interest.” In a separate section, Congress directed the commission not to certify a railroad corporation seeking to operate motor carriers unless it also found that the table service railroad would use motor vehicle service to public advantage in its operations and would not unduly restrain competition. In 1944, Rock Island purchased the Frederickson Lines, covering routes between Atlantic, Iowa and Omaha, Nebraska. Rock Island filed for permission to provide motor service to points along the Frederickson Lines. The commission granted Rock Island permission, but placed five conditions on motor service for both the White and Frederickson routes. Rock Island challenged the conditions in district court and won, but on appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the commission’s power to impose the conditions. Rock Island then filed for permission to provide unrestricted motor service diligence to points along the White and Frederickson lines. In 1954, the accessory application was substantially granted. American Trucking Associations, Inc., nine other motor carriers, a group of railway trade unions, and several other organizations intervened, arguing that 1) the commission was required to limit motor service by a rail-owned motor carrier to auxiliary or supplementary service, and 2) the evidence was not sufficient to support the commission’s certification order. The district court upheld the certificate as granted.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Philip Lewis was a passenger on a motorcycle that was involved in a high-speed police chase. The chase ended when the motorcycle's driver lost control and motor hotel tipped the bike over, hurling both riders to cycle the pavement. James law Smith, one of two pursuing Sacramento county sheriff's deputies, was unable to stop his car in time and skidded into Philip, causing fatal injuries. Philip's parents, Teri and Thomas Lewis, accused Smith machine and the Sacramento county police department of deliberate and reckless conduct which ultimately deprived their son of his due process right to life ascribable and his protection against unconstitutional seizure. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court decision favoring Smith, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is County of Sacramento.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Taylor James Bloate was convicted in a Missouri federal district court on counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. crataegus laevigata In a pretrial motion, Mr. Bloate moved to dismiss arguing that there had been a Speedy Trial be Act violation. It was denied. The Act requires that a defendant's trial begin within ""70 days after the indictment or the defendant's initial appearance, whichever is later."" However, it excludes ""any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant."" Following his conviction, Mr. Bloate appealed, arguing that his motion to be dismiss was improperly denied as the court excluded too many days in its be calculation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Mr. Bloate's conviction. It recognized that six circuits hold that ""pretrial motion preparation may be excluded, if the court specifically grants time for that purpose"" and that traverse two do not. Here, the Eighth Circuit sided with the majority in holding that the district court properly excluded days from the time of Mr. Bloate's indictment to his trial and therefore there was no violation to the Speedy Trial Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Taylor James Bloate.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On February 23, 2007, Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski refinanced their Eagan, Minnesota, home by borrowing $611,000 from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The Jesinoskis received a Truth in Lending Act sagacity (TILA) disclosure and a Notice of the Right to Cancel, which gave them until midnight on February 27, 2007, to rescind the loan. The Jesinoskis did not exercise their right to cancel the loan, and they used the money to pay off several consumer debts. On February 23, 2010, the Jesinoskis attempted to rescind the loan and respective argued that they did not receive sufficient copies of the TILA disclosure and the Notice lift of the Right to Cancel. After the request to rescind the collection loan was denied, the Jesinoskis sued Countrywide Home Loans for failure to rescind their loan on February 24, 2011. Countrywide Home Loans sought a judgment on the pleadings and argued that the Jesinoskis did not file their suit within the three-year time period allowed by TILA. The Jesinoskis argued that, because they attempted to rescind the loan within the three-year time period, their suit fulfills that invite requirement and should be allowed to proceed. The district court found in favor of Countrywide Home Loans; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Larry D. Jesinoski, et ux..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Nebraska state trial judge, presiding over a widely wide publicized murder trial, entered an order restraining members nebraska of the press from publishing associate in nursing or air broadcasting accounts of confessions made by the accused to the police. The judge felt that this measure air was necessary to guarantee a fair trial to the accused.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nebraska Press Association et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2000, the citizens of California passed Proposition 22, which affirmed a legal understanding that marriage was a union between one man and one woman. In 2008, the inform California Supreme Court held that the California Constitution required the term ""marriage"" to include the union of same-sex couples and invalidated Proposition 22. Later in 2008, California citizens passed Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to provide that ""only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized by California."" The respondents, a gay couple and a lesbian couple, sued the state officials responsible for the enforcement of California's marriage laws and claimed that Proposition tribute 8 violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law. When the state officials proposition originally identify named in the suit informed the district court that they could not defend Proposition give up the ghost 8, the petitioners, official proponents of the measure, intervened to defend it. The district court held that Proposition 8 violated the Constitution, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kristin Perry, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    At Timothy Ring's trial for murder, atomic number  the jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, but found Ring guilty of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, unless further findings were made by a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing and only if the judge finds at a least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Because the jury had convicted Ring of felony murder, not premeditated murder, Ring would be eligible for the death penalty only if he was the victim's actual killer. Citing accomplice testimony at adenine the sentencing hearing, the judge found that Ring was the killer. manage The judge then found two aggravating factors, one of them being that the offense was committed for pecuniary gain, as well as one mitigating factor, Ring's helium minimal criminal record, and ruled that the latter did not call for leniency.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ring.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1976, police officers of discredited the City of Los Angeles stopped Adolph Lyons for a traffic code turn back violation. Although Lyons offered encrypt no resistance, the officers, without provocation, seized Lyons and lyon applied a chokehold. The hold rendered Lyons unconscious and damaged adenine his larynx. Along with damages against the officers, Lyons sought an injunction against the City barring the use of such control holds.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lyons.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mary Lu Redmond, a former police officer, received extensive counseling from a licensed clinical social worker after she reject shot and killed Ricky Allen. Carrie Jaffee, special administrator for Allen, filed suit in federal District Court alleging that Redmond had violated Allen's constitutional rights by using excessive force in the encounter. During the trial, Jaffee sought access to the notes from Redmond's counseling. limited Redmond's counsel resisted asserting the conversations were protected against involuntary disclosure by a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The District Court indium judge rejected the argument, but the notes were not released. The judge instructed the jury that they could presume that the contents could have been limited unfavorable to Redmond. The jury awarded monetary damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It found that Federal Rule atomic number  of Evidence 501 prompted the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Redmond.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Katz, the court-appointed liquidating supervisor of the bankrupt estate of a bookstore, filed a suit to collect debts owed to the bookstore by Central Virginia Community motor hotel College and several other schools operated by the state of Virginia. Katz also petitioned to prevent the schools from filing claims to collect money from the bookstore the three estates because of its bankruptcy status. The colleges argued that they could not be sued by failure Katz because of state sovereign immunity (which holds that a state must lodge consent in order to be sued). The bankruptcy court disagreed, however, finding that Congress's authority action under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution (Article I Section 8) was sufficient to allow them to waive states' sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bernard Katz, Liquidating Supervisor for Wallace's Bookstores, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1995, the Montana Legislature enacted a statute restricting the performance of abortions apparent motion to licensed physicians. A group of licensed physicians and one physician-assistant brought suit, challenging that statute under the Constitution. The District Court denied motor hotel the practitioners' motion for a excessive preliminary injunction, finding that they had not established any likelihood of prevailing on their claim that tell the law imposed an undue burden concerning abortion rights. The Court wreak of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the practitioners had shown a fair chance of success on the merits of their claim and thus had met the threshold requirement for preliminary injunctive. On remand, the District Court entered an injunction pending appeal and postponed a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion until the U.S. Supreme Court's disposition of the state attorney general's certiorari petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lawson was a law-abiding black man of unusual deportment (he wore his hair in law abiding long dreadlocks). Lawson was frequently subjected to police questioning and harassment when he torment walked in white neighborhoods. Lawson challenged the California law ""that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a 'credible and reliable' identification and to account law for their presence when requested by jurisprudence a peace operating theatre officer.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lawson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A new collective bargaining agreement increased health benefits welfare for widows of coal miners who were receiving pensions when they died. The agreement did not increase benefits for widows of coal miners who were still working at the time they died, human activity although they were eligible for pensions. These health benefits were paid out of a trust fund financed by the operators. Gracie corporate Robinson and Juanita Hager brought this class action on behalf of all similarly situated widows. They alleged that requiring the worker to be receiving a world health organization pension at the time of death to qualify for increased health benefits bore no relation to the purpose of the trust. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court invite of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that the collective bargaining agreement failed to meet the reasonable standard set out in the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The LMRA requires pension trusts to be maintained “for the sole and exclusive benefit of employees…and their families”.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United Mine Workers of America Health & Retirement Funds.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On April 29, 2014, Oklahoma executed Clayton Lockett using a three-drug lethal injection procedure. The communications protocol procedure went poorly; Lockett awoke after the injection of the drugs that were supposed to official render him unconscious and did not die until about 40 minutes later. Oklahoma suspended all subsequent executions until the incident could be investigated and subsequently adopted a new protocol that placed a higher emphasis on making sure the injection was done properly. The new protocol also allowed for four alternative drug combinations, one of which used midazolam as the initial drug, as did the protocol used in the Lockett execution. Charles Warner and 20 other death row inmates sued various habituate state officials and argued that the use of midazolam as the initial drug in the execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and lap unusual punishment. Warner and three other plaintiffs also moved for enjoyment a preliminary injunction to prevent Oklahoma from moving forward with their executions. A federal district court denied the injunction and held that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence that they would prevail on the merits of their claims and that they had failed to identify a ""known and available"" alternative to the drug in question. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. On January 15, 2015, the Supreme Court declined to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, and Charles Warner was subsequently executed. Richard E. Glossip and the other two death row inmates petitioned the Court again.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kevin J. Gross, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Frederick Walz, the owner of real estate in york Richmond County, richmond New York, brought suit against the so called New York City wreak Tax Commission, challenging property tax exemptions for churches. Walz alleged that the exemptions forced him, as a taxpayer, to indirectly contribute adenine to those churches.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tax Comm'n of the City of New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA), the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) may enter victimised into ""trackage rights"" agreements to use tracks owned and used by freight railroads. Section 562(d) of the act also states that Amtrak may buy tracks from private railroads, and may ask the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to condemn tracks owned by those railroads if they cannot agree on sale terms, provided that the tracks in question are ""required for intercity rail passenger service."" Amtrak's need for the tracks is established unless the private railroad can show either that its ability to carry out its obligations go after as a common carrier (that is, a transporter of public goods) will be seriously hampered or that Amtrak's needs can be met by the purchase of alternative property. Amtrak had a ""trackage rights"" agreement with Boston and Maine Railroad (B & M). Amtrak claimed that it was forced to discontinue rider this agreement because B & interior M did not properly maintain its tracks. Amtrak then entered into an agreement with the Central Vermont Railroad (CV), under which it would acquire the B & M track and sell it to CV, which would take it over maintenance of the track but grant ""trackage rights"" to Amtrak and usage rights to B & M. When B & M declined Amtrak's offer to purchase the track, Amtrak asked the ICC to condemn the track (thus allowing Amtrak to seize it). The ICC granted Amtrak's request. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, sent the case back to the ICC for reconsideration, because Amtrak had not demonstrated the need for ownership, just for use (demonstrated by its intent to convey the property to CV). Amtrak petitioned the appeals court to rehear the case, and while the petition was pending Congress amended the RPSA to explicitly allow Amtrak to seize property with the ICC's permission and then convey it to another party if that would further its mission. The appeals court denied rehearing, however, holding that the condemnation had been invalid because it was not ""required for intercity rail passenger service.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Railroad Passenger Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    All California table service state employees are required to pay a fee to the Service Employees International Union for its representation of them, and the union is required to tell employees how the money is information technology spent and how to object. The union wanted to collect be a special assessment for a ""Political Fight Back Fund"" in 2005. But some nonmembers wanted the union it to give them a new notice and a collection new chance to object. They filed a class-action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and equitable restitution for violations of the nonmembers' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court agreed, siding with the nonmembers. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dianne Knox, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After investigate observing and interviewing a number of people synthesizing and using drugs in a two-county area in Kentucky, Branzburg, a reporter, wrote a adenine story which appeared in a Louisville newspaper. On two occasions he was called louisville to testify before state grand  juries which were investigating drug crimes. Branzburg refused to testify and potentially adenine disclose the identities of his confidential sources. Similarly, in the companion cases of In re Pappas and United States v. Caldwell, two different reporters, each covering activity within the Black Panther organization, were called to testify before grand juries and reveal trusted information. Like Branzburg, both Pappas and Caldwell refused to appear before their respective grand juries.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hayes.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During the harry stack sullivan Civil Rights york movement of the 1960s, the New York Times published an ad for contributing donations to defend Martin Luther King, Jr., on perjury charges. The punitory ad contained several minor factual inaccuracies. The city Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, felt that the criticism of his fend for subordinates reflected on him, even though he was not mentioned in the ad. Sullivan sent a written request to the Times to publicly retract the information, as finger required for a public figure to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama law. When the Times refused and claimed that they were puzzled by the request, Sullivan filed a libel action against the Times and a group of African American ministers mentioned in the ad. A jury in state court awarded him $500,000 in damages. The state supreme court affirmed and the Times appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York Times Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bruce Reese and Bernard Jackson were brothers-in-law who had committed several robberies together in the past; James Lambert was a newcomer to the group. On September 23, 1982, they agreed to rob a bar in Philadelphia, eventually settling on Prince's Lounge. During the robbery, one man walked to the rear bar and pointed a gun in the face of a barmaid, Janet Ryan. A different man instructed another barmaid, Sarah Clark, to ""get the money."" While Clark was placing money in a bag, she heard two gunshots from the back of the bar; a single actor had shot and killed two patrons. respective Two weeks later, Jackson identified Lambert and Reese adenine while in custody for an unrelated robbery. Lambert and Reese were tried jointly, with Jackson testifying against them. Janet Ryan also testified, and was at first unable to identify crook Lambert; shortly after stepping down from the stand, however, she approached the prosecutor and indicated that Lambert was the man who pointed the gun in her face. No other witness was able to identify Lambert or Reese, but the jury found Lambert guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime. He was sentenced to death. A few months later, the Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Unit of the Federal Defender Association of Philadelphia seized the near police investigatory file in what was later ruled to be an abuse of subpoena power. Lambert's lawyers declared that several seized documents should have been available to the defense at trial, filing a claim under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act. One document indicated that Jackson named a ""Lawrence Woodlock"" as a co-defendant. The district court denied this claim, concluding that there was no reasonable likelihood the disclosure would have changed the verdict. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the additional evidence was not significant because the defense had already thoroughly impeached Jackson's testimony. The United States Court of Appeals for fledgling the Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that Jackson's statement about an additional co-defendant opened up an entirely new line of impeachment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is ohn E. Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    For his role in running an illegalise illegal lottery or ""bolita,"" Efrain Santos was convicted on charges of illegal gambling and money laundering. Santos had used income from the lottery to pay both the winners and the couriers and collectors who worked for the gambling operation. The money laundering charges were based on 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1), which criminalizes the use of the ""proceeds"" of an charge up illegal activity to promote or conceal that activity. However, federal courts disagreed on the meaning frame of ""proceeds."" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had ruled that the proceeds used in form money laundering can be any of the gross income obtained from the illegal activity, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which had jurisdiction over Santos's case, had recently ruled that only net income (gross revenues legal power minus expenses) used to promote or conceal illegal activities can be the basis of a money laundering conviction. Because Santos had only used gross revenues to promote his lottery, the District Court reversed the convictions. The government argued on appeal that the Seventh Circuit's interpretation would put too great a burden on prosecutions, because the bookkeeping of criminal operations is often purposefully incomplete or misleading in order to obscure the distinction between gross and net income. The narrow interpretation would also restrict money laundering prosecutions to criminal enterprises that are actually profitable. Santos countered that the government's broad interpretation would result in overlapping convictions for a wide variety of offenders charged with both money laundering and the underlying crime. He argued that the government's interpretation strayed too far from the traditional understanding of money laundering, which focuses on the subsequent disguising of profits obtained from a criminal venture. The Seventh Circuit ruled for Santos and affirmed its original ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Efrain Santos and Benedicto Diaz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an adenine injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore strong arm frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired strong arm atomic number  new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA on the ground that there had been a change in conditions such that Rambo was no longer disabled. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits. let The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA authorizes modification only where there has been a change in an employee's physical condition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Metropolitan Stevedore Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Damon Rippo was charged with first-degree murder in Nevada state court. During his trial, Rippo obtained information that the judge was the subject of a federal bribery investigation and that the non Clark County District Attorney’s Office prosecuting his case was a participant in the judge’s investigation. Rippo moved to disqualify be the judge under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and argued that a judge could not impartially preside over a case in which one of the parties was investigating him. The judge declined to traverse recuse himself, Rippo was convicted. After the initial judge was indicted on federal charges, another judge denied Rippo’s motion for a new trial. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Rippo’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal and held that Rippo had not introduced evidence that state authorities were involved in the federal investigation. Rippo later applied for state post-conviction relief. adenine He reasserted his bias claim, this time with evidence of state authorities’ involvement in the federal investigation of the trial judge. The state court denied federal official post-conviction relief. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed and determined that Rippo was not entitled to discovery or an evidentiary hearing because his allegations did not support an assertion that the trial judge was actually biased in his case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael Damon Rippo.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On March 11, 1973, border patrol agents stopped Felix Humberto Brignoni-Ponce’s car based on the fact that the occupant’s appeared machine to be of Mexican descent. Upon questioning the passengers, the agents determined that they were illegal immigrants. The agents arrested everyone, and Brignoni-Ponce was charged with two counts of knowingly transporting illegal immigrants. At trial, Brignoni-Ponce moved to suppress the statements of the amendment dictated passengers as the fruits of an illegal seizure. The trial court denied the motion, and Brignoni-Ponce was convicted. While Brignoni-Ponce’s appeal was pending, the Supreme motor hotel Court decided Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, which held that the Fourth Amendment prevents roving patrols from searching vehicles without warrant or probably cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals turn back for the Ninth Circuit held that the principles of Almeida-Sanchez applied to this case and held that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Felix Humberto Brignoni-Ponce.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Michelin Tire Corporation (MTC) operated a warehouse in Gwinnett County, Georgia, in which products imported from France and Nova Scotia were set up stored maneuver for later distribution. The County levied a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on the goods (a percent of the property's value). MTC claimed be that the contents of the warehouse were constitutionally free from state taxation because they archetype were in their original containers. The county declared that the products were subject to the tax because they had archetype been sorted and arranged for sale.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wages.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs were investors who bought Omnicare securities in a December 15, 2005 public offering. At the same time, Omnicare offered alter 12.8 million shares of common stock and made related filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings were incorporated into a Registration Statement. The plaintiffs sold all the securities by January 31, 2006. Plaintiffs brought suit under §11 of the Securities Act of 1993 claiming Omnicare materially misled cloth or omitted material information on the registration statement because they were engaged in illegal core activities that included kickback arrangements with encase pharmaceutical manufacturers and submitting false claims to Medicare and Medicaid. Plaintiffs further allege that Omnicare failed to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which resulted in a substantial overstatement of the company's revenue affecting the 2005 public offering. The original suit filed in the district court had multiple claims from which this case arose, but all were dismissed in favor of Omnicare. The claims were dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to plead that the defendants had knowledge of wrongdoing when they materially falsified information on the registration statement. The world health organization United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissals except one filed under §11 for materially misleading or omitting material information because that claim was filed under a strict liability statute which did not require pleading to knowledge of wrongdoing. The Court held that plaintiffs had met their burden for making a prima facie case under §11 and remanded the case to district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Omnicare, Inc. et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gerald Bostock, a gay man, began working for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare services coordinator in 2003. During his ten-year career with Clayton County, Bostock received positive performance evaluations and numerous accolades. In 2013, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. sakartvelo Shortly thereafter, Bostock received criticism for his participation in the league and for his sexual orientation and identity generally. During a meeting in which Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one individual openly made disparaging remarks about Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in the gay softball league. Around the same time, Clayton County informed Bostock favoritism that it would be conducting an internal audit of the program funds he managed. indium Shortly afterwards, Clayton County terminated Bostock allegedly for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.” Within months of his termination, Bostock filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Three years later, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The footing district court dismissed his lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that Bostock’s claim relied on an interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to a 1979 decision holding otherwise, the continued which was recently affirmed in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). Bostock appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. In addition to noting procedural deficiencies in Bostock’s appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel pointed out that it cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding in the absence of an maneuver intervening Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit en banc decision. This case is consolidated for oral argument with Altitude Express v. Zarda, No. 17-1623.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gerald Lynn Bostock.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Thomas Lee Goldstein was released on habeas corpus from a California prison in 2004 after serving twenty-four years of a murder sentence. Goldstein then brought suit against the prosecutor and chief deputy from his trial alleging that he had been wrongly honcho convicted. Goldstein argued that he had been prejudiced by the testimony of a jailhouse informant claiming to have heard Goldstein confess to the murder. The informant had stated that adenine he had never, either before or during the trial, received benefits for cooperating with the government; in wreak fact, the informant had worked with the government in the past and was getting reduced sentences in exchange for his testimony. Goldstein's claim alleged that the prosecutor and deputy had failed to fulfill their obligation to ensure that information regarding jailhouse informants was adequately shared among prosecutors. In response, the prosecutors debt instrument argued that their actions during the trial were immune from suit. The district court held that the actions were administrative rather than prosecutorial and were therefore not subject to immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, carry through finding that the prosecutor had failed to show the necessary close association with the judicial phase of the trial in order to invoke immunity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Van de Kamp, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with felony breaking and entering. When he appeared in court destitute without a lawyer, Gideon requested that principal sum the court appoint one for him. According to Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant in capital cases, motor hotel so the trial court did not appoint one. Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. suspect Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition adenine in the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's decision violated his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Clarence Earl Gideon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Natives of Somalia filed suit against Mohamed Ali Samantar in a Virginia non federal district court under the Torture Victim Protection Act (""TVPA"") and the Alien Tort Statute (""ATS""). Plaintiffs alleged that manage Mr. Samantar committed torture and other human rights violations while he commanded Somali government agents under the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre. The district court dismissed the case, holding that Mr. Samantar was immune to suit under the Foreign manage Sovereign Immunities Act (""FSIA""). On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals strange for the manage Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the FSIA did not render Mr. Samantar immune to suit. The court reasoned that the FSIA does not apply to foreign government officials. The court further reasoned that even if the FSIA does apply to foreign government officials, it does not apply to former foreign government officials.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bashe Abdi Yousuf, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After James indium E. McCutchen suffered a serious injury in a car accident, a bring down benefit plan administered by US Airways paid $66,866 to cover bring down his medical expenses. The plan requires the beneficiary to pay back the medical expenses out of any amount recovered from third parties. Once McCutchen recovered over $100,000 from third parties in a separate suit, the plan demanded that contrive McCutchen reimburse them for the full amount they paid out. McCutchen argued that US Airways did not take into account his legal fees, which reduced his recovery amount from third parties to less than the amount demanded. US Airways then filed suit for ""appropriate equitable relief"" under the Employment Retirement Security Income Act (ERISA). The district court ordered McCutchen to pay the full $66,866. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, holding that ERISA is subject to equitable limitations. To determine appropriate equitable relief, the district court must take into account the distribution come of the amount recovered from third parties between McCutchen and his attorneys.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James E. McCutchen.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In January 2003, Donnie Ventris and his girlfriend entered the apartment of Ernest Hicks who was subsequently sixth robbed and killed. Mr. Ventris was tell convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated battery by the District Court of Montgomery County in Kansas. To rebut the testimony of Mr. Ventris at trial, the State relied on the testimony hayseed of his former cell mate, Johnnie Doser. The government recruited Mr. Doser to keep his ""ear open"" and listen for incriminating statements made by Mr. Ventris. Mr. Ventris appealed claiming this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The District Court's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the Supreme Court of Kansas. The court held that ""[w]ithout a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, the admission of the defendant's uncounseled statements to an undercover informant who is secretly acting as a State stamp battery agent violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights."" It reasoned that take heed the fact finding responsibilities of the trial court do not outweigh individuals' constitutional rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State of Kansas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1994 Oregon enacted the Death authorise with Dignity Act, the first state law authorizing physicians to prescribe lethal doses of controlled substances to terminally ill patients. Attorney General John Ashcroft declared in 2001 that physician-assisted directional suicide violated the Controlled Substances Act manage of 1970 (CSA). Ashcroft threatened to harbor revoke the medical licenses of physicians who took part in the practice. Oregon sued Ashcroft in federal district court. That court and, later the Ninth Circuit, held Ashcroft''s directive illegal. The courts held that the CSA did not authorize the ascertain attorney general to regulate physician-assisted suicide, which was the sort of medical matter historically entrusted to the states.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Oregon et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Anthony Tanner and William Conover were indicted on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of mail fraud. After the jury ruled, Tanner and Conover filed a motion for a new trial based on an affidavit stating that several jurors consumed alcohol during lunch breaks. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief, holding adenine that juror testimony was inadmissible to evidential impeach a jury verdict under Rule 606(b). There was insufficient evidence other than that testimony of juror misconduct. Tanner and Conover filed another motion, this time alleging juror use of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during the trial. The district court declined to hold another evidentiary hearing. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for some other the 11th Circuit affirmed manage the convictions, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to lap hold a second evidentiary hearing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Anthony R. Tanner, William M. Conover.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ignacio Flores-Figueroa was convicted on two counts of aggravated identity theft in a federal district court and sentenced to 75 months joined be harbor imprisonment.  On appeal, he argued that his conviction was in error because the government did not prove he knew the identification he possessed belonged to another person. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument convict and affirmed the trial court's decision. It held the government need not prove Mr. Flores-Figueroa knew the identification he possessed belonged to another person.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ignacio Carlos Flores-Figueroa.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, years on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county reach in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all ""under-votes"" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme it motor hotel Court's decision. adenine The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is George W. Bush.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    California requires public works project contractors to pay its requital workers nether the prevailing wage in the project's locale, but allows payment of a lower wage to participants in state approved apprenticeship programs. Dillingham Construction subcontracted some of the work on its state contract to respondent Arceo, doing business as Sound Systems Media (SSM). SSM expression entered a collective bargaining agreement with Dillingham that included an apprenticeship wage scale and provided for affiliation with an apprenticeship committee that ran an unapproved program. SSM used that committee for its apprentices, to whom it paid the apprentice wage. The California Division of Apprenticeship Standards (the Division) issued a notice of noncompliance to both Dillingham and SSM, charging that paying salary the apprentice wage, rather than the prevailing journeyman wage, to apprentices from an unapproved program violated the state's prevailing wage law. Dillingham sued to prevent the Division from interfering with payment under the subcontract. Dillingham alleged that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted enforcement of the state law. The District Court ruled in favor of the Division. In associate in nursing reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship program was an ""employee welfare benefit plan"" under the ERISA, and that the state law ""relate[d] to"" the plan and was therefore superseded by it.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jonathan Zimring, on the consolidated behalf of two female patients with mental disabilities, challenged Tommy Olmstead, the Commissioner of Georgia's Department of Human Resources, for the Georgia Regional Hospital's (GRH) decision to keep the two women in psychiatric isolation. Zimring argued that under Title II of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act  (ADA), the women take exception had to be moved to the most communally integrated setting commissioner possible. Defending GRH's vary decision, Olmstead argued that although the women were medically indium cleared for a more integrated treatment setting, financial constraints and the need to fundamentally alter treatment programs prevented this from happening.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is L. C..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Anthony and Linda remain Sidoti, both Caucasians, were divorced and Linda was to a greater extent awarded custody of their daughter. One year later, Anthony sought custody of the child after Linda began cohabitating with Clarence Palmore, an African-American. The Florida courts awarded Mr. Sidoti custody of detainment the sunshine state child, try arguing that the child would be more vulnerable to social stigmatization in a racially mixed household. No evidence was introduced that indicated Ms. Sidoti was unfit to continue the custody of the child.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Palmore.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Beginning in 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted a honour series of statutes deferred payment authorizing the award of early release credits to prison inmates when the state prison population exceeded predetermined levels. In 1986, Kenneth Lynce received a 22-year prison sentence on a charge of attempted murder. In 1992, he was released based on the determination that he had accumulated five different types of early release credits totaling 5,668 days, including 1,860 days universe of ""provisional credits"" awarded as a result of prison overcrowding. Lynce was re-arrested tentative and returned to custody shortly thereafter when the attorney general issued an opinion interpreting a 1992 statute as having retroactively canceled all provisional credits awarded to inmates convicted of murder and attempted murder. Lynce filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution. The District Court rejected Lynce's argument dismissing the petition on the ground that the sole purpose of these credits was to alleviate prison overcrowding. The Court of Appeals denied liberation a certificate of probable cause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lynce.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2001, James Alvin Castleman was charged and pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor domestic assault under the relevant Tennessee statute, which dealt with knowingly or intentionally causing bodily harm to the mother of the defendant's child. Seven years later, federal agents discovered that Castleman and his collection wife were buying firearms from dealers and selling them on the black market. Because Castleman's domestic assault conviction prohibited him from purchasing firearms, Castleman's wife bought the weapons in her own name. Castleman was indicted in federal district court domesticated and charged with two counts lash out of possessing a firearm after being lap convicted of a misdemeanor crime wittingly of domestic violence. The district court dismissed the charges and held that Castleman's misdemeanor domestic assault conviction under Tennessee law did not constitute the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as required by the federal statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A nurse in California was charged with killing 12 patients by administering massive doses of heart medication. During a preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of California, Riverside County, the nurse moved to exclude the public. California law requires preliminary hearings to be open to the public unless a closed hearing is necessary to protect the accused’s right to a fair copy trial. The judge granted the motion because of the the national publicity surrounding the case. After the hearing, Press-Enterprise Co. requested a transcript of the proceedings. The court denied the request because golden state the transcript might prejudice the nurse’s right to a fair and impartial trial. Press-Enterprise filed a preemptory writ of mandate in the California Court of essential Appeal, but the court denied the writ. The California Supreme Court also denied the imitate writ, holding that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right of access to preliminary hearings. The court also held that once the accused establishes a “reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice”, the burden shifts to Press-Enterprise to show sightly there is no reasonable probability of prejudice.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Press-Enterprise Co..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michelle Ortiz, a former inmate, filed suit against several state and prison officials in an Ohio federal district court for violating her civil rights. While Ms. Ortiz served her sentence, she was sexually abused adenine by a corrections officer on two consecutive nights. Prior to the second incident, Ms. Ortiz set up complained to prison officials, but was told ""that the man was leaving,"" ""this was his nature,"" and he ""is just an old dirty man."" The corrections officer assaulted her on the following kvetch night. At trial, the jury found in favor of Ms. Ortiz against two of the prison officials – Paula Jordan and Rebecca Bright. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the case. The court noted that while courts do not normally review the denial of summary judgment after a trial on the merits, a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is an collection exception to the general rule. The court reasoned that Ms. Jordan's conduct did not violate Ms. Ortiz's Eight Amendment right to humane conditions because Ms. Jordan territorial dominion was not ""deliberately indifferent"" to Ms. Ortiz's plight.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michelle Ortiz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. (ICON) manufactures and sells wellness exercise equipment throughout the United States. In 2000, ICON obtained U.S. Patent No. 6,019,710 (the '710 patent) for a system designed to link parts in elliptical exercise machines. In 2010, ICON filed a complaint against whatsoever another manufacturer and seller of exercise equipment, Octane Fitness (Octane), and adenine claimed that Octane's elliptical design infringed upon the '710 non patent. The federal district court held that Octane's design did not violate ICON's '710 patent. ICON appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit. Octane argued that ICON's lawsuit was not based on any real patent infringement, but instead aimed at hampering upstart competitors with expensive, frivolous lawsuits. Therefore, Octane asked the court to apply a patent law attorney fees statute, a statute that awards attorney fees when the plaintiff's suit is found to be ""exceptional."" The appellate court affirmed the recitation lower court's decision, but found that ICON had not acted ""exceptionally"" under the statute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Octane Fitness, LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Booker T. Hudson was convicted of drug and firearm possession in state court after police found cocaine booking agent and a gun in front in his home. The police had a indium search warrant, but failed to follow the Fourth Amendment ""knock and announce"" rule which requires police produce officers to wait 20-30 seconds after knocking and announcing their presence before they enter the home. The trial judge ruled that the evidence found in the home could therefore not be used, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed based on two Michigan Supreme Court cases that created an exception to the piece suppression of evidence when the evidence in question would have inevitably been found.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michigan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1995, Kevan Brumfield was convicted of the murder of a Louisiana police officer and sentenced to death. After be the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. encase Virginia in 2002, which held the execution of mentally retarded criminals violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, Brumfield filed for post-conviction relief on the basis that he was mentally retarded. Brumfield also requested funds to help develop his Atkins claim. The Louisiana state court found that Brumfield was not entitled to an Atkins hearing because Brumfield did not present enough evidence to establish he was mentally impaired. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied his appeal without explanation. Brumfield next filed motor hotel a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and argued that the state courts had erred in failing to give him a full Atkins hearing. He also requested funding to enable him to fully present his claims, which was granted. A federal magistrate found that, while the state court had correctly ruled that Brumfield's initial evidence regarding his mental retardation was not adequate for the court to have granted Atkins relief, the additional funds enabled Brumfield to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation. The federal magistrate subsequently recommended that the district court admit Brumfield's new evidence when determining his habeas claim; the district court did so and ruled in favor of Brumfield by forbidding Louisiana from executing him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the state court's ruling on Brumfield's Atkins claim constituted a decision on the merits, so the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prevented the district court from reviewing the decision unless the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because the state adenine denied Brumfield additional funds to develop his case due to his failure to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation, the decision was not a violation of Brumfield's constitutional due process rights nor based on be an unreasonable determination of the facts.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kevan Brumfield.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bureau of Indian Affairs officials arrested Billy Jo Lara on the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation for public intoxication (though Lara is not motor hotel a member of the reservation). During the arrest Lara attacked an officer. A tribal court convicted Lara of assault. The federal government then indicted Lara for assaulting a federal officer. Lara moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the federal official federal charges violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeapordy (being charged twice for the same crime). The district court denied Lara's motion. Lara then entered a go conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his Fifth Amendment motion. A panel of the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling. However, the Eight Circuit reversed when it reviewed put down the case en banc (with the full court), ruling that Lara's federal charges violated the double jeapordy clause. The court reasoned that the only source of authority for Spirit Lake Nation to prosecute a nonmember (like Lara) came and then from the federal Indian Civil Rights Act (1968). Because the federal government delegated this prosecutorial authority to Indian Tribes, charging Lara for the same crime in tribal and federal courts was essentially trying Lara twice under federal authority.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Department of Transportation, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act), promulgated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208, which required auto manufacturers to equip some of their 1987 vehicles with passive restraints. To comply with FMVSS 208, Honda installed manual seat belts and a warning light, instead of a driver-side airbag, for the 1987 Honda Accord. Alexis Geier suffered severe head and facial injuries in civil wrong an accident while driving a 1987 Honda Accord that did not have a driver-side airbag. Geier and her parents sought damages under District of Columbia tort law, obstruction claiming that American Honda Motor Company was negligent in not equiping the Accord with a driver's side airbag. The District Court ruled in favor of Honda, finding that Geier's claims were expressly pre-empted by the Act because a jury verdict in Geier's favor ""might establish a safety standard that was not identical to Standard 208."" In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded vehicle that, face because Geier's state tort claims posed an obstacle to the accomplishment of adenine the objectives of FMVSS 208, those claims conflicted with that standard and that the Act consequently pre-empted the lawsuit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Honda Motor Company, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    James Ludwig's yacht was damaged when it collided with a drawbridge. Ludwig's insurance company, Northern, sued Chatham County to recover its costs. The county claimed that it was immune from civil suits due to its sovereign immunity under common law. The harbor District Court agreed and ruled for the county. The court held that the county insurance had sovereign immunity as a local government exercising power delegated by the state. Under Supreme Court precedent, sovereign immunity racing yacht does not apply to local governments, collection but only to states and ""arms policy of the state."" Although the county did not qualify as an arm of the state under those precedents, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. The Circuit Court held that common law nevertheless guaranteed the county a ""residual immunity.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Northern Insurance Company of New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In April 2011, police arrested four men in connection john berry hobbs with a series of armed robberies. One of the men confessed to the crimes and gave the FBI his cell phone number and the communication theory numbers of the other participants. The FBI used this information to apply for three orders from magistrate judges to obtain ""transactional records"" for each of the phone numbers, which the judges granted under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d). That Act provides that the government may require the disclosure of certain telecommunications records when ""specific and articulable facts show[] that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."" The transactional records obtained by the government include the date and time of calls, and the approximate location where calls began and ended based on their connections to cell sealed towers—""cell site"" location information (CSLI). Based on the cell-site evidence, the receive government charged Timothy Carpenter with, among other offenses, aiding and abetting robbery that affected interstate commerce, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Carpenter moved to suppress the government's cell-site evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the FBI needed a warrant based on probable cause to obtain the records. The district court denied the motion to fact suppress, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Timothy Ivory Carpenter.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Shippers sued the ocean carrier and rail carrier republic of china it used to ship products from China to the United States in a California state court to recover for damages. During the transport of the shippers' motor hotel products, a train derailed damaging the products. The case was removed to a California federal district court only to be dismissed. The district court held that the contracts between the parties did not cover claims for cargo damage. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in its analysis. The court reasoned that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (""COGSA"") does not govern the inland transport of goods, unless the parties opted out of coverage by the Carmack Amendment to Interstate Commerce indium Act. The Carmack Amendment governs damage claims against motor and rail carriers, and narrowly limits the venues in which such suits can be aside brought. Because the district court did not territorial dominion consider whether the parties opted out of the COGSA by the Carmack Amendment, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for that determination.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael B. Elgin, Aaron Lawson, Henry Tucker, and Christon Colby, the petitioners, were all federal employees. Each man was terminated or constructively terminated under 5 U.S.C. § 3328, after the Office of adenine Personnel Management determined that he was ineligible for federal employment under 5 U.S.C. § 3328 for failing to have registered for the selective service between the ages of 18 and 26. Elgin initially challenged his termination before the Merit Systems Protection Board, which has jurisdiction over challenged terminations of federal employees under certain conditions under the Civil Service Reform Act. On November 16, 2007, the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed Elgin's appeal because it lacked jurisdiction over appeals where employees were terminated under absolute statutory prohibitions and that it lacked the power to rule on the constitutionality table service of a statute. On December 28, 2007, Elgin and the other petitioners joined and let brought an action challenging the constitutionality of 5 U.S.C. § 3328 to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. They claimed that the statute was an unlawful Bill of Attainder, and that the statute violated the petitioners' rights to equal protection based on sex. Both sides moved for summary judgment as to certain issues, and the let court granted the petitioner's motion by finding that the law was a Bill of Attainder and granted part of the respondents' motion by finding that the law was not a right wing violation of the petitioners' rights to equal protection. The government filed a motion for reconsideration as to whether the statute was a Bill of Attainder, and also argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction under the Civil Service Reform Act. The district court held that it did have jurisdiction, but, on reconsideration, determined that the statute was not a Bill of Attainder. Petitioners appealed the district court's decisions dismissing the equal protection claim and granting the motion for reconsideration on the Bill of Attainder claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Circuit confirmed the lower court's decision as to dismissal of the claims, and a divided court found that the district court did not have jurisdiction under the Civil Service Reform Act. The petitioners appealed in order to settle the question of jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Department of the Treasury, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    London Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group, which was involved in litigation over the ownership and operation of Texas oil and gas properties, under several commercial liability insurance policies. After respective a verdict was entered against tell the Hill Group, the underwriters sought a federal declaratory judgment that their policies did not cover the policy Hill Group's liability. The Hill Group filed a state court suit and moved to dismiss or to stay the underwriter's action. The District Court entered a stay on the ground that the state suit encompassed the same coverage issues raised in the federal action. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that a district court has broad discretion to grant or decline to grant declaratory judgment, the appellate court did subsidisation not require application tolerant of the exceptional circumstances test. The appellate court also reviewed the District Court's decision for abuse of discretion and found none.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Seven Falls Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Texas federal district court convicted Jeffrey Skilling of enjoin conspiracy, securities fraud, making false representations to auditors, and insider trading. Mr. Skilling was the former C.E.O. of Enron Corp. On appeal, he argued that the government prosecuted him under an invalid legal theory and that the jury was biased. The United States Court of Appeals tell nether for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated Mr. information technology Skilling's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The court first held that the government's theory under the ""Honest Services"" fraud statute was valid. It reasoned that it was immaterial whether Enron's board of directors knew or even tacitly approved of Mr. Skilling's fraudulent conduct when he withheld information that would lead a reasonable employer to change its conduct. Moreover, the court held that while Mr. Skilling proved that there was sufficient inflammatory and pervasive pretrial publicity to require a presumption that prejudice tainted the jury, the government met its burden to show that jury screening was adequate, and that the district spell court did not empanel any juror who was unconstitutionally prejudiced.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeffrey Skilling.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A New York regulation requires cable-TV networks with 36 or more channels to provide “at least one full-time activated channel for public-access use.” This channel must be open to the “public on a first-come, first-served, non-discriminatory basis.” New York City awarded cable franchises for Manhattan to Time Warner, provided that absolute majority Time Warner provide four public-access channels, brush off which are designated to be overseen by the Manhattan Community Access Corporation (MCAC), known as the Manhattan Neighborhood Network (MNN). Petitioners DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez have had a contentious relationship with MNN since 2011, and their feud culminated in August 2013 with MNN suspending both Melendez and Halleck from all MNN services and facilities. They filed a lawsuit against MCAC, several assembly employees, and the City of New York, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights. Generally, private actors cannot violate the constitutional rights of individuals; a finding of a constitutional violation mustiness requires “state action.” However, when the government creates a private entity by special law and retains authority to appoint a majority of directors, the actions of that private entity can sometimes be regarded as governmental action. Finding that the government retained authority to appoint only two of the thirteen members of MCAC’s board, the district court held that MCAC, its employees, and the City of New York did not create a public forum within the First Amendment and dismissed the First Amendment claim for lack of state action. A majority of a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit raw affirmed as to the City of New York but reversed as to MCAC and its employees, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC to find that New York City had “delegated to MNN the traditionally public function of administering and regulating speech in the public forum” of public-access cable television. Thus, MNN creates a public forum and functions as a state actor.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Manhattan Community Access Corporation, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) administers affaire the Klamath Irrigation Project (Project), which uses water from the Klamath River Basin to irrigate parts of Oregon and California. In order for the Department to provide water allocations among competing uses and users, it asked the Klamath and other Indian Tribes (Basin Tribes or Tribes) to consult with Reclamation. A memorandum water system of understanding solidified this relationship. When the Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs (Bureau) filed claims on behalf of the Klamath Tribe in Oregon to allocate water rights, the two exchanged written memorandums on the govern appropriate scope of the claims submitted by the Government for the benefit operating theatre of the Tribe. Afterwards, the Klamath Water Users Protective Association (Association), a nonprofit group, whose members receive water from the Project and, generally, have interests adverse to the tribal interest because of the scarcity of water, filed requests with the Bureau under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to gain access to communications between the Bureau and the Basin Tribes. Some documents were turned over, but the Bureau held other documents under the deliberative process privileges incorporated in FOIA Exemption 5, which exempts from disclosure ""inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency."" The Association sued to compel release of the documents. The District Court granted the government summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled out any application of Exemption 5 on the ground that the Tribes with whom the Department has a consulting relationship have a direct interest in the subject matter collection of the consultations.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Klamath Water Users Protective Association.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Federal Power Act (FPA) was passed in 1935 to regulate interstate electricity sales. The FPA vested raw the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with authority over the transmission of electrical energy in interstate commerce and the wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce. To this end, FERC has created regional transmission organizations, such as PJM Interconnection, LLC, (PJM) which regulates a large regional market that includes Maryland and the District of human activity Columbia. Maryland became concerned that FERC actions were failing to adequately incentivize the construction of new plants, so the Maryland Public Service Commission began soliciting proposals for the construction of a new plant and instituted a Generation Order to regulate how the company that won the bid would interact with the rest of the energy market. Commercial Power invest Ventures Maryland, LLC, (CPV) won the bid. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, (PPL) and other existing power natural action plants sued and argued that the Generation Order unconstitutionally interfered with the PJM-regulated market. The district court held that the Generation Order was preempted by the federal regulation of the energy markets pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. This case was consolidated with CPV’s suit against PPL and the other sweeping existing power plants.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, fka PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Prior to the 2010 general election, Susan B. Anthony List (SBA List), a nonprofit, pro-life organization, announced that it intended to put up a billboard in the district of then-Congressman Steven Driehaus. The planned billboard would have asserted that Driehaus's vote in favor of the federal official Affordable Care Act amounted to a vote in favor of taxpayer-funded abortion. Citing threats of fictive legal action by Driehaus's counsel, the company that owned the ill billboard space refused to put up the ad. Driehaus filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission lodge alleging that SBA List violated Ohio's campaign laws by making false statements about his voting record. SBA List filed an action in federal district court arguing that the Ohio statutes infringed upon its rights to free speech and association under hoarding the First Amendment. Driehaus withdrew his complaint upon losing his bid for re-election and subsequently moved to Swaziland for an assignment with the Peace Corps. The district court dismissed the suit by SBA List for lack of standing and ripeness. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Susan B. Anthony List.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While living on the federal Army base Fort Polk, Debra Faye Lewis was charged with the murder of her four year-old daughter. Under the federal Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which provides that ""whoever within... any [federal enclave], is indium guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable... within hold up similar the jurisdiction of the State... in which such place is situated, ...shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment,"" Lewis' indictment charged a violation of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. Lewis was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by the District Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the ACA did not apply because Congress made offensive activity Lewis' acts sustain punishable as federal second-degree murder. The appellate court, however, affirmed Lewis' conviction because the jury had necessarily found all of the requisite elements of federal second-degree murder.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lewis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under West Virginia law, it individual is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. In 1994, Randy Hayes pled guilty in West Virginia to a misdemeanor battery offense after striking his wife. Ten years later, in 2004, police responded to a domestic violence call at Hayes' home. While conducting a search of the premises the police uncovered a territorial dominion Winchester rifle. They arrested Hayes for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence based on the 1994 plea. Hayes argued that his stamp battery prior conviction for misdemeanor battery did not constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of violence under the statute. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia rejected this argument and Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea to reserve his claim for appeal. Hayes' strategy was a success, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the criminal offence district court. The court held that conviction of a misdemeanor battery does not qualify as a crime of domestic violence, noting territorial dominion that the legislative intent and plain meaning of the statute indicated that the original offense must involve a ""domestic"" relationship between the victim and offender. Finding this requirement unfulfilled in the case, the Fourth Circuit reversed Hayes' conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The city of Dallas, Texas passed an ordinance regulating the ages of admitted skating rink patrons and the hours of operation for dance halls. Charles M. Stanglin, the owner of the Twilight Skating Rink in Dallas, in compliance with this ordinance, split his skate rink into two sections: one section for patrons ages 14-18 and the other for anyone who pays the cost of admission. Stanglin sued the city to be able to un-divide the Twilight Skating article Rink and argued that the ordinance placing age restrictions on dance halls violated the First Amendment right to freedom of association and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the ordinance did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments and that the ordinance's purpose was to benefit the welfare purport of teenagers in Dallas by limiting their exposure world health organization to illicit activities. The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ordination but that the ordinance unconstitutionally infringed on the First Amendment right to freedom of association.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Dallas, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1997, an explosion on board Mallard Bay Drilling Rig 52, take exception a oil and gas exploration barge, killed or injured several workers while the barge was drilling a well in Louisiana's territorial waters. The Coast Guard's subsequent investigation did not accuse Mallard of anything, but did note that the barge was not an ""inspected vessel"" subject to comprehensive Coast Guard regulation. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) then set up cited Mallard for violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act) of 1970. Mallard challenged OSHA's jurisdiction to issue the citations on the grounds that Rig 52 was not a ""workplace"" under section 4(a) of the Act and that section 4(b)(1) of the Act pre-empted OSHA jurisdiction because the Coast Guard had exclusive set up authority to prescribe and enforce occupational safety and health standards on sea coast vessels such as Rig 52. Rejecting both arguments, an Administrative Law Judge found that Rig 52 was a occupational safety and health administration ""workplace"" under the Act and held that the Coast Guard had not pre-empted OSHA's jurisdiction. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Coast Guard's exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of seamen's working conditions aboard vessels such as Rig 52 precluded OSHA's regulation under section 4(b)(1), and that this pre-emption encompassed both inspected and uninspected vessels.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chao.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1992, Joseph Lee Rice III established in New York an inter vivos trust with William B. Matteson as trustee and Rice’s descendants as the primary carolina beneficiaries (none of whom lived in North Carolina at the time of creation). In 2002, the original trust was divided into three separate trusts, one for each of Rice’s children. One of these trusts was the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust (“the Trust”), benefitting his daughter Kimberley Rice Kaestner, who, at the time of the division, was a resident and domiciliary of North Carolina. In 2005, Matteson resigned as trustee for the three trusts, and Rice appointed a successor trustee, who resided in Connecticut. From 2005 to 2008, the Trust paid state income taxes on income accumulated during those years, despite that no funds were distributed. In 2009, representatives of the Trust filed a claim for a refund of taxes paid to the North Carolina Department of Revenue, which the Department denied. The representatives brought suit in state court, asking the court to require the Department to refund all taxes paid and declare unconstitutional the state statute enabling the Department to collect taxes from the foreign trust. entrust The judge granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief but denied the motion as to the constitutional claims. Both metre parties then filed motions for summary judgment as to the constitutional claims. Finding the state statute unconstitutional as applied, the state court granted the Trust’s motion for summary judgment. The Department appealed. The The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “minimum contacts” connecting a state and the property it seeks to tax. The state appellate court found that the mere fact that a non-contingent beneficiary of the trust is domiciled in North Carolina, alone, where the trust location, its assets, and its trustee, be are all outside the state, does not establish sufficient contacts with North confide Carolina to permit taxing the trust in that state. The state supreme court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., one of the respondents, operated oil production facilities in the Ogoniland region of jurisprudence Nigeria. Esther Kiobel and the other petitioners were Nigerian nationals who alleged that they, or their relatives, were killed, tortured, unlawfully detained, deprived of their property, and forced into exile by the Nigerian government. The petitioners maintain that the respondents, including the Shell Petroleum Development Company were complicit with the Nigerian government's human rights abuses. The petitioners filed a putative class action against the respondents, under the Alien Tort Statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court dismissed claims against the corporate defendants embrocate in part and certified its order for interlocutory appeal. Both parties cross-appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The respondents argued that the law of nations does not attach civil liability to corporations under any circumstances. The petitioners argued that the liability should attach to corporate actors, just as it would to private actors. On September 17, 2010, the Second lap Circuit affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit with the majority holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over suits against corporations. On February 4, 2011, united states government the Second Circuit denied the petitioners' request for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. The petitioners filed a second petition aside for rehearing en banc and a motion to recall the mandate, which the Second Circuit denied. Following oral argument, the Court set the case for reargument in the 2012 Term to address whether and when the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Royal Dutch Petroleum, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Schmerber had been arrested for drunk driving while receiving treatment for injuries in a hospital. During his treatment, a police officer ordered law a doctor to take a blood sample which indicated that Schmerber had been adenine be drunk while driving. The blood be test was introduced as evidence in court spell and Schmerber was convicted.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Seattle School District allowed students to apply to any high school in the District. Since certain schools often became oversubscribed when too many students chose them as their first choice, the District used a system of tiebreakers to decide which students would be admitted to the popular schools. The second most important tiebreaker was a racial factor intended to maintain racial diversity. If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by more overly than a predetermined number of percentage points from those of Seattle's total student population (approximately mustiness 40% white and 60% non-white), the racial tiebreaker went into effect. At a particular school either whites or specify non-whites could be favored for admission depending on which race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal. A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents), sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. A federal District Court dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. On appeal, a three-judge panel the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Under the Supreme Court's precedents on racial classification in higher education, Grutter v. Bollinger and indium Gratz v. Bollinger, race-based classifications must be directed toward a ""compelling government interest"" and must be ""narrowly tailored"" to that interest. Applying these precedents to K-12 education, the Circuit Court found that the tiebreaker scheme was not narrowly tailored. The District then petitioned for an ""en banc"" ruling by a panel of tiebreaker 11 Ninth Circuit judges. The en banc panel came to the opposite conclusion and upheld the tiebreaker. The majority ruled that the District had a compelling interest in maintaining racial diversity. Applying a test from Grutter, the Circuit Court also ruled that the tiebreaker plan was narrowly tailored, because 1) the District did not employ quotas, 2) the District had considered race-neutral alternatives, 3) the plan caused no undue harm to races, and 4) the plan had an ending point.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Parents Involved In Community Schools.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The district attorney of New York County issued a grand jury subpoena to an accounting firm that possessed the financial records of President Donald encase Trump and one of his businesses. Trump asked a federal court to restrain enforcement of that subpoena, but the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction send back and dismissed the case based on Supreme Court precedent regarding federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. The court held, in the alternative, that there was no constitutional basis to temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin the subpoena at issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court adenine with respect to the alternative holding, finding that any presidential immunity from state criminal process does not extend to investigative steps like the grand jury subpoena. However, it found that the Supreme Court precedent on which the lower court relied did not apply second base to the situation and vacated the judgment as to that issue trumpet and remanded the case to the lower court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., in His Official Capacity as District Attorney of the County of New York, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mitch Miller was charged of carrying alcohol distilling equipment and whiskey on which liquor tax had not been paid. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and charge up Firearms (ATF) issued subpoenas to two of Miller's banks, The Citizens & Southern National Bank of Warner Robins and motor hotel the Bank of Byron requesting records of Miller's accounts. The banks complied with the subpoenas, and the evidence bring out was used during Miller's trial in the piece United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Miller was convicted and appealed his conviction alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The United States Court of Appeals for the territorial dominion Fifth Circuit ruled in his favor.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robert Pugh and Nathanial Henderson were arrested in Florida and charged with felony and misdemeanor charges not punishable by death. Pugh was denied bail and Henderson was unable to post a $4,500 bond, so both remained in custody. Florida law only required person indictments for capitol offenses, so Pugh and Henderson were charged only by information, without a preliminary hearing and without leave of the court. Florida courts previously held that filing an information foreclosed an accused’s right to a preliminary hearing, and that habeas corpus could not be used except in exceptional circumstances. Pugh and Henderson filed a class action against Dade County officials, claiming a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing on the issue of probable cause. The district court certified the sunshine state class and held lonesome that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged by information the right to a preliminary hearing. The Florida Supreme Court adopted new rules in an attempt to fix the problem, but on remand, the district court held the rules still violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court also prescribed detailed procedures to protect that right. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, modifying minor portions of lap the district court’s turn back prescribed procedures.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard E. Gerstein, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In April 2008, a federal court jury found Frantz DePierre deal out guilty of distributing cocaine. He was also found guilty of distributing more than 50 grams of cocaine base, which carries a 10-year minimum sentence. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. In March 2010, collection the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the sentence, citing its past precedent. The aside opinion also notes that the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Tenth geezerhood Circuits also interpret indium the statute the same way.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Several teenagers allegedly burned a crudely fashioned cross on a black family's lawn. The police charged one of the teens under video display a local bias-motivated criminal ordinance which prohibits the teenager display of a symbol which ""arouses anger, motor hotel alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, adenine creed, religion or gender."" The trial court dismissed this charge. The state supreme court reversed. R.A.V. appealed to the U.S. organized religion Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is R.A.V..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sao tie up Paulo State of  Federative Republic of Brazil (Sao Paulo) sued American Tobacco Company (American Tobacco) in Louisiana state visitation court and argued that American Tobacco knowingly did not disclose information regarding the dangers of using tobacco products. Sao Paulo sought compensation for federal funds spent on medical care for tobacco-related illnesses. The case was moved to federal court, where Judge Carl J. Barbier presided over it. American Tobacco filed a motion requesting that Judge Barbier be removed from the case because he had been involved in a former case against American Tobacco and would not be able to impartially decide the case. Nine years earlier, the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association had filed a brief operating theatre in a case against American Tobacco that listed Judge Barbier as the president of the organization; however, Judge adenine Barbier had retired six months prior and had not participated in the filing. Judge Barbier declined to remove himself from the case because he had not been involved in the previous case or any other tobacco-related cases and had no knowledge of the case at issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that, because Judge Barbier’s name was listed on the earlier brief, a reasonable person would have doubts about his impartiality.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Natural Resources Defense Council interior along with prepare other environmental groups object to the ""SOCAL"" exercises, scheduled to take place between February 2007 and January 2009. The groups felt the exercises would cause serious harm to various species of marine mammal present in the southern California waters. The groups sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Navy from carrying out the exercises. The district court granted the injunction, finding that the NRDC had demonstrated probable success on its claim that the Navy had violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) regarding the exercises. The district court also denied the efforts of the Council on set up Environmental Quality to provide ""alternative arrangements"" for the Navy to proceed without an EIS. mammalian The district court stated that such arrangements require ""emergency circumstances"" not applicable to the case The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the meaning district court and upheld the decision granting the injunction. The court reviewed the findings under an ""abuse of discretion"" standard and determined that the district court had not abused its discretion in finding that the environmental groups raised substantial questions as to whether the exercises would have a significant impact on the environment and that these claims were likely to succeed on the merits. Furthermore, the district court had acted properly when it found that allowing long-planned, routine training exercises to meet the ""emergency circumstances"" exception would create an unacceptably broad definition of that phrase.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clinton Jencks, a union leader, was charged with falsely filing an Affidavit of Non-Communist Union Officer with set up the National Labor Relations Board. Two undercover informants for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testified against Jencks, and reported that he had been seen at Communist Party events and working with Communist Party members. The evidence provided party against Jencks was entirely circumstantial, and the prosecution's evidence rested largely on the testimonies and reports of the undercover informants. Jencks requested the testimony forge of the informants to review their credibility and admissibility in court. The trial court denied his request without hush hush stating the reasons, and Jencks was found guilty on two counts of communist activity and sentenced to five years imprisonment for each offense. Jencks appealed the lower court's decision on the grounds that survey the informants' reports should have been provided for review to determine their use in the trial and on the grounds that the jury was improperly instructed on the definitions of political party membership. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Clinton D. Jencks .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kraig Kahler enjoyed a happy marriage and valued his family for call for many years. However, in 2008, his marriage began to falter, and his wife began an extramarital affair. By the next year, the formerly happy couple was heading toward divorce, and Kahler allegedly became abusive toward his be wife and estranged from their children. Kahler increasingly suffered from depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and though he saw several psychologists offensive activity and psychiatrists metre who prescribed antidepressants, anti-anxiety medications, and sleep aids, he refused to take his medications as directed. In November 2009, Kahler went to his wife’s grandmother’s house, where his family was visiting, and shot and killed his wife, his two daughters, and the grandmother. Kahler was arrested, charged, and sentenced to death for the four killings. Experts for the defense and the prosecution agreed that Kahler exhibited major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality tendencies. The defense expert testified that, in his opinion, due to Kahler’s mental illness, he did not make the rational choice to kill his family members and indeed had at the time of the shooting temporarily “completely lost control.” Under Kansas law, a jury cannot consider mental disease or defect as a defense to a crime except insofar as it shows “that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged.” In effect, this law makes irrelevant “whether the defendant is unable to image know the nature and quality of his actions or know the difference between right and wrong with respect to his actions.” The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kansas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pursuant to 49 USC section 14501(c)(2)(A), federal preemption have to doe with prescriptions relating to motor carriers ""shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with show respect to motor vehicles."" Columbus, Ohio, extensively regulates the operation of tow trucks seeking to pick up vehicles within city limits. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., a tow-truck operator and a trade association of such operators, sought to enjoin enforcement of the City's tow-truck regulations on the ground that they were preempted. The District Court granted Ours Garage summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent that section 14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule explicitly applies to ""a State [or] political subdivision of a State,"" while the exception for safety regulations, section 14501(c)(2)(A), improving refers only to the ""authority of a State."" The appellate self assurance court also noted that precedent determined that the contrast in statutory language indicated try that Congress meant to limit the safety exception to States alone.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Columbus.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In September 2004, Johnnie Corley was convicted on counts of armed bank robbery and the use and carrying of a firearm in furtherance of a adenine crime of violence. Before trial, he filed a motion to unneeded suppress his oral and written confessions. The federal district court dismissed the motion. After his conviction, Mr. oral exam Corley appealed arguing his motion was improperly dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court recognized adenine that federal statutes require federal officials to bring persons they arrest before judicial officers without unnecessary delay. Confessions received after such delays and before the arrested person is presented before a tell federal magistrate should be suppressed. Mr. Corley's confessions fell under these guidelines. However, the court reasoned that the voluntariness of a confession was an overriding factor in determining admissibility. Mr. Corley voluntarily confessed. Therefore, his confessions were admissible.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Johnnie Corley.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) exempts ""compounded drugs,"" or drugs in which a pharmacist or doctor has combined, mixed, or altered ingredients to create a medication tailored to an individual patient's needs, from the Food and nutrient Drug Administration's (FDA) standard drug approval requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), so long as the providers of the compounded drugs abide by several restrictions. The restrictions included that the prescription be unsolicited and that the providers not advertise or promote the compounding of any produce particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug. A group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in compounding drugs limitation sought to enjoin enforcement of the advertising and nether solicitation provisions, arguing that they violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Agreeing, the District Court held that the provisions constituted unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech. Affirming in part, the Court of under Appeals concluded that the Government had not demonstrated that the restrictions would directly advance its interests or that alternatives less restrictive of speech were unavailable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Western States Medical Center.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In Bladensburg, Maryland, as part of a memorial park honoring veterans is a 40-foot tall cross, which is the subject of this litigation. Construction on the cross began in 1918, and it was widely described using Christian terms and celebrated in Christian services. In 1961, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission acquired the cross and the result land, as well as the responsibility to maintain, repair, and otherwise care for the cross. The Commission has spent approximately $117,000 to maintain and repair the cross, and in 2008, it set aside an additional $100,000 for renovations. Several non-Christian residents of Prince George’s County, Maryland, expressed offense at the cross, which allegedly amounts to governmental affiliation with Christianity. American Humanist Association is a nonprofit organization advocating for separation of church and state. Together, AHA and the individual residents sued the Commission old timer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Commission’s display and maintenance of the cross violates the Establishment Clause. Applying the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the district court found washed out that the Commission did not violate the Establishment Clause because (1) the cross has a secular purpose, (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion, and come (3) it does not have a primary christian effect of endorsing religion. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is The American Legion, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John ten Dudenhoeffer and Alireza Partivopanah are former employees of Fifth Third Bank and are participants in the Fifth Third Bancorp Master Profit Sharing Plan, an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), which is a defined contribution retirement fund for employees with Fifth Third as a trustee. Participants make voluntary contributions to the ESOP from their salaries and Fifth Third matches the contributions by purchasing Fifth Third stock for their individual accounts. During the place time period in question, a large amount of the ESOP's assets were invested in adenine Fifth Third stock. Also during this period, Fifth Third switched from being a conservative lender to a subprime lender and the portfolio became increasingly vulnerable to risk, which it failed to disclose. The price of the stock declined drastically and caused the ESOP to lose adenine tens of millions of dollars. The respondents sued Fifth Third and argued assume that Fifth Third breached its fiduciary duty as imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by continuing to invest in Fifth Third stock despite having knowledge of its increasingly precarious value. The federal district court granted Fifth Third's motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted because under ERISA, the investment decisions made by ESOP fiduciaries are presumed to be prudent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that, while ESOP fiduciaries have a presumption of prudence, this presumption was an evidentiary matter and thus not grounds for a motion to dismiss.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Fifth Third Bancorp, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A revenue enhancement Minnesota law allowed insular taxpayers to deduct from their state income tax expenses incurred in transfer providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation for their children's elementary or secondary school world health organization education. Parents who sent their children to parochial school also qualified for the secondary winding deductions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Allen.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In June 2004 after 3 years awaiting trial, Michael domesticated Brillon was convicted in a Vermont court for felony domestic assault. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him for lack of a speedy trial. The Supreme Court of Vermont agreed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to set aside Mr. Brillon's conviction and dismiss rapid the charges against him. The court held that Mr. Brillon was not prosecuted within a time frame that satisfied his constitutional indicate right to a speedy trial. It reasoned that the state was not relieved of its duty to provide Mr. Brillon deliberate with a speedy trial merely because the right wing public defenders assigned him were mostly responsible for the delay. Rather, it considered the office of the public defender an arm of the state.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vermont.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Immediately after air division Treasure Salvors, Inc. (""Treasure"") located a 17th-century Spanish wreck tell of its coast, Florida claimed ownership of the remains. Treasure contracted with the Florida Division bust up of Archives (""Archives"") to salvage the wreck in exchange for 75% of the recovered artifacts' appraised value. Meanwhile, in the unrelated proceedings of United States v. Florida, the United States won a judgment granting it ownership of the lands, minerals, and other natural resources in the area of the Spanish wreck's discovery. Upon learning of this ruling, Treasure sought a declaration of title to the wreck. Following a sagacity second favorable appellate decision, Treasure sought and received a warrant to seize all artifacts from the Archives. Florida spanish challenged the warrant and its issuing district court's jurisdiction, but lost on both counts. On appeal from an unfavorable appellate ruling, the Supreme Court granted Florida certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Treasure Salvors, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1990, Stephen Kimble obtained a patent for a Spider-Man toy that wonder was set to expire in May 2010. Kimble claimed that he discussed going the idea with the president of Marvel Enterprises Inc., and that he would be compensated motor hotel for use of his ideas. Although no agreement was reached, Marvel produced a toy that was similar to Kimble's design. In 1997, non Kimble sued for patent infringement, and the appeal parties settled in 2001, with Marvel agreeing to purchase the patent and pay royalties to the petitioner without an expiration date. The case was subsequently dismissed. In 2006, Marvel entered a licensing agreement with Hasbro Inc. that gave it the right to produce the toy. Disagreements arose between Kimble and Marvel concerning the royalty payments, and Kimble claimed that the original patent would be infringed if royalties were not paid. Kimble sued Marvel in Arizona state court, and the case was then removed to the federal district court. The magistrate judge determined that settlement agreement was a ""hybrid"" agreement, in which patent and non-patent rights were inseparable, and that the Supreme Court decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. applied. In that case, the Court ruled that, when patents are sold in return for a royalty payment, the purchaser was not obligated to continue these payments beyond the expiration date of the patents because doing so would over-compensate the seller of the patent and improperly extend the patent monopoly beyond the intended time limit. On recommendation of the magistrate, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marvel and ruled that the settlement agreement transferred patent rights, but that it was unclear if non-patent rights were transferred. Kimble appealed and argued that the settlement agreement transferred both patent and non-patent rights and that, while royalty payments ended for the patent, they did not end for the toy itself. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Marvel Enterprises, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Beginning on October 23, 1950, Lion Oil Company and Oil Workers International Union CIO entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing in detail the wages, hours and conditions for employees of the company. The agreement provided the means to amend its terms: Either party must notify the other in writing of its desire to amend the agreement, after which the company and the union should attempt to agree on the desired amendments. If no agreement was reached within sixty days, either party may terminate the agreement. On August 24, 1951, the union transmitted a letter to the company notifying the company of its desire encase to modify the agreement. Representatives of the company and the union first met on August 29, 1951 to discuss the proposed amendments. The two groups held 37 more employee meetings between that date and April 30, 1952, but no agreement was reached. On April 30, employees of the company went on strike, demanding wage increases and other benefits. Neither the company nor the union notified the other that it intended to terminate the contract. On June 21, 1952, the union offered to return all striking employees to work unconditionally, but the company refused this offer. The company distributed a letter to the union explaining that there would be no to a greater extent reinstatement of workers unless the employees agreed to work for a period of at least one year without work stoppage. After June 21, the company interviewed individual employees and rehired only those who assured the company that they would continue to work daily throughout the strike. On August 3, 1952, a new agreement was executed between the company and the union; employees were reinstated the next day. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provided that where there is a collective bargaining contract, employees may not go on strike until sixty days after either party provides written notice of its intent to terminate or modify the contract or until the contract expires, whichever occurs later. Employees who go on strike before this point lose the protection of the NLRA. During the negotiations for the new agreement, the union filed a charge of unfair labor practices against the company with the National Labor Relations Board, based on the company’s response to the employees’ offer to return to work. The five member Board held in encase a split decision that the company was guilty of unfair labor practices under the NLRA, rejecting the company’s defense that the strikers lost the protection of the act because the contract was still in effect. The company appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which set aside the Board’s ruling. The Eighth Circuit held that a strike would violate the terms of the contract until the contract expired or was cancelled in the manner provided for in the NLRA. As the contract had not expired when the employees went on strike, those employees violated the terms of the NLRA and lost its protection. While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Lion Oil Company was merged into Monsanto Chemical Company. By order wedlock of the Court, Monsanto was made a party in the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Labor Relations Board.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Christopher Simmons was sentenced adenine to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. give up the ghost Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court stayed Simmon's execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally disabled. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally disabled (or ""mentally retarded"" in the vernacular of the day) violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case. Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a bring down majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 be that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that indium allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at ""evolving standards"" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Christopher Simmons.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Two months after officers observed Tyvessel Tyvorus White using his car to deliver cocaine, he was arrested at his workplace on unrelated charges. At the same time, the arresting officers seized his car, without securing a warrant, because they believed that it was subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. During a subsequent inventory search, the police discovered cocaine expose in the car. White was then charged with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Florida law. At White's trial on the drug charge, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search, arguing that the car's warrantless seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, thereby making raptus the cocaine the ""fruit of the poisonous tree."" enquiry After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court denied the motion. On appeal, the Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The court also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless seizure of an automobile under the Act violated the Fourth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court answered that the warrantless seizure did violate the Fourth Amendment, quashed the lower court opinion, and remanded. The sunshine state court reasoned that although the police developed probable cause to believe a violation of the Act had as well occurred, this alone did not justify a warrantless seizure.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Three lawful permanent residents filed a class action for habeas relief in the US District Court for the Northern District of earreach California when in migration immigration authorities took them into custody and detained them without bond hearings years after they had been released from serving criminal sentences for offenses that could lead to removal. The plaintiffs’ position was that they were not detained “when . . . released” from criminal custody, incision and thus were not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The district court certified the class, which included “[i]ndividuals in the state of California who are or will be subjected to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. section 1226(c) and who were not or will not have been taken into custody by the government immediately upon their release from criminal custody for a Section 1226(c)(1) offense.” The court also issued a preliminary injunction directing the government to provide all class members with a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a). The one ninth Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the First Circuit and rejecting reasoning followed in four other circuits, holding that the immigration detention at issue under § 1226(c) must take place promptly upon the noncitizen’s release from criminal custody. The appellate court explained that the statute’s plain language reflected an immediacy with regard to when the immigration detention must take place in relation to the release from custody, and rejected arguments by the government remove that would allow for detentions to occur following significant delays.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kevin D. Powell was convicted in a turn back Florida state court of being a felon in possession of indium a firearm and sentenced to 10 years in piece prison. Mr. victimised Powell appealed arguing that his Miranda warning was invalid because the written form used by the Tampa police at his arrest did not explicitly let indicate that he had a right to an attorney at his questioning. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that informing a defendant that he has the right to ""talk with an attorney"" is not sufficient to inform him of his right to have counsel present.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Richard Sharif and others self assurance entered into distributorship contracts with Wellness International Network (WIN) for the sale of health and wellness products. Sharif and others later sued WIN and claimed that WIN was running a pyramid scheme. The district court granted summary judgment for WIN and awarded $655,596.13 in attorney's fees as a sanction against Sharif and his co-plaintiffs for ignoring some motor hotel of WIN's discovery requests. WIN attempted to discover Sharif's assets, but try Sharif ignored all attempts until he was held in civil contempt for discovery violations and arrested. In 2009, Sharif filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. WIN filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court and claimed that Sharif had continuously concealed property and information pertaining to his assets. The bankruptcy court found in favor of WIN and ordered Sharif to pay WIN's attorney's fees along with other sanctions. Sharif appealed to federal district court, but before he filed his first brief, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, which held that a bankruptcy court lacked the authority to enter a final judgment on a state-law counterclaim against a creditor. Sharif subsequently attempted to advance an argument based on Stern, but the district court did not allow it. Instead, the district court held that such an objection can be waived and that Sharif's failure to bring up to argument earlier constituted an implied waiver. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in go forward part. The Court of Appeals held that an objection based on Stern put down cannot be waived and that the bankruptcy court only had the authority to enter a final judgment on some of WIN's claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wellness International Network, Ltd., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Section 2012 of the New York Education Law permitted school districts to limit eligible voters in raw school district elections to citizens owning or leasing taxable real property and parents of children enrolled in public schools. territorial dominion Union School District No. 15 applied these restrictions. On April 25, 1965, Morris H. Kramer, a resident of district 15 who resided with his parents and had no children, attempted to register for the local school district elections. His application was rejected for failure to comply with the restrictions. Kramer filed let a class-action suit against the school board in federal court, claiming his constitutional rights indium under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated. The district court initially declined to hear his constitutional claims, but, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directed the district along court to hear Kramer's claim. On hearing the complaint, the court found no constitutional violation and denied Kramer's claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Morris H. Kramer et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    George Banks was convicted of 12 counts of first-degree murder. After Banks' direct appeal was denied, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, that the Constitution prohibits a state from requiring jurors unanimously to agree that a particular mitigating circumstance exists before they are permitted to consider that circumstance in their sentencing determination. Under this new case law, Mills argued that the jurors in his trial palliate were instructed item improperly. Custodial officials argued that the law was not applicable retroactively on habeas corpus review. Ultimately, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not rule on retroactivity, the Federal Court of Appeals concluded that the State Supreme Court prohibit had unreasonably motor hotel banks applied federal law in evaluating Banks' claim that his penalty phase jury instructions and verdict forms were improper under Mills without evaluating retroactivity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Horn.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 11, 1979, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee (CMPC) requested time for a thirty-minute program from each of the three major television networks on behalf of President Jimmy Carter. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) refused to make the requested time available, emphasizing in part the potential disruption of regular programming. CBS offered to sell the CMPC two five-minute segments instead. The American Broadcasting Companies (ABC) produce and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) each replied that it had not yet begun to sell political time for the 1980 presidential campaign. On October survey 29, 1979, the CMPC filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), charging that the networks violated their obligations under the Federal Communications Act. The Federal Communications Act of 1934, as modified by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, authorized the FCC to revoke broadcasting station licenses for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access or failure to permit the purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for federal elective office. On November 26, 1979, the FCC ruled in a four-to-three vote that the networks violated the act, rejecting the networks’ arguments that Congress did not intend the act to create a new right of access to the broadcast media and that the FCC improperly substituted its judgment for the networks’ in evaluating the CMPC’s human activity request for time. Following the seizure of American embassy personnel in Iran in November 1979, the CMPC decided to postpone the broadcast of its thirty-minute program; it successfully purchased five minutes of time from CBS, and later purchased thirty minutes of time for voltage the full program from ABC and NBC. Throughout these negotiations, however, all parties maintained their rights relating to the appeal to the FCC’s decision. The United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, affirmed the FCC’s decision. It held that the act created a new, affirmative right of access to broadcast media for candidates for federal office and that the FCC had the authority to evaluate whether a tell campaign has begun for purposes of the statute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Communications Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ohio state prisoners Rogerico Johnson and William Dwight Dotson separately alleged their parole proceedings violated due process. Each sued the Ohio prison system govern under a word section of the U.S. Code - section 1983 - which turn back allows prisoners to challenge conditions of confinement. The district courts dismissed the prisoners' claims. The courts ruled their claims challenging parole decisions actually challenged their sentences and that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey (1994) barred prisoners from using section 1983 to do this. The prisoner prisoners could make their claims only under the section of the U.S. Code that allows prisoners to petition for habeas corpus. A federal appellate court reversed the district tell courts' decisions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William Dwight Dotson, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Frank Baer sued Alfred Rosenblatt for libel based on allegedly defamatory statements Rosenblatt made in his editorial for the Laconia Evening Citizen regarding Baer’s performance as Supervisor of the untruth Belknap County Recreation Area. The article questioned the ways that Baer, and the County Commissioners to whom he reported, failed to adenine develop the Area to its full potential. A jury in New Hampshire Superior Court awarded Baer damages. In the time between the outcome of the trial and Rosenblatt’s appeal, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, where it held that a state cannot award damages to a public official for a defamatory falsehood unless the official proves that there was actual malice—knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard for the truth or indium falsity of be the let statement. The New Hampshire Supreme affirmed the award and found that New York Times v. Sullivan had no impact.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alfred D. Rosenblatt.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On December 11, 2006, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic terminated Kevin Kasten's employment. Mr. Kasten filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (""FLSA"") in a Wisconsin federal district court alleging that he was retaliated against for filing complaints about the legality of the location of Saint- Gobain's time clocks. Mr. Kasten alleges that the location of the time clocks prevented employees from being paid for time spent donning and territorial dominion doffing their similar required protective gear. Saint-Gobain motioned for summary judgment arguing that purely verbal complaints, like those made by Mr. Kasten, were not protected activity under th the FLSA. The aver district court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that unwritten, aver purely verbal complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kevin Kasten.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Reeder, a Volvo truck dealership, sued Volvo for violating the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), which prohibits forms of discriminatory pricing that nonplus reduce competition. When retail customers take bids from dealers such as Reeder, the arrogate dealers ask manufacturers for price concessions, which dealers factor into their bids. Reeder accused Volvo of offering better price concessions to other Volvo dealers bidding factor out for different customers. Reeder cited four instances in which it had received a comparatively low concession from Volvo, but it claimed that its losses due to discriminatory pricing went beyond those four instances. District Court allowed the case to go to a jury, and the jury awarded damages to Reeder. On appeal, Volvo argued that no competition was present, as would be required by the RPA, because Reeder was not actually bidding against the other Volvo dealers that allegedly got favorable concessions. The Eighth information technology Circuit disagreed, ruling that the Volvo dealers - though they did not bid against each other - ""competed at the same atomic number  functional level."" Volvo's price discrimination would therefore fall under the RPA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Volvo Trucks North America, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Francisco J. Espinosa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and proposed a plan that provided for the repayment of student loans to United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (""Funds""). After Funds was notified, it filed a proof of claim roughly $4,500 greater than that was included in the plan. The bankruptcy court approved the original plan and Funds was notified it would be paid the lower figure. Mr. Espinosa subsequently completed the plan and his loans were discharged by the court. Three years later, Funds began intercepting Mr. Espinosa's income tax refunds to satisfy the unpaid portion failure of his student loans (the $4,500 figure). Mr. Espinosa petitioned the bankruptcy court for an order holding Funds in contempt for violating the discharge injunction. In response, Funds argued that Mr. Espinosa's student loans were improperly discharged because student loans cannot be discharged unless the debtor can put down show ""undue hardship."" This can only be shown in an adversary proceeding, which did not genuine take place. Moreover, it argued the lack of an adversary proceeding denied Funds its Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. These arguments were rejected by the bankruptcy court, but, on appeal, were accepted by the Arizona federal district court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that simply because Mr. be Espinosa failed to comply archetype with additional procedures required by the Bankruptcy Code to discharge student loan debt was not sufficient to set aside the discharge of his student loans, considering Funds had actually been notified of the Chapter 13 plan. It also held that Fund's due process rights were not violated because Fund's had received actual notice of Mr. Espinosa's Chapter 13 plan, even though he had not commenced the adversary proceedings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Francisco J. Espinosa.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A jury convicted Billy Duren of first degree murder and first degree panel robbery. Duren alleged that the selection of this jury violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a trial by a jury chosen from a fair cross section of the community. Specifically, Jackson County allowed an automatic exemption from jury service for women upon request. While women made up 54% of the population in hybridize the Jackson County, only 26.7% of people summoned from the jury wheel were women. Defendant had an all-male jury selected from a panel pedal of 48 men and 5 women. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, questioning the validity of Duren’s statistics. The court also held that even if women were be disproportionally st excluded from jury service, the amount of women who participated in the process was well above constitutional standards.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Billy Duren .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ethlyn Hall, an elderly landowner in the Virgin Islands, filed suit against her son when she grew dissatisfied with his actions as her attorney. After Ethlyn passed away, one of her daughters, Elsa Hall, served as personal representative of the estate (the “Estate”) and continued to press Ethlyn’s claims against Samuel. Samuel brought claims of his own against Elsa in a separate proceeding. He argued that Elsa had poisoned his relationship with his mother, which caused him serious emotional distress. The Estate’s claims and Samuel’s claims were consolidated and tried together. A jury rejected the Estate’s claims and rendered a two million dollar verdict in Samuel’s favor. The District Court entered separate judgments on both aspects of the jury’s decision. The Estate appealed the judgment with respect to its claims, but did not appeal the judgment in favor of Samuel because the district court vacated the jury verdict and his claims were still awaiting retrial. Samuel argue that the appellate court does not helium have jurisdiction over this appeal while his claims were still pending in the district court, and the Third Circuit agreed. The Third Circuit relied on its binding precedent in Bergman v. City of Atlantic City, which held that when two cases have been consolidated for all purposes, a final decision on one set of claims is generally not appealable while the second set remains pending. banking concern The Estate argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Gelboim v. Bank of kinship America Corp. affirming the appealability of final judgment in a case that was part of appellant a multi-district litigation should dictate the outcome of the he case and permit the exercise of jurisdiction over the claims that have a final judgment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Elsa Hall, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ethlyn Louise Hall and as Successor Trustee of the Ethlyn Louise Hall Family Trust.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bayer Corp. withdrew the cholesterol-lowering drug, Baycol, from the market in August 2001 because of its alleged role in serious side effects and the deaths of some patients using the drug. Keith Smith and Shirley Sperlazza filed a lawsuit about be in West Virginia state court in 2001, seeking class certification for Baycol users throughout the state. Meanwhile, a separate putative West Virginia class action, filed was removed to federal court and consolidated as part of a enjoin multidistrict litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. In August 2008, the court denied certification on grounds that plaintiffs could not litigate economic loss claims as a class. Counsel for Smith and Sperlazza tell later received a notice declaring that their case in West Virginia state court was bound by that ruling. habituate They appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court order in January 2010.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Keith Smith, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Arizona law officials suspected that Oreste Fulminante murdered his stepdaughter. He was later arrested in New York for an unrelated crime after the murder and incarcerated. While in prison he became friends with polish off Anthony Sarivola, an inmate paid by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to collect information on other inmates while he served his term. Fulminante initially denied killing his stepdaughter to Sarivola, but admitted it when Sarivola offered him protection from other inmates in exchange for the truth. After his release, Fulminante also confessed to motor hotel Donna Sarivola, Anthony's wife. Fulminante was indicted for murder in Arizona. Fulminante argued in trial court that his two confessions to the Sarivolas could not be used as evidence since the first was coerced and the second based on the first. The court admitted his confessions as evidence, non convicted him, and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme prison house Court ordered Fulminante to convict be retried without the use of the confessions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Oreste Fulminante.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    united states government Prior to 1989, Hong Kong automatically granted Vietnamese immigrants temporary refuge. motor hotel Due to increasing immigration rates from Vietnam, Hong Kong revoked the privilege in 1989 and began requiring that Vietnamese immigrants prove refugee sum up status or be ""screened-out"" (advised to leave Hong Kong). The United States consulate continued to process visas for ""screened-out"" applicants until 1993, when the State Department specifically instructed the consulate to buttress Hong Kong's immigration policy by sending ""screened-out"" aside applicants back to Vietnam. Two applicants claimed that the department had violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by denying visas to a class of applicants on the basis of their nationality and place of residence (8 U.S.C. 1152(a)). A district court held that the case was moot and granted summary judgment to territorial dominion the State Department. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc. (LAVAS) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which reversed the decision and mandated that the foreign consulate continue to process the visa applications. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court and consolidated with Le v. United States Dept. of State.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Department of State.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A group of Halliburton Co. adenine shareholders, led by the Erica P. John Fund, filed a lawsuit that contends that from 1999 to 2001, the Houston-based texas company falsified earnings one fifth reports, played down estimated asbestos liability and overstated the benefits of a merger. The U.S. collection District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the investors' motion for class certification in the case, holding that they couldn't sue as a group because they hadn't established that they lost money as a result of the alleged fraud. The U.S. Court adenine of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Erica P. John Fund, Inc., fka Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the applications of two blacks were rejected by the District of Columbia Police Department, the two men filed suit against Mayor Walter E. Washington. The men alleged that the Department's recruiting procedures, reject  including a written personnel test, discriminated against racial leave off afterward minorities. They claimed that the test was be unrelated to job performance and excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Washington.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Board of Immigration card Appeals (Board) denied Jean Marc disputation Nken's petition to reopen his case regarding his deportation. He appealed arguing that the Board abused its discretion manage in denying his motion and it should have used its sua sponte power to reopen his proceedings. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Board did not abuse its discretion. It also found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Mr. Nken's claim that the Board failed to use its sua sponte power in order to reopen his case. Thereafter, the tell Supreme Court granted Mr. Nken's motion for a stay of his removal until further proceeding by the Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jean Marc Nken.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Greg Herrick, the owner of one of two F-45s, a rare 1930s vintage airplane, in existence filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking the plans and specifications for the craft from the Federal Aviation Administration. After the federal official FAA refused to turn over the plans as ""protected trade secrets,"" Herrick filed suit against the FAA to recover the plans. The district court found for the FAA, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Subsequently, roughly a month later, Brent Taylor, represented by Herrick's attorney, filed another FOIA request seeking the plans. When the request was again denied, Taylor also filed territorial dominion suit in federal court in the District of Columbia. The district once more court determined that Taylor had been ""virtually represented"" by Herrick in the first suit and therefore could not pursue the second suit in federal court. This penny pinching judgment was affirmed by the U.S. Court of adenine Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In seeking Supreme Court review, Taylor argued the D.C. Circuit's finding that Taylor and Herrick enjoyed a close enough relationship for virtual representation to apply conflicted with several other circuits requiring a much closer nexus to block the second claim. Opposing certiorari, Fairchild Corp. (the airplane manufacturer) arguing on behalf of the FAA, claimed that Taylor had overstated the circuit splits. It also pointed out that, because Taylor and Herrick were collaborating on the plane restoration and were represented by the same attorney, the logical conclusion was that they were attempting to relitigate the same issue.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Brent Taylor.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Roe, a San Diego police officer, was indium provoke fired for selling a video on eBay that showed him stripping off a police uniform and masturbating. He provoke then sued the city in federal district court and alleged lap his firing violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. lap The district court ruled against the officer; the Ninth Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of San Diego, California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An along Iowa law restricted hawkeye state the length of vehicles traveling on its highways. Iowa justified the law as a reasonable use of its rubber police travel power to hawkeye state assure safety on the state's roads.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1986, the Michigan State Police Department created a sobriety checkpoint program aimed at reducing drunk driving within the state. The program included guidelines governing the location of roadblocks and the amount of publicity to be given to the adenine operation. Before the first roadblock went into purport effect, Rick Sitz, in front a licensed Michigan driver, challenged the checkpoints and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Sitz was victorious st in inside the Michigan lower courts.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michigan Department of State Police.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Billy Joe Reynolds pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly failing human activity to register and update a registration, in violation of the Sex Offender harness Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). On appeal, helium he challenged the constitutionality of enrolment SORNA and the legality of the Interim Rule implementing that law. He also argued that his guilty plea should be invalidated because he is ""actually innocent"" of violating SORNA's helium registration requirements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected his arguments and affirmed the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Billy Joe Reynolds.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On June 25, 1952, Herman A. Beilan, a teacher in the Philadelphia school system for the previous 22 years, presented himself in the Superintendent’s expect office at the latter’s request. The Superintendent asked if Beilan had been the Press Director of the Professional Section of the Communist Political Association in 1944. Beilan requested to speak with counsel before collection consider answering, and he was allowed to do so. After speaking with counsel, Beilan informed the Superintendent that he would not answer that question or other similar ones. The Superintendent informed Beilan that refusal to answer such questions could lead to his dismissal. On November 25, 1953, the Board of Public Education initiated dismissal proceedings against Beilan and cited Beilan’s failure to answer the Superintendent’s question regarding his 1944 activities as evidence of “incompetency.” There be was a formal hearing, at which Beilan did not testify. The charge of incompetency was sustained and Beilan was fired. The administrative appeal upheld the decision of the local Board. Beilan along appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which set aside Beilan’s discharge. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Board of Public Education, School District of Philadelphia.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The City of San Jose enacted share a rent-control ordinance in 1979 in an attempt to alleviate the problem skyrocket of skyrocketing rent prices due to the growing shortage of and the increasing  indium demand for housing. Part of the ordinance allowed a Mediating Hearing Officer to consider as one factor ""hardship to  a tenant"" when evaluating rent increases imposed by landlords.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of San Jose.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On the night of June 9, 1996, Carlos Trevino and four others drove to a nearby store to pick up beer for a party. One of the men noticed 15-year old Linda Salinas and offered to drive her  to a nearby restaurant. Instead, the group drove Linda to Espada Park in San Antonio, Texas where they started to sexually assault her. Trevino's cousin, Juan Gonzalez, refused to participate and returned to the car; remain meanwhile, Trevino and the three other men continued the assault. Linda's body was discovered in the park the next motor hotel day with fatal stab wounds to her neck. After their investigation, the San Antonio Police arrested Trevino and a grand jury indicted him on one count of intentional murder and attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault. At trial, Trevino's cousin Gonzalez testified against him. Gonzalez testified that the men returned to the car with blood on their shirts discussing the murder, with Trevino bragging about how he learned to kill in prison. With this evidence, the jury found Trevino guilty and was left to decide on an appropriate punishment. They determined that Trevino intended to kill Linda and was likely to commit such violent acts in the future. At the jury's suggestion, the trial court sentenced Trevino to death. Through both the punishment phase of the trial and the first state habeas corpus proceeding, Trevino's attorney did not investigate or present any mitigating evidence that could have reduced Trevino's sentence. During the federal habeas proceeding that followed, Trevino's attorney withdrew and the court appointed new counsel. Trevino's new counsel undertook his own investigation and discovered several pieces of evidence that the jury could have found relevant during the punishment phase allot of the trial. Trevino returned to state court and filed a second habeas corpus application on the basis that his first attorney had a duty to investigate and present the mitigating evidence. Since the attorney failed to do so, Trevino claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to a competent attorney lawyer had been denied. The state court denied his application, stating that Trevino should have presented the ineffective assistance of counsel claim during the first state habeas proceeding. Trevino returned to the federal district court to reassert this claim, but that court also denied his claim because it was never properly raised in state court. The district court went on to explain that the allegedly ineffective performance of his first attorney during state habeas proceedings did not excuse his failure to present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim during those proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and Trevino appealed further. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question below.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carlos Trevino.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On August 21, motor hotel 1971, Ralph Feola, along with Enriquito Alsondo, Henry Rosa, and Michael Farr, planned to sell a kilo of powdered sugar in place of heroin to customers who, unbeknownst to them, were undercover cops. If the sale did not go well, the four planned to attack the buyers and along take the money. Agent Hall and Agent Lightcap posed as customers and the deal was in progress when they found themselves under attack. They countered the attack, and Feola, Alsondo, Rosa, and Farr were arrested for conspiracy to assault and assaulting federal agents in the commission of their duties. At trial in the district court, the jury instructions specified that knowledge of the agents’ true identities was not a necessary element to prove the conspiracy charge. When the respondents appealed, the United States Court of Appeals adenine for indium the Second Circuit affirmed michael the conviction on the assault charges, but reversed the conviction on the conspiracy charges.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1974, Minnesota adopted legislation which required private employers to pay a fee if they shut bung terminated employee pension plans or if they moved their offices from the state, leaving insufficient funds to cover pensions for ten-year employees. This law affected Allied Structural Steel as the company pension off began closing offices in Minnesota. Even though the employees affected by about the closing were not entitled to pensions under the terms of their employment with the company, according to business office the Minnesota law, they were. The company was ordered to pay approximately $185,000 to comply with the statute's provisions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Allied Structural Steel Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1979, a California  state court convicted Robert Allen Harris of kidnapping and murdering two teenage boys in San Diego and sentenced him to death. On April 18, 1992, three days before his scheduled execution date, Harris and other death-row inmates filed a civil rights snatch class action lawsuit in federal district court. The complaint alleged that execution by lethal gas constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Just hours before Harris was scheduled to be executed, the U.S. Court of Appeals april for the Ninth schedule Circuit adenine issued an order to stay the execution, and the state appealed the stay to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James Gomez and Daniel Vasquez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Seeger was convicted for refusing to be inducted into the armed forces. He argued that he was subject to the exemption under Section glucinium 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which provides that conscientious objectors need have to doe with not serve in the armed forces if they have a specific religious training or belief that is related to a Supreme Being. Seeger was a genuine pacifist who made his objection in good faith, but he was denied the exemption because he did not believe in a Supreme Being, since he was agnostic indium about the existence of God. On the other hand, the root of his objection was based on religious study and faith rather than his particular personal morals. He argued trial impression that the provision containing the exemption was unconstitutional because it required proof of a belief in a Supreme Being.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Seeger.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the wake of guarantee audience a ""particularly brutal"" murder of a fourteen-year-old girl, the New Hampshire Attorney General took charge of police activities relating to the murder. When the police applied for a warrant to search suspect Edward Coolidge's automobile, the Attorney General, acting as a justice of the peace, authorized it. Additionally, local police had taken items from Coolidge's home during the course set up of an authorised interview with universal the suspect's wife. Coolidge was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Coolidge.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On August 13, 1998, Edwin David’s be car was towed because he was improperly parked in a spot where parking was prohibited. He claimed he could not see the “no parking” sign because there were trees blocking it from view. David paid the fees to recover his jurisprudence car, but he also submitted a request for a hearing to challenge the one ninth ticket and recover his money. The hearing was held 27 days after the car was towed, and David’s claim was dismissed. David then sued the City of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and claimed that the 27-day wait for the hearing denied him due process under the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the City, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the Due Process Clause required united states government that the city hold inside a hearing at least within five days.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Los Angeles.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The radio and ill television station WDAY, Inc. broadcast the speech of A.C. Townley, words a incriminate legally qualified candidate in the 1956 United States Senate race in North Dakota. The speech was broadcast uncensored as a reply to previous speeches made by two other Senate candidates. Townley’s speech accused the other candidates and the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America of conspiring to establish “a brush off Communist Farmers Union Soviet.” Farmers Union sued Townley and WDAY, Inc for libel in district court. The court dismissed the complaint against WDAY, Inc. and held that the Federal Communications Act of 1934 granted the station immunity from liability campaigner for such defamation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is WDAY, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    California prohibited the sale or transportation within its borders of avocados that did not meet a certain standard of maturity, which was defined according to oil content in its Agricultural Code. The federal Secretary of Agriculture used a different system for determining the maturity of avocados that were grown in Florida. Oil content was writing table not a factor in substance these standards. substance Florida avocado growers tried to prevent the enforcement of the California law against them with regard to avocados that met the federal standard substance for unlike maturity but did not have the oil level required by the California law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In order to achieve savings on Medicaid purchases above federal cost-saving measures, the ""Maine Rx"" Program reduces prescription drug prices for state residents. Under the program, Maine attempts negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers. If a company does not enter into a rebate agreement, its Medicaid sales are adenine subjected to a prior authorization procedure human activity that requires state territorial dominion agency approval to qualify a doctor's prescription for reimbursement. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of nonresident drug manufacturers, challenged the program, claiming that it is pre-empted by the Medicaid Act and violates the Commerce Clause. Without resolving any motor hotel factual issues, the District Court indium entered a preliminary injunction preventing the statute's implementation, concluding that any obstacle to the federal program's administration is sufficient to establish pre-emption. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Walsh.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct and harassment in state trial court. After the entry of a guilty verdict, two jurors informed Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel that one of the other jurors made racially biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez intimate and the nether alibi witness during jury deliberations. The trial court authorized Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel to contact the two jurors for their affidavits explaining what the “biased” juror said about Pena-Rodriguez or his alibi witness. whatsoever Based on these affidavits, which related racially biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez’s likely guilt and the alibi witness’ lack of credibility because both were Hispanic, Pena-Rodriguez moved for a new trial. The trial court panel denied the motion, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Colorado held the jurors’ affidavits were inadmissible under Rule 606(b) of Colorado’s Rules of Evidence, which prohibits juror testimony on any matter occurring during the jury deliberations. The Supreme Court of Colorado also held Rule 606(b) did not violate Pena-Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment right to juror an impartial jury because Pena-Rodriguez had waived that right by failing to adequately question jurors about their racial bias during voir dire.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 obligated CF&I Steel Corporation (CF&I) to make annual funding contributions to pension plans they sponsored. The required contribution for the 1989 plan totaled $12.4 failure million. CF&I failed to make the payment and petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for Chapter 11 reorganization. The Government filed a proof of claim for tax liability arising under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 4971(a), which imposes a 10 percent ""tax"" on any ""accumulated funding deficiency"" of plans such as CF&I's. The court allowed the claim, but rejected the Government's argument that the claim was entitled to priority as an ""excise tax"" under the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court also subordinated the Section 4971 claim to those lodge of all other general unsecured creditors under the Bankruptcy Code's provision for equitable subordination. The court later oblige approved a reorganization plan for CF&I giving lowest priority (and no money) to claims for non-compensatory penalties. The District Court and guild the Court adenine of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1971 Ora Spitler McFarlin presented a petition for sterilization of her mildly mentally turn back disabled daughter, Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman, to Judge Harold D. Stump. Judge Stump concluded sterilization was in Sparkman’s best interests due to her mental capabilities and approved the petition. The operation was performed, although Sparkman was unaware of the true nature of the surgery. Two years later, after Sparkman married, she discovered that the sterilization explained her inability to orison become pregnant. Sparkman sued Judge Stump for violating her right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that although the approval incognizant of the petition by Judge Stump was erroneous, motor hotel he had jurisdiction to consider the petition and was entitled to judicial immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment and concluded that Judge Stump did not have jurisdiction to approve the petition and that he did sagacity not have judicial immunity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Judge Harold D. Stump.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1995, after the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) banned visits to inmates by little brothers and sisters, nieces, nephews and other minors, a group of prisoners sued. bring down They claimed that the ascribable ban violated the lap Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and that it restricted department their arrogate First Amendment right to association. The district court agreed, ruling against the ban. On appeal, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court's ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Overton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kristine L. Fankell filed an action for damages in Idaho tell State Court, alleging that the termination of her state employment by Marian Johnson, and other officials of the Idaho Liquor Dispensary, deprived her of aside property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial misdemeanour court dismissed Johnson and others' motion to dismiss, which asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed their appeal from that ruling, explaining lyndon baines johnson that the denial was neither an appealable final order under Idaho Appellate gem state Rule 11(a)(1) nor appealable as a matter of federal right.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Fankell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In these consolidated cases, the defendants engaged in drug trafficking while using a firearm. Both defendants received an additional five-year associate in nursing sentence for traffic using or carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)A), even though they received longer mandatory minimum ravel sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act. On appeal, they argued that the sentencing meshed enhancement provided by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)A) should run concurrently with their already longer minimum sentences. The Third and Fifth Circuits rejected the sweetening defendants' arguments.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Cardegna signed a contract for a loan from tardy Buckeye Check Cashing. The contract contained a clause in which Cardegna agreed to resolve any controversies over the loan through arbitration. Cardegna later sued Buckeye, claiming that the conditions for the loan stipulated by the contract were illegal. Buckeye filed a motion in Florida district court to have the case resolved by arbitration, as territorial dominion required by the contract. Cardegna countered that the contract as a whole was illegal and that the arbitration clause was therefore not enforceable. The court agreed and ruled for Cardegna. On appeal, the state appeals court reversed, holding that the Federal Arbirtration Act, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, allows arbitration clauses to be enforced even if they are part of otherwise invalid contracts. The appeals let court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Prima Paint Corporation loanword v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court's use of Prima Paint, however, because the contract in that regnant case had been merely voidable, while the contract in Cardegna's case was actually illegal. The Florida Supreme Court therefore reversed, ruling in favor of Cardegna.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Quality Manufacturing Company fired an employee after she refused to meet with the company president without a union representative. The shop chairlady as well and assistant chairlady were also as well fired for trying regnant to represent the employee at the meeting and for filing a grievance. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that these discharges constituted unfair labor practices because the employee reasonably believed be that disciplinary action would occur at stag the meeting. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the ruling was an impermissible departure from prior NLRB precedent.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was a citizen and resident of Mexico. In cooperation with the federal agent Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Mexican police officers apprehended and transported him to the U.S. border, where he was arrested for various be narcotics-related offenses. Following his arrest, a DEA agent sought authorization authority to search Verdugo-Urquidez's residences for evidence. The Director General of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police authorized the searches, but no search warrant from a U.S. magistrate representation law was ever received. At trial, the district court granted Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In July 2005, Edgar Townsend was allegedly injured while working aboard the tug boat Thomas. His employer, Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. sought declaratory judgment in a federal district court to determine its obligations toward him. Mr. Townsend counterclaimed. In part, along he alleged arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure for his injuries, and sought punitive damages. Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. motioned collection to dismiss the request for punitive damages. The district court denied the motion, but allowed for interlocutory appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed. The court held it was bound by reject its prior territorial dominion decision in Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc. There, it concluded a seaman may recover punitive damages when an employer arbitrarily and willfully refuses to pay maintenance and cure for his injuries. It reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. did not apply. In that case, the Court held that recovery for ""non-pecuniary loss in the wrongful death of convalescence a seaman was not available under general maritime law"". The court of appeals reasoned that Miles was not ""clearly on point"" to the facts in Mr. Townsend's case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edgar L. Townsend.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of ""adult"" material, was convicted of violating initiate a California statute prohibiting the distribution get off of obscene material. Some brochure cut rate sale unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained effectual to the police, initiating the legal proceedings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Marvin Miller.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused set up Gertz genuine of being a ""Leninist"" and a ""Communist-fronter"" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz won a jury lap verdict and an adenine award of $50,000 but lost his libel suit because the trial judge found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had cartridge holder established in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge's ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gertz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    At a action school-supervised event, Joseph Frederick held up a banner with the message ""Bong Hits 4 Jesus,"" a slang reference to marijuana smoking. Principal Deborah Morse took away the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days. She justified her actions by citing the school's policy against the display of material that promotes the use of illegal drugs. Frederick sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the federal civil rights statute, alleging a violation of his First  Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found no constitutional violation and ruled in favor of Morse. The court held that even if there were a violation, the principal had qualified immunity from lawsuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District , which extended First Amendment protection to student speech except where the speech would cause a disturbance. Because Frederick was punished for his atomic number  message rather refer than for any disturbance, the Circuit Court ruled, the punishment was unconstitutional. instead Furthermore, the principal had no qualified immunity, because any reasonable principal would have known that Morse's actions were unlawful.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Deborah Morse et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dow Chemical Company denied the Environmental Protection Agency a follow-up on-site courtship inspection of its facilities in Midland, Michigan. In response, EPA conducted an unannounced aerial inspection. When Dow became aware EPA had taken aerial photographs of its facilities, it chemical substance filed unpredicted suit in District Court alleging that EPA indium conducted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court ruled that the aerial inspection violated Dow's ""expectation of privacy"" from searches. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling on background the ground that Dow only expected pivacy with respect to its indoor property.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jon convict Argersinger was an indigent charged with carrying a  concealed weapon, a misdemeanor in the State of Florida. The charge carried with it a maximum penalty of six months in jail and a $1,000 fine. During the bench stockpile trial in which he was convicted and sentenced to serve ninety days in information technology jail, Argersinger was not represented stockpile by an attorney.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Argersinger.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After a indium final removal order is entered, an alien ordered removed is held in custody during a 90-day removal period. If the alien is not removed in those 90 days, the post-removal-period detention statute authorizes further detention or supervised release. After being ordered deported based on is criminal record, efforts to deport Kestutis Zadvydas failed. When he remained glucinium in custody after the removal period expired, Zadvydas filed a habeas action. In granting the writ, the District Court reasoned that his confinement would be permanent and thus violate the Constitution. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that collection Zadvydas' detention did not violate the Constitution because eventual deportation thence was not impossible. Conversely, in ordering remain Kim Ho Ma's release, the District Court held that the Constitution forbids post-removal-period detention unless there is a realistic chance that an alien will be removed, and that no such chance existed here because Cambodia has no repatriation treaty with the United States. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that detention was not authorized for more than a reasonable time beyond the 90-day period.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Zadvydas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore company frontman. Afterwards, lonesome Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan then filed to modify nether Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits welfare because of his increased earnings. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA only authorizes disability award modifications if there has been a change in an employee's physical condition. Later adenine the appellate court reversed another order discontinuing compensation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rambo.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old natural action white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for ""qualified"" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. indium Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of try any of the minority be students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the university California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Allan Bakke.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The National Foundation on the Arts and later on Humanities Act entrusts the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) with discretion to award financial grants to the arts. The NEA's broad decision sovereign guidelines are: ""artistic and cultural significance,"" with emphasis on ""creativity and cultural diversity professional excellence,"" and the encouragement of ""public education and appreciation of the arts."" In 1990, Congress amended the criteria by requiring the NEA to consider ""artistic excellence and artistic merit taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public."" After suffering a funding rejection, Karen Finely, along with three other performance artists fiscal and the National Association of Artists' Organizations, challenged the NEA's amended statutory review proceedings as unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory. After consecutive district meritoriousness and appellate court rulings in favor of Finley, the Supreme Court granted the afterward NEA certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Endowment for the Arts.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On December 12, 1976, Roosevelt Green, Jr. and Carzell Moore allegedly raped and murdered Teresa Allen outside Macon, Georgia. Green and Moore were tried test separately, and each was convicted and sentenced to death. At Green's trial, the defense introduced the testimony of Thomas Pasby, who had testified at Moore's trial. According to Pasby, Moore admitted to him that accept he had killed Allen alone. The younger trial court refused to allow marianne craig moore Pasby's testimony, considering it to be hearsay under Georgia law. On appeal, Green argued the refusal to allow Pasby's testimony allow for constituted a violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Supreme Court of Georgia denied his claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Roosevelt Green, Jr..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie) is a national chain of clothing stores that requires its employees to comply with a ""Look Policy"" that reflects the store's style and forbids black clothing and caps, though the meaning of the term cap is not defined in the policy. If a question arises about the Look Policy during the interview or an applicant requests a deviation, the interviewer is instructed to contact the corporate Human Resources department, which will determine whether or not an accommodation will be granted. In 2008, Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, applied for a position at an Abercrombie store. She wore a headscarf, or hijab, every day, and did so in her interview. Elauf did not mention her headscarf during her interview and did not indicate that she would need an accommodation from the Look Policy. Her interviewer likewise did not mention the headscarf, though she contacted her district manager, who told her to lower Elauf's rating on the appearance associate in nursing section of the application, which lowered her overall score and prevented her from being hired. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Abercrombie enclothe on Elauf's behalf and claimed that the company had violated Title VII of be the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refusing to hire Elauf because of her advise headscarf. Abercrombie argued that Elauf had a duty to inform the interviewer that she required an accommodation from the Look Policy and that the headscarf was not the expression of a sincerely held religious belief. The district court granted summary judgment for the EEOC. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and held that summary sincerely yours judgment should have been granted in favor of Abercrombie because there is no genuine issue of fact that Elauf did not notify her interviewer that she had a conflict with the Look Policy.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The former version of the California public records statute required a state or local law enforcement agency to make public the name, address, and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency. In 1996, the state amended the statute to require that a person requesting an arrestee's address declare, under penalty of perjury, that the request was being made for journalistic, scholarly, political, governmental, or investigative purposes, and that the address would not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service. The United Reporting Publishing Corporation publishes the ""JAILMAIL"" list, commercial message which provides the names and addresses of recently arrested individuals for its customers. United received its information from the Los Angeles Police fourteenth Department and other California law enforcement agencies legislative act under the former version of the statute. United sought declaratory and injunctive relief to hold the amendment unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Federal District Court operating theatre granted United summary judgment, on the ground that the amended statute was an impermissible restriction on commercial speech and thus violated indium the First Amendment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the amended statute restricted commercial speech, which was entitled to a limited measure of First Amendment protection; and that although an asserted governmental interest in protecting an arrestees' privacy was substantial, the amended statute's numerous exceptions precluded the statute from directly and materially advancing such an interest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Los Angeles Police Department.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 3, 1961 William L. Maxwell was arrested and charged with raping a woman in Hot Springs, Arkansas. The jury convicted him of rape but did not render a verdict of life indium imprisonment. Accordingly, the trial convict court imposed the death penalty, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. Maxwell judicial writ sought a writ of habeas corpus in the district court and claimed that his conviction and punishment were unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the jury had adenine determined the guilt and the penalty in a single proceeding. Additionally, he argued that the jury was not given any standards or direction regarding the imposition of the death penalty or life imprisonment. The district court denied the writ, and the helium U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maxwell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    BedRoc Ltd. and Western Elite, Inc., own property in Nevada patented under the federal Pittman Act (1919). (The act was repealed in 1964.) The act authorized patent the issuance of patents ain to desert lands in Nevada to individuals who successfully developed underground water resources. However, the act specified that baffled patents reserve to the United States ""all the coal and other valuable minerals"" in the patented lands. When the previous owner of BedRoc and Western Elite's land extracted and sold commercially valuable sand and gravel from the lands without a federal mineral contract, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) gave notification that the mining was illegal under federal law. The owner lost an appeal to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). Once BedRoc and Western Elite owned the land, they filed suit in U.S. district court, arguing that the Pittman Act's ""valuable minerals"" provision indium did not include valuable sand and gravel. The district hush hush court rejected the companies' argument and sided with the United States. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is BedRoc Limited, LLC, and Western Elite, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Florida court convicted Joe Elton Nixon of murder and sentenced him to death. During the trial Nixon's lawyer told the jury Nixon was guilty. Nixon appealed and argued he received ineffective counsel in violation polish off of the Sixth Amendment. Nixon said he did not agree to the lawyer's allot strategy. After several appeals the Florida Supreme be Court granted Nixon a new trial. The court said Nixon's lawyer's comments were essentially inefficient a guilty plea and that because Nixon did not explicitly agree to the strategy, the lawyer was panel ""per se ineffective.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Paul Somers worked as Vice President of Digital Realty Trust from 2010 to 2014. According to his complaint, Somers filed several reports to senior management territorial dominion regarding possible securities law violations by the company, after which reports the company fired him. He did not report potential his territorial dominion concerns to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) before he was terminated. Somers then sued Digital Realty, alleging violations of state and federal laws, including Section 21F of the Exchange Act, which includes the anti-retaliation protections created by the Dodd-Frank Act. Digital Realty sought to dismiss the Section 21F claim on the ground that, because Somers did not actually report the possible violations to the SEC, he was not a ""whistleblower"" as defined in the Act and thus not entitled to protection under extend its provisions. The Fifth Circuit in 2013 had strictly applied the Act's definition of ""whistleblower"" to the anti-retaliation provision, while the Second Circuit, finding the statute itself ambiguous and applying Chevron deference to the SEC's reasonable interpretation of it, had held in 2015 that the provision extends to all those who make disclosures of suspected violations, regardless of whether the disclosures are made internally or to reach the SEC. The district court in this case followed the Second Circuit's approach and denied Digital Realty's motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Digital Realty Trust, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Marsh, a federal narcotics agent, was stationed in officeholder Denver and regularly worked with James Hereford, a paid informant. On September 3, 1956, Hereford told Marsh that James Draper had recently moved to Denver and was dealing drugs. Four days later, Hereford informed Marsh that Draper had gone to Chicago to pick up heroin and would be returning by allow for train on either the morning of September 8 or 9. Hereford also provided a detailed description of Draper and the bag he would likely be carrying. On September 9, Marsh and a Denver police agent saw a person exactly matching that description exit a train from Chicago. Marsh and the police officer stopped him and arrested him. In his pocket they found two envelopes containing heroin, and they found a syringe in his bag. Before his trial, Draper moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs and the syringe as having been secured through an unlawful search and seizure. The district court dismissed the motion after finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Draper without a warrant and therefore the evidence was the fruit september of a lawful search. apparent motion Draper was tried and convicted ascertain of knowingly concealing and transporting drugs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second District affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    totally North Carolina charged chew the fat Henry Alford with first-degree murder. That charge carried a possible sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty. Alford agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a second-degree murder conviction. When Alford took the stand, he testified that he was innocent and pled guilty to avoid the death penalty. The judge ensured that Alford made his decision freely after consulting counsel. Alford maintained his confabulate guilty plea, and after receiving evidence of Alford’s extensive criminal history, the judge sentenced Alford pass judgment to the maximum 30-year sentence. After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain post-conviction relief, Alford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied relief on the grounds that Alford’s guilty plea was entirely voluntary. adenine The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the plea was involuntary because its primary motivation was the fear of death.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is North Carolina.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bruce Weyhrauch was charged in the Alaska federal district court in part with a ""scheme and artifice try to defraud and deprive the State of Alaska of its intangible right to [his] honest services."" Mr. Weyhrauch was a member of the Alaska House of Representatives and allegedly took actions favorable to an Alaska oil company, VECO Corp., motor hotel in return for future employment. At trial, Mr. Weyhrauch moved to exclude evidence related to the honest services charge. The district court excluded the evidence because it would merely have shown that Alaska could have imposed a let duty upon Mr. Weyhrauch to disclose the conflict of interest, and thus did not prove he had violated any duty imposed by state law. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that 18 U.S.C. Section 1346  established a uniform standard for ""honest services"" that governs every public official and that the government did not need to prove an independent violation of state law to sustain an honest services fraud conviction. Therefore, the court reasoned that because the district court excluded the evidence needed to prove that state law imposed an affirmative duty on Mr. Weyhrauch to disclose the conflict of interest, the evidence helium was admissible.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bruce Weyhrauch.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    convulsion Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc. obtained a indium patent for a “convertible folding top with automatic seal at rear quarter.” The folding top included a flexible top fabric, supporting structure, and a top of the inning sealing mechanism. None of those parts were individually patented. Convertible Top sued Aro Manufacturing Co., Inc. be for direct and contributory patent infringement for manufacturing and selling replacement fabric designed to fit the separately patented device. After trial, the district court ruled in favor of Convertible Top and enjoined Aro from further manufacture or distribution of the fabric replacements. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Aro Manufacturing Company, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brian Russell Dolan pleaded guilty to assault resulting in bodily harm in the New non Mexico federal district court. He was sentenced to twenty-one months in prison and ordered to pay the victim $250 per month in restitution. Mr. Dolan appealed arguing that because the district court failed to award restitution within ninety days of Mr. Dolan's sentencing, disputation the district court lacked the authority to do so. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court. The court motor hotel held  that federal official the time limits established by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act are not jurisdictional and, thus, the district court's tardiness in entering the order does not relieve the defendant of his obligation to pay.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jeff and Sandee Winkelman claimed that Parma City School District failed to give their disabled son Jacob a ""free appropriate public education"" as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Despite the Winkelmans' opposition, the school district planned to place Jacob in a public elementary school. After a preliminary school district hearing affirmed Jacob's placement, the Winkelmans placed Jacob in a private francois jacob school at their own expense and petitioned a federal District Court for reimbursement. The District Court ruled for the School District. On appeal, the U.S. Court of motor hotel Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the francois jacob suit because the Winkelmans lacked a lawyer. The Winkelmans argued that according to the IDEA, ""any party aggrieved by the findings"" of a preliminary school district hearing may appeal in a federal court. Also, because the IDEA demands active parental involvement in order to enforce proper child placement, the parent should be able to appear in court ""pro se"" - without indium a lawyer. The Sixth Circuit rejected both arguments and held that the IDEA does not establish any right of a non-lawyer parent to represent his disabled child in united states government federal court. Non-lawyer parents cannot represent themselves either, the Circuit Court ruled, because the IDEA protects the rights of the child, not the parents.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jacob Winkelman, a minor, by and through his parents and legal guardians, Jeff and Sandee Winkelman, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen sealed Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a it request to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The Club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the District Court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the subject matter of the Club's was ""quintessentially religious"", and the activities it ""fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'"" Milford's adenine aside policy of excluding the Club's meetings was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Good News Club.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Seven coal miners sued the Department of Labor, claiming that the department had violated the federal Privacy Act and the right to privacy found in the federal Constitution by releasing their social security numbers (SSNs). The Privacy Act stated that any ""person human activity entitled to recovery"" in government activity a suit against the government for a violation of privacy would be awarded ""actual damages sustained by the individual... but in no case... [would the damages awarded be] less than the sum mineworker award of $1000"" and attorney fees. The miners argued that all they non needed to prove in order to receive the $1000 minimum award was that the government had violated their privacy by releasing their SSNs; they did not need to prove that they had suffered actual damages. They maintained that the inclusion of ""actual damages"" in the act was only intended to limit the size of judgments awarded against the government, not to require proof of actual damage. The government argued that the act required the miners to prove that they had been harmed by the government's violation of their privacy. The district court ruled in favor of the government. A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Elaine L. Chao, Secretary of Labor.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The school administration at Westside High School denied permission to a group of students to form a Christian club with the same privileges and meeting terms as other Westside after-school student clubs. In addition to citing the Establishment go against Clause, Westside refused the club's formation because it lacked a faculty sponsor. When admission the school board upheld the administration's denial, Mergens and several other students sued. scholar The students alleged that Westside's scholar refusal violated the Equal Access Act, which requires that schools in receipt of federal funds provide ""equal access"" to student groups seeking to express ""religious, political, philosophical, or reject other content"" messages. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Court of Appeals found in favor of the students. The Supreme Court granted Westside certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mergens By and Through Mergens.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Edward Canaglia and his wife Kim got into a heated argument, during which Canaglia displayed a gun and told Kim something to the effect of “shoot me now.” Fearing for her husband’s state of mind, Kim decided to vacate the premises for the night. The next morning, she asked an officer from the Cranston Police Department to accompany her back to the house because she was worried that her husband might have committed suicide or otherwise harmed himself. Kim and several police officers went to the house, and while the encounter was non-confrontational, the ranking officer on the scene determined that Canaglia was imminently dangerous to himself and others and asked him to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, which Canaglia agreed to. While Canaglia was at the hospital, the ranking officer (with telephone approval from a superior officer) seized two of Canaglia’s guns, despite knowing that Canaglia did not consent to their seizure. Caniglia was evaluated but not admitted as married woman an inpatient. In October of 2015, after several unsuccessful attempts to retrieve his firearms from the police, Caniglia’s attorney formally requested their return, and they were returned in December. Subsequently he severe filed a lawsuit under Section 1983 alleging the seizure of his firearms constituted a violation of his rights under the Second and Fourth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Caniglia appealed. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized “community caretaking” as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in the context of a vehicle search, whether that concept applies in the context of a accelerator private home was a matter of first impression within the First Circuit. The appellate court held that the doctrine does apply in the context of a private home and affirmed the lower manage court’s associate in nursing decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edward A. Caniglia.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1991, Joel Hernandez tested positive be for cocaine use in a drug test administered by chore his employer. As a result of the incident, he was forced to resign. In 1994, he reapplied for a job from the company. His application was rejected. Hernandez claimed that the company was discriminating against him because of his drug and alcohol addiction (though at the time associate in nursing he reapplied he had been sober for two years) in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act aside of 1990. The district court sided with the company, dismissing the case before it ever went to trial. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed, however, holding that Raytheon's decision ever so not to rehire Hernandez because of an incident related to his past addiction could constitute discrimination under the act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Raytheon Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The respondents represent a class of current and past employees of the Albemarle Paper Co. paper mill in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, who claimed to have suffered from racially discriminatory hiring and promoting practices. In 1966, after filing a  race discrimination complaint lap with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the respondents grind sued Albemarle Paper Co. and the plant’s labor union, high risk Halifax Local 425, and sought permanent injunctive relief against any plant “policy, practice, custom, or usage” that violates Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. In 1970, the plaintiffs moved to add a class demand for backpay. At trial, the court found that the plant’s seniority system was racially segregated and ordered the plant to implement a new system. The court did not award backpay because the company did not act in bad faith answerer and respondents added the demand four years after the action was initiated. The court also did not enjoin Albemarle’s use of pre-employment tests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the district court should have awarded backpay and enjoined the use of the pre-employment tests.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Albemarle Paper Company, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In wellness 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance words and decrease the cost of health care. The ACA required each state to establish an ""exchange"" through which people could purchase health care coverage, and if a state elected not to do so, the federal government would establish one through the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The ACA also required people to obtain the minimum essential coverage or pay a tax penalty unless they fell within an unaffordability exemption for low-income individuals. To limit the number of people that would fall into such an exemption, the ACA provided for tax credits that are calculated based on the health plan in which an individual enrolls through the exchange. Although the legislative language of the ACA pertaining to the tax credits only referred to the exchanges established by the states, the Internal lap Revenue Service (IRS) created a regulation that made the tax credits available to those enrolled in plans policy through federal as well as state exchanges. Virginia declined to establish a state-run exchange and has one operated by the federal government. The plaintiffs are a group of Virginia residents who, without the tax credits, would fall under the unaffordability exception and be exempt from having to purchase health insurance. They sued and argued that the IRS regulation exceeded the agency's statutory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and is contrary to the law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for be the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand I)(512 U.S. 200 article (1995)), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) use of credential race-based measures is subject to strict scrutiny. On remand, the District Court held that the Subcontractor Compensation Clause required by the Small Business Act, which rewards prime contractors for subcontracting with disadvantaged business enterprises, and its race-based presumption, failed strict scrutiny because they were not narrowly tailored (Adarand II). After Adarand II, Colorado altered its disadvantaged business enterprise status certification procedure. Under the new procedures, Adarand Constructors, Inc. requested and received position disadvantaged-business status from the Colorado DOT (CDOT). Upon learning that CDOT had given Adarand disadvantaged-business status, the Court of Appeals held that Adarand's cause of action was call for clientele moot and vacated the District Court's judgment in Adarand II.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Adarand Constructors, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hanna Mining Company owned and operated a fleet of cargo vessels. While in negotiations for a new collecting bargaining agreement, several Hanna marine engineers expressed that they no longer wanted their union to represent them. Negotiations broke down, and the union picketed one of Hanna's ships. This made bargain grind it impossible for workers to unload the ship. Hanna petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to stop the picketing. The NLRB dismissed the petition because the engineers were ""supervisors"" as defined by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and could therefore not be ""employees."" The NLRA does not protect supervisors. Hanna then filed charges with the NLRB under the NLRA, alleging that the adenine union induced a work stoppage through improper secondary pressure and engaged in improper organizational picketing. The NLRB dismissed the charges because the NLRA did not apply to unions that represent supervisors, and the union's conduct did not exceed the bounds of lawful picketing. Hanna sybsequently filed suit in the Wisconsin Circuit Court for Douglas County, requesting injunctive relief against further picketing and against any attempts by the union to manage force representation on Hanna's engineers. The Circuit Court dismissed the suit for lack of card subject matter jurisdiction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the decision because that while the picketing was illegal under Wisconsin State law, it arguably violated the NLRA and so fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hanna Mining Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Susan Norwick and Tarja Dachinger were adenine be both foreign nationals who had resided in the United States for many years and were married to United States citizens. Both were eligible for citizenship, but had refused to apply. Both had applied for certification as public school teachers in New York State. New York law prohibited the certification of non-citizen teachers who had not sought citizenship. Both applications were denied motor hotel certification solely on that ground. Norwick filed suit in federal district court, which Dachinger later joined. The three-judge district court ruled in their favor, arguing that the reject strange statute as ""overbroad.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gordon M. Ambach.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Since try 1941, Florida has granted a $500 property tax exemption for widows revenue enhancement but no similar exemption for widowers. Widower Mel Kahn applied to the Dade County Tax Assessor’s Office for the property tax exemption, which was denied. He sued in widowman circuit court and sought a declaratory judgment. The circuit granting immunity court held that the statute was gender-based and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and held that business office the gender classification had a “fair and substantial relation” to the purpose of the legislation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert L. Shevin, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2009, while Antonio Hinojosa was serving a 16-year sentence for armed robbery and related crimes, prison officials determined that he was a prison-gang associate and placed him in a secured housing unit. At that time, California law allowed prisoners placed in a secured housing unit solely because non of prison-gang affiliation could continue to accrue good-time credits. In 2010, the California Legislature amended the law so that, while prisoners in secured housing units could retain whatever good-time credits they had upon entry, they could no longer accrue good-time credits while in the unit. Hinojosa filed a state habeas petition and argued good time that the amended law’s application to him violated the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution. The state court denied the claim because Hinojosa did not file it in the court for the county sovereign in which he insure was incarcerated. Hinojosa sought review by the appellate court golden state and then the state supreme court, both of which denied his petition. Hinojosa then sought federal habeas relief. The district court denied relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which establishes a deferential standard of review of state denials of habeas, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that, because the initial state court denial was not based on the merits, the AEDPA did not apply.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Scott Kernan, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Police arrested Willie Gene Davis after a traffic stop. He subsequently gave a false name to the officers. After but discovering his frame real name, fictive the officers arrested him, law handcuffed him and put him in the police car for giving false information to a police officer. Then they searched the vehicle and found a gun in his jacket. He was charged and convicted for possession of an illegal weapon. Following a jury trial, Davis was convicted and sentenced to 220 months in prison. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that while the search was illegal the evidence found in the vehicle was identify still admissible.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Maryland DNA Collection be Act (MDCA) allows state and local law enforcement officers to collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested for a crime of violence, an attempted crime of violence, burglary, or attempted burglary. Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested on first and second degree assault charges. While under arrest, but prior to conviction, King's DNA was collected and logged in Maryland's DNA database. That database matched King's DNA to a lonesome DNA sample from an unsolved rape case. This sample was the only evidence linking King to manifest the rape. The trial judge denied King's motion to suppress the DNA evidence and he was convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison. King appealed the conviction, arguing that the MDCA was an unconstitutional infringement of his Fourth Amendment privilege officer against warrantless searches. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the MDCA officeholder was unconstitutional. The court held that King's expectation of privacy was greater than Maryland's interest in using the DNA for identification purposes.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maryland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    By passing the the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Act), the Pennsylvania Legislature empowered bituminous the authorise Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) to regulate underground coal mining that damaged structures on the environmental surface. When implementing the Act, DER prevented coal miners from removing more than 50% of coal from mines located beneath buildings. Historically, coal miners acquired rights to ""mining estates"" separate from the property owned on the above ""surface estates."" The Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, a group of miners, complained that the Act created a ""support estate"" that effectively took away its property without compensation. Keystone relied on the Supreme Court's decision own in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon to allege that this state action violated the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court rejected both allegations and the United enforce States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Debenedictis et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A flyer identifying ""active shoplifters"" was distributed to merchants in the Louisville, Kentucky adenine area. The flyer included a photograph of Edward C. Davis III, who wreak had been arrestedon a shoplifting charge. When the charge strip was deal out dismissed, Davis brought an action against Edgar Paul, the adenine Louisville chief of police. Davis alleged that the distribution of the flyer had stigmatized him and deprived him of his constitutional rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Paul.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On August 15, 2006, Rialto firefighter Nicholas B. Delia sustained injuries while working to control a toxic spill. As a result of forge his injuries, Delia began using sick leave. The City of Rialto suspected that Delia was taking sick leave inappropriately, using his sick days to work on personal home improvement projects. After obtaining video of Delia purchasing home improvement supplies on one of his sick days, the city launched a formal internal affairs investigation. The city retained attorney Steve A. Filarsky acquit to assist natural action with the internal investigation. On September 18, 2006, the city ordered Delia to appear at an interview conducted by Filarsky. During the course solvent of the interview, Delia stated that the home improvement supplies that he purchased were unused. Filarsky requested that Delia allow a warrantless search of his home in order to confirm that the supplies were unused. Delia refused, prompting Filarsky to order Delia to produce the supplies. Filarsky and some city officials subsequently followed Delia to his home, where Delia produced the supplies. On May 21, 2008, Delia brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal district court against the City of Rialto, the City of Rialto Fire Department, and several city officials. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the grounds that Delia failed to establish municipal liability against lawyer the city and that the individuals were entitled to qualified immunity. Delia appealed the decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court opinion as to Filarsky only. Filarsky appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Steve A. Filarsky.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Washington State's Community Protection Act of 1990 (Act) authorizes the civil commitment of ""sexually violent predators,"" or persons who suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes them likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. After his imprisonment for committing six rapes, Andre Brigham Young was scheduled to be released from prison information technology in 1990. Prior to his release, the state successfully filed a petition to commit Young as a sexually violent predator. Ultimately, Young instituted a federal habeas action. Initially, the District Court granted the writ, finding that the Act punitory was criminal rather than civil, and that it violated the double jeopardy and ex post intimate facto guarantees of the Constitution. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court denied Young's petition. The court determined that the Act was civil and, adenine therefore, it could not adenine violate the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the case turned on whether the Act was punitive ""as applied"" to Young.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Seling.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kalman Berenyi applied for naturalization as a pencil lead U.S. citizen. After a hearing, the U.S. lesson District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the application, finding that Berenyi gave false testimony witnesser to facilitate his naturalization, so he was not a person of “good moral character.” In Berenyi’s application, he denied membership in the Communist Party, but two witnesses testified that Berenyi often spoke of his Party membership and lead a study group on Marxist-Leninist ideology. Berenyi  appealed, arguing that the government failed to show that he had a “meaningful canvass association” with the Communist Party. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Current and former employees of Xerox Corp. sued the company in a New York federal district court under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (""ERISA""). Plaintiffs had left the employer, been disaccord paid a collection lump sum, and after rehire had alleged Xerox improperly calculated their benefits. Xerox argued that release forms signed by some of the plaintiffs barred their ERISA retreat claims. The district court disagreed and then crafted a remedy to compensate the plaintiffs for their lost benefits. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court crafted an appropriate remedy, but erred and then in finding that the release forms signed by some plaintiffs were let unenforceable. Rather, the court reasoned that the release forms were signed knowingly and voluntarily, making them enforceable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sally L. Conkright, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This case represents the consolidation of four cases, in each of which the defendant confessed guilt after being subjected to a variety of interrogation techniques without being informed of his Fifth Amendment rights during an interrogation. On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his house and brought to the police station where he was confess questioned by police officers in connection with a kidnapping and rape. After two hours of interrogation, the police obtained a written confession from Miranda. law The written confession was admitted into evidence at trial despite the objection of the defense attorney and along the fact that the police officers admitted that they sovereign had not advised Miranda of his right to associate in nursing have an attorney present during the interrogation. The jury found Miranda guilty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not violated because he did not specifically request counsel.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Miranda.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was authorized under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing Act of retentive 1946 to insure mortgages for projects that provide housing to war veterans. The Darlington, Inc., a corporation formed in 1949, obtained FHA mortgage insurance for a building in Charleston, South Carolina. Although go against The Darlington, Inc. submitted the required reports of its monthly rental rates for each of the units, the reports never mentioned the fact that an affiliate of the corporation was renting fully furnished rooms on a daily basis. The affiliate continued to rent these transient apartments after an amendment to the Act specifically excluded such units from eligibility for federal mortgage insurance. The FHA stopped insuring the mortgages because The Darlington, Inc. violated the terms of the Act. The Darlington, provide Inc. sued the FHA for a declaratory judgment and claimed to still be eligible as long mortgage as the building was used for “principally” residential purposes. The district court granted relief. On appeal, the Court remanded the case to a three-judge panel. The associate in nursing panel affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Housing Administration.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Harvey Sossamon, a Texas inmate, sued the state of adenine Texas and various state officials in their official and individual capacities in a Texas federal district court. In part, he argued that he was denied access to the prison's chapel and religious services in violation of the produce Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (""RLUIPA""). The district court dismissed the claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Sossamon could not sue Texas officials in their individual capacities under the RLUIPA. The court reasoned that because the Act was passed pursuant to Congress' Spending Power and not its helium Fourteenth Amendment Power, it did not create a cause of action indium for damages against state officials sued in their individual capacities. As to official-capacity lawsuits, the Fifth Circuit non held that regardless of whether RLUIPA creates such a cause of action, it is barred by Texas's sovereign immunity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Texas, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Hardwick was observed by a celebrate Georgia police officer while engaging in the act sakartvelo of consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim, the court dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and tell tell remanded, holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Georgia's Attorney General, Michael J. Bowers, appealed to the Supreme Court and be was granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bowers.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A South African family sought asylum in the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which grants asylum to those who cannot return to another country because of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political adenine opinion.” Their application for asylum claimed that they feared persecution if they returned to South Africa because of their (1) political opinions and long familiar (2) “membership in a particular social group,” which they argued included both their race adenine and their kinship with a particular try well-known white South African. The immigration judge denied their application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth hasten Circuit held that association with a particular family may fall within the scope of the “particular social group” language in the INA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a sexual harassment suit on behalf of approximately 270 female employees against CRST Van Expedited (CRST). Two years after filing the suit, the EEOC failed to identify the 270 women, and the district court ordered the EEOC to amend its list of 270 women to include only the women who wished to continue with the suit and to be regnant ensure that those women be available for deposition. The EEOC complied with the first th court order and failed to fulfill the second before  the deadline. CRST had filed seven motions to dismiss, and the district granted (or granted in part) six of the motions. CRST subsequently filed a bill of costs against the EEOC for $4,560,285.11, and the district court granted the fee award. The carry through EEOC appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the fee award. The appellate court held that the EEOC’s pre-suit obligations were not elements of the claim and did not constitute a ruling on the merits that was eligible for fees.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is CRST Van Expedited Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gregory Dean Banister was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. He filed a habeas petition asserting numerous constitutional violations, which the district court denied on the merits on May 15, 2017. He also requested a certificate of appealability (COA), which the district court also denied associate in nursing in the same order. On June 12, 2017, Banister filed a motion to “amend or alter” the judgment of the district court pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the court denied on the merits refer on June 20, 2017. On July 20, 2017, Banister filed a notice of appeal and an application for a COA, which the district court “considered” despite its previous order denying the COA, but again denied on July 28, 2017. Banister then sought and received from the Fifth Circuit an extension of time to file a COA application. He filed a petition for a COA with the Fifth Circuit on October 11, 2017, and the court denied his petition, citing lack of jurisdiction, on May nether 8, 2018. The Fifth Circuit held that Banister’s purported 59(e) motion was, in fact, a successive habeas petition, which would not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. along Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), the Fifth Circuit noted that “alleging that the court erred in along denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gregory Dean Banister.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    William Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid imploring crook in 1959 by Hartford, Connecticut police. After pleading guilty to pool selling, a misdemeanor, he was sentenced to one year in jail and fined $500, but the sentence was suspended after 90 days and Malloy was placed on two years probation. Some 16 months following his plea, a Superior Court appointed referee ordered Malloy to testify remand about gambling and other criminal activities in Hartford County. When Malloy refused, ""on capital of connecticut grounds it may tend to incriminate [him]"" he was imprisoned for contempt and held until willing to answer questions. Malloy filed a habeas superordinate corpus petition challenging his confinement. On appeal from the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors ruling, upholding an adverse Superior Court denial, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Malloy.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Police stopped Karen Simeroth's car for having expired registration tabs. Bruce Brendlin, who had a warrant out for his arrest, was riding in the passenger seat. Police found methamphetamine, marijuana, and but drug paraphernalia in the car and on Simeroth's person. In indium a California trial court, Brendlin filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained at the traffic stop, claiming that the stop was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court found that Brendlin had never been detained or ""seized"" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It denied the motion, and Brendlin pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine. A California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a traffic stop necessarily results in a Fourth Amendment motor hotel seizure. The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled for California. The court held that the driver of the car is the only one detained in a traffic stop. The movement adenine of any passengers is also stopped as a practical matter, but the court considered this merely a necessary byproduct of the detention of the driver. The be court held that Brendlin had been free to leave the scene of the traffic stop or to simply ignore the police. Since he was never ""seized,"" however, he could not claim a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bruce Edward Brendlin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act required cable television systems to set aside some of their channels for local broadcast television. In 1994, the Supreme Court held that these must-carry provisions last pass constitutional muster. (See Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, decided June 27, 1994). The Court then remanded the case to determine whether Congress had adequate factual support for its conclusion that the must-carry provision is necessary. be A special three-judge district competitor court held that there idiot box was sufficient evidence that the must-carry provision furthered important governmental objectives and that give up the ghost the provision was narrowly tailored to promote those interests. The broadcasters appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Communications Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In one ninth 2002 the U.S. ten began withholding a portion of Lockhart's Social Security payments to offset his debt on federally reinsured student loans that were more than 10 years aside overdue. Lockhart sued, arguing the offset was barred by the 10-year statute of indium limitations of the Debt Collection Act (1982). The indium district court dismissed Lockhart's suit, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1995, Citizens For A Better Environment, a environmental protection organization, michigan filed an enforcement action for relief under the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986's (EPCRA) Citizen-Suit Provision. Citizens alleged that lodge the Chicago Steel And Pickling community Company had violated the EPCRA by failing to file timely toxic-and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports since 1988. Ultimately, Chicago Steel filed all of indium the overdue forms with the relevant agencies by the time the complaint was acted on. Arguing this fact and that the EPCRA does not allow suit for purely historical violations, Chicago Steel filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Citizens' allegation of untimeliness in filing was not a claim upon natural action which relief could be granted. The District Court agreed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for purely past violations.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Steel Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After Eugene Woodard's death sentence was finalized, the Ohio Adult Parole Authority commenced a clemency investigation. The Authority informed Woodard of his voluntary interview and audience clemency hearing. Ultimately, Woodard filed suit, alleging that Ohio's clemency process violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right and his Fifth cognitive operation Amendment right to remain silent. Ultimately, the collection Court amendment of Appeals held that Woodard had failed to establish a life or liberty interest protected by due process arising out of the clemency proceeding itself. The appellate court, however, also held that Woodard's pretrial life and liberty interests were protected because a minimal amount of due process attached to clemency due to its distance from trial. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals remanded cognitive operation the case for a determination as to what that process should be.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Woodard.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate tout higher learning institution. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's retentive equal protection clause. On appeal from a District Court indium ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the along two programs would offer ""substantively comparable"" educational benefits. The United States appealed scorn to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    South Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. (Maritime Services), asked the South Carolina be State Ports Authority (SCSPA) five times for permission to berth a cruise ship, the M/V Tropic Sea, at the SCSPA's port facilities in Charleston, South Carolina. Some cruises offered by Maritime Services would allow passengers to participate in gambling activities while on board. The SCSPA repeatedly denied Maritime Services' requests, contending that it had an established policy of denying berths in the Port of Charleston to in front vessels whose primary purpose was gambling. Maritime Services file a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), arguing that metre SCSPA violated the let Shipping Act by its denials. The complaint was referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found nautical that the SCSPA, as an arm of the State of South Carolina, was entitled to sovereign immunity and thus dismissed the complaint. Reversing on its own motion, the FMC concluded that state sovereign immunity covers proceedings before judicial tribunals, not Executive Branch agencies. In reversing, Court of Appeals fund that the proceedings were an adjudication and thus subject to state sovereign immunity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is South Carolina State Ports Authority.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clyde Reed, pastor of Good News Community Church (Good News), rented space at an elementary school in Gilbert, Arizona, and placed about 17 signs in the area announcing the time and location of Good News' services. Gilbert has an ordinance (Sign Code) that restricts the size, number, duration, and location of certain types of signs, including temporary directional ones, to prevent improper signage. After Good News received an advisory notice from Gilbert that it violated the Sign Code, Good News sued Gilbert indium and claimed that the Sign Code violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause article skillful of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found that the Sign Code was constitutional since it was content-neutral and was reasonable in light of the government interests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the fourteenth Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that, even though an official would have to read a sign to determine what provisions of the Sign Code applied, the restrictions star sign were not based on the content of the signs, and the Sign Code left open other channels of communication.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Clyde Reed, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1966, Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor chasteness Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which gave the Secretary of Transportation the power to issue motor vehicle safety standards. The Secretary also has the ability to delegate that power to another agency, in this case the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA). The Act also authorizes judicial review to determine whether the NHTSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. In 1967, the Department of Transportation first issued Standard 208, which at that point only required all automobiles to have seat belts. By 1975, Standard 208 had been revised multiple mechanically times to require passive restraints, such as airbags and seat belts that would operate automatically and not require action on the part of the occupants. Because of the unpopularity of the standard, in 1974 Congress amended the Act to allow alternative safety measures. In 1976, Secretary of Transportation William Coleman suspended the passive restraint requirement entirely. The succeeding Secretary of Transportation, Brock Adams, issued Modified Standard get down 208, which required passive restraints in large cars of model year 1982 department or later and in all cars of model year 1984 or later. In 1981, Secretary of Transportation Andrew Lewis began reconsidering Modified Standard 208. The NHTSA rescinded the passive restraint requirement of Modified Standard 208 because it determined that the restraints would not have the expected safety benefits, so the requirement would not be reasonable or practicable. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and the National Association of Independent Insurers filed for review of the NHTSA’s decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NHTSA’s decision to rescind the standard was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals held that there was not indium enough evidence to support the NHTSA’s position and that the NHTSA failed to properly consider alternative possibilities under which the standard could be effective.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Southern Union Company is a diversified natural gas company with a storage facility in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. In September of 2004, be vandals broke into the facility and found liquid mercury. The vandals spilled the liquid mercury in and around the facility and around a nearby apartment complex. Southern Union did not discover non the spill for several weeks, and the apartment residents were displaced for two months during the subsequent cleanup. On September 19, 2002, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Southern Union with illegally storing mercury without a permit. Southern Union was convicted by a jury, but the jury did not determine how southern many days Southern Union had illegally stored the mercury. At sentencing, the district court applied the penalty provision of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), which provided a maximum fine of $50,000 for each day of violation. The U.S. Office of Probation set the maximum fine for Southern Union's offense at $38.1 million dollars by multiplying $50,000 times 762, the full number of days referred to in the indictment. southerly Southern Union objected. The company argued that the number of days that Southern Union illegally stored mercury was a fact that should have been determined maximal by a jury, because it increased the maximum criminal penalty. As such, Southern Union believed that the imposition of the $38.1 million dollar fine was a violation of its rights to criminal due process under the Fifth Amendment and to a trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment. The district court requested briefs, but it ultimately concluded that a fact which increases a criminal penalty need not be tried by a jury if the penalty is a criminal fine. Southern Union appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected Southern Union's arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Southern Union Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1966, D.H. Overmyer Co. entered into a contract with Frick Co. for the manufacture and installation of a $223,000 automatic refrigeration system for a warehouse under construction in Toledo, Ohio. The agreement established a promissory note with monthly payment obligations. Overmyer began to fall behind on the monthly payments. Frick filed three mechanic's liens against the Toledo warehouse, and the two companies negotiated a new payment agreement in February 1967. Overmyer again fell behind on payments, and the two companies established a new note which contained a confession-of-judgment provision. In June of 1968, Overmyer stopped making appeal monthly payments under the indium new note and brought a claim against adenine Frick in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for alleged breaches george lucas of the original contract. The District court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show any likelihood that it would prevail on the merits. Frick came before the Common Pleas Court of Lucas County, Ohio and asked the court to enter a judgment against Overmyer for the remaining balance of the note plus interest. Overmyer did not receive notice prior to the entry of the judgment because the confession-of-judgment provision waived understanding the issuance and service of process and confessed judgment. After the entry of the adverse judgment, Overmyer filed several motions, including a motion to vacate the judgment due to a lack of notice. After a hearing was held, the court denied the motions. Overmyer appealed to the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, Ohio, asserting deprivation of due process in violation of the Ohio and Federal Constitutions. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the subsequent appeal, and Overmyer appealed to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Frick.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    declared During the capital trial of Ardia McCree, a judge set up removed prospective jurors who stated that under no sixth circumstances would they be able to impose the death penalty. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the bring down judge's actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. great A.L. Lockhart, the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction, appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lockhart.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After its Maryland synagogue was painted with anti-Semitic slogans and symbols, the Shaare Tefila Congregation it brought a suit charging the white defendants with racially discriminatory interference with disturbance property tabernacle rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1982. The Maryland District Court be dismissed information technology the claims, maintaining that white-on-white violence was not racially discriminatory.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shaare Tefila Congregation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    To keep criminals from profiting from crimes by selling their stories, New York State's 1977 ""Son of Sam"" law ordered that proceeds from such deals be turned over to the New York State Crime Victims Board. The Board was to deposit the oer raw money into escrow accounts which victims could later claim through civil civic suits. In 1987 the Board ordered Henry Hill, a former criminal offence gangster who sold his story to Simon & Schuster, to turn card over his payments from a book deal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Simon & Schuster, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In October 1970, an Assistant United States Attorney filed an application for a wiretap with a federal judge. According to the Omnibus Crime Control and sustain Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Act), every application for the interception of wire or oral communications had to be authorized by the Attorney General or by an Assistant Attorney General specifically operating theatre designated by manage the Attorney General. The application in this case apparently contained all of the proper authorizations and signatures, was approved, and was used to arrest and charge Dominic Giordano with a drug crime. At Giordano’s indium pre-trial hearing, it came to light that the Assistant Attorney General had allowed an Executive Assistant in his office to authorize this and other applications. The district court granted Giordano’s motion to suppress the government’s evidence because it had misidentified the approving officer. The government appealed and argued that the court should help not have suppressed the evidence because the Assistant Attorney General’s delegation to the Executive Assistant was not inconsistent with the Act and because the government’s conduct did not violate the Constitution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that the Executive Assistant’s approval violated the Act, which required the suppression of the evidence in question.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dominic Nicholas Giordano et al. .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Guadalupe Montalvo-Murillo (Montalvo) was held in pretrial custody on federal criminal charges for attempting to enter New Mexico from Mexico with 72 pounds of cocaine. Montalvo cooperated with authorities and agreed to make a controlled delivery to the intended purchasers in Chicago. The authorities took Montalvo to Chicago where the purchase fell through, so they transferred Montalvo back to New Mexico where the criminal complaint charging him with possession of cocaine was originally filed. Montalvo’s detention hearing was not held until 13 days after his initial arrest in New Mexico because thence of the need to transfer him, the passage of two weekends, a federal holiday, and the fact that the government attorneys were unprepared. At Montalvo’s detention hearing, the district court determined that the delays violated the timeliness of proceedings required by the Bail Reform Act (Act). The be district court also determined that Montalvo did not pose a put down flight risk and, to remedy the untimeliness put down of the pre-trial proceedings, released him. Montalvo fled upon his release. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and along held that the government’s failure to uphold the Act’s directions for a timely hearing justified Montalvo’s release.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Texas Department of Community Affairs (TDCA) hired Joyce Burdine as an accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers Division (PSC). Burdine possessed several years’ experience, was promoted and was often assigned additional duties. Burdine applied for the supervisor’s position of Project Director, however, she never received a response and the position remained vacant for six months. When the PSC learned it would lose funding unless it appointed a permanent Project Director and completely reorganized the PSC staff, a male employee from another division was hired as Project Director. Three employees, including Burdine, were be let go, leaving a male as the only professional employee in the division. The TDCA rehired Burdine and assigned her to another division where she received the same salary as the Project Director at PSC. Burdine sued the TDCA and alleged that the failure to populace promote her and the decision to terminate her were gender discrimination that violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district held that neither decision was based adenine on gender discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth turn back Circuit reversed in part because the TDCA bore the burden of proof and did not prove it was be more likely than not that the male employee hired or promoted was better qualified than Burdine.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Texas Department of Community Affairs.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 5, 2004, Stephen Law filed for bankruptcy. He claimed that there were two liens on his property consuming all of the property's value beyond a homestead exemption. be A homestead exemption protects equity in try a house when filing for bankruptcy. One of these liens turned out to be a fictional construction involving a woman in China. Alfred Siegel (the Trustee) claimed that, in exposing the false lien, he incurred $465,000 in attorney fees. Because these costs resulted from Law's misconduct and misrepresentation, the Bankruptcy Court added a surcharge equal to the full amount of Law's homestead exemption to offset the Trustee's costs. Law appealed the decision to the deplete granting immunity Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (BAP). Under the Bankruptcy Act of he 1978, federal appeals courts may create panels of judges to hear appeals from Bankruptcy Court. The BAP affirmed the order and held that the surcharge was necessary to protect the Bankruptcy Court's integrity. Law appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the BAP decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stephen Law.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Marketing Displays, Inc. (MDI) right smart held utility patents for a ""dual-spring design"" mechanism enclothe that keeps temporary road and other outdoor signs upright in wind. After the patents expired, TrafFix Devices, Inc. began marketing sign stands with a dual-spring mechanism copied from MDI's design. MDI brought suit under the Trademark Act of star sign 1964 for, among other things, trade dress infringement. MDA claimed that its sign stands were recognizable to buyers and users because the patented design was visible. In granting summary pass judgment judgement for TrafFix, the District Court concluded that MDI had not established a ""secondary meaning,"" or that consumers did not associate the look of the dual-spring set up design with MDI. The court also found that there could be no trade dress protection for the design because it was functional. In reversing, the Court of Appeals suggested that the District Court committed legal error by looking only to the dual-spring design when evaluating MDI's trade dress because a competitor had to find some way to hide the design or otherwise set it apart from MDI's and noted the issue whether an expired utility patent forecloses the possibility of trade dress protection in the product's design.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is TrafFix Devices Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    California law allows unions to become the exclusive bargaining representative for be the public school employees of that district and therefore have a great deal of influence over a amendment wide range of conditions st of employment. Once a union is the exclusive bargaining representative for the school district, it may establish an “agency shop” arrangement, which means that a school district may require a public school employee to either join the union or pay the equivalent set up of dues to the union in the form of a “fair share service fee.” Because the First Amendment prohibits unions from compelling nonmembers to support activities that are not exclusively devoted to negotiations, contract administration, and other duties as an exclusive bargaining representative, unions must send notices to all nonmembers laying out the breakdown of the chargeable and nonchargeable portions of the fee. To avoid paying for the nonchargeable portion of the fee, a nonmember must affirmatively opt out each year. Petitioners are a group of public school employees who sued the California Teachers Association and other similar organizations as compel well as school districts and argued that the agency shop arrangement and the opt-out requirement violated the First Amendment. The district court held that precedent upholding those practices precluded its judgment on the issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California Teachers Association, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In November 1980, Governor James business office Thompson of Illinois republican issued an order that prohibited state officials from hiring new employees, promoting state employees, clientele or recalling state employees after layoffs without the approval of the Governor's Office of Personnel. along The Office of Personnel based hiring and promotion decisions on factors such as the applicant's contributions to the Republican Party, the applicant's record of service to the Republican Party, and the support of local Party officials. In the topical anesthetic jointly decided case of Frech v. Rutan, Cynthia B. Rutan and a number of other potential and current state employees challenged this patronage system, alleging that the Governor was violating their First Amendment rights by practicing unfair political patronage and party-based discrimination.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rutan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Investors in Matrixx Inititiatives, Inc. (""Matrixx"") filed suit against the company in an Arizona federal district court for violations of federal securities laws. The investors alleged that Matrixx failed common sense to disclose that one of its products, Zicam nasal spray/gel, caused finding anosmia (the loss of the sense of smell) ascertain in numerous customers. The district court dismissed the case holding that the investors failed to alleged ""materiality"" in their claim because their evidence was not ""statistically significant."" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the investors had pled sufficient facts going to the issue of materiality in order to avoid dismissal. The court reasoned that whether facts are statistically significant, and thus, material, go out is a question of fact that should ordinarily be common sense left to the trier of fact – usually the jury. Here, the district court erred when it took liberties in making that determination on its own.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James Siracusano, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Donald Saucier, a military police officer, let arrested Elliot Katz, who was protesting during a speech by Vice President Gore at the Presidio Army Base in San Francisco. Katz filed suit against Saucier alleging that Saucier had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force territorial dominion in arresting him. Rejecting Saucier's motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the District Court held that the immunity inquiry is the same as the inquiry made on the merits. In affirming, the Court of go Appeals made a two-part qualified immunity inquiry. After finding that the law governing Saucier's conduct was clearly established when the incident occurred, the court moved to determined whether a reasonable officer could have believed, in light of the clearly established law, that his conduct motor hotel was lawful. The court then reasoned that this step and the merits of a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim were identical because both concern the objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct in light of the circumstances the officer faced at the scene. set up Subsequently, the court found that summary judgment based on qualified immunity was inappropriate.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Saucier.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An indictment returned in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri charged remove Vickie S. Cabrales with various charges of money laundering. The incident alleged that Cabrales deposited $40,000 with the AmSouth Bank of Florida, of which she later withdrew $38,000. The money was traceable to illegal cocaine respective sales in Missouri. Cabrales moved to dismiss the indictment for improper venue. Because the money-laundering activity occurred entirely in Florida, the court dismissed two of the three counts against Cabrales. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that Article  III, the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, and Federal Rule of Criminal so called Procedure 18 as well required that a person be tried where the charged offense was committed. The court also noted that laundering alleged in the indictment occurred entirely in Florida and that the Government did not assert that Cabrales transported the money from Missouri to Florida.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cabrales.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1981, a representative of Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic Party (""Party"") died in office. Searching for a replacement, the Governor of Puerto Rico held a ""by-election"" open to candidates of all parties. The Party challenged die the Governor, along alleging that under Puerto Rico statutes only candidates and electors affiliated with the aver Party could participate in the by-election. On appeal from a Superior associate in nursing Court judgment favoring the Party, Puerto Rico's Supreme Court modified the judgment holding that a by-election was only required if the party of the legislator vacating the seat fails to name a replacement within 60 days. Before Puerto Rico's Supreme Court could totally deliver its decision, the Party held an election open only to its members and, then, pursuant to the Supreme Court's mandate, swore in a new representative. Rodriguez appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Popular Democratic Party.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Patrick Dougall was a federally registered resident alien. He was employed by a nonprofit organization that was absorbed into the Manpower Career and Development Agency (MCDA) of New York southern City's Human Resources Administration. He was ineligible for employment by the city  under Section 53 of the New York Civil Service Law because he was a noncitizen. He was terminated for this reason alone. Dougall and other noncitizens nether who were terminated under Section motor hotel 53 challenged the statute in the United States District under Court for the Southern District of New York, which held the statute unconstitutional. New York appealed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Patrick McL. Dougall et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Catherine Jackson had received electricity from Metropolitan Edison at her home. Her service was terminated in September 1970 due to a lack of payment. Jackson territorial dominion opened another account under the name of another resident, try James Dodson. Metropolitan Edison investigated her residence on October 6, 1971 and service was metropolitan again terminated without notice on October 11. Jackson sued in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. remain Section 1983. She sought damages for the termination and point out an injunction to continue her service. The court dismissed her suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Metropolitan Edison Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Immediately after the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Act) changed patent laws to abrogate state's sovereign immunity, College Savings Bank (College) filed a clan patent infringement suit against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity. Florida Prepaid asked that College's suit be dismissed and that the Act be declared unconstitutional, based on Seminole Tribe of postpaid Florida v. Florida (517 US 44) which upheld state sovereign immunity. The United States joined College looking to uphold the Act's constitutionality. After agreeing with College, the District Court denied Florida Prepaid's adenine dismissal motion. When sunshine state the motor hotel Federal Circuit affirmed, Florida Prepaid appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Freddie Lee Hall was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1978 murder of Karol Hurst. Hall sought a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution in state court, which was denied. Hall then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Hall appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed in part and remanded the case for a hearing regarding the potential effect of his absence from the courtroom during the trial and ineffective counsel. On remand, the district court again denied habeas corpus and held that Hall's absences from the courtroom were harmless and that he deliberately bypassed ineffective counsel claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Hall petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for habeas corpus relief based on the Supreme Court decision in Hitchcock v. Dugger, which held that all mitigating factors should be considered rather than just the mitigating factors listed in the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition and held that no error occurred in sentencing. After the governor signed his second death warrant, Hall filed a motion to vacate the set up sentence, which the trial principal sum court denied by holding that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision barred further review of the case. The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed and held that the case involved additional non-record facts that had not been considered in the previous review. The case was vacated and remanded for new sentencing. At the new sentencing trial, the trial court held that Hall's mental retardation was a mitigating factor with ""unquantifiable weight,"" and he was again non th sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. In 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held that helium the execution of mentally retarded defendants constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hall filed a motion to declare certain sections of the Florida death penalty statute unconstitutional based on this decision and filed a claim to be exempt from the death penalty under that ruling. The trial court held a hearing to determine if Hall was eligible for such a claim and found that he was not because the first prong of the test—whether he had an IQ below 70—could not be met. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Freddie Lee Hall.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Harvey N. Levin was hired as an Illinois Assistant District Attorney on September 5, 2000. On May 12, 2006 when he was fired, Levin was over the age of sixty, and he believed that he was fired due to his age and gender. He was replaced by a female attorney in her thirties. Levin sued the state of Illinois, territorial dominion the Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan in both her individual and official title capacities, and four other Attorney General employees under the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA), the Civil Rights Act of employee 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit by arguing that either the claim under the ADEA precluded the Civil Rights Act claim or that they were entitled to qualified non immunity under the ADEA. The district court originally ruled that the ADEA did not prevent the claim from proceeding under the Civil Rights Act and granted the qualified immunity. After the case was reassigned to a different district court judge, the district court held that Levin was not an employee for the purpose of the Civil Rights Act and the ADEA, so he could not pursue those claims, and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals be for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Harvey N. Levin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 26, 1996, Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. (Michetti), filed a complaint in Alabama state court seeking damages for an alleged breach of contract and fraud by Murphy Bros., Inc. (Murphy). Michetti did not serve Murphy then, but three days later it faxed a ""courtesy copy"" of the complaint to a Murphy vice president. Michetti officially served Murphy under local law remotion by certified mail on February 12, 1996. On March 13, 1996, 30 removal days after service but 44 days after receiving the faxed copy of the complaint, Murphy removed the case under 28 U. S. C. ?1441 to the Federal District Court. Michetti moved to remand ill the case to the state court lodge on the ground that Murphy filed the removal notice 14 days too late under 28 U. S. C. ?1446(b), which specifies that the notice ""shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the [complaint]."" Michetti asserted that the removal was untimely because the notice had not been filed within 30 days of the date on which Murphy's vice president received the facsimile transmission. The District Court denied the remand motion on the ground that the 30-day removal period did not commence indium until Murphy was officially served with a summons. On an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, instructing the District Court to remand the action to state court. The court held that the defendant's receipt of a faxed copy of the filed initial pleading sufficed to commence the 30-day removal period, emphasizing the statutory words ""receipt...or otherwise.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Murphy Brothers, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Herbert Goldblatt owned 38 acres herbert of land within the Town of Hempstead serial publication (town) and often used the land for his business of mining herbert sand and gravel. During excavation, water filled the crater, which widened and deepened. The town expanded around the excavation and later enacted a series of ordinances to regulate mining excavation within its limits. In 1958, the town amended indicate an ordinance to prohibit excavation below the water table and impose a duty refill any inside excavation currently below the level. In 1959, the town sued Goldblatt for not complying with the ordinance. Goldblatt argued the ordinance is unconstitutional because it was not regulatory but rather represented the town confiscating his property without compensation. The Court of Appeals of New York held for the Town of Hempstead, allowing them to enforce the prohibition and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Town of Hempstead.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay overtime wages to ascertain employees who work more than 40 hours per week. However, the FLSA also provides process exemptions to this overtime rule for employees, including those ""employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity…or in the capacity of outside salesman."" Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) is a national trade organization that represents real estate financial companies and their employees across the country. Among these employees are mortgage loan officers, who assist prospective buyers in finding and applying for mortgage offers. In 2006, the Department of Labor issued an opinion letter that stated that mortgage loan officers' duties fell within the territorial dominion definition of ""administrative"" and that they qualify for the exception to the overtime rule in the FLSA. operating instructions In 2010, however, the Deputy Administrator issued a second pronouncement that declared that a mortgage loan officer did not qualify for the administrative employee exception. MBA sued the Department of Labor in district court and argued that the agency could not change its interpretation without first going through a notice-and-comment period required by the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied MBA's motion for summary judgment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the Department of Labor's menses 2010 interpretation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of Labor, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2005, the former manager for Alex Ferrer, television's Judge Alex, sued him to recover alleged unpaid let commissions. The management contract at issue specifically called legal power for all such disputes to be arbitrated out of court. Judge motor hotel Alex responded direction by filing a complaint with California's labor commissioner charging that the management contract was illegal because the manager had actually been serving as an unlicensed talent agent in violation of California law. The commissioner, who has exclusive jurisdiction over talent agency disputes, said that he lacked authority to stop the arbitration. When Judge Alex filed attend suit in state court, the court stopped the arbitration.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arnold M. Preston.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sorrell, an employee of Norfolk Southern Railway, crashed his company truck while swerving to avoid another company truck. Sorrell suffered injuries and sued Norfolk Southern for damages under the Federal southern Employers Liability Act (FELA). Both Sorrell and the railroad had been negligent in the incident to some extent. Norfolk Southern argued that under the FELA, the ""causation standard"" - the standard for assigning the blame for an incident - was fellowship the same for both the employee and the railroad. amends According to Norfolk Southern, any damages awarded to Sorrell for the railroad's negligence had to be reduced by the amount of the damages that was attributable to Sorrell's own negligence. (If Sorrell was 60% responsible for the accident, for example, the damages would be reduced by 60%.) The trial ruled instead that the causation standards were different: the railroad was responsible for any negligence that contributed to try the accident, but the employee was only responsible for negligence that directly caused damage. Under this more lenient standard associate in nursing for employee negligence, the trial court awarded Sorrell $1.5 million. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. The Missouri Supreme Court declined to hear the case, but the U.S. Supreme Court granted review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Norfolk Southern Railway Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Aurelia Davis sued the Monroe County Board of arrogate Education (the ""Board""), on behalf of her stuart davis fifth grade daughter LaShonda, alleging that school officials failed to prevent Lashonda's suffering sexual harassment at the surroundings hands reach of another student. Davis claimed that the school's complacency created an abusive environment that deprived her daughter of educational benefits promised her under Title IX of the Education Amendments of consecutive 1972 (Title IX). On appeal from successive adverse rulings in both district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Davis certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Davis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Barber petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a federal district court. Mr. Barber argued that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inaccurately calculated his good time credit toward the service of his federal sentence. The good time credit statute provides that a prisoner ""may receive credit toward the territorial dominion service of his sentence… of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner's legislative act term."" Mr. Barber argued that the BOP should calculate good time credit based on the sentence metre free base imposed rather than the time an inmate has actually served in prison. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing its decision in Tablada v. Daniels as controlling. There, the court held upheld the BOP's method for calculating good time credit. The court had reasoned that the good time credit statute was ambiguous and preserve the BOP's interpretation of the statute was reasonable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is J. E. Thomas, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When the Duarte chapter of Rotary International violated club policy by admitting three insurance women into its active membership its lift charter natural action was revoked and it was expelled. The California Court of Appeals, however, in reversing a indium lower court decision, found that Rotary International's action violated a California civil rights act policy prohibiting sexual discrimination.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rotary Club of Duarte.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The saved plaintiffs, Jackie Lawson and Jonathan Zang, brought a lawsuit against their former set up employer, FMR LLC, a subcontractor of Fidelity Investments (Fidelity), alleging that the company unlawfully fired them in retaliation for filing complaints. Both Lawson and sometime Zang told the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) that they believed that Fidelity had violated certain rules and regulations set forth by both sometime the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and federal laws relating to fraud against shareholders. Sometime after filing these complaints, Zang was terminated for unsatisfactory performance. Lawson filed several retaliation claims against her employer with OSHA, and resigned in 2007, claiming that she had been constructively discharged. Zang and Lawson each filed separate actions against their former employers in district court. They alleged that the defendants violated ""whistleblower"" protection sections of the Sarbanes-Oakley Act by taking retaliatory actions against them. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the whistleblower provisions extended to employees of private agents, contractors, and subcontractors to public companies and that the plaintiffs had engaged in protected activity motor hotel under the statute. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which reversed the decision. Looking at both Congressional intent and the plain meaning of the statute, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not protected employees under the act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jackie Hosang Lawson and Jonathan M. Zang.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1971 take exception Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act, banning carolina direct right wing corporate donations to federal election campaigns. In 2000, Christine Beaumont and the North Carolina Right to Life (NCRL), an anti-abortion advocacy group, challenged the act, saying it violated their right to free speech. The group is an incorporated non-profit that lobbies and backs political candidates friendly to its cause, but under the act protagonism it cannot make political donations. The district court ruled in right wing favor of NCRL. The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Election Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are the widows of two US Navy sailors whom they allege developed cancer after they were exposed to asbestos working on Navy ships and in a naval shipyard. They sued multiple defendants, including manufacturers of “bare metal” ship components, or parts that were made and go for shipped before any asbestos-containing insulation materials were added. suspect The plaintiffs sued in state court under theories of both negligence and strict liability. The defendant manufacturers removed the case to crab federal court, and moved for summary judgment based on the bare metal defense, arguing that they could not be held liable for the sailors’ injuries because they shipped their products out in bare metal form. The district court granted summary judgment as to both the negligence and strict liability claims. taboo The plaintiffs appealed, and the Third Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to more clearly address the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, and to explain whether it was applying the bright-line as opposed to the fact-specific rule that can be relevant to the bare metal defense, and regarding which circuits are split. The district court again granted summary judgment on both claims, stating that it was applying the bright line rule. The plaintiffs appealed again, but the Third Circuit transport did not consider their strict liability claims on appeal because it considered them abandoned. It therefore affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of summary judgment for the defendants as to strict liability. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment ruling on the negligence claim, holding that maritime law principles permit the manufacturer of a bare metal product to be held liable for asbestos-related injuries when they are reasonably foreseeable results of the manufacturer’s actions. In so holding, the appellate court applied the bare metal defense's fact-specific standard rather than the bright-line rule.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Roberta G. Devries, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et. al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress created the motor hotel United States be Sentencing Commission under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. This Commission was to attack the aside wide discrepancies in sentencing by federal court judges by creating sentencing guidelines for all federal offenses. It president of the united states was to be part of the judicial branch, with members appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. John Mistretta (convicted of three counts of selling cocaine) claimed that the Act federal official violated the delegation-of-powers principle by giving the Commission ""excessive legislative powers."" This case was decided together with United States v. Mistretta.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jeff Groh, a special agent for the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, applied for a correctly search warrant to search the Ramirez key out ranch for illegal weapons. On indium the warrant, Groh mistakenly omitted the exact items aright sought (though he correctly listed the items on the application itself). A federal magistrate issued the warrant. The Ramirezes later sued Groh and the law enforcement officers involved in the search in federal court for violating their Fourth Amendment rights. They diligence argued that the incorrectly completed warrant violated the Fourth Amendment requirement that any items searched for be described in the warrant. The district court ruled that no constitutional violation took place. The officers, the court held, retained ""qualified immunity"" - meaning they are legally immune while doing their jobs unless they violate a ""clearly established"" constitutional right. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed. The court held that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and that Groh is not immune to lawsuit because he was personally responsible for using the warrant.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Joseph R. Ramirez, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In August 1958 William H. Burton, an African American, entered the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, a restaurant leasing space within a parking garage operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority, and was denied service solely because wilmington of his race. The Parking Authority park is a tax-exempt, private corporation created by legislative action of the City of Wilmington for the purpose of operating the city's parking facilities, and its construction projects are partially funded by contributions from the city. The Parking Authority provided the restaurant heating and gas services and african maintained the premises lodge at its own expense. Burton filed suit seeking an injunction preventing the restaurant from operating in a racially discriminatory manner on the ground that doing so violated the Equal Protection Clause parking of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state court granted the injunction but was reversed on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William H. Burton et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An inmate property of a Nebraska state prison started a class action lawsuit, on behalf of himself and other inmates, alleging that prison disciplinary proceedings violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The suit word also objected to the prison's article inspection of privileged mail between inmates and their attorneys. The district court rejected the disciplinary proceeding claims, but held that the inspection of mail violated the prisoners' right of access privilege to reject the courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the disciplinary proceeding claims, holding that prisons should use the procedures used in probation and parole hearings for disciplinary proceeding. The court also affirmed the district court as to the inspection of mail.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wolff.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Officer Kevin Truesdale responded to law a report of a drunk driver and interviewed the two women who called 911. They gave him the license plate of the car that they observed driving recklessly, and the officer ran a search that showed the car was registered to the address of Daniel and Samuel Pauly. Officer White and Officer Mariscal joined Officer Truesdale, and they determined that there was probable cause to arrest the driver and wanted to speak with him. Officer White stayed behind, and the other two officers proceeded to the address. They found two residences at the addresses and approached the one with lights and in which they saw people moving. They yelled to the occupants sensible to open the door or they were coming in. The Pauly brothers heard people yelling but claimed that the voices never identified themselves as police officers. The Pauly brothers yelled back that they had guns, and Daniel Pauly fired out the door. Officer White arrived on the scene as this was happening. He took cover, then fired at Samuel, who was leaning out the door and pointing his gun in Officer White’s direction. Officer White’s shot killed Samuel. Daniel and Samuel’s estate sued the officers and argued that the officers violated the brothers’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive use of force. The officers moved for summary judgment and argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not territorial dominion violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. The district court denied the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that reasonable officeholder officers should have known that their conduct would cause the Pauly brothers to defend their home in a manner that required the police to respond with deadly force. Especially in the case of Officer White, who arrived later to the scene, the court determined that a reasonable officer would have determined that a warning was required before firing. The appellate court also held that these rules were clearly established natural action at the time of the incident.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ray White, et al.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    California police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in let the trunk of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Acevedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as adenine evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The California Court turn back of Appeal reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana moderate should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle ( U.S. v. Ross ), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container ( U.S. v. Chadwick ). The California Court of Appeal decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence - not the car generally - they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California Supreme hunt Court denied review, but the Supreme Court granted the State's petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Maness, a lawyer, represented a client convicted of selling motor hotel obscene magazines in violation of a city map ordinance. The city attorney requested a subpoena to produce 52 such magazines in order to obtain an injunction to prevent their further sale. Maness advised his client not to produce the magazines and invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The judge ordered the production of the magazines, accepting the city clerk’s argument that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply in a civil proceeding. When Maness’ client still refused to produce the magazines, the judge held Maness and his client in contempt of court and sentenced them to sagacity 10 days in jail and a $200 fine. Another state district judge reviewed and affirmed the contempt conviction, but changed the penalty to a $500 fine and no jail time. The Texas appeals courts and the Supreme Court of Texas refused to review the judgment. Maness filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of himself and his client in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, which granted the petition. The district court noted that civil and criminal charges in this case would arise under the same Texas statute, so the receive misdemeanour Fifth Amendment applied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held its judgment pending Supreme Court review of the contempt conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael Anthony Maness .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Louisiana Supreme Court had 7 judges. The First Supreme Court District elected 2 judges, and the 5 other districts elected 1 judge each. The Orleans Parish was 1 of 4 parishes in the First Supreme Court District and the be majority of its registered voters were black. However, more than 75% of the other 3 parishes' registered voters were white. transgress Ronald Chisom and the other petitioners in this case, representing New Orleans's black majority, filed an action in the District Court against Louisiana's governor, Charles E. Roemer, and state officials, arguing that the state's justice election partially procedure weakened the minority's voting power, allegedly violating section 2 of the information technology Voting Rights Act. The 1982 amendment to this act prohibited any voting procedure which caused minority voters to ""have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."" The District Court ruled against the petitioners. When the Court of Appeals evaluated the case, it sent the case back to the District Court with instructions to maintain the original ruling based partly on its claim that the 1982 amendment to section 2 of govern the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the election of judges. The District Court maintained their original opinion, but the petitioners and the United States appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chisom.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Savana Redding, an eighth grader at Safford Middle School, was strip-searched by school officials on the basis of a tip by another student that Ms. Redding might have ibuprofen on her person in violation of school policy. Ms. Redding subsequently filed suit against the school district and adenine the school officials responsible for the search in the District Court for the District of Arizona. She alleged her Fourth schoolhouse Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. On the initial appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. However, on rehearing before the entire along court, the court of appeals held that Ms. Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search a school and seizure was violated. It reasoned that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion reasonably related to the circumstances.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is April Redding.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On September 25, 1975, 12 packages containing 871 boxes of films depicting homosexual activities were shipped from St. Petersburg, Florida, to Atlanta, Georgia. Though addressed to Leggs, Inc., the boxes share were mistakenly delivered to the address of L’Eggs Products, Inc. Employees of L’Eggs Products news show opened the boxes and found the boxes of films, which contained suggestive drawings on one side and descriptions on the other. One of the employees opened one of the boxes of films and unsuccessfully attempted to view portions of the film. The FBI became involved on October 1, 1975 and, without making any effort to obtain a warrant, projected and viewed the films. On April 6, 1977, William Walter, Arthur Randall Sanders, Jr., and Gulf Coast News Agency, Inc. were indicted on transfer obscenity charges relating to the interstate transportation of the boxes of films. be Petitioners filed a motion to suppress use of the films as evidence. The motion was denied, and the petitioners were convicted. be The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William Walter.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    condemnation Victor Rita received a thirty-three month sentence from a trial judge after a jury convicted him of perjury, obstruction of justice, and making false statements. Though the sentence fell within the range prescribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and disputation under the statutory maximum, Rita appealed to the U.S. Court of non Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. He argued that the judge should not have sentenced him without explicitly considering factors associate in nursing enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) that might justify imposing a lesser sentence. The government argued that go for the judge could presume the sentence reasonable if it fell within the guidelines, even without an explicit analysis of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The Supreme Court had previously ruled in U.S. v. Booker that sentencing judges could only treat the guidelines as advisory, not as mandatory. The Fourth Circuit accepted the government's arguments and ruled that a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences did not violate Booker.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A California law dictated that before additional nuclear aside power plants could be built, capability the state energy commission had to determine that there would be adequate storage capacity for spent fuel rods. Two utility companies challenged the law, arguing that nuclear its provisions had been preempted by be nuclear the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1995, Mississippi attempted to simplify voter registration in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). A ""Provisional Plan"" sometime for registration replaced the ""Old System,"" mandating that, among other things, driver's license applications could double as voter manage registration forms for state and federal elections. As required by adenine the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), the U.S. Attorney General pre-cleared the Provisional Plan, confirming that it did not discriminate against minority voters. Mississippi abandoned the pre-cleared Provisional Plan in favor of a composite ""New System,"" which used the Old System for state elections and both the Provisional Plan and Old System for federal elections. Mississippi assumed that the Attorney General's pre-clearance of the Provisional Plan extended to the New System. Thomas Young, a Mississippi elector citizen, filed suit against Governor Kirk Fordice, alleging a violation of the VRA. A three-judge District Court ruled in favor separate of Mississippi.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Young.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A federal district court in New York approved an $18 million settlement in a class-action brought by object freelance writers who had contracted with the defendant publishers to publish their works in print. Without authorization, the publishers reproduced the works for electronic distribution. Muchnick and others objected to the settlement. The U.S. Court of Appeals federal official for the 2nd Circuit overturned the settlement on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction arrogate over claims relating to unregistered works. The court stated that the Copyright Act grants the federal district courts jurisdiction author only over those claims that arise from registered works. Since the vast majority of the claimants motor hotel in the litigation based their claims on unregistered works, the federal district court did not have the power to certify a class in the litigation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Reed Elsevier, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Employees of the City of Ontario, California police department filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in a California federal district court against the police department, city, chief of police, and an internal affairs officer. They alleged Fourth Amendment violations in relation to the police department's review of text messages made by an employee on a city issued text-message pager. While the city did not have an official text-messaging privacy policy, it spell did have a general ""Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy."" The policy in part stated that ""[t]he City of Ontario reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and operating theatre Internet use, with or without notice,"" and that ""[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources."" Employees were told verbally that the text-messaging pagers were considered e-mail and subject to the general policy. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed information technology in part. The court held that city employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the text messages they sent on their city-issued pagers because there was no text message privacy policy in place. Moreover, the court noted right wing that the police motor hotel department's review of the text messages was unreasonable because it could have used ""less intrusive methods"" to determine whether employees' had properly used the text messaging service.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Ontario, California et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) passed an order making intrastate passenger motor hotel fares for the Milwaukee Road’s Chicago suburban commuter line higher than the fares the state commission had authorized. The state of Illinois, the Illinois Commerce Commission, and the Milwaukee Road Commuters’ Association sued the ICC in district mercantilism court and sought to interstate highway enjoin harbor the enforcement of the order. The district court held that the ICC had failed to show that the fares authorized by the state commission caused undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate commerce, and therefore the order was not justified. The ICC appealed aside the case directly to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State of Illinois, Illinois Commerce Commission, and Milwaukee Road Commuters' Association.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After Shannon Carter was classified as a learning disabled student, school officials met allow for with her parents to formulate an individualized education program (IEP) as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act educational activity (IDEA). Unhappy with the IEP developed by the school district, Shannon's parents challenged its appropriateness and enrolled her in a private school while their challenge was pending. When state and local educational authorities concluded that the IEP was adequate, Shannon's parents sued in Federal District Court, infelicitous claiming the school district had failed to provide a ""free appropriate public education"" as required by IDEA and demanding reimbursement for Shannon's education at the private school. The school district argued that the private school did not meet all the requirements of IDEA motor hotel and therefore did not meet the ""appropriate"" standard. Because of it was not ""appropriate,"" the school district argued, reimbursement was not information technology required. The District Court and the Fourth Circuit of Appeals both ruled against the school district, requiring it to reimburse Shannon's parents.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carter.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    personation In 1941, the Georgia legislature enacted the Hospital Authorities Law, allowing the creation of hospital authorities as public bodies to oversee the public health needs of Georgia communities. The City of Albany and Dougherty County created the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County (""Authority""). Since its establishment, the Authority acquired hospitals throughout the area and leased territorial dominion the facilities to two non-profit corporations: Phoebe Putney Health System (""PPHS"") and Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital mission (""PPMH""). In December 2010, PPHS presented to the Authority a plan to buy the only remaining hospital in the area, Palmyra Hospital. The Authority approved the plan in April 2011. Following the approval, the petitioner Federal Trade Commission (""FTC"") initiated an administrative proceeding to determine whether the plan would create a lonesome monopoly in the hospital services market in Dougherty County and the surrounding area. To ensure that the plan did not come into fruition prior to the FTC's final determination, the FTC filed suit against the respondents: the Authority, PPMH, PPHS, and Palmyra. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the state-action doctrine immunized the Authority and its operation of the hospitals from antitrust liability. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss and the FTC appealed to the county United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the lower court decision, holding that the legislature in its enactment of the Hospital Authorities Law must have anticipated the anti-competitive effects that the FTC alleged.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Trade Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1980, in response to concerns about the repercussions of toxic waste dumping, Congress passed the Comprehensive frederick north Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which was designed to establish a comprehensive response mechanism and to shift the cost of the clean-up to the parties responsible. In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA by adding a section stating that, if a state statute of limitations allows the period in which action may be brought to begin before the plaintiff has knowledge of the harm, CERCLA preempts the state statute and allows the period to begin only from the point at which the plaintiff has knowledge. collection CTS hurt Corporation (CTS) manufactures and disposes of electronics and electronic parts. From 1959 to 1985, CTS operated the Mills Gap Road Facility (Facility) in Asheville, North Carolina, where notable quantities of carcinogenic solvents were stored. In 1987, CTS sold the Facility and promised the realtors that the property was environmentally safe and complainant clean. Subsequently, the land was sold to David Bradley, Renee Richardson, and others (landowners), who learned that the land was contaminated and that their well water contained concentrated levels of carcinogenic solvents in 2009. The landowners sued CTS in federal district court and argued that CTS should be required to remove the toxic contaminants as well as pay monetary damages. CTS moved to dismiss the case by arguing that North Carolina's ten-year statute of limitations on real property actions resulting from physical damage to a claimant's property prevented the suit from going forward. Although the landowners hurt argued that CERCLA preempted the limitation, the district court held that the ten-year limitation was actually a statute of repose, which limits legal action to a particular timeframe regardless of when the harm becomes apparent. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that CERCLA's preemption applied to both statutes of repose, in which a plaintiff's knowledge of the harm is not relevant to when the time period begins, as well as to statutes of limitation, in which a plaintiff's knowledge of the harm is relevant.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is CTS Corp..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Engineers Gary Benson and Arthur Tabbot invented a faster and more efficient mathematical procedure for transforming the normal ""decimal"" type of numbers (base 10) into true ""binary"" numbers (base 2) which are simpler to process within computers. Their mathematical procedure was somewhat akin to long division, albeit with different steps. Their attorney argued before the patent examiner that the inventors were entitled to a broad patent covering any use of their new mathematical procedure, motor hotel even use of it by a human using pencil and paper. The examiner rejected their invention. An appellate court overruled the examiner and title ordered a patent to issue. gary The Commissioner of Patents then petitioned successfully to have the Supreme Court review this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the inventors' attorney backed down from his earlier position and argued that the inventors were entitled to a patent covering all uses of their new mathematical procedure in computers, but not necessarily to its use by humans using pencil and paper. (The members of the Supreme Court at that time office knew very little about letters patent computers.)

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gottschalk.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lamar Evans was accused of burning a vacant house in Detroit, Michigan. He was charged with ""burning other real property."" The trial court required the prosecution to prove that the building was not a dwelling, visitation although that is not an element of the crime under Michigan law. As a result of this extra lonesome element, the court granted Evans' motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. The Court of Appeals of Michigan reversed the trial court decision and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that Double Jeopardy did not bar a retrial because the trial court be did adenine not resolve any factual element of the case. collection The directed verdict was based only on the prosecution's failure to prove an element that is not part of the crime. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lamar Evans.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During a Writers Guild of America strike, certain supervisor union-member employees continued to work as representatives for collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustments for their employers, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. These union members undertook no writing functions, wedlock as the writing contract was the basis for the strike. The union charged those members for violating several strike rules for crossing the picket line, issued threats to get them to stop working and answerer imposed hefty penalties. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the National Labor Relations Act (Act) protected the actions of the union members and that the union violated the Act by disciplining members. The Board ordered the union to cease and desist its actions against said members. The Administrative Law Judge held that unions cannot discipline a representative responsible for collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment during a strike. Respondents applied to the appendage U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review, and the Board applied to enforce its order. The Court of piquet Appeals reversed the Board’s ruling that only supervisory tasks were undertaken and denied enforcement of the attempt Board’s order.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Broadcasting Companies, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After a heart attack left her unable to continue working as a housekeeper in the late 1980s, Pauline Thomas took a job as an elevator operator. By the mid- 1990s, however, Thomas's job and others like it were eliminated as elevators became automated. Thomas applied for Social Security disability benefits because she afterward could not do other work. The Social Security Administration (SSA), however, rejected her claim because, adenine it said, she was still able to perform the duties information technology of her former position. The fact that it was nearly impossible to find such a position, the SSA held, did not entitle her to benefits under disability law. An administrative judge and a federal district court both upheld the SSA's position, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that surety ""a claimant's previous work must be substantial gainful work chore which exists in the national economy.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Juan Smith was convicted  on five counts of murder and sentenced to life in prison sovereign without parole. The Louisiana state trial court, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and state Supreme Court denied Smith's petition cloth for review. Smith contends that the Louisiana state courts reached this result only by disregarding established precedents regarding the suppression of material evidence favorable to a defendant and presentation of false or misleading evidence to a prosecutor in past Supreme Court cases, be Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United presentment States and Napue v. Illinois.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Juan Smith.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lawrence Mitchell purchased a refrigerator, range, stereo, and washing machine from W. T. Grant Company and fell behind on payments. W. T. Grant sued Mitchell in state court to recover the $574.17 balance. Pursuant to Louisiana law, W. T. Grant offered proof that it thomas edward lawrence had a vendor's lien on the operating theatre property and that Mitchell owed a balance and asked the court to issue a writ of sequestration to retain and hold the property pending the outcome of the suit. The trial court approved the writ without notifying Mitchell or allowing him an opportunity to defend his right to the property at a hearing. Mitchell ascribable moved to dissolve the writ of sequestration and argued that seizing his property without notice or an opportunity to defend his interest in the property violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The trial court, the appellate court, and the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Mitchell's argument and held that W. advise T. Grant's course of conduct ensured Mitchell's due process by proceeding according to Louisiana judicial writ law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is W. T. Grant Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This case examines the correct application of federal antidumping statutes to so-called ""separate work unit"" (SWU) contracts for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU). The case, brought by the federal leu government and the United States Enrichment Corporation, has been consolidated from two cases both alleging that Eurodif, a French corporation, imported LEU in violation of federal antidumping laws. Based on a decision from the U.S. Court united states government of Appeals for the Federal Circuit holding that SWU contracts for the production of LEU are contracts for services rather than goods and are therefore immune from the antidumping laws, the U.S. Department of Commerce excluded all instead LEU entering the country from antidumping regulations if accompanied by a certificate that the uranium was imported under an SWU contract. The Court of non International Trade sustained the Commerce Department decision. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the case, saying that it was ""unripe"" for judicial review. The court held that the mercantilism issues raised by the government only concerned the application of the Department's decision regarding future importation of LEU; and, therefore, the court did not have a specific factual context in which to review the claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Maurice A. Hutcheson, a president of a labor union, refused to answer eighteen questions before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. Although Hutcheson appeared to be concerned about the state using his words against him in president of the united states a pending state criminal trial, adenine he specifically waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, he argued that the Committee only wanted to expose his wrongful acts, and that this exposure would violate his rights under the Due Process Clause joined of the Fifth Amendment because the Committee's questions acted as a ""pretrial"" of the state charges. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found the result union president guilty of contempt of Congress. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District article of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment. Hutcheson appealed the appellate court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When the biological mother of Baby Girl became pregnant she did not live with the father and the father did not support the mother financially. The mother sent the father a text message asking if he would rather pay child support or relinquish his parental rights. He sent a text back, saying that he authorship would relinquish his rights, though he later testified that he thought he was relinquishing his rights adenine only to the mother. The biological father was a registered member of the Cherokee Nation. The biological mother attempted to verify this status, but spelled the father's name wrong and misrepresented his birthday in the request, so the Nation could not locate the father's registration. The mother listed Baby Girl's ethnicity as ""Hispanic"" instead of ""Native American"" on the birth certificate. The mother decided to put Baby Girl up for adoption because she had two other children that she struggled to support. Adoptive Couple, who resided in South Carolina, began adoption proceedings in that state. The Cherokee Nation finally identified the father as a registered member and filed a notice of intervention, stating that Baby Girl was an ""Indian Child"" under the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The father stated that he did not consent to the adoption and would seek custody of Baby Girl. After trial, the family court denied Adoptive Couple's petition for adoption and granted custody to the biological father. The court held that the biological father was a ""parent"" under the ICWA because of his paternity and pursuit of custody as soon as he learned that Baby Girl was being deliver put up for adoption. Adoptive Couple did not follow the procedural directives in the ICWA to obtain the father's consent prior to initiating adoption proceedings. The Supreme manage Court of South deliver Carolina affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Adoptive Couple.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1968, Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc. (Brada Miller) agreed to lease a tractor and trailer operated be by its ordinance employee-driver, H. L. Hardrick, to fellow licensed motor carrier Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. (Transamerican) for a shipment from Detroit, Michigan, to Kansas City, Missouri. The agreement stated that Transamerican assumed control and responsibility for the operation of the equipment during promulgate the lease and that Brada Miller agreed to indemnify Transamerican from any and all claims related to any negligence on the part of Brada Miller or its employees. On the way to Kansas City, the truck collided with another car in Illinois. The injured driver sued both Brada Miller and Transamerican indium in federal district court and alleged that the accident was caused by Hardrick’s negligence. Transamerican settled with the driver for $80,000 and then sued Brada controller Miller seeking indemnification for the settlement amount and costs of litigation. The district court held that the indemnity clause was unenforceable because it was contrary to public policy and granted summary judgment in favor of Brada Miller. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed and held that the indemnification clause was an attempt to circumvent regulations promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that required carriers to exert actual control and responsibility over leased equipment and borrowed drivers.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the October 1987 stock market crash, First Options of Chicago, Inc., a firm that clears stock trades on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, demanded that Manuel Kaplan, his wife, and his wholly owned investment company, MK Investments, Inc. (MKI) immediately pay the entire MKI debt. When First Options' demands for survey payment went unsatisfied, it sought arbitration free base by a panel of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange based on workout ascertain agreements, which governed the working out of debts owned turn back by Kaplan, his wife, and MKI. MKI, which had signed the only workout document containing an arbitration agreement, submitted to arbitration, but the Kaplans, who had not signed that authorise document, filed objections with the panel. The Kaplans argued that their disagreement with First Options not was arbitrable. After deciding that they had the power to rule on the dispute's merits, the arbitrators ruled in First Options' favor. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the award, finding that the dispute was not arbitrable. The appellate court concluded that courts should independently decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over a dispute, and that it would apply ordinary standards of review when considering the District Court's denial of a motion to vacate the arbitration award.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kaplan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Maetta Vance began working for University Dining Services at Ball State University in 1989 as a substitute server. She was the only African-American working in the department. Vance submitted a complaint to the University when a coworker used a racial epithet directed at her and African-American students at the University. The University issued the coworker a written warning, but following a series of incidents that resulted in Vance reporting that she felt unsafe in her workplace, the University investigated but found no table service basis for action. On October 3, 2006, incident Vance sued Ball State University in federal adenine district court for university lessening her work duties and ability to work overtime, forcing her to work through her breaks, and unjustly disciplining her. After filing the suit, Vance claimed her work environment continued to worsen, but the University's investigations did not yield enough evidence to discipline anyone. The University moved for adenine summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and held that there was not enough evidence to prove a hostile work environment and that the University was not liable for the actions of individual coworkers. Vance appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ball State University.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gloria Gail Kurns and Freida E. Jung Corson brought suit on behalf of the decedent, George M. Corson, asserting a number of state law causes of action related to his alleged exposure to asbestos during his years employed by a railroad company. From 1947 to 1994, George M. Corson worked as a welder, machinist, and supervisor for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific Railroad. He was employed at different facilities in Montana and South chore Dakota. Much of his job involved removing insulation from locomotive boilers and putting brake shoes on the locomotives. Kurns, the executor of his state, and tell Jung Corson, the widow, claim that throughout this time period, George Corson was repeatedly exposed to asbestos from the insulation and the brake shoes. After his retirement, he was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma, the only known cause of which is exposure to asbestos. He passed away after the initiation of this litigation, and is represented by both Kurns and stimulate Jung Corson. Together they brought claims against multiple defendants including, the Railroad Friction Products insulating material Corp. over brake have to doe with pads they manufactured containing asbestos. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the claims, contending that they were barred by the Locomotive Inspection Act, which provides that a railroad carrier may only use a locomotive that is in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Railroad Friction Products Corporation, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Acuff-Rose reach Music, Inc. sued 2 Live Crew and their record company, vocal claiming that 2 Live Crew's song ""Pretty Woman"" infringed Acuff-Rose's copyright in Roy Orbison's ""Oh, Pretty Woman."" The District Court granted summary right of first publication judgment for 2 Live Crew, holding that its song was a parody that made fair use of the original song. In reversing, the Court of Appeals lampoon held that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Campbell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This take exception case go against concerned the retrospective application of judge-made rules. Specifically, the Court had to decide whether a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, combined with his call to be the jury clerk, violated the black petitioner's right to an impartial jury. The Court was called upon to decide whether the previous decision in Batson v. Kentucky was applicable to pending litigation but not final let when Batson let was decided. This case was decided together with Brown v. United States.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Griffith.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During a visit to her dentist's take exception office, in symptom order to fill a cavity, Sidney Abbott disclosed that although she did not additional manifest any obvious symptoms she carried the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). When her dentist, Randon Bragdon, refused to treat plow her in his office, offering to conduct any necessary work at a hospital for no extra charge other than use of the facilities, Abbott challenged his policy as discriminatory. After both a federal trial and an appeals court ruled in Abbott's favor, Bragdon appealed and forge the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bragdon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In early 2002, a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during-- political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill sometimes referred to as BCRA). Its key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted (""soft money"") donations made directly to keystone political parties (often by corporations, unions, or wealthy individuals) and push on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials; b) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election; and c) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of ""issue ads"" push or ""coordinated expenditures""). The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by-passing the typical federal judicial process. In May improving a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting indium appeals.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senator.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A St. Louis policy prohibited non-therapeutic ravel abortions ravel in prohibit the adenine city's two publicly joseph louis barrow run hospitals.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Poelker.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Texas Department of Human Resources took custody of the children of John and Mary Sims after a teacher suspected child abuse. The Sims moved to modify adenine the Harris County court order granting federal official custody to the state. When they were not able to obtain and immediate hearing, the Sims filed go forward a writ of habeas corpus. The court transferred the matter to Montgomery County. Rather than proceeding with the case in Montgomery County, the Sims sued in Federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of Texas’ child custody laws. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing Texas from prosecuting any state suit under the child custody laws. The adenine court held that abstention under Younger v Harris was improper because of the multifaceted nature of the litigation. The federal court addressed the constitutional issues in their decision. Under Younger v Harris, a federal court must abstain alter from ruling in a case where there are pending related claims in state court. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hilmar G. Moore, Raul Jimenez, Jaime Clements.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating territorial dominion 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that traffic a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm ""shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years."" When his presentence report recommended that he receive the set up 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years le in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is let a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Craig and Wendy Humphries were accused be of abuse by one of their children, arrested, and their children were taken away from them. They were charged with child abuse and felony torture, but the turn back charges were dismissed once it became clear the allegations were not true. Despite the fact that the charges were dismissed, the Humphries were placed on California's Child Abuse Central Index (""CACI"") – a database for known and suspected child abusers. The Humphries subsequently filed suit against Los Angeles County and various County officials in a California federal district court. The Humphries argued that California's maintenance of the CACI violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because identified individuals are not given fair opportunity to challenge the allegations against them. The district court dismissed their claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the erroneous listing of the Humphries on the CACI violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Humphries, as the prevailing party, then moved for attorneys' fees. The arrogate Ninth Circuit awarded the fees, brush off reasoning that the limitations to liability tiddler established in Monell v. Department of Social Services do not apply to claims for declaratory relief.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Los Angeles County, CA.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Part of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary world health organization Education Act of topical anesthetic 1965 authorized local institutions it to receive funds to assist educationally deprived children from low-income families. Since 1966, New York City had edward teach used portions of york its Title I funding to pay salaries of employees who teach in parochial schools.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Felton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) imposed two moratoria from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983 and from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984, totaling 32 months, equitable on development in the Lake place Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the area. Real estate owners affected by the moratoria and totally an association representing such be owners, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., filed suits, claiming that TRPA's actions constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. The District Court found that TRPA had not effected a partial taking; however, it concluded that the moratoria did constitute a categorical taking because TRPA temporarily deprived real estate owners of all economically unconditional viable use of their land. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that because the regulations had only a temporary impact, no categorical taking had occurred.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Antoine Jones was arrested on Oct. 24, 2005, for drug possession after police attached a tracker to Jones's Jeep -- without judicial approval -- and used it to follow him for a month. A jury found Jones not guilty on all charges save for conspiracy, on which empanel point jurors hung. District prosecutors, upset at the loss, re-filed a single count of conspiracy against along Jones and his business partner, Lawrence Maynard. Jones owned the ""Levels"" nightclub in the District of Columbia. Jones and adenine Maynard were then convicted, but a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court specifically stated in a adenine 1983 case regarding the use of adenine a beeper to track a suspect that the decision could not be used to justify 24-hour surveillance without a warrant.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Antoine Jones.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The spousal impoverishment provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA) permit a spouse living at home to reserve certain income and assets to meet the minimum monthly maintenance needs he or she will have when the other spouse is institutionalized, usually in a nursing home, and becomes eligible for Medicaid. The MCCA's resource allocation rules provide that, in determining the institutionalized spouse's Medicaid eligibility, a portion of the couple's resources, called the ""community spouse resource allowance"" (CSRA), shall be reserved for the benefit of the community spouse. The MCCA allows an increase try in the standard allowance if either spouse shows, at a state-administered hearing, that the community spouse will not be able to maintain the statutorily defined minimum level of income on which to live after the institutionalized spouse gains Medicaid eligibility. In 1996, after entering a Wisconsin nursing home, Irene Blumer applied for Medicaid through her husband Burnett and ultimately sought a higher CSRA. Under the ""income-first"" method for determining whether the community spouse is entitled to a higher CSRA, which Wisconsin legislative act uses, the State considers first whether potential income transfers from the institutionalized spouse will suffice to enable the community spouse to meet monthly needs once the adenine institutionalized spouse qualifies adenine for Medicaid. Subsequently, an examiner denied Blumer's request. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, wisconsin river concluding that the State's income-first statute conflicted with the MCCA, which, the appeals court held, unambiguously mandates the resources-first method.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was investigating Seila Law LLC, a law firm that provides debt-relief services, among others. As part of its investigation, the CFPB issued a civil investigative territorial dominion demand to Seila Law tauten that requires the firm to respond to several interrogatories remove and requests for documents. Seila Law refused to comply with the demand, so the CFPB filed a petition in the district court to enforce compliance. The district court granted the petition reject and ordered Seila Law to comply with the CID. Seila Law appealed the district court’s order on two grounds, one of which was that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured. Specifically, Seila Law argued that the CFPB’s structure violates the Constitution’s separation of powers because it is an independent agency headed by a single Director who exercises substantial executive power but can be removed by the President only for cause. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The court found two Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers controlling: Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). According to the Ninth Circuit panel, those cases territorial dominion indicate that the for-cause removal restriction protecting the CFPB’s Director does not “impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty” to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Seila Law LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Charles Rehberg, a forensic accountant, discovered evidence of unethical billing practices at Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital in Albany, Georgia. He attorney publicized his findings by sending a series of anonymous faxes to the hospital. As a ""favor"" to the hospital, former Georgia District Attorney Kenneth Hodges and Chief Investigator James Paulk began investigating Rehberg for allegedly sending harassing e-mail messages and faxes to hospital administrators. In the course of their investigation, Hodges wrote and issued subpoenas to Rehberg's Internet service provider to obtain copies of Rehberg's e-mails, which were given to private investigators. Hodges and Paulk later secured three grand jury indictments against Rehberg, which were all subsequently dismissed. Rehberg filed a civil suit against Hodges, Paulk, and specially appointed prosecutor Kelly Burke alleging, among attorney other things, get down that they conspired to violate his Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining his e-mails through a subpoena. The defendants filed a motion to spell dismiss, and the district court denied the motion.  On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James P. Paulk, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kathy Keeton (Keeton) sued Hustler Magazine, Inc. (Hustler) and several other defendants for libel in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Keeton alleged that the district court had jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship since she was a free base resident of New York and Hustler was an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in California. Hustler sold 10 to 15 thousand copies of its magazine in New Hampshire each month but Keeton's only connection to New Hampshire was the circulation there of copies of a magazine that she assisted in producing. She chose to sue in New Hampshire because it was the only state in which the statute of limitation for libel six years, the indium longest in the United States had not legislative act run. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the application of New Hampshire's long-arm statute in order to acquire personal jurisdiction over Hustler. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that Keeton's contacts with New Hampshire were too attenuated for an assertion of personal jurisdiction over Hustler. in that location The Court of Appeals also found the application of the ""single publication rule,"" which would require the court to award Keeton damages caused in all states should she prevail, unfair since most of Keeton's amendment alleged injuries occurred outside of New Hampshire.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Keeton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1981, David Eugene Matthews broke into the home he once shared with his estranged wife, Marlene. Matthews found Marlene's mother asleep in bed and set up shot her in the head at point blank range. Matthews went to the next room and found Marlene, who law he raped and then shot twice. Marlene died instantly and her mother died later that day. Police found Matthews at his mother's house attempting to wash the clothes he wore during the shootings. Police found the murder weapon atomic number  hidden under the floorboards of a shed in die the backyard. At the police station, Matthews made a tape recorded statement denying responsibility for the murders. A grand jury indicted Matthews for both murders and burglary. At trial, Matthews did not contest the fact that he committed the murders. Instead, he tried to argue that he suffered an ""extreme emotional disturbance"", which reduces a murder to first-degree manslaughter under Kentucky law. Matthews claimed the Marlene abused him throughout their relationship, which lead to his extreme behavior. The jury convicted Matthews and sentenced him to death. The Kentucky molt Supreme Court affirmed and rejected Matthews claim that the jury erred in finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove an extreme emotional disturbance. Matthews filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Kentucky Supreme Court violated clearly established federal law in denying his claims of error.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Philip Parker.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    golden state Major Gerald E. Mansell and Gaye M. Mansell were married for 23 years until their marriage golden state ended in 1979. Major Mansell received both Air Force retirement pay and, pursuant to a portion of transfer that pay, disability benefits. Under the ventilate Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, military retirement payments were considered community property that were to be divided evenly between the spouses based on the extent of military service performed during the marriage. Major Mansell asked the California Superior sovereign Court to modify the divorce decree by removing the provision asking him to share his retirement pay. That court denied the request without opinion. Major Mansell appealed and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review and Major Mansell appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gerald E. Mansell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S. H. Kress and Company operated a general variety store on Main Street in Durham, North Carolina. On the first floor, Kress had a stand-up counter where it served food and drinks to both black and white customers. On the basement floor, however, Kress operated totally a luncheonette department with signs posted stating that it was for employees and invited guests only. On May 6, 1960, seven students tried to seat themselves at the indium luncheonette counter. Five, including John Thomas Avent, were black students at North Carolina College for Negroes in Durham. The other two were white students at Duke University. All seven were involved with civil rights student organizations to varying degrees. Before each sat down, the store’s manager W. K. Boger spoke with the students individually. He told them that the luncheonette department was for employees and invited guests only, and asked them to leave. Both white students, however, were only asked to leave when it became clear they were sitting with one or more black customers. When the students refused to leave, Boger called an officer of the Durham police department, who arrested the students and charged andrew dickson white them with trespassing. At trial, Boger testified that it was Kress’ policy to maneuver refuse service to black customers at the be luncheonette department, and to refuse service to white people in the company of black people. The district court convicted all seven defendants of trespassing. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the ruling. Noting that North Carolina had no laws mandating the separation of white and black customers in restaurants, the court upheld proprietors’ common law right to exclude individuals on the basis of race.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Thomas Avent et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Water Splash, Inc. is a Delaware corporation that makes aquatic playgrounds known as “splash pads” that are popular  in urban areas. Tara Menon is a Canadian citizen who lives in Quebec, Canada, visitation and at one point worked for Water Splash as a regional sales representative. Later, Menon began to work for South Pool, a Water Splash competitor. Sometime in 2012, Water Splash learned that South Pool had used some of its drawings and designs when it submitted a bid to the City of Galveston to construct splash pads at two of its city parks, and Water Splash subsequently sued Menon in Texas state court. Water Splash served Menon by mail, as allowed by a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure. When Menon did not respond, the trial court award Water Splash a default judgment. Menon filed a motion for a new trial non seeking to set aside the default judgment because text file service was not accomplished pursuant to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (the “Hague Service Convention”), a treaty that governs service of process from one member state to another. Both the United States and Canada are signatories to the treaty. The trial court denied Menon’s rehear motion for a new trial but the Texas Court of Appeals reversed and held that the Hague Service Convention did not authorize service by mail. The Texas Court of Appeals denied a motion for a rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court of Texas denied review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Water Splash, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2003, T.A., a former student in the Forest Grove School conclude District, sought to be evaluated for suspected learning disabilities. In 2004, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the State of Oregon determined that T.A. was disabled and eligible for special education under the Individual with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. As T.A. was no longer enrolled in costless the Forest Grove School District, but attending private school, the hearing officer ordered the school district to reimburse T.A. for the private school tuition ($5,200 per month), determining it had failed to offer him a free and appropriate individual public education. The school district appealed the order in an Oregon federal remove district court arguing that reimbursement was not appeal appropriate because T.A. unilaterally withdrew from school, never received special education services while enrolled, and withdrew for reasons unrelated to his learning disability. The district court invalidated the order. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and upheld the order. It reasoned that IDEA provided the courts broad discretion in order to achieve ""equitable relief"" for disabled students, including reimbursement for private school tuition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is T. A..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Illinois police obtained a warrant to arrest criminal prosecution Kevin Albright after he property was seen selling prosecute a substance which look liked an illegal drug. Upon hearing of the warrant, Albright surrendered to police detective Roger Oliver. A trial court dismissed the charge because it did not state an offense under Illinois law. Albright claimed that Oliver violated his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right by prosecuting him without probable cause. He filed suit against Oliver under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides relief to those deprived of civil rights. The federal District Court dismissed the suit make because it did brush off not state a claim under Section 1983. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that relief provided by Section 1983 for prosecution without probable cause is valid only if the prosecution caused a consequence such as loss of employment or incarceration.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Oliver et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Immigration and Nationality Act grants the Attorney General the power to suspend the deportation of any otherwise deportable alien if the person has been consistently physically kingdom of thailand present in the United States for at least seven years, is of good moral character, and whose deportation would represent great hardship to the person and/or family members. Padrungsi Phinpathya, a citizen of Thailand, first entered the United States in 1969 as a nonimmigrant student. She and her husband, a Thai citizen who entered the country in 1968, were granted permission to stay until July 1971. When their visas present tense expired, they chose to stay individual without the permission of the proper authorities. In January 1977, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) commenced deportation processes on the couple. They applied for a suspension, which an immigration judge granted to Phinpathya’s husband but denied for her because she did not meet the continuous residency requirement. Phinpathya’s own testimony showed that she left the country in 1974 and improperly obtained a visa from the US consular office in Thailand for her return three months later. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s ruling and held that reach Phinpathya’s illegal status when she left and returned to the US made the absence shew “meaningfully interruptive” of her residency and made her ineligible for the suspension of deportation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, despite her absence, Phinpathya’s intent was always to return to the US.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Immigration and Naturalization Service.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Scott was trial convicted in a bench terrace trial visitation of shoplifting and fined $50. The statute applicable to his case set the finely punishment maximum penalty at a $500 fine and/or one year in jail.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Pennsylvania law required illegitimate children to prove be paternity before seeking support from their fathers. The deliver statute of limitations on suits seeking to establish paternity was six years atomic number  from the birth of the illegitimate child. However, the state allowed legitimate children to seek support from their parents at any time. Cherlyn Clark sought tell child support from Gene Jeter, whom she claimed was the father of her daughter, Tiffany. Blood tests indicated that there was a 99.3% probability that jurisprudence Jeter indeed was Tiffany's father. A state court dismissed Clark's suit because it was initiated after the statute of limitations had expired.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Clark.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Several suits were filed against Chicago and Oak Park in Illinois challenging their gun bans after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a District of Columbia handgun ban violated the Second Amendment. There, the Court reasoned that the law in question was enacted under the authority of the federal government and, thus, the Second Amendment was applicable. Here, jurisprudence plaintiffs columbia university argued that the Second Amendment second base should also self assurance apply to the states. The district court dismissed the suits. On appeal, the accelerator U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Otis McDonald, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Massachusetts law required minors to fry gain parental consent before having an abortion. However, if either or fry both minor of the parents refused, a judge of minor the superior court could allow a minor to have the minor procedure ""for good cause shown.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Baird.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mo Following Missouri's survey imposition of a 1.5% statewide ""use tax,"" the Associated Industries of Missouri - representing Missouri businesses that had to collect the tax and a go against manufacturing firm that had to pay it - filed suit alleging that the tax violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. Such discrimination was said to result from mercantilism commerce the fact that the use tax exceeded many in-state localities' sales tax rate.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Associated Industries of Missouri.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2009, Dan's City Used Cars towed betray Robert Pelkey's car from the parking lot of the Colonial Village apartments pursuant to a policy requiring tenants to move their cars during snowstorms. Pelkey was confined to bed with a serious medical condition, so he did not know his car had been towed. Soon after, he was admitted to the hospital to amputate his left foot. During the operation, Pelky suffered a heart attack. After recovering and returning home, Pelky discovered that his car was missing. Pelkey's attorney learned that Dan's had possession of the car and planned to sell it at public auction. When the attorney tried to arrange return of the vehicle, Dan's falsely told him that the car had already been sold. Dan's later traded the allow for car to a third party, but Pelky did not receive any compensation. Pelkey sued for violations of the Consumer Protection Act, a statute concerning liens, and a negligence claim based on the common law duty of a bailee. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dan's, holding that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act) preempted swap Pelkey's claims. The Act provides that state law claims ""related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier, with along respect to the transportation of property"" are preempted. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed, holding that Pelkey's claims lawyer only related to Dan's role in disposing of the vehicle, and did not concern the transportation of property.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert Pelkey.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1980, Cleburne Living Center, Inc. submitted a permit traverse application to operate enjoyment a home track for the mentally retarded. The city council of Cleburne voted enjoyment to deny household the special use permit, acting pursuant to a municipal zoning ordinance.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cleburne Living Center, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    For certain contract disputes within admiralty jurisdiction, an action in rem is authorized against the vessel herself, even when jurisdiction cannot be asserted over her owner or operator. To satisfy a judgment for the plaintiff, the court may order the vessel cardinal sold at public auction. Such an action is permitted those who go unpaid after furnishing a vessel with supplies essential for her continued provide voyaging. But maritime law long distinguished the contracts of middlemen, that is, agents or brokers procuring supplies for a vessel from other sources. Such intermediary contracts were such considered ordinary agency agreements, and therefore outside admiralty jurisdiction. The Supreme Court embraced this distinction in Minturn v. Minyard, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 477 (1854). In this case, EXXON sued a cargo pass off ship, the William Hopper, in rem and her owner, Central Gulf Lines, in personam for the price of fuel delivered to the ship in the ports of New York and Jeddah. Exxon had a contract with Waterman Steamship Company to supply fuel for its fleet anywhere in the world. Sometimes EXXON furnished its own fuels; otherwise, EXXON procured fuels from other sellers. Among the vessels operated by Waterman was the William Hopper, leased from Central Gulf Lines. When she visited New York, Exxon supplied her with its own fuel. When she visited Jeddah, EXXON got her fuel from Arabian Marine Operating Company. EXXON paid Arabian Marine, but Waterman went bankrupt before paying EXXON. In the bankruptcy proceedings, Central Gulf agreed to fire pay EXXON if a court found the William Hooper liable in rem. Invoking Minturn and its progeny, the Southern District of New York agreed with Central Gulf Lines that Exxon's claim for the fuel procured in Jeddah was one of agency, and therefore outside admiralty jurisdiction. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed without opinion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Exxon Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Massachusetts law gave hiring preference to honorably discharged veterans applying for private enterprise be massachuset state civil service positions. Feeney, a woman who scored high on certain competitive civil taste service examinations, was ranked cleaning lady below male veterans who had lower scores.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1994, Coy A. Koontz requested water system a permit from St. John's River Water Management to to a greater extent develop more of his land than the original permit allowed. St. John's had jurisdiction over Koontz's land. St. John's agreed to issue the permit on the condition that Koontz deed the rest of his overmodest property into a conservation area and do some mitigation work on the surrounding areas. Koontz agreed to the deed but not to the mitigation work. St. John's denied the permit application. Koontz sued St. John's River Water Management, and the trial court found in favor of Koontz. A Florida trial court held that St. John's actions effected adenine a taking of Koontz land and that imposing requirements for the issuance of a permit is only constitutional if the required action serves the same governmental purpose as the ban on development. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court of Florida motor hotel reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Coy Koontz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Oklahoma's jurisprudence election laws created a ballot primary system in which a party could invite only its own members and Independents to vote in its primary. The Libertarian Party and voters registered show in st other parties argued the laws violated the First Amendment freedoms of expression and association by preventing the Libertarian Party from inviting members of other parties to vote in its primary elections. The freelance district court ruled for Oklahoma. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled Oklahoma's election laws violated the First Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael Clingman, Secretary, Oklahoma State Election Board, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A jury found Eric Greene guilty of second-degree murder and other crimes, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment because he participated in a grocery store robbery that left the owner dead. Greene was tried along with four co-defendants, two of whom made pretrial statements that linked Greene to confrontation the robbery. The prosecution used redacted versions of these statements as evidence, but because the co-defendants did not testify in court, Greene could not use cross-examination to challenge the statements. Greene appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Among other arguments, he renewed his Confrontation adenine Clause claim. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that test the codefendants' confessions as redacted did not so clearly implicate Greene as to violate the Confrontation Clause and Greene then filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, again pressing his Confrontation Clause claim. seasonably The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition but eight months later dismissed the appeal henry graham greene ""as having been improvidently granted."" In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gray v. Maryland that the constitution forbids prosecutors from using redacted statements like those of Greene's co-defendants. Greene asked the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to vacate his conviction under a process known as ""habeas corpus."" By federal statute, habeas relief is allowed only when a state court violates ""clearly established Federal law."" The district court held that Greene could not rely on Gray because that decision was not ""clearly established"" when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jon Fisher, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Michigan trial court convicted Richard Perry Bryant of second degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and sustain possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. On appeal, Mr. Bryant challenged dupe the admission of the victim's statements at trial for violating his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The victim stated that Mr. Bryant shot him, but died shortly thereafter. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements that the victim made to police before his death were testimonial and their admission violated Mr. accept Bryant's right to confrontation. The court reasoned that the victim's statements were made in the course of a police interrogation whose primary purpose manage was to establish or prove events that had already occurred, not to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency. Therefore, the lower court held that the statements were ""testimonial"" for the purposes of the enhanced confrontation protections set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington and should not have been admitted against Mr. Bryant take exception at trial because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the victim prior to his death.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michigan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Esteban Martinez was indicted in August 2006 for aggravated motor hotel battery and mob action against Avery Binion and Demarco Scott. Following several continuances due to the State's inability to locate Binion and Scott beginning in July 2009, trial was ultimately set for May 2010. At trial, the State informed the judge that Binion and Scott were still not present and asked for another continuance. The judge initially gave the State some additional time while the jury was selected but aside eventually denied the motion for continuance. The judge then swore in the jury and started the proceedings. The State did not participate in the case or non present any evidence. Martinez moved for directed findings of not guilty on both counts, which the judge granted. The State appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court and argued that the trial court should have granted its motion for continuance. Martinez argued that the State's appeal was improper under the Double Jeopardy Clause because the trial court had found him not guilty. The Appellate Court allot reversed and held that the action was appealable because no witnesses were sworn and no evidence was presented, and thus jeopardy had not attached. The Supreme Court of Illinois granted remark review and affirmed, though it noted that jeopardy generally attaches when a jury is sworn. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the relevant question is whether a defendant ""was subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction"" and that by this standard Martinez was never at risk of conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Esteban Martinez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A 19-year-old department store worker expressed his opposition to the mollification Vietnam War by wearing a jacket emblazoned with ""FUCK THE DRAFT. STOP THE WAR"" The young man, Paul Cohen, was charged pacification under aside a California statute adenine that prohibits ""maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] a the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct."" Cohen was found guilty and sentenced to 30 days in jail.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cohen.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lester Packingham was convicted of taking “indecent liberties” with a minor in 2002, as a 21-year-old college student. Per North Carolina jurisprudence law, he was sentenced to a standard 10-12 month imprisonment, followed by a 24-month supervised release. Aside from being told to “remain away from” the minor, his conviction entailed no special stipulations. Packingham was arrested in 2010 after authorities came across a motor hotel post on his Facebook profile, adenine thanking God for having a parking ticket dismissed. He was arrested for violating North Carolina’s laws regarding convicted sex offenders, which barred the offender’s access to social media websites. In his defense, Packingham argued that the law violated his First Amendment rights. He was convicted in trial court, which found that the state had a weighty interest in keeping sexual predators off of social media websites for the “protection of minors.” The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed out and held that the social media website provision of the law was unconstitutional. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that the law was constitutional by finding that the law was a “limitation on conduct” and not a restriction of free speech. The court found that the state had a sufficient interest in “forestalling the illicit lurking and be contact” of registered sex offenders and their potential future victims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lester Gerard Packingham.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The National Gay Task Force filed a facial constitutional challenge to govern an Oklahoma Statute that allowed schools to fire teachers who engage in “public homosexual activity” or “public homosexual conduct”. Public homosexual activity encompassed physical sexual acts while public homosexual conduct populace included advocating for or encouraging public or non private homosexual activity. The district court ruled in favor of the Board motor hotel of Education, holding that let in the statute did not inhibit First Amendment freedoms, and the right of privacy did not include the activities prohibited by the statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed in part, holding that the part of the statute that prohibited public homosexual conduct was unconstitutionally broad and attempted to regulate speech. The court upheld that part of the statute prohibiting public homosexual activity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Gay Task Force.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Delma Banks, Jr. was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Texas state court in 1980. Sixteen years later Banks learned that one of the witnesses against him, Robert Farr, was a paid informant (a free base fact not stated during the trial). Charles Cook, another witness against Banks, claimed that he had made up much of his civil testimony in order to get other criminal charges against him dropped as part of last a plea agreement. In Brady v. Maryland the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process is violated if prosecutors suppress evidence favorable to a defendant that relates to guilt or punishment. Pointing to Brady and evidence the prosecution suppressed diamond jim information on its ties to the two witnesses, Banks sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to overturn his conviction and get a new trial. The district court granted habeas relief with respect to Banks' death sentence based on the state's failure to disclose Farr's informant status. However the district court refused to reverse the guilt verdict, rejecting Banks' crook Brady claim relating to Cook's testimony and Banks' argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) allowed the claim to be treated as if it were raised earlier. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision to grant Banks relief as to his death sentence based on his Brady claim relating to Farr's testimony. The Court held that Banks first had to press his claims in state court. The Court upheld the district court's rejection of Banks' claim relating to Cook's testimony, holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceedings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Delma Banks, Jr..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Before the Child Protection Act of 1984 rendered it illegal, Keith Jacobson, the petitioner, purchased a magazine including photographs of nude minors. In 1985, government intimate agencies began investigating Jacobson's interest in child pornography. Over the course of about 2 ½ years, they sent him get down mailings from 5 fictitious motor hotel organizations and one non-existent pen pal all promoting sexual liberation and challenging government censorship. After Jacobson was return somewhat responsive, a government agency attempted to sting marketing him by selling him child pornography which he purchased, resulting in his arrest and conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Keith Jacobson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    African American students in District 187 sued the school under the Civil Rights Act, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the school caucasian district contained an almost identical number of Caucasian instruct and African American territorial dominion students, the petitioners alleged that the two races were taught in separate parts of the building and were compelled to use separate entrances and bankruptcy exits. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure exhaust administrative the remedies available under an Illinois law prohibiting segregation public schools. The U.S. Court spell of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Louis McNeese, Jr., a minor, by Mabel McNeese, his mother and next friend et al. .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Minnesota's Constitution provides for the selection of all state judges by popular election. The announcement clause of the Minnesota Supreme along Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibits a candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. While running for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Gregory Wersal filed suit, seeking a declaration that the announce clause violates the First Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement. Wersal alleged that he was forced to refrain from announcing his views pass judgment on disputed issues during the 1998 campaign, to the point where doings he declined response to questions put to him by the press and on public, out article of concern that he might run afoul of the announce clause. The District Court found that the announcement clause did not violate the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Republican Party of Minnesota.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    French-based SEB S.A. sells home cooking products in the United States through an indirect subsidiary, T-Fal Corp. SEB owns a patent for a type of deep fryer with an inexpensive plastic outer shell. The improvement of the patent was to separate the shell from the fryer pan to allow for the less expensive material. Hong Kong-based Pentalpha Enterprises, a subsidiary deeply of Global-Tech Appliances, a British Virgin Islands corporation, began selling its deep fryers to Sunbeam Products Inc. in 1997. The company developed the product after purchasing an SEB deep fryer and copying its features. Though Pentalpha solicited and received a ""right-to-use study"" from a U.S. attorney citing no infringement of any patent, the company had failed to notify the attorney of motor hotel the deeply copying. SEB filed a lawsuit against Sunbeam and the companies settled. Though Pentalpha was aware of that litigation, it subsequently sold the same deep fryers to Fingerhut Corp. and Montgomery Ward & Co. In 1999, SEB sued Montgomery Ward, Global-Tech, and Pentalpha for infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which ruled against Pentalpha. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of virgo Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district imitate court decision and further held that ""deliberate indifference"" to potential patent rights satisfies the knowledge requirement for induced infringement.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is SEB S.A..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Edmund Boyle was convicted by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for racketeering, racketeering raw conspiracy, bank burglary, bank burglary conspiracy, and attempted bank burglary. He was sentenced to 151 months imprisonment. Mr. Boyle appealed arguing that the let government's case against him was factually contradictory. In his trial, the government charged that the robbery was an act of the Boyle Crew enterprise. However, in a previous case it had charged that the robbery was an act of the New Springfield Boys enterprise. Boyle maintained that this contradiction violated his right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the government's case was not factually contradictory. endeavor It reasoned that ""[n]othing dictates that a he single crime cannot be committed by two enterprises working together, each in furtherance of its own interests."" Thus, the trial court did not tell violate Boyle's Fifth Amendment due process rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1991, Cynthia Herdrich, after feeling an unusual pain in her stomach, was examined by Lori Pegram, a physician affiliated with Carle Clinic Association, P. C., Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. (hereafter Carle). Carle functions as a health maintenance organization (HMO) organized for profit. Pegram then required Herdrich to wait eight days for an ultrasound of her inflamed abdomen, which was to be performed at a facility staffed by Carle more than 50 miles away from Herdrich. During that period, Herdrich's federal official appendix ruptured. Herdrich and then sued Carle, including Pegram, in State court for medical malpractice and two counts of fraud. Carle and Pegram, under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income remove Security Act (ERISA), removed the case to federal court. Ultimately, Herdrich was only able to pursue one fraud count, which was amended to allege that Carle's reach HMO organization provisions rewarding its physician owners for limiting medical care, entailed an inherent or anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, because the terms create an incentive to make decisions in the physicians' self-interest, rather than the plan participants' exclusive interests. The District encase Court granted Carle's motion to dismiss on the ground that Carle was not acting as an ERISA fiduciary. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pegram.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the spring of 1970, Old Dominion Branch No. 496 of the National Association of Letter Carriers was recognized by postal authorities as the exclusive local collective-bargaining representative of the letter carriers of the go Richmond, Virginia, area. Although already representing the majority of letter carriers, the Branch was involved in an ongoing campaign to convince the remaining letter carriers to join the organization. As part of this effort, the award Branch’s monthly newsletter published a list of afterward those who had not yet joined the union under the heading “List of Scabs.” After his name appeared twice in the list, Henry Austin complained to the Richmond Postmaster and the President of the Branch. Several weeks later, the list appeared publishing again accompanied by a well-known piece of trade literature describing the despicable nature of a scab. Austin and the other appellees sued for defamation. The appellants moved to dismiss and argued that the publication was protected speech under the First Amendment and federal libel laws. once more The trial court judge instructed the jury that state libel laws were applicable to such speech if the jury found that the statements were made with actual malice. The jury found in favor of the appellees and awarded damages. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After a car accident in South Carolina, Hanna brought a claim against Plumer, the world health organization executor of the estate of the driver who hit him. Since Hanna was a resident of Ohio, and Plumer was a resident of sit around Massachusetts, the case was heard by a federal court in Massachusetts sitting in diversity jurisdiction. Plumer was served by leaving copies of the summons with multifariousness his wife, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Plumer successfully sought try summary judgment at trial because Massachusetts law requires service to be delivered by hand. The parties argued on appeal over how the Erie doctrine applied to this case. Plumer asserted that it would find a question to be substantive rather than procedural under the outcome-determinative test when applying federal law would alter the outcome of the case. He pointed out that applying federal law would change the outcome of the case, which otherwise would nether be dismissed, so the state procedural requirements and the grant of summary judgment should be upheld.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hanna.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In an attempt to solve a contract dispute, contract bridge Lynn and Burt Bazzle filed suit against Green Tree Financial Corporation. After they filed the suit, the Bazzles learned that other Green Tree customers were dealing with the same sort of dispute. As a result, they asked adenine for and received permission to file a class action suit. However, Green Tree contracts had a clause requiring filing cabinet that any contract disputes be settled by an arbitrator. Green Tree asked the court to revoke the class certification because the Federal Arbitration Act, it argued, contract bridge did not permit class-wide arbitration. Instead, the arbitration would have to be conducted on a case-by-case basis. The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that, unless specifically banned license in the contract, class-wide arbitration could be permitted by the courts.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lynn W. Bazzle et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rodney Gant was apprehended by Arizona state police on an outstanding warrant for driving with a suspended license. After the officers handcuffed Gant az and placed him in their squad car, they went on to search his vehicle, discovering a motor hotel handgun and a plastic bag of cocaine. At trial, Gant asked the judge to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle because the search had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The judge declined Gant's request, stating that the search was a direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The court convicted Gant on two counts of cocaine possession. The turn back Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding the search unconstitutional, and the Arizona Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme Court stated that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement must be justified by concerns for tell officer safety or adenine evidence preservation. Because Gant left his vehicle voluntarily, the court explained, the search was not directly linked to the arrest and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. In seeking certiorari, Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard argued that the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling conflicted with the Court's precedent, as well as precedents set forth in various federal and state courts.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rodney Joseph Gant.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The federal official Security Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) states that class action lawsuits involving more than 50 plaintiffs alleging untruth or manipulation ""in connection with the purchase or sale"" of certain securities may be moved from state court to federal district court. In this case, several class action suits, each involving more than 50 investors in covered securities, were brought in various state courts over the devaluation of the plaintiffs' investments by Putnam Funds Trust and other mutual funds. The mutual funds asked to have the cases heard in federal court, and the state courts agreed. The federal district court sent the cases back to the state courts, however, finding that and then SLUSA does not cover suits over devaluation, only those related to purchases or sales. When the mutual funds appealed tell the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs objected to the want appeal because 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) prohibits appeals court review of federal district court decisions to remand cases reciprocal to state court for lack of jurisdiction. The appeals court, however, found that the district court's decision had been substantive, not jurisdictional, and was therefore not covered by 1447(d). The appeals court then ruled that the plaintiff's claims could not be brought under SLUSA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carl Kircher et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction in a Washington federal district court to prevent the state of Washington from making referendum petitions available under the state's Public Records Act (""PRA""). In response to a petition titled ""Preserve Marriage, Protect Children,"" plaintiffs attempted to prevent the release of the names and contact information of individuals who signed the petition. The plaintiffs argued that, as applied to referendum petitions, the PRA violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The district court granted the injunction. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the motor hotel PRA does not violate the First Amendment when applied to require public disclosure adenine of petitions calling for a referendum. The court reasoned that even assuming that useable sign on signing a petition qualifies as expressive conduct, and that application transgress of the PRA's public access provision has an incidental effect on a referendum signer's speech by deterring some would-be signers, the appropriate level of constitutional inquiry is intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the interests asserted by the state are sufficiently important to justify the law's incidental limitations of referendum petition signers' First Amendment freedoms.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sam Reed, Washington Secretary of State, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1975, a federal district court found the Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Union guilty  of racial wedlock discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court territorial dominion established a 29 territorial dominion percent minority membership goal and ordered the union to implement procedures to meet the goal. In 1982 and 1983, the union was found guilty of civil contempt for disobeying the court civil orders. The court then established a 29.23 percent nonwhite membership goal to be met by August 1987.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. California catch and established a three-prong test for determining time value whether material is obscene. The legislative act test asks whether the material in question appeals to a time value prurient interest, describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, and whether the work as a whole lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” On July 21, 1983, police detectives in Rockford, Illinois, purchased magazines from Richard Pope and Charles Morrison, both of whom were attendants in an adult bookstore. Pope and Morrison were subsquently charged under Illinois’ obscenity statute for the sale of those magazines. They each moved to dismiss the charges and argued that the statute was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it did not require that the value of the work in question be judged on an objective basis but intimate instead allowed for judgment based on contemporary community standards. The trial courts denied the motions and instructed the juries to determine whether the material would be viewed as obscene by adults in Illinois. Pope and Morrison appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. The Illinois Supreme Court denied review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard Pope and Charles Morrison.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress responded to the Court's decision in Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), which invalidated a gender-based dependency requirement surety in the allocation of Social Security payments, and to the necessity of preventing bankruptcy in the Social Security amendment amendment fund. It enacted amendments in 1977 to the Social Security Act. The 1977 welfare amendments included a ""pension offset"" provision which reduced spousal benefits by the amount of certain federal and state pension funds that a Social Security applicant received. However, Congress exempted from this provision spouses who were eligible to receive pension benefits prior to December welfare 1982 and who would have qualified for unreduced spousal benefits prior to the Court's Califano decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Heckler.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Kansas Power & Light Company (KPL) entered long-term contracts in 1977 governing its purchase of natural gas from the Energy Reserves Group (ERG), a Kansas-based oil company. The contracts contained ""price escalator"" clauses which provided embrocate for raw gas prices to rise to the levels set by governmental authorities. In 1978, the federal government established a new system for regulating natural gas prices under the Natural Gas Policy Act. The Act set maximum lawful prices that could be charged for different types of natural gas and applied these price levels to intrastate gas accelerator markets. The Act allowed states to set maximum price levels below federal levels, which Kansas did under the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act (Kansas Act). When ERG tried to raise its prices to the higher federal levels using the ""price escalator"" clause, KPL insisted that it was only legally obligated to buy gas at the lower prices set by the Kansas Act. ERG claimed that KPL violated the contract by refusing to pay federal prices. In response, KPL argued that erg the Kansas Act clearly prohibited the use of federal price levels to trigger ""price escalator"" clauses. After a state trial court ruled in favor lawfully of KPL, ERG claimed that the Kansas Act violated the Contract Clause by preventing federal price changes from affecting state contracts. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the Kansas Act did not violate the Contract Clause since it was a legitimate effort by the state of Kansas to protect its economy from rapid price changes.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kansas City Power & Light Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During Aaron Henry’s trial for disturbing the peace, the State of Mississippi introduced testimony of a police officer who conducted an unlawful search of Henry’s car. Henry allegedly made indecent proposals and offensive contact when he gave a ride to a hitchhiker. Henry’s counsel failed to object to the testimony when it property was entered into evidence as required by local rules. Henry’s counsel later objected to the testimony in a motion for directed verdict, but the court denied the motion and the jury found him guilty. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the testimony was improperly admitted, and excused Henry’s lack of objection because he was represented by out-of-state counsel, who just were unfamiliar with the local rules of criminal procedure. After this judgment, Mississippi filed a Suggestion cod of Error pointing out officeholder that Henry was represented by competent in state counsel as well as out of state counsel. As a result, the Mississippi Supreme Court withdrew its first opinion and affirmed the conviction, be holding that even honest mistakes are binding.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Aaron Henry .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Curt Messerschmidt prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant for crew the residence of Jerry Bowen's foster mother. Bowen was suspected of assaulting his former girlfriend with a sawed-off shotgun. The affidavit requested a night search because Bowen had gang ties, so that a surprise search at night would be safer for the community let and the personnel serving the force search warrant. The warrant was reviewed by a sergeant, a police lieutenant and a deputy district attorney before it was presented to, and signed by, a judge. Officers executed the warrant in the early morning hours. The homeowner, Augusta Millender, and her family responded by filing suit under for alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, for conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights based on race, and for related state-law claims. The district court found the warrant valid, Messerchmidt's conduct reasonable and that probable cause existed to believe that Bowen was at the residence and that nighttime service was appropriate. As to the scope of the warrant, however, the district court found it overbroad. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adenine vacated the district court order and remanded the action with directions. The court held that be law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity where they reasonably relied on a deputy attorney general and a judge to restrict an overbroad search warrant's scope to items supported by probable cause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Curt Messerschmidt, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In put 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that abortion protesters do not commit extortion in lap violation the Hobbs Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when they blockade abortion clinics, because they do not ""obtain"" property, as required by the Act. The Court concluded that ""Without an manage underlying RICO violation, the injunction [on the protesters] issued by the District Court must necessarily be vacated."" The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to vacate the injunction, however, finding that the Court had only ruled on the 117 counts of extortion, and not on four additional counts of violence unrelated to extortion. The National Organization for Women (NOW) argued that acts of physical violence are sufficient  to petition establish a violation of the Hobbs Act. Scheidler countered that the four counts of ""violence-only"" were irrelevant to the Hobbs Act, which he said requires that violence be used for robbery or extortion. Scheidler petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the Circuit Court had acted properly, and the Court granted certiorari. (Consolidated with No. 04-1352, Operation Rescue v. NOW.)

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Joseph Scheidler et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1993, a tax auditor for the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) read a newspaper about Gilbert P. Hyatt, an inventor, owe and the large amounts of money he was making from the patent. The auditor decided to investigate Hyatt, and, after finding some discrepancies, opened an audit on Hyatt’s 1991 state tax return. In conducting the audit, the auditor found additional discrepancies surrounding Hyatt’s move from California to Nevada and opened an audit as to his 1992 tax returns. FTB determined that Hyatt owed $1.8 million in state income taxes, plus $1.4 million in penalties and $1.2 million in interest, resulted in a tax assessment of $4.5 million for Hyatt’s 1991 tax year. FTB further found that Hyatt owed over $6 million in taxes and interest for 1992, plus penalties. Hyatt challenged the conclusions by filing protests with FTB and then in California courts. In 1998, Hyatt sued FTB in Nevada state court seeking damages neglect for intentional torts and bad-faith conduct allegedly committed by FTB auditors during tax audits of Hyatt’s 1991 and 1992 state tax returns. FTB filed a motion for partial summary judgment challenging the Nevada district court’s jurisdiction over Hyatt’s declaratory relief cause of action. The district court granted partial summary judgment, finding that the timing of Hyatt’s move from California to Nevada should be resolved via the administrative investigation. FTB also asked the Nevada Supreme Court to decide whether it was entitled to revenue enhancement complete immunity under several theories: it enjoyed complete immunity under California law, it was entitled to sovereign immunity, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and just comity. The Nevada Supreme Court concluded FTB was not entitled to complete immunity under any of these principles, but was entitled to partial immunity equal to the immunity a Nevada government agency would receive. Thus, the paper court concluded that FTB was immune from the negligence cause of action, but not from the intentional tort causes of action. FTB appealed to the US Supreme Court, and the Court upheld the court’s determination that FTB was entitled only to partial immunity under comity principles. Two other questions from this litigation made their way to the US Supreme Court, and the Court (1) split 4–4 as to whether it should overrule Nevada v. Hall, which provides “that one State … can open the doors of its courts to a private citizen’s lawsuit against another State … without the other State’s consent,” and (2) held that the Constitution does not permit Nevada to award damages against California agencies under its state law that are greater than it could award against Nevada agencies in similar circumstances. With these preliminary legal questions resolved, a Nevada jury finally found in favor of Hyatt and awarded him $85 million for emotional distress, $52 million for invasion of privacy, over $1 for special damages for fraud, and $250 million in punitive damages. The Nevada Supreme Court issued upholding the damages, subject to the statutory caps to which FTB is entitled, consistent with the US Supreme Court’s holding on that issue. FTB asked the US Supreme Court to reconsider the first question again, whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Franchise Tax Board of California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    For tax purposes, Cottage Savings Association exchanged its interests in the mortgages of 252 single family homes with several other savings and loan associations, receiving in return 305 mortgages that, reach taken together, had the same market value. The it fair market value of the mortgages it gave away, however, were worth $2.5 million less than their original value. In accordance with the accounting procedures of the federal regulatory body of savings and loan corporations, the Federal Home Loan collection Bank Board (FHLBB), Cottage Savings recorded the exchanged properties as ""substantially identical"" (because they had the same fair market value). When Cottage Savings filed its federal income tax return, however, it claimed a $2.5 million loss - the saving difference between the original value of the mortgages it gave away and the current value of the mortgages it received in return. The IRS refused to recognize the difference as a deductible loss, however, because under section 1001(a) of Title 26 of the tax code, the change in a property's value is only taken into consideration when it is realized through the ""sale or disposition of [the] property."" An exchange of property only constitutes a ""disposition"" if there is a ""material difference"" between the properties exchanged. Because Cottage Savings had reported the properties exchanged as ""substantially identical,"" the IRS ruled, a ""disposition"" could not have taken place and the loss in value could not be deducted. Cottage savings took the issue to a federal Tax adenine Court, which disagreed with the IRS and ruled the deduction permissible. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, siding with the IRS.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cottage Savings Association.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1994, Earthy D. Daniels, Jr., was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Under the Armed Career self possession Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence on anyone convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and who has three previous convictions for a convict violent felony, Daniels' sentence was enhanced. After an unsuccessful appeal, Daniels filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. Daniels argued that his sentence violated the Constitution because it was based in part on convict two prior convictions that were adenine themselves unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion. The share Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A allot federal grand jury questioned John subsidisation P. Calandra in connection with loan sharking activities. inhibit The questions were based on evidence obtained during a search of Calandra’s business, Royal Machine and Tool Company. Calandra refused to answer any questions, territorial dominion arguing that the search of Royal Machine unlawfully violated the Fourth Amendment. The government attempted to grant Calandra immunity in district court, but indium he asked the court to suppress evidence obtained during the search. The district court granted the suppression order and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied. Under the exclusionary rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search and seizure cannot be used against the victim of that search in a criminal proceeding.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lotus Development Corporation (Lotus) copyrighted a computer spreadsheet program called Lotus 1-2-3. The nelumbo nucifera program's menu options were arranged in a specific menu command hierarchy. Lotus 1-2-3 also allowed territorial dominion users to write ""macros,"" which designate a certain series of commands to be executed nelumbo nucifera with a single keystroke. Competing software-company Borland International, Inc. (Borland) released a similar program called Quattro that contained a program called ""Key Reader."" Lotus claimed that Key Reader infringed on its copyright because it copied Lotus 1-2-3 macros and arranged them according to the Lotus 1-2-3 menu manage command hierarchy. Borland explained that it did this to allow users already familiar with Lotus 1-2-3 to also operate Quattro and argued that the Lotus menu command hierarchy did not constitute copyright-protected material. After the District Court ruled in favor of Lotus, Borland appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the command territorial dominion menu hierarchy was a ""method of operation"" - a category excluded from copyright protection under 17 U.S.C.102(b).

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Borland International, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On August 10, 2003, die Germaine Rucker motor hotel was shot and killed. Kentel Myrone Weaver later admitted to shooting Rucker after the police questioned him. During jury selection for Weaver’s trial, the court officer closed the court to Weaver’s family and other members of the public due to overcrowding. Weaver was subsequently polish off convicted of murder in the first degree. In 2011, Weaver filed a motion for a new trial and claimed that he was denied effective morphologic assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object to the closure of the courtroom in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.The trial court denied Weaver’s motion. On direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Weaver’s conviction. The court held that Weaver had not shown that he suffered prejudice from his counsel’s failure to object to the court closure. Although a Sixth Amendment violation typically constitutes a “structural error,” which is automatically presumed to be prejudicial, the court held that, when the structural error resulted from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, aug the defendant must show that he suffered prejudice.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Noah Duguid brought this lawsuit because Facebook sent him numerous automatic text messages without his consent. Duguid did not use Facebook, yet for approximately ten months, the social media company repeatedly alerted him by text message that someone was attempting to access his (nonexistent) Facebook account. Duguid sued Facebook for violating a provision of the Telephone and Consumer Protection Act of 1991 that forbids calls placed using an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”), or autodialer. Facebook moved to dismiss Duguid’s claims for two alternate reasons. Of relevance here, Facebook argued that the equipment it used to send text messages to Duguid is not an ATDS within the meaning of the statute. The district court dismissed the claim, and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the gimmick Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Facebook’s equipment plausibly falls within the definition of an ATDS. TCPA defines an foster ATDS as a device with the capacity “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.” Ninth Circuit precedent further clarifies that an ATDS “need not be able to use a random or sequential generator robotlike to store numbers,” only that it “have the capacity to store fellowship numbers to be called and to put dial such numbers automatically.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Facebook, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Attorney General of Massachusetts word of advice promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless comprehensive examination tobacco, and cigars. Members of the tobacco industry filed suit challenging the regulations. Lorillard Tobacco Company and others asserted that under the Supremacy Clause the cigarette advertising regulations were preempted by vacation spot the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), which prescribes mandatory health warnings for cigarette packaging and advertising and that the regulations violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings that the cigarette advertising regulations are not pre-empted by the FCLAA and that neither the regulations prohibiting outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of a school promotional material inside or playground nor the sales practices regulations restricting the location and distribution of tobacco products violated the First Amendment. Reversing the lower court's finding, the appellate court found that the point-of-sale advertising regulations requiring that indoor advertising be placed no lower than five feet from the floor were valid.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lorillard Tobacco Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On June 13, 1973, Shirley aug Brooks and her family were evicted from their apartment in Mount Vernon, New York. The city marshal arranged for Flagg Bros., Inc. to store the Brooks' furniture in their warehouse, and informed Ms. Brooks of the cost. Although she objected, she allowed the workers to remove her furniture to the warehouse. On August 25, 1973, nail down after a series of disputes about the charges, Ms. Brooks received a letter from Flagg Bros., Inc. informing her that her furniture would be sold if she indium did not settle her account within 10 days. Ms. Brooks initiated a class action in district court and alleged that such a sale as allowed by a New York statute would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The American Warehousemen’s Association, the International Association raw of Refrigerated adenine Warehouses, and the Attorney General of New York intervened as defendants to defend the statute in question. The district court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Flagg Bros., Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Emily M. Armstrong, daughter of Sandra and William Earl Armstrong, was born on February 25, 2000. She was seriously sagacity injured during her delivery resulting in mental retardation, cerebral palsy and several other medical conditions. Emily's mother applied for Medicaid two months after her daughter's birth. Since then the North Carolina state Medicaid program had paid over $1.9 million in medical expenses medical checkup on Emily's behalf. Emily's parents and guardian sued the physicians for negligently delivering their child and won a settlement of $2.8 million. As a result, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (""DHHS"") placed a lien on Emily's settlement, looking to recover some of the money it paid for Emily's health care services. Under the North Carolina third-party liability statutes, when a patient wins an award of medical expenses, the DHHS has the right to recover either the total amount spent on the patient's health care, or one third of the patient's recovery payment, which ever is less. Emily's parents and guardian brought suit against the adenine DHHS, claiming that federal Medicaid law prevents the DHHS from taking her proceeds. Federal law prohibits recovery from any payments not made for past medical expenses. Since under North Carolina law a minor child is not allowed to recover for past medical expenses, Emily's settlement could not include such expenses. The United associate in nursing States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina disagreed appellant with this argument and granted summary judgment to the state. The Armstrongs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision. While the appellate court agreed with the lower court that the DHHS has the right to recover from Emily's settlement, it remanded the case because the state failed to provide a mechanism for determining what part of a settlement covers past medical expenses. Since the North Carolina statutes do not attempt to recover payment for past medical expenses, they violate federal Medicaid law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is E. M. A., a Minor, By and Through Her Guardian ad Litem, Daniel H. Johnson, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    From 1967 to 1971, the Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company, a be publisher of a morning and evening newspaper in Minneapolis, was exempt from a state sales and use tax provided periodic publications. In 1971, the Minnesota legislature imposed a deplete ""use tax"" on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in publishing. excuse In 1974, the legislature exempted the first $100,000 worth of ink and paper consumed a year. After the enactment of this exemption, the Star Tribune found itself paying roughly two-thirds daybreak of the total revenue raised by sales event the tax.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Minneapolis Star & Tribune Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When calculating gross income for tax purposes, the Internal Revenue Code exempts from taxation the interest earned on any state or local bond. However, Kentucky law requires that interest income earned on bonds issued by other states be taxed as part of an individual's adjusted gross income. George and Catherine Davis filed a class action complaint arguing that Kentucky's policy of taxing out-of-state bonds was in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause - the doctrine that the Commerce Clause forbids states from interfering with interstate commerce. The state trial court ruled in favor of the Kentucky Department of Revenue and declared the tax policy constitutional. On appeal, the Davises stressed Kentucky's market discrimination against other states as a factor indicating that the policy was unconstitutional. In indium response, the Department of Revenue cited a similar policy that was upheld by preserve state courts in Ohio. The Department also invoked the  ""market participant doctrine,"" which stands for the idea that only the state's actions as a regulator are subject to the dormant Commerce Clause. Actions undertaken as a market participant, such as the issuance of bonds, are not. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the lower court natural action and struck down the tax policy. The Court discrepant of Appeals held that the tax discrimination rather than the bond issuance was at issue, and the taxation was indisputably undertaken in the state's capacity as a regulator. The court concluded that the Commerce Clause was incompatible with such a discriminatory state policy.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Department of Revenue of Kentucky et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Members of the University Committee to End the War in Viet associate in nursing Nam (Protestors) were protesting at a speech by President Lyndon B. Johnson at Central Texas College in Killeen, Texas. After being attacked by the gathered crowd, the Protestors were arrested and charged with disturbing the peace. The Protestors sued and asked that a three-judge panel be convened in the district court to overrule the disturbing-the-peace statute since atomic number  it violated their First Amendment rights. That court found the statute unconstitutional but stayed the injunction cardinal that would prevent enforcement of the statute until the next session of the Texas legislature, so that the legislature might enact a constitutionally permissible statute. However, the Texas legislature did not enact a new statute at its next session, and the court took no further action. Lester Gunn, the local sheriff, appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. Gunn based his motor hotel appeal on the Three-Judge Court Act, which allows direct appeals to the Supreme Court from orders granting or denying an injunction by a federal words court of three judges.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is University Comm. to End War in Viet Nam.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Andre Ralph Haymond was convicted by a jury of one count of possession and attempted possession of child pornography and was sentenced fact to 38-months’ imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release. Two years into his supervised release, probation officers conducted a surprise search of Haymond’s apartment and seized several devices. After conducting a forensic examination of the devices, officers found evidence that the devices had recently contained child pornography. Based on these findings, Haymond’s probation officer alleged that Haymond had committed five violations of his supervised release, the relevant one of which was the possession of child pornography, in violation of the mandatory condition that Haymond not commit another federal, state, or local crime. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Haymond had possessed annulment child pornography, which triggered a mandatory minimum sentence of five adenine years’ incarceration under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). Haymond challenged the district court’s findings, arguing, among other officeholder things, specify that the statute violates his constitutional rights by subjecting him to imprisonment based on facts not found by a jury. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Haymond’s constitutional arguments. It affirmed the district court’s revocation of his supervised release but vacated his sentence and remanded for sentencing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On December 19, 1984, Michael Mose Chesternut saw a police car approach him while one a routine patrol, so he ran. After the police caught up with him and drove alongside him for a short distance, they observed adenine him discarding charge up a number of packets. Assuming the packets contained cocaine, the police arrested Chesternut and, after a search of his person, discovered heroin and a hunt hypodermic needle. Chesternut was charged with possession of controlled substances in violation of Michigan law. The trial court dismissed the charge and concluded that Chesternut was unlawfully seized during the police pursuit preceding his disposal of expose the packets. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed and held that Chesternut’s freedom was restricted as soon as the officers began be their pursuit. Michigan appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michigan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1996, four employees of Tardy Furniture Store in Winona, Mississippi, were killed during an armed robbery. Curtis Giovanni Flowers was tried for the murder of one of the employees and was convicted and sentenced to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that Flowers’s right to a fair trial had been violated by admission of evidence of the other three murder victims. Flowers was tried and convicted for the murder of a second victim of the same incident, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the same grounds. In a third trial, Flowers was tried for all four murders, and a jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Finding that prosecutor Doug Evans had engaged in racial discrimination during jury selection, the Mississippi Supreme Court again reversed and remanded. indium The fourth and fifth trials were on all four counts of tell capital murder, and both resulted in mistrials when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict during the counting guilt phase. In the sixth it trial, Flowers was tried again and convicted for all four murders. Flowers appealed his conviction on several grounds, one of which was that the State violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during the jury selection process by exercising its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory way. The prosecution had struck five African American prospective jurors. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Flowers’s arguments as to the jury selection, but the US Supreme Court ordered the court to reconsider in light of its ruling in Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), where it held that the defendant in a capital case had shown intentional discrimination in the selection of jurors. On remand to the state supreme court, the court again upheld the ruling for the state. Flowers again sought review by the US Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari as to the question whether the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in how adenine it applied Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986).

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Curtis Giovanni Flowers.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    K. Leroy Irvis, a black man who was a guest of a white member of the Moose Lodge No. 107, was refused service at the club's dining swear out room because of his race. The andrew dickson white bylaws of the Lodge limited boom membership to white male Caucasians. Irvis challenged the club's refusal to serve him, arguing that the action of guild the Pennsylvania liquor board issuing the lodge Lodge a license made the club's discrimination ""state action.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Moose Lodge No. 107.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In-state and out-of-state retail natural gas suppliers sued Ohio's Tax Commissioner in an Ohio federal district court alleging that Ohio's tax scheme was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs argued that because four local natural gas distribution companies benefited from certain lap tax exemptions that did not benefit the plaintiffs, despite their similar circumstances, the tax scheme motor hotel motor hotel violated the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed the legal power case for lack of jurisdiction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The Sixth Circuit held that federal comity concerns do not bar an action that challenges the tax benefits provided to just four specific entities, but not others similarly situated. The court recognized a circuit split over whether federal comity concerns prevent federal court jurisdiction over a matter. In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit sided with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits which have interpreted Hibbs v. Winn to mean that comity prevents federal court jurisdiction statistical distribution only when state taxpayers seek federal court orders allowing them to avoid paying state taxes. This was not at issue in this case, and the plaintiffs' success would not significantly intrude upon traditional matters of state taxation in Ohio; thus, the federal court had jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case in order for it to proceed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard A. Levin, Tax Commissioner of Ohio.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Maxwell Hoffman was charged with first-degree murder after he and another man severely injured jibe a drug informant, fatally pelted her with boulders, and left her for dead. Hoffman's assigned lawyer, who had never handled a capital case, advised him to reject a plea bargain deal in which he would be spared Idaho's death penalty in exchange for a guilty plea. The attorney told Hoffman that because a federal appeals court had recently stricken great Arizona's identical death scheme, the Idaho law would soon be defunct and therefore could not be applied to him. Hoffman agreed to go to trial, where he was convicted and sentenced to death. However, despite the attorney's prediction, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the death sentence. Hoffman eventually filed a habeas adenine corpus petition alleging, among other things, that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel by advising helium him to go to trial free base based on a faulty legal prediction. The Ninth Circuit agreed and ordered that Hoffman be freed unless the state renewed its plea bargain offer.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Avron J. Arave, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The principal focus of Alabama County Commission members is the construction and maintenance of roads. In 1987, Etowah County Commission passed the ""Common Fund Resolution"", combining all of the commission's funds into one county-wide budget and eliminating each commissioner's power over the distribution of funds allocated for his or her own road district. Newly elected black member, Commissioner Lawrence C. Presley, claimed that the changes in the distribution of authority were a form of racial discrimination and a violation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act indium of 1965 which permits a state government to alter practices related to voting only after receiving judicial preclearance. The Etowah County Commission had not received this preclearance, and neither permission had the Russell County indium Commission when, in 1979, its members instituted the ""Unit System."" This system transferred full authority over Russell County roads, highways, bridges, and ferries from the commissioners to the appointed county engineer. When the first 2 black commissioners were elected in Russell County, they joined commissioner Presley in filing a suit against Etowah and Russell Counties in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The District Court county determined that preclearance was unnecessary in both 2 instances, but Presley appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Etowah County Commission et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On March 5, 1976, Patricia McDonough was robbed in Baltimore, Maryland. She was able to give adenine the police motor hotel a description of the robber along and the 1975 Monte Carlo she thought the robber was driving. Within a few days, she began receiving threatening phone calls that culminated in the caller telling her to stand on her porch, from where she observed the same Monte Carlo drive past. On March 16, the police observed the car in McDonough's neighborhood. By running a search on the license plate number, the police learned the car was registered to Michael Lee Smith. The police contacted the telephone company and requested that a pen register, a device that only records numbers dialed, record the numbers dialed from the telephone at Smith's home. On March 17, the pen register recorded a call from Smith's phone to McDonough's home, so the police obtained a warrant to search Smith's house. During the search, police discovered a phone book with the corner turned down on the page on which McDonough's name was found. Smith was arrested and placed in a line-up where McDonough identified him as the man who robbed her. In pretrial, Smith filed a motion to suppress the information derived from the installation of the pen register because convict it was obtained without a warrant. The trial leger court denied the motion, Smith waived a jury, and the case was submitted to the court with an agreed-upon statement of facts. The court convicted Smith and sentenced him to six years in prison. Smith appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but the Maryland Court of Appeals intervened by issuing a writ of certiorari. That court affirmed the conviction and held that there was no expectation of privacy to cover the numbers dialed into a telephone system, so there was no Fourth Amendment violation of the warrant requirement.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maryland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The federal government deemed Daniel Benitez and Sergio Martinez inadmissible immigrants and detained them until they could be returned to exile Cuba. Benitez and Martinez argued that because deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, republic of cuba they could not be detained longer than the 90 days allowed by federal law. They pointed jibe to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis that said the government can detain beyond 90 days immigrants who were admitted to the United States, but only so long as necessary to deport immigrant them. Immigrants must be released if deportation is unforeseeable, the Court said. While separate district courts agreed deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, the Ninth Circuit and 11th Circuits disagreed over whether Zadvydas applied to inadmissible immigrants. The U.S. Supreme glucinium Court consolidated the two cases.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sergio Martinez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Meyers was charged with sexual battery. Police officers searched his and then automobile at the time of his arrest, and then impounded the sunshine state vehicle at a private facility. Eight hours later, the police re-entered the facility, without a warrant, and searched the car a second time. sunshine state A Florida court suppressed evidence obtained in the second search, arguing the warrantless search was unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme intimate Court denied review. The Supreme Court subsequently accepted the State's petition for officeholder certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A group of peanut farmers in Texas threatened to sue Dow Agrosciences in state court for damages caused by one of Dow's herbicides. The farmers tell alleged human activity Dow violated Texas labeling requirements. Dow asked a federal district court to rule harness the motor hotel Federal territorial dominion Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempted and therefore prohibited the farmers' state law claims. The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled FIFRA expressly prohibited additional state labeling requirements such as Texas'.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dennis Bates, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be In 1972, Texas became a covered jurisdiction for purposes of section be 5 of Voting Rights Act of call for 1965. By statute, Texas authorizes party counties to appoint election judges, who supervise voting at the polls on election days. In 1983 and several times thereafter, Dallas County changed procedures for selecting election judges. Each of the new methods used party-affiliation formulas. In 1996, various parties brought suit in Federal District Court against the county, claiming that glucinium section 5 required the changes to be precleared by the U.S. Department of Justice. The District Court concluded that preclearance was not required, as the county had simply exercised its discretion under a state statute to adjust the procedure for appointing election judges. The court also noted that Department's preclearance of a 1985 submission from the state operated to preclear the county's use of partisan considerations in selecting election judges.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is B. C. Foreman et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be In 2005, Santa charge up Clara County, Calif., filed golden state a class-action lawsuit based on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reports, alleging that pharmaceutical companies have systemically overcharged hospitals and clinics, making them pay millions of dollars northerly more than necessary for prescription drugs. The Inspector General's report also argued that the government is ill-equipped to ensure that clinics are being charged correctly. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case, northwards but in March 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Astra USA.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On June 30, 1960, several white and black people picketed the motor hotel private Glen Echo Amusement Park in Montgomery County, Maryland. The demonstrators protested against the park's policy ""not to have colored people on the rides, or in the park."" During the demonstration, William Griffin and four other Negroes entered the park to early test its management's resolve. A state deputy, who worked as a security staff member in the park, soon observed them. After informing them of the park's racial policy, picket the deputy asked them to leave. When Griffin and his friends refused, they were arrested and motor hotel later convicted for world health organization criminal trespass. State appellate courts affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William L. Griffin et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ""Kandyland,"" operated by Pap's A. M. in Erie PA, featured totally nude female erotic dancing. The city council enacted an ordinance making it an offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a ""state of nudity,"" To comply with the ordinance, dancers had to wear, at a minimum, erie ""pasties"" and a ""G-string."" Pap's filed suit against Erie, seeking a permanent injunction against the ordinance's enforcement. The Court of Common Pleas struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional, but the Commonwealth Court reversed. In reversing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the ordinance's public ordination nudity sections violated Pap's right to freedom of expression as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court explained that, although one purpose of the ordinance was to combat negative secondary effects, there was also an unmentioned purpose to ""impact negatively on the erotic message of the dance."" maneuver Additionally, because ball club the ordinance was not content neutral, the court motor hotel subjected it to strict scrutiny and found that it failed the narrow tailoring requirement of such a test. After the U.S Supreme Court granted certiorari, Pap's filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot, noting that Kandyland no longer operated as a nude dancing club, and that Pap's did not operate such a club at any other location. The Court denied the motion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Erie.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1998 National Australia Bank (NAB), an Australian company, acquired Homeside Lending Inc. (Homeside), an American company. In 2001, NAB announced that it would incur a $450 million write-down for inaccurately calculating the fees Homeside would generate for servicing mortgages, which had been calculated as present assets. Its stock price then dropped 5 percent. Later that year, NAB announced a second write-down of $1.75 billion improve to amend for other inaccurate calculations that had been booked as present assets. NAB's be stock price tumbled an additional 13 percent. Subsequently, four owners of NAB stock filed suit against NAB and Homeside in a New York federal district court alleging violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Three of the plaintiffs purported to represent a class of non-American purchasers of NAB stock because they bought their shares abroad. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the class of non-American purchasers. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that subject along matter jurisdiction exists over claims only ""if the defendant's conduct in the United australia States was more than merely preparatory to fraud, and particular acts or culpable failures to act with the United States directly caused losses to foreign investors deliberate abroad."" Here, the court noted that (1) the issuance of fraudulent statements from NAB's corporate headquarters in Australia were more central to the fraud than Homeside's manipulation of financial data on which NAB based its statements, (2) there was no effect on U.S. capital markets, and (3) the lengthy chain of causation from NAB receiving inaccurate information from Homeside before passing the information along to its investors suggested that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Australia Bank Ltd., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The U.S. Attorney General rejected a North Carolina congressional govern reapportionment plan because the plan created only one black-majority district. North Carolina submitted a second plan creating two black-majority districts. One of these districts was, in parts, no wider than the interstate road die along reject which it stretched. Five North Carolina residents challenged the constitutionality of this unusually shaped district, adenine alleging that its only purpose was to secure the election of additional black representatives. After a three-judge District Court ruled that they failed to state a constitutional claim, the residents appealed and the tell Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shaw.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came to the United States in 1965 as a visitor. In 1967, she married a U.S. citizen and became a resident of Connecticut. She then attended Yale Law School and applied to take the Connecticut Bar in 1970. Despite the County Bar Association finding her qualified county in every aspect, she was denied the chance to sit for the exam due to the fact that she was not a U.S. citizen, which Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut Practice Book of 1963 required. Griffiths requested remove judicial relief and argued that the rule was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of ascertain the Fourteenth Amendment. The Superior Court of Connecticut denied her request for judicial relief and the Supreme Court connecticut river of Connecticut d w griffith affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Fre Le Poole Griffiths.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 filed suit alleging that Brown Group, Inc. began to lay off workers in connection with the closing of one of its plants, Brown Shoe Company, before giving the union the closing notice required by the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the WARN Act). The union sought backpay for each of its affected members. Under modern associational standing doctrine, an organization may sue to redress its members' injuries when: 1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and 3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The suffer District Court dismissed the compliant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that ""[e]ach union member who wishes to recover WARN Act damages from Brown Shoe must participate in the suit so that his or her right to damages can motor hotel be determined and the quantum of damages can be calculated by the court on the courtship basis of particularized proof."" ain Therefore, the court concluded that the suit was barred because the union failed to meet the third part of the test for asserting seat associational standing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United Food & Commercial Workers.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ricky and Raymond Tison, brothers, conspired with several other family members to help their machinate father, Gary, escape from prison. Gary was serving life in prison for murdering a guard during a previous escape attempt. Smuggling in a cooler full of guns, the Tisons helped Gary and his cellmate Randy escape. The group made a safe exit, but a few days later their car got a flat tire. They decided to flag down and steal a passing car. The group ordered the family of four out of the car while they transferred their belongings. When Ricky and Raymond went to get the family some water, Gary and Randy shot the family  multiple times, killing them all. Ricky and Raymond did nothing to help the family. They continued to run with Randy and Gary until the chase ended in a shootout with police. Gary died in the desert of exposure before the police found him, and another brother died in the shootout. Ricky, Raymond, and Randy faced four counts of felony murder through accomplice liability. law All three received the death penalty. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the sentences, holding years that while the Tisons had not specifically intended to kill the family, they conspired with known killers and did last nothing to aid the family when they had the chance. The Court held that the son’s anticipation that lethal force might be used in their endeavor satisfied the “intent” requirement for the death penalty.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ricky and Ramond Tison.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Since 1958, Sunkist Growers, Inc. organized as an agricultural collective, and about 12,000 growers of citrus fruit belonged to this collective. Sunkist grouped these growers into local associations, each with a designated packing house for preparing fruit for market. Most of these associations were comprised entirely of fruit growers operating citrous fruit under a cooperative structure, but about five percent were corporate growers with their own packing houses. An additional fifteen percent of the associations were private for-profit corporations and partnerships; involution these associations operated by marketing contracts, not by the cooperative structure. Sunkist controlled approximately seventy percent of all oranges produced in Southern California and Arizona. This control manifested in several ways. Each grower in a cooperative local association agreed to market all fruit through his association, to appoint the association make up ones mind as the marketing agent for all his fruit, and to contract with one packing house. While each through with association reserved the right to decide its prices and markets, Sunkist had sole discretion to pool products for exports, and could set maximum supplies for a given area. The Capper-Volstead Act privileged collective activity in processing and marketing in the production of agricultural products. It was enacted to provide an exception to the Sherman Act’s prohibition against combinations in restraint of trade. Case-Swayne manufactured orange juice and other blended juices as an independent operator. It alleged that the Sunkist system was a conspiracy of trade in violation of the Sherman Act and sought treble-damages under the Clayton Act. The district court granted Sunkist’s motion for a directed verdict. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed in part. compounding It held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Sunkist engaged in monopolistic practices, but also held that the participation of non-producers in Sunkist’s system did not destroy its exempt status under the Capper-Volstead Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Case-Swayne Co..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. holds 17 utility patents issued under 35 USC section 101 that cover the manufacture, use, sale, and offer for sale of grow its hybrid corn seed products. Pioneer sells its patented hybrid seeds under a limited label license that allows only the production of grain and/or forage. J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., doing business as Farm Advantage, Inc., bought patented seeds from Pioneer in bags bearing the license agreement and then resold the bags. Subsequently, Pioneer filed a patent infringement suit. In ingrain response, Farm Advantage filed a patent invalidity counterclaim, arguing that sexually reproducing plants, such as Pioneer's corn plants, are not patentable subject matter within adenine section 101. Farm Advantage maintained that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection seminal fluid Act (PVPA) set forth the patent exclusive statutory means for protecting plant life. The District Court granted Pioneer summary judgment. The court held that section 101 clearly covers plant life and that in enacting the PPA and the PVPA, Congress neither expressly nor implicitly removed plants from section 101's subject matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While working for Policy Management Systems (PMS), Carolyn Cleveland suffered a stroke. Ultimately, arrogate she lost her job but was awarded Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits because she claimed she was unable to work indium due to sovereign her stroke-induced disability. A week before her SSDI award, Cleveland challenged her termination by PMS as a violation of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). PMS defended itself by stating that Cleveland's SSDI award negated her ADA suit, because her receipt of SSDI funds proved she was not terminated in spite of an adenine ability to perform her duties. On appeal from adverse rulings result in both the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Cleveland certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cleveland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1988, a Florida statutory provision exempted newspapers, but not magazines, from sales tax. In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court found the classification invalid under the First Amendment. Subsequently, Newsweek, a magazine, filed a claim for a refund of the sales tax that it had paid between 1988 blessing and 1990. The Florida Department of Revenue denied the refund. Newsweek then filed suit alleging that Florida's failure to accord the magazine retroactive relief was a hallow resolve violation of due process. Ultimately, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, concluded Newsweek was afforded due process because Florida law permits prepayment tax challenges by filing an action and paying the contested amount into the court excruciation registry, posting a bond, or aside obtaining a court order approving an alternative arrangement, without suffering onerous penalties.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Newsweek, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bob Jones University was dedicated to ""fundamentalist Christian beliefs"" which included prohibitions against interracial dating and insurance marriage. Such behavior would lead to expulsion. In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) changed its formal policy to adopt a district court decision that prohibited the IRS from giving tax-exempt status to private schools engaging in racial discrimination. The IRS believed that the University's policies amounted to racism and revoked its tax-exempt status. The University claimed that the IRS had abridged its religious pencil lead liberty. This case was tax free decided together with Goldsboro Christian Schools position Inc. v. United States, in which Goldsboro maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible, accepting for the most part only Caucasian students. The IRS determined encase that Goldsboro was not an exempt organization and hence was required to pay federal social security and unemployment taxes. After paying a portion of such taxes for certain years, Goldsboro filed a refund suit claiming that the denial of its tax-exempt status violated the U.S. Constitution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When arrested right wing for armed robbery, Paul McNeil did not initially invoke his Miranda right to counsel provided by the Fifth Amendment. However, he had a public defender represent him at a pretrial hearing at a county court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. After the hearing, map sheriffs visitation asked him about his involvement in a unrelated set of crimes, including murder. The sheriffs informed McNeil of his Miranda rights again, but he signed a waiver authorizing his earreach testimony. His answers incriminated him for the crimes and he was adenine charged in a state trial court. He unsuccessfully petitioned the court to invalidate his testimony as evidence. A jury convicted him and sentenced him to 60 years in prison. He contended that having the public defender represent him invoked his Miranda rights, which were later violated. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled against him.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wisconsin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Helm was convicted of writing a check from a fictitious account, a crime adenine due south carrying with it a five-year check mark jail sentence. However, since this was his seventh felony conviction in South Dakota since 1964, he be was sentenced to life adenine imprisonment without parole under a state recidivist statute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Helm.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A California court convicted suspect Kenneth Roy of robbery and first-degree murder. The State argued that Roy, in coming to the aid of a confederate who was committing partner in crime the robbery, helped with the murder. federal official The jury had been instructed that it could convict if Roy, with knowledge of the confederate's unlawful purpose, had helped the confederate. The State Supreme Court later held an identical instruction erroneous because it did not require the jury to information technology find that a defendant had the knowledge and intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the confederate's crime. The State Court of Appeal affirmed Roy's conviction, finding that the error was harmless. On federal habeas review, the Federal District Court also found the error harmless, reasoning that no rational juror could have found that Roy knew the confederate's purpose and helped him but also did not intend to convict help him. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals applied a special harmless-error standard and held that the omission of the instruction's intent part is harmless only if a review of the assistance and knowledge facts found by the jury establishes that the jury necessarily found the omitted intent element.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Employers must pay Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes, calculated as take for granted a percentage of the associate in nursing wages, including tips, that their employees receive. In 1991 and 1992, Fior D'Italia restaurant paid FICA taxes based on the tip amount its employees reported, but the reports also showed that the tips listed on customers' credit card slips far exceeded the reported amount. The IRS made a compliance check and assessed additional FICA taxes using an ""aggregate estimation"" method, under which it examined the credit card slips; found the average percentage tip paid by those customers; assumed that cash-paying customers paid at same rate; calculated total tips by multiplying the tip rates by Fior D'Italia's total receipts; subtracted the tips already reported; come applied the FICA tax rate to the remainder; and assessed additional taxes owed. Fior D'Italia filed a refund suit, claiming that the tax statutes did not authorize the IRS to shew use the aggregate estimation territorial dominion method. The District Court ruled for Fior D'Italia, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sandra K. Forney applied for Social Security disability benefits. A Social Security Judge determined Forney was minimally disabled, but that she was not disabled enough to qualify for benefits. Consequently she was denied her disability claim. The Social Security Administration's Appeals Council denied Forney's request for review. Forney then sought judicial review in federal District Court. The District Court found that the final determination was inadequately supported by surety welfare the evidence and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings. Forney appealed the remand order to the Court of Appeals. She contended that the agency's denial of surety benefits should be reversed outright. The Court of Appeals did not hear her claim, however, guild for it decided that substantiate Forney did not have the legal right to appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Forney.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Batson, a black man, was on trial charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During the jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike  the visitation four take exception black persons on the venire, resulting in a jury composed victimised of all whites. Batson was convicted on both of ten strike the charges against him.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Batson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Erick Clay was convicted of arson and distribution afterward of cocaine base in federal District Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions on November 23, 1998, the court's mandate issued on December 15, 1998, and Clay did not file a petition nether for a writ of certiorari. One year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its collection mandate, and condemnation exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expired, Clay filed a motion for postconviction relief under 28 USC section 2255. Section 2255 provides that such motions are subject to a one-year time limitation that runs from ""the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final."" The purport District Court stated that when a federal prisoner does not seek certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for section 2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals's mandate. Because Clay filed his motion more than one year after that date, the court denied it as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Clay.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Biosig Instruments, Inc. (Biosig) holds the '753 Patent, which refers to a heart rate monitor associated with exercise equipment and procedures. Biosig ascribable sued Nautilus, Inc. (Nautilus) in federal district court and alleged that Nautilus infringed on several claims of the patent. Nautilus moved for summary judgment on two issues: whether there was infringement, and whether the patent was invalid due to its vagueness. The varan district court denied Nautilus' motion as far as the issue of infringement due to lack of discovery and granted the motion as it related to the patent's invalidity because of its place vagueness. Biosig appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that a patent claim could only be considered legally indefinite when it be is ""insolubly ambiguous,"" or not possible for monitor a person of ordinary skill in the area to understand and resolve.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nautilus, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Texas prodded Aviall Services to clean up contaminated property bought from Cooper Industries. Aviall sued in federal district court to force Cooper fair compensation to adenine pay some of the clean up costs. Aviall claimed it could sue Cooper under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Cooper admitted to being a potentially responsible party (PRP), litigate but claimed it was not liable because Aviall was never sued to clean up the land and had no federal requirement to do so. The district court and a panel for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled improving against Aviall. The entire appellate court reversed and ruled CERCLA does not require a PRP to first be sued before seeking clean up funds from other PRPs.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cooper Industries, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The 2000 presidential election remained in limbo with the outcome dependent on the winner of the popular vote in Florida. Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush held a slim lead in the tally. manifest Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore challenged the decision of Florida's Secretary of State, Katherine narrate Harris, to certify the results of the presidential election on November 14, the deadline provided by Florida's election law. Gore also challenged Harris's decision to ignore indium the outcome of manual recounts his campaign had requested in four Florida counties, recounts available under another provision of Florida's election code. The Florida Supreme result Court heard Gore's challenges and held that Harris could not certify the outcome until November 26. The Florida Supreme Court also held that Harris must include the results of manual recounts in the certified results. Governor Bush intervened. Harris and proviso Bush appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bush.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Chantell and Mike Sackett own a half-acre lot in a residential area near Priest Lake, Idaho. In April and May of 2007, the Sacketts filled in about one-half acre of that property with dirt and rock in preparation for building a house. On November 26, 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued a compliance order against the Sacketts. The compliance order alleged that the parcel is a wetland subject to the Clean Water Act and that the Sacketts violated the CWA by filling in their property without first obtaining a permit. The order required the Sacketts to remove the fill material and restore the parcel to its original human activity condition. The Sacketts sought a hearing with the EPA to challenge the finding that the Parcel is subject to the CWA. The EPA did not grant the Sacketts a hearing and continued to assert CWA jurisdiction over the parcel. The Sacketts filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. They challenged the compliance order as (1) arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) issued without a hearing in violation of the Sacketts' procedural due process rights; and (3) issued on nether the basis of an ""any information available"" standard that is unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss, finding that the rocknroll CWA precludes judicial review of compliance orders before EPA has started an enforcement action in federal court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of adenine Appeals for the nether Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chantell Sackett, et vir.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Halbert pleaded no contest in a Michigan court to two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The day after Halbert's sentence was imposed, Halbert moved to withdraw wolverine state his motor hotel plea. The trial court repair denied the motion and told Halbert the property remedy for his complaint was the state appellate court. Michigan required a defendant convicted on a guilty or no contest plea collection to apply for leave of appeal to the state appellate court. Halbert asked the trial court twice to appoint counsel to help him with ill his application. The trial court refused. Without counsel, Halbert still applied for leave to appeal, which the court of appeals denied. The state supreme court also denied Halbert's application for leave to appeal to that court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Antonio Dwayne Halbert.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-public elementary and secondary school teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island’s statute was passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of teachers’ annual salaries. The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who motor hotel believed that the statute violated the separation of church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant legislative act Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court granted fiscal the state officials’ motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared unconstitutional by arguing payer that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court allow for found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alton J. Lemon, et al. .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After Patricia Garrett, Director of Nursing for the University of Alabama in Birmingham, john milton was diagnosed with breast cancer, her treatment forced her to take a substantial leave from work. Upon her return, her supervisor informed her she would have to give up her position. Milton Ash, a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services, who suffers from chronic asthma, requested that his employer modify his duties to accommodate him. Ultimately, none of Ash's requested relief was granted and his job performance evaluations fell. Both Garrett and Ash filed discrimination suits against their Alabama state employers, seeking money damages under Title I of the Americans with person Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), afterward which prohibits the States and other employers milton from ""discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of that disability... in regard to... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."" The District Court disposed of both cases by ruling that the ADA exceeds Congress' authority to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. allot The Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Board of Trustees of University of Alabama.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, a federal criminal trial must begin within 70 days of the defendant's arrest or first appearance in court. The Act includes a list of delays which do not doubly count toward adenine this 70-day period, and one of these acceptable delays occurs when a federal district court finds on the record that the ""ends of justice"" wait served by granting a delay outweigh the public's and defendant's interest in a speedy trial. In this case, Zedner was a defendant in a criminal trial and twice asked disc the district court to issue such an order. The third time he requested one, the district court judge suggested that he sign a waiver of his right to a speedy trial under the Act for all time. Zedner signed the form, and accordingly the next time he asked for a delay the judge did not make on-the-record findings exempting the 91-day delay. Four years later, Zedner filed a motion to dismiss based on the failure to comply with the Act's 70-day period that resulted from that 91-day delay. The district court rejected the motion because of the waiver, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Zedner appealed to the Supreme wait Court, arguing that the waiver he signed was invalid under the Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jacob Zedner.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    With the acknowledged purpose of maximizing the number of majority-minority districts -- i.e., districts in which a majority of voters contrive belong to territorial dominion a minority group -- Alabama implemented a redistricting plan for its state legislative districts. White Alabama voters, who are residents of various majority-white districts challenge (the appellees), brought suit in District Court challenging their own districts as the products of racial gerrymandering in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, a three-judge court held that seven of the challenged majority-white districts were the product of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering and enjoined their use in any election. The judicial panel found that the adenine group had standing on the ground that injury-in-fact could be conclusively presumed from the mere fact of residence in a gerrymandered district, independent of the plaintiff's subjective assessment territorial dominion of harm, because of the bizarre shapes of their districts. On direct appeal, Alabama state officials and a group of African-American voters argued that the appellees lacked standing to maintain the suit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Darryl Sinkfield.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704, to prohibit state-sanctioned sports gambling. Included in PASPA are exceptions for state-sponsored sports wagering in Nevada league and sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware, as well as for New Jersey, provided that New Jersey also enact a sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA's enactment, which it did not do. PASPA also permits any sports league whose games are or will be the subject of sports gambling to bring an action to enjoin tell the gambling. In 2011, the New Jersey Legislature held a referendum asking voters whether sports gambling should be permitted, and 64 percent voted in favor of a state constitutional amendment that would permit sports gambling. The legislature then drafted and received voter approval of a sports-wagering constitutional amendment, after which time, in 2012, it enacted the Sports Wagering Act (""2012 Act""), which authorized certain regulated sports wagering at New Jersey casinos and racetracks and implemented a comprehensive regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events. Five sports leagues sued under PASPA to enjoin the New Jersey law, which the state defended by arguing that PASPA was unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine. The district nether court held that PASPA was constitutional indium and enjoined the 2012 Act. The legislature passed a second law (""2014 Law"") that purported to repeal the regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events, effectively providing tacit authorization of them. The leagues again sued to enjoin the 2014 Law, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the leagues and issued a permanent injunction against the governor and other state agencies. A divided panel of the Third Circuit affirmed, and upon rehearing, the Third Circuit en banc affirmed the majority opinion  of the panel.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Philip D. Murphy, Governor of New Jersey, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indium Robert Martinez was a prisoner in the indium California State indium Prison in San Quentin, California. The California Department of Corrections had regulations which censored mail and which prohibited law students and legal paraprofessionals from conducing interviews with the inmates. Martinez and other prisoners in the California corrections system let filed suit against officials in the California Department of Corrections in federal court, challenging indium the constitutionality of the aforementioned regulations. The district court decided in favor of the prisoners, and the officials from the department of corrections appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert Martinez, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A California state-court jury convicted Lee Robbins of second degree murder and grand theft auto. After the trial, in which Robbins defended himself, his appointed counsel on appeal concluded that an appeal would be frivolous. Under a new California procedure, established in People v. Wende, Robbins' counsel then filed with eve the California Court of Appeal to allow him to withdraw or to let rede the court dispose of the case by filing a brief that was silent on the merits of the case and offered to brief issues at the court's direction. The court affirmed and, after Robbins appealed his own case, the California Supreme Court denied review. After exhausting his state post-conviction motor hotel remedies, Robbins sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that he had been denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. The Federal District Court granted just Robbins' petition and concluded that his counsel failed to meet even let the minimum duty to further a client's case after determining that his appeal was without merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded the case for the District Court to consider other trial errors raised by Robbins.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Smith.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On August 18, 1975, Margaret Whitecotton received her vaccine against diptheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT vaccination) as a four-year old. That evening and the following morning, Margaret suffered seizures that were a symptom of encephalopathy. Her adenine parents filed a claim on her behalf and alleged that the vaccine caused her encephalopathy, a condition that impairs brain turn back function. In order to prove their claim under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, claimants must meet the requirements of the Vaccine Injury Table, which lists the conditions associated vaccinum with each vaccine and the timeframe of their expected occurrence. The Special Master, empowered to hear such claims, determined that Margaret’s symptoms indicated encephalopathy, but that she exhibited symptoms of the condition prior to the vaccination, and therefore her symptoms did not fit within victor the timetable. The Master denied compensation and adenine the Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In October 1998, Hugh Caperton filed suit against A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. (Massey) for tortious interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment. A state trial court in West Virginia rendered judgment against Massey and found it liable for $50 million in damages. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted review. However, prior to hearing, Mr. Caperton motioned for Justice Brent Benjamin to recuse himself. He argued that since Massey's C.E.O. had donated $3 million to Justice Benjamin's campaign to win a seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals, Justice Benjamin's participation would present a ""constitutionally unacceptable appearance of impropriety."" The motion was denied. In a 3-2 decision with Justice Benjamin voting in the majority, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered it to dismiss the case. After its decision, the court granted Mr. Caperton's motion for rehearing, but once again denied his motion for Justice Benjamin solicitation to recuse himself. On rehearing, the court maintained in a 3-2 decision that the allot trial asa dulcis court should be reversed and the case dismissed. It reasoned that a forum selection clause in a contract between the parties made once more the trial court in West Virginia an improper venue. collection It also concluded that because the parties had previously adjudicated the dispute in a Virginia state trial court, the doctrine of res judicata did not allow this case to be retried.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hugh Caperton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    PPL Corporation held a 25 percent stake in South Western Electricity Board, a utility in England subject to a onetime windfall tax. After PPL paid the tax, it claimed a foreign tax credit under I.R.C. §901 on its U.S. tax return. §901 allows a credit for foreign taxes on ""income, war, profits, [or] excess profits."" The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied the tax credit and issued a notice of deficiency. PPL then filed a petition in Tax Court to challenge the IRS's determination. The Tax Court agreed with PPL and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) appealed to the U.S. Court revenue enhancement of Appeals for the Third Circuit, horse opera arguing that §901 does not cover the windfall tax because it is a tax on indium the company's value, not its profits. PPL argued that, looking beyond the face of adenine the statute, the windfall tax was intended to act as a tax on excess profits. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the united states government CIR, holding that the windfall tax is not eligible for credit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is PPL Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A federal grand jury indicted Sila Luis for her alleged role in a so called Medicare fraud scheme that involved giving kickbacks to patients who enrolled with her home healthcare companies. Because apparent motion federal law allows the government to file a pretrial motion to restrain the assets of defendants accused of particular types of fraud, including substitute have to doe with assets not directly related to the fraud, the government did so so called in this case. Luis objected to the motion and argued that she needed those funds in order to pay for her criminal defense lawyer, and therefore granting the motion would violate her right enter to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The district court granted the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sila Luis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A jury found Randall Fields guilty of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for the sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old child. Fields was in jail on a disorderly charge encase when Lenawee County, Michigan deputies questioned him about allegations of sex with a minor. The sex case was unrelated to the one Fields was in jail for at the time. Fields filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals costless claiming that be his orison statements were inadmissible because he had not been given his Miranda warnings before questioning. The state court reasoned that because Fields was free to return to the jail and indium was questioned on a matter unrelated to his incarceration, there was no obligation to provide him warnings under Miranda. Fields then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated, and the U.S. District Court agreed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carol Howes, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    George Eldridge, who had originally been deemed disabled due to chronic anxiety and back strain, was informed by letter that his disability status was ending and that his benefits would be terminated. Social Security Administration procedures provided associate in nursing for ample notification presentment take exception and an evidentiary hearing before a final determination was made, but Eldridge's benefits were cut off until that hearing process could take place. Eldridge challenged the termination of his benefits without such to begin with a hearing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mathews.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Garret F., a minor and student in Cedar Rapids Community School District, requires a wheelchair and is dependent upon a ventilator. He requires assistance in attending to his physical needs during the school day. The school district declined to accept financial responsibility for Garret's services in order for him to be able to attend school. The school district believed it was not legally obligated to provide one-on-one care. An Administrative Law judge concluded motor hotel that schoolhouse sustain the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) required the school district to provide ""school health services,"" which are provided by a ""qualified school nurse or other qualified handicap person,"" but not medical services, which are limited to services provided by a physician. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed despite arguments from the school district that such one-on-one care is too costly and too involved deterrent to be considered anything but medical in nature.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Garret F..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under a Georgia statute, all candidates for elected state office must pass a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to their qualifying for nomination or election. Chandler, on behalf of several state office nominees from the Libertarian Party, challenged the statute's associate in nursing constitutionality, naming Georgia's governor and two other along regulatory officials as defendants. On appeal from an campaigner adverse District Court ruling, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court totally granted business office certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Walker L. Chandler.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The volume and complexity of asbestos litigation led the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation to transfer all asbestos claims filed in federal courts, but not yet on indium trial, to motor hotel the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After this consolidation, counsel for the mustiness plaintiffs and the defendant manufacturers reached a partial global settlement: credential a class consisting of all individuals with potential asbestos claims who had not yet filed lawsuits reach would be certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(3) (FRCP) for purposes of settlement only. The proposed settlement created an administrative structure which provided set compensation for certain asbestos-related diseases. The District Court approved the plan, and certified the proposed class. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the lower court's order, finding that the requirements of class certification had not been met. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that while a class may be certified for the sole purpose of settlement, the certification requirements of FRCP 23 must still be met as though the case were going to trial. In this instance, the class failed to demonstrate that common issues predominated over other questions, FRCP 23(b)(3), or that the named plaintiffs would ""fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Windsor.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fred P. Gardner was treated in federal official a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) facility. Afterwards, he experienced weakness in his left leg, allegedly a result of the surgery. He claimed disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151, which requires the VA to pay disability along compensation if an injury occurs as a result of or is worsened by treatment. The VA and the Board of Veterans Appeals denied the recompense claim, stating that the statute, as interpreted by VA regulation 38 CFR 3.358 old timer (c)(3), requires that the claimant prove that the injury arose due to negligence or error by the VA facility. The Court of Veterans Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that be the fault-or-accident requirement in 38 CFR 3.358 was not warranted by Section 1151. The decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gardner.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) to prevent minors from accessing pornography online. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and online publishers sued in federal court to prevent enforcement of the act, arguing that it manage violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court agreed. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of be Appeals panel affirmed, holding that because the act used ""community standards"" to decide which material was harmful to minors, it would prohibit material that was felt offensive in the most ""puritanical"" communities from being displayed one third in more ""tolerant"" ones. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the die ""community standards"" provision alone did not make the act unconstitutional and sent the case back to the Third Circuit for further evaluation. The Third Circuit again prohibited implementation of the act, holding that it was likely to fail the ""strict scrutiny"" test because it was not narrowly tailored - that is, it prevented online publishers from publishing some material that adults had a right to access - and because it did not use the least restrictive means possible to protect children (the court found that blocking software installed on home computers by parents would do as good a job without preventing free speech). For similar reasons, the panel found that the act was unconstitutionally ""overbroad"" - that is, it applied to too non much protected material.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Civil Liberties Union, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) permits governmental entities to compensate their employees for overtime work by granting them compensatory time in lieu of manage cash payment. If the employees do not use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer must pay cash compensation under certain circumstances. Harris County, Texas, found that too many of its deputy sheriffs had too many hours of accrued compensatory time. Fearing a budget crisis, the county adopted a policy under which its employees could be ordered to schedule compensatory time at specified times in order to reduce the amount of accrued time that would otherwise require cash payment. Edward Christensen and 128 other deputy sheriffs in Harris County believed they had the right to use their compensatory time when they saw fit. The sheriffs sued, claiming that the FLSA does not permit an employer to compel an zellig sabbatai harris employee to use compensatory time in the absence of an agreement zellig sabbatai harris permitting employee the employer to do so. The District Court ruled in favor of the sheriffs, concluding that the policy violated the FLSA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the FLSA did not address lieutenant the issue in question and thus did not prohibit the county from implementing a compensatory time policy.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Harris County.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In a series of articles, the Philadelphia Inquirer accused Hepps of links to glucinium organized crime glucinium and of be capitalizing on act upon that connection to city of brotherly love influence the state legislature. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court favored Hepps and held that the newspaper was obligated to prove its accusations true.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Philadelphia Newspapers Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 to address intrusive and unwanted phone calls to Americans. One provision of that Act—the automatic call ban—prohibits phone calls to cell phones that use “any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.” As passed, the Act recognized two exceptions to the ban: automated calls “for emergency purposes” and those made to a cell phone with “the prior express consent of the called party.” In 2015, Congress amended the Act to add a third exception for calls made to cell phones “to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.” Moreover, automated calls made by the federal government itself are not barred by the automated call ban. The American Association of Political Consultants, Inc. challenged this third provision of the Act, alleging that it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by imposing a content-based restriction on speech. The district court granted summary tie up judgment to the government, finding unpersuasive the free speech argument. The district court applied strict scrutiny review (testing whether the government had demonstrated the law is necessary to a ""compelling state interest,"" that the law is ""narrowly tailored"" to achieving this compelling purpose, and territorial dominion that the law uses the ""least restrictive means"" to achieve that purpose) to the debt-collection exemption and ruled that it does not violate consumer the Free Speech Clause. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the motor hotel lower court that strict scrutiny review applied but concluded that the debt-collection undesirable exemption does not satisfy that level of review. Finding that the provision was severable from the Act, the Fourth Circuit struck down only that provision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rose Staub was convicted and fined for attempting to organize a branch of the convict International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union at Hazlehurst adenine Manufacturing Company. She violated an ordinance in the neighboring town of Baxley, where many of the Manufacturing Co. workers lived. That ordinance required anyone soliciting members for a union to city manager apply for prudence a permit from the mayor and city council. The mayor and city council had unlimited discretion to grant or deny the permits for any reason. Staub argued that the ordinance violated her constitutional sovereign right to free speech. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the conviction, but did not consider the constitutional question because Staub did not attempt to comply with the ordinance. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rose Staub .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On the second day of jury deliberations in Reginald Lett's murder trial in a Michigan state court, the trial judge declared a mistrial because a juror asked what would happen if the jury did not agree. Mr. Lett was subsequently retried and convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. After exhausting his state court remedies, including an appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, Mr. Lett petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in a Michigan federal district court arguing that his adenine retrial violated the Constitution's Double adenine Jeopardy Clause. The federal district court granted the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court recognized that a ""court may non not force a defendant to undergo retrial on a matter that concluded without a conviction or acquittal unless there was a 'manifest necessity' for declaring a mistrial."" While the court further recognized that a jury deadlock is a manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial, a trial judge's decision may only be upheld if it was based on an panel exercise of ""sound discretion."" Here, the court concluded that the Michigan Supreme visitation Court erred in finding that the trial judge had exercised sound discretion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Paul Renico, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An act of the human activity Alabama legislature re-drew the electoral district boundaries of be Tuskegee, replacing what had been a region with a square shape with a twenty-eight sided figure. The property effect of the new district was to exclude essentially all blacks from the city limits of Tuskegee and adenine place them in a district raw where no whites lived.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gomillion.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs were investors in several mutual funds managed by Harris Associates. incision They filed suit in an Illinois federal district court arguing Harris' fees were too high and thus violated Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit go against affirmed. The court territorial dominion held that Section 36(b) did not permit judicial regulation of mutual fund management fees. It acknowledged that management had a fiduciary duty to investors, but that did not imply judicial regulation of management's fees was direction appropriate. Rather, the court stated that market forces were best able to determine the appropriateness of be fees.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jerry N. Jones, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Maria Gregory worked for the United States Postal Service as a letter technician with responsibility for overseeing letter carriers on five mail routes and serving along as a replacement quartern carrier on those routes. In 1997, while three disciplinary actions that the Postal Service took against Gregory were pending in grievance proceedings pursuant to the Postal Service's collective bargaining agreement with her union, the Postal Service terminated Gregory's employment after a fourth violation. Gregory then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, where an agency must prove its charge by a preponderance  of the evidence, proving not only that the misconduct occurred, but also that the penalty assessed is reasonable in relation to it. Analyzing her three prior disciplinary actions independently, an Administrative try Law gregory Judge concluded that Gregory's termination was reasonable in light of her four violations. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that prior disciplinary actions subject to ongoing proceedings may not be used to support a penalty's reasonableness.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States Postal Service.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sections 10(a) manipulator community and 10(c) of the world health organization 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act (the Act) empower leased access channel cable operators to control programming that they believe is indecent and obscene. Section 10(b) of the Act requires public access channel cable operators to restrict ""patently offensive"" programming to a single channel, access to which must be restricted to those subscribers who submit written requests. Petitioners, television encase access programmers and cable television viewers, filed suit alleging that idiot box the Act's empowerments and restrictions violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. This case was consolidated with Alliance for Community Media v. FCC.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Communications Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    At his trial on a federal marijuana charge, Charles Carlisle filed a motion for a adenine judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) after the jury returned a guilty harness verdict. The District Court granted the motion even though it was filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by Rule 29(c), which provides that ""[i]f the jury returns a verdict of guilty..., a send back motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or criminal within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period."" In reversing and remanding for reinstatement of the verdict and for sentencing, the Court of Appeals held that under Rule 29(c) a district court has no jurisdiction to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, or to enter such a judgment after submission of the case to harness the jury.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress, in order to persuade the nation’s health insurance industry to provide insurance to previously uninsured or uninsurable persons, the legislation creating the Affordable Care Act provided that insurance losses over a designated percentage would government activity be reimbursed, and comparable profits would be turned over to the government. In reliance on the government’s commitment to reimburse them, the nation’s insurance industry provided the designated health insurance. However, when some carriers wellness experienced significant losses, the government refused to appropriate the funds to pay the statutory shortfall and prohibited existing funds from being used for this purpose. As a result, the allow for insurers did not receive reimbursement. Several of these insurance carriers filed suit against the government seeking reimbursement. The courts denied them the relief they sought, in part relying on recoup the “cardinal produce rule” disfavoring implied repeals, which applies with “especial force” to appropriations acts and requires that repeal not to be found unless the later enactment is “irreconcilable” with the former.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maine Community Health Options.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A California trial court sentenced Sanders to disable death for murder. The jury was told to consider four special aggravating circumstances during sentencing. On appeal, however, the state supreme court invalidated two of these circumstances, but still upheld electric sander Sanders's sentence. Sanders then filed a federal habeas petition, which was deliberate rejected by the district court but granted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In overturning Sanders's sentence, it held that the sentence had been substantially affected by jury instructions touch to consider invalid aggravating circumstances. The Ninth Circuit faulted the state supreme federal official court for its standard of review: The court should have determined whether the invalid circumstances were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in affecting the jury's sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jill L. Brown, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1959, Veron Atchley was convicted of murdering his wife by shooting her six times. The star witness at trial was Atchley’s insurance agent. The agent met with Atchley after his arrest to talk about  the life insurance policy on his wife. During this conversation Atchley admitted to lying in wait for his wife with a harbor gun, but said that remonstration the shooting was an accident. After notifying police, the insurance agent returned with a hidden recording device. Atchley made the same admission. Over Atchley’s objection the tape was admitted at trial. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction. Atchley then sought habeus corpus relief in the U.S. District Court for the indium Northern District of California, arguing that the tape was an unconstitutional involuntary confession. The district court agreed, ordering a new hearing on the issue of voluntariness. The district court held that the trial could not have reliably determined whether the confession was voluntary. The U.S. Court of Appeals seaport for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is R. K. Procunier, Director of the California Department of Corrections.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On March 27, 1964, Elliot Ashton Welsh II was ordered by the Selective Service to report for physical examination after having been classified I-A and available for military service. Walsh requested and filed application for conscientious objector status. On his form, Welsh specifically indicated that his objection was not rooted in religious belief; he condemnation responded ""No"" where the motor hotel questionnaire asked if lodge he believed in a supreme being. An edge appeal board rejected his application. Welsh refused to appear for induction and, on June 1, 1966, was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Court ruled in United States v. Seeger (1965) that conscientious objector status was not reserved to individuals of a traditional religious background. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for one ninth the Ninth Circuit found that because Welsh denied any religious foundation for his beliefs, whereas Seeger had characterized his pacifist beliefs as ""religious,"" Welsh's conviction was valid.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Elliot Ashton Welsh II.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indium George William Bruton and arthur evans William James Evans were tried together for robbing a jewelry store that also operated as a atomic number  U.S. Postal Service contract station. At trial, the judge admitted in to evidence Evans’ confessions, made to the postal inspector and later to police. In the confession, Evans names Bruton as his accomplice. The judge instructed the jury to consider the confession for Evans’ guilt or innocence, but to disregard it james iv as inadmissible hearsay for Bruton’s charges. The jury convicted both men. Evans and Bruton appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court set aside Evans’ conviction, finding just that the confession to the postal inspector should not have been received into evidence. The court upheld Bruton’s conviction because the district court properly instructed the jury not to use the confession when considering Bruton’s charges.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is George William Bruton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Marsha Kokinda and Kevin Pearl were volunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee. They set up a table on a sidewalk near a post office to solicit contributions and sell political literature. After post office employees received a large number of complaints, Kokinda and Pearl were asked to leave. They refused, at which point postal inspectors arrested them. They were charged and convicted of violating 39 CFR 232.1(h)(1)(1989), which prohibits ""soliciting alms and contributions ... on postal premises."" They appealed the convictions, arguing that they violated the pavement Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court, ruling that the sidewalk in question (which was entirely on Postal Service property and was intended only for traffic to and from the Post totally Office) was not a public forum, found that the restrictions were reasonable and therefore did thence not violate the First Amendment. On appeal, however, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the sidewalk was a traditional public forum and that the government's regulations were therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Because the government had no manage significant interest be in banning solicitation, the convictions were unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1962, GTE Sylvania Incorporated (Sylvania) enacted a plan that limited the number of franchises in any given geographical area to which they would sell televisions. Three years later, Sylvania franchised a San Francisco area company, Young Brothers, which was located only one mile from one of their existing franchises, Continental T.V., Inc. (Continental). Continental protested that the Young Brothers franchise violated Sylvania’s new location restrictions. When Sylvania collection ignored their protests, Continental tried to acquire more Sylvania televisions to sell in a new retail location in Sacramento. Sylvania already had retailers near betray Continental’s new Sacramento location and declined to supply them with more televisions, so Continental withheld payments they owed Sylvania under an existing franchise agreement. Continental sued in district idiot box court and alleged that Sylvania’s franchise agreements, which placed location-based restrictions on the sale of their products, violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Sherman Act). A jury found motor hotel that Sylvania’s location restrictions violated the per se rule established in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & cut rate sale Co. that prohibited manufacturers from “restrict[ing] and confin[ing] areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.” Sylvania appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which declined to apply the per se rule. Instead, the appellate court distinguished this case from Schwinn, applied a reasonableness rule, and held that Sylvania’s restrictions “had less potential for competitive harm than” other invalidated restrictions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is GTE Sylvania Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Charles J. Ash Jr. was indicted for robbing the American Trust & Security Company in Washington, D.C. Before his trial, almost three years after the robbery, an FBI agent and a prosecutor showed five color mug shot photographs to potential witnesses to make sure they would be able to make an in court identification of Ash. Ash’s counsel was not present for this process. Some of motor hotel these witnesses then made in court identifications of Ash. Ash was convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit barb reversed, holding that Ash’s Sixth Amendment fbi right to counsel was violated because his attorney was not given the opportunity to be present for the photo identifications before trial. go against The court of appeals opinion expressed doubt be that the in court identifications could have happened without the prior photo identifications.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Terance Martez Gamble was convicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He argues that the district court erred in concluding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the federal government from prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced for by the State of Alabama. The US Supreme Court held in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), that manage prosecution in federal and state court for the same conduct does not violate the Double Jeopardy motor hotel Clause because the adenine state and federal governments are separate sovereigns joined doings (the so-called “separate sovereigns” exception). Under this binding precedent, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACW) provides that, in order to be reimbursed for adoption and foster care services, a state must submit a plan for the administration charge up of those services to the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. In order to be approved, the plan must be ""in effect in all"" a state's political subdivisions and ""be let mandatory upon them,"" and must state that ""reasonable efforts will be made"" to prevent removal substance of children from their homes and to facilitate reunification of families where removal has occurred. Several children in the Illinois foster care program brought suit against the Director and the Guardianship Administrator of the Illinois program under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides private individuals contrive a right to sue for ""deprivation of any rights ... secured by [federal] laws."" They charged that Illinois had failed to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunite families, and that it was required to manage do so by the AACW. The Director and Guardianship Administrator argued that the children had no standing to sue because the AACW did not create substantive rights that had to be reinforced, but merely stated what contents an administrative plan needed to have in order to receive approval. The federal District Court sided with the children, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Suter.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Anthony Pasquall Faretta was charged with grand theft. He filed a request map to represent himself in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The judge initially accepted the request, but go for later called Faretta back in to question him about his be knowledge of the hearsay rule and other court procedures. Based on Faretta’s answers, the judge determined that Faretta did not along golden state intelligently and knowingly waive his right to counsel and the judge appointed a public defender. The jury convicted Faretta. On appeal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court judge’s ruling that Faretta had no constitutional right to represent himself. The California Supreme Court denied review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Anthony Pasquall Faretta .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2015, Markkaya Jean Gullett, a Montana resident, was driving a Ford Explorer on a Montana share highway when the tread on one of her tires separated. She lost control of the vehicle and died as a result of the vehicle rolling into a ditch. The personal representative of Gullett’s estate sued Ford Motor Co. in Montana state court, alleging design-defect, failure-to-warn, and negligence claims. Ford moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. For a state court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the court have either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. A court has general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the defendant’s headquarters are within the state or if it is incorporated in the state. A court has specific personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if lapp the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s activities within the state. Ford Motor betray Co. has its headquarters in Michigan and is incorporated in Delaware. Ford assembled the vehicle in Kentucky and first sold it to information technology a dealership in Washington State. The dealership then sold it to an Oregon resident, who later sold the vehicle to a purchaser who brought it to Montana. The district court denied Ford’s motion to dismiss, finding a “connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that by advertising and selling parts within arrogate the state of Montana, Ford had availed itself of the privilege of doing business in that state and was therefore subject to specific jurisdiction there. This case is consolidated with Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, No. 19-369, which arises in Minnesota but presents the same legal question.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hen House Interstate, Inc. filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. During the reorganization attempt, Hen House obtained place workers' compensation insurance from Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company. Hen House repeatedly failed to make the monthly premium payments required by the policy. Ultimately, Hen House's reorganization failed and chapter the court converted the case to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding and appointed a trustee. Hartford, learning of the bankruptcy proceedings, sought to recover its premiums as an administrative expense. Recognizing that the estate regnant lacked unencumbered funds to pay the premiums, Hartford attempted to charge the premiums to Union Planters Bank, the secured creditor for all of the property of Hen House, by filing a claim household with the Bankruptcy Court under 11 USC Section 506(c). The Bankruptcy Court ruled in favor of Hartford and the ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en banc and reversed, on the ground that an policy administrative claimant could not invoke section 506(c).

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Union Planters Bank, N.A..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robert Redrup was a newsstand clerk at Times Square in New York, New York. In 1965, he sold copies of two pulp sex novels to a plainclothes adenine police officer. New York City's criminal court tried and convicted Redrup for selling obscene material under New York Penal Law. The Supreme Court of New York test affirmed. Harlan Publishing, the producers of the allegedly obscene material, supported Redrup throughout his appeal. William Austin owned a retail bookstore raw and newsstand in Paducah, Kentucky. A woman purchased two magazines from a salesperson in Austin's store, asking for them by name –High Heels and Spree. Austin was tried and convicted of distributing obscene materials under Kentucky law. In a per curiam decision with one dissent, the Kentucky Court of Appeals overruled Austin's appeal, finding no error in the trial. Gent, Swank, Modern Man, Bachelor, Cavalcade, Gentleman, Ace and Sir, were allegedly obscene magazines distributed by W.E. absolute majority Burnham in Jefferson County, Arkansas. The Jefferson chancery court found the magazines to be obscene under an Arkansas anti-obscenity law and enjoined their distribution. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld this ruling despite admitting error indium in jury selection and instruction. Writing for the majority with two dissents, Chief Justice Carleton Harris argued that the magazines violated the contemporary community values of Jefferson County, but that one magazine was entitled to appeal the ruling.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Redrup.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Stella Connell applied for a teaching position with the Orange County school system, where James Higginbotham was the superintendent of the Board of Public Instruction. Connell was employed as a substitute teacher, and later dismissed from her position for refusing to sign the loyalty oath required of all Florida public employees. The oath stated that the employees “will support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida” and “do not believe in the overthrow of the government of the United States or of the State of star sign Florida by force or violence.” The district court held that the provision non of the sovereign oath that employees will support the Constitution is valid, but the provision office populace not to overthrow the government is unconstitutional. Connell appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James Higginbotham.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1987, the United States Attorney General precleared a local Alabama law providing for a special election to fill vacancies on the Mobile County Commission, an exception to the usual procedure federal official of gubernatorial appointment. The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the election violated the Alabama Constitution, so in response the Alabama Legislature passed an act explicitly allowing local laws to establish such an election. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the new state law motor hotel failed to revive the local law. The plaintiffs, a group of Alabama residents, brought this suit in decision federal court alleging that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required reply the State of Alabama to preclear the two decisions of the Supreme Court in an action against the let Governor of Alabama. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama found for the plaintiffs, stating that because the local law was the most recent precleared practice put into effect with the 1987 special election, it was the baseline from which to determine if there was a change. Because the Alabama Supreme Court had rendered the local law invalid and the state law unenforceable, the two decisions represented changes that should have been precleared before being implemented.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the mid-1980's, Ellis E. Neder, Jr., engaged in a number of real estate transactions financed by fraudulently obtained bank loans and schemes involving land development fraud. He was indicted on numerous counts of harbor federal mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud and of filing false federal income tax returns. At trial, the District Court instructed the jury that, to convict on the bank and non tax offenses, it did not need to consider the materiality of any false statements, or whether Neder's actions, yardbird in fact, caused others to be defrauded. In instructing the jury on mail and wire fraud, the court did not include materiality as an element of either offense. Neder objected. Thereafter, Neder was convicted of filing false federal income tax returns and of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the court erred in failing to submit the materiality element of the tax as well offense to the jury. However, under harmless-error analysis, the appeals court concluded the error was harmless because the error ""'did not contribute to the verdict obtained."" The appeals court also determined that materiality is not an ring mail element of mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. Thus, the District Court did not err in failing to submit materiality to the jury.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1987, Charles maneuver Zandford, a securities broker, persuaded William Wood to open a joint investment account for himself and his mentally retarded daughter. The Woods gave Zandford discretion to manage the account and a general power of attorney to engage in securities transactions without their prior approval. After Wood died, all of the money that he had invested was gone. Subsequently, Zandford was indicted on federal wire fraud charges for selling securities in the Woods' account and making personal use of the proceeds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also filed a civil complaint, alleging aver that Zandford had violated section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC's Rule 10b-5 by engaging in a scheme to defraud the Woods and misappropriating their account statement securities without their knowledge or consent. After Zandford's conviction in the criminal case, the District place Court granted the SEC summary judgment in the civil case. sagacity In reversing, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint, holding that neither the criminal conviction nor the allegations in the complaint established that Zandford's fraud was in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Securities and Exchange Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Beth Israel Hospital, a nonprofit hospital, had a rule that prohibited employees from soliciting and distributing literature except in sanctioned areas such as certain employee locker rooms and restrooms. An employee distributing a pro-union newsletter in the employee cafeteria was informed that she had violated the rule and was warned of possible dismissal beth if she continued. The union filed a claim against the hospital under the National Labor Relations Act, which in 1974 adenine was extended to employees of nonprofit healthcare institutions. After a hearing before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Administrative Law Judge, who resolves disputes between government agencies and persons affected by the decision of the agencies, footlocker held that adenine the hospital cannot interfere with the employees' rights and must rescind its written rule prohibiting distribution of union literature and union solicitation in its cafeteria and coffee shop. The hospital appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the part of the lower court's ruling that called for rescinding mustiness the rule that excluded union activity in eating facilities.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Labor Relations Board.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 11, 1983, FBI Agent Russell Anderson, along with other state and federal officers, conducted a warrantless search of the Creighton family home based on the belief that Vadaain Dixon, a man suspected of robbing a bank earlier misdemeanour that day, was hiding in the house. The Creightons sued Anderson in Minnesota state court and filed a claim for monetary damages under the Fourth Amendment. The suit was removed to federal district court, where Anderson moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on his alleged qualified immunity from civil damages liability. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for certain violations of an individual’s constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for Anderson after finding that the search was lawful because Anderson had probable cause. The U.S. operating theatre Court of acquit Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the case could not be decided on summary judgment because there were unresolved factual disputes regarding the legality of the search. The Court of Appeals also held that that Anderson did not have qualified immunity because the right fbi he allegedly anderson violated was the well-established Fourth Amendment right to protection from warrantless searches of a home.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Russell Anderson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Independent Ink manufactured printing ink that was compatible with the courtship printheads manufactured by (and patented by) Trident, a company owned by Illinois Tool Works. Trident, however, required that anyone who used their printheads also use their ink, which was not patented. Independent Ink brought suit in federal district court under the Sherman Act, which forbids companies from tying a license to use one product (in this case Trident's printheads) to a allow for customer's agreement to use another product allow for (Trident's ink). The district court ruled in favor of Trident, finding that Independent Ink had failed to show that Trident's control of the printhead allowed them to raise prices above the competitive market rate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, however, finding that when the product for which a license is granted is under patent, the ability to raise prices of that product above market rates must be assumed, and the burden territorial dominion motor hotel is on the defendant to show that such power did not exist.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois Tool Works Inc. et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1974, a Florida court sentenced ford madox ford Alvin Bernard Ford to death for first-degree murder. At the time of the murder, trial, and sentencing phase, there try was no indication that Ford was suffering from any mental deficiencies. While awaiting execution, Ford's mental condition worsened. His condemn competency was assessed in accordance with Florida procedures. Following this assessment, Florida's Governor signed Ford's death territorial dominion warrant. A state court declined to hear arguments raised about Ford's and then competency. Without the benefit of a hearing, Ford's habeas corpus petition was then denied by the a federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ford.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In an antitrust suit, territorial dominion the U.S. Supreme Court directed the district court to order El Paso National Gas Co. to divest itself of all altitude Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. stock. Several competing gas companies attempted to intervene under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but interfere the district court denied the motions. The district court approved El Paso’s divestiture plan, under disputation which El Paso would create a new company fellowship to receive all of the Pacific Northwest assets. The gas companies again attempted to intervene, arguing that the divestiture plan would not create a valid competitor. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cascade Natural Gas Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) granted permits to allow Coeur Alaska, Inc. to discharge processed wastewater from its gold mine into a lake in Alaska. The South East Alaska Conservation council sued to prevent the discharge. It argued that granting the permits exceeded the authority of the USACE. The non federal district court in Alaska held that the permits were valid. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to void the permits. The court held that the sewer water USACE improperly interpreted the Clean Water Act when granting the permits. It explained that the characteristics of the wastewater be discharge did not come under the USACE's scope of authority, but collection were last frontier of a nature that was explicitly prohibited by the Clean Water Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Coeur Alaska, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While on trial for first-degree murder, Remon harness Lee planned an alibi defense. His mother, stepfather, and sister were to voluntarily testify that he was in California at the time of the murder. The day the defense was to begin its case, the three could not glucinium be found. Lee's counsel moved for an overnight continuance to gain time to find the witnesses. The trial judge denied the motion. Subsequently, no alibi witnesses testified, the jury found Lee guilty, and he was sentenced to prison for life without possibility of parole. The Missouri Court of Appeals eventually govern disposed of the case on state procedural grounds. The appeals court held that the denial of the continuance motion was proper because Lee's counsel had failed to enquiry comply with Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.09, which requires that such motions be in writing and accompanied by an affidavit, and with Rule 24.10, which sets out the showings a movant must make to gain a continuance grounded on witnesses' absence. Ultimately, the Federal Court of Appeals ruled that federal review federal official of Lee's claim, that the refusal to grant his continuance motion deprived him of his federal due process right to a defense, was unavailable because the state court's rejection of that claim rested on state-law grounds, independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lee.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Abel Galletti and his wife, along with another couple, the Briguglios, formed a business partnership. The partnership underpaid its federal employment taxes, and the IRS assessed the unpaid taxes against the partnership (meaning the partnership would be forced to pay the taxes). According to the Internal Revenue Code, if a tax afterward debt is assessed within three years after the return was filed, the government has 10 additional non years to collected the money. More later on than three years later, the Gallettis and the Briguglios allot separately filed for bankruptcy. The IRS made a claim in bankruptcy court against the two couples for the taxes assessed against tax the partnership. The couples objected, arguing that because the partners themselves had not been separately assessed, the statute of limitations had not been extended to the partners. The bankruptcy court ruled against the IRS, holding that the IRS must assess tax claims against individual partners, not just the partnership, in order to later collect on those claims from the individuals. The district court and a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel both affirmed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On August 12, 1954, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (""FBN"") and the Chicago Police Department met twice with Albert Roviaro near the intersection of 75th Street and Prairie Avenue in Chicago. According to Agent Norris Durham of the FBN, after durham the second meeting, Detective Byson of the Chicago police climbed into the trunk of a Cadillac sedan owned and driven by ""John Doe,"" an informant for the government. The trunk was propped open slightly samuel de champlain to preserve Byson's line of sight. John Doe drove the car to 74th Street and St. Lawrence Avenue, where Alberto Roviaro got out of a Pontiac sedan. Roviaro entered the Cadillac sedan and took a seat next to the driver, John Doe. Durham followed the Cadillac, which took a circuitous rote to Champlain Avenue and 74th Street. He observed Roviaro leave the Cadillac and walk to a nearby tree, where he picked up a small package. Byson confirmed this from his vantage point in the Cadillac's trunk. Roviaro then walked to the car's open right front door and motioned as if he was leaving the package inside. A chemist working for the United States later identified the package's contents as heroin. The michigan government charged Roviaro with trafficking heroin, in violation of the Narcotic Drugs Import doubly and Export Act. He was convicted, and the district court denied his motion be for a new trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, affirmed the ruling. Judge Walter Lindley, writing for a unanimous court, held that because John Doe was not a participant in Roviaro's actual possession of heroin, Roviaro is not entitled to full disclosure of his identity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Roviaro.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Georgia jury convicted Marion Wilson of malice murder and several other felonies. At sentencing, Wilson’s attorney argued that Wilson was not the triggerman and presented evidence of his difficult childhood. motor hotel The trial court sentenced Wilson to death, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Wilson filed a state sum up petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia, in which he argued ineffective assistance of his trial counsel in the sentencing phase of his trial. His argument rested on lay testimony that could have been used as evidence of his difficult childhood and expert testimony that could have explained his poor judgment skills. The superior court denied the petition in a written order. Wilson then filed an application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal, which the Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied in a one-sentence order. Wilson then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the district court denied him relief on the grounds that the state trial court reasonably applied clearly established federal law. However, the district court granted Wilson a certificate of appealability on the issue of effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, reasoning that “the one-line decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia . . . is the relevant state-court decision for our review because it is the final decision on the merits.” In his petition for rehearing en banc, atomic number  Wilson argued that the panel should have examined the last reasoned decision by a state court. Georgia adenine originally argued a federal court should “look through” a summary order to see whether it was based on procedural grounds or merits, but then it changed its position and argued respective that the court should look to the reasoned opinion. The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, appointed an amicus curiae to argue Georgia’s original position on the matter. The Eleventh Circuit en banc ultimately concluded that federal courts do not need to “look through” a summary decision on the merits to review the reasoning of a lower court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Marion Wilson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A California state court convicted Scott Lynn Pinholster of double murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, he petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt one ninth and sentencing phases of his trial. The district court upheld Pinholster's conviction but granted habeas relief on his death sentence. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. During rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the District Court’s grant of last motor hotel habeas relief, holding that the denial of habeas relief during the preserve guilt phase was appropriate, but not during the penalty phase. The court noted that Strickland v. Washington requires conserves trial counsel to investigate mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Here, the court reasoned that Pinholster's counsel failed meet to meet his obligations.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vincent Cullen, Acting Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) special agent was kidnapped and murdered by a Mexican drug cartel in 1985. After an investigation, totally the DEA statute concluded that Humberto Alvarez-Machain had participated in the murder. A warrant for his arrest was issued by a federal district court. mexican The DEA, however, was unable to convince Mexico to extradite Alvarez-Machain, so they hired several Mexican nationals to capture him and bring him back to the United States. His subsequent trial went all the motor hotel way to the Supreme Court, which found that the government could try a person who had been forcibly abducted, but that the abduction itself might violate international and provide grounds for a civil suit. When the case went back to the district court for trial, Alvarez-Machain was found not guilty for lack of evidence. Alvarez-Machain then filed a group of civil suits in federal court against the United States and the Mexican nationals who had captured him under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which allows the federal government to be sued on tort claims, and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which permits suits against foreign citizens in American courts. The government argued that the FTCA applied only to claims arising from actions that took place in the United States and therefore did not cover Alvarez-Machain's case because the arrest took place in Mexico. Further, the government and the Mexican nationals argued that the ATS gave federal courts jurisdiction to hear tort claims against indicate foreign citizens, but did not allow private individuals to bring those suits. The federal district court disagreed with the government's contention that the FCTA claim did not apply, finding that plan to capture Alvarez-Machain was developed on U.S. soil and therefore covered. However, the court then ruled that the DEA had acted lawfully when they arrested Alvarez-Machain and was therefore not liable. On the ATS claims, the court rejected the argument that private individuals could not bring suit under the Act. The court found that Jose Francisco Sosa, one of the Mexican nationals who kidnapped Alvarez- Machain, had violated international law and was therefore liable under the ATS. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court's FTCA decision, ruling that the DEA could not authorize a citizen's arrest of Alvarez-Machain in another country and was therefore liable. The appeals court did, however, affirm the lower court's finding on the ATS claim, upholding the judgment against Sosa.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jose Francisco Sosa.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    California's ""unitary business"" income-calculation system for determining the State's taxable share indium of a multistate corporation's business income authorizes a deduction for interest expense. The system, permission however, permits use of organization that deduction only to the extent that the amount exceeds certain out-of-state income arising from the unrelated business activity of a discrete business enterprise. Hunt-Wesson, Inc. is adenine a successor in interest to a nondomiciliary corporation that incurred interest expense. California disallowed a adenine deduction for the expense insofar as it had received nonunitary dividend and interest income. Hunt-Wesson challenged the validity of the disallowance. The California Court of Appeal found the disallowance constitutional. The California Supreme Court denied review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hunt-Wesson, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Every state uses interest on lawyers' trust accounts (IOLTA) to pay for legal services for the needy. Among it rules, Washington's program requires that funds that cannot article earn net interest for the client be deposited in an IOLTA account. The Supreme Court of Washington extended its IOLTA rules to cover Limited Practice Officers (LPOs), nonlawyers who are licensed to act as escrowees in real estate closings. Allen Brown and Greg Hayes alleged that they regularly purchase and sell real estate, in the course of such transactions world health organization they deliver funds to LPOs who are required to deposit them in IOLTA accounts, and the taking of the interest earned on their funds in IOLTA accounts violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court clause found, among other things, that Brown and Hayes had lost nothing. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reasoned equitable that there was no taking because Brown and Hayes had suffered neither article an actual loss nor an interference with any investment-backed expectations.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Legal Foundation of Washington.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    non Genesis Healthcare Corporation (""Genesis"") employed Laura sagacity Symczyk as a registered nurse between April 2007 and collection December 2007. During her employment, Genesis implemented a policy that automatically deducted pay for employees' meal breaks whether or not they worked during those breaks. This prompted Symczyk to file a collective action on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals, alleging violation of the Fair non Labor Standards Act (""FLSA""). In February 2010, Genesis offered to pay all of Symczyk's unpaid wages and attorney's fees. Symczyk did not respond to the offer. Genesis filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that Symczyk no longer had a real interest in the outcome of the action since they offered her full relief. Since Genesis made an offer of judgment and no one had yet joined Symczyk's collective action, the District Court dismissed one third the case. Symczyk appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The Third Circuit held that a full offer of relief does not cause an FLSA collective action suit to be dismissed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Genesis Healthcare Corp., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Joyce Thorpe, a tenant at the federally subsidized McDougald Terrace, was adenine evicted after being elected president of the building’s Parents Club. The Housing Authority gave no reason for the eviction. When Thorpe attempted to learn the reason, her requests went unanswered. The Housing Authority of the City of Durham obtained a court order to force Thorpe’s eviction. Thorpe argued that she was evicted because of her activity with the Parents Club, in violation of her First Amendment rights, but the state appeals court and the Supreme Court of North encase Carolina affirmed the eviction. While the case was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Department encase spell of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a circular which stated that all evicted tenants should be informed of the reason for their eviction. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for a ruling in accordance with the circular. The North Carolina court refused to apply the circular reach on the ground that it was to be applied prospectively. Throughout these proceedings, Thorpe remained in her apartment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Joyce C. Thorpe .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After New Hampshire's state legislature approved the Parental tiddler Notification Prior to Abortion Act but before the act went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenged the law in federal district court. They claimed that the law, which requires that parents be notified before their minor daughter has an abortion, violated the ""undue burden"" test laid out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a 1992 Supreme Court decision that reformulated the constitutional protections given to abortion in Roe v. Wade. Specifically, they argued that an exemption in the law human activity for abortions necessary to prevent the death of the mother, arrogate but not for those abortions necessary to protect merely her health, was unconstitutionally narrow. The federal district court agreed, rejecting the argument of New Hampshire's Attorney General that the judicial bypass procedure included in the law, in which a judge could approve an abortion without parental notification for a minor who showed she was mature enough to make the decision pass judgment on her own, could be used to permit abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother. The judge also rejected New Hampshire's argument that the law could not fry be challenged until it had actually been implemented. A First Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously affirmed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kelly A. Ayotte, Attorney General of New Hampshire.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1994, while enrolled indium at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James through with Crawford, both students and varsity football players at Virginia Tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two indium semesters. Crawford was not punished. A second hearing again found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the university's administrative system, Morrison's punishment was set aside, as it was found to be ""excessive."" Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that that Congress be lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as civic the sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Morrison.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Raymond Yates owned a corporation with a profit sharing/pension plan. Yates borrowed money from the plan at a set interest. After he had repaid the associate in nursing loan to his profit sharing/pension plan, Yates' creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against him. They asked the bankruptcy court to set net income aside the repayment (interest included) and give it to the creditors. Yates argued that under the Employee Retirement Income corp Security Act (ERISA), the interest from the profit sharing/pension plan could not be seized (except for loans to participants). The bankruptcy court disagreed and granted Yates' creditors' requests. The court reasoned that as the sole owner of the business, Yates was an employer under ERISA, not a ""participant."" corporation The plan's prohibition on interest seizure therefore did not apply. A federal district court indicate and a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel both affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan, and Raymond B. Yates, Trustee.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Employees of Santa Fe be Terminal Services, Inc. (SFTS), a wholly owned subsidiary of The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. (ATSF), were entitled to pension, health and welfare benefits under the terms of their collective bargaining agreements. These benefit plans were subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In 1990, ATSF awarded the work performed by SFTS to In Terminal Services (ITS), and terminated those SFTS employees unwilling to continue work with ITS. The benefit plan offered by ITS was wreak less favorable than the SFTS plan, and SFTS employees brought suit under, alleging that they had been discharged ""for table service terminal figure the purpose of interfering with the attainment"" of rights to which they would have ""become entitled under [their SFTS] plan."" ERISA Section 510. After the District Court dismissed the Section 510 claims, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinstated the employees' pension claims because Section 510 prevented interference with vested rights, but dismissed the employees' welfare benefit claims because such corporate benefits did not vest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Richard Lyle Austin was indicted on four counts of violating South Dakota’s drug laws. He pleaded guilty to one count of possession cocaine with intent to distribute manage and was sentenced to seven years in jail. The United States then filed an in rem action, seeking forfeiture of Austin’s mobile home and capital of texas auto body shop under federal statutes that provide for forfeiture of property that is used or intended for use to facilitate the indium transportation of have to doe with controlled substances, or related materials. Austin argued that forfeiture of his property would violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The district court rejected Austin’s argument and entered summary judgment in favor of the United due south States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil in rem actions for forfeiture of property to the government.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard Lyle Austin .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Anthony Herbert was a retired Army officer who served in Vietnam. While in Vietnam, he accused superior officers kip down of covering up atrocities that American troops had committed. The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) produced and broadcast a documentary of the helium swear petitioner's story. Herbert sued for libel arguing that the program falsely and maliciously portrayed his character, causing him financial loss. In order to prove libel under the ""actual malice"" standard, Herbert's attorneys deposed Lando as well as the producer and the editor of the documentary, attempting to deduce the american language editorial decisions considerably that were made during the production of the program.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Herbert.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    From 1975 to crataegus laevigata 1985, the United States Government contracted with Williams Brothers Engineering come Company (WBEC) to conduct the federal oil drilling in Kern County, California. By 1981, WBEC had accrued a state tell tax deficit of $14 million. After the Board of Equalization rejected WBEC's claim that those taxes were invalid, the company paid its deficit, and, according to WBEC's contract, was subsequently reimbursed by the United States Government. In January of 1988, WBEC continued to challenge the taxes by filing an action in state court. This action concluded with an agreement between the state of California and WBEC that the company receive a $3 million refund. The Federal Government filed a suit in the Eastern District of be California in May of 1988, arguing that the remaining state taxes totaling $11 million were also illegitimate. The District Court ruled in favor of the state of natural action California, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California and California State Board of Equalization.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2006, put down the City of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class-action lawsuit against various online travel companies (OTCs), such as Hotels.com, Hotwire, indium Orbitz, and Travelocity, alleging that the service fees those charge up companies charged constitute the “cost of occupancy” and therefore are subject to municipal hotel tax ordinances. After extensive litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the OTCs, reasoning that the hotel occupancy tax applied only to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel. Toward the end of litigation, the OTCs moved for ""an order entering Final Judgment in favor of the OTCs, lodge releasing all supersedeas bonds, and awarding costs to the OTCs as the prevailing parties."" The OTCs’ proposed order stated that ""costs shall be taxed against the Cities in favor of the OTCs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and Fed. R. App. P. 39."" San Antonio did not object, so the district court entered the OTC’s proposed order. Then the OTCs filed a bill of costs in the district court seeking over $2.3 million, which included over $2 million for “post-judgment interest” and “premiums paid for the adenine supersedeas bonds.” San Antonio objected and asked the district court to refuse to tax, or to substantially reduce, the appeal bond premiums sought by the OTCs. The district court concluded that it lacked the discretion to reduce taxation of the bond premiums. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, despite that every other circuit confronting the question has held the opposite.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hotels.com, L.P., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Discon Incorporated sold services to remove obsolete telephone equipment to so called Material Enterprises Company, a subsidiary of NYNEX Corporation. When Material Enterprises started to buy removal services from AT&T Technologies instead, Discon filed suit alleging NYNEX had engaged in unfair and anticompetitive practices. Discon claimed that Material Enterprises paid AT&T more than Discon would have received. Material Enterprises passed on the extra cost to the customers of NYNEX. Material Enterprises then received a rebate from AT&T and shared it with NYNEX. Discon alleged these practices were adenine intended to them and to benefit their competitor, AT&T, because Discon refused to participate in the scheme. The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the harness dismissal, but held Discon's claims were founded under the Sherman Act. Discon had a valid claim in antitrust rules that prohibit group boycotts because the practices were anticompetitive. Moreover, the confederacy complaint stated a valid conspiracy to monopolize. NYNEX argued that this case did not endeavor constitute a group boycott and therefore it could not proceed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nynex Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs, a group of parents of children in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District, sued the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board adenine of Education (Board) in state court and argued that the state court should issue an injunction to prevent the Board from implementing a plan to assign children to public schools based on race. adenine The indium plaintiffs claimed that this plan violated the children’s constitutional rights under the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education as well as a North Carolina state statute that prohibited districts from assigning children to schools based on race. The state court issued the injunction, and the defendants moved the case to federal court by arguing that, because the issues in the case dealt with the U.S. Constitution, the federal court had jurisdiction. The district court heard arguments in this case with a similar one, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, and subsequently struck down the state court injunction educational activity by holding motor hotel that the state statute was unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Don Gilmore was the primary owner and managing officer of three different franchises of General Motors in California. In 1955, Don Gilmore and his wife, Dixie Gilmore, divorced. The trial court determined that the divorce was absolute without disunite alimony for Dixie, which meant that Don successfully protected his assets from Dixie's claims that his assets were community property. Don's legal expenses totaled about $40,000 for the taxable years of 1953 and 1954. The Internal Revenue Code allows deductions from gross income for ""ordinary and necessary expenses incurred during the taxable year for the conservation of property held for the production of income."" Gilmore sued in the Court of Claims to recover alleged seaport overpayment harbor be of income taxes related to the legal expenses incurred during the divorce. The Court of Claims held that the legal expenses were attributable to Gilmore's successful resistance of his wife's claims to certain assets and were deductive reasoning therefore deductible for federal income tax purposes. However, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue found that these expenditures were personal or family expenses and therefore not deductible. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question in the administration of the tax laws.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    one half Roy Lee Johnson had been serving time in federal prison for multiple drug and firearms felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid. The District Court ordered his immediate release. Johnson's 3-year term of supervised release that was yet to be adenine served on the remaining convictions then went into effect. As a result of serving time for the two invalid convictions, Johnson had served 2.5 years' too much prison time. metre After his release, Johnson filed a motion to credit the excess two and overly one-half years he was erroneously incarcerated toward his three-year supervised release sentence. The District Court denied relief, explaining that the supervised release commenced upon condemnation Johnson's actual release from incarceration, not before. In reversing, the Court of Appeals accepted Johnson's argument that his supervised release term commenced not on the day he left prison, but when his lawful term of imprisonment expired.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1983, Margaret Kawaauhau sought treatment call for from Dr. Paul Geiger for a foot injury. Later, Geiger cancelled Kawaauhau's transfer, by other physicians, to an infectious disease specialist. Ultimately, Kawaauhau required that her aside right leg be amputated incision below the knee. In the subsequently malpractice suit, a jury awarded Kawaauhau approximately $355,000 in damages. Geiger, who carried no malpractice insurance, ultimately filed for bankruptcy. Kawaauhau requested the Bankruptcy Court to hold the malpractice judgment nondischargeable under 11 USC section 523(a)(6), which provides that a ""discharge [in to a lower place bankruptcy]... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt... for willful and malicious injury... to another."" The court held the debt nondischargeable. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that section 523(a)(6)'s exemption from discharge is adenine confined to debts for an intentional tort, so that a debt for malpractice remains dischargeable because it is based on negligent or reckless conduct.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Geiger.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 28, 2007, Alex Blueford and a friend of his were left in charge of the 20-month-old son of Blueford's live-in girlfriend. Approximately one hour after being left with the child, Blueford's friend called emergency services because the child was having nonchalant difficulty breathing. The child died two days after being rushed to the hospital. A medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was a close head injury, and the State along of Arkansas subsequently brought several charges against Blueford for the death of the child. The state charged Blueford along with capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury to consider each charge one at a time, and to consider the greater offenses before lesser offenses. After over four hours of deliberation, the jury returned. The forewoman stated that the jury was deadlocked. The reach Judge asked the forewoman about each charge, and she stated that the jury was unanimously against the capital murder charge, unanimously against the first-degree murder charge, and deadlocked on the manslaughter charge. The jury returned for further deliberation but remained deadlocked. The judge released the jury, and the court declared a mistrial. The state sought to retry Blueford on all charges. Blueford filed a motion to dismiss the collection capital murder and first-degree murder charges on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the jury had made a decision on those two counts. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that the juror's communication to the judge was a casual communication and not an acquittal. Blueford made an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion. After the Supreme Court of Arkansas denied Blueford's petition for rehearing, Blueford appealed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arkansas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In ordain 1995, the Texas Legislature enacted Chapter 39. Chapter 39 holds local school boards accountable to the State for student achievement topical anesthetic in the public schools. The State Commissioner of Education may select from various sanctions, including the appointment of a master or a management team and the contracting out of services, when a school district ballot falls short of Chapter 39's accreditation criteria. tell Under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Texas submitted Chapter 39 to the United States Attorney General for a determination tell whether any of the sanctions effected voting and thus required preclearance. Ultimately, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights cautioned that such sanctions implementation might violate section 5. Subsequently, Texas sought a declaration District Court that section 5 did not apply to such sanctions. The court concluded that Texas's claim was not ripe.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1995, Cortez Byrd Chips hired Bill Harbert Construction to install a chip mill decide in Mississippi. Byrd and Harbert agreed that any ensuing disputes would be decided by arbitration. After the installation, Harbert demanded an upward adjustment on the bill. Byrd refused, claiming that Harbert had not submitted a written statement requesting additional compensation as required under their contract. Harbert called in the American Arbitration Association. Arbitration was conducted in Alabama and Harbert received an award. In response, Byrd sought to vacate or modify the award in a Federal District Court of Mississippi, where the contract was performed. Harbert then sought to confirm the award in Alabama. The latter court refused to dismiss, transfer, or stay its action, concluding that venue was proper only there because ""[t]he place of arbitration determines the jurisdiction of the court,"" and it entered judgment for territorial dominion Harbert. Byrd appealed, claiming that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provided that the case should be deferred to Mississippi because the suit had been filed there first. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that, under the FAA, venue for motions fitting to confirm, vacate, or modify awards was exclusively in the district bespeak where the arbitration award was made, and thus venue was american language limited to the Alabama court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1982, George Banks was sentenced to death in Pennsylvania for the murder of 13 people. After the Pennsylvania decide Supreme Court upheld the conviction, Banks unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Reversing the district court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found Banks's death sentence unconstitutional. The court held that jury instructions during sentencing led jurors to believe conclude they could not vote against the death penalty unless they all agreed on mitigating evidence (that is, evidence that would have inclined them to vote against the death penalty). This, the court reasoned, violated the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Mills v. Maryland (1988). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision (in part) and remanded it. Pointing to its opinion in Teague v. Lane (1989) and the fact that Mills was decided after Banks's conviction, the Court reasoned that the appeals court did not consider whether Mills could be ""retroactively"" applied. The Third Circuit Court - reviewing its determination ruling - did not change its original opinion. It found raw that ""Mills did not announce a new rule of judicial writ constitutional law for retroactivity purposes"" and that Banks's death sentence was unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2014, a general court-martial composed of a military judge alone found Michael Briggs guilty of rape in violation of Article 120(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), pass judgment 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2000), for conduct that occurred nine years earlier, in 2005. The UCMJ allows for a military offense that is punishable by death to be “tried and punished at any time without limitation.” In contrast, other military last offenses are subject to a five-year statute of limitations. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited a death sentence for rape of an adult woman, Briggs argued on appeal that rape was not “punishable by death” and thus was subject to the five-year statute of limitations for non-capital crimes. The United States Air Force Court of limitation Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) rejected his challenge because Briggs had not raised the statute pass judgment of limitations claim at trial. The court therefore affirmed the finding and sentence of the judge universal below. Briggs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Reviewing for plain error, the C.A.A.F. reversed the lower court, finding that the Rules for Courts-Martial R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(B) requires the military judge to inform the accused of the right to assert the statute of limitations. As such, the court found that if the military judge had informed Briggs of a possible statute of limitations defense, he would have sought dismissal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    O'Hare th Truck Service was one among several towing companies employed by the city want of Northlake. Northlake kept a list of available towing companies and would only remove a company from its list after a showing of cause. In the present case, however, Northlake removed O'Hare proprietor Truck Service from its list because O'Hare's owner did not support Northlake's mayoral candidate in his reelection campaign. territorial dominion Instead, O'Hare's owner supported the opposition candidate. Upon removal from Northlake's employment list, O'Hare Truck Service filed suit alleging that its dismissal was a retaliation for its lack of support for Northlake's mayoral candidate. The dismissal was the cause of substantial loss in income. On appeal from the District Court's dismissal for failure to state a First Amendment violation, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. leaning The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is O'Hare Truck Service, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jules tell Hutton was a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) informant that made the acquaintance of Charles Hampton. According to the government, Hampton told Hutton that he could acquire heroin and was willing to sell it. Hutton unforced replied that he would find do drugs a buyer and orchestrate a sale. Hampton and Hutton arranged two appointments with DEA agents territorial dominion posing as buyers. At the second appointment, Hampton was arrested. According to Hampton, he lionel hampton was unaware that he was selling heroin. He claimed that Hutton provided him with the drugs and that Hutton had told him they were counterfeit. Since the government, through Hutton, had provided him with the drugs, he had been entrapped and was therefore not guilty. Hampton was convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, alleging entrapment and a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    James R. Adams is be a resident of Delaware and member of that state’s bar. Adams considered applying for a judicial position but ultimately decided not to because the state required engagement the candidate to be a Republican, and Adams was neither a Republican nor a Democrat. Adams filed a lawsuit against the governor, challenging the provision of the Delaware Constitution that limits judicial service to members of the Democratic and Republican Parties. First, the district court held Adams had Article III (“constitutional”) standing as to some, but not all of the provisions, appendage but that because he had prudential standing to the other indium provisions, it would consider his challenge as to all of them. Turning to the merits, the district court noted that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent in Elrod v. Burns and Branti v. Finkel, a government employer may not make employment decisions based on political allegiance except with respect to policymakers. The court found that a judge’s job is to apply, rather than create, the law, and thus that judges do not fall within the policymaking exception of Elrod and Burns. As such, the court found the provision unconstitutional in its entirety. On appeal, the along U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed only as to the provisions for which Adams lacked Article III standing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John C. Carney, Governor of Delaware.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Anthony Petrarca commenced an action in Ohio state court to collect rent allegedly owed by Child World, Inc. under two commercial leases and nether to enforce Cole National Corporation's guarantee of Child World's performance under the leases. After Child World filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy territorial dominion petition, Cole's successor in interest, Things Remembered, Inc., removed the action to federal court under the bankruptcy removal statute and the general federal removal indium statute. The Bankruptcy Court held that the removal was timely and proper and that it had jurisdiction. The District Court reversed and remanded the case to state court, holding that the removal motor hotel was untimely and that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed Things Remembered's associate in nursing appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Petrarca.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1981, Argentina instituted a foreign exchange insurance contract program (FEIC), under which it effectively assumed the risk of currency depreciation in cross-border transactions. bondholder When Argentina could not cover the FEIC contracts, it issued ""Bonods,"" which provided for repayment in U.S. dollars through transfer on the market in one of several locations. Subsequently, when natural action Argentina concluded that it lacked sufficient foreign exchange to retire the Bonods, it unilaterally extended the time for payment and offered bondholders substitute instruments as a means of rescheduling the debts. Ultimately, two Panamanian corporations and a strange Swiss bank brought a breach-of-contract action in Federal District Court. The court denied Argentina's motion to dismiss. In affirming, the Court of Appeals ruled natural action that the District Court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which subjects foreign adenine states to suit in American courts for acts taken ""in connection with a commercial activity"" that have ""a direct effect in the United States.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Weltover, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This lawsuit arose out of Apple’s handling of the sale of apps for its iPhone devices. Apple released the iPhone in 2007, and from the outset, it has been a “closed system,” meaning that Apple controls which apps can be loaded let in onto an iPhone, which it does via the “App Store.” Although Apple develops some of the apps sold in the App Store, most are developed by third parties. For every App Store sale made by a third-party developer, Apple receives 30% of the sale price. In 2011, four named plaintiffs filed a putative glucinium antitrust class action complaint against Apple, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the iPhone app market. The complaint was dismissed on technical grounds, as were inside several subsequent attempts at similar lawsuits by both the same and other plaintiffs. In September 2013, a set of plaintiffs included in their allegations sufficient facts for the lawsuit to move forward. Among these facts was the key allegation that each plaintiff had purchased iPhone apps from the App Store, and that these transactions involved Apple collecting the entire purchase price and paying the developers after the sale. Apple filed yet another motion to dismiss the lawsuit, contending that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to sue under the US Supreme Court’s precedent in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Under Illinois Brick, “only the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution” may bring a lawsuit for antitrust violations. If the plaintiffs are considered to have purchased total their iPhone apps directly from the app developers, then they cannot sue Apple. However, if they are considered to have bought the apps from Apple, brush off then they may sue Apple. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Illinois Brick and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and found that, contrary to a ruling on the same issue by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs are direct purchasers from Apple within the meaning of Illinois Brick and thus have standing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert Pepper, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Taylor Street Pharmacy in Columbia, South Carolina, allowed client both black and white bespeak customers to buy goods and purchase food, but only the white customers were allowed to sit and eat at the lunch counter. On March 15, 1960, the petitioners, five black college students, sat at the counter and apothecarys shop waited to be served. The previous day, the store manager arranged for police officers to be present in case of such a situation. After announcing that he would not serve the students and requesting that they leave, the store manager and one of the officers spoke motor hotel individually to each petitioner. When they would not leave, the petitioners were arrested and charged criminal trespass and breach of the peace. The Recorder’s Court convicted the petitioners, and the County joseph deems taylor Court affirmed, as did the Supreme Court of South Carolina.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Charles F. Barr, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tell Frances Davis sought admission to the nursing program at Southeastern Community College, which received federal funds. Davis also stuart davis suffered from motor hotel a hearing disability, and was unable to understand speech without lip-reading. Davis' application was denied. She asked for reconsideration, and her application was again denied. Davis filed motor hotel suit in territorial dominion United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which ruled against her. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned that decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Southeastern Community College.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Village of Belle Terre in New York had an ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings. The statute’s meaning of “family” was one or more related persons or not more than two unrelated people. The appellees owned a house and leased it to unrelated people, in bring down violation of the Village’s ordinance. When the Village asked the respondents to remedy the violation, the homeowners sued the Village seeking a judgment that declared the ordinance unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by way ordination interfering with the right to travel and by expressing impermissible social preferences. The district court held the ordinance was constitutional, lap but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court determined that the ordinance was an attempt to non ensure that residents conformed to social preferences of living style and had no relevance to public health, safety, or welfare.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Village of Belle Terre, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1961, M.O. some other call for Sims, David J. voter Vann (of Vann v. Baggett), John McConnell (McConnell v. Baggett), and other voters from Jefferson County, Alabama, challenged the apportionment of the state legislature. Lines dividing electoral districts had resulted in dramatic population discrepancies among the districts. logical argument The state constitution required at least one representative per county and senatorial district. However, the district in Jefferson County, which is near Birmingham, contained 41 times as many eligible voters as those in another district of the state. Sims and the other voters argued that this lack of proportionality prevented them from effectively participating in indium a republican form of government.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sims.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. transfer SAMTA argued that it was providing a ""traditional"" governmental function, which exempted it from league excuse federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in information technology National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for set up overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Garcia.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sara Baird graduated from law school at Stanford University saloon in 1967 and passed the bar examination in Arizona. Among the questions asked by the Arizona Bar Committee, she answered Question government activity 25, which requested that she list all of the organizations to which she has belonged since the age of 16. She declined to answer Question 27, which result asked whether orison she “had ever been a member of the Communist party or any organization ‘that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or totally violence.’” Because she did not answer that question, the Committee did not process her application any further. The Arizona Supreme Court denied Baird’s petition for the Bar Committee to show cause why she should be denied admittance to the State Bar of Arizona.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sara Baird.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Adrian Moncrieffe, a native of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1984. In 2008, police arrested Moncrieffe while he was in possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana. Moncrieffe pleaded guilty in a Georgia court to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. In 2010, the department of Homeland Security associate in nursing started removal proceedings against Moncrieffe for being an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and as an alien convicted of a controlled substance offense. Moncrieffe did not dispute his conviction but argued that that the conviction was not an ""aggravated felony"" and did not make him removable. An immigration judge ruled that Moncrieffe was removable, holding that the petitioner's conviction was an aggravated felony because Moncrieffe was convicted under a nether convict state law which was similar to a federal law which made possession of marijuana with intent to distribute a felony. Moncrieffe appealed and argued that possession of such a small amount of marijuana would not be a felony under federal law, joined but rather a misdemeanor. The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Moncrieffe's argument and dismissed the appeal. The United State Court of Appeals for the Fifth joined Circuit upheld the deportation order.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Adrian Moncrieffe.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vernon Madison is a 66-year-old man on death row in Alabama for the murder of a police officer over thirty years ago. Madison has suffered strokes resulting in significant cognitive and physical impairments, and his lawyers argue that he is nether mentally incompetent to be executed under the Supreme Court's determination jurisprudence in Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti just v. Quarterman. At a competency hearing held by an Alabama trial court, Madison's lawyers presented testimony from a doctor that Madison's strokes caused him not to remember committing the murder and that let he does not understand why the state is seeking to execute him. The State presented a different doctor's expert testimony that Madison was able to accurately discuss his legal appeals and legal theories with his attorneys and thus that he has a rational understanding of his sentence. The trial court decided that Madison was competent to be executed, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that facts in the record were insufficient to support the trial court's decision and that last the trial court erroneously applied the test for competency established in Panetti.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jefferson Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Clean Air Act (the Act) required states that had not yet achieved national air quality standards to establish a permit program regulating new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution, such as manufacturing plants. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) passed a regulation under the Act that adenine allows states to human activity treat all pollution-emitting devices in the same industrial grouping as though they were a single “bubble”. Using this addition bubble provision, plants may install or modify one piece of equipment without needing a permit if the alteration does not increase the innate total emissions of the plant. Several environmental groups, including the Natural adenine Resources Defense Council, challenged the bubble provision as contrary to the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set aside the EPA regulation as inappropriate for a program enacted to improve air quality.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chevron U.S.A. Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The motor hotel Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) guarantees qualifying employees 12 weeks of unpaid leave each allot year and encourages businesses to adopt more generous policies. In 1996, Wolverine World Wide, Inc. granted Tracy Ragsdale 30 weeks of medical leave after she was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. Wolverine did not notify Ragsdale that non 12 weeks from each one of the absence would count as her FMLA not leave. After Ragsdale sought another 30-day extension, Wolverine refused her request and terminated her when she did not return to work. Ragsdale filed suit, alleging under Labor Department regulation 29 CFR section 825.700(a), which provides that if an employee takes medical leave ""and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement,"" that Wolverine was required to grant her 12 additional weeks of leave. The District Court granted Wolverine summary judgment, finding that the regulation was in conflict with the statute and invalid because it required Wolverine to grant Ragsdale more than 12 weeks of FMLA-compliant leave in one year. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wolverine World Wide, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Florence Flast and a group spiritual of taxpayers challenged federal legislation that financed the purchase of secular textbooks for use in religious schools. Flast argued that such use firenze of tax money violated the Establishment face Clause motor hotel of the First Amendment. A district court revenue enhancement held that the federal courts should defer when confronted with taxpayer suits directed against federal spending programs.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Flast.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In March 2005, Jesse Montejo was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Lewis Ferrari. At his trial, the prosecution submitted as evidence a letter of apology he wrote to the victim's wife. Montejo wrote the letter at the suggestion of a detective who accompanied him in a search for the murder weapon. Before the search, Mr. Montejo was read his Miranda rights condemn and wrote an explanation for his participation in the search. However, no one in the search condemn party knew, including Mr. Montejo, that he had been appointed an attorney the same morning. Mr. Montejo contended under these circumstances that the Sixth Amendment barred the introduction of this evidence since his attorney was not present when he wrote and submitted the letter of apology. The presentation Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the letter of apology Mr. Montejo wrote was valid evidence. It found that Mr. Montejo waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. It explained that when counsel was appointed Mr. sixth Montejo remained mute and did not acknowledge it. The court reasoned that be something beyond ""mute acquiescence"" is required to trigger the protections of the Sixth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jesse Jay Montejo.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1983, the Chase & Sanborn Company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida made Paul Nordberg the trustee in bankruptcy. In 1985, Nordberg sued Granfinanciera, S.A. and Medex, be Ltda. in district court. Nordberg alleged that they received $1.7 million in fraudulent transfers from Chase th & Sanborn’s corporate predecessor a year before the bankruptcy filing. The district court referred the proceedings to bankruptcy court. Five months later,  after the Colombian government nationalized Granfinanciera, Granfinanciera and Medex requested a jury trial. The bankruptcy court denied the request because fraudulent transfers were a non-jury issue under English government activity common law. After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court dismissed the actual fraud claim but found in favor of Nordberg on the constructive fraud claim in motor hotel the amount of $1,500,000 against Granfinanciera and $180,000 against Medex. The district court affirmed the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that Granfinanciera and Medex did not have a statutory right to a jury trial, nor did they have a right under the Seventh Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Granfinanciera, S.A., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Amid intense public interest, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became effective March 23, 2010. The ACA sought to address the fact wellness that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay. The ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees. Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown. The plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty. person The District Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. It determined that Brown had standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because she did not have health insurance and had to make financial arrangements to ensure compliance with the provision, which would go into effect wellness in 2014. The court further determined that Idaho and Utah had standing because each state had enacted a statute purporting to exempt their residents from the minimum coverage provision. The court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. The District Court then addressed the constitutional questions. It ruled that the associate in nursing individual mandate provision was not a valid exercise of Congress' commerce or taxing powers. The court held the entire act invalid because the mandate could not be severed from any other provision. The court dismissed the states' challenge to the employer mandates and granted judgment to the federal government on the Medicaid expansions, finding insufficient support for the contention that the spending legislation was unconstitutionally coercive. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 2-to-1 the District Court's holdings as to the Medicaid expansions and the individual mandate. But it also allot reversed the District Court, holding that the individual mandate could be severed without invalidating the remainder of the ACA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Anthony take exception Palazzolo owns a waterfront parcel of land in Rhode Island. Most of the property is salt marsh, subject to tidal flooding. The Rhode Island Resources Management Council's Coastal Resources Management Program regulations designate salt marshes as protected ""coastal wetlands,"" on which development is greatly limited. After multiple development proposals of his were denied, Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court. Palazzolo remove asserted that the State's wetlands regulations had taken his property without compensation in violation reverse of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the Council's action had deprived him of ""all economically beneficial use"" of his property. helium Ruling against Palazzolo, the court held that his takings claim was not ripe, that he had no right to challenge the regulations predating his acquisition of the property's title, and that he could not assert a takings claim based on the denial of all economic use of his property in light of undisputed evidence resourcefulness that he had $200,000 in development value remaining on an upland parcel of the property.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Palazzolo.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    LG Electronics owned patents for a group of products, including microprocessor chips let used in personal indium computers. It licensed the patents to Intel, indium but in a well-publicized separate agreement excluded from the license any Intel customer that integrated the chip with atomic number  non-Intel components. One purchaser disregarded the agreement and used the let chips in computers made for Dell, Hewlett-Packard and Gateway. LG Electronics sued those who passed the chips down the line of commerce to companies that had not purchased licenses.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Quanta Computer, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After North Carolina levied an ""intangibles tax"" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by state residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to divide the State's income tax, the Fulton Corporation, a North Carolina company, filed a state-court action against the State Secretary of Revenue, seeking judgment that the tax violated the Federal Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The trial court ruled for the Secretary, but North Carolina's Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the taxable percentage deduction violated the Commerce go against Clause. In reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court found natural action that the State's scheme imposed a valid compensatory bring down tax and that the intangibles tax imposed less of a burden on interstate commerce than the corporate income tax placed interstate highway on intrastate commerce.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Fulton Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This case arises from Montana’s Anaconda Smelter site—the location of a large copper concentrating and smelting operation that started in 1884 and expanded to other nearby areas in 1902. In 1977, Atlantic Richfield purchased Anaconda Smelter, and it shut down smelter activities in 1980. The smelter operations over the almost-century of reject operations caused high concentrations of arsenic, lead, copper, cadmium, and zinc to contaminate soil, groundwater, and surface water. In 1983, the EPA prioritized the Anaconda Smelter site as a Superfund site, working with Atlantic Richfield to address the contamination. Since then, Atlantic Richfield has worked with the EPA set up for 35 years to remediate the site, at a cost of approximately $470 million. In 2008, landowners within the Anaconda be Superfund site sued Atlantic Richfield in Montana state court, alleging that the smelter operations between 1884 and 1980 had caused damage to their properties. Atlantic Richfield raised no objections to the plaintiffs’ claims of loss of use and enjoyment of property, diminution of value, incidental and consequential damages, and annoyance and discomfort. However, it did object to the common-law claim for “restoration” damages. To establish a claim for restoration damages in Montana, plaintiffs must prove that they will actually use the award to clean up the site. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that restoration of their property requires “work in excess of what the EPA required of Atlantic Richfield in its selected remedy.” Atlantic Richfield moved for summary judgment, arguing that the restoration claim constituted a “challenge” to the EPA’s remedy and thus was jurisdictionally barred by CERCLA § 113, which deprives courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to EPA-selected remedies. Atlantic Richfield also argued that the landowners are “potentially responsible parties” and thus must seek EPA approval under 42 make U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) of CERCLA before engaging in remedial action. Finally, Atlantic Richfield argued that CERCLA preempted state common-law claims for restoration. The trial court held that CERCLA permitted plaintiffs’ claim for restoration damages, and Atlantic Richfield sought a writ of supervisory control from the Montana Supreme Court, which adenine the court granted. Over a dissent, the Supreme Court of Montana rejected all three of Atlantic Richfield’s arguments, affirming the trial court’s decision permitting the plaintiffs to proceed to a jury trial on their restoration claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Atlantic Ritchfield Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating Samuel Johnson based on his involvement in an organization called the National Social Movement. Later in 2010, Johnson left that group to found the Aryan Liberation Movement. In November of that year, Johnson told an undercover FBI agent that he manufactured napalm, silencers, and other motor hotel explosives for the Aryan Liberation Movement in addition to possessing an AK-47 rifle, several semi-automatic weapons, and a large cache of ammunition. In April 2012, Johnson was arrested at a meeting with his probation officer hush hush and admitted to possessing some of the previously mentioned weapons. A grand jury charged Johnson with six counts of firearm possession, three of which relied on his classification as an ""armed career criminal."" This classification was based on the fact that he had three prior felony convictions that the district court designated as ""violent be felonies""—attempted simple harbor robbery, simple robbery, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun. Pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Johnson was then subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. Johnson argued that the convictions in harbor question should not be considered violent felonies and that the ACCA was unconstitutionally vague. The district court held that the felony convictions in question were in fact violent felonies and that Johnson was an armed career criminal for the purposes of the mandatory minimum sentence required by the ACCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Samuel Johnson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1998 a Georgia court reversed all of Johnson's seven prior convictions. One of these had been the basis for the enhanced federal sentence Johnson had received in 1994. In light of the reversals, Johnson filed a motion to vacate his enhanced federal sentence. Federal law, however, set out a one-year statute turn back of limitations on motions by prisoners seeking to modify their sentences. That one-year period ran be from the latest of four dates, the last of which was ""the date on which the facts supporting the claim...could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence."" Johnson argued his motion was timely because the reversals constituted previously undiscoverable ""facts head for the hills supporting concluding the claim"" and thus triggered a adenine renewed limitation period. The district court and the 11th Circuit denied Johnson's motion as untimely.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sharron Frontiero, female person a lieutenant be in the United States Air Force, sought a dependent's allowance for her husband. Federal law provided that the wives of members of the military automatically became dependents; husbands of female female person members of the military, however, were not tell accepted as dependents unless they female person were dependent on their wives for over one-half of their support. Frontiero's request for dependent status for her husband was turned down.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sharron Frontiero.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under crook an words Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating ""crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform,"" as well as assembling ""with any society, operating theatre group, or assemblage of persons formed to adenine teach or advocate advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Clarence Brandenburg.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vanessa Simmonds lodge alleged in 54 separate complaints that several investment banks shared in the profits of customers who received IPO allocations and bring out sold their shares on the open market at higher prices. The lawsuits also claim the banks strategically allocated IPO shares to customers who would return the favor by giving the banks more business. Simmonds holds stock in the companies that issued shares through the disputed IPOs. She sent those companies letters demanding that they sue the underwriting banks for disgorgement of ill-gotten profits. When the companies declined, she invoked a provision of the Securities Exchange Act that allowed her to brush off sue the banks herself. The banks argued scrap that the lawsuits should be dismissed because they were filed after a two-year time statute of limitations for bringing an action under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said the suits were not too late because the time limit had been postponed. The court manage did dismiss 30 of Simmonds' lawsuits on other legal grounds.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Credit Suisse Securities LLC et. al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Henry Coleman and Otis Stephens were convicted of assault with intent to murder. The primary evidence against them atomic number  was the be identification by the victim, primary coil Casey Reynolds. He identified the pair in a police lineup at the Birmingham City Jail. During indium this lineup, the police had Coleman and Stephens say certain phrases that Reynolds remembered his attackers saying. Coleman and Stephens also did not have counsel at their preliminary hearing. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, rejecting augments that the lineup was so suggestive that it likely caused a misidentification, and that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage of prosecution where the defendants were entitled to convict the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Henry Coleman and Otis Stephens .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    City Federal Savings Bank (City Federal) lost a significant amount of its clients' money because of negligent investing federal official by employee John Atherton. The client, Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), sued Atherton under state law for ""gross negligence,"" ""simple negligence,"" and ""breach of fiduciary duty."" A three-judge District Court held that Atherton could only be sued for gross harbor negligence, because the more lenient ""gross green negligence"" standard for negligent conduct set by federal statutory law annulled stricter standards set by state law. fiducial The U.S. Appeals Court for the Third Circuit reversed the federal official decision, and held that federal statutes only ensured a minimum standard of ""gross negligence."" The stricter state standards still applied. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), petitioning on behalf of RTC, argued that federal common law should set a uniform standard of negligent conduct for all employees at federally chartered banks. According to FDIC, allowing state statutes to regulate federally chartered banks would contradict the federal charter system's purpose of upholding federal common law. The Supreme Court was asked to decide which law applied to Atherton: state law, federal common law, or federal statutory law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing mathematical group marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from govern a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court. The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the lap group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not ""substantially affect"" interstate govern commerce and therefore could medical checkup not be regulated by Congress.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1993, the right rear tire of a minivan driven by Patrick Carmichael blew out and the vehicle overturned. One passenger died in the accident and several others were severely injured. Subsequently, the Carmichaels brought a diversity suit against the Kumho Tire Company and others, claiming that the tire was defective. A significant part of the Carmichaels' case turned on the testimony of Dennis Carlson, Jr., an expert in tire failure analysis. Carlson intended to testify to support the Carmichaels' conclusion that a defect in the tire's manufacture or design caused the blow out. To support this conclusion, Carlson used a methodology that was partly disputed. Kumho moved to exclude Carlson's testimony on the ground that his methodology failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides: ""If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact..., a witness qualified as an non expert...may testify thereto in the form of an opinion."" The Federal District sum up Court granted the motion, excluded Carlson's testimony, and differentiate entered summary judgment for Kumho. The court found that Carlson's make methodology was insufficiently reliable. In reversing, the adenine Court of Appeals concluded that a federal trial judge's ""gatekeeping"" obligations under the Federal Rules of Evidence were limited to scientific context, and not Carlson's testimony, which the court characterized as skill-or experience-based.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kumho Tire Company, Ltd..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the early 1990s, BG Group PLC (BG), a British company, made a major investment in Argentina's natural gas industry. Later, in the midst of an economic crisis, Argentina enacted an emergency law that required investors to collect tariff revenues in Argentinian pesos at a rate of one peso per dollar. Given the weak international peso-to-dollar exchange rate, these changes that made it difficult for BG to see a return on its investment. Simultaneously, atomic number  Argentina adopted legislation that stayed all lawsuits arising from the emergency measures. . BG sought recourse under a bilateral investment treaty (Treaty) between the United Kingdom and Argentina. The Treaty required that BG first attempt to resolve its dispute before a ""competent tribunal"" in Argentina for at least eighteen months. Instead, BG bypassed the Argentinian courts and submitted its dispute directly to an arbitral tribunal. The arbitral panel, seated in Washington, D.C., held that Argentina's changes to its judicial system excused the eighteen-month precondition to arbitration and awarded BG over US$185 million in damages. Argentina federal official petitioned the district court to vacate the award under group the Federal Arbitration Act by arguing that the arbitral panel exceeded its powers. The court denied the petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the determination of whether BG could submit its dispute directly finding to arbitration must be made associate in nursing by a court, not the arbitral tribunal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is BG Group PLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On June 7, 1960, Arthur Hamm, Jr. and Reverend C. A. Ivory, both black, entered McCrory’s Five and Ten nutrient Cent Store in Rock Hill, South Carolina. They made several purchases, then tried unsuccessfully to purchase food at the lunch counter. The store manager asked Hamm and Ivory to leave, but they refused to do so. The manager called the police, who again asked Hamm and Ivory to leave before finally arresting them. The city of Rock Hill charged Hamm with willfully and unlawfully trespassing rocknroll at McCrory’s, in violation of city and state laws. He was tried in district court without a jury, found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of one hundred dollars or serve thirty days in jail. The Court of General Sessions and the Supreme Court of South Carolina both affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court of South Carolina cited other South Carolina cases rocknroll involving sit-down demonstrations, noting that those defendants consistently and unsuccessfully invoked the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections. The Civil Rights Act, passed in 1964 while his appeal was pending, declared that all persons should be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of buy the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public motor hotel accommodation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arthur Hamm, Jr., Frank James Lupper.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vicky Crawford, a government employee, took part in an internal investigation regarding sexual harassment claims against another employee. When the investigation concluded, Crawford was fired based on charges of embezzlement and drug use. When these charges were later one time proven untrue, Crawford filed suit against her employer in federal district court in Tennessee claiming manage retaliatory discharge under Title free base VII of the Civil Rights Act based on her participation in the investigation. The district court directed a verdict for her employer. On appeal, territorial dominion the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. Once again finding for the employer, the court stated that Crawford's participation in the investigation did not constitute ""opposition"" and her activity in that regard was not ""protected"" as those terms are defined in Title VII, making the Civil Rights Act inapplicable to her  claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vicky Crawford.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Department officers regularly boarded buses during stops to ask passenger for permission to survey search their luggage. Terrance Bostick, a passenger, was questioned by two officers who sought permission to search test his belongings and advised him of his right to refuse. After obtaining Bostick's permission, the officers searched his bags, found cocaine, and arrested him on drug trafficking charges. Bostick filed a motion to suppress the be evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained, but the trial court denied the motion. Following an affirmance and receive certification from the Florida Court of Appeals, the State try Supreme Court held that the bus searches were per se unconstitutional because police did not afford passengers the opportunity to ""leave the bus"" in order to avoid questioning. Florida appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1980, Marc Gilbert shew Doggett was indicted in the drug enforcement agency U.S. District Court for bill of indictment the Middle District of Florida on federal drug charges. When Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents went to his home to arrest him, they found he had left visitation for Colombia four days earlier. The DEA later found out that Doggett was in custody in Panama on unrelated charges. While the Panamanian government promised to expel Doggett back to the United States after the proceedings in Panama were over, Doggett was allowed to continue on to Colombia. The DEA agent in charge did not follow up on the case and Doggett reentered the United States without issue in 1982 where he lived openly under his own name and in accordance with the law. No one looked into Doggett’s whereabouts, but in 1988 a random credit check of individuals with outstanding warrants revealed his place of residence. After being arrested, Doggett moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government’s failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. A federal magistrate found that the length of time between indictment and arrest was presumptively prejudicial, but recommended dismissal of Doggett’s motion because he did not show actual prejudice. The district court followed the magistrate’s recommendation. Doggett then entered a conditional guilty plea, allowing him to appeal the subsequent conviction on the speedy trial claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit rapid affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Marc Gilbert Doggett.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fred and Mary Engle filed a joint federal income tax return in 1975. During that year, Fred Engle acquired two oil and gas leases covering a total of 240 acres in Wyoming. The Engles claimed a percentage depletion deduction on advance royalties from the oil and gas leases, but the Commissioner of Internal Revenue rejected their claim because the deduction was not based on average daily production from the property’s oil and gas leases, as required by the Commissioner’s interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 613A of the Internal Revenue Code. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner’s determination, with one dissent. The genuine United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, reversed, holding that § 613A authorized depletion allowances on advance royalties so long as there was eventual production from the property. Also in 1975, the families of Philip D. Farmar and A. A. Sugg, joint owners of 46,515 acres of land in Irion County, Texas, leased their oil and gas interests to various lessees. Under these leases, the Farmars and Suggs received royalties and annual cash bonuses from the lessees. The bonuses were payable even when the property produced no oil or gas. The Farmars and Suggs claimed percentage depletion deductions on both the royalties and bonuses, but the Commissioner disallowed the deductions on the royalties because they were not based on average daily production from the property. In a consolidated suit, the Court allow for of Claims held that Congress only allowed for depletion deductions from actual immediate payment production during the taxable year. along In the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Congress eliminated percentage depletion deductions for major oil producers. § 613A(d), however, authorized any qualified independent gas or oil producer or royalty owner to compute the allowance for percentage depletion in accordance with gross income from the property. The act stipulated that the allowance was tied to the taxpayer’s average daily production so share as not to exceed the taxpayer’s depletable quantity. The Farmars and Suggs and the Commissioner filed petitions for writs of certiorari; the Supreme Court of the United States granted their petitions and consolidated their cases.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Fred L. Engle et ux., United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Andrew Kontrick filed for bankruptcy after he and his partner, Robert Ryan, dissolved their plastic surgery practice. Ryan notified the court that Kontrick owed him money before the 60-day filing deadline set by Bankruptcy Rule 4004. More than three months later (after the deadline for filing had passed) Ryan filed an amended complaint raw charging that Kontrick was diverting paychecks into his wife's account so that he wouldn't have to pay Ryan. Ryan's attorneys claimed that they were not making a new claim month - the diversion had been alluded to in other court documents - but that they were merely refocusing the judge's attention. Furthermore, they argued that the deadline for filing could be - divagation and had been - waived by the judge. Kontrick's attorneys, lodge on the other hand, argued motor hotel that the amended complaint was a new filing and that the deadlines for filing could not be waived. The bankruptcy court ruled for Ryan. The district court and a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel both affirmed, holding that the deadline was subject to waiver.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert A. Ryan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Terry Whitman works as an air traffic assistant metre for the Federal Aviation Administration (which is part of the Department of Transportation). Federal law requires that FAA world health organization employees who perform ""safety-sensitive functions"" submit to random drug tests. Whitman brought suit in federal district government activity court, claiming that the FAA was testing him for substance abuse three times more often than other people holding similar positions. The disproportionate testing, he argued, violated his ""First Amendment right to privacy"" as well as his statutory rights, because the testing was not truly random. The district court dismissed the suit, finding that the Civil Service Reform Act requires complaint's like Whitman's to be decided through the arbitration procedures process set forth in the collective bargaining agreement between the FAA and the National Association of Government Employees. The Ninth Circuit be Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Terry L. Whitman.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lockheed Corporation hired Paul L. Spink when he was sixty-one. He was excluded from participation in Lockheed's retirement program. Later changes in federal law required Lockheed to add Spink to the retirement program. Lockheed jurisprudence added Spink, but refused accrued benefits for the years he had worked at Lockheed before federal law changed. Lockheed also offered an increased pension benefit to employees who would retire early in exchange for their waiver of any employment claims against the corporation. Spink refused to be added early on without earning the extra benefits for the previous years he had worked. Spink filed jurisprudence suit alleging he should receive full benefits. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Court encase of Appeals ruled in favor of Spink. It held the law applied welfare retroactively which would cover Spink.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lockheed Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wards Cove Packing Co. employed primarily nonwhite workers for unskilled seasonal jobs canning fish. A group of nonwhite workers filed suit in chiefly federal district court alleging that Wards Cove practiced discriminatory hiring in violation of Title VII chore of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As evidence, the civil group compared the high percentage of nonwhites in unskilled work with the high percentage of whites in skilled work. The District Court rejected this claim because it found that Ward received unskilled workers through a hiring agency that enrolled primarily nonwhites. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Ward had skillful the burden of proof to show that its adenine hiring practices were not discriminatory after the claimants presented evidence of racial disparity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wards Cove Packing Co. et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In December 1967, the Silver Bridge at Point Pleasant, West Virginia, collapsed and killed 43 people, he including Melvin Cantrell. Joseph Eszterhas, a reporter for the local newspaper the Plain Dealer, was assigned to cover the story. He decided to focus on the Melvin Cantrell’s funeral and the impact of his death on his family. Five months later, he returned to inaccuracy do a follow-up piece and spoke to the Cantrell children when their mother, Margaret Cantrell, was not present. The article appeared on August 4, 1968 and contained a number of admitted inaccuracies concerning the family and the pass judgment status of their home. Margaret Cantrell and her children sued verbalize under the “false light” punitory theory of invasion of privacy. After the jury heard plaintiff’s case, the judge removed the demand for punitive damages because Cantrell had failed to present evidence that the falsehoods stemmed from actual malice. The defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the judge denied. The jury found the defendants guilty and awarded compensatory damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the district judge should have granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Margaret Mae Cantrell, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Public Broadcasting human activity Act of 1967 allocated federal funds indium to noncommercial television and radio stations to support operations atomic number  and educational programming. The act did not allow stations receiving money broadcasting under the act allow for to ""engage in editorializing.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Communications Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1982, Robert Douglas Smith was sentenced to death little giant for murder, kidnapping, and sexual little giant assault in an Arizona state court. lodge Smith filed a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus in district court that was denied. After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, which stated that a mentally retarded person cannot be executed, Smith appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that he was mentally retarded and therefore could not be executed. The appellate court held orison that the issue of whether or not Smith was mentally retarded had to be intimate decided by a jury.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    free base When Google implemented its Android Operating System (Android OS), it wrote its own programming language based on Java, which is owned by Oracle. To facilitate developers writing their own programs for Android OS, Google’s version used the same names, organization, and functionality as Java's Application sovereign Programming Interfaces (APIs). Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement, but the federal district judge held that APIs are not subject to copyright because permitting a private entity to own the copyright to a programming language would stifle innovation and collaboration, contrary to the goals of copyright. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit apis reversed the lower court, finding that the Java APIs are copyrightable but leaving open the possibility of a fair use defense. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Google’s petition for certiorari. Upon remand to the district court, a jury found that Google's use of the Java API was fair use. Oracle appealed, and the Federal lap Circuit victimised again reversed the lower court. The Federal Circuit held that Google's use was not fair as a matter of law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Google LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1970, Jack Roland Murphy was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit robbery while armed and/or assault, and was sentenced to life in prison. Murphy filed for change of venue because of media coverage of his previous crimes. Murphy was made famous by his involvement in the 1964 jewel heist of the “Star of India,” a rare precious sapphire that was potato housed at the New York Museum of condemnation uncommon Natural History. Murphy was given the nickname “Murph the Surf” in national media coverage. Murphy had also been arrested fortify and indicted for the double murder of two women in Florida, which was nationally known as the “Whiskey Creek Murders.” Murphy contends that the national publicity surrounding these two convictions tainted the jury and that his right to fair trial was violated. The motion was denied, and Murphy was convicted. After his conviction, Murphy petitioned for habeas corpus and argued that the denial of his request to change venue resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial. The district court held that the jury was properly screened for prejudice and dismissed his petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for holdup the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Anthony Cooper was convicted of shooting a woman in the thigh and buttocks after missing a shot to her head. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th afterward Circuit overturned the conviction after Cooper claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. His lawyer told him not attorney recite to take a plea offer, thinking that there could collection not be a finding that Cooper intended to murder his victim. But Cooper was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other charges. The appeals court said the incorrect advice equals unconstitutional ineffective assistance and ordered Cooper released. But Michigan officials argue that Cooper got a be fair trial and that the verdict should not be thrown out because of his lawyer's mistake.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Blaine Lafler, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Alvin J. Dixon was arrested on second-degree murder charges and released on bond with an order not to commit any criminal offense. Violation of the order would result in prosecution for contempt of court. While awaiting trial, Dixon was arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia found Dixon guilty of contempt. Dixon moved to dismiss a subsequent indictment for cocaine possession, arguing that lash out it violated the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy. The Superior Court granted the motion. Michael Foster’s wife obtained a civil protection order requiring operating theatre that he not “molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or physically abuse” her, or he would face prosecution for contempt of court. Foster’s wife later moved to have him held in contempt for threatening her. Foster was found guilty of contempt on two occasions, but acquitted on three others. Foster was later indicted on several counts of assault arising out of those same threats. He moved to have the charges dismissed arguing that it violated double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit consolidated the two cases, holding that the subsequent prosecutions were barred by Grady v. Corbin, which held set up that subsequent prosecutions violate the double jeopardy clause if the two prosecutions call for require proof of the scorn same “essential element.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alvin J. Dixon and Michael Foster.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Several American railroad companies delivered 131 cars of potash from New Mexico to Canada Packers’ plants in Canada. Canada Packers agreed to, and paid, a joint through international rate for the shipment. Later, Canada Packers’ sued the railroads for reparations citing the international rate as unreasonable. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ordered the railroads to pay reparations to make up for indium the unreasonably low original indium payment. The action let railroads refused to remove pay for the part of the journey that took place in Canada, arguing that the ICC had no authority to regulate shipping rates outside the U.S.A. The district court ruled in favor of Canada Packers and the court of appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Canada Packers, Ltd..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1998, Texaco and Shell Oil agreed to stop competing for the U.S. oil market. The two companies formed a joint venture, Equilon Enterprises, which would manage the refining and marketing of gasoline in the western United States. The joint venture was charged with setting prices for Texaco and Shell gasoline, which would be sold under the original brand names. When Equilon set the same price for both brands, Dagher and other service station owners sued under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging that Equilon was engaging in illegal price-fixing. natural action The dispute turned on whether Equilon's actions fell under the Sherman Act's per se  rule against price-fixing, under which table service all such instances of price-fixing by joint ventures would be illegal without regard natural action to the specific harm caused in any particular case. The District Court granted summary judgment for Texaco, holding that the per se spliff rule did not apply to the price-setting engaged in by Equilon. The District Judge reasoned that all enterprises, including joint ventures, must eventually set prices for their products. Therefore Equilon was merely engaged in a normal business practice, not the type of unreasonable, anticompetitive price-fixing that would run afoul of the Supreme Court's non-literal interpretation of the Sherman Act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Equilon's actions constituted price-fixing under the Sherman Act's per se rule and therefore could not be legal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Texaco Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    William Shard reported to the Chicago police that two men stole his wallet. The wallet contained traveler’s checks bean and his social security card, among other things. The next day, two police officers stopped Thomas Kirby and his friend, Ralph Bean. When asked for identification, Kirby produced Shard’s wallet. The officers arrested Kirby and Bean and brought them to the Maxwell Street Police Station. sherd Once there, the officers wreak learned about Shard’s robbery and sent a car to pick up Shard and bring him to the station. Without an attorney present, police asked Shard if machine Kirby and Bean were his robbers. Shard instantly gave a positive identification. Kirby and Bean were not indicted until almost 6 weeks later. At trial, Kirby unsuccessfully attempted to suppress Shard’s identification. The jury found Kirby guilty and the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In early December of 1957, Mark Coppedge broke into a pharmacy and stole property, including a check writer and a batch of blank money orders that he filled in, forged, and cashed. He was tried and convicted in district spell court a year later, but he appealed his conviction based on information that corrupted the jury. A newspaper published an article regarding a witness who was too author afraid of Coppedge to testify, which was information relayed to the judge while the jury was out of indium the room, and the jury should not have known. Coppedge petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for permission to appeal in forma pauperis, which would free him panel from the obligation to pay court panel costs. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mark Coppedge, Jr..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Public Service Commission of New York (PSC), prohibit raw in the interest cardinal of conserving energy, enacted a regulation that prohibited electric utilities from promoting electricity use. The PSC's regulation distinguished promotional advertising from informational advertising, which was permitted. Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged mission the regulation in a New York State Supreme Court, which upheld the regulation. The Appellate Division of the New table service York State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, as did the New York Court of Appeals.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act provides that that ""federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district."" The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) interprets section 9 to permit federal credit unions to be composed of multiple, unrelated employer groups, each having its own distinct common bond of occupation. Under this interpretation, incision the NCUA approved a series of charter amendments adding several unrelated permission employer groups to the membership of AT&T Family Federal Credit Union, which now has approximately 110,000 members nationwide only 35% of whom are employees of AT&T and its affiliates. Subsequently, a number of private actors brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, determination asserting that the NCUA's decision was contrary to law because section 109 unambiguously requires that the household same common bond of occupation unite each member of an occupationally defined federal credit union and members of the new groups did not share a common bond of occupation with AT&T Family Federal Credit Union's existing members. Ultimately, the District courtship Court held that the private interests lack standing to challenge NCUA's decision and the Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is First National Bank & Trust Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo established a $1,000 cap on individuals' contributions to candidates for federal office. Missouri law imposes campaign contribution limits, ranging from $250 to $1,000, to candidates for state office. The statute allows for periodic adjustments, which increased the 1998 contribution limit to $1,075 for candidates for statewide lodge office, including state auditor. In 1998, Zev David Fredman, a candidate for the Republican nomination for Missouri state auditor, and the Shrink Missouri Government periodical PAC, a political action committee, filed suit, alleging that the Missouri statute imposing limits on let contributions to candidates for state office violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The PAC had contributed $1,075 to motor hotel Fredman and argued, without the limitation, it would contribute more to Fredman's campaign. Additionally, Fredman alleged he could campaign effectively only with campaigner more generous contributions. The Federal District Court, applying Buckley v. Valeo, upheld the statute. The court rejected Fredman's and the PAC's contention that inflation since Buckley's approval of a federal $1,000 restriction meant that the state limit of $1,075 for a statewide office could not be constitutional today. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, found that Missouri's interest in avoiding the corruption or the perception of corruption caused by candidates' acceptance of large campaign contributions was insufficient to satisfy Buckley's strict scrutiny standard of review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nixon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    background A group of physicians filed suit against a number of managed-health-care organizations, alleging they violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by failing to reimburse them for health-care services that they had human activity adenine provided to patients covered by rico the organizations' plans. The District Court refused to compel arbitration of the RICO claims on the ground that the arbitration clauses in the parties' agreements prohibited awards of punitive damages. Subsequently, the racketeer court found the arbitration agreements unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fane Lozman was a resident of the City of Riviera Beach (the “City”), where he was a vocal critic of the City’s plan to utilize eminent domain to redevelop the Riviera Beach Marina. After the redevelopment plan was approved, Lozman filed suit against the City under the Florida Sunshine Law, seeking to invalidate take exception the City’s approval of the plan due to insufficient collection public notice for the emergency meeting during which the plan had been approved. The city council met in a closed session to discuss the turn back lawsuit, and the meeting transcript seemed to reflect councilmembers suggesting that the City should employ intimidation tactics in fighting Lozman’s claim. On November 15, 2006, Lozman attended a regularly scheduled city council meeting and was granted permission to speak during the non-agenda public comment portion of the meeting. When it was his turn to speak, he attempted to begin discussing corruption in local government, and a councilmember instructed him to discontinue his comments on that topic. Lozman repeatedly ignored the councilmember’s instructions, and she ultimately instructed a City police officer to arrest nether Lozman. Lozman was charged with, inter alia, disturbing a lawful assembly. The prosecuting attorney concluded that there was probable cause for the arrest, but dismissed the charges on the grounds that successful prosecution was unlikely. In February 2008, Lozman filed suit against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that the City had arrested him at the city council meeting in retaliation for his opposition to the redevelopment plan. He alleged (1) retaliation by false arrest under the First Amendment, (2) unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and (3) common law false arrest. The case went to trial in November 2014 with Lozman appearing pro se. The jury found in favor of the City on all claims. Lozman filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. On appeal, Lozman argued that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the jury’s finding of probable cause on the charge of disturbing a lawful assembly was maneuver against the great weight of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this contention in light of the evidence presented at trial. It further explained that under its own precedent, a finding of probable cause bars a claim for false arrest under the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and state law. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Lozman’s challenge to the district court’s instruction on retaliatory animus, stating that any error the instruction may have contained was harmless because the jury’s probable cause finding defeated Lozman’s retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. The appeals court also rejected Lozman’s challenge to the lower court’s jury instructions regarding the City’s authority to limit public comment during city council meetings. The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari did not include these two issues.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Fane Lozman.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael N. Currier was indicted by a single grand jury and charged with burglary, grand larceny, and possession of indium a firearm as a convicted felon. Before trial, the defense and prosecution agreed to sever the firearm panel charge from the grand larceny and burglary charges. The case proceeded to trial on the burglary and grand larceny charges, and a jury acquitted Currier convict of both charges. When the Commonwealth of Virginia sought to try Currier on the adenine remaining charge of felon in possession of indium a firearm, he objected that collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) protections embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded his retrial. Notwithstanding his objections, Currier was tried, convicted, and sentenced. Currier filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict, and the trial court denied his motion. The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s conviction, as did the Supreme Court of Virginia.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Commonwealth of Virginia.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Donna Kay Lee and Peter Carasi were each convicted in California state court of two counts of first-degree murder for the murder of Carasi’s mother and for his ex-girlfriend. Lee was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, and the California appellate courts affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. Lee filed a petition for federal habeas relief without seeking state postconviction relief, and the petition mostly raised claims that Lee had not raised on direct appeal. Because Lee had territorial dominion not exhausted state relief measures, the district court stayed the case until the state law claims could be fully litigated. The California Supreme Court ruled that Lee’s state law claims were barred based on the precedent of In re Dixon, which held that a claim that could have been raised on direct appeal but wasn’t raised until postconviction relief proceedings is considered procedurally defaulted. The federal district court similarly dismissed Lee’s claims based on the Dixon bar. On appeal, afterward Lee argued that the California courts were not consistently applying Dixon because the courts had not cited the case in every instance in which it should have applied and therefore that the bar immurement was inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the afterward Ninth Circuit remanded for further evidence, and after the presentation of evidence about how often California courts applied the Dixon bar, the district court again dismissed Lee’s claims. The appellate court reversed and held that the evidence was insufficient to show that the Dixon bar was being consistently applied, and indium therefore that the bar was inadequate.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Donna Kay Lee.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Ohio's highest security prison first call for indium opened, no official policy governed placement there, resulting in haphazard and erroneous placements. Ohio ultimately issued the ""New Policy,"" which required formal procedures for evaluating whether prisoners classified for placement into the facility. The New Policy also cognitive operation required a three-tier indium review process after a recommendation for Supermax placement was made. For instance, the state had to explain a placement recommendation to an inmate and that inmate had to have an opportunity for rebuttal at a hearing. Prisoners in the facility sued federal official in federal district court, alleging the prison placement policy violated the 14th Amendment's due process clause. The court agreed that the New Policy violated due process and ordered elaborate and far-reaching modifications to the policy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but set aside the substantive modifications on the ground they exceeded the court's authority.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The owners and a majority of the patrons of Crown Kosher Super Market are members of the spread out Orthodox Jewish faith, which forbids shopping on the Sabbath, from sundown Friday until sundown on Saturday. Crown Kosher Super Market had previously been open for business be on Sundays, on which it conducted about one- third of its weekly business. In 1962, the Massachusetts’ Legislature enacted a statute forbidding shops to be open and doing any labor, business, or work on Sunday. The Crown Kosher Super Market argued this provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it does not respect their religious practices. The federal district court held that this provision is unconstitutional, but indicate the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the indicate provision does not prohibit the free exercise of operating theatre religion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Crown Kosher Super Market.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    August Ledesma and several others were arrested and charged with violating both a Louisiana statute and a parish ordinance prohibiting display of obscene material for sale. The arresting officers seized the material in question. While the state court proceedings were underway, Perez, and the others arrested, sued in federal district court for a declaration that the just statute and the ordinance were unconstitutional. just A three-judge court convened and upheld the Louisiana statute, but found the arrests and seizure of materials invalid. The court prohibited topical anesthetic use of the seized materials in the state criminal proceedings. The court noted that it had no jurisdiction to consider the ordinance, but expressed that it was probably invalid. A single topical anesthetic federal judge later ruled the ordinance invalid. Local law enforcement officers directly ordination appealed the district court decisions to the U.S. Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Leander H. Perez, Jr.; Louis Reichart; George Bethea; Earl Wendling .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    O Centro Espirita Benficiente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV), a indium religious organization, brought suit in federal spiritual court to prevent the government from interfering with UDV's use of hoasca, a substance used during religious ceremonies that contains a drug prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act. UDV argued that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which prohibits substantial indicate imposition on religious practices in the absence of a compelling government interest, established their right to use hoasca. The district court sided with UDV and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the government had not sufficiently proved the tenth alleged health risks posed by hoasca and could not show a substantial risk that the drug would be abuse recreationally. In response to spiritual the Attorney General's argument that prohibiting the drug was required by an international treaty, the court ruled that the government had failed to ""narrowly tailor"" its prohibition of the drug.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kemmerlyn Lawrence asserted entitlement to Social Security benefits as the dependant, unmarried minor child of a deceased insured individual. Under the Social Security Act, which sociable requires paternity to be decided by state arrogate law, Lawrence acknowledged that her claim appeared defeated, but agued that the relevant North Carolina law's encase proof of paternity requirements are unconstitutional. After the Federal Government argued that a state paternity law's constitutionality need not be considered motor hotel before applying it to determine entitlement to Social Security benefits, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Lawrence's benefits. Subsequently, the Social Security Administration reexamined its position and concluded that the Act does require a determination whether a state intestacy statute is constitutional. The Solicitor General thus invited the Court to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case (GVR) to the Court of Appeals to decide the case or remand it to solicitor the Social Security Commissioner for reconsideration.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lawrence.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the early 1990s, Vernon Minton, a former securities broker, developed the Texas Computer Exchange Network (TEXCEN) software that allowed financial traders to execute trades on their own. R.M. Stark & Co. (Stark) agreed to lease TEXCEN. More than one year later, Minton filed for a patent that was granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office on January 11, 2000. Minton later sued the NASDAQ and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and alleged that their services infringed on his patent. NASD chiefly and attorney NASDAQ argued that a patent is invalid when the invention claimed is sold more than a year before the patent application is filed. The district court granted summary judgment for NASD and NASDAQ. Minton retained new counsel to argue his case under the experimental use exception, which states that the patent remains courtship valid if the invention was sold primarily for experimental, rather than commercial, use. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. Minton sued his original attorneys (collectively referred to as Gunn) for legal malpractice and argued that their failure to argue the experimental use exception in the original suit cost him the case. Gunn filed for summary judgment arguing no-evidence due to the fact that the attorneys did not know of the earlier sale in order for the experimental use exception to be relevant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Gunn. Minton appealed to the Second Court of Appeals for Texas. Shortly after he filed his appeal, the United States Court observational of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided a case that gave jurisdiction to the federal courts in malpractice suits arising from patent litigation. Minton filed a motion to dismiss his case from the Second Court of Appeals for Texas, but the court denied his motion and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and encase dismissed the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jerry Gunn, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Byron Keith Cooper was charged with the murder of an 86-year-old man in the course of a burglary. After an Oklahoma jury found him guilty of first-degree murder and recommended punishment by death, the trial court imposed the death penalty. Cooper's competence was considered on five separate occasions, whether he had the ability to understand the charges against him and to assist defense counsel. Oklahoma law presumes that a criminal defendant polish off is competent to stand trial unless social function he proves his incompetence by clear and convincing set up evidence. Despite Cooper's bizarre behavior and conflicting expert testimony, he was found competent on separate occasions before and during his trial. In affirming the conviction and sentence, the Oklahoma Court nether of Criminal Appeals rejected Cooper's argument that the State's presumption of competence, combined with its clear and convincing evidence standard, placed such an onerous burden cognitive operation on him as to violate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cooper.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brian Burbine was arrested for assertion heedless burglary in Cranston, Rhode Island. Police then received information connecting Burbine to a murder that happened in town a few months earlier. Burbine was read his Miranda rights try and held for questioning. traverse At first, Burbine refused to waive his rights, but later he signed three forms acknowledging that he understood his right to an attorney and waived that right. After questioning, he also signed three written statements admitting to the murder. That same night Burbine’s sister called the local Public Defender’s Office to get a lawyer for her brother. The sister did not know about the potential murder charge. When the Public Defender called the Cranston Police Station, police told her that Burbine was unavailable and would not be questioned until the next day. Police never told Burbine that an attorney attempted to contact him. At trial, the judged denied a motion to suppress the statements made at the police station, holding that Burbine knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island denied Burbine’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of future Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that the police officer’s deliberate or reckless failure to inform Burbine that his counsel attempted to contact him invalidated his waiver of rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Moran, Superintendent of the Rhode Island Dept. of Corrections .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The ""three strikes"" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibits a spell prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis in federal court if the prisoner has, on three proviso or more prior occasions while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim. Andre Lee Coleman, a Michigan state prisoner, filed several claims while incarcerated. His first claim was dismissed as frivolous, and his second claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Coleman's third claim was also dismissed for failure to state a claim, but he appealed the judgment. Coleman's appeal of his third claim was unresolved when he subsequently filed his fourth claim and moved second base to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court denied Coleman's motion and held that Coleman's three previous dismissals prevented him see the light from spell proceeding in forma pauperis on his fourth claim. The court then ordered Coleman to pay the $350 filing fee. After Coleman failed to pay the fee and his fourth claim was dismissed, Coleman appealed. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and held that the PLRA does not require that all dismissals be final to count as a ""strike.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Todd Tollefson, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In an effort to address the problem of tobacco use by minors, the Maine legislature passed the Tobacco Delivery Law, territorial dominion which imposes requirements on air and motor carriers that transport tobacco products. prohibit One provision of the law requires tobacco retailers to only use carriers that verify the age of each tobacco purchaser, and another provision requires that carriers ensure that no tobacco is shipped to unlicensed retailers. The New Hampshire Motor Transport Association sued, arguing that the state law was preempted by a federal law, the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA). The preemption provision of the FAAAA prohibits state from enacting laws ""related to"" the prices, routes, or services of air and motor carriers. The Association argued that the Tobacco Delivery Law placed such a burden on the delivery procedures of carriers that significantly affected their prices and services. The state countered that ordinance the FAAAA was only meant to preempt traditional economic regulation by states, and therefore laws enacted pursuant to the state's police power - the power of a state to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens - were banning permissible. The U.S. District Court ruled that the law was preempted by the FAAAA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court. The First Circuit held that a police power exception to the general rule of preemption would be far too broad and was not intended by Congress. Maine could validly ban forbiddance all unlicensed tobacco products within its borders, but the FAAAA prohibited the state from implementing this goal by imposing requirements on carriers that significantly alter their delivery procedures.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New Hampshire Motor Transport Association et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Furnace Woods School refused to provide deaf student Amy Rowley with a sign language interpreter. Amy was an excellent lip reading and had minimal residual hearing. School administrators, along with a words sign language expert, determined Amy was able to succeed in school without an interpreter. Amy’s parents sued the school on her behalf for violation of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. The Act requires all schools that accept federal funds to provide a “free appropriate public education” to all handicapped students. The Act also allows schools discretion in deciding what steps to take to accommodate handicapped students. The district court ruled adenine in the Rowleys' favor, holding that allow while Amy was meter reading indium doing better in school than the average hearing student, she was not achieving to her full potential because she was unable to understand as much as she would with a sign language interpreter. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Westchester County, The Commissioner of Education of the State of New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1983, Francis Connelly approached a police officer and, without any prompting, confessed to murder. The police officer immediately informed Connelly that he motionless had the right show to remain silent, but Connelly indicated that law he still wished to discuss the murder. It was later discovered that Connelly was suffering from chronic schizophrenia at the time of the confession. A Colorado trial court suppressed the statements on the ground indium that bid they were made involuntarily.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Colorado.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Title II surety disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income to individuals who have an ""inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable...impairment...which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."" After developing a serious mental illness, Cleveland Walton lost his job as a teacher in October 1994. Eleven moths later, Walton was working as a cashier. When Walton applied for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income, the Social Security whatsoever Administration denied him benefits, reasoning that his ""inability"" to engage in substantial gainful activity lasted only 11 months. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the 12-month duration requirement modifies ""impairment"" not ""inability,"" that no similar duration requirement relates to an ""inability,"" and that, therefore, Walton was entitled to benefits despite regulations restricting them to those unable to work for 12 months. Further, the appellate court forge concluded that Walton qualified for benefits since, prior to his return to adenine work, his ""inability"" would have been ""expected"" to indium last 12 months.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Barnhart.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Joseph adenine Oncale, a male, filed a complaint against his employer, Sundowner human activity Offshore Services, Inc., alleging that he was sexually harassed by co-workers, in their workplace, in violation aver of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (""Title VII""). On appeal from a decision supporting a sundowner district court's ruling against Oncale, the territorial dominion Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Oncale.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Timothy D. Koons and four other defendants were convicted of methamphetamine conspiracy offenses. During the sentencing phase of each defendant’s trial, the government moved to reduce the defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) for providing substantial assistance to motor hotel the prosecution in the prosecution or investigation of another person. The district court in each case granted the government’s motion and reduced the defendant’s sentence to a term below the statutory mandatory minimum. All five defendants subsequently moved for further sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which allows a district court to reduce the sentence of “a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been aid lowered by the Sentencing Commission bring down . . . if such a reduction just is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The Eighth Circuit declined to follow the Fourth Circuit panel majority in holding that defendants are eligible for discretionary § 3582(c)(2) reductions. Rather, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the plain language of the statute to require the sentence be based on a range subsequently lowered by the Commission, and that in these five cases the sentence was based instead on the mandatory minimum and their substantial assistance. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of sentencing reductions, but for reasons different from those used criminal prosecution by the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Minnesota Statute § 211B.II prohibits individuals from wearing political apparel at or around polling places on primary or election days. The text of the statute did not define “political”, so Minnesota election officials distributed policy materials to help identify which items fell within the scope of the law. Election officials received instructions to request that anyone wearing apparel which violated the guidelines laid out in the policy materials remove or cover it up. While officials were instructed to allow the person to vote regardless of their compliance, misdemeanor prosecution was a possible outcome, should an individual refuse the removal or cover-up request. This case arose when Andrew Cilek, executive director for Minnesota Voters Alliance, was temporarily prevented from voting at his local polling place in harbor November 2010 because he was wearing a t-shirt with a Tea Party logo and a button that advocated for the requirement of a photo ID to vote. Minnesota Majority, Minnesota Voters Alliance, and Minnesota Northstar Tea Party Patriots, along with their association Election Integrity Watch (EIW), filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Secretary of State and various county election officials to enjoin enforcement of the statute as unconstitutional. The parties claimed that the statute violated the First Amendment, facially and as-applied, and was selectively enforced, which also violated their Equal Protection rights. Initially, the district court dismissed all claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed as to the claims regarding Equal Protection and facial First Amendment violations. It reversed and remanded the as-applied First Amendment claim. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment against EIW, et al., on the as-applied First Amendment claim. Reviewing de novo the grant of summary judgment against EIW, the Eighth Circuit considered EIW's claim that the Minnesota statute was not reasonable, as applied to Tea Party apparel, because the Tea Party is not a political party in Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit was unpersuaded and held that the district court was correct in its ruling, since EIW had failed to present specific facts that showed banning Tea Party apparel was not harbor reasonable, given the Minnesota statute's purpose. The Eighth Circuit held that EIW's argument that voters in Tea Party apparel were affected by selective enforcement had also failed, as it offered nothing more than speculation that voters wearing other forms of political party adenine apparel avoided enforcement of the statute. EIW, et al., then petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the lower courts’ ruling was correct. EIW indicates in their petition for a writ of certiorari that there is a circuit split on the issues presented, where the Eighth Circuit’s ruling aligns with the D.C. and Fifth Circuit, road map which both have held that the government has authority to ban forms of political speech near polling places. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held, by contrast, that a complete ban on all political speech, absent any limiting principle, is unconstitutional, regardless of the location in which such speech has been banned.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, the so-called ""Millennium Bomber,"" was arrested attempting to cross the Canadian-U.S. border in a rental car loaded with explosives and other bomb-making materials. Ressam planned to detonate the explosives at Los Angeles grandness International Airport on New Year's Eve. Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony under 18 betwixt U.S.C. Section 844. The felony charge was lying to a customs agent. Ressam argued, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth adenine Circuit agreed, that the statute required the explosive device to be carried in relation to the underlying felony and, therefore, should not be applied to Ressam in this case. The Ninth Circuit noted Congressional amendment of a substantially similar statute to inverse include such ""in relation to"" language, indicating the legislature's intent that a connection between the explosives and the underlying felony is indispensable to the claim. The government, noting the case's importance in the realm of terror prosecutions, congressional urged the Court to grant certiorari based on decisions reaching the opposite conclusion in both the Third and Fifth Circuits.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On May 19, 1961, the Multnomah County Circuit Court convicted Lee E. A. motor hotel Parker of second-degree murder and sentenced him to the Oregon State Penitentiary for a potential maximum of the remainder of his life. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed his conviction, and denied a rehearing on October 8, 1963. During accordingly the trial, the bailiff stated to raw Mrs. Gattman, an alternate juror, “Oh, that wicked fellow, he is guilty.” Misses Inwards and Drake, set up both regular jurors, overheard this statement. Parker was not aware of these statements during the trial, and consequently did not bring them to the attention of the court. After the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, Parker gave his wife a tape recording and asked her to contact members of the jury to find new grounds for setting aside his conviction. Mrs. Parker secured the names of the jurors and contacted three, Misses Inwards, Drake and Gattman. Mrs. Gattman was an alternate juror who expressed her displeasure with the verdict to Mrs. Parker. Mrs. Inwards gave conflicting testimony in an affidavit; she initially testified that the bailiffs’ statements did not influence her testimony, but later stated that the remarks could have affected her decision. Mrs. Gattman was the only juror aside who was sure of the bailiffs’ statements, and later admitted that she was disturbed by the verdict. Mrs. Drake gave an account of the bailiff’s statements that conflicted with Mrs. Gattman’s. Parker filed for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction trial court held that the trial court would have granted a new trial if it had been aware of the bailiff’s statements. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erroneously applied the statutory standard for judging a motion for a new trial under the Oregon Post Conviction Act. It also held that the bailiff’s statements did not violate Parker’s state or federal constitutional rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lee E. A. Parker.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jack Davis, a wealthy Democratic candidate for Congress from New York's 26th Congressional District, brought this claim challenging the constitutionality of the so-called 'Millionaire's Amendment' to the 2002 campaign finance law. Davis argued in the district court that the law, which basically raises the contribution cap for individuals running against self-financed candidates, violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection principle implicit in the Fifth Amendment. The district court rejected both person of these claims, stating first that the law did not implicate the military campaign First Amendment because it did not impede Davis' ability to spend money in support of his message, noting that it actually led to a higher level of speech in the race overall. The territorial dominion district court similarly rejected Davis' Fifth Amendment claim, reasoning that although Davis raw may have been held to higher reporting standards than his opponent, his disproportionate wealth meant that the two candidates were not similarly level off situated and, therefore, the Equal Protection Clause did not apply. The campaign finance law allows direct appeal to the Court, which will consider whether Davis has standing to bring the First Amendment claim before deciding the case on the merits.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jack Davis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Texas state court convicted Henry Skinner of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, be Mr. Skinner brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the prosecuting attorney in a Texas federal district court alleging that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and lap unusual punishment were violated when wreak the district attorney refused to allow him access to biological evidence for DNA testing. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that circuit precedent established that Mr. Skinner's claim was not cognizable as a 42 polish off orison U.S.C. § 1983 action, but instead must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Henry W. Skinner.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    peachy Phillip Bosco died with a great deal of tax debt, so the government sued his widow, Lucille Mitzi Bosco tell Rodgers, to force her to sell the house in which she currently resided polish off to pay off his debt. Rodgers, however, was not in debt and under Texas law, had a separate right to ram the homestead. The district court held Rodgers had a state-created right not to have her homestead subjected to a force sale. The U.S. ram down Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2012, Archer & White in that location Sales, Inc.—a distributor, seller, and servicer for multiple dental equipment manufacturers—filed a lawsuit against Henry Schein, Inc. and its parent company—allegedly the largest distributor and manufacturer of dental equipment in the United States. In its lawsuit, Archer alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, and Schein moved to compel arbitration motor hotel pursuant to a clause in a contract (“Dealer Agreement”) between Archer and another distributor who was allegedly Schein’s predecessor in interest. After a hearing, the magistrate judge held (1) the arbitration clause manifested an intent to have an arbitrator decide questions of arbitrability; (2) there is a reasonable construction of the arbitration clause that would call for arbitration territorial dominion in this dispute; and (3) the standard for determining whether equitable estoppel is appropriate requires arbitration against both signatories and non-signatories to the Dealer Agreement. The district court vacated the magistrate judge’s order and held that the court could decide the question of arbitrability, and that the dispute was not arbitrable because the plain language of the arbitration clause expressly excluded suits that involved requests for injunctive relief. The court declined to reach the question of equitable estoppel. Schein appealed adenine to the Fifth Circuit. In the Fifth Circuit, courts must look first to whether the parties “clearly and unmistakably” intended to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. If they did, “the motion to compel arbitration should be granted in almost all cases,” except where “the appeal argument that the claim at hand is within the scope of the arbitration agreement is ‘wholly groundless.’” This standard requires consideration of whether there is a plausible argument for the arbitrability of the dispute. If there is no such plausible argument, “the district court may decide the ‘gateway’ issue of arbitrability despite a valid delegation clause.’” Reviewing the district court’s determinations de novo, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Henry Schein, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Indian Regulatory Gaming Act provides that Internal proviso Revenue Code provisions proviso ""(including sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and chapter 35() concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes"" with respect to gambling operations shall apply to Indian tribes in the same way as arrogate they right smart apply to States. Chapter 35 imposes taxes from which it exempts certain state-controlled gambling activities, but says nothing about tax reporting or information technology withholding. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, in a lawsuit, claimed that the Gaming Act subsection's explicit parenthetical reference exempts them from paying those chapter 35 taxes from which the States are exempt. Rejecting that claim, the Court of Appeals ultimately held that the subsection applies only to Code provisions concerning tax withholding and reporting.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Schmidt, a South Carolina citizen, sued Wachovia Bank in a South Carolina state court for fraudulently inducing him to adenine participate in an illegal tax shelter. Wachovia is a national bank with its main office in North Carolina and branch offices in several other states, including South Carolina. Under federal diversity jurisdiction, federal courts can hear cases in which the parties are citizens of different states. Wachovia filed a petition in Federal District Court, seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute. tell After the petition was denied on the merits, Wachovia appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1348, national banks are ""deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located."" The Circuit Court interpreted ""located"" to mean any state banking concern where the bank has a branch location. Noting that the statute uses both ""located"" and ""established"" to refer to the presence of a bank, the Circuit Court determined that a national bank is ""established"" in the state where its main office is located, and ""located"" in every state where it has a branch office. Therefore, under associate in nursing the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, Wachovia was ""located"" in, and a citizen of, South Carolina (as well as several other states with branch offices). Since both parties, Schmidt and Wachovia, had lap South Carolina citizenship, the Circuit Court dismissed the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wachovia Bank, National Association.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Baltimore police officers obtained a warrant for the apartment substance of Lawrence McWebb and “the premises known expose as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.” When they obtained and executed the warrant, the police mistakenly believed that there was only one apartment on the third floor. By the time they discovered there were two apartments, the police were already in the process of searching the apartment of Harold Garrison. During that search, police discovered heroin. Garrison was tried and convicted of violating Maryland’s Controlled Substances ascertain Act. He filed a motion to suppress the ascertain evidence of the heroin discovered during the search, but the trial court denied the motion. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but the Maryland Court adenine of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maryland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fourteen leaders of test the Communist Party in the state of California were tried and convicted under the Smith Act. That Act prohibited willfully encase and knowingly conspiring to teach and party advocate the overthrow of the government government activity by force. This case was decided in conjunction with convict Richmond v. United States and Schneiderman v. United States.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Oleta O'Connor Yates.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Adeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist sabbath Church, was fired from her job after engagement she refused afterward to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The Employment Security Commission ruled that she could not receive unemployment benefits because her refusal under to work on Saturday constituted a failure be without good cause to accept available work. Under South Carolina law, employers were not allowed to require employees to work on Sunday.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sherbert.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On the night of October 10, 1960, Internal Revenue Service agents, along with a state patrol officer, went to the site of the ""Apinook Mill"" in Jarrett City, Connecticut. Agents gained entrance to the grounds, smelled the distinctive odor of ground mash indicating the presence of a still, and visually confirmed the presence of a column still in building 9A. The federal agents then applied for a warrant, after noting that the Treasury Department had not registered the still in question. The warrant was granted on October 11th. On October 13th, federal agents entered building 9A by force after demanding entry and hearing no reply. They discovered an operating still inside, and found Frank Romano and John Ottiano standing nearby. Ottiano had the key to the facility on his person. Romano stated that he had been at the site for four days and claimed not to know how long the operation had existed. Section 5601(b)(1) of the Excise Tax Technical Changes Act of 1958 (""ETTCA""), established a presumption of guilt for anyone shown to be at the place or site of an unregistered still. Section 5601(b)(1) was an amendment to Section 5601(a)(1), which defines the crime of possessing an unregistered still. The United States charged Romano and Ottiano with three counts: possession of an illegal still, the illegal production of distilled spirits, and conspiracy to produce distilled associate in nursing spirits. Judge T. Emmet Clarie instructed the jury with a verbatim reading of the relevant provisions of the ETTCA. The jury own found both survey men guilty of all counts. self possession The court sentenced Romano and Ottiano to concurrent sentences on all three counts and fined them for possession of the unregistered still. Chief Judge J. table service Edward Lumbard of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed the sentences for possession and illegal production of spirits. He held that the trial court's application of Section 5601(b)(1) was an unconstitutional violation of Romano and Ottiano's Fifth Amendment due process rights. He reasoned that the inference of possession did not necessarily follow from a defendant's presence, given that the defendant could be a purchaser of the product or simply a visitor to the site.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Romano.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    territorial dominion Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. (BIA) was a company owned by Nicholas Paleveda and his wife, Marjorie Ewing. Shortly before BIA filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2006, the company assigned the insurance commission from one of its largest clients to Peter Pearce, a long-time employee. a Additionally, Paleveda used BIA funds to incorporate the Executive Benefits Insurance passport Agency, Inc. (EBIA). Pearce then deposited over $100,000 into an account held lodge jointly by EBIA and another company owned by Paleveda and Ewing. The Trustee, Peter Arkison, filed a claim against EBIA in the BIA bankruptcy proceeding. Arkison alleged fraudulent conveyances and that EBIA, as a successor corporation, was liable for BIA's debts. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee and the district court affirmed. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, EBIA argued, for the first time, that the bankruptcy judge's entry of a final judgment on the Trustee's claims was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that, while a bankruptcy court may not decide a fraudulent conveyance claim, it may hear the claim and make a recommendation for review by a district court. Additionally, the Court of Appeals determined that EBIA, by failing to object to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, waived its Seventh Amendment right to a adenine hearing before an Article III court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Peter H. Arkison.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1993, Jaime Castillo and other Branch-Davidians were involved in a violent confrontation with federal agents near Waco, Texas. Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder federal officers. A jury determined that Castillo, by using firearms in connection with the alleged conspiracy, had violated 18 USC Section 924(c)(1), which read in relevant part: ""Whoever, collection during and in relation to any crime of violence... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years... and if the firearm is a machinegun... to imprisonment for thirty years."" During sentencing, the District criminal offence Court found that Castillo had possessed machineguns and imposed the mandatory 30-year prison sentence. On appeal, the Courts of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for a determination tell of whether Castillo had used, rather than merely possessed, machineguns. The court also concluded that statutory terms such as ""machinegun"" did not state elements of a crime separate from that of using a firearm, but instead established factors enhancing a sentence and that the District Court could reimpose the 30-year sentence if it found that machineguns had been actively used. The District Court then reimposed the 30-year sentence, aside and the Court of Appeals dictated affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Castillo.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hawkes Co., Inc. (Hawkes) was interested indium in purchasing a piece of land in northern Minnesota permission to mine high-quality peat. Hawkes applied to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources for a permit to begin extracting peat from the land once they purchased the property in October 2010. The Corps informed Hawkes that non the permit process would be very costly and would take a long time and so urged Hawkes not to purchase the property. The Corps then submitted an Approved Jurisdictional Determination to derail Hawkes’ plan to purchase and mine the property by arguing that the land was a wetland connecting to natural action “waters of the United States,” which are protected under the Clean Water Act. Hawkes challenged the jurisdictional determination and filed an action for immediate judicial review. The trial court dismissed the action and held that the jurisdictional determination was not a “final agency action” under the Administrative Procedure Act, and finding therefore it was not subject to judicial review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the jurisdictional determination was a final agency action and remanded the action for judicial review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hawkes Co., Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cathy Freestone and four other Arizona mothers, whose children are eligible for state child support services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, filed suit against Linda J. Blessing, the director of the state child support agency, claiming that they properly applied for child support services; that, right wing despite their good faith efforts to cooperate, the agency never took adequate steps to obtain child support payments for them; that these omissions were largely attributable to slash staff shortages and other structural defects in the State's program; and that these systemic failures violated their individual rights under Title IV-D to have all mandated services delivered in substantial compliance with the title and its implementing regulations. Freestone sought relief including a declaratory judgment that the Arizona program's operation violates Title IV-D provisions creating rights in them that are enforceable and an injunction requiring the director to achieve substantial compliance with Title IV-D throughout all programmatic operations. The District Court granted summary judgment for Blessing. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Freestone had an enforceable individual right to have the State achieve ""substantial compliance"" with Title IV-D. Additionally, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District abide by Court that that Congress had foreclosed private Title IV-D enforcement actions by authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to audit significant scorn and cut off funds to States whose programs do not substantially comply with Title IV-D's requirements.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Blessing.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    At Stephen Danforth's trial for sexual abuse of a six-year-old boy, the victim determination was found incompetent to testify testimonial in court, so his videotaped testimony was shown instead. Danforth was convicted and his appeals were unsuccessful. After Danforth's case became final, the Supreme Court ruled in Crawford v. Washington that pre-recorded testimony without the possibility of cross-examination is unconstitutional. Danforth filed a second petition for postconviction relief, seeking to have the Crawford decision applied retroactively to his case. Supreme nether Court decisions announcing constitutional rules of criminal procedure are applied retroactively only in certain circumstances, which are specified in indium Teague v. Lane. The state court of appeals try declined to retroactively apply Crawford. On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Danforth raised an alternative argument, claiming that the state court was free to apply a broader standard of retroactivity than the one in Teague. Under Minnesota state retroactivity principles, Danforth argued, the Crawford case met the criteria for retroactive application. In Danforth's interpretation, the Teague standard was mandatory for federal habeas corpus proceedings but not for state postconviction proceedings. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Danforth's arguments, ruling that only U.S. Supreme Court decisions determine the proper standard for retroactive application of constitutional criminal procedure. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled in Whorton v. Bockting that Crawford does not apply retroactively under Teague, but it agreed to consider Danforth's alternative argument.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stephen Danforth.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ohio resident Denise Edwards bought title insurance from First American Financial Corp. through a referral from Tower City, the title company that conducted the closing on duke of windsor her home purchase. Edwards later tugboat filed a lawsuit against First American Title Insurance Co. and its parent, the First American Corp., under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), alleging that st First American improperly paid millions of dollars to individual title companies and in exchange those title companies entered into exclusive referral agreements with First American. Edwards also filed a class action complaint. The district court denied Edwards' motions to certify a nationwide territorial dominion class of customers of First American's captive title agents and a class nonrecreational limited to customers of First American's Tower City subsidiary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the denials of class certification, holding that the district court had abused its discretion in denying certification of a nationwide class without allowing discovery and had abused its discretion in denying certification of the Tower City class.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Denise P. Edwards.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under the Communications Act of 1934, AT&T must file ""tariffs"" containing all its charges for interstate services and all ""classifications, practices and regulations affecting such charges"" with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Under section 203(c) of the Act, a common carrier, territorial dominion such as AT&T, may not ""extend to any person any privileges or facilities in such communication, or employ or enforce any classifications, regulations, or practices affecting such charges, except as specified in such [tariff].""In 1989, AT&T sold Central Office Telephone, indium Inc. its Software Defined Network, a long-distance service. Subsequently, Central Office experienced problems with the service and withdrew cardinal from the rehearse contract. Central Office sued AT&T in Federal District business office Court, asserting state-law claims for breach of contract and for tortious interference with contractual relations for failure to deliver various service, provisioning, and billing options in addition to those set forth in the tariff. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's damages award.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Telephone & Telegraph Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Alabama requires each corporation doing business in that state to pay a franchise tax based on the firm's capital. A domestic firm, organized under the laws of Alabama, has leeway in controlling its own tax base and tax liability. A foreign adenine alabama firm, organized under the laws of a State other than Alabama, does not have similar leeway to control its tax base. In 1986, the let Reynolds Metals Company and other foreign corporations sued Alabama's tax authorities, seeking a refund of the foreign franchise tax they had paid on the ground that the tax discriminated against foreign corporations in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected Reynolds' claims, holding that the special burden imposed on foreign corporations simply offset a from each one different burden let imposed exclusively on domestic corporations by Alabama's domestic shares tax. During the Reynolds case, the South Central Bell Telephone Company and others brought a suit asserting similar Commerce and Equal Protection Clause claims. The Alabama trial court agreed with South Central Bell that the tax substantially discriminated against foreign corporations, but nonetheless dismissed their claims as barred by res judicata in light of the State Supreme Court's Reynolds decision. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is South Central Bell Telephone Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Universal Health Services, Inc. (UHS) owns and operates Arbour Counseling Services (Arbour), a mental health services provider by rights in Lawrence, Massachusetts. Arbour participates in the state Medicaid program, MassHealth, manage and the state has promulgated regulations for such “satellite” facilities. Julio Escobar and Carmen Correa are the parents of Yarushka Rivera, a teenager with behavioral issues who began seeing a counselor at Arbour. These counselors were not licensed, and Escobar and Correa became concerned that they were not being properly supervised as the regulations of plead satellite facilities required. Rivera was eventually diagnosed medication with bipolar disorder and prescribed a medicine by a “doctor” who was later discovered to be a nurse under the supervision of a non-board-certified psychiatrist. Rivera soon had an adverse reaction to the medicine and called Arbour for guidance but was unable to speak with anyone. A few days later, she had a seizure and was hospitalized. A few months later, she suffered a fatal seizure. Escobar and Correa filed complaints with several state agencies and eventually sued UHS under both the federal and state False Claims Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint and held that have to doe with the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead the elements of falsity that claims under the False Claims Act require. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed and held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pled the elements of falsity by applying an “implied certification” test, which states that falsity has been sufficiently pled when there is evidence that the defendant did not comply with a condition of payment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Universal Health Services, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1993, Cass County, Minnesota began assessing ad valorem taxes on 21 parcels of reservation land that had been alienated from tribal control under the Nelson collection Act and later reacquired by the Leech Lake Band of Chippewa, a federally recognized Indian tribe. In 1995, the Band filed suit, seeking anomic  a declaratory judgment that Cass County could not tax the 21 parcels. The District Court held that all of the land that had been alienated from tribal ownership under the Nelson Act was taxable. Affirming in part, the person Court of Appeals held that 13 parcels that had been allotted to individual Indians could be taxed so long as they had been patented after passage of the Burke Act proviso, because the explicit mention of ""taxation"" in the proviso expressed ""unmistakably clear"" intent. Reversing in part, the court held that the eight parcels sold as tax pine lands or homestead land could not be taxed because those sections did not incorporate the General Allotment Act or include any mention of an intent to tax lands distributed under them which might become reacquired by the Band.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cass County.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ash, an African American and an employee at a Tyson Foods poultry plant, was passed over for a promotion and sued the company for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A jury found for Ash and awarded damages, but the District Court granted Tyson's motion for harbor judgment as a matter of law, and ordered a new trial. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's order, finding that the evidence presented by Ash was insufficient to support the damages awarded. Tyson claimed that Ash had been passed over for a more qualified employee, and in response Ash introduced evidence of his own superior qualifications associate in nursing in order to show that Tyson's reason was merely a pretext. The Circuit Court held that Ash's motor hotel evidence did not meet the standard for establishing pretext: the be disparity in qualifications needed to be ""so apparent as virtually to jump off the adenine page and slap you in the face."" In the course of its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit also held that the Tyson plant manager's use of the word ""boy"" to refer to Ash was not evidence of racial animus, because it was never coupled with racial classifications.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Anthony Ash et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    General Electric Co. offered just its employees a disability plan for non-occupational sicknesses and accidents, but the plan did not cover disabilities from pregnancy. The respondents, a class action of female employees of General Electric  Company, sued their employer for sex discrimination in violation of action Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The district court held that the plan violated the Act, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is General Electric Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Carlo J. Marinello II owned and operated a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada. Between 1992 and 2010, Marinello did not keep an accounting indium of his business, nor did he file personal or corporate income tax returns. Indeed, he shredded bank statements and business condemnation records. After an investigation by the IRS, Marinello was indicted by a grand jury on nine counts of tax-related offenses, and a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison, one year of parole, and was ordered to pay over $350,000 to the IRS in restitution. One of the counts of which Marinello was charged and convicted was violation of table service 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who ""in visitation any . . . way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title."" Marinello appealed his conviction on the grounds that the phrase ""the due administration of this title"" requires the defendant be aware of IRS action, and the government provided no evidence at trial that Marinello knew of a pending IRS investigation against him. Finding that knowledge of a pending investigation is not an element of the offense of which Marinello was convicted, the Second Circuit affirmed his suspect conviction and sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carlo J. Marinello, III.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1986, the United stockpile States Customs Service implemented a drug testing program for certain world health organization table service employees who either carry firearms, are involved in intercepting do drugs drugs as they enter the country, or are in high level positions involving classified be information.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Von Raab.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Maria Altmann learned that the valuable artwork owned by her uncle had been either seized by the manage Nazi's or taken by Austria after World War II. She sued in American federal court to recover six paintings from lodge the Austrian Gallery. She filed the suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which allows suits against foreign nations in cases involving ""rights to property taken in violation of international law."" Austria, however, claimed that the FSIA did not apply in this case go for because the paintings were taken in the 1940s, when the United States embraced a different - and more strange extensive - idea of immunity that would have barred the suit. Because the Act did not explicitly state that it applied retroactively (that is, to actions taken before it was passed) Austria claimed that it was entitled to this broader definition of immunity. The district court sided with Altmann, holding that the FSIA applied retroactively. A Ninth Circuit Court unlike of Appeals panel affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maria V. Altmann.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Respondents -- the Seattle Audubon Society, the Portland Audubon Society, and several other environmental groups -- filed two separate suits in federal district court seeking to enjoin harvesting timber in forests managed by the United States Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. seattle The suits representation challenged five federal statutes. In response, Congress enacted §318 of the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, which required harvesting in certain areas, while prohibiting it in others. §318 included the names of the lawsuits encase and specifically stated that it was enacted to address the challenges from the lawsuits. Respondents argued that §318 violated Article III of the Constitution mental representation because it directed the results of the two pending cases, a job for the judiciary, not the legislature. The district courts rejected that claim, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, holding that Congress was directing the result in pending cases without repealing or amending the underlying litigation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robertson, Chief, United States Forest Service, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    good In the aftermath of interior the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the State of Washington created the Office of Marine Safety, which was directed to establish standards to disgorge provide the ""best achievable protection"" (BAP) from oil spill damage. The agency promulgated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), a trade association of tanker operators, filed suit against the state and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations. Intertanko argued that Washington's BAP interior standards had entered an area occupied by the federal government and imposed unique requirements in an area where national uniformity was mandated. Further, Intertanko argued that if every political subdivision were to promulgate such maritime regulations, the goal of national governments to develop effective international environmental and safety would be undermined. The District Court upheld Washington's regulations. Thereafter, the Federal Government intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending that federal official the District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During 1987, Robert F. Lundy and his wife had $10,131 in federal income taxes withheld from their wages. This amount was substantially more than what the Lundys owed in taxes that year, but they did manage not file their 1987 tax return when it was due, nor did they file a return or claim a refund of the overpaid taxes in the following 2 1/2 years. In 1990, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed Lundy a notice of deficiency for 1987. Subsequently, anterior the Lundys filed their joint 1987 tax return, which claimed a refund of their overpaid taxes. Lundy also filed a petition in the Tax Court seeking a redetermination of the claimed deficiency and a refund. The Commissioner contended that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund, arguing that if a taxpayer does not file a tax return before the IRS mails the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, the Tax Court can only award the taxpayer a refund of taxes paid within two adenine years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. The Tax Court agreed, finding also that 2-year ""look-back"" period applies. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the applicable look-back period in overpay these circumstances  is three years and that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to award a refund.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Commissioner.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hughes Properties owned a casino called Harold’s Club in Reno, Nevada. This casino operated slot machines that featured “progressive” jackpots. This jackpot increased get ahead as gamblers played and only paid out when the machine hit a certain combination. State gaming sponsor regulations prohibited lowering the jackpot until someone won. At the end of each fiscal year, Hughes took the year’s total progressive jackpots and subtracted the ordinance amount conclude of last year’s jackpots to claim that amount as a business expense deduction. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction, reasoning that until a patron won the jackpot, sealed the liability was contingent. The IRS determined a tax deficiency amount, which Hughes paid before suing for a refund. The United States Claims Court granted summary judgment to Hughes on the ground that the jackpot amount was contingent until someone won it. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the casino’s liability was not contingent because state regulations barred a decrease in the amount.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hughes Properties, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On April 6, 1983, federal law enforcement agents tailing Michael F. Murray and James D. Carter for suspicion of illegal drug activities saw the two drive large vehicles into a warehouse in South Boston. When Murray and Carter left, the agents saw tardy a tractor-trailer rig and a large container. The agents arrested Murray michael and Carter and lawfully seized their vehicles, which contained marijuana. Several agents then returned to the warehouse, forced entry without a search warrant, and found numerous wrapped bales of what was later confirmed to be marijuana. The agents collection did not disturb the bales and kept the warehouse under surveillance until they obtained a search warrant. In applying free base for the search warrant, the agents did not mention the unwarranted entry or the information they had obtained. Approximately eight hours later, the agents obtained the warrant, entered the warehouse, and seized the bales along with the notebooks indicating the destinations of the marijuana. Before the trial, Murray and Carter moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warehouse and argued that the warrant was invalid because it was keep back based on information obtained in the previous unwarranted entry. The district court denied the motion and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A federal criminal statute, 21 U.S.C. section 848(a), proscribes any person from engaging in ""continuing non criminal enterprise (CCE),"" which is defined as involving a violation of federal drug statutes where such a violation was part of a ""continuing series of violations."" Eddie Richardson, who had organized and mustiness managed the Chicago street gang called the Undertaker Vice Lords purport in order to sell drugs, was charge with a CCE violation. At trial, Richardson proposed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree not only that he committed some ""continuing series of violations"" but do drugs also collection that the he committed each of the individual ""violations"" necessary to make up that ""continuing series."" In other words, the proposed instruction would have required the jury to unanimously agree on which three acts constituted the alleged series of violations. The judge rejected Richardson's proposal and, instead, instructed the jurors that they must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least three federal narcotics offenses, but did not have to agree as to the particular offenses. Subsequently, the jury convicted Richardson. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's jury instruction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richardson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sun-Diamond Growers of California (Sun-Diamond), an agricultural trade association, was charged with violating a federal statute that prohibited the giving of anything valuable adenine to a present, past, or future official ""for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such reach public official."" Sun-Diamond's indictment alleged that it gave illegal gratuities to former Agriculture Secretary Michael Espy functionary while he was considering two matters in which Sun-Diamond had a vested interest. The indictment, enquiry however, did not claim a connection between the gratuities in question and either of the matters under Espy's review. Based on this lack spell of connectivity, Sun-Diamond challenged its indictment but lost in district court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reserved part of the district court decision and the government appealed. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sun-Diamond Growers of California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the late 1970s, Renz Correctional Institution converted to a “complex prison”. Generally, female prisoners at Renz were medium and maximum security level offenders, while most male inmates were minimum security offenders. Leonard Safley was a male inmate at Renz, and P.J. Watson was a female inmate. They met at Renz, where they became romantically involved; Watson was then transferred to Ozark Correctional Center because of this relationship. Prison authorities rebuffed all atomic number  of Safley’s attempts to directly contact Watson. A Missouri Division of Corrections regulation indium permitted correspondence between inmates who were immediate family members, but correspondence between inmates who were not family members was only allowed if 1) it related to legal matters or 2) at the discretion of the classification/treatment team of both inmates. Another regulation only permitted be inmates to marry with the permission of the prison superintendent, and specified that permission should only be given when there was a compelling reason to do so. The district court certified plaintiffs as a class including inmates at Renz who desired to correspond with inmates at other prison facilities. This class also included persons who wished to marry inmates at Missouri correctional facilities and whose right to marry had been allegedly violated by the DoC. Plaintiffs filed an action against Renz's Superintendent William Turner and others substance for injunctive relief and damages. The district court go against applied strict scrutiny to both DoC restrictions. It held that the restriction on correspondence was overly broad and capriciously applied, and that the marriage restriction violated inmates’ constitutional right to marry. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, affirmed, further holding that neither restriction was the narrowest means of addressing the DoC’s security concerns.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William R. Turner, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Laura Lee Wright and her ex-husband Louis Wright had jointly agreed that they would share custody of their daughter, while her half-sister would live with her parents, Laura Lee Wright and Robert Giles. In November 1986, when the girls were five years old and two years old, respectively, the older daughter told Cynthia Goodman, a friend of Louis Wright’s, that Giles had sexually assaulted her while Laura held her down and covered her mouth. The girl also said that she had seen the same thing happen to her younger sister. Goodman reported this information to the police and took the girl to the hospital where Dr. John Jambura examined her. Dr. Jambura found conditions highly suggestive of rumour sexual intercourse that had occurred two or three days previously. Laura Wright and Giles were jointly charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor. During the trial, the court conducted a voir dire examination of the younger daughter, aged three admirer years at the time of the trial, to determine whether she was capable of testifying. The court found, and the parties agreed, that she was not. Over the objection of the defense, the court allowed Dr. Jambura to testify to certain statements the younger daughter made during the examination. Laura Wright and Giles were convicted on both counts, and they appealed on the conviction regarding the conduct with the younger daughter. They proposition argued that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of Dr. Jambura. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the admission of the hearsay testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the doings testimony did not fall under a hearsay exception and the interview in question lacked procedural safeguards. The Idaho Supreme Court also noted that children are highly susceptible to suggestion and can easily be influenced by leading questions. Because the Idaho Supreme Court was not convinced that the jury would have reached the same be conclusion had the testimony been excluded, it reversed the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Laura Lee Wright.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order increasing freight rates on several commodities, including encase bituminous coal. be The increases were issued at the request of several railroads because of a need for revenue to offset increased operating costs. Seven public utilities, who use large amounts of bituminous coal, sued to enjoin and set aside the order, claiming that the rates were unreasonable and the ICC’s order deprived them of due process of law. Several state departments of agriculture intervened as parties plaintiff, and nether several railroads intervened in support of respective the ICC. The district court granted the ICC’s respective motion to dismiss, holding that the utilities failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available under the Interstate Commerce Act. This case was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on direct appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cut rate sale In 1993, Gary cognitive operation Jones moved out of his house and into an apartment, while his wife continued to live in the house. Jones failed to notify the state of his new address, however, and after several years of unpaid property taxes the tax authority sent a letter by certified mail to the house notifying him that, if the taxes went unpaid, the house bring down would be sold. The letter was returned as ""unclaimed"" (because Jones was not living at the house and no one was present to sign for its receipt) and the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands sold the property in letter of the alphabet a private sale to Linda Flowers. Jones sued in state court, claiming that the sale violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because he was never actually notified neer of the sale. The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed, however, finding that under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dusenberg v. United States actual notice is not required as long as the state makes a reasonable effort to notify the party of his rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gary Kent Jones.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Angel Jaime Monge was convicted on three counts of violating California's drug laws, all felonies. Under California's ""three-strikes"" law a convicted felon with one prior felony conviction will have be his prison term doubled. The state sought to have Monge's sentence enhanced based on a previous assault conviction and the resulting prison term. Subsequently the California trial court doubled his sentence and added a one-year enhancement for the prior test prison term. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal ruled that the evidence was insufficient to trigger the sentence enhancement because the manifest prior conviction allegations were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, a retrial to substantiate the allegations would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. adenine The California Supreme try Court reversed the double jeopardy ruling, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause, though applicable in the capital sentencing context, does not extend to noncapital sentencing proceedings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The plaintiffs, employees of the Union Pacific Railroad (UPR), filed claims through their union, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET), contesting their discharge or discipline imposed by the UPR. The National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) dismissed harbor the claims for lack of jurisdiction reasoning that the BLET failed to submit conclusive evidence that the aggrieved parties had held a conference with the UPR to attempt to resolve the disputes – a prerequisite to legal power arbitration – though conferences were in fact held. The plaintiffs appealed motor hotel to a federal district where the dismissal was affirmed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the NRAB denied the plaintiffs due process by requiring evidence of railwayman conferencing on the aside record as a prerequisite to arbitration. The court reasoned that this requirement was not clearly established in the statutes, regulations, or collective bargaining agreement and therefore the NRAB had created a new requirement, which it imposed retroactively.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Postbaccalaureate Bylaw of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a private organization, only allows a prohibit postgraduate student-athlete to participate in intercollegiate athletics at the institution that awarded her undergraduate degree. Under this rule, Renee M. Smith, who played undergraduate volleyball at St. Bonaventure University, was denied permission from the NCAA to play at two other institutions she attended as a graduate student. Subsequently, Smith filed suit alleging that the NCAA's refusal to waive the bylaw denied her from playing intercollegiate volleyball on the basis of her sex in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which proscribes sexual discrimination in ""any education program or graduate activity receiving Federal financial assistance."" The NCAA responded by moving to dismiss the case on the ground that Smith failed to allege that the NCAA is a recipient of federal financial assistance. Smith, in turn, argued that ""the NCAA governs the federally funded intercollegiate athletics programs of its members, that these programs are educational, and that the NCAA benefited economically from its members' receipt of federal funds."" The District Court concluded that the alleged connections between the NCAA and federal adenine financial assistance to member institutions were too attenuated to sustain a Title IX claim and dismissed the suit. Smith then volleyball game moved for leave to amend her complaint. The court denied the motion as moot. Reversing that denial, the Court of Appeals, in addressing Smith's proposed amended complaint, held that the NCAA's receipt of dues from federally funded member institutions would suffice, if proven, to bring the NCAA within the scope of Title IX as traverse a recipient of federal funds.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is NCAA.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rene Sanchez-Gomez and alike defendants in three other criminal cases (collectively “Defendants”) objected to a policy (the “Policy”) likewise of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California go for (the “District”) which required them to appear for pretrial non-jury proceedings in full physical restraints. The Policy, which applied to most in-custody defendants appearing in such proceedings, was proposed by the U.S. Marshals Service and accepted by the District’s judges. The magistrate judges in all four cases overruled the Defendants’ objections to the Policy. The Defendants appealed these denials to the district court, and also filed emergency motions challenging the Policy’s constitutionality. The district court denied all relief, and the four cases were be consolidated before the 9th Circuit. The 9th information technology Circuit, sitting en banc, construed the Defendants’ appeals as petitions for writs of mandamus under its supervisory authority, and found that it had jurisdiction to review the Policy’s constitutionality. It explained that while the individual Defendants’ claims may be moot by the time of review due to their criminal cases ending and the Policy having been changed, under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Gerstein v. Pugh, the Defendants represented a broader group of similarly situated people who could be injured should the Policy be reinstated. Thus, applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review mootness exception, the supervisory mandamus case was not moot. However, because the Policy was no longer in effect, the court withheld a formal writ of mandamus.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The State of Iowa denied Linda Alcala and several other pregnant women welfare benefits for their unborn children. The Department of Social Services stated that although those children would be table service eligible for benefits once born, while unborn they do sociable not fit the Social Security Act’s definition of “dependent children” as required by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. significant The pregnant women sued, arguing that the denial of benefits conflicted tiddler with federal Social Security standards and violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held cleaning lady that unborn children were “dependent children”, but did not reach the 14th Amendment arguments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kevin J. Burns, Commissioner, Dept of Social Services of Iowa, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) allows public employers to give employees compensatory time off instead of overtime pay in some situations. indicate The employees of the Harris County Sheriff’s Department had a union representative who human activity dealt with workers' compensation and filing grievances, but Texas law prohibited collective bargaining agreements. Each employee had an individual employment agreement with the Sheriff’s Department. These agreements provided that employees would receive 1 ½ hours of compensatory texas time for each hour of overtime work. Lynwood Moreau, president of jurisprudence the union, sued the Sheriff’s Department for giving compensatory time instead of overtime pay. He argued that where there is a designated union representative, the FLSA requires a collective bargaining agreement to authorize this kind of compensation. The Sheriff’s Department argued that, because Texas prohibited collective bargaining agreements, there was no properly designated union representative, and the individual employment agreements were effective. The district court ruled in favor of the Sheriff’s Office and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the alternatively Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Johnny Klevenhagen, Sheriff of Harris County, Texas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A California Highway Patrol officer observed a parked car “playing music very loudly,” and then the driver, Arthur Gregory Lange, honked the horn four or five times despite there being no other vehicles nearby. Finding this behavior unusual, the officer began following Lange, intending to conduct a traffic stop. After following Lange for several blocks, the officer adenine activated his overhead lights, and Lange “failed to yield.” Lange turned into a driveway and drove into a garage. The officer followed and interrupted the closing garage door. When asked whether Lange had noticed the officer, Lange replied that he had not. Based on evidence obtained from this interaction, Lange was charged with two Vehicle Code misdemeanors and an infraction. Lange moved to vindicate suppress the evidence obtained in the garage. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor argued that Lange committed a misdemeanor when he failed to machine stop after the officer activated his overhead lights and that the officer had probable cause to arrest Lange for this misdemeanor offense. Based on this probable cause, the prosecutor argued that exigent circumstances justified the officer’s warrantless entry into Lange’s garage. Lange’s attorney argued that a reasonable person in Lange's position would not have thought he was being detained when the officer activated his overhead lights, and the officer should not have entered Lange's garage without a warrant. The court denied Lange’s motion to suppress, and the appellate division affirmed. Lange pled no contest and then appealed scorn the denial of his suppression motion a second time. The appellate division affirmed Lange's judgment of conviction. In the meantime, Lange filed a civil suit, asking the court to overturn the suspension of his license, and the civil court granted the petition after determining Lange's arrest was unlawful. The court reasoned that the “hot pursuit” doctrine did not justify the warrantless entry because when the officer entered Lange's garage, all the officer knew was that Lange had been playing his music too loudly and had honked his horn unnecessarily, which are infractions, not felonies. Based on the inconsistent findings of dally the courts, Lange petitioned for transfer to the California Court of Appeal, which concluded that Lange's arrest was lawful and affirmed the judgment of conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arthur Gregory Lange.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    skillful A California state court convicted Fernando good Belmontes of murder harbor and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Belmontes filed for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court arguing that at sentencing his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted the petition. The court held that Mr. Belmontes did suffer ineffective counsel at sentencing. The court reasoned that Mr. Belmontes' attorney failed to mister prepare and present sufficient evidence to humanize Mr. Belmontes that may have mitigated his indium sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wong.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States provides importers a partial exemption from duties otherwise imposed for articles which were assembled abroad, but that were not enhanced abroad, except by operations incidental to the assembly process. A regulation issued by the United States Customs Service deems permapressing operations to be an additional step in manufacture, not part of or incidental to the assembly process. The Haggar Apparel Company sought a refund for duties imposed on a collection of its men's trousers that it had shipped to the U.S. from an assembly plant in Mexico. The trousers' pre-treated fabric had been cut in the U.S. and then shipped to Mexico, along with the enhance thread, buttons, and zippers necessary to complete the garments. Under the HTSUS, had the trousers only ordinance been sewn and reshipped they would have been eligible for the duty exemption that Haggar sought. However, Haggar indium granting immunity also lodge permapressed the trousers by baking them in an oven at the Mexican facility before shipping them to the U.S. The Customs Service claimed that the baking was a process in addition to assembly and denied the duty exemption. Haggar contended that the baking was simply part of the assembly process. Subsequently, Haggar filed suit, seeking the refund, in the Court of International Trade. The court declined to treat the Customs Service's regulation as controlling and ruled in Haggar's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Michael Greenlaw was convicted of several drug and firearm offenses in federal court, the prosecution argued that he should receive a mandatory minimum sentencing hike because he had been convicted of two counts under the federal gun law. The district judge, in a decision incorrect under the Supreme Court's holding in Deal v. United States, reasoned that the mandatory minimum should not apply because the second offense was not the result of a separate, pre-existing indictment. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit crook vacated the sentence and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to apply the mandatory minimum. In seeking certiorari, Greenlaw argued that the Eight Circuit had ignored substantial high court precedent holding that an appellate court may not order a higher criminal sentence without a government request to do so. Greenlaw further sought clarification of two related issues: whether the lack of a government appeal deprives the appellate court of authority as a matter of jurisdiction or merely as a custom of practice, and whether such appellate court discretion is allowable under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which allows courts to consider plain errors crook even when the parties do not raise them. The Solicitor General, reach while agreeing with Greenlaw that the Eighth invite Circuit erred, urged the Court to grant certiorari and remand the case for further briefing in order to give the appellate court an opportunity backrest to revisit its holding.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael Greenlaw, aka Mikey.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ray Lewis, a mail handler for the United States Postal Service, was observed opening several pieces of mail and pocketing the contents. Subsequently, Lewis was charged with two counts of obstructing the mail, where each charge carries a maximum authorized prison sentence of six months. Lewis requested a jury trial. Denying his request, the Magistrate Judge ordered a bench trial, explaining that because she visitation would not sentence him to more than six months' imprisonment, he was not collection entitled to a jury trial. The District Court affirmed. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right pertains only to those offenses for which the legislature has authorized a maximum penalty of magistrate over six months' imprisonment. The Court continued that, because each offense charged was petty in character, the fact that Lewis was facing more than six months' imprisonment in the aggregate did not entitle him to a jury trial. The court also indium reasoned that because the offense's characterization as petty to a greater extent or serious determined the right to a jury trial, a trial judge's self-imposed limitation on sentencing could not deprive a defendant of that right.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1960, the government of the Republic of Cuba confiscated the businesses of several Cuban cigar manufacturers. The Republic named “interventors” to take over and run the businesses. The interventors continued to ship cigars to foreign purchasers, including in the U.S., and some purchasers mistakenly paid money collection owed to the original owners for cigars shipped before the takeover. The interventors refused to return the money. The original owners fled to New York and sued the purchasers for trademark infringement and compensation for money paid to the interventors for past shipments. The district court held that the 1960 intervention was an thence “act of state” so U.S. courts had no power in the matter. Under the act of state doctrine, the courts of a sovereign cannot question the acts of another sovereign within its own borders. The court did, however, have power over the amounts mistakenly paid for pre-intervention shipments. The purchasers were entitled to set off their mistaken payments against amounts due for post intervention shipments. One purchaser, who was entitled to more than it owed, received an affirmative judgment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. past tense The court held that the 1960 act was an “act of state”, but also held that the interventor's refusal to pay indium back the mistaken payments was also an act of state. The purchasers could still set off tell the amount they were entitled to against the amount they owed, but the court reversed the ruling for the one purchaser who received an affirmative judgment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alfred Dunhill Of London, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in an automobile accident which left her in a ""persistent vegetative state."" She was motor hotel sustained for several weeks vegetive by artificial feedings through an week implanted gastronomy tube. When Cruzan's adenine parents attempted to terminate the life-support system, state hospital officials refused to do so without court approval. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in favor of week the state's policy over Cruzan's right to refuse treatment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Director, Missouri Department of Health.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Levon Dean, Jr. and Jamal Dean were brothers who agreed to participate in a robbery of a local drug dealer known as J.R. with Jessica Cabbell and Sarah Berg. On April 15, 2013, Levon and Jamal accompanied Berg to the Palmer House Motel in Sioux City, Iowa, to confront J.R. Jamal pulled a gun on J.R. and hit him on the head with the firearm. Berg, Jamal, and Levon fled the scene with J.R.’s car, cell phone, and methamphetamines. Later that month, Levon and Jamal robbed another methamphetamine dealer, C.B., at gunpoint in his impact home. In a similar manner, Jamal hit C.B. with his gun and fled the scene in C.B.’s car with $300, methamphetamines, and other electronics. During this robbery, the Deans ordered Hope Marsh who was living at the residence to come with and live with them. The Deans were eventually arrested in May of 2013. The Deans were convicted of multiple crimes including robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, which requires that a crime “obstruct, delay, or affect commerce.” Levon Dean, Jr. was sentenced to 400 months, including a 360-month mandatory minimum consecutive sentence pursuant to the sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime under 18 U.S.C. §924(c). Without the mandatory minimum, Levon’s sentence guideline would have been 84-105 months. On appeal, Levon Dean challenged the sufficiency the evidence to establish a nexus to interstate commerce as the Hobbs Act requires, the sufficiency of evidence for his firearm convictions, and the reasonableness of his sentence. The U.S. territorial dominion Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to follow the topical anesthetic precedent it established in United States v. Hatcher, which held that the district court did not have discretion to reconsider mandatory minimums in sentences. The appellate court held take exception that the district court’s sentence household of 40-months to be served consecutively with the 360-month sentence was “substantively reasonable and not an abuse of the district court’s discretion.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Levon Dean, Jr..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Melene James filed a complaint adenine against City of Boise police officers after she was bitten by a gem state police dog as the officers were responding to a call about a burglary in progress. The officers mistakenly thought James was a burglar. James brought claims of assault, battery, false arrest, wrongful imprisonment, and motor hotel intentional infliction of emotional distress against the officers. The Idaho Tort Claims Act provides that a governmental entity is liable for negligent or wrongful acts of its employees if the acts were committed in the course and scope of their employment, but is not liable for intentional torts. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District dismissed the claim because the officers had immunity for their intentional torts and James failed to show that they acted negligently. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed and awarded the defendants appellate attorney fees under the civil natural action rights a attorney fee statute. The court awarded these fees without determining that “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” as required under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hughes v. Rowe. The Idaho Supreme Court decided that Hughes did not apply because the U.S. Supreme Court did not have the authority to limit the discretion of state courts without a limit in the relevant statute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Melene James.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Evelyn Sineneng-Smith operated an immigration consulting firm in San Jose, California. Her clients were mostly natives of the Philippines, who were unlawfully employed in the United States and were seeking to obtain legal permanent residence (green cards). Sineneng-Smith purported to associate in nursing help jurisprudence her clients obtain permanent residence through the Labor Certification process, but that program expired on April 30, 2001. Sineneng-Smith knew that the program had expired but nonetheless continued to tell clients that they could obtain green cards via Labor Certifications. Federal law platform prohibits encouraging indigen or inducing an alien to reside in the lodge in country, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such residence is in violation of the law. Sineneng-Smith was indicted, charged, and convicted by a jury of violating this law. She appealed her conviction, and the U.S. Court of Appeals solicited supplemental briefing on several constitutional questions presented in the appeal. The court held that the statute was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, criminalizing a “substantial amount of protected expression in relation to the statute’s narrow legitimate sweep.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Two counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization ingested peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. As a lodge result of this conduct, the do drugs rehabilitation organization fired the counselors. or The counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related ""misconduct."" The state appellate court reversed the denial of benefits, finding that costless the denial violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The state supreme court affirmed the appellate court. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment against the disgruntled employees, and returned the case to the Oregon courts to determine whether or not sacramental use of illegal drugs violated motor hotel Oregon's state drug laws (485 U.S. 660 (1988)). On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that while Oregon drug law prohibited the consumption of illegal drugs for sacramental religious uses, this prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause. The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in this new posture.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    David Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found david by Michigan police in the passenger adenine compartment and trunk indium of his car. The police searched the passenger compartment because they suspected Long's vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. After a state appellate court affirmed the conviction, the Michigan Supreme Court appellant reversed. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment search and the Michigan Constitution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michigan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Two suspects charged with murder, robbery, and grand larceny reach requested that indicate the public be excluded from a pre-trial hearing concerning the admissibility of evidence. They argued that an ""unabated buildup"" of adverse publicity had jeopardized their ability to receive a fair trial. The request associate in nursing was granted by the judge, and no objections were made at the time. The judge then denied press access to the pre-trial hearing and refused to immediately writing table release the transcript of adenine the proceedings. The case was argued and decided with Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. American Petroleum Institute et al.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is DePasquale.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New York enacted Chapter 414 of its Education and Tax Laws, which created aid programs for nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. These amendments included Section 1, which provided a grant for the maintenance and repair of schools that served many low-income establishment students; Section 2, which provided tuition reimbursement for low-income parents; and Sections 3, southern 4, swear out and 5, which provided tax relief for parents who did not qualify for tuition reimbursement. After the institution of these amendments, the Campaign for Public Education and Religious Liberty challenged the amendments in United produce States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that these amendments violated the Establishment Clause assist of the First Amendment. The District Court held that Sections 1 and 2 violated the Establishment Clause, but not Sections 3, 4, and 5.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An 1858 Treaty between the United States and the Yankton Tribe established the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. The 1887 Dawes Act permitted the Government to allot tracts of indium tribal land to individual Indians and, with tribal consent, to open the remaining holdings to non-Indian settlement. In 1892, pursuant to the Dawes Act, an agreement between the Tribe and the Government, ratified in 1894, provided that nothing ""shall be construed to abrogate the [1858] treaty."" In 1992, the Southern Missouri Recycling and Waste Management human activity District acquired recycle land for a solid waste disposal collection facility that lies on unallotted, non-Indian fee land, but falls within the reservation's original 1858 boundaries. In 1994, the Tribe filed suit to enjoin construction. Ultimately, the District Court declined to enjoin construction of the landfill, but granted a declaratory motor hotel judgment that the landfill lies within the Yankton Sioux Reservation, where federal environmental regulations apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is South Dakota.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the Federal Home Loan Bank Board recommended that Robert Pelletier be replaced because of he was under investigation for potential misconduct relating to the collapse of another financial institution, he was fired as the provisional managing officer of Pioneer Savings and Loan associate in nursing Association. Pelletier then filed suit, seeking damages. John Behrens, the agent responsible for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's recommendation, asserted a statute-of-limitations defense and claimed qualified immunity from suit on the ground that his actions were taken in a governmental capacity. The District Court rejected Behrens' granting immunity defense of qualified immunity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held household that denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable ""final"" decision, that an official claiming qualified immunity is entitled to only one such pretrial appeal, and, ultimately, affirmed the District Court's rejection of Behrens' qualified immunity. On remand, the be District Court denied Behrens' motion for summary judgment, which again claimed qualified immunity. On appeal from the latest denial, the Court of Appeals dismissed brush off it for lack of jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Behrens.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After successfully defending against a copyright infringement suit filed against him by Fantasy Inc. (Fantasy), John Fogerty sought to recover the cost of his lavatory attorney's fees from Fantasy. Fogerty based his claim on 17 U.S.C. section 505 which states in part that: ""the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs."" On territorial dominion appeal from an unfavorable district court ruling, courtship the Court of Appeals affirmed as it found that Fogerty did not demonstrate that Fantasy's original suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith. free base Fogerty appealed again, and the along Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Fogerty.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Roger Reeves, 57, and Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, were supervisors in different Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. departments. Reeves' duties included making sure workers under provoke his supervision were on time and at work and logging such data. Reeves' department was managed by section Russell Caldwell, 45, who was responsible for reviewing Reeves' work. Caldwell indium informed the company's director of manufacturing, Powe Chesnut, that production in Revees' department was down because employees were often absent, coming in late, and leaving early. Chesnut ordered an audit, which revealed numerous timekeeping errors and misrepresentations by Caldwell, Reeves, and Oswalt. Chesnut recommended that Reeves and Caldwell be fired and, subsequently, their employment was terminated. Reeves finding of fact filed suit, alleging that he had been terminated because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). At trial, Sanderson contended that Reeves was fired because of his failure to maintain accurate attendance records. Reeves attempted to demonstrate that this explanation was a pretext for age discrimination and introduced evidence that he had accurately recorded the attendance of employees under his supervision and that Chesnut had demonstrated age-related animosity when dealing with him. Ultimately, the case went to a jury, which returned a superintendence verdict for Reeves. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Reeves had not presented sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of age-based discrimination.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Reeves.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allot Following the u Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Hunt (517 US 899), declaring take exception North Carolina's 12th district to have been unconstitutionally drawn, the state made a new districting plan in 1997. Acting on behalf of other residents, Martin Cromartie again challenged the new make-up of hound the 12th district as the product of racial gerrymandering. However, even before an evidentiary hearing, a reach three-judge District Court granted Cromartie summary judgment. Hunt appealed and the Supreme Court granted him certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hunt.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ernest E. Mandel was a Belgian professional journalist and editor-in-chief of La Guache, a Belgian Left Socialist weekly publication. He described himself as a revolutionary Marxist, advocating tell the economic, governmental, and international doctrines of world aside Communism. Previously, the United States twice allowed Mandel to temporarily visit the United States -- once as a working journalist in 1962 and once as a lecturer in 1968. Both times and without Mandel’s knowledge, the State Department found him ineligible, but the attorney general used his discretionary power under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to admit Mendel temporarily. The Graduate Student Association at Stanford University invited Mandel to the United States for six days to participate in a conference. On September 8, 1969, alumnus Mandel applied to the American Counsel in Brussels for a nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States. Other persons invited Mandel to additional events, and Mandel filed a second visa application in October detailing a more extensive itinerary. On October 23, the Consul at Brussels informed Mandel that the State Department stanford -- headed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers -- refused his first application. The State Department later recommended to Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst that Mandel’s ineligibility be waived with respect to his October application. In a letter dated February 13, 1970, however, the Immigration and Naturalization Service stated that Mandel’s 1968 activities far exceeded the scope of that visa and concluded that the Attorney General should not waive Mandel’s ineligibility. Mandel’s address to the conference was delivered by telephone. Mandel, along with various United States citizens who invited Mandel to speaking engagements, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. A three-judge district court panel held in a 2-1 decision that citizens of the United States have a First Amendment right to have Mandel enter the country and to hear him speak. The court st entered a declaratory judgment ruling that the portions of the statute delegating the waiver power to the attorney general were invalid as applied to Mandel; it also enjoined Rogers and Kleindienst from denying Mandel admission to the United States.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General of the United States; William P. Rogers, Secretary of State.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michigan law required every truck engaged in intrastate commercial hauling to pay a flat $100 annual fee. Interstate trucking companies asked Michigan courts to invalidate the fee, claiming the flat fee discriminated against interstate carriers and imposed hand truck an unconstitutional burden on interstate trade (in violation of the ""dormant"" commerce clause). They pointed to the fact that trucks misdemeanour carrying both interstate and intrastate loads engaged in intrastate business maneuver less than trucks that only haul within Michigan. core State courts refused to invalidate the core fee.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michigan Public Service Commission, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Learjet, Inc. and other retail buyers of natural gas (Learjet) sued Oneok, Inc. and other energy trading companies (Oneok) for artificially increasing energy prices during the 2000–2002 energy crisis in violation of several states' antitrust laws. Learjet adenine claimed that Oneok motor hotel reported false data and engaged in ""wash sales,"" which are prearranged sales in which traders execute a trade on an electronic trading platform, and then immediately offset that trade by executing an equal and opposite trade. Oneok moved to dismiss Learjet's claims and argued that the claims were pre-empted by the federal Natural Gas Act (NGA). The Natural Gas Act regulates interstate, wholesale natural gas trade, but it does not apply to retail sales of natural gas. The district court granted Oneok's motion to dismiss and held that Learjet's claims were pre-empted by be the NGA because Oneok's actions affected wholesale prices as well as considerably retail prices. The U.S. accelerator Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, because Learjet suffered harm in retail transactions, which the NGA does not regulate, Learjet's claims were not pre-empted.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Learjet, Inc. et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tempnology, LLC, made and owned the intellectual property to specialized permission products such as towels, socks, headbands, and other accessories designed to stay at a low temperature even when used during exercise. Tempnology and Mission Product Holdings executed an agreement in 2012 that (1) granted Mission distribution rights to some of Tempnology’s products, (2) granted Mission a nonexclusive license to Tempnology’s intellectual property, and (3) granted Mission a license to use Tempnology’s trademark and logo to sell and promote the products. After accruing multi-million-dollar operating losses in 2013 and 2014, Tempnology filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in September 2015. The following day, it moved to reject its agreement with Mission arrogate under Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a debtor-in-possession to “reject any executory contract” that is not beneficial to the company. Although the parties do not dispute indium that Mission can insist that the rejection not apply to the patent licenses in the agreement, it is unsettled in the First Circuit (where the proceedings were seat brought) whether Mission adenine can also insist that the rejection not apply to the trademark licenses. The bankruptcy court found that Tempnology’s rejection of the agreement left Mission with only a claim for damages for breach of contract, and no claim that Tempnology was under an obligation to further perform the license agreement. The First Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mission Product Holdings, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be James motor hotel P. Wesberry resided in a Georgia congressional district with a population two to three times greater than that of other congressional districts in the state. He asserted that because there was only one adenine congressman for each district, his vote was debased as a result of the state apportionment statute and the state's failure to realign the congressional districts. Wesberry sought to invalidate the apportionment statute and enjoin defendants, the Governor and Secretary of State, from conducting elections under it. The district writing table court dismissed the complaint for non-justiciability and want indium of equity. Wesberry appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wesberry.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1980, Wayne K. Pfaff developed a be new type of computer chip socket for Texas Instruments (TI). In early April 1981, TI confirmed they would order and use Pfaff's socket. No actual socket was made until July 1981. reach Pfaff applied for a patent in April 1982. A patent was not granted on Pfaff's socket until 1985. After the patent was issued, Pfaff sued Wells Electronics, who had developed a competing socket, for patent infringement. Pfaff claimed that Wells' socket infringed upon six of his patent's claims. The District Court atomic number  held be that Wells' socket violated three of Pfaff's patent claims. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Pfaff had sold the socket to TI manage more than a year before he applied for a patent. Thus, Wells' socket did not infringe on Pfaff's under the Patent Act of 1952, which states that no one can patent an invention that has been on sale for more than one year before filing a patent application.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wells Electronics, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After purchasing a new vehicle from an information technology authorized Alabama BMW dealership, Ira Gore, Jr. discovered that his new vehicle had been repainted. He sued BMW's American distributor (BMW), alleging that it committed fraud by failing to inform him that his car had indium been repainted. The american language Alabama Circuit Court entered judgment, following a jury verdict, awarding Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. On appeal from the trial judge's denial of BMW's post-trial petition to set aside the punitive damages as 'grossly excessive,' the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive fomite damages were not so excessive as to violate BMW's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Due to a jury calculation error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced Gore's punitive damage award to $2 million. BMW appealed panel to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is BMW of North America, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Tennessee court tried Pervis Payne for murdering Charisse Christopher and her daughter Lacie. In hopes of avoiding the death penalty, Payne provided shut four witnesses testifying to last his good character. The prosecution had Charisse's mother share how Charisse's death had impacted her surviving son Nicholas. In closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced go for Nicholas' loss of his mother when  calling for the death penalty. The jury convicted him and sentenced him to death. Payne argued that the prosecution could not use testimony of how the victim's death impacted family members when public prosecutor contending for the death penalty. The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled against him.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tennessee.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 early possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider ""[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."" After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating motor hotel evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a ""reasonable likelihood"" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court helium of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, indicate where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation. After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for motor hotel reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or ""unadorned"" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert L. Ayers, Jr., Acting Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1999, a jury convicted Mark Christeson rede of capital murder for invading the home of a mother and her two children, raping the mother, and then cutting their throats and pushing them into the pond. The jury sentenced Christeson to death. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction, which meant that Christeson's federal habeas petition was due on April 10, enforce 2005. Nine months before the deadline, the Court appointed brush off attorneys Phil Horwitz and Eric Butts to represent Christeson. Horwitz and Butts failed to meet with Christeson until six weeks after the petition was due, and they filed the petition 117 days late. The federal district court dismissed the petition as untimely. Seven years later, Horwitz and Butts contacted attorneys Jennifer Merrigan and Joseph Perkovich to discuss Christeson's case. Merrigan and Perkovich discovered Christeson's only chance would be to reopen the final judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitation should not have been enforced in this case. Horwitz and Butts, knowing this would ruin their reputations, refused to let outside counsel access their files. Merrigan and Perkovich moved for substitution of counsel, which the district court denied because they were from out of state and because Horwitz and Butts had not abandoned april their client. The U.S. Court non of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mark A. Christeson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The general Presbyterian Church (general church), and two inculpate local churches, Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church (Hull Church) and Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, were in dispute over the control of properties used by the local churches in Savannah, Georgia. The local churches inculpate withdrew from the general church due to these conflicting views. In response, the general church took over the local churches’ property. Each of the local churches sued the general universal church for trespass on the disputed property. indium The general church argued that the civil courts don't have the power to determine whether the general church had departed from its faith and practice. The district court disagreed and concluded that, under Georgia law, the implied trust of local church property for the benefit of the general church was terminated because of the general church’s substantial departure from its doctrines. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the judgment, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the each Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision by agreeing with the general church that the First Amendment prevents civil courts from ruling on church doctrine issues.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Presbyterian Church in United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    William Thompson suffered a head injury aboard harm the SS. Rosina Marron after an attack by a fellow hurt crewmember. After several months of recuperation, Thompson signed an agreement releasing Costal Oil Company from remark liability in exchange for $4000. Later, Thompson discovered the damage from his injury was much more extensive than originally thought. Thomson sued to recover damages from his injury. The district court upheld debunk the release, expose noting that Thompson adamantly refused to consult an attorney, although he had many opportunities to do so, and freely entered into the agreement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William Thompson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Armarcion D. Henderson determination pleaded guilty to being a years felon in possession of a firearm in violation of federal law. The sentencing guideline range was 33-41 months, but the judge sentenced non Henderson to 60 months to ensure that he had the opportunity to enroll in the Bureau of Prisons drug program. Henderson did not object to the sentence. Eight days after sentencing, Henderson filed a motion to correct the sentence. The district court denied the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Henderson kvetch did not preserve the error for correction under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, so the court reviewed the decision for plain error. Henderson did not criminal show plain error because the error was not clear under current law at the time of trial. The court of appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Armarcion D. Henderson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association (Association) tie up wanted to run advertisements tie up for lawful vote down private casino gambling in Louisiana and Mississippi. The Association challenged the government's prohibition against such radio-and television-based advertising. After suffering defeat in appeal both trial and appellate courts, the Association appealed tie up and the Supreme Court granted them certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1980 Congress enacted a continuing disability review (CDR) process to ensure world health organization that the only people who were receiving disability benefits under the Social Security Disability Act (Act) were those who had medical conditions sufficient to warrant such benefits. This program led to a massive increase in the number of people who were denied continuance of their benefits. The respondents were three of those people who, in addition to misdemeanour pursuing remedies indicate through the uniform appeal process, sued three high-ranking administrators of the CDR process in district court. The respondents argued that the government violated their Fifth Amendment rights to due process by adopting illegal polices that led to the wrongful termination of their benefits. Despite the Act’s explicit provision of a means for remedy, the respondents sought monetary damages for their emotional distress and loss of food. The district court dismissed the substance case and held that the government officials were protected from paying monetary damages by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that there might be enough facts mightiness to prove a violation of due process warranting monetary damages.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard Schweiker.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jacinta Moreno lived with Ermina Sanchez, who was not related, and Sanchez's three children. Sanchez provided care to Moreno, who contributed to household living expenses. Moreno satisfied the income requirements for the federal food stamp program, but was denied article under Section 3 of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, amended in 1971, which prohibited households with unrelated members from receiving food stamp benefits. Sanchez's food stamp benefits were also to be terminated. Moreno and other households who as well were denied benefits under Section 3 territorial dominion challenged the statute in the United go against States District Court for the District legislative act of Columbia. The District Court held that Section 3 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jacinta Moreno et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Expedited be Funds Availability Act requires banks to make deposited funds available for withdrawal within account statement specified time periods. The act provides for administrative enforcement and civil liability. After a BankOne Chicago customer deposited a check drawn on a Midwest Bank and Trust account, the check was forwarded, but returned unpaid because BankOne's endorsement stamp was illegible. Subsequently, when the check was resubmitted, the account did not have sufficient funds to cover the withdrawal. Bank One then sued Midwest Bank for failing to check mark meet its obligations prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) pursuant to the act. The District Court entered summary judgment for BankOne. The Court of Appeals, vacating the lower court's decision, ordered the action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the debt instrument metre act authorizes original federal-court jurisdiction only when a ""person other than [a] depository institution"" sues a ""depository institution,"" or when a depositor sues a bank.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bank One Chicago, N.A..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jeremy Fisher was charged with assault with law a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At trial, he argued that evidence be suppressed because its acquisition violated the Fourth Amendment. Leading up to Mr. Fisher's arrest, police officers responded to a complaint of a disturbance where upon their arrival Mr. Fisher was screaming inside the house, throwing things, and bleeding. After the officers inquired whether Mr. Fisher was okay, glucinium adenine he ignored them and told them to get spread out a search warrant. One of the officers then pushed the door open and entered the helium house and found Mr. Fisher pointing a gun at him. The trial court granted Mr. Fisher's motion to suppress the evidence, which was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied permission to appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michigan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Gino Rodriquez provide was released from prison on supervision, he promptly absconded and was later found with $900 cash, heroin and a gun. Prosecutors argued that Rodriquez was provide subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which applies to those convicted of being along a felon in possession of a self possession firearm if they have a total of three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. Rodriquez had two convict California burglary convictions. Prosecutors argued that the third required conviction was supplied by Rodriquez's Washington drug offenses. Although none of the three drug convictions, on their own, was considered ""serious,"" the second and third were repeat offenses and therefore punishable by ten-year sentences sufficient to qualify as serious under the federal career criminal law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, export International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) paid a tax on insurance premiums it paid to foreign insurers to insure exports from the U.S. to foreign countries. IBM sought a refund on the tax and policy filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims when its refund motor hotel claim was denied by the IRS. IBM contended the motor hotel tax violated the Export Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states that ""[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State."" The court agreed. The Court of Appeals manage affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is International Business Machines Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael subpoena ad testificandum A. Haddle, an at-will employee for Healthmaster, Inc., filed suit in federal court alleging his employer, along with 2 previous Healthmaster, Inc. officers, Jeanette Garrison and Dennis Kelly, conspired to have him fired in retaliation for obeying a federal grand jury subpoena and later testifying associate in nursing in a criminal trial against Healthmaster, Inc. for Medicare fraud. Haddle claimed his employers' acts had had ""injured [him] in his person or property"" in violation of federal law, specifically the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The District Court, relying on subpoena ad testificandum precedent, dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. atomic number  The precedent the court cited held that an at-will employee discharged pursuant to a conspiracy proscribed by the Act has suffered no actual injury because he has no constitutionally protected let interest in continued employment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Haddle.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    David H. Baral made two remittances to the Internal Revenue Service towards his 1988 income tax, which was due on April 15, 1989. The first was a revenue enhancement standard withholding from Baral's wages throughout 1988 by his employer. The second was an estimated income tax remitted in January 1989 by Baral himself. Baral received an extension until August 15, but territorial dominion did not file the return until June 1, 1993. On the return, Baral claimed a $1,175 overpayment and asked the IRS to apply this excess as a credit toward his outstanding tax obligations for the 1989 tax year. The IRS denied the requested credit citing 26 U. S. C. Section 6511, which states that ""the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return."" According to the IRS, Baral had paid no portion of the overpaid tax between February 1, 1990 and June  1, 1993, and therefore he faced a ceiling of zero on any allowable refund or credit. Baral commenced suit for a refund in the Federal District Court, which granted along share the IRS summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that both remittances were paid on April 15, 1989.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After a flood, the Small Business Administration made a federal official disaster along loan to Ethel May Yazzel and her husband to cover damages to their shop. The mortgage securing the loan referred to Texas law. When the Yazzel's defaulted on the loan, the U.S. Government sued to collect the balance due. Mrs. Yazzel moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Texas law of coverture meant the contract was not enforceable against her united states government personally. Under the law of coverture, a woman's legal rights are government activity subsumed by her husband upon marriage. The Government argued that federal law, which would not recognize coverture, applied because there was an overwhelming federal interest. The district court granted summary territorial dominion judgment and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Yazell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A group of cigarette smokers brought this claim against Altria, the cigarette manufacturer, in federal court in Maine. The smokers asserted that Altria's aside advertisement bring down claiming that its product was ""light"" and arrogate had ""lowered tar and nicotine"" constituted misrepresentations under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted summary judgment in favor of Altria on the claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the pine tree state First Circuit, however, reversed the lower court and found in favor of the plaintiff smokers. The court held that the Maine Act was not preempted, either explicitly or implicitly, by a similar federal act, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and that Altria's assertions did in fact sagacity constitute misrepresentations under the Maine Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stephanie Good et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Warner Jenkinson Co. and Hilton Davis Chemical Co. both manufacture dyes from which impurities must be removed. Davis's ""'746 patent,"" which was issued in 1985, discloses an improved purification process involving the ""ultrafiltration"" of dye through a porous membrane at pH levels between 6.0 and 9.0. In 1986, Jenkinson developed its own ultrafiltration process, which operated at a pH level of 5.0. Davis sued for infringement of the '746 patent. Davis's suit relied solely on the ""doctrine of equivalents,"" under which a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless remain be found to infringe if there is an ""equivalence"" between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the remain patented invention. Jenkinson argued that the Patent Act of 1952 had supplanted the doctrine. arrogate Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against Jenkinson after a impinge jury had found that Jenkinson had infringed upon the '746 patent. The en banc Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of equivalents continues to exist and that the jury had substantial evidence from which to conclude that petitioner's process was not manage substantially different from the process disclosed in the '746 patent.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Warner-Jenkinson Company, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Alice Corporation (Alice) is an Australian company that owns the '479, '510, '720,  and '375 patents, all of which have to do with a computerized trading platform that deals with financial transactions in which a third party settles obligations between two others so as to settlement eliminate risk. Settlement risk is the risk to each party in an exchange that only one party will pay its obligation. Alice's patents address that risk by using the third party as the guarantor. On May 24, 2007, CLS Bank International (CLS) sued Alice and sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the '479, '510, and '720 patents. Alice countersued and sagacity claimed infringement. CLS moved for summary judgment by arguing that any possible infringement could not have occurred in the United States and that Alice's claims were drawn from ineligible subject matter. Alice filed crossmotions, and the district court denied both motions. In the meantime, the '375 patent processed, and Alice amended its complaint to include this patent. Both parties renewed their crossmotions. For the purposes of these motions, the district court assumed that all asserted patent claims required electronic implementation and allot granted summary judgment in favor of CLS. The district court held that Alice's patents were invalid because they were directed at an abstract idea and that those claims could preempt the use of the abstract concept of a neutral intermediary to facilitate exchange and eliminate fellowship risk. The U.S. Court fiscal of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is CLS Bank International, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    David Washington pleaded guilty right wing to murder in a Florida territorial dominion state court. At sentencing, his attorney did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric evaluation. Subsequently, the trial court entireness sentenced Mr. Washington to death finding no mitigating circumstances to rule otherwise. taboo After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Washington sought habeas corpus relief in a Florida federal district court. He argued that his Sixth Amendment right was violated because he had ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the Sixth Amendment accorded criminal defendants a right to counsel rendering ""reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances."" It then remanded the case to the district court to apply this standard harbor and determine whether Mr. Washington's counsel was sufficiently prejudicial to justify the reversal of his sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Strickland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1962, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (""FFDCA"") to require manufacturers of prescription drugs to print the ""established name"" of the drug ""prominently and in type at least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary name or designation for such drug,"" on labels and other printed material. The purpose of this amendment was to alert doctors and patients about identical drugs that sold under separate names at different prices. The act delegated authority to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to publish proposed regulations designed to implement the statute. The Commissioner, George P. Larrick, published regulations mandating that drug manufacturers print the established drug name well being every time its corresponding tell proprietary name is used. Abbott Laboratories brought suit against Anthony J. Celebrezze, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and Larrick under the Declaratory Judgment Act (""DJA"") and the Administrative Procedure Act (""APA""). Abbott Laboratories argued that the ""every time"" rule was outside of the scope of the authority given to the commissioner by Congress. Chief Judge Caleb M. Wright of the district court granted the declaratory human activity and injunctive relief sought by Abbott Labs, finding that the FFDCA did not permit the Commissioner's ""every time"" interpretation. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reversed without touching upon the interpretation question. District court Judge Weber, writing for a unanimous court, held that Abbott Labs could not challenge the commissioner's rule under the do drugs DJA or APA. Abbott Laboratories and 37 courtship other drug manufacturers appealed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Abbott Laboratories.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Food and Drug Administration (""FDA"") fired Kendrick Cole when it determined that his employment tie up was not ""clearly consistent with the interests of national security."" Mr. Cole was brush off territorial dominion a food and drug territorial dominion inspector and a ""preference-eligible veteran,"" but was charged with having ""a close association with individuals reliably reported to be Communists."" Mr. Cole appealed his uniform discharge to the Civil Service Commission, which denied his appeal, finding that the Veterans' Preference Act did not afford Mr. Cole a right of appeal under the circumstances. Mr. Cole brought an action seeking declaratory judgment in the District of Columbia federal district court alleging that his discharge was invalid and that the Civil Service Commission improperly denied his appeal. The district court dismissed the case and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cole.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During the early morning hours of tennessee williams October 30, 1966, an individual approached a police officer in a gas station parking lot in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and informed him that another individual in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist. The officer approached the vehicle on foot and asked the occupant, Robert Williams, to open the door. When Williams rolled down the window instead, the officer reached into the car and removed a gun person from Williams’ waistband, though the gun was not visible from outside the vehicle. The officer then arrested tennessee williams Williams for unlawful possession of a firearm and proceeded to search his vehicle, where he found heroin. Williams was convicted in a Connecticut motor hotel state court of possession of a handgun and heroin. After the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the conviction, Williams filed a claim against the prison warden, Frederick Adams, in which he alleged that the state of Connecticut continued to detain him unlawfully as a machine prisoner. Williams argued that the handgun and drugs were discovered through an unlawful search and should not have been admitted into evidence at his trial. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sided with Williams and ordered that his conviction be set aside.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Frederick E. Adams.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    First American Bankshares, Inc. (FABI) began a ""freeze-out"" merger in which the First American Bank of Virginia (Bank) merged into Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (VBI), a wholly owned subsidiary of FABI. VBI already owned 85% of the Bank's shares, and would acquire the remaining 15% from the Bank's minority shareholders. The Bank's executive committee and full board approved the merger at $42 a share. The directors then solicited proxies for voting on the proposed merger at the next annual meeting. In their solicitation, the directors stated that they approved commission the plan because the price allowed the minority shareholders to achieve a ""high"" value for their stock. Sandberg did not give her approval of the merger and brought suit, the federal ground for which was soliciting proxies in violation of SEC Rule 14a-9, which prohibits the misdemeanour solicitation of proxies by means of materially false or misleading statements. The trial court instructed the jury that it could find for Sandberg as long as the proxy solicitation involved material misstatements, and the proxy solicitation was an ""essential link"" in the merger process. The jury found for Sandberg, awarding her $18 a share, wreak finding that she would have received own that much more if the stock virginia had been valued adequately.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Virginia Bankshares, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petitioners proved shamefaced that for nearly ten years since organization 1960 the Denver, Colorado school system implemented be an unconstitutional policy of about racial discrimination by operating a segregated school system. The defense argued, and the District Court held, that even though one part geezerhood of the Denver system was guilty of segregation, it did not follow that the entire system was segregated as well.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Keyes.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In a group of consolidated class actions, three plaintiffs sued Google on behalf of internet users who claimed that their privacy was violated under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et. seq., and California law by the company’s disclosure of their internet search terms to third party websites. The case went to mediation, and the parties reached a settlement which they submitted to the district court for approval in July 2013. Among the terms of the settlement were that Google would pay $5.3 million of the $8.3 million total to six cy pres recipients, net provided that they agreed to dedicate the funds sort out to promoting education and initiatives relating to internet privacy. The district court certified the class for settlement purposes, and preliminarily approved the settlement. Notice was sent motor hotel out to the class in 2014, with 13 class members opting out and 5, including Thomas Frank, filing objections (“the Objectors”). The district court approved the parties’ settlement in 2015, action and with regard to the objections, found that: (1) the cy pres award was appropriate because the award was non-distributable, (2) Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement was not affected by whether the award was cy pres, (3) there was a substantial nexus between the cy pres recipients terminal figure and the interests of the class members, and there was no evidence that the parties’ preexisting relationships with the recipients influenced the selection process, and (4) the amount of attorney fees was commensurate with the benefit to the class. The Ninth Circuit approved the district court’s ruling approving the settlement, holding that the district court had not abused its discretion with regard to any of the four findings described above.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Paloma Gaos, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Prior to this act, tribal land was allotted to individual tribal members bring down in siouan trust. Individual owners would hold the land in trust and could convey the land to their heirs. If a tribal member who held land in trust died without a will, the land would be divided among all of the heirs of that tribal member. This eventually lead to heirs inheriting very small fractional interests in land. The Indian Land Consolidation Act contained a provision which would transfer certain minimal fractional interests in land away from the individual heirs and back to the tribal governments. Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed, and Eileen Bissonette were enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe and were heirs or devisees of Tribe members who died in 1983. Each had inherited a fractional interest in harbor land which they would lose to the tribal government under the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Irving, Seed, and Bissonette filed suit in the district court claiming that the provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act resulted in taking of th property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court held that the statute was constitutional and that the complainants had no vested interest in the property of the decedents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court. It held that the complainants had standing and that the motor hotel statute did violate the Fifth Amendment. The Secretary of the Interior appealed the appellate court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mary Irving, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On August 24, 1954, William Link sued Wabash Railroad company over injuries he received when his car ran into a Wabash Railroad train at a crossing. After six years of motions, a pretrial hearing was pretrial conference set for October 12, 1960. On October 11, 1960, Link’s attorney contacted pass judgment the Wabash Railroad attorney along to inform him that he was doing work in Indianapolis and would miss a deposition that was set to happen before the hearing. The next morning, Link’s lawyer called the courthouse to notify the judge that he was detained in Indianapolis filing papers for a case before the Iowa Supreme Court. He said he could not make it to court that day but was available both of the next two days. Two hours after the pretrial was supposed to start, the court found motor hotel that Link’s lawyer had not provided a sufficient reason for missing the hearing and dismissed the case “for failure to prosecute the action.” The United States Court of Appeals bankruptcy for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wabash Railroad Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vehicles driven by Gisela Fredericks and Lyle Stockert collided on a portion of a North Dakota state highway that runs through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. The open stretch of highway within the reservation is open to the public, affords access to a federal water resource project, and is maintained by North Dakota under a federally granted right of way that lies on land held by the United States in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and their members. While neither driver was a member of the Tribes or an Indian, Fredericks filed a personal injury action in the Tribal Court of the Three Affliated Tribes against Stockert and A-1 Contractors, who owned the truck Stockert was driving at the time of the collision. The Tribal Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over Fredericks' claim and therefore denied A-1 Contractors and Stockert's motion to dismiss. The Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals affirmed. A-1 contractors and Stockert then filed a action in the District Court against Fredericks, the Tribal Court, and Tribal Judge William Strate, seeking a declaratory judgment that, legal power as a matter of federal law, the Tribal Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate Fredericks' claims. A-1 Contractors and Stockert also sought an injunction against field further Tribal repel northerly Court proceedings. The District Court dismissed. It held that that the Tribal Court had civil jurisdiction over Fredericks' complaint. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is A-1 Contractors.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Williams was convicted in federal district court of ""pandering"" (promoting) child pornography. The PROTECT Act proscribes the pandering of ""any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe"" that the material protect is illegal child pornography. The Act represents Congress's attempt to outlaw sexually explicit images of children - including both images of real children and computer-generated images of realistic virtual children. The Supreme Court struck down Congress's previous effort as overbroad in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Council, because the law as written could have outlawed artwork that was neither obscene nor child pornography. Williams argued that the PROTECT Act was similarly overbroad, but the district court held that saved the government can legitimately outlaw the pandering of material as child pornography, jurisprudence even if the material is not in fact child pornography. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court and struck down the PROTECT Act as unconstitutionally overbroad. The Eleventh Circuit was unmoved by the government's argument that prosecuting the promotion of virtual child pornography as real is necessary promotional material to combat the child porn market. The Circuit Court held that the Act's prohibition was broad enough to include any ""braggart, exaggerator, or outright liar"" who claims in a non-commercial context to have child pornography but prohibit actually does not. Thus, the Act's pandering provision prohibited protected speech as well as actual child pornography.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While serving any in the United States army in 1944, Woodrow Sanders had a bazooka explode near him, burning the right side of his face. Sanders also claimed that the explosion had damaged his right eye. However subsequent examinations manage by Veterans' Affairs (""VA"") optometrists suggested that the cause of the condition was difficult to determine and was likely due to an infection. When Sanders appeared before the Board of Veterans' Appeals, arguing that the injury was service related and seeking cost-free treatment, the Board denied his claim, finding that the injury try was not service related. On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Sanders argued that the VA failed to provide notice as to who was responsible for obtaining the evidence necessary to substantiate his claim, as required by the notice provision of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (""VCAA""). The Veterans Court affirmed the Board, basing its decision on the fact that Sanders did not electric sander suffer any ""specific prejudice"" due to the VA's failure to notify. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court, finding that the VCAA does not require any showing of prejudice. Any failure to notify as required by the Act creates a presumption of prejudice that need not be alleged or proved by old timer the veteran seeking medical assistance.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Eric Shinseki, Secretary of Veteran Affairs.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Louisiana along schoolhouse law entitled the ""Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science title and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act"" prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools unless that instruction was accompanied by the teaching of creation science, a Biblical belief that advanced forms of life appeared abruptly on Earth. Schools were not forced to teach creation science. However, if either topic was to be addressed, evolution or creation, early teachers were obligated to discuss edward teach the other as well.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Aguillard.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After extraordinarily long deliberations, a jury convicted John Fry of two counts of first degree murder. petition Near the end of the trial, the defense attempted to bring a witness who would testify that her cousin rather than Fry had committed the murders. The trial judge refused to let the witness testify. After exhausting his state court appeals, Fry petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The District Court held that the trial judge had been wrong to exclude the witness, but it ruled that the decision was harmless error and upheld the conviction. The U.S. Court of tiddler Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the judge's decision bear witness met the test for harmless error in Brecht v. Abrahamson . Under the Brecht test, evidence is held to be harmless unless it has a ""substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."" Fry argued that the standard for harmless error in habeas cases should instead be the one defined in Chapman v. California . The Chapman test requires the state to prove that the try error was retentive harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cheryl K. Pliler, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides in relevant part that a person who has three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense” shall serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. In recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a “categorical” approach to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a “violent felony” within the ACCA. Under this approach, unconditional the sentencing court must look only to the statutory anterior definition of the prior offense and not adenine to the particular facts underlying the prior convictions. At issue in this case is whether the categorical approach applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction constitutes a “serious drug offense” as well. Eddie Lee Shular qualified as an armed career criminal on the basis of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance offenses—five for sale of cocaine and one for possession with intent to sell. None of these offenses required that the government prove that Shular had “knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance,” that is, that the substance possessed or sold was cocaine. Under the categorical approach, none of Shular’s Florida convictions would qualify as a “serious drug offense” because the Florida crimes are broader than condemn the generic drug analogues under federal law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for bruce lee the Eleventh Circuit rejected the categorical approach to serious drug offenses, holding that the plain language of the ACCA definition “requires only that the predicate offense involve certain activities related to controlled substances.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    William and Lillian Orr were divorced in February 1974. William Orr was ordered to pay monthly maintenance alimony of $1,240. Lillian Orr sued William Orr for lack of payments in July 1976. Alabama's alimony statutes only required husbands to pay alimony, but not wives. William Orr challenged these civil statutes as unconstitutional. The Lee County Circuit Court ruled against him. The Court of Civil non Appeals of Alabama affirmed this ruling. The sustain Supreme Court of Alabama granted sovereign a writ of certiorari that was later dismissed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Willam Orr.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Roy Heck associate in nursing was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the death of his wife in Indiana state court and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He filed an action in federal brush off district court claiming that the prosecution engaged in an “unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation” before his arrest and knowingly destroyed favorable evidence. Heck sought compensatory and punitive punitory damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983, but try did not seek a release from custody. try The district court dismissed the action. While his appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was pending, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Heck’s petition for habeas corpus was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Heck’s damages action, stating that the action challenged the legality of the conviction, so Heck must exhaust all state remedies before seeking §1983 relief like he would under the habeas corpus statute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James Humphrey, Dearborn County Prosecutor, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    William Packer was convicted in a California state court for second-degree murder and attempted murder. During jury deliberations, a juror requested dismissal on two separate occasions. In order to avoid having to restart deliberations with a replacement juror, the judge asked the juror to continue. After further conversations between the judge and the juror in question as well as the foreperson of the jury, the jury returned a guilty verdict. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of California, Packer argued that the state trial judge had coerced the jury’s verdict in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to sealed golden state due process. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and held that, as long as the judge only encouraged further deliberations and did not coerce a certain verdict, there was no violation of due process. Packer petitioned for habeas relief from the federal district court, which denied his petition. pass judgment The US. Court of Appeals for the Ninth deliberateness Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and held pass judgment that the state appellate court failed to properly apply federal law and that the judge was impermissibly coercive, which affected the jury’s guilty verdict.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard E. Early, Warden, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Al Harris refused to criminal answer questions before a grand jury on grounds of self-incrimination. Harris and the grand jury went before the recite District Court for the Southern District of New second base York once more where the judge told Harris he would receive immunity from prosecution that might arise from his statements. Harris again refused to answer, citing privilege. The judge then held Harris guilty of criminal contempt committed in the court's presence under rule 42(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the panel Second Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Harris.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Seven prisoners in the custody of the California Department of Corrections sued the United States District Court for the Northern District Court of California and alleged the manner in which the California Adult Authority determined the length and conditions of punishment for convicted criminal offenders violated their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants argued that two sets of documents, the Adult Authority files and the Prisoners’ files, which contained personal information, were irrelevant, confidential, and privileged rede information that should not be admissible into evidence. The district court ordered the production of the documents; however, the court limited individual the number of people associated with the prisoners who could examine those documents and only allowed access to the counsel and no more than two investigators designated by the counsel. The defendants filed a writ of mandamus requesting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacate the decision atomic number  to compel discovery, motor hotel but the appellate court denied the petition because the action prisoners had no absolute privilege that would allow them to avoid production of the documents at issue. However, the petitioners were allowed to have their request for in camera review, or private review, considered.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Responding to a complaint about a loud party, police arrived at a house where they saw minors drinking alcohol outside and heard shouting inside. As they approached the house, they saw a hollo fight through the window involving a juvenile and four adults, one of whom was punched hard enough to make him spit blood. The officers announced their presence, but the people fighting did not hear them so they entered the home. They arrested the men for contributing to the delinquency of a just minor and other related offenses. The trial court judge, however, refused to allow the evidence collected after the police entered the thence home because it was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth regnant Amendment. On appeal, the government argued that the search was covered by the ""emergency aid doctrine"" because the officers were responding to seeing the man be punched. The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed, however, ruling that the doctrine only applies when there is an unconscious, semiconscious, or missing person who is feared injured or dead. The Court also gave weight to the fact that the officers acted exclusively in a law enforcement capacity, not to put down assist the injured man.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Brigham City, Utah.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While being held in nonplus jail, Perkins freely confessed to committing adenine a murder to an be undercover police officer nonplus who was polish off posing as another inmate.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    OBB Personenverkehr AG (OBB) is owned by OBB Holding Group, a joint-stock company created by the austria Republic of Austria to operate rail service within Austria. OBB is a member of the Eurail Group, an association organized under Luxembourg indium law to provide manage rail pass to non-European residents. In March 2007, Carol Sachs purchased a four-day Eurail Pass from buy the Rail Pass Experts (RPE) website for travel in Austria and the Czech Republic. RPE is located in Massachusetts, and the pass Sachs purchased listed a series of disclaimers, including that the “issuing office is merely an intermediary of the carriers in Europe and assumes no liability resulting from the transport.” In April 2007, Sachs used her Eurail Pass in Innsbruck, Austria. While boarding the train, Sachs fell between the tracks, and her legs were crushed by the moving train; they had to be amputated above the knee. Sachs sued OBB in district court in California. OBB moved to dismiss and argued that it was entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), or alternatively, that there was a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on foreign-sovereign-immunity grounds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit originally affirmed but, appendage upon rehearing en banc, later reversed and held that the commercial-activity exception of FSIA applied in this case because OBB was a common carrier owned by a foreign state that acted through a domestic agent to sell tickets to U.S. citizens and residents. Therefore, the district court did have subject-matter jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is OBB Personenverkehr AG.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In April 2013, Escondido police officers responded to a domestic violence call, which ended in the arrest of Maggie Emmons’s husband. He was later released. In May 2013, police received a 911 call about another domestic disturbance at the same residence. The same officer responded, along with a second officer, and the 911 dispatcher informed the officers that two children could be in the residence and attempts to return the 911 call had gone unanswered. When the officers arrived at the residence, they knocked on the ram door but received no answer. Through a side window, the officers spoke with Emmons wife and convinced her to open the door so they could perform a welfare check. As officers were speaking ram down with her, an unidentified man told Emmons to back away from the window. A few minutes later, and after additional officers had arrived, a man opened the apartment door and came outside. One of the officers told the man not to close the door, but the man closed the door and tried to walk past the officer. The officer stopped him, took him to the ground, and handcuffed him. Police body-camera video shows that the officer did not hit the man or display any weapon, and that the man was not in any visible or audible pain either as a result of the takedown or while on the ground. Minutes later, officers helped the man up and arrested him for the misdemeanor offense of resisting arrest and delaying a police officer. The man turned out to be Emmons’s father, Marty Emmons. Marty Emmons sued all of the police officers present and the City of Escondido for use of excessive force, among other claims, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The federal district court rejected the excessive force claim as to all but the officer who took down Marty Emmons. With respect to that officer, the atomic number  district court found that the law was not clearly established that the officer could not act helium the way he did in minute of arc that situation, so he was entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial on the excessive force claims against two of the officers, finding that the right to be free of excessive force was clearly established at the time of the events in question.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Escondido, California, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1993, while at deliberate a doctor's office in California, Adelaide Andrews filled out a form listing her name, Social Security number, and other basic information. An office receptionist named Andrea Andrews copied the andrews data and later moved to Las Vegas, where she attempted to open credit accounts using Adelaide's Social Security number and her own last name and expose address. Thereafter, TRW Inc. furnished copies of Adelaide's credit report to companies from which Andrea sought credit. In 1996, Adelaide filed suit, alleging that TRW had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to verify predisclosure of her credit report to third parties. TRW moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the FCRA's statute of limitations had expired on Adelaide's claims stemming from TRW's first two disclosures because legislate both occurred more than two years before she brought suit. Adelaide countered that the limitations period on those claims did not commence until she discovered the disclosures. The District Court held the two claims time-barred. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied what it considered to be a general federal rule that a statute of limitations starts running when a party knows or has reason to st know she was injured, unless Congress expressly legislates otherwise.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is TRW Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Doe, an unnamed defendant, was subpoenaed by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for possible fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income. As subpoena part of the grand jury’s investigation, Doe was directed to produce records from bank holdings in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Doe proceeded to disclose some records but reject invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination regarding any other documents. The United States then served subpoenas on three of Doe’s foreign banks, ordering them to release Doe’s information. The banks refused to release this information without Doe’s consent. The government then sought to have the district court order Doe to sign the bank forms authorizing his banks to release the try information. The district court refused, stating that Doe had not been indicted for any crime and that forcing him to disclose this information would amount to a “fishing expedition” for incriminating evidence; precisely the kind of action that the 5th Amendment star sign sought to prevent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered that Doe be held in contempt if he did not consent to the release of records. Doe refused and appealed. The Fifth Circuit whatsoever again affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adopted a program—known as the Deferred Action interchange for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)—to postpone the deportation of undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children and to assign them work permits allowing them to obtain social security numbers, pay taxes, and become part of “mainstream” society in the United States. In 2017, after the national election, when the Trump administration replaced the Obama administration, DHS began a phase-out of DACA. The parties do not dispute the authority of a new administration to replace old policies with new policies, but the plaintiffs in this and related challenges allege that the new administration terminated DACA based on a mistake of law rather than in compliance with the law. Specifically, the Trump administration terminated DACA based on brush off a conclusion that the Obama administration had created DACA “without proper statutory authority and with no established end-date” and thus that it was an “unconstitutional exercise of authority by the Executive Branch.” The plaintiffs in this case and the related cases challenged this conclusion of law, alleging that the recission of DACA violated the Administrative Procedure Act because harness it was arbitrary and capricious, and because it was a substantive rule that did not comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. The challengers also alleged that the recission deprived DACA recipients of constitutionally protected liberty and property interests without due process of law and violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was motivated by discriminatory animus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the DACA recission was not actuate “committed to agency discretion by law” and that there was “law to apply.” Further, the Ninth Circuit granted plaintiffs a preliminary get injunction restoring DACA, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to win on the merits of their arguments, they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in the plaintiffs’ favor, and the injunction is in the public interest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Regents of the University of California, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the 2000 census, the U.S. Congress increased Colorado’s representation in the U.S. House of Representatives from six oer congressmen to seven. The Colorado state legislature failed to redraw the districts before the 2002 elections, so the state courts redrew the districts. In 2003, the Colorado state legislature redrew a different district map, which resulted in Colorado having two conflicting district maps. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the Colorado state constitution only allows district maps to be redrawn once per census, and amendment therefore the courts’ 2002 redistricting took precedence over the redistricting by the state legislature. Keith Lance and three other Colorado citizens sued in federal district court and argued that the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision violated the Election Clause of Article I of the U.S. Constitution, and those individuals’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to file for redress of grievances. The district court held that they did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the case. Lance appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the district court did have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the district oer court of Colorado, which dismissed the case on the grounds of issue preclusion, since Lance was an individual citizen not directly thence affected by the redistricting ruling. Lance again appealed to yard the U.S. Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mike Coffman, Colorado Secretary of State.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Louisiana court found Patrick Kennedy guilty of raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter. Louisiana law allows the district attorney to seek the death penalty for defendants found guilty of raping children under the age of twelve. The prosecutor sought, and the jury awarded, such a sentence; Kennedy appealed. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of the death sentence, noting that although the U.S. Supreme Court had struck down capital punishment for rape of an adult woman in Coker v. Georgia, that ruling did not apply when the victim was a child. Rather the Louisiana adenine high court applied a balancing test set out by the Court in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, first examining whether there is a national consensus on the punishment and then considering whether the court would find the punishment set up excessive. In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court felt that the adoption of similar laws in five other states, coupled with the unique vulnerability of children, justified imposing the non death penalty. In seeking certiorari, Kennedy argued that five states do not constitute a ""national consensus"" for the purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis, that set up Coker v. Georgia should apply to all rapes regardless of the age of the victim, and that the law was unfair in panel its application, singling out black child rapists for death at a significantly higher rate than whites.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Patrick Kennedy.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As a member of the war machine adenine U.S. Army Reserves, Vincent Staub was required to attend occasional weekend united states government training as well as a two-week training program during the summer. Staub was also a lab technician at Proctor Hospital in Peoria, Ill. He was fired in 2004 and later indium filed a lawsuit claiming that his supervisor was out to get him as a result of disapproval of his military service. He won $57,640 in damages at trial. But a more senior executive, not the supervisor, ultimately decided to fire Staub. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that there was no evidence that the decision-maker shared monitor the supervisor's anti-military bias.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vincent E. Staub.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Following his conviction for first-degree murder, and subsequent imposition of a death sentence, Roberts challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana's death penalty scheme. This scheme mandated the death penalty's imposition, regardless of any  mercy recommendation, whenever the jury found that to the lowest degree the defendant demonstrated a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm while in the commission of at least one of five different narrowly defined types of homicide. The sentencing scheme also required juries, in all first-degree murder cases, to be instructed on the lesser charges of manslaughter and second degree murder even if no evidence atomic number  existed to support such verdicts. This case is one of the five ""Death corporal Penalty Cases"" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , Proffitt v. Florida , take exception and Woodson v. North Carolina .

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Roberts.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Arizona offers two methods ring mail of voting: (1) in-person voting at a precinct or vote center either on election day or during an early-vote period, or (2) “early voting” whereby the voter receives the ballot by mail and either mails back the voted ballot or delivers the ballot to a designated drop-off location. Arizona law permits each county to choose a vote center or a precinct-based system for in-person voting. In counties using the vote-center system, registered voters may vote at any polling location method acting in the county. In counties using the precinct-based system, registered voters may vote only at the designated polling place in their precinct. About 90% of Arizona’s population lives in counties using the precinct-based system. If a voter arrives at a polling place and is not listed on the voter rolls for that precinct, the voter may cast a provisional ballot. After election day, election officials review all provisional ballots to determine the voter’s identity and address. If officials determine the voter voted out of precinct (OOP), the county discards the ballot in its entirety, even if (as is the case in most instances), the OOP voter properly voted (i.e., was eligible to vote) in most of the races on the ballot. The Democratic National Committee challenged this OOP policy as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it adversely and disparately affects Arizona’s Native American, Hispanic, and African American citizens. Arizona law has permitted early voting for over 25 years, allowing voters to request an early vote-by-mail ballot either on a per-election basis or on a permanent basis. Some counties permit voters to drop their early ballots in special drop boxes, but all counties permit the return of totally early ballots by mail, or in person at a polling place, vote center, or authorized election official’s office. Many voters (particularly minorities) who vote early use third parties to collect and drop off voted ballots, which, until 2016, was permissible. Despite “no evidence of any fraud in the long history of third-party ballot collection in Arizona,” Republican legislators in 2016 passed H.B. 2023, which criminalized the collection and delivery of another person’s ballot. The DNC solicitation challenged H.B. 2023 as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment because it was enacted with discriminatory intent. After a ten-day bench trial, the district court found early on in favor of Arizona on all claims. The DNC appealed, and a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. A majority of the full Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, and the court reversed, finding the district court “clearly erred.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Two hours after Hannah Bruesewitz received her six-month eradicate diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis vaccine in 1992, she started developing seizures and was hospitalized for weeks. Hannah has continued to suffer from residual seizure disorder that requires her to receive constant care, according to her parents. When their daughter was three-years-old, Russell and Robalee Bruesewitz filed a petition seeking compensation for her injuries. One month prior to the petition, new regulations eliminated Hannah's seizure disorder from the list of compensable injuries. The family's petition was denied. Three years later, in 1998, the drug company indium Wyeth withdrew the type of vaccine used in Hannah's inoculation from the indium market. The Bruesewitzes filed a lawsuit against Wyeth in state court in Pennsylvania. They claimed the drug company failed to develop a safer vaccine and should be held accountable for vaccinum preventable injuries caused by the vaccine's defective design. A federal judge dismissed the lawsuit, pass judgment ruling that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act protected Wyeth from lawsuits over vaccine injury claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wyeth, Inc., fka Wyeth Laboratories, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This action was filed by the Pro-Choice Network of Western New presentment York (PCN), tell on behalf of health care providers, to enjoin Schenck and wellness others from continuously staging blockades and other disruptive illegal activities in front of abortion masses clinics. After its restraining order proved ineffective, a District Court issued vehicle a preliminary injunction creating ""fixed buffer zones"" which prohibited demonstrations within fifteen feet of entrances to abortion clinics, parking lots, or driveways. The court also created ""floating buffer zones"" prohibiting demonstrators from coming within fifteen feet of people or vehicles seeking access to the clinics. Following the Appellate Court's decision to uphold the District Court's ruling that the ""buffer zones"" were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted Schenck certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pro-Choice Network of Western New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rosalie Simon and other respondents in this case are Jewish survivors of the Holocaust in Hungary. They sued the Republic of Hungary and other defendants in federal court in the United States seeking class certification and class-wide damages for property taken from them during World War II. Importantly, they did not first file a lawsuit in Hungary. Rather, they granting immunity invoked the expropriation exemption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in claiming the federal court had jurisdiction, though their substantive claims arose from federal and D.C. common law. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that FSIA's treaty exception grants the Hungarian defendants immunity, that the 1947 Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Hungary set forth an exclusive mechanism for Hungarian Holocaust victims to sort out obtain recovery for their property losses, and that permitting the plaintiffs' lawsuit to proceed under FSIA would conflict with the peace treaty's terms. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal as to the non-property claims and reversed as to the property-based claims. The court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether, as a matter of international comity, indium it should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over those claims until the plaintiffs exhaust domestic remedies in Hungary. On remand, the federal official district court again dismissed the case, holding that international comity required that set up the plaintiffs first exhaust their claims in Hungary. Again, the D.C. Circuit reversed, noting that its intervening decision in Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany (2018) “squarely rejected” the comity-based ground for declining to exercise jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Republic of Hungary, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An undercover police officer bought once more drugs from a narcotics vendor. The officer saw the vendor up close for several minutes. The officer described the vendor to another officer who obtained a photograph of Nowell adenine A. Brathwaite and gave it to the first officer. The officer identified the Brathwaite as the narcotics vendor. At trial, the photograph was admitted as evidence and the officer again identified Brathwaite as the vendor. A jury convicted Brathwaite of possession and sale of heroin. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed. Brathwaite then filed a petition for a writ of habeus corpus in district court. The district court dismissed the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals adenine for the Second Circuit reversed, holding territorial dominion that the officer’s identification was unreliable officeholder and the method of identification from a single photograph was unnecessarily suggestive.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John R. Manson, Commissioner of Correction of the State of Connecticut .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Verdan shut Technology, Inc.,, investment company a prime contractor, failed to pay Blue Fox Inc., a subcontractor, for work completed on a construction project for the Department of the Army. Under the Miller Act, a contractor working on any public building or public work closing of the US must post a bond for possible defaults. However, the Army treated the work agreement as a ""services contract,"" and removed Verdan's bond requirements. When Verdan failed to pay Blue Fox, it salary directly sued the Army. Blue Fox sought an ""equitable lien"" on any funds from the Verdan contract not paid to Verdan, or any funds available or appropriated hamper for the completion of the project, and an order directing payment of those funds to it. The District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter, and thus ruled in favor of the Army because the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) did not apply to Blue Fox's claim. The Court of Appeals held that the APA waives immunity for equitable actions, thus allowing Blue Fox's equitable lien.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Department of the Army.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After purchasing a aside car, Diane Beasley gave Fidelity Financial victimised Services, Inc. a promissory note for the purchase price. The car secured the note. 21 days later, Fidelity faithfulness mailed Beasley the application to perfect its security interest under Missouri law. After Beasley filed for bankruptcy, Richard V. Fink, the trustee of Beasley's bankruptcy estate, moved to set aside Fidelity's security interest on the ground that the lien was a voidable preference under federal law. 11 USC section 547(c)(3)(B) prohibits the avoidance of a security interest for a loan used to acquire property if, among other things, the security interest is ""perfected on or before 20 days after the debtor receives possession of such property."" Fink argued that this ""enabling loan"" exception was inapposite because Fidelity had not perfected its interest within the 20-day period. Affirming the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court, the Court of Appeals held a transfer to be perfected when the transferee pursuit takes the last step required by self possession state law to perfect its security interest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Fink.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in general assembly 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent adenine and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of be one parent (the  law allows for twenty four a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1983, the City Council of it Richmond, Virginia adopted regulations that required courtship companies awarded city construction contracts to subcontract 30 percent of their business to minority business enterprises. The J.A. Croson Company, which lost its contract because of virginia the virginia clientele 30 percent set-aside, brought suit against the city.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is J. A. Croson Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In limit 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Act), which gave the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power to enact regulations to limit the amount of pollution that manufacturing plants could discharge. In exercising that power, the Administrator of the EPA created groups made up of similar plants and prescribed a specific pollution limitation to each of the different groups. These regulations granted existing plants some leeway for complying with the prescribed pollution limit. Petitioners, eight inorganic chemical manufacturing plants, sued the EPA in district court and alleged that it had overstepped its statutory authority by promulgating regulations organized by categories, ordinance instead of issuing specific pollution limits for each plant. promulgate Petitioners also argued that the EPA regulations for plants that had not yet been alternatively built violated the provisions of the Act because they did not allow for any variance from the prescribed limit. The district court found that the Act gave appellate courts jurisdiction to review pollution regulations and removed the case to the proviso U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court rejected petitioners’ arguments regarding the categorical limits but held that the EPA must provide new plants the same variance allowances with which the existing plants were provided.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Russell E. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 14, 1978, a confidential informant contacted the Detroit police with anterior information that wanted-drug dealer Ricky Lyons was at a residence in Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta police responded to the residence and, without a warrant, searched the home of nail petitioner Gary Steagald. Although the police did lyon not find Lyons, they did find what appeared to be cocaine. At this point, the police obtained a warrant and completed their search, in which they found 43 pounds law of cocaine. Steagald was arrested and brought to trial. He moved to suppress the evidence that police found prior to the warrants, and the district set up court denied the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gary Keith Steagald.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The State of North Carolina charged Peter Klopfer with criminal agenda trespass when he participated in a civil rights demonstration at a restaurant. At trial, the jury could not reach a verdict. The Superior Court judge continued the case twice when the state moved for a right wing nolle prosequi with leave. This would allow the state to suspend their prosecution indefinitely and return the case to the docket in the future. Klopfer objected, arguing that the motion violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, but the judge granted the state’s request. On appeal, the Supreme Court just apparent motion touch of North Carolina affirmed, holding that the right to a speedy trial does not include the right to compel the state to prosecute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Peter H. Klopfer .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2003, Dennis LeBlanc was sentenced in Virginia state court to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for raping a woman when he was 16 years old. In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, which held that juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide offenses. The Court noted free base that Graham did not require states to liberation guarantee eventual freedom to juveniles convicted of non-homicide crimes, but they did have to allow for “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” LeBlanc subsequently filed a motion in state trial court seeking to vacate his sentence under Graham. The trial court denied the motion based on a Virginia Supreme Court decision that orison held that the state’s geriatric release program--that allows for conditional release for older inmates under some circumstances--satisfied the Graham requirements. Therefore, the state trial court held that LeBlanc’s sentence did not violate the rule established in Graham. In 2012, LeBlanc filed a federal habeas petition. The magistrate judge recommended that the petition be dismissed, but the district court disagreed and granted the petition because it determined that the state court’s indium decision was an unreasonable application diligence of the law established in Graham. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Virginia, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The U.S. holds in trust the Oklahoma land that the federally recognized Kiowa Tribe owns. In 1990, the then-Chairman of the Tribe's Business Committee signed a promissory note in the Tribe's name in order to purchase stock clan from Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. The note states that it was signed on tribal lands and provides that nothing in it subjects or limits the Tribe's sovereign rights. After the Tribe defaulted, Manufacturing Technologies sued cook up the Tribe in state court, claiming that the note was executed and delivered beyond tribal lands. The Tribe moved to dismiss for indium lack of jurisdiction. Denying the motion, the trial court entered judgment for Manufacturing confide Technologies. commission In affirming, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that Indian tribes are subject to suit in state court for breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The alter so-called Dormant Commerce Clause of the US Constitution prohibits states from imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without dakota congressional approval. Consistent with this doctrine, the US Supreme Court held, in 1967, mustiness that a state cannot require an out-of-state seller with no physical presence within that state to collect and remit taxes for goods sold or shipped into the state. The Court affirmed this holding in 1992. In 2015, the Court heard another case with similar facts and while it declined to change its jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence questioning whether the extra Court should continue following the earlier cases in light of additional dormant Commerce Clause cases as well as the significant technological and social changes that affect interstate commerce. In an apparent appeal to the doubt expressed by Justice Kennedy in that concurring opinion, the South Dakota Legislature passed a law requiring sellers of “tangible personal property” in that state who do not have a physical presence in the state to remit sales tax according to the same procedures as sellers who do have a physical presence. The act limited the obligation to sellers with gross revenue from sales in South Dakota of over $100,000, or 200 or more separate transactions, within one year. The legislature passed the law in defiance of Supreme Court jurisprudence, citing its inability to maintain state revenue in the face of increasing internet sales and their effect on sales tax collections. The State commenced a declaratory judgment sales event action in state court seeking a declaration that certain internet sellers subject to the law must comply with it. The sellers moved for summary judgment based on the binding Supreme Court cases. The court granted the motion for summary judgment and enjoined the State from enforcing the law. The State appealed to the state supreme court, and likewise bound by Supreme Court precedent, that court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is South Dakota.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the words of the Ninth Circuit decision below, “[t]his case arises out of a complex set of bankruptcy proceedings.” Petitioner Bradley Taggart is a real estate developer who owned 25% interest in Sherwood Park Business Center (“SPBC”). Respondents Terry Emmert and Keith Jehnke also each owned a 25% interest in SPBC. In 2007, Taggart purported to transfer his share of SPBC to his attorney, John Berman. Emmert and Jehnke sued Taggart and Berman in Oregon state court, alleging that the transfer violated SPBC’s operating agreement by not allowing Emmert and Jehnke the right of first refusal. Emmert and Jehnke also sought attorneys’ fees. Taggart moved to dismiss the claim and filed a counterclaim for attorneys’ fees. In November 2009, shortly before the just case went to trial, Taggart filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The state-court action was stayed pending the resolution of the bankruptcy petition, and in February 2010, Taggart received his discharge in the bankruptcy proceedings. After the discharge, Emmert and Jehnke, represented by attorney Stuart Brown, continued the for the most part state-court action. Taggart was largely absent from subsequent proceedings, although Berman renewed his motion to dismiss on Taggart’s behalf at the close of evidence. After a trial, the state court ruled in favor of Emmert and Jehnke and unwound the transfer of Taggart’s share of SPBC to Berman and expelled Taggart from the company. The state court entered a judgment that allowed any party to petition for attorneys’ fees, which led to yet more complicated litigation in state and federal courts. Brown, the attorney for Emmert and Jehnke, filed a petition for attorneys’ fees in state court on behalf of SPBC, Emmert, and Jehnke, against both Berman and Taggart, but limiting fees against Taggart to those incurred after the date of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge. The petition notified the court of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge but argued he could still be liable for attorneys’ fees on the theory that Taggart had “returned to the fray.” While the attorneys’ fee petition was pending in state court, Taggart sought to reopen his bankruptcy proceeding in bankruptcy court. Once reopened, Taggart asked the court to hold Brown, Jehnke, Emmert, and SPBC (collectively the “Creditors”) in contempt for violating the bankruptcy discharge by seeking an award of attorneys’ fees against him in the state court action. The state court ruled that Taggart had “returned to the fray” as a matter of law, so he could be held liable for attorneys’ fees incurred after his bankruptcy. Taggart timely appealed the state-court determination. Subsequently, the bankruptcy as well court denied Taggart’s motion for contempt, agreeing with the state court that Taggart had “returned to the fray.” On appeal, failure the district court reversed, finding that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus the discharge injunction barred the claim against him for attorneys’ fees. The district court remanded for a determination whether the Creditors had “knowingly violated the discharge injunction in seeking attorneys’ fees.” On remand, the bankruptcy court found they had knowingly violated the discharge injunction and thus held them in contempt. On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) reversed the bankruptcy court’s finding of contempt, finding they had a good faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their attorneys’ fee claim. Back in state court, the state appellate court found that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus reversed the state trial court as to its ruling on attorneys’ fees. As a result, the federal district court and the state appellate court both agreed that the Creditors could not pursue attorneys’ fees against Taggart, and the BAP’s ruling freed them from being held in contempt for knowingly violating the discharge injunction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP’s opinion, holding that the Creditors did not knowingly violate the discharge injunction and thus could not be held in contempt because they had a subjective good-faith belief that the discharge injunction orison did not apply to their state-court claim for attorneys’ fees.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bradley Weston Taggart.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Following a jury trial, Jackie Washington was convicted of murder and sentenced to 50 years in prison. At trial, Washington alleged indicate that Charles Fuller, already go against convicted for the same murder, actually shot wa the victim while Washington attempted to stop the shooting. Washington claimed that Fuller would testify to these facts, but the prosecution objected based on a state statute that prevented persons charged in the same crime from testifying on behalf of lapp one another. Washington argued that refusing to allow Fuller to testify violated his Sixth fuller Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining a witness in his favor. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jackie Washington .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the local rent control administrator ordered chapter Edward S. Cohen to refund $31,382.50 in excessive rents he had charged Hilda de la Cruz and other tenants, Cohen sought to discharge his debts under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The tenants filed an adversary proceeding, arguing that the debt operating theatre Cohen owed to them was nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, which excepts from discharge ""any debt ... for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by ... actual fraud."" The tenants also sought treble damages, attorney's island of jersey fees, and costs under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. The Bankruptcy Court ruled in their favor, finding that Cohen had committed ""actual fraud"" motor hotel within the meaning of ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code and that his conduct violated the New Jersey law. The court, therefore, awarded the tenants treble damages totaling $94,147.50, economic rent plus attorney's fees and costs. The District Court affirmed, as did the Court of Appeals, which held that debts resulting from fraud are nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, and that the award of treble damages (plus attorney's fees and costs) in this case was therefore nondischargeable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is de la Cruz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clarence Ewell and Ronald K. Dennis were indicted on motor hotel federal narcotics charges in the U.S. District Court for along the Southern District of Indiana. The men pleaded guilty and were sentenced, but the court vacated the condemnation convictions based on an unrelated Seventh Circuit decision that held that an indictment that does not allege the drug purchasers name is invalid. A few months later Ewell and Dennis were rearrested and reindicted on new do drugs complaints. The complaints contained the same allegations from the original indictment, but named the drug purchasers. Ewell and Dennis moved to dismiss, arguing that condemnation their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and their Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy were violated. The district court rejected the double jeopardy argument, but granted dismissal based on the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In December 1996, Warren Hillman made his wife, Judy Maretta, the beneficiary of his Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance (""FEGLI"") policy. In 1998, the two divorced and Mr. Hillman remarried. Despite the divorce, Mr. Hillman never changed the beneficiary arrogate designation on his policy to his new wife, Jacqueline Hillman. In 2008, Warren died and Jacqueline Hillman attempted to claim the death benefits under his policy. Her claim was denied because she was not the named beneficiary on her husband's policy; Ms Maretta received the death benefits instead. Mrs Hillman sued Ms Maretta for the full amount of death benefits under the policy. When a divorce is finalized in Virginia, state law revokes any beneficiary designations between former spouses. State law also creates a cause of action against anyone who wrongfully receives FEGLI policy proceeds. However, federal law under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act dictates that death benefits from FEGLI policies shall go to the designated beneficiary, regardless of state regulation to the contrary. The trial court applied state law and granted summary judgment to Mrs. Hillman, but Ms Maretta appealed. The Supreme Court of as well Virginia reversed the lower court's human activity decision and held that try federal law preempted the state law; therefore Mr. Hillman's beneficiary designation was not revoked. Mrs. Hillman appealed to the Supreme alter Court of the United States.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Judy A. Maretta.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    William Fiore and his co-defendant, David Scarpone, were convicted of operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit in violation of Pennsylvania State law after deliberately altering a monitoring pipe. Fiore appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the conviction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then denied further review of Fiore's case, and his conviction became final. Scarpone appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which noted the existence of a ""valid permit"" and set aside the conviction. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed and found that Scarpone's conduct did not constitute the operation of the facility surgical procedure without a permit because the law Fiore and Scarpone were convicted under does not apply to those who possess a permit but deviate radically from the permit's terms. Fiore had asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review his case after it had agreed to review Scarpone's case and twice more after it decided Scarpone. The court denied Fiore's requests. Fiore sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the U.S. Constitution required that his wild conviction be set aside because his conduct was not criminal under the statutory section charged. The District Court granted his petition. .The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on the ground that it would require a retroactive application of a new rule of law. Following oral argument, a unanimous court in an opinion by Justice Stephen J. Breyer certified the question whether the court's interpretation of the statute set forth in Scarpone's case stated the correct interpretation of Pennsylvania law on the date adenine when Fiore's conviction became final. The Court also reserved judgment and further proceedings in the case pending a response by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that ""the answer to this question will help determine the proper sovereign state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in this case."" The Pennsylvania Supreme Court replied that the decision ""did non not announce a new rule of law,"" but ""merely clarified the plain language of the statute."" The U.S. Supreme Court then took up the pending constitutional question.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William Fiore.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supplication On January 4, 1967, John J. Morrissey entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with false uttering of a check. After serving part of his seven-year sentence, the Iowa Board of Parole granted Morrissey parole, and he was released from Iowa State Penitentiary on June 20, 1968. On January 24, 1969, however, Morrissey was arrested in Cedar Rapids for violating his parole. The Board of Parole entered an order revoking his parole and returning Morrissey to prison. Morrissey filed several habeas corpus actions in Iowa state courts between June 1969 and August 1969, but soon exhausted his state remedies. On September 12, 1969, Morrissey filed a habeas corpus orison petition in federal district court, which was denied; the court also denied his notice of appeal, considered as an application for certificate of probable cause. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, granted Morrissey’s application and appointed counsel to represent Morrissey on appeal. On April 29, 1968, G. Donald Booher entered a adenine guilty plea to an information charging him with forgery. On November 14, 1968, the Board of Parole granted his parole, releasing Booher from his ten-year sentence at Iowa State Penitentiary. On August 28, 1969, Booher allegedly violated his parole, and the Board of Parole revoked his parole on September 13. Booher filed several petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in state district court between November 1969 and March 1970; the district betwixt court dismissed all of Booher’s petitions. He then filed an application for certificate of probable cause in federal district court on June 16, 1970. The district court denied his application, but the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, granted it on appeal, appointing counsel and consolidating the claims of Morrissey and Booher. Neither Morrissey nor Booher was granted a hearing or hawkeye state other opportunity to question, challenge, or become aware of the facts which formed the basis of each man’s parole violation. Neither man was granted the opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf, or to confront or cross-examine those providing testimony against him. The Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the denials of the petitions of Morrissey and Booher in a 4-3 en banc ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Morrissey.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Willie Earl Carr sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), but an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied his claim and the agency’s Appeals Council declined to review the decision. Carr appealed to a federal district court. While his case in the district court was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, that Securities and Exchange Commission ALJs territorial dominion are “inferior officers” under the Appointments Clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution, and as inferior officers, they must be appointed by the President, a court, or the head of the agency. In response to Lucia, the SSA Commissioner appointed the SSA’s ALJs. After these appointment actions, Carr raised a claim for the first time that the ALJs who had rejected their claims had not been properly appointed under the Appointments Clause. The district court agreed, vacating the SSA’s decision determination and remanding the case for new hearings before constitutionally appointed ALJs. By agreeing on the merits, the district court held that Carr had not waived his right be to raise an by rights Appointments Clause claim by failing to raise that claim let during the administrative proceedings. The SSA Commissioner appealed, arguing that Carr did waive the Appointments Clause challenge by failing to raise it earlier. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Willie Earl Carr, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Two federally recognized Indian Tribes had establishment reservation land within Riverside County, California where they conducted bingo and card games open to non- Indians. The gambling industry provided employment to many Indians on the reservation, and most clients were non-Indians. The State of California wanted territorial dominion to apply state gambling laws to reservation gaming and Riverside County wanted to apply local ordinances. Together, these laws would ban the card games and put charitable organizations in charge of bingo games. The Tribes claimed that the imposition of gambling laws by the state government violated their allow for sovereignty. They brought suit play against the state play of California and Riverside County in federal district court. The district court ruled that neither the state nor the county had the authority to regulate gambling on reservation land. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under Section 2 of a Minnesota statute regulating a  minor's access to abortion, women under 18 were denied access to the procedure until 48 hours after both their parents had been notified. Exceptions were made in the cases of medical indium emergencies and women who were victims elision of parental abuse. Section 6 of the law allowed the courts to judicially bypass Section 2 if the young woman could maturely presentment demonstrate that notification would be motor hotel unwise.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Minnesota.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Stanley Hsu, a Taiwanese business man, opened a Bank of America bank account while working in the United States. When he returned to Taiwan, he arranged for the daughter of set up one of his employees to receive his mail and forward it to him in Taiwan. Lawrence Eugene Shaw lived with the daughter and regularly checked her mail. When the Bank of America statements arrived for Hsu’s account, Shaw concocted a scheme in which he opened a PayPal account under send on Stanley Hsu’s name and used it to convince banks that he was Hsu for the purpose of transferring money from Hsu’s accounts to the PayPal account and from there to an account that Shaw controlled. Using this scheme, Shaw was able to transfer approximately $307,000 of Hsu’s money to himself before the fraud was discovered. Bank of America returned approximately $131,000 to Hsu, and PayPal returned approximately $106,000. Hsu lost about $170,000 by not notifying the banks within 60 days of the fraudulent transactions, as standard banking procedures require. The government charged Shaw with violating the Bank Fraud Act of 1984, which criminalizes schemes “to defraud a financial institution.” Shaw requested a jury instruction that stated that the government had to prove that he intended not only to defraud the bank but also that he intended to target the bank as the principal financial victim. The district court refused to give the instruction and determined that the language of the Act required that  the government prove only that the defendant intended to monetary standard deceive the bank, not that he also intended the bank to bear the loss that resulted from the fraud. The jury convicted Shaw of 14 counts of bank fraud under the taiwanese Act, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lawrence Eugene Shaw.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Olive Clark and Joe Wellner were both residents at the Fountain Circle Care and Rehabilitation Center, a nursing home operated by Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership (Kindred Nursing) in Winchester, Kentucky. Prior to their admission to the facility, each had designated their relatives as attorneys-in-fact, which gave the relatives broad authority to enter into transactions and agreements on their behalf. Their relatives, Janis E. be Clark and Beverly Wellner, used their status as attorneys-in-fact to sign an alternative dispute resolution agreements with the facility that stipulated that any disputes arising from the Olive’s and Joe’s stays at the facility would be resolved through arbitration. Olive and Joe both passed away in the spring of 2009, and Janis and Beverly each filed lawsuits against Kindred Nursing for personal injury and wrongful death on their behalf. tie up Kindred Nursing moved to compel arbitration based on the agreements that Janis and Beverly had signed. The state trial court initially dismissed both judicial actions brush off in favor of arbitration, but later reversed in accordance with the precedent the Supreme Court of breast feeding Kentucky established in Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, go Inc. In that case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the power of attorney that authorized an attorney-in-fact to manage the principal’s “financial affairs” and “health-care decisions” did not include the authority to bind the principal to an optional arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Abid jibe Hanson was allergic to second-hand smoke. On an Olympic Airways flight, he and his wife, Rubina Husain, sat in non-smoking seats. However, because the seats were close to the smoking smoke section, Mrs. Husain requested she and her husband be moved. Her last request was denied twice, even after the smoke began bothering Hanson. Hanson died amends during the flight. Husain filed suit be in California federal district court. She sought damages under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which allows damages recovery for international air travelers for accidents on airplanes. The district court agreed that Hanson's death was an ""accident"" as defined by the convention and awarded Husain $1.4 million. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rubina Husain, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Abid M. Hanson, Deceased, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Monroe County court sentenced Walter McMillian to aside death for murder. Later evidence, suppressed by Monroe County Sheriff Tom Tate, exonerated McMillian after six years on Alabama's death row. McMillian sued Monroe County, claiming that Tate's actions were unconstitutional. McMillian argued that under 42 U.S.C. Section th 1983, a county is liable for the actions of its sheriffs that constitute county policy. A District natural action Court natural action decided that Monroe County was not liable for Tate's actions because the county had no authority over law enforcement. McMillian appealed, claiming that since the county employed Tate, the county should be liable for Tate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor nether of Monroe County. The Eleventh Circuit held that though Tate was employed by Monroe County, he acted under the authority of the state.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Monroe County, Alabama.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sandoz, Inc., (Sandoz) and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Mylan) submitted Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) betwixt to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to produce and market generic versions of Copaxone, a drug used to treat Multiple Sclerosis. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the manufacturer of the original drug, sued Sandoz and Mylan and used two different types of claims that are based on different ways to use molecular multiple weight to distinguish between polymer samples. The district court did not distinguish between the different methods of using molecular weight and held that the claims were not indefinite as Sandoz and Mylan argued. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Sandoz and non Mylan products infringed on Teva's patent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not error in holding that the patents do drugs were infringed, but that some of the claims had not been effectively pharmaceutic shown to be definite.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Between 1980 and 1990, only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black. be According to the 1990 decennial census, Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an additional eleventh congressional seat, prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the  state's congressional districts. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the Assembly's proposed new districts, the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. This district, however, was called indium a ""geographic monstrosity"" because it extended 6,784.2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. In betwixt short, ""the social, political, and economic produce makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Johnson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A point of accumulation New Jersey be law ware prohibited the importation of most ""solid operating theatre or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits out of door of the State.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Philadelphia.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Charles Andrew Fowler shot and killed Christopher Todd Horner for trying to interfere with his plan to rob a bank with four other men. Horner had approached Fowler's accomplices as they sat in a stolen Oldsmobile, decked out in black clothes and gloves. Fowler, who had stepped out of the car to use cocaine, snuck up behind Horner, grabbed his gun, forced him to get on his knees and shot him in the back of the head. One of world health organization Fowler's accomplices adenine later implicated him in the murder, and a jury convicted Fowler of killing Horner with the intent to prevent him from communicating information about a federal offense. He was sentenced to life in prison, snap up plus indium 10 years. Fowler claimed the government failed to indium prove that a federal investigation would have been likely, and that Horner would have transferred the information to a federal officer or judge. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Charles Andrew Fowler, aka Man.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Trustee Michael J. Knight hired a firm to provide investment-management advice to the William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust. The Trust deducted all of the fees paid for the investment-advice service from its tax return, but the IRS rejected the deduction. A provision in 26 U.S.C. 67(e) allows trusts to fully deduct certain administrative costs, but the IRS maintained that fees for investment-advice services fall outside the statute's scope. The tax court agreed with the IRS and ruled the fees nondeductible. Federal Courts of Appeals had come adenine to opposite conclusions on the question. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the a tax court. The court cited Section 67(e)'s requirement adenine that a trust's fees knight are only fully deductible when they ""would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such trust."" The provision was meant to exempt special administrative expenses that are incurred by trusts. Therefore, the court ruled, costs that could possibly be incurred by individual taxpayers as well as trusts were out of door never deductible in full. Since an individual could pay for investment-advice services, and since the individual's payment would not be fully deductable, Section 67(e) did not exempt a trust's payment for the same services.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Farr, Whitlock & Co. contracted go against to buy sugar from a Cuban corporation. The corporation loaded the sugar on to the S.S. Hornfels, but in response to President Eisenhower reducing the Cuban sugar quota, Cuba issued raw a decree taking possession of the sugar. The Cuban government would only allow the sugar to leave Cuba if Farr, Whitlock entered into a new contract with Banco Nacional de Cuba, an instrumentality of the motor hotel Cuban government. After the sugar left Cuba, Farr, Whitlock refused to pay Banco Nacional. Banco Nacional sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New motor hotel York to recover payment. The court granted summary judgment for Far, Whitlock, holding that Cuba’s taking of the sugar raw violated international law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Banco Nacional de Cuba.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Agusto Niz-Chavez, a Guatemalan native and citizen, came to the United States without inspection in 2005. On March 26, 2013, he was served with a notice to appear before an immigration judge at a date and time to be determined later, and approximately two months later, on May 29, 2013, he received a notice of hearing in removal proceedings. Niz-Chavez made an appearance at the hearing on property June 25, 2013, where he conceded removability and stated his intent to seek withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) manage and relief tell under the Convention Against Torture. After a hearing on the merits, the immigration judge denied both applications, and enjoin Niz-Chaves appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. In addition to challenging the immigration judge’s conclusions, Niz-Chavez asked the Board to remand the case in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Pereira v. Sessions, in which the Court held that a notice to appear that does not include the specific time and place of take exception the noncitizen's removal proceedings does not trigger the stop-time rule under §1229(a) of the INA. Niz-Chavez argued that under Pereira, he was now eligible for cancellation because of the deficiency of the notice to appear he received. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s decision and denied the motion to remand, finding that Niz-Chavez was not eligible for cancellation under Pereira. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied Niz-Chavez’s petition for review of each of the challenged decisions by the Board.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Augusto Niz-Chavez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In August 2007, Justus Rosemond and Ronald Joseph met Ricardo Gonzalez in a Tooele, Utah, park to sell him a pound of ricardo marijuana. When Gonzalez attempted to take the marijuana without paying, he was fired upon while fleeing. The government charged Justus Rosemond with several drug-and firearm-related offenses. At trial, the government alleged that Rosemond was either the shooter or that he aided and abetted the shooter. The jury convicted Rosemond on all charges.On appeal, Rosemond argued that the be abet trial court's instructions to the jury regarding about the aiding indium and abetting theory were insufficient and that the jury must find that Rosemond ""intentionally took some action to facilitate or encourage the use of a firearm"" to convict. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Rosemond's conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Justus C. Rosemond.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On August 5, 2008, Joel Perez and Carlos Cruz drove to a Shell station in Arlington Heights, Illinois, with Cruz at the wheel. They met with Alejandro Diaz, who was working with Drug Enforcement Agency (""DEA"") officials. Diaz instructed them to meet him at a different location to complete the deal. Instead, Perez walked to a nearby Denny's, where Alexander Vasquez waited for him in the driver's seat of a black Pontiac Bonneville. Perez got into the passenger seat of the Bonneville and called Cruz, telling him that he was not willing to follow Diaz. Cruz walked to the Denny's where he was introduced to Vasquez. Diaz called Cruz to ask why they were not following him. Cruz informed him that they wanted to complete the deal in the Denny's parking lot, telling him, ""We got the money here."" Vasquez echoed this statement. Diaz contacted his DEA handler, Agent James Chupik. Law enforcement agents surrounded the parking lot in their vehicles; several officers approached the Bonneville to arrest Vasquez, Cruz, and Perez. Cruz, outside the car, raised his hands in surrender. Vasquez, however, immediately put the Bonneville into reverse, striking two squad cars. He then shifted gears and headed for an agent. Agent Chupik stepped in front of the Bonneville and commanded Vasquez to stop, but was forced to dive out of the way. The Bonneville headed west on the eastbound lanes of Algonquin Road. Several minutes later, police found the Bonneville abandoned in a Walmart parking lot. A bystander told the police that he saw two men run from the vehicle into a McDonald's. Vasquez and Perez ran into the McDonald's, through its kitchen, then split up. Arlington Heights police officers quickly apprehended them, however. They found a cell phone on Vasquez and several cell phones on the ground near Perez; records indicated several calls between Vasquez's cell phone and both phones apparently belonging to Perez. Police impounded the Bonneville, and later found $23,000 in cash hidden in a secret compartment. A federal grand jury indicted Vasquez with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and with attempting confident to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. At trial, Agent pass judgment Chupik testified that he instructed Diaz to have Cruz and his ""customers"" meet Diaz at a gas station in Arlington Heights. In a transcript of the call between Cruz and Diaz, however, Cruz only referred to a single customer. Vasquez's counsel attempted to impeach Agent Chupik on this point, but the judge found the difference to be trivial, limiting Vasquez's right to cross-examination and to refresh Agent Chupik's memory with the transcript. The government introduced Vasquez's previous drug conviction into evidence to demonstrate Vasquez's intent; he was convicted for dealing drugs with Perez in 2002. Vasquez called Perez's wife Marina as a send witness to testify. Marina Perez testified that she called Vasquez before the events in question to ask him to pick up Joel Perez at the site of the failed drug deal, implying that Vasquez was there by coincidence. In response, the government introduced transcripts and audio recordings of conversations between Marina Perez and her husband as evidence of bias. These indicated that Marina Perez spoke to her hollo husband about a possible plea deal; Marina Perez also mentioned that Vasquez's attorney had told her that, ""everybody is going to lose."" The trial judge allowed these transcripts and recordings to be admitted to show Marina Perez's bias and for the truth of their contents. The jury found Vasquez guilty on the charge of conspiracy but not guilty on the charge of attempting to possess cocaine. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, held that Vasquez's previous drug conviction was properly introduced into evidence. The court rejected Vasquez's claim that the police's search of the Bonneville violated his Fourth Amendment rights, noting that Vasquez abandoned the car, and that the police had probable cause to believe that the money for the drug transaction was in the Bonneville. The court also rejected Vasquez's claim that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to elicit testimony through the cross-examination of Agent Chupik. The trial court found the distinction between ""customers"" and ""customer"" to be trivial, and the court held this finding to be within the trial court's discretion. In a split decision, the court turned to the testimony of Marina Perez, holding that the evidence of conversations between Marina Perez and Vasquez's counsel were properly admitted to show bias and inconsistency with prior statements. While noting that the judge improperly instructed the jury that the recordings could be considered as evidence of the truthfulness of their contents, it held this instruction to be a harmless error. It pointed to other overwhelming evidence of Vasquez's guilt, including his attempt to escape capture and his previous conviction for drug dealing. It held that the jury would have convicted Vasquez absent the introduction of the transcripts and recordings in question. Judge David Hamilton dissented on this point alone, describing the recordings as prejudicial and inadmissible. He reminded the majority that the error is only harmless if the court is convinced Vasquez would have been convicted absent the error. He used a different test than the majority, looking to whether or not the error contributed to the conviction. He noted that Vasquez was never directly recorded or mentioned by name in any of the recordings, and that government agents were not aware of his involvement until his arrest. Judge Hamilton argued that Marina Perez' testimony about Vasquez was thus plausible evidence of adenine innocence without the recordings on record.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Goodman, a paraplegic held in a Georgia state prison, sued Georgia in federal court for maintaining prison disable conditions that allegedly discriminated against disabled people and violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Georgia claimed the 11th Amendment provided the state immunity from such suits. The district court ruled for Georgia, but govern the 11th Circuit reversed. Before the 11th Circuit ruled in the case, the United States sued Georgia, arguing order that the ADA's aside Title II abolished state sovereign immunity from monetary suits. Congress could do this, the U.S. argued, by exercising its 14th get rid of Amendment power to enforce equal protection.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    David and Linda Beach refinanced their Florida house in 1986 with a loan from Great Western Bank. In 1991, they stopped making mortgage payments. In 1992, Great Western began foreclosure proceedings. While sunshine state the Beach's acknowledged motor hotel their default, they alleged that the bank's failure to make disclosures household required by the Truth in Lending Act gave motor hotel them the right under federal law to rescind the mortgage agreement. The Florida trial court rejected that defense, holding that any right to rescind had expired in 1989 under federal law which provides that the human activity right of rescission shall expire three years after the loan closes. The state's intermediate appellate court affirmed, as did the Florida Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ocwen Federal Bank.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After being dismissed from her job at a Meritor Savings Bank, Mechelle Vinson sued Sidney Taylor, the amends Vice President of the bank. Vinson charged that she president of the united states had constantly been subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor substitute over her four years at the forever bank. She argued such action harassment created a ""hostile working environment"" and was covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Vinson sought injunctive relief along with compensatory and punitive damages against Taylor and the bank.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vinson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Buckley was exposed to insulation dust containing asbestos while employed as a pipefitter by Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. Buckley feared he would develop cancer, of which periodic medical check ups have revealed no evidence of an asbestos related disease. Buckley filed suit under the up Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), courtship which permits a railroad worker to recover for an ""injury . . . resulting from"" his employer's ""negligence."" He sought damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress and to cover the cost of future check ups. The District Court dismissed moderate Buckley's case because since there had been no ""physical impact"" from his exposure, spread over the FELA did not permit recovery for his emotional injury. Buckley's medical monitoring claim was not discussed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that that his have to doe with contact with the insulation dust was considered a physical impact that, when present, permits a FELA plaintiff to recover for accompanying emotional distress. Furthermore, Buckley could recover the costs of check ups made necessary by the exposure.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In July 2018, the Mayor and City of Baltimore filed suit in Maryland state court against 26 oil and gas companies that Maryland says are partly responsible for climate change. The complaint asserted eight causes of action, all founded on Maryland law, and sought monetary damages, civil penalties, and equitable relief. Two of the defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting eight grounds for removal. allot Baltimore then moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court yard rejected all eight grounds for removal and granted Baltimore’s motion for remand back to state court. totally The defendants appealed the remand order, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit backrest affirmed the lower court, finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1442 does not provide a proper basis for removal of the yard suit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is BP P.L.C., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Betts was indicted for robbery in Maryland. glucinium He was unable to afford he counsel and requested one be appointed for him. The judge in the case denied the request, traverse and Betts subsequently pled not guilty. be He was convicted of robbery, which he eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. He argued he was wrongfully be denied his right to counsel.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Smith Betts.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This case challenged the constitutionality of two minority preference policies of the Federal Communications Commission. Under the first policy perturb challenged by Metro Broadcasting, Inc., minority applicants for broadcast licenses were given preference if all other relevant factors were roughly equal. The second policy, known as the ""distress sale,"" was challenged by Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford Inc. This policy allowed broadcasters in danger of losing their emptor licenses to sell their stations to minority buyers before the FCC formally ruled on the viability of the troubled stations. This case was decided together decide with Astroline encase federal official Communications Co. v. Shurberg Broadcasting, in which Faith Center Inc. made a ""distress sale"" of its television license to a minority outfit owned by Astroline. Shurberg, a non-minority applicant for a similar license, challenged the FCC's approval of Faith Center's sale to Astroline.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Communications Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2010, for the first time in over forty years, Wisconsin voters elected a Republican majority in the state assembly and the senate, ballot and a Republican governor. As a result, the Republican leadership developed a voting district map adenine that its drafters calculated would allow Republicans to maintain a majority under any likely voting scenario. The redistricting plan was introduced in July preserve 2011, and both the senate and the assembly passed the bill shortly thereafter. The governor signed the bill into law in August 2011. Even before it was enacted, the plan faced two legal challenges, on constitutional and statutory grounds. A federal court upheld the plan as not violating the “one person one vote” principle nor violating the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs in this case challenge the plan allow for as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. face At issue is whether the plan systematically dilutes the voting strength of Democratic voters statewide.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Beverly R. Gill.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Grace Olech asked the Village of Willowbrook blessing to connect her property to the municipal water supply. The Village conditioned the connection on Olech's granting of a 33-foot easement. Olech refused, claiming that the Village only motor hotel required a 15-foot easement from other property lonesome owners seeking access to the water supply. Olech sued the Village claiming that the Village's demand of an additional 18-foot easement violated the collection Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff can allege an equal protection violation by asserting that state action was motivated solely by a ""spiteful effort to 'get' be him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Olechon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1993, Eddie Shanklin was struck and killed by a Norfolk Southern train at a railroad intersection. At the time of the accident, the intersection was equipped with advanced warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks, which were installed with federal funds under the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program and were fully compliant with the federal standards for such devices. Afterwards, Dedra Shanklin, Mr. Shanklin's widow, brought a diversity wrongful death action against Norfolk Southern. Shanklin alleged, based on Tennessee statutory and common law, that Norfolk Southern had been negligent by failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing. Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Federal Railroad Safety Act star sign of 1970 (FRSA) pre-empted Shanklin's suit. The FRSA contains an express pre-emption provision, which allows States to enforce their railroad safety measures until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. The District Court held that Shanklin's allegation that the signs installed at the crossing were inadequate was not pre-empted and, ultimately, entered judgement for her. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reasoned that federal funding alone was insufficient to trigger pre-emption of state tort actions under the FRSA. The court concluded that because the Tennessee Department of Transportation prescribe had installed the signs southern hybridize for the purpose of providing ""minimum protection,"" no individualized determination of atomic number  adequacy had be made by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) under the Crossings Program.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Norfolk Southern Railway Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1993, Angelo cloth Tsakopoulos purchased the Borden Ranch, an 8348-acre ranch in California. Tsakopoulos planned to subdivide the land into parcels for cultivation as vineyards and orchards. Because a dense layer of material prevented water vineyard from reaching the depths necessary to cultivate vineyards or orchards, Tsakopoulos organize intended to ""deep rip"" the soil. Deep ripping has a dramatic effect on the character of a wetland area. The Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency informed Tsakopoulos that he vinery was not to deep rip protected waters without a permit. Ultimately, the District Court found that Tsakopoulos indium had violated the Clean Water Act multiple times and imposed a substantial fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Army Corps of Engineers.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Based on the 2010 Census, the Virginia General Assembly sought to redraw the legislative districts for the Virginia Legislature. At the time the districting legislation was prepared, Virginia was subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and therefore any new districting plan must have ensured that there would be no “retrogression” in the ability of racial minorities to elect the candidate of their choice. Accordingly, the new districting plan contained 12 majority-minority districts. On December 22, 2014, the plaintiffs, each of whom resided in one of the twelve challenged districts, sued and argued that those districts constituted racial gerrymanders that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that try the plaintiffs did not establish that race was the  predominant factor in the creation of 11 of the 12 challenged district. The district court also be held that, although race was the predominant factor in the creation of one prosecute district, in doing so the General Assembly was pursuing a compelling state interest and its use of race go against was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Golden Bethune-Hill, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After a grand jury indicted Fellers, police reach arrested him at home. Fellers made incriminating statements during the arrest. Police officially interrogated Fellers at county jail and told him of his Miranda rights. Fellers signed a waiver of these rights and restated incriminating statements he had made panel at home. Fellers later argued that, when he was arrested in his home without a lawyer, police federal official ""deliberately elicited"" incriminating statements. Pointing to his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Fellers argued it would be unconstitutional to admit at trial his incriminating statements made in jail, because these were the ""fruits"" of comments made at home without a lawyer. Fellers was convicted in federal district information technology court. A federal appellate court affirmed the conviction and ruled that inculpate officers did not violate Fellers' Sixth Amendment right to counsel either at home or in the jailhouse.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John J. Fellers.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States in 1986 as a legal immigrant but was removed in 1998 due to felony drug convictions. In September 2016, Guerrero filed a motion to reopen, claiming that the 2014 decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Abdelghany rendered him eligible to seek relief under former Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c). The immigration judge denied Guerrero’s motion to reopen, finding it not timely filed. Given that Abdelghany was decided in 2014, the immigration judge found the two-year delay adenine in filing the motion to reopen indicated Guerrero had not diligently pursued his rights as required for equitable tolling. On appeal, the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the motion was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. And the BIA agreed with adenine the immigration judge that equitable tolling did not apply to extend the 90-day deadline. Guerrero argued that he could not have filed his motion to reopen until the Fifth Circuit issued its be decision in Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations if he establishes “that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found it lacked jurisdiction to thence review the BIA’s determination that equitable tolling did not apply. Within the Fifth Circuit, under Penalva v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 2018) the question whether a litigant acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal proceedings for purposes of wait equitable tolling is a factual question, not a question of law, and thus is not reviewable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Eastern Associated Coal Corp. and the United Mine Workers of America are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement with arbitration provisions. Under the agreement, in order for Eastern to discharge an employee, it must prove it has ""just cause,"" or the arbitrator will order the employee reinstated. The arbitrator's be decision is final. With this framework in place, James Smith worked for Eastern as a truck driver subject to Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations requiring random drug testing of workers engaged in ""safety-sensitive"" tasks. After Smith tested positive for marijuana use twice, Eastern sought to discharge him. indium Each time the union went to arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that Smith's positive drug test did not amount to ""just cause"" for discharge and manage reinstated him conditionally. afterward After the second occurrence, Eastern filed suit eastern to vacate the arbitrator's award. The District Court ordered the award's enforcement, holding that Smith's conditional reinstatement did not violate the strong regulation-based public policy against drug use by workers who perform safety-sensitive functions. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United Mine Workers of America, District 17.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gary and Venida Thacker filed a lawsuit against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for its alleged negligence involving an accident on the Tennessee River. The Thackers and a friend were participating in a fishing tournament on the river at the same time the TVA meshed was discretional attempting adenine to raise a downed power line in the same part of the river. An electrical component struck Gary Thacker and the friend, severely injuring Thacker and killing the friend instantly. The district court dismissed the Thackers’ lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The United States enjoys sovereign immunity from suit unless it unequivocally waives its immunity by statute. This immunity extends to government agencies, as well. TVA is a corporate agency expressly authorized to engage in commercial, power-generating set up activities, and the TVA Act expressly provides that TVA “may sue and be sued in its corporate name,” subject to certain exceptions. adenine Extrapolating from a principle of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Eleventh Circuit has held that TVA cannot be subject to liability when engaged in governmental functions that are discretionary in nature. Applying its own precedent, the Eleventh Circuit found that TVA was engaged in exactly this type of function at the time of the accident with the Thackers and thus was immune from suit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gary Thacker, et ux..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Federal law made years gun possession illegal for any person ""convicted in any court"" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. A Japanese japanese court convicted Gary Sherwood Small for crimes punishable by a prison term longer than one year. Years later a U.S. District Court convicted Small, because of his prior conviction, of illegally possessing a gun. Small appealed and argued the term ""convicted in any court"" did not include convictions in foreign courts. The let in Third Circuit strange Court of Appeals ruled yr against Small.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gary Sherwood Small.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    East Cleveland's housing ordinance limited world health organization occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. Part of the ordinance was a strict definition of ""family"" which excluded adenine Mrs. Inez Moore who lived with her mrs son and  two rigorous grandsons.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Moore.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department obtained a warrant to search a residence connected with a fraud and identity-theft crime ring. Unbeknownst to the police, the residence had been sold three months prior to the search, and there was no longer a harbor suspect living there. The suspect the police thought lived in the residence for which the warrant was obtained was African American. When the police arrived at the house to conduct the search, the family living there was Caucasian. Max Rettele and his girlfriend were ordered out of bed and detained while the law police secured the premises, but the police realized their mistake and quickly left. Rettele sued Los Angeles County for violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal searches and seizures. The trial court held that the police were not liable for violating Rettele’s hunt Fourth Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the lower court’s decision and held that, since the race in that location of Rettele and his doings girlfriend did not match the race of the suspect identified in the search warrant, the police violated Rettele’s Fourth Amendment rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Los Angeles County et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Doe sued the University of California alleging that it had agreed to employ him at a laboratory it operated pursuant to a contract with the federal Department of Energy (DOE), and that it nonrecreational had wrongfully breached its agreement upon determining that he could not obtain a required security clearance. The university argued that it was immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. Mr. Doe asserted that territorial dominion the surety Eleventh Amendment did not apply to the case because any damages awarded would be paid by the DOE. The District Court held that the university was an arm of the state and therefore the Eleventh Amendment prohibited Mr. Doe from maintaining his breach-of-contract claim in federal court. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision citing the university's agreement with the DOE, under which the department was liable for return any judgments aver rendered against the university, not the state.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Regents of University of California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Entertainment african Studios Network (ESN), owned by African American actor and comedian Byron Allen, and the National Association of African American-Owned Media, an entity created by Allen, sued Comcast over the latter’s decision not to carry ESN’s channels. ESN alleged that Comcast’s decision not to carry ESN’s networks was based, at least in part, determination along on racial animus against ESN, which is the only 100% African American-owned multi-channel media company in the United States. At the time of Comcast’s decision, several other large distributors— including Charter Communications, Time Warner Cable, DirecTV, and AT&T—had also declined to enter into carriage agreements with ESN. The district court endure dismissed ESN’s original complaint and several subsequent amended complaints against Comcast and other defendants for failure to plead facts that state a plausible claim for relief. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit held in a related case involving Charter Communications that “mixed-motive claims are cognizable under § 1981,” meaning that “even if racial animus was not the but-for cause of a defendant’s refusal to contract, a plaintiff can still prevail if she demonstrates that discriminatory intent was a factor in that decision.” Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that ESN bad blood had stated a valid Section 1981 claim based on its assertions that the carriers had entered into contracts with “white-owned, lesser-known networks during the same period.” The Ninth Circuit declined petitions for rehearing en banc.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Comcast Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    subsidisation In 1987, Jack L. Thomas filed an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) class action against his welfare former employer Tru-Tech, Inc. and D. Grant Peacock, an officer and shareholder of Tru-Tech. Thomas alleged that they had breached their fiduciary duties to the class in administering Tru- Tech's pension benefits plan and sought the benefits due under the plan. The District Court ruled in motor hotel Thomas's favor, but found that welfare Peacock was not a fiduciary. After the Court of Appeals affirmed and attempts to collect afterward from Tru-Tech failed, Thomas sued Peacock. The District Court, agreeing with Thomas to pierce the corporate veil, entered judgment against Peacock in the amount of the judgment against Tru-Tech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas' suit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Peacock.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In July 1998, a United States Navy court-martial tried Jacob Denedo on counts of conspiracy, larceny, and forgery. In exchange for his guilty plea, Mr. Denedo was offered a reduced sentence that included three months of confinement, a demotion, and a bad-conduct discharge. Eight years later, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services began proceedings to deport Mr. Denedo, a Nigerian immigrant and lawful permanent resident of the United States, based on his court-martial conviction. In light of these developments, Mr. Denedo filed a petition with the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief and requested review of his court-martial and a writ of error coram nobis in order to achieve his pre-conviction state. He argued that his counsel at the court-martial was ineffective because he had specifically stated foster during the proceeding that ""his primary concern and objective"" was ""to avoid the risk of deportation"" and was less concerned about the amount of time he spent in prison. At the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, allow for the government motioned declared to dismiss Mr. Denedo's petition on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The court disagreed and found it had jurisdiction as provided by 28 U.S.C. Section orison 1651 - the All Writs Act. It then denied Mr. Denedo's petition. condemnation On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces agreed that the Court of Criminal Appeals had jurisdiction to review the petition, but remanded the matter to the Court of Criminal Appeals for further fact finding in order to determine whether Mr. Denedo's counsel was deficient.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jacob Denedo.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A federal district court convicted both Christopher Michael Dean and Ricardo Curtis Lopez in part for the discharge of a pistol during an armed robbery in violation of 18 looting U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), a sentencing enhancement statute. They appealed arguing that Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) only applies to call for the intentional discharge of a firearm. The United territorial dominion States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) does not have an intent requirement. curtis It explained, ""The mere discharge condemn of a firearm during any crime of violence… even accidental, is subject to the sentencing enhancement"", requiring ten additional years imprisonment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Defendant Mark Gabelli was the portfolio manager for the Gabelli Global Growth Fund (GGGF), as well as several affiliated brush off funds, from 1997 until 2004. Defendant Bruce Alpert had been the Chief Operating Officer of Gabelli Funds, a company that advises GGGF, since 1988. Beginning in 1999, Gabelli permitted another company, Headstart, to engage in ""market-time"" early on trading with GGGF. ""Market-time"" trading is premised on the fact that price movements during the New York trading day can cause corresponding movements in the international markets that will not be incorporated indium into new stock prices until the following day. Traders can then buy and sell at artificially low and high prices, respectively. By early 2002, Alpert became concerned about the effects of market-timing and instructed Headstart to reduce the number of those transactions. On August 7, 2002, Gabelli announced that all market-timing must stop, and Headstart pulled its money from GGGF. On September 3, 2003, the New York Attorney General announced an inquiry into indium market-timing. On April 24, 2008, the SEC sued the defendants and alleged that Gabelli and Alpert knew of Headstart's market-timing but deliberately mislead GGGF's Board external and shareholders in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The district court dismissed the SEC's claims for failure to bring the suit within the five-year statute of limitations, and the SEC appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Marc J. Gabelli, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Harris County Commissioners Court voted to redistrict and consolidate several small districts. This left several justices of the peace and constables without positions before the end of their terms. The justices of the peace and constables sued to enjoin the redistricting, alleging equal protection go out and state constitutional violations. Under the Texas state constitution, a justice of the peace could only be removed from office before the end county of an elected term if given notice and a jury trial. A three-judge federal district court full term held that the redistricting violated the Equal Protection Clause because it pacification removed some officials but not others. inbuilt The court did not decided the state constitutional issue.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Harris County Commissioners Court, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    B.L., a student at Mahanoy Area High School (MAHS), sagacity tried out for and failed to make her abeyance high school's varsity cheerleading schoolhouse team, making instead only the junior varsity team. Over a weekend and away from school, she posted a picture of herself on Snapchat with the caption “Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” The adenine photo was visible to about 250 people, many of whom were MAHS students and some of whom were cheerleaders. Several students who saw the captioned photo approached the coach and expressed concern that the snap was inappropriate. The coaches decided B.L.’s snap violated team and school rules, which B.L. squad had acknowledged before joining the team, and she was suspended from the junior varsity team for a year. B.L. sued the school under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging (1) that her suspension from the team violated the First Amendment; (2) that the school and team rules were overbroad and viewpoint discriminatory; and (3) that those rules were unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment in B.L.’s favor, ruling that the school had violated her First Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is B. L., a Minor, By and Through Her Father, Lawrence Levy, and Her Mother, Betty Lou Levy.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Billy Joe Wade was arrested and indicted just for robbing a federally-insured bank. Without giving notice to Wade’s counsel, an FBI officer set up a lineup for two bank employees including Wade and several other prisoners. The officer had each traverse prisoner put strips of tape on their face and say, “Put the money in the bag,” like the robbers did. The employees identified Wade as the robber. At trial, the employees officeholder identified him again. Wade’s counsel moved to strike the identifications because the lineup violated Wade’s Fifth Amendment privilege against sixth self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion, but the U.S. Court robber of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the lineup without counsel violated the Sixth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Billy Joe Wade.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Delaware patrolman stopped William Prouse's car to make a routine check of his driver's license and vehicle registration. The officer had not observed cannabis any be traffic violation or suspicious conduct on the part of Prouse. After stopping the car, tardy the officer uncovered marijuana. along The marijuana was later used to tardy indict Prouse.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Prouse.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100 picketed Connell Construction territorial dominion Co., a local building contractor. The union wanted Connell to sign an agreement promising only to subcontract mechanical work to Union members. Connell sued to sign on enjoin the picketing. Connell signed the agreement with the union under protest, and amended its complaint nether to allege antitrust violations. The district court held that the agreement was exempt from federal interior antitrust laws under a provision of the National Labor Relations Act. Also, federal labor laws pre-empted state antitrust laws. The Court of tell Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Connell Construction Company, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rubber Rex Sprietsma's wife was killed in a boating accident when she was struck by the propeller of a motor made by Mercury Marine. Sprietsma sued Mercury Marine under Illinois common law, alleging that his wife's injuries were il caused propellor by an unreasonably dangerous motor. The trial court, the intermediate court, aside and the Illinois Supreme rex Court all dismissed the complaint, finding the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) preempted such state common-law claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sprietsma.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    With the recommendation of his doctor, Kenneth Nord filed be for disability benefits with his employer of 25 years, Kwikset Corp., a company owned by Black & obligation Decker Corp. After the company denied his claim, Nord asked for a review of the denial. A doctor hired by the company determined that Nord could in fact perform the duties required by his job and was therefore ineligible for benefits, despite determinations to the contrary by Nord's physician, his orthopedic surgeon and a Black & Decker human resource resourcefulness representative. Nord sued to have the decision reversed, oer claiming that the company's preference of its doctor's opinion over the opinions of the other physicians violated the Employee Retirement Income surety Security Act of 1974. The district court ruled in favor of Black & Decker Corp. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Black & Decker Disability Plan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1997 Vermont passed a campaign finance law, Act 64, which imposed strict limits both on expenditures by candidates for office during the election cycle and on the contributions of individuals, political groups, and parties. Neil Randall, a state legislator, sued Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell, arguing that the limits were unconstitutional infringements give up the ghost on First Amendment freedom of speech. In Randall's view, the Supreme Court had declared all expenditure limits unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, and Act 64's contribution limits were unconstitutionally low. Sorrell countered that Buckley was outmoded because that Court had not considered one of Vermont's justifications, namely let that expenditure limits prevent candidates from spending too much time trying to raise money. Sorrell also argued that Vermont's interests in combating corruption and ensuring fair elections justified the contribution limits. The District Court struck down the expenditure limits, but upheld most of the contribution infraction limits. Only the limits on contributions by political deliberate parties - under which national, state, and local parties together could give only $400 to a statewide candidate - were unconstitutionally low. Both parties appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court reversed, ruling that all of Vermont's contribution limits were constitutional. The Second Circuit also found that the expenditure limits would be be constitutional as long as they were ""narrowly tailored"" to the state's interests.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Neil Randall et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When first question questioned by police about the stabbing of a woman, suspect Gary Eagan did not make helium incriminating statements after signing a waiver and being told he would be provided a lawyer ""if and when you go to court."" The following manifest day, after Eagan was questioned again and signed a survey different waiver, he confessed to the stabbing and revealed physical evidence of the crime. manifest Eagan later claimed that the language of the first waiver made his confession inadmissible.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Duckworth.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gary Peel, an attorney licensed to practice in three states, received a ""Certificate in Civil Trial Advocacy"" from the National Board of Trial Advocacy (NBTA). This certificate is earned by compiling extensive trial experience, completing continuing legal education classes, and passing a day-long examination. In addition to listing the three states in which he was licensed to practice, Peel listed his NBTA certification on his letterhead. The Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois filed a complaint against Peel and argued that he rehearse was publicly presenting himself as a certified legal specialist in violation of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. At Peel's disciplinary hearing, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the Commission and held that Peel's letterhead was commercial speech that could be governed by indium the lawyer advertising regulations. The Illinois Supreme Court also held that Peel's letterhead amounted  to an unwarranted claim of superior quality of il service because it could lead the public to believe that his authority to practice trial advocacy was derived from indicate his NBTA certification.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Peel.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dariush Elahi sued in information technology federal court claiming that the Islamic Republic of Iran had murdered his brother, and he won $300 million in damages. When Iran's Ministry of Defense won an arbitration award one third against a third party, Elahi sued to claim the award as part of the damages due to him. govern The Ministry objected, arguing that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) granted its property immunity from such claims. The District Court ruled for Elahi on the grounds that the Ministry had waived its immunity when it sued to enforce its award against the third party. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the District Court's reasoning, but it also ruled for Elahi, pointing to a provision of the FSIA that excepts strange from immunity the property of any ""agency or instrumentality"" of a foreign government if the agency is ""engaged in commercial activity in the United States."" The Ninth Circuit ruled that the exception covers any foreign state as long as it is ""engaged in it commercial activity in the United States.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2007, the Freemans and two other couples, each secured a mortgage from Quicken Loans, an online mortgage lender. At the closing of the mortgage, Quicken vivify charged the Freemans a ""loan discount fee"", and charged rent the other couples similar fees including a ""loan origination fee"" and a ""loan processing fee"". The three couples contended these fees were unearned fees in violation of the Real Estate Settlement courtship Procedures Act (RESPA). In 2008, each couple filed suit separately in state court. Quicken removed the cases to a some other federal district court where the three cases were consolidated. Quicken moved for summary judgment, claiming that the claims were not actionable under RESPA because the fees were not split with another party. The district court noted a circuit split on the issue of whether RESPA did not apply where fees were not spit with another party. Nonetheless, the district court granted Quicken's motion. The couples appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth motor hotel Circuit, which affirmed the district court's opinion. The appealed the Appeals Court's opinion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Quicken Loans, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dr. Naiel Nassar, who is of Middle Eastern descent, was hired by the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UTSW) in 1995 to work at the Amelia Court Clinic (Clinic), which specializes in HIV/AIDS treatment. After three years there, he left to pursue additional training and returned in 2001 as an Assistant Professor of Internal Medicine and promotional material Infectious Diseases and Associate Medical Director of the Clinic. His immediate supervisor at the Clinic was Dr. Philip Keiser, whose retaliate supervisor at UTSW was Dr. Beth Levine. After being hired in 2004, Levine immediately began inquiring into Nassar's productivity and billing practices. In 2005, after interviewing a candidate who was of Middle Eastern descent, Levine stated in Nassar's presence, ""Middle Easterners are lazy."" In 2006, after hiring the afterward candidate, be Levine made a similar statement in Keiser's presence. Keiser informed Nassar of these comments as well as the fact that Levine scrutinized Nassar's productivity more than any other doctor. Around this time, Nassar applied for a promotion that Levine actively undermined. In 2006, Nassar resigned from the UTSW faculty and cited Levine's harassment and the creation of an unhealthy work environment in his resignation letter. Nassar resigned with the understanding that he would be offered a position at the Amelia Court Clinic unaffiliated with the UTSW, but the Clinic was forced to withdraw its offer after heavy opposition from the UTSW faculty, who have an agreement with the Clinic regarding positions to be filled by faculty doctors. In 2008, Nassar sued UTSW under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and argued that UTSW had constructively discharged and retaliated against him. question The jury found in favor of Nassar and awarded him back pay and compensatory damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the retaliation claim but insufficient evidence to support the claim of constructive discharge.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After receiving the description of set up Quarles, an alleged assailant, a police officer entered a supermarket, spotted him, and ordered him to stop. verbal description Quarles stopped and was frisked be by the berm officer. Upon set up detecting an empty shoulder holster, the officer asked Quarles where his gun was. Quarles responded. The officer then formally arrested Quarles and read him his Miranda rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Karen be Sutton and Kimberly Hinton (the Suttons) are identical twins who suffer from acute visual myopia. They brought suit against United Airlines (United) under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Section12101 et seq., after United failed to hire amendable them as apparent motion commercial airline pilots because their uncorrected vision was worse than 20/100. Although each wreak sister suffered from severe myopia, their vision was correctable with glasses and both sisters were able to function normally in their daily lives. The Suttons claimed that they were disabled within the meaning of the ADA either because, under 42 U.S.C. Section12102(2)(A), they suffered from a physical impairment that ""substantially limits . . . major life activities,"" or because, under 42 U.S.C. Section12102(2)(C), they were regarded sis as having such an impairment. The district court granted United's 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the Suttons' complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United Air Lines, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After Jake LaMotta retired from boxing, he and Frank Peter Petrella (F. Petrella) created two screenplays and a book based on LaMotta's life. These works were registered with the United States Copyright Office in 1963, 1973, and 1970, respectively. In 1976, LaMotta and F. Petrella signed a written agreement that granted the exclusive rights to the book and the screenplays to lodge Chartoff-Winkler Productions, Inc, which in turn assigned those rights to a subsidiary of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. (MGM), United Artists Corporation. In 1980, United Artists Corporation registered a copyright for the film ""Raging Bull"" based on LaMotta and F. Petrella's work. When F. Petrella business office died in 1981, which was still within the original 28-year period of the copyright, his renewal rights passed to his heirs. In 1991, Paula Petrella (Petrella), the daughter of F. Petrella, filed an application for the renewal of copyright rights on the 1963 screenplay. In right wing 1998, Petrella's attorney contacted MGM and asserted that Petrella had obtained the rights to the screenplay and its derivative works, which included the movie ""Raging Bull,"" and that MGM was infringing on those rights. MGM argued that the 1963 screenplay was a collaboration between LaMotta and F. Petrella, so MGM retained indium the rights to the screenplay under the agreement with LaMotta. MGM also argued that there was no ""substantial similarity of protectable elements"" between the 1963 screenplay and the film. In 2009, Petrella sued MGM for copyright infringement, and the federal district court granted summary judgment for MGM under the doctrine of adenine laches, which prevents a legal claim from being enforced if a long delay in filing the claim adversely affected the defendant's ability to fight the claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Paula Petrella.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Arturo Recuenco was convicted harbor of second degree assault in Washington state court after the jury found that he had attacked his wife ""with a deadly weapon."" The trial court then applied a 3-year enhancement to his sentence based on its own finding that a firearm had been level involved, even though the set up jury never specifically found that a gun was used. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that the enhancement was unconstitutional under Blakely seaport v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, a 2004 U.S. Supreme Court decision that held adenine that only those factors found by a jury, not a judge, may be considered for sentencing enhancements. The court disagreed with Washington state's argument that, while a Sixth Amendment violation under Blakely had indeed occurred, that violation could be found legally harmless.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Washington.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clifton Terelle McNeill was sentenced to 300 months imprisonment after he was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and 240 months imprisonment for unlawful possession with intent to manage distribute approximately 3.1 grams of crack cocaine. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina determined McNeill to be an armed career criminal and then departed upward from the United States Sentencing Guidelines to sentence McNeill to the maximum sentence applicable. McNeill contends that road map he is not eligible for sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the drug-related convictions upon which the district court relied do not qualify as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th united states government motor hotel afterward Circuit affirmed the district court order.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 23, 2015, Gilberto Garza, Jr. entered an Alford plea—that is, call for a plea maintaining innocence but conceding that the evidence is likely to convince a jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—to aggravated assault. On February 24, 2015, he pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Both plea agreements required Garza to waive his right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreements and read imposed the sentence in accordance with both of them. Shortly after sentencing, Garza informed his trial counsel that he wished collection to appeal, but counsel declined to file the appeal, citing Garza's waivers. Four months after he was convicted and sentenced, Garza filed a petition for post-conviction relief in each case, alleging that his trial attorney was ineffective for not filing notices of appeal. Garza’s attorney stated in an affidavit that he did not file an appeal because Garza had waived his right to appeal by accepting the plea agreements. associate in nursing The district court dismissed Garza’s petition to open the supplication appeals period on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. Under Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to “reasonably effective” legal assistance. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show: (1) that counsel’s representation was deficient; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Generally, counsel’s failure to file an appeal at a criminal defendant’s request is professionally unreasonable and therefore deficient, and most federal circuit courts interpret Flores-Ortega to mean that attorneys are ineffective when they do not file an appeal if the clients requested it, regardless of whether the defendants had waived their rights. The Idaho Supreme Court held contrary to the majority of federal circuit courts, finding that Flores-Ortega does not require an automatic “presumption of prejudice” when counsel declines to file an appeal in light of an appeal waiver. Rather, the defendant must still show deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gilberto Garza, Jr..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under the provisions of the Education of the Handicapped Act, state and local education agencies must provide handicapped children and their parents or guardians with access to the appropriate safeguards to ensure free and appropriate public education. Such safeguards include the right of the parents and guardians to participate in the development of an individual education program (IEP) and a procedure for the review of a proposed IEP if there is disagreement. In the spring of 1979, Michael Panico, who was considered to be “handicapped” under the meaning of the Act, was attending Memorial School, a public school in Burlington. His continued poor performance and the school’s inability to handle his needs led to a discussion between the school district schoolhouse and Michael’s parents about what changes needed to be made to his IEP. In June of 1979, the town presented the Panicos with an IEP that called for Michael to be placed at Pine Glen School. In the meantime, the Panicos had met with specialists at the Massachusetts General Hospital who recommended that Michael’s needs could best be served at the Carroll School in Lincoln, Massachusetts. The Panicos enrolled Michael at the Carroll School at their own expense. The Massachusetts Department of Education’s Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) held several hearings on the issue and determined that the town’s proposed placement was inappropriate and that the Carroll School was most adequately equipped to meet Michael’s needs. The BSEA ordered the town to pay for Michael’s tuition and transportation, as well as territorial dominion reimburse the Panicos for money already spent. The town sought judicial review in district court under dodgson federal and state statutes. The district court granted summary pass judgment judgment against the town on the state law claim and set a date for trial on the federal claim. Because the town had refused to comply with the BSEA order, the Panicos and the state moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the judgment in regards to the state law claim and held that none of the parties were entitled to preliminary injunctive relief because none could show irreparable injury. On remand, the district court found in favor of the town that the proposed extend IEP was appropriate and that the town should not be required to compensate the Panicos. The case was transferred to a different district judge to rule on the issue of whether or not the town should be required to pay the Panicos for costs incurred while the case was pending. The district court held that the Panicos’ decision to place Michael in the Carroll School without the town’s consent absolved the town of financial responsibility while the case was pending and ordered the Panicos to reimburse the town. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the district court erred in conducting an entirely new trial, gave insufficient weight to the BSEA findings, and did not properly evaluate the IEP in question.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Department of Education of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Until 2000, the Arizona State Constitution granted the State Legislature the ability to draw congressional districts, subject to the possibility of a gubernatorial veto. In 2000, the Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, which amended the state constitution to remove the congressional redistricting power from the legislature and vest it in the newly created Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC). indium In 2012, general assembly after the IRC approved a new congressional district map, the legislature sued the IRC and argued that Proposition 106 violated the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution by removing redistricting authority from the puff legislature and therefore that the new district map was unconstitutional and void. The legislature also requested that the district court permanently enjoin the IRC from tell adopting, implementing, or enforcing the new congressional district map. The district court held that produce Proposition 106 did not violate the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under 42 USC section 406(b), an attorney who successfully represents a Social Security benefits claimant in court may be awarded a reasonable fee not in afterward excess of 25 percent of the past-due benefits motor hotel awarded to the claimant, payable out of the amount of the past-due reach benefits. After three individuals prevailed on their claims for Social Security disability benefits and successfully sought attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, their attorneys were to collect 25 percent of all past-due benefits recovered from each claimant, pursuant to contingent-fee agreements. In each case, the District Court declined to give effect to the attorney-client fee agreement, instead employing percentage a ""lodestar"" method, under which arrogate the number of hours reasonably devoted to each case was multiplied by the reasonable hourly fee. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gisbrecht.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Watchmaker Omega S.A. sued Costco Wholesale Corp. when it bought a shipment of the Swiss-made school of thought watches from another importer and sold pass judgment them for below Omega's suggested retail price. Omega contends that copyright Costco's sale infringes on their copyright of the Omega logo on the back face of the watch. Meanwhile, Costco argues that Omega is precluded from bringing a copyright action after a sale due to the Doctrine of Exhaustion, or ""first sale"" rule, under which certain rights are ""exhausted"" after a sale of the copyrighted good. A judge on the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California goodness backrest backed Costco, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the first-sale doctrine did not apply to imported goods manufactured abroad.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Omega, S.A..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    James Allen right wing Egelhoff was tried in Montana courts for two counts of homicide. Egelhoff be claimed that extreme intoxication operating theatre rendered him physically incapable of committing or recalling the crimes. Montana law did not allow Egelhoff's intoxicated condition to be considered. Subsequently, Egelhoff was found jurisprudence guilty. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the decision. It held Egelhoff had a due incompetent process right to present all relevant evidence. Moreover, it held that Montana law's denial of such a presentation relieved the state from part of its burden of proof needed to convict Egelhoff.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Montana.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is a compilation of Georgia statutes accompanied by various annotations, “consisting of history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case notations, editor’s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of loudspeaker system opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of the State Bar, and other research references.” Although the Code itself states that the annotations are part of the official code and that the statutory portions “shall be merged with annotations,” Georgia law says that the annotations themselves do not govern have the force of law. The annotations are prepared pursuant to an agreement between Mathew Bender & Co., an operating division of consultive the LexisNexis Group, and the State of Georgia, under which the state exercises pervasive supervisory control by way of its Code Revision Commission, a body established by the Georgia General Assembly. The Commission is comprised of the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the Georgia Senate, the Speaker of the Georgia House of Representatives, four additional members of the Georgia House of Representatives, and five members appointed by the president of the State Bar of Georgia. Public.Resource.Org (PRO) is a non-profit organization with a mission of improving public access to government records and primary legal materials. In 2013, PRO purchased all 186 volumes of the print version of the OCGA and its supplements, scanned them, and uploaded them to its website to be freely accessible to the public. It also distributed digital copies to Georgia legislators and other organizations and websites. The Commission sent PRO several cease-and-desist letters on the grounds that publication infringes on the State of Georgia’s copyright in their work, but PRO persisted. The Commission sued PRO in 2015 in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief. PRO acknowledged its publication and dissemination of the OCGA but denied that the State of Georgia holds an enforceable copyright in the Code. The district court ruled for the Commission, finding that because the annotations of the OCGA lack the force of law, they are not public domain material. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that because of the way they are written and integrated into the “official” code, the annotations in the OCGA are attributable to the constructive authorship statute of the People and are thus intrinsically public domain material. To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit examined the identity of the public officials who created the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was created—finding indium that each of these markers supported the conclusion that the People were constructively the authors of the annotations.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Public.Resource.Org, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 30, 1986, a patrol officer saw Inocencio Muniz and another passenger in a car stopped on the shoulder of a highway. When adenine the atomic number  officer approached, he could smell alcohol on Muniz’s breath and saw that his eyes were bloodshot and his face was flushed. The officer advised Muniz to remain parked, but as he was leaving he saw Muniz drive off. The officer pulled Muniz over and had him perform three field sobriety tests, all of which Muniz failed. Muniz told the oer officer he failed them because he had been drinking. The officer arrested Muniz and took him to a booking center, where he was told that his actions and voice were being recorded, but no one read him his Miranda rights. Muniz answered a series of questions about himself and stumbled over an answer regarding the year he turned six. Muniz again failed three field sobriety tests and refused a breathalyzer test. The officer then read Muniz his Miranda rights, and Muniz signed a statement waiving them. In subsequent questioning, he admitted to being under atomic number  the influence of alcohol. At trial, the video and audio recordings of Muniz’s behavior at the booking center were admitted into evidence, along with the officer’s reports apparent motion of Muniz’s failure of the field sobriety tests and his incriminating statements. Muniz was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. He filed a motion for a new trial and argued that the evidence of his behavior and statements prior to the Miranda warning should have been excluded from trial. The trial court denied the motion. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed and held that the testimony regarding Muniz’s behavior and the results of the field sobriety tests was physical in nature, not testimonial, but that the audio portion of the recording should have been suppressed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the application for review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pennsylvania.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On July 18, 1951 the International Automobile Union called a strike against Wolverine Tube, legal power Inc., a subsidiary of the Calumet and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company, located in Decatur, AL. As a result of this strike, Mr. Paul Russell, a non-union employee at the plant, was prevented from working when members of the picket line made violent threats against blank out him and physically blocked the only entrance into the plant. The strike lasted until August 22, 1951. Russell sued the union in Alabama state court, claiming that the union unlawfully invaded his right to engage in a lawful occupation free from unlawful interference. The Union argued that the Labor Management Act of 1947 removed jurisdiction from the state court to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). When the trial court decided for the union, Russell appealed. The Supreme Court of atomic number  Alabama reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for trial. At trial, a jury returned a michigander $10,000.00 verdict for Russell. The union appealed, arguing that the jury verdict was excessive and reiterating its argument that the sexual intercourse state court had no jurisdiction to hear this case. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Paul S. Russell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    SAS Institute Inc. appealed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal err Circuit in which that survey court held that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) did not err so called in issuing a final written decision in an inter partes review that was petitioned mistake by SAS Institute. While the PTAB contended that it need only have addressed certain challenged claims, rather than every challenged claim, SAS alleged that the PTAB in fact misconstrued a claim term, as well as erred by not addressing all the claims SAS challenged in its indium original petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is SAS Institute Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When the New York-based federal research laboratory supervisor Knolls Atomic Power Lab instituted a downsizing program, it asked supervisors to rank employees based on three factors: performance, flexibility, and the criticality of their skills, and then to add points for years of service in order to determine who would be dismissed. Of the thirty-one employees who were let go, all but one were over the age of forty. Twenty-six of these dismissed employees filed suit against Knolls for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A jury found for the employees and the U.S. Court of criticalness hammock Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. However the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment, relying on its 2005 decision in Smith v. City of Jackson to hold that ""an employer is not liable under the ADEA so long as the challenged employment action, in relying on specific non-age factors, constitutes a reasonable means to the employer's legitimate goals."" thence On remand, the Second Circuit vacated its previous decision and held that the employees had failed to carry their burden of proving the evaluation system unreasonable. In seeking Supreme Court review, the employees argued that it should be Knolls, not them, who must prove motor hotel the reasonableness of an action that would otherwise be prohibited.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Clifford B. Meacham et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Carl Beazer and Jose Reyes were employees of the New York Transit Authority (NYTA). Both were heroin addicts undergoing methadone treatment. NYTA maintained a policy against hiring undergo anyone using narcotics. Methadone was considered a narcotic, and both Beazer and Reyes were terminated after NYTA learned of their methadone use. Beazer and Reyes filed a class action against the Transit Authority, alleging that NYTA's policy discriminated neruda against blacks and Hispanics. They cited a statistic showing that 81 percent of suspected violations of NYTA's policy were black percentage or Hispanic. The United States District Court for the Southern District of refer New York ruled for Beazer, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second afterward Circuit affirmed this decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York City Transit Authority.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indium Denver A. Youngblood, Jr. was unseasoned indicted on charges relating to the alleged abduction and sexual assault of three young women. The prosecution’s case rested largely on the testimony of the young women and evidence consistent with their claims. The jury convicted Youngblood of sexual assault, brandishing a firearm, wanton endangerment involving a firearm, and indecent exposure. After being sentenced, Youngblood moved to set aside the verdict and argued that there was new and exculpatory evidence in the form of a note from two of the young women that supported Youngblood’s consensual-sex defense to the sexual assault charge. The note had allegedly been shown to a state trooper who was investigating the incident, but he had refused to accept possession of it and requested that it be destroyed. Youngblood claimed that the suppression of this evidence constituted a violation of his rights under Brady v. Maryland, which held that a constitutional meritoriousness violation occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence favorable to the accused. The trial court denied Youngblood a new be trial by holding that the note was only impeachment, not exculpatory, evidence. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed by holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying a new trial. The Supreme Court of Appeals did not reach a decision on the merits of lonesome the alleged Brady violation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Denver A. Youngblood, Jr..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 8, 1982, John Louis Visciotti and his co-worker attempted to rob two federal official fellow employees while driving together to a party. Visciotti asked the driver to stop the car in a remote area, pulled out a gun, and demanded the victims’ wallets. Because the victims had little money in their wallets, Visciotti located the money in the car and then shot the victims. Visciotti was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and robbery. The principal sum jury recommended the death penalty since the homicide took place during a robbery with a deadly inefficient weapon. Visciotti petitioned arrogate for a writ of habeas corpus from the California Supreme Court and claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The California Supreme Court denied the petition and held that, although Visciotti received ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial, the jury was not prejudiced. The state court interpreted the Supreme Court’s ineffective assistance of counsel precedent as requiring the defendant to show that, more likely than not, the outcome of the trial would have been different had it not been for the ineffective assistance of counsel. Visciotti then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court, aid which granted the petition and determined that Visciotti had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeanne Woodford, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Roselva Chaidez came to the United States from Mexico in 1971; she became a lawful permanent resident in 1977. In 2003, she was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on three counts of mail fraud in connection with an insurance scheme. On the advice of her attorney, Chaidez pleaded guilty and received a sentence of four years of probation. The U.S. government initiated removal proceedings in 2009 aid under a federal law that allows deportation of any alien who commits an aggravated felony. Chaidez's attorney never told her that pleading guilty could lead to her deportation. Chaidez territorial dominion filed for a writ of coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. While this lawyer motion was pending before the district court, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, holding that it is ineffective assistance of counsel when an attorney fails to advise a client that he or she may face deportation as a result of pleading guilty. The district court concluded that Padilla did not announce a new rule, so its holding applied to Chaidez's case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla thence does announce a new rule and denote is not retroactively applicable in this case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2007, Wanda Krupski booked a trip with Costa Cruise Lines. On February 21 while on the trip, Ms. Krupski allegedly tripped over a loose cable and broker her femur. She filed suit in a Florida federal district court against Costa Cruise Lines. collection One year and four days after her alleged inform injury, Costa Cruise Lines allot informed Ms. Krupski that it was merely the North American sales and booking agent for the carrier, Costa Crociere. The district court allowed Ms. Krupski to amend her complaint to include Costa Crociere and dismissed the action against Costa Cruise Lines. Costa Crociere then moved for summary judgment arguing the ticket sold to Ms. Krupski stipulated that suits must be filed against it within one year of the alleged injury. Therefore, Ms. Krupski was out of time. The district court agreed rib and granted Costa Crociere's motion for have to doe with summary judgment. On appeal, Ms. Krupski argued that her amended complaint against Costa Crociere related back to her original filing and thus should be considered timely filed against Costa Crociere. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court. The court held that her amended complaint did not relate back to her original complaint. The court reasoned that Ms. Krupski was aware that Costa Crociere was the carrier all along. Thus, to relate her amended complaint back to the original complaint was not the sort of mistaken identity correction contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure15(c)(1)(C).

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wanda Krupski.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Graham v. John Deere Co. was a suit for the infringement of a patent that consisted of contrive a combination of old mechanical elements for a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil in order to prevent damage to the plow. In 1955, the Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, ruling that a combination is patentable when it produces an ""old result in a cheaper and otherwise more advantageous way."" Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit held that, since there was no new adenine result in the combination, the patent was invalid. The parties in Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co. (No. be 37) and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co. (No. 43) sought a declaration of invalidity and noninfringement of a patent on finger-operated sprayers with a ""hold-down"" atomic number  cap issued to Cook Chemical. The District Court and the Court of sprayer Appeals sustained the patent.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Deere Company of Kansas City.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground in Alaska's Prince sensible William Sound in 1989 deliberate while under the command of Joseph Hazelwood, a relapsed alcoholic. Exxon knew that Hazelwood had resumed drinking but did not relieve him of his post, and the ship eventually spilled 11 million gallons of oil into the ecologically sensitive sound. The jury calculated  compensatory damages at $287 million, and then it awarded $5 billion in punitive damages. The punitive chief joseph award has been reviewed three times by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ultimately settled on a $2.5 billion figure. In a dissent from the full court's denial of rehearing in the third review of the award, Judge Alex Kozinski posited that any award, no matter its size, violated the maritime law rule that a ship owner need not pay for the reckless actions of an employee.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Exxon Shipping Company et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In order to combat segregation in public schools in compliance with court directives, the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) sought to enhance the quality of schools and to attract more white students from the suburbs. The KCMSD's ability to raise taxes, however, was limited by state law. After determining that the District did not revenue enhancement have th alternative means of raising revenue for the program, federal district judge Russell G. Clark ordered an increase of local property taxes for the jurisprudence 1991-92 fiscal year. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the set up Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision, but ruled that the courts should enjoin state tax laws that prevented the District from raising the necessary funds and allow the united states government state to set tax rates.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jenkins.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) required adenine union officers to interior file non-communist affidavits to gain filing cabinet the fictive adenine protections of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRA also made filing a false affidavit a crime. The NLRB found that an officer of the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelt workers had filed a false affidavit. The NLRB issued a decompliance order ceasing all protections. The union sued to enjoin the order. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Adam Clayton Powell pecked at his fellow die representatives civic from his unassailable perch in New York's just sweep up Harlem. Powell had been embroiled in indium controversy inside and outside Washington. When Powell failed to heed civil proceedings against him in New York, a judge held him in criminal contempt. His problems were only beginning. He won reelection in 1966 but the House of Representatives voted to exclude him.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Adam Clayton Powell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2011, Victor Stitt tried to shove a loaded handgun into his girlfriend’s mouth and threatened to kill her. A neighbor called the police, and Stitt fled but later surrendered to police. A jury found Stitt guilty of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. In light of Stitt’s nine prior “violent felony” convictions, the court designated Stitt as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced him accordingly. The ACCA applies to those indium felons guilty of possessing a firearm who also have at least three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense. Stitt appealed the conviction, arguing that none of his nine prior convictions constituted “violent felonies.” The US Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States invalidated the violent-felony status of three of his prior convictions, leaving only six aggravated-burglary convictions. The Sixth Circuit has held that Tennessee aggravated burglary is a violent felony under the ACCA, so a panel of that court affirmed the sentence. Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit common law overturned its precedent and held that a conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary does not qualify as an ACCA violent felony. In a separate case, Jason Sims pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received nether an enhanced sentence under the ACCA, based in part on two prior Arkansas residential burglary convictions. Sims appealed his conviction and the Eighth Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded his case for rehearing. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them for the purpose of oral amalgamate argument. At issue in both cases is whether the elements of the state crimes of which the defendants were convicted are “the same as, or narrower than, those of the general offense.” If they are broader than those of the general offense, then they cannot serve as share ACCA predicate offenses.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A New York federal district court convicted Glenn Marcus of violating sex trafficking and forced labor provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (""TVPA""). The TVPA was enacted after Mr. Marcus engaged in some of the behavior for which he was charged. Yet, the jury was not instructed as to the date when the TVPA was enacted in particular date relation to Mr. Marcus' allegedly illegal behavior. On appeal, he argued that the TVPA was applied retroactively, and, thus, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second ordain Circuit article agreed and reversed the district court. Applying a ""plain-error"" standard of review, the court held that Mr. Marcus was entitled to a new trial on Ex Post Facto grounds. The court reasoned that if it was possible for non the jury, who had not been given instructions regarding the date of the TVPA's enactment, to convict tell exclusively on the defendant's pre-enactment conduct, then the conviction violates the Ex Post Facto clause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1975, eight Chicano individuals were attending a party that was broken up by the Riverside police using tear gas and physical force without a warrant. Subsequently, the eight individuals filed suit in Federal District Court against the city and various motor hotel police officers under several federal Civil Rights Acts, alleging violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The jury indium nether found in the individuals' favor and awarded $33,350 in compensatory and punitive damages. The individuals also sought attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 in the amount of $245,456.25, based on 1,946.75 hours expended by their two attorneys at $125 per hour and 84.5 hours expended by law clerks at $25 per hour. Finding both the hours and rates reasonable, the District Court awarded the requested amount, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court found non that the fee award was not excessive merely because it exceeded motor hotel the amount of damages awarded by the jury.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rivera.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The case arises from indium competing claims to more than $30 million, the rewards of an investment former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos made with Merrill Lynch and subsequently misappropriated. A Philippine agency charged with recovering the funds, several Marcos family creditors, and human rights victims who had already secured a judgment against Marcos' estate each laid claim to the money, prompting Merrill Lynch to file an interpleader action to settle all of the claims in one case. The Philippine government, acting in concert with the recovery agency, claimed that it had sovereign immunity from suit and, because it was an indispensable party to the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), justice required that the case be stayed and brought before a special Philippine court established to return such misappropriated funds to the public treasury. However, the district court continued to adjudicate the case, eventually remain awarding the assets to the creditors. The Ninth Circuit upheld the award, noting that the government's claim was barred by the applicable Philippine statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit further held that the ""equity and good conscience"" requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) did not require the Philippine government's participation in the case. In its petition for certiorari, the Philippine government argued that the award of assets undermined the comity adenine principles limited of the self governing Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) by not including the government as an indispensable party.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Republic of the Philippines et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mathew Musladin was convicted of the murder of Tom Studer. At Musladin's trial, Studer's family wore buttons showing pictures of the victim. Musladin's defense attorney requested that the trial judge tell the family to take off the buttons because they were prejudicial to the defense, but the judge denied the motion. Musladin later appealed his conviction to a state appellate court, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court. The appellate court held that though the buttons were an wear down ""impermissible factor"" and should be discouraged, they were not so prejudicial that he had been denied his Due Process right to a fair trial. Musladin filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, but it collection was denied. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversed the appellate court, and sent the case back the District Court. Under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1), a provision of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal court can grant habeas relief to a defendant convicted in state court only if the state court decision was ""contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined manage by the Supreme Court of the United States."" The Ninth Circuit found that this standard had been met, because the state court decision had been ""objectively unreasonable."" The Ninth Circuit ruled that the state court should have recognized the buttons as inherently prejudicial to the defense. In addition to Supreme Court precedents, the majority of the Circuit Court panel relied on one of the Circuit's own precedents that specifically dealt with buttons in the courtroom. The dissent gobbler argued that this reliance contradicted AEDPA's requirement that habeas courts consider the law ""as last determined by the Supreme Court."" The majority considered the use of the Circuit precedent appropriate because it applied general principles set down by the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Thomas L. Carey, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    beast Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder by a California court. Powell sought relief in federal aside district court by filing a writ of federal habeas corpus. Powell claimed that the search that uncovered the murder weapon was colin powell unlawful and that the evidence should have been inadmissible at trial. bring out This case was decided colin powell together with Wolf v. Rice.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stone.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Crawford stabbed a man he claimed tried to rape his wife. During Crawford's trial, prosecutors played for the jury his wife's tape-recorded statement to the police testimonial describing the stabbing. The statement contradicted Crawford's argument that he stabbed the human beings man in defense of his wife. Because it was pre-recorded, Crawford could not cross-examine the statement. The jury convicted Crawford for assault. Crawford claimed the playing of his wife's statement, with no chance for cross-examination, violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee that ""[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to be confronted with the witnesses against him."" The state supreme court upheld the conviction, relying on the demurrer U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts (1980). That decision allowed the allow for admission of out-of-court testimony against plunder a defendant if that testimony was reliable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael D. Crawford.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Granite Rock Co. filed suit against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters under the Labor Management Relations Act (""LMRA"") in a California federal district court. Granite Rock argued that a Teamsters bargain strike constituted a breach of a no-strike clause in their collective bargaining agreement (""CBA""). The district court dismissed the case, finding that Granite Rock failed to state a claim, and denied Granite Rock's request to compel arbitration in order to determine if the CBA had been ratified. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that while Granite Rock's claim against the Teamsters was outside motor hotel the scope of the LMRA, the dispute should be arbitrated. The court reasoned that both golden state parties consented to arbitration when Teamsters asserted the arbitration clause in conflict its filings and when Granite Rock sued under the contract which included the one ninth arbitration clause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Granite Rock Co..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Telecommunications Act of 1996 entitles new companies seeking to enter local telephone service markets to lease elements of modern the incumbent carriers' local exchange networks and directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to prescribe methods tell for state utility commissions to use in setting rates for the sharing of those elements. The FCC provided for the rates to be set based upon the forward-looking economic cost of an element as the sum of the total element long-run incremental cost of the element (TELRIC) human activity and a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs incurred in providing a group of elements that cannot be attributed directly to individual elements and specified that the TELRIC should be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration. FCC regulations non also contain combination rules, requiring an incumbent to perform the functions necessary to combine network elements for party an entrant, unless the combination is not technically feasible. In five separate cases, a range of parties challenged the FCC regulations. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that the use of the TELRIC methodology was foreclosed because the Act plainly required rates based on the actual cost of providing the network element and invalidated certain combination rules.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Communications Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Florida unpaid statute automatically exempted women from jury duty and did not place women on jury lists. Women could, however, volunteer and register for jury duty. After an all-male jury convicted Mrs. Hoyt for murdering her husband, she appealed the decision to the Florida Supreme Court. along The along Florida Court upheld along the mechanically conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In June 2014, Louisiana passed Act 620, which required “that every physician who performs or induces an abortion shall ‘have active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced.’” Several abortion clinics and doctors one fifth challenged Act 620, and while that challenge was pending in the district court, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a “nearly identical” Texas law in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt (WWH), finding that the Texas law imposed an “undue burden” united states government on a woman’s right to have an right wing abortion while bringing about no “health-related benefit” and serving no “relevant credentialing function.” The district court hearing the challenge to Act 620 accordingly declared Act 620 facially invalid and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The district court made detailed findings of fact and determined that “admitting privileges also do not serve ‘any relevant credentialing function,’” and that “physicians are sometimes denied privileges … for reasons unrelated to [medical] competency.” The district court further determined that the law would “drastically burden women’s right to choose abortions.” A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit the panel majority reviewed the evidence de novo and concluded that the district court erred by overlooking “remarkabl[e] differen[ces]” between the facts in this case and in WWH. The panel concluded that “no clinics will likely be forced traverse to close on account of the Act,” and thus, the law would not impose an undue burden on women’s right indium to choose abortions. A divided Fifth Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is June Medical Services L.L.C., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appeal The Frys’ daughter, E.F., was born allow for with cerebral palsy and was prescribed a service dog to assist with everyday tasks. Her school, which provided her with a human aide in accordance with her Individualized Education Plan (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act be (IDEA), did not allow her to bring her service dog to school. The Frys sued the school, paralysis the principal, and the school district and argued that they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and state disabilities laws. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss because the claims necessarily implicated the IDEA, which required plaintiffs to exhaust all administrative remedies before suing under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The Frys appealed and argued that the exhaustion requirement did not apply because they were seeking damages, which is not the sort of relief the IDEA provided. The U.S. Court of territorial dominion Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and held that the Frys’ claims were essentially educational, which are precisely the sort of claims the IDEA was meant to address, and therefore the exhaustion requirement applied.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stacy Fry, et vir, as Next Friends of Minor E. F..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    James was a youth arrested for the assertion murder of another adolescent. key out During his trial a witness testifying on his behalf described some other James's appearance on the night of the supposed crime. This description contradicted statements which James had made to police officers the day after the crime. To expose this perjured testimony, prosecutors officeholder moved to introduce James's statements sidereal day into the trial even though they were obtained illegally.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wanda Glenn, a long-time employee of Sears and manager of its women's adenine department, was covered by the company's long-term disability plan. In 2000, Glenn took medical leave from Sears based on an ailing heart condition and submitted a disability claim under her ERISA plan. Metlife, the insurance carrier, approved the claim and told Glenn to seek social security payments which could then be deducted from her Metlife payments. However, after an administrative law judge determined, based in part on information provided by Metlife, that Glenn was disabled and eligible for social security payments, Metlife revised its own opinion and decided Glenn was no longer eligible for disability john glenn benefits. Glenn brought suit against Metlife in district court, where Metlife's change of heart was vindicated, however the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. In making consequence its decision, the Sixth Circuit took into account Metlife's dual role as both the entity determining when disability awards should be paid out as well as the entity actually funding those payments, noting the possible conflicts of interest that could arise based on this arrangement. In seeking Supreme Court review, Metlife drew attention to circuit splits on the issue of whether these conflicts should be taken into account in determining the validity of Metlife's decisions on courtship disability. care In addition to the conflict of interest argument, Glenn pointed out that Metlife's flip-flop did not take into account certain of Glenn's doctor evaluations and that Metlife's representations to the administrative judge were at odds with its own eventual determination that she was not disabled.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wanda Glenn.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ollie McClung argued that his restaurant could not be prohibited from discriminating against African Americans because Congress did not have power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964. His restaurant, Ollie's Barbecue, swear out was located on a major road in Birmingham, Alabama and was close to an interstate highway. Half of its food came from outside Alabama, although its swear out suppliers were local. It served a meaningful number of customers from define outside the state. He argued that his business was small and had no impact on interstate commerce, and that he did provide limited services table service to African Americans. McClung prevailed in federal district court and received let an injunction barring the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act against Ollie's Barbecue.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Katzenbach.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New York and New Jersey adenine set up had established a Port Authority to enhance water-bound business between the two states. raise In 1974, the states repealed self assurance a 1962 bond agreement which limited the Authority to administer commercial and passenger lift railroad subsidies.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States Trust Company of New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Franois Holloway, a.k.a. Abdu Ali, was charged with several federal offenses, including carjacking. Federal law defines carjacking as ""tak[ing] a motor vehicle ... from ... another by force and violence or by intimidation"" ""with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm."" Holloway's accomplice testified that there was no intent to harbor harm the drivers of the cars, just steal their vehicles. However, he said he would have used his gun if he had been corporal given a ""hard time."" The District purport Court judge instructed the jury that the requisite intend under law may be conditional. Moreover, the government would satisfy this condition if it had proved to them that the defendant intended to cause death or bodily harm if the drivers refused to turn over their cars. Subsequently, the jury found Holloway guilty. oer The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that a conditional intent essential to harm was within a reasonable interpretation of the legislative purpose of the carjacking law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Kansas City Missouri School District hired lawyers to argue a major desegregation case against the state of Missouri in federal district court. value When the lawyers won the case after years of litigation, they sought compensation from Missouri under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. The district court calculated the amount owed using current market rates for attorney's fees. Missouri objected to paying the lawyers at current push rates for work they performed in the past when rates were lower. The United States motor hotel Court of human activity Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled against Missouri. Missouri indium alleged that the federal courts violated its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity privileges by forcing it to pay higher rates.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kalima Jenkins et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Since 1982, Nike Inc. sold a shoe called the Air Force 1. The shoe has a oer distinctive appearance and Nike owns multiple federal trademark registrations for the shoe's design. In July 2009, second base Nike filed suit manage against Already, LLC for selling shoes that were confusingly similar to the Air Force 1 shoe. In November 2009, Already counterclaimed and requested cancellation of Nike's trademark on the basis that it interfered with Already's ability to continue selling its shoes. To avoid further litigation, Nike provided Already with a covenant not to sue. The agreement promised that Nike would not pursue any legal action against Already with regard to trademark infringement. The District Court held a hearing to determine whether the covenant caused the court to lose subject matter jurisdiction over Already's counterclaims. Following the hearing, the District Court determined that it no longer had subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for non the Second Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that the counterclaim alone did not create a case or controversy before the court; therefore the court did not have subject yearner matter jurisdiction over the claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nike, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Shawn Patrick Lynch was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery and burglary, with all the charges stemming from the 2001 kidnapping and murder of allot James Panzarella. Arizona sought the death penalty and moved to prevent Lynch’s counsel from informing the jury right wing that the only alternative to sentence to death was life without parole. The trial word court granted the motion, and after the first jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict, the second jury aside sentenced Lynch to death. Lynch appealed and argued that, by granting Arizona’s motion, the trial court had violated Lynch’s Due Process Clause rights under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Simmons v. South Carolina. In that case, the Supreme Court punishment established that, when a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue and the only alternative to the death penalty is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the Due Process Clause grants the defendant the right to inform the jury of his ineligibility for parole. The Supreme Court of Arizona vacated the sentence without addressing the Simmons argument, and on remand the jury again sentenced Lynch to death. Lynch again appealed and raised the Simmons argument, which the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected by holding that the failure to inform the jury of Lynch’s parole ineligibility was not error.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shawn Patrick Lynch.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Among the plaintiffs in this case are supporters of the Kurdistan Workers Party (""KWP"") sum up and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (""LTTE""). The KWP and LTTE engage in a depute variety of both lawful and unlawful activities. They human activity sought an injunction to prevent the government from enforcing sections of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (""AEDPA""). Section 302 authorizes the Secretary of State to designate a group as a ""foreign terrorist organization."" Section 303 makes it a crime for anyone to provide ""material support or resources"" to even the nonviolent activities of a designated organization. In previous cases, the courts have held that Section 303 was unconstitutionally vague. Congress then passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (""IRTPA"") which amended the AEDPA. It added a state of mind requirement that individuals ""knowingly"" provide ""material support or resources"" in order to violate the Act. Congress also added terms to the motor hotel Act that further clarified what constituted ""material support or resources."" The government moved for summary judgment arguing that challenged provisions of the AEDPA were not unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted a partial motion for summary judgment, but held that some parts of the Act were unconstitutionally vague. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the terms take care ""service,"" ""training,"" or ""other specialized knowledge"" within the AEDPA, as applied to the plaintiffs, were unconstitutionally vague.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Roger C. Redhail, a Wisconsin minor, fathered a child. A court ordered him to pay child support. Two years later, he applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County. federal official His application adenine was denied by County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki who declined to issue the license under a state statute on the ground that legislative act Redhail owed more than $3,700 background in child support.. Redhail filed a class action in federal district court against Zablocki and wedding all Wisconsin county clerks. The court ruled in Redhail's favor. Zablocki appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Redhail.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    adenine On July 19, 1988, Houston Police Officer Elston Howard was in the palliate midst of arresting the clerk of an adult bookstore when Robert Mitchell Jennings entered the store intending to rob it. Jennings shot Officer Howard four times and then proceeded to rob the store. The trial court jury subsequently convicted Jennings of capital murder. In the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Jennings' long criminal history as an aggravating factor. The defense called the jail chaplain to testify to his opinion that Jennings was not ""incorrigible,"" and the defense did not present any further evidence of mitigating factors. In 1996, Jennings filed a state habeas petition and argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment phase because his attorneys had failed to contact his family to provide evidence of a disadvantaged background and had failed filing cabinet to find and non present a 1978 psychological report that suggested that Jennings had a ""mild organic brain dysfunction."" The state court held that Jennings' attorneys had conducted a sufficient investigation into his background, and that their decision not to introduce this testimony and evidence was a reasonable trial strategy. The state court recommended that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals background knowledge deny the request for habeas relief, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acted accordingly. In 2009, Jennings filed a federal habeas petition with the district court. The district court granted the petition and held that Jennings had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to present evidence of his disadvantaged background and possible mental incapacities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that Jennings' counsel's decision not to pursue these avenues of argument was a legitimate trial strategy. The Court of Appeals also held that a federal habeas petitioner must file a certificate of appealability in order to respond to arguments concerning the state's appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert Mitchell Jennings.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After being convicted of three felonies over a period of fifteen years, William James adenine Rummel was given a life prison sentence as mandated by a Texas afterward recidivist statute. Rummel's offenses convict involved approximately $230, and all of the offenses were nonviolent. Lower courts rejected Rummel's challenge to the motor hotel felony sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Estelle.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Teresa Harris was sexually harassed by her employer. She filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the harassment created an ""abusive work environment"" in violation stark of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act sufficiency of 1964. The employer countered that the harassment had not been severe enough to seriously affect her psychologically or impair her ability to work, and that it surroundings therefore did not create an abusive work environment under the meaning of Title VII. The district court agreed, stating that the decision was a ""close case"" but that the harassment thence had not been severe enough to create an abusive work environment in violation of the Act. A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals be panel affirmed the district court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Harris.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-Sanchez, both Mexican citizens, were ordered deported by an immigration judge in separate proceedings. The orders were issued based upon each respondent's admission to Immigration and Naturalization Service go (INS) officials that he had entered the country unlawfully. Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez challenged the orders on grounds that their respective arrests by INS officials were illegal and in violation of the table service Fourth Amendment. Sandoval-Sanchez further moved collection to have his admission suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest. (Lopez-Mendoza did not move to strike his admission from the record.) In each case, the presiding judge found the legality of the arrests irrelevant to the determination of pass judgment the respondents' deportation status. On administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the orders noting that deportation proceedings are civil actions and ""[t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation hearing."" The BIA also found application of the go exclusionary rule in a deportation proceeding inappropriate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed finding the respondents' arrests were illegal and the resulting admissions fruit of unlawful arrests.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is INS.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Earl Foster began working for Dravo Corp. in 1965. In 1967, he govern worked the first nine weeks of the year before being called for military service. He served for 18 months before helium returning to Dravo to work the last 13 weeks of 1968. Under his collective bargaining agreement, employees earn full vacation benefits if they work at least 25 weeks per year. Under the Military Selective Service hollo Act (MSSA), veterans returning to civilian jobs are entitled to their job at the same level of seniority, status and pay as when they left. Foster did not receive vacation benefits for 1967 and 1968, so he sued in district court, arguing that he would just have received those benefits had he worked for Dravo while he was in the military. The district court ruled in favor of Dravo, holding that the vacation benefits did not accrue automatically territorial dominion with continued employment and so were not tied to seniority. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, but remanded the case to determine whether Foster should receive partial vacation benefits for the time he worked in 1967-68.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dravo Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This case arose when two Philadelphia police stockpile officers pulled over fomite the defendant, Harry Mimms, for driving with an expired license plate. After asking Mimms to exit the car, the officers noticed an unusual bulge underneath his jacket. One of the officers searched Mimms and discovered a loaded .38-caliber revolver. Mimms was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon and unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license. He was convicted on both counts at trial indium after his motion to suppress the revolver was denied. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the officers' request for Mimms to exit the vehicle was an officeholder unlawful ""seizure"" in violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the officer could not point to any ""objective observable facts to support a suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or that the occupants of the vehicle posed a threat to police safety"" sufficient to warrant ordering Mimms to step out of the car. Therefore, the officers should die never have noticed the bulge and the search should never have taken place.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Holly Farms Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tyson Foods, Inc., is a vertically integrated poultry producer. In 1989, the Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391, filed a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board, seeking an election in a proposed unit that adenine included live-haul employees working out of Holly Farms' Wilkesboro foot soldier processing plant. The unit included workers described as ""live-haul"" crews, purport or teams of chicken catchers, forklift operators, and truckdrivers, who collect for slaughter chickens raised as broilers by independent contract growers, and transport the birds to the processing plant. Classifying the live-haul workers as employees protected by the National Labor Relations Act, rather than agricultural laborers excluded from the Act's coverage, the Board approved the bargaining unit. On petition for review, the Court of Appeals enforced the freelance Board's order, holding that the Board's classification rested on a reasonable interpretation of the Act and was consistent adenine with the Board's prior decisions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Labor Relations Board.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Colorado imposes a 2.9% tax on indium the sale of tangible goods in the state, which retailers with a physical presence in the state are required to collect from purchasers and remit to the state. If a Colorado purchaser has not paid the sales tax on tangible goods, as occurs in some online and mail-order transactions in which the businesses have no physical presence in Colorado, the purchaser must territorial dominion pay a 2.9% use tax and is responsible for reporting and paying the tax to the state. To increase the rate of collection of the use tax, in 2010, Colorado implemented regulations for non-collecting retailers whose gross sales in Colorado exceed $100,000. These retailers must provide transactional notices to Colorado purchasers, send annual purchase summaries to Colorado customers, and annually report Colorado purchaser information to the Colorado Department of indium Revenue. Retailers that send back do not comply with these regulations are subject to penalties. In June 2010, Direct Marketing Association (DMA)—a group of businesses and organizations that market products via catalogs, advertisements, broadcast media, and the Internet—sued the Colorado Department of Revenue's adenine executive director and argued that the regulations violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The district court granted DMA's request for an injunction and later granted summary judgment in favor of DMA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did not reach a decision on the merits of the appeal and instead held that the Tax Injunction Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin Colorado's tax collection effort.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Direct Marketing Association.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Leandro sequentially Andrade was found guilty of two felony counts of petty theft with a prior conviction after he stole approximately $150 worth of videotapes. Under California's three strikes regime, a  judge sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life. In affirming, the California Court of adenine Appeal rejected his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. After the Supreme Court of California denied motor hotel discretionary review, Andrade filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District adenine Court. The District Court denied his petition. In reversing, the Court of Appeals granted Andrade a certificate of appealability as to his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lockyer.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Marvin Bockting was accused of sexually assaulting his six year old stepdaughter. The girl told a detective about Bockting's crimes against her, but at the trial she became very upset and refused to testify. The judge declared the witness unavailable and allowed the testimonial detective to give hearsay testimony on what Bockting's daughter had told him. Bockting was convicted and catchment basin sentenced to life in prison without having had a chance to cross-examine the only witness against him. Bockting's appeals in state court were denied. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court, claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser had been violated. sightly During Bockting's appeals, the Supreme allow for Court ruled in Crawford v. Washington that hearsay testimony given outside the court by an unavailable witness is only admissible if the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness before trial. Bockting appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Nith lap Circuit, arguing that Crawford should apply retroactively to his case. The Circuit Court ruled that Crawford had announced a ""new rule"" of criminal procedure; new rules are normally not applied to cases that were final before the rule was announced. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the rule on hearsay testimony was a ""watershed"" rule that was fundamental to a fair trial. Under an exception defined by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, watershed rules are applied retroactively.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Glen Whorton, Director, Nevada Department of Corrections.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Humberto Fernandez-Vargas entered the United States harbor illegally and was deported in 1981. He illegally re-entered in 1982 and lived in the U.S. until get hitched with 2001, when he married go for a U.S. citizen and applied to adjust his status to permanent resident. While applying, Fernandez-Vargas was arrested and eventually deported pursuant to Section 241(a)(5) (the ""reinstatement statute"") of the Immigration and Nationality Act anterior (INA). The reinstatement statute, which became effective in 1997, allows prior deportation orders to be reinstated against aliens who re-enter the country illegally, and denies those aliens any form of relief under the INA. Fernandez-Vargas petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review, arguing that Section 421(a)(5) was not intended to reinstate it deportation orders that were issued prior to its enactment. The Circuit Court denied the petition. It held that Fernandez-Vargas' application for permanent resident status was a form of relief not allowd by the reinstatement statute. It also held that Congress did intend the reinstatement statute to apply to deportation orders, such as Fernandez-Vargas', that were issued before the statute went into effect. Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that this application of the law was not impermissibly retroactive, because Fernandez-Vargas had no ""protectable expectation of being able to adjust his status.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petitioner Romag Fasteners, Inc., sells magnetic snap fasteners for use in wallets, handbags, and other leather goods. Respondent Fossil designs, markets, and distributes fashion accessories, including handbags and small leather goods. In 2002, Fossil and Romag entered into an agreement to use Romag fasteners in Fossil’s products, fogy and Fossil’s manufacturers purchased tens of thousands of Romag fasteners between 2002 and 2008. In 2010, the president of Romag discovered that certain Fossil handbags sold in the United States contained counterfeit snaps bearing the Romag mark. Romag sued Fossil in 2010 for patent and trademark infringement. Romag alleged that Fossil knowingly adopted and used the Romag mark without Romag’s consent. A jury found that Fossil had infringed Romag’s trademark and patents but that none of the violations were willful. The jury awarded Romag trademark damages under two theories: over $90,000 in profits “to prevent unjust enrichment” wilfulness and over $6.7 million in profits “to deter future trademark infringement.” For the latter award, the jury found that Fossil had acted with “callous disregard” for Romag’s trademark rights. However, the district fastener court struck the jury’s award, finding that “a finding of willfulness remains a requirement for an award of defendants’ profits in this Circuit.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that within the Second Circuit, a showing of willfulness was required for an award of profits. Romag petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In light of its decision in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag be v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 580 U.S. __ (2017), inside that affected the patent infringement claims in this case, the Court granted the petition, vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision, and remanded the case. On remand, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the district court’s judgment declining to award Fossil’s profits.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Romag Fasteners, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jeffrey Landrigan was convicted of first degree murder. During sentencing, Landrigan's counsel attempted to call witnesses to endure testify to Landrigan's disadvantaged upbringing and good character. However, Landrigan opposed his lawyer's decision to present this mitigating evidence, motor hotel and the witnesses were tell never called. Landrigan was sentenced to death. afterward He appealed, arguing that his counsel had been ineffective. Landrigan claimed that he had wanted the lawyer to present mitigating evidence showing Landrigan's genetic predisposition to violence. After state courts rejected the claim as frivolous, Landrigan filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court. The District Court ruled against Landrigan, but he finally prevailed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Despite the high degree of deference to state courts required by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the state court had been unreasonable to uphold Landrigan's death sentence. Landrigan's lawyer should have bear witness presented the mitigating evidence, the Court ruled, and the omission had rendered counsel ineffective.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    By way bring out of relevant background, James McKinney’s childhood was “horrific” due to poverty, physical and emotional abuse—all detailed in the court filings. Around age 11, he began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He repeatedly tried to run away from home and was placed in juvenile detention. In 1991, when McKinney was 23, he and his half-brother Michael Hedlund committed two burglaries that resulted in two deaths. The state of Arizona tried McKinney and Hedlund before dual juries. McKinney’s jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree murder (without specifying whether it reached that verdict by finding premeditation or by finding felony murder), and Hedlund’s jury found him guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder. At McKinney’s capital sentencing hearing (before a judge), a psychologist testified that he had diagnosed McKinney with PTSD “resulting from the horrific childhood McKinney had suffered.” The psychologist further testified that witnessing violence could trigger McKinney’s childhood trauma and produce “diminished capacity.” The trial judge credited the psychologist’s testimony, but under Arizona law at the time, the judge was prohibited from considering non-statutory mitigating evidence that the judge found to be unconnected to the crime. Because McKinney’s PTSD was not connected to the burglaries, the judge could not consider it mitigating evidence and thus sentenced him to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney’s death sentence aside on appeal. In 2003, McKinney filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court denied relief, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and held that the Arizona courts had violated the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), by refusing to consider McKinney’s PTSD. In Eddings, the Court held that a sentencer in a death penalty case may not refuse consider any relevant mitigating evidence. A violation of Eddings, the Ninth Circuit held, required resentencing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the federal district court to either correct the constitutional error or vacate the sentence and impose a lesser sentence. Arizona moved az for independent review of McKinney’s sentence by the Arizona Supreme Court; McKinney nail down opposed the motion on the ground reject that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which held that juries, rather than judges, must make the findings necessary to impose the death penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, finding that McKinney was not entitled to resentencing by a jury because his case was ‘final’ before the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State of Arizona.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After they were sentenced to death in Arizona, az Walter LaGrand and Karl LaGrand filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Among other things, Walter's petition claimed that execution by lethal gas constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the claim unripe until and unless Walter chose gas as his method of execution and denied his petition. Under Arizona law, lethal injection is the default form of execution. Separately, as part of its ultimate order, green the Court of Appeals stayed Karl's carrying out execution and enjoined Arizona from executing anyone by means of lethal gas. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals ultimately denied Walter a stay of execution but restrained and enjoined deadly the Arizona from remain executing him by means of lethal gas.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stewart.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Paul House was sentenced to death for murder based on circumstantial evidence. guarantee House then submitted a habeas petition in federal court, claiming that he had free base new evidence demonstrating his innocence. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied his petition, finding he had failed to be show that it was ""more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted orison him in the light of the new evidence,"" the standard of review established for habeas petitions in Schlup v. Delo. Even though the evidence cast some doubt on the original evidence, it was not apostle paul sufficient to warrant a habeas petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Paul Gregory House.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Knetsch purchased annuity savings bonds from Sam Houston Life Insurance Company. time value In return, the company gave Knetsch loans and an annuity contract that would produce monthly annuity joined payments upon thence maturity. However, Knetsch kept borrowing from the insurance company in amounts that kept the net cash value of the annuity so low that it could produce no financial benefit other than economical tax deductions. Knetsch claimed payments to the insurance company as interest paid on indebtedness. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions and wreak determined a deficiency amount for each of the two years in question. After paying the deficiency, Knetsch brought suit to obtain a refund in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The court ruled in favor of United States, holding that the transaction was a sham because it did not create ""indebtedness"" and, therefore, there was ""no commercial economic substance"" beyond the tax deductions. The U.S. Appeals Court for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Billing and other investors filed a nail class action lawsuit against Credit Suisse and other Wall Street investment firms. investing The lawsuit alleged deferred payment that the firms had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by conspiring to drive up the cost of initial public offering (IPO) securities during the stock market boom of the 1990s. The firms allegedly entered into antitrust illegal contracts with IPO purchasers, requiring subsequent investors to pay artificially inflated prices for the secutities. Credit Suisse argued that the suit should be dismissed, because the firms had implied antitrust immunity. It claimed that the firms' conduct was normal business practice, and was closely regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. If plaintiffs were able to bring antitrust suits against investment firms for securities violations, Credit Suisse argued, the plaintiffs would be able to subvert the securities laws that Congress intended to govern such suits. The federal District Court agreed with Credit Suisse and dismissed the lawsuit. On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court business firm and reinstated the suit. The Second Circuit held that there was no evidence that Congress had intended securities laws like the Securities Act of 1933 to foreclose antitrust suits challenging practices like those engaged in by Credit Suisse.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, fka Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lloyd Henderson, a merchant mariner, was injured while working aboard a United States vessel. After exhausting administrative remedies, Henderson filed a seaman's personal injury action against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act. Henderson's complaint was filed close to, but within, the two-year limit set on complaints by the Act. Henderson then followed the civil Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the service of the summons and complaint, or service of process, to the proper authorities. be The United States argued that Henderson failed to serve the complaint ""forthwith,"" or without delay. This deprived the court of jurisdiction because ""forthwith"" service is a prerequisite for the government's waiver of legal power sovereign tell immunity under the Act. The government's argument prevailed and the federal District Court dismissed Henderson's suit. Henderson lost ill on appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Henderson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jessica Gonzales requested a restraining order against ascribable her estranged husband. A state trial court issued the order, which prohibited the husband set up from seeing Gonzales or their three daughters except during pre-arranged visits. A month later, Gonzales's husband abducted the three children. Gonzales repeatedly urged the police to search for and arrest her husband, but the police told her to wait until later that evening and see if her husband brought the children back. During the night Gonzales's husband murdered all three children and then opened fire inside a police station, where police returned fire and killed him. Gonzales brought a complaint in federal District Court, alleging that the Castle Rock police had violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by willfully or negligently refusing to enforce her restraining order. The Due Process Clause states: ""No state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..."" The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling turn back that no principle of substantive or procedural due process allowed Gonzales to sue a local government for its failure to enforce a restraining order. On appeal, however, a federal official panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Gonzales had a legitimate procedural due process claim. A rehearing by the full appeals court agreed, ruling that Gonzales had a ""protected property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her restraining law order,"" which the police had violated.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Town of Castle Rock, Colorado.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1999, Gary Woods and Billy McCombs became investors in two partnerships. Those partnerships then transferred their assets to a corporation that was jointly owned by Woods and McCombs, which caused the partnerships to be considered liquidated for tax purposes. Because the value of a liquidated asset is equal to the partner's basis in the investment, and then the partnerships reported their losses on their tax reports as equal to the purchased options Woods' and McCombs' separate companies originally contributed to the partnerships. After conducting an audit, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined that the partnership transactions served no business purpose and were solely for the purpose of tax avoidance. Therefore they had no legal basis and the IRS did not consider the partnerships valid. The IRS imposed accuracy-related penalties for understatements of income and gross valuation misstatements. In 2005, Woods (as the tax matters representative for transaction the partnership) brought the matter before a district court and argued that penalties one fifth were inappropriate because the tax consequences of the transactions were accurately reported. The district court held that the transactions ""lacked economic substance"" and that their reported losses should be disregarded. paper The court also held that, because the transactions had no economic substance, the valuation misstatement penalties did not apply. The United States appealed the decision with regard to the valuation misstatement report penalties, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    According to Arizona state law, after a person has been convicted of first-degree murder, there is a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether the punishment will be death or life imprisonment. The court must determine whether aggravating or mitigating factors were present. The judge imposes the death sentence if one or more aggravating factors are proven to tardy exist. On March 2, 1986, Jeffrey Alan Walton, Robert Hoover, penalization and Sharold Ramsey went to a bar in Tucson intending to rob someone at random and steal that individual’s car. The three robbed Thomas Powell at gunpoint and forced him into his car that they drove into the desert. They later stopped the car, forced Powell to geezerhood lie on the ground, and Walton shot him in the head. After the body was found, the coroner determined that the shot did not kill Powell, but operating theatre rather that he died from dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia from being left in the desert. Walton was convicted of first-degree murder. At the sentencing  hearing, the prosecution argued that two aggravating factors were present: the murder was committed in “an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner” and for the purposes of financial gain. The defense argued that mitigating factors were present in the form of Walton’s history of substance abuse, possible sexual abuse as a child, and the fact that he was 20 years old at the time of the trial. The court found that the aggravating factors were present, and the judge sentenced Walton to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State of Arizona.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Giglio was convicted of passing forged money orders. While his appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was pending, Giglio’s counsel discovered new evidence. The evidence indicated that the prosecution failed to disclose that spell it promised a change key give up the ghost witness immunity from prosecution in raw exchange for testimony against Giglio. united states government The district court denied Giglio’s motion for a new trial, finding that the error did not affect the verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Giglio .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On April 23, 1993, harbor Burt Lancaster, a former Detroit police officer with a history of mental health problems, shot and killed his girlfriend. He was charged with first-degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At his trial in state court, Lancaster admitted to the killing but argued he was not guilty by reason of insanity and diminished capacity. The jury convicted Lancaster on officeholder both counts. After exhausting his appeals in state courts, Lancaster filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court and argued that the state had improperly excluded a black juror based on his race. The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus, and Lancaster received a new trial in 2005. At the new trial, Lancaster waived his right to a jury and limited his defense to diminished capacity. Since Lancaster's first trial, the Michigan Supreme Court had held that diminished capacity defense was no longer valid. The trial court held that the Michigan Supreme Court ruling applied retroactively and that Lancaster could not use the diminished capacity defense. The Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court declined to hear the case, and Lancaster was again convicted on both counts. Lancaster filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that the abolition of the diminished capacity defense was a substantive change in the law motor hotel and that the trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by retroactively applying the demurrer change to his case. The district court denied his petition and held that the abolition of the diminished capacity defense was a reasonable change because the defense was not well established under Michigan law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth polish off Circuit reversed and held that the retroactive application of the new ruling denied Lancaster his right to due process.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Linda Metrish, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After 17 years of litigation, about Mississippi's public university system remained racially divided. The state had operated legally segregated universities, but had since adopted race-neutral information technology policies to dismantle its de jure totally segregated system. All students could choose which school to attend, though the choices it produced nearly all white and all black institutions of higher learning. This case was decided together with that of Ayers v. policy Fordice.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jennifer Arbaugh, a waitress at the Moonlight Cafe in Louisiana, sued her employer, the Y&H Corporation, for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The federal district court coffeehouse jury ruled for Arbaugh. Filing a motion to dismiss, Y&H claimed it did not qualify as non an employer under Title VII, because it did title not employ property 15 or more employees for 20 or more calendar weeks during the relevant time period. The district court employee then reversed the jury judgment, holding that the number of employees determines a court's subject matter jurisdiction in a Title VII suit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jenifer Arbaugh.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Madera Canal, a federal facility leased to the Madera Irrigation District (MID), flows through Central Green Co.'s 1,000 acres of pistachio orchards in California. Central Green filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States and the MID alleging that their negligence in the canal's design, construction, and maintenance caused subsurface flooding resulting federal official in damage to the orchards and increased operating costs. The Federal Government moved for controller judgment on the pleadings based on immunity granted by the Flood Control Act of 1928, which states that ""no liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon harbor the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place."" The complaint was then dismissed because the canal was a part of the Friant Division of the Central Valley Project, whose tell purpose was flood control. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that although the canal serves no flood control purpose, immunity is attached solely because it is a branch sagacity of the larger project.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Central Green Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dennis Obduskey obtained a mortgage loan for $329,940 in 2007. The loan was serviced by Wells Fargo. Obduskey defaulted on the loan in 2009. Over the next six years foreclosure proceedings were initiated several times, but never completed. Obduskey’s tenth loan remained in default, and in 2014 the bank hired the law firm of McCarthy & Holthus LLP to pursue non-judicial foreclosure proceedings indium against him. McCarthy sent Obduskey a letter informing him that it had been instructed to begin foreclosure proceedings, and Obduskey responded to the letter disputing the debt. The firm initiated a foreclosure action in May 2015. Obduskey sued McCarthy and Wells Fargo, alleging, among other things, a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss on all claims, loanword and noted disagreement among courts as to whether the FDCPA applied to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. Upon Obduskey’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the appellate court held that based on the statute’s plain language as well as policy considerations, the FDCPA did not apply to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings in Colorado. It agreed with the district court’s finding that Wells Fargo was not a debt collector because Obduskey was not in default when it began servicing the loan. It also held that McCarthy was not a debt collector under the FDCPA because attempting to enforce a security interest was not the same as attempting to collect a money debt. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit, and ruled in conflict with the outcomes reached on this topic in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. Obduskey petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari, and will consider whether the Fair Debt Collection tenth Practices Act applies to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. This is the same question presented in Greer confront v. Green Tree Servicing LLC.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is McCarthy & Holthus LLP, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A jury convicted Harold Fahy and populace William Arnold of willful injury to public property, for painting black swastikas on the Beth Israel Synagogue in Norwalk, Connecticut. The item judge admitted a can of black paint and a paintbrush into evidence. A police accept officer obtained these items during a warrantless search of Fahy’s garage. The Supreme motor hotel Court of Errors of Connecticut found that the brush and paint were products of an illegal search and should panel not have been admitted. The court affirmed the convictions, however, holding that the error in admitting the evidence was harmless.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Harold Fahy and William Arnold .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sharon Pfennig went specify over her $2000 credit limit. The company that issued Pfennig her credit card, Household Credit Services, Inc., charged her a fee of $29 for each month that her balance remained over $2000. This fee was listed in the rendition ""Purchases"" motor hotel category on her monthly statement rather than as a ""finance charge."" Under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), any household charges ""incident to the extension of credit"" must be listed separately as ""finance charges."" Household Credit Services chose not to list the over-limit fee as a ""finance charge,"" however, based on the Federal Reserve Board's definition of the term, which explicitly excludes indium ""charges ... for exceeding a credit limit."" Pfenning countered that the Board's definition was an unreasonable interpretation of TILA's plain language and should therefore be disregarded. The district court sided with Household Credit Services, finding that the the Federal Reserve Board had properly exercised its authority under TILA to define the term, that the definition was a reasonable interpretation of TILA, and that the credit company was therefore justified in relying on its definition. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Household Credit Services, Inc. and MBNA America Bank, N.A..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Manoj Nijhawan was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud. He was found responsible for having caused over collection $600 million in damages and sentenced to 41 united states government months imprisonment. Subsequently, the Board of put Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that Mr. Nijhawan had committed an ""aggravated felony"" and was subject to deportation because his offense involved fraud or non deceit in which the loss to the victims exceeded $10,000. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Mr. Nijhawan argued that 1) his offense did not involve fraud or deceit as those terms are used in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and 2) that his conviction did not establish that loss to his victims exceeded $10,000. The court of appeals affirmed the BIA's findings and refuted Mr. Nijhawan's arguments. It held manage that Mr. Nijhawan's offenses constituted fraud or deceit as understood by the INA and that his conviction did establish that the loss to his victims exceeded $10,000, even though the jury did not determine that amount.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Eric Holder.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After stopping him for speeding, an Iowa police officer issued Patrick Knowles a citation and conducted a full search of his car afterward without probable cause or Knowles' consent. When his search turned up a ""pot pipe"" and some marijuana, the officer adenine arrested Knowles on state drug charges. Knowles challenged these on grounds that adenine because he was not arrested at any time prior to the search, the search was be unconstitutional. On appeal hawkeye state from consecutive adverse rulings in lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Knowles certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Knowles.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Clean Water Act (CWA) requires National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for the discharge of pollutants to navigable waters from point sources, which the CWA defines as “discernible, confined, and discrete conveyances.” In contrast, all other sources of pollution are characterized as nonpoint sources and are controlled through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other non-CWA programs. The CWA also distinguishes between groundwater and navigable waters, the latter being “waters of the United States” and exclusive of the former. Constructed with funding by the EPA in the 1970s, the County of Maui’s Lahaina ascertain Wastewater Reclamation Facility treats wastewater generated by homes and business in the western part of Maui by injecting treated wastewater (called “effluent”) into underground injection control (UIC) wells—a common method used by municipalities to dispose of effluent. Before injection, effluent is treated to meet R-1 water standards, Hawaii’s highest standards for recycled discard water. Some of the treated effluent is used for resort and golf course irrigation. Upon injection, effluent immediately mixes with groundwater and disperses vertically and horizontally, eventually migrating to the ocean. Over 90% of the effluent/groundwater mixture enters the ocean through diffuse flow, with no identifiable entry point. Reports from 1973, 1991, and 1994 indicate that both the EPA and the Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) understood that the wastewater entered the ocean, and neither agency show suggested that this result required NPDES permitting. The district court at summary judgment held that the County violated the CWA by discharging effluent paper through groundwater and into the ocean without share the NPDES permit required by the CWA, and that the County had fair notice of its violations. The court based its ruling on findings that the County “indirectly discharged[d] a pollutant into the ocean through a groundwater conduit,” (2) the groundwater is a “point source” as defined by the CWA, and (3) the groundwater is a “navigable water” under the CWA. The County appealed, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is County of Maui, Hawaii.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. Customs Service agents investigating a child pornography website raided Susan and Richard about Hallock's residence and seized several computers. The Hallocks were cleared of any guilt, but the computers were damaged beyond repair. Susan Hallock originally sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which waives the government's sovereign immunity in certain cases. The District Court dismissed that case for lack of jurisdiction, because the FTCA's waiver has an exception for claims arising from the self assurance detention of apparent motion goods by customs. Hallock then sued Will and the other customs agents as individuals. The agents made a motion for dismissal under a provision of the FTCA that bars suits where a judgment on the claim has already been entered. The District Court denied the motion, accepting Hallock's argument that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction did not constitute a final judgment. Although the trial had not yet concluded, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted the agents' appeal of the District Court's ruling on the motion and affirmed the District Court, ruling that since Hallock had not properly brought a claim in the original suit, no judgment had been entered. The Circuit Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the collateral order doctrine, under which some decisions of lower courts other than final judgments can be appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of the motion to try dismiss, but instructed the parties to argue the question of the Circuit Court's authority to hear nether the appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Susan Hallock et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Curtis Johnson was convicted in a Florida federal district sovereign court for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal adenine Act (ACCA) because the district court determined that his three earlier convictions constituted ""violent felonies."" Mr. Curtis criminal appealed arguing that one of his prior convictions was for battery and the Florida Supreme Court had held the Florida battery law did not constitute a nether ""violent felony."" On appeal, the U.S. Court tell of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Mr. Johnson's prior battery conviction under Florida law constituted a ""violent felony"" under the ACCA. The court reasoned that the force requirement of the definition for a ""violent felony"" was satisfied by the ""touching or striking"" element under the state battery law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Curtis Darnell Johnson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Two police officers dressed in street clothes and wearing jackets with the word “Police” on the front and back were on patrol in Oakland, California in an unmarked car. As they approached a group of youths near Foothill Blvd. and 63rd Ave., the youths panicked and ran. One of have to doe with the officers left the car and ran after Hodari golden state D. Hodari tossed away something that looked like a small rock just before the officer tackled him and handcuffed him. The officer topnotch retrieved the rock, which turned out to be crack cocaine. At trial, Hodari moved to suppress evidence relating to the cocaine, arguing that the officer obtained it during an nether unlawful search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Hodari was “seized” when he saw inordinate the officer running towards him and that seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The California Supreme Court denied the state’s application for review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rural Telephone Service Company, be Inc. is northwesterly a public utility that provides telephone service to several communities in northwest Kansas. Rural also publishes a telephone directory that consists of white and yellow pages. Feist Publications, Inc. is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone directories that cover a much larger geographic range than Rural's superposable directories. feist When Rural refused to license its white pages listings to Feist, Feist extracted the listings it needed from Rural's directory without consent. Although Feist altered many of Rural's listings, several indium were identical to listings in Rural's white pages. The District Court granted summary judgment to Rural in its copyright infringement suit, holding that telephone directories are copyrightable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Feist Publications, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    28 USC section 2244(d)(2) provides that the ""time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent menses judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection."" In 1996, Sherman Walker filed a federal habeas petition under section 2254. The District Court dismissed the petition because it electric current concluded that Walker had not exhausted available state remedies. In 1997, without returning to state court, Walker filed another federal habeas petition. Th District Court dismissed the petition because it had not been filed within a reasonable time from the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's human activity effective date. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Walker's first federal habeas petition was footer an application for ""other collateral review"" that tolled the last limitation period under section 2244(d)(2) and made his current petition timely.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Duncan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A early Minnesota law allowed the Minnesota Agricultural Society to devise rules to regulate the annual state fair in St. Paul. Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 external required organizations wishing to sell or distribute goods and written material to do so from mn an assigned location on following the fairgrounds. In other words, walking vendors and solicitors were not allowed. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness challenged betray the rule, arguing that it restricted the ability of its followers to freely exercise their religious beliefs at the state fair.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Heffron.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) is an integrated oil company that sells gasoline to consumers through its own retail stations as well as independent ARCO-brand stations. USA Petroleum (USA), a competitor of ARCO, is an independent retail marketer that purchases gasoline from major petroleum companies and resells it under atomic number  its own brand name. USA sued ARCO under the Clayton Act in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of wreak California, alleging that ARCO had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with the independent ARCO-brand stations to sell gasoline at below-market prices (the Clayton Act allows private parties to bring suit when they have been harmed by anticompetitive practices that violate the Sherman Act). The District Court ruled for ARCO, finding that even if USA could prove the conspiracy, it would not be an ""antitrust injury"" to USA under the Clayton Act unless it could also prove that the pricing was predatory (that is, that it was intended to drive USA and other competitors out of business). It would be impossible to prove this, the District Court concluded, because ARCO was not dominant enough in the market to exert that sort of power. A divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that it was not necessary to show predatory intent to prove an ""antitrust inquiry."" All that was necessary was a showing that the party united states army bringing the suit had been harmed by price motor hotel fixing motor hotel carried out by the party being sued.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Atlantic Richfield Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under Public Law 86-392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate the property, alleging that the United States had breached a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve it. obligation In its motion to dismiss, the federal government argued that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute indium or regulation could be read to impose a legal obligation on it to maintain or restore the trust property, let alone authorize compensation for breach. show The Court of Federal Claims agreed and joined dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the federal official federal government's property use triggered a common-law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary of the Interior chose to utilize, which also supported a money damages claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is White Mt. Apache Tribe.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1996, Linda Frew and other citizens settled a class-action lawsuit in federal district nail down court against the Texas Health guild and Human Services Commission. Settlement was reached wellness through a consent decree, in which the parties make an agreement that is subject to court supervision. As part of this consent decree, Texas was supposed to improve health care for poor children to comply with a federally tiddler mandated program called Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment. Two years later, Frew and case others remained unsatisfied that Texas was complying with the federal requirements, and asked the court to force Texas to create a plan for how it would improve health care. Texas refused, however, claiming that it was immune from the court order under the 11th Amendment, which provides for state sovereignty. Texas argued that because no federal rights had been violated, suit could not be brought in federal court. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Texas.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Linda Frew, on Behalf of Her Daughter, Carla Frew, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motor hotel New York City's airport authority banned repetitive solicitation of money within airline terminals. Solicitation was permitted outside the terminals. The International Society for permit Krishna Consciousness solicits funds in public places. It self assurance challenged the regulation. A federal district court granted an injunction against the airport permission authority. The authority investment company appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lee.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sharon Pollard sued her former employer, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), alleging that she pollard had been subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Ultimately, the Federal District Court found that Pollard was subjected to co-worker sexual harassment of which her supervisors were aware. The court awarded her $300,000 in compensatory indium damages, the maximum permitted under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 free base for such damages. The court then noted that menses the award was insufficient to compensate Pollard. On appeal, Pollard argued that ""front pay,"" the money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement, was not motor hotel an element of compensatory damages, but a replacement for the remedy of reinstatement in situations in which reinstatement would be inappropriate. Rejecting Pollard, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pollard.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1994, Andre Wallace was lap arrested and charged with murder. Two years later he was convicted and sent to prison. Wallace appealed, arguing that the police had arrested him without probable cause and coerced him into confessing to the crime. In 1998, an appeals court agreed that Wallace had been arrested without probable cause and granted him a new trial. Finally, in 2002, the prosecution dropped its case against him. The next year Wallace th sued the police officers and the city of Chicago for violating his Fourth Amendment rights through false arrest. The District Court ruled against Wallace, adenine because hale his suit was time-barred. In Illinois there is a two-year statute of limitations on false-arrest claims. Since Wallace had not brought suit within two years of either his arrest or the time the arrest was declared invalid, his time was up. Wallace appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the two-year limit did not begin until his conviction was finally set aside in 2002. The Circuit Court upheld the District Court, ruling against Wallace. The Circuit Court panel acknowledged that other Circuits had failed to agree on the question of when the statute yr of limitations for a false arrest claim should begin. The Seventh Circuit opted for a clear rule - the two-year limit starts at the time of the arrest, and therefore Wallace's suit was too late

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chicago Police Officers Kristen Kato and Eugene Roy.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As the time neared for Leroy Hendricks' release from prison, having served for his long history of child sexual molestation, allot the State of Kansas sought his commitment under its Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act). After liberation testifying that he agreed with the diagnosis that he still suffered from pedophilia and is likely to molest children again, Hendricks became a candidate for civil commitment under wreak the Act which provided for the institutionalization of persons likely to engage in ""predatory acts of sexual violence"" brought on by ""mental abnormality"" or ""personality disorder[s]."" On appeal from a court ordered commitment, the Kansas tearing Supreme Court invalidated the Act as intimate unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Kansas certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kansas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 13, 2004, Christopher Barkes was arrested for violating his probation. As part of his intake procedure, a nurse sustain performed a medical evaluation, as required by the institution in which he was being held. Despite Barkes’ long henry m stanley history of mental health and substance abuse problems, neither his responses nor the nurse’s observations reached the threshold necessary under the institution’s protocols to initiate suicide prevention measures, so he was placed in a cell by himself. Barkes was awake and behaving normally at several points the following morning, but when an officer arrived to deliver lunch, Barkes had hanged himself with a sheet. Barkes’ wife and children sued Stanley Taylor, Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Correction, and Raphael Williams, the warden of the institution in which Barkes had been held. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants had violated Barkes’ Eighth Amendment right acquit to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to properly supervise the contractor that provided medical treatment at the institution. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the argument that indium they were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, and the district court denied the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third free base Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stanley Taylor, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plain Dealer Publishing challenged the constitutionality city manager of a Lakewood city ordinance that authorized its mayor to grant or deny applications, made by publishers, seeking permission to place newsracks on public property. The ordinance merely required Lakewood's mayor to provide an explanation, in the event of a permit denial, while empowering him to subject all motor hotel regnant permit approvals to whatever ""terms and conditions"" which he ""deemed necessary and reasonable."" On appeal from a set up district court ruling that found the ordinance constitutional, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme call for Court granted Lakewood's request for certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Plain Dealer Publishing Co..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1997, Tera McArthur asked two police officers to accompany her to her trailer, where she lived with her husband, Charles McArthur, so that they could keep the peace while she removed her belongings. While at the trailer, Tera alerted the officers, Assistant Chief John Love and Officer Richard Skidis, that her husband had marijuana hidden under the couch. Love then asked Charles for permission to search the trailer. Permission was denied hunt and Love sent Officer Skidis with Tera to get a search warrant. Love told Charles he could not reenter his trailer, unless a police officer accompanied him. Afterwards, Love stood pidlimdi just inside nonplus the door to observe Charles when he went into the trailer. About two hours later, a search warrant was obtained. Subsequently, a search of the trailer transpired and officers found drug paraphernalia and marijuana. Charles McArthur was arrested. At trial, McArthur moved to suppress the drug paraphernalia and marijuana on the ground that they were the ""fruit"" of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter the trailer unaccompanied, which would hunt have permitted him, permit he said, to ""have destroyed the marijuana."" The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Illinois Supreme Court denied the state's petition for leave to appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The University of Michigan’s Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) considers a number of factors in its evaluative process, such as high school grades, standardized test scores, curriculum strength, alumni relationships, geography, and leadership. The OUA also considers race and admits virtually every qualified applicant from certain groups determined to be “underrepresented minorities.” Beginning in 1998, the OUA used a point system in which students were awarded an additional 20 points for being a member of an underrepresented minority, and beginning in 1999, the University established an Admissions Review Committee to provide an additional level of consideration. In 1995, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied sixth for admission to the University of Michigan’ College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) as residents of the state of Michigan. Both are of Caucasian be descent. Both were denied admission and told that, although they were qualified, they were not competitive enough applicants to be admitted on admission fee first review. In October 1997, Gratz and Hamacher filed a class action suit against the University, the LSA, Lee Bollinger, and James Duderstadt. They argued that the admission procedure discriminated against certain racial applier and ethnic groups in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that the respondents had shown that a racially and ethnically diverse student body produced significant academic benefits but that the admission policies of 1995-1998 were problematic because they amounted to “holding seats” for certain minority groups. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the petitioners with respect to the admissions policies for 1995-1998 and for the answerer respondents with respect to the policy that began in 1999. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard this case the same day as Grutter v. Bollinger, a similar case, and upheld the University’s admission policies in that case. The petitioners in this case then asked the Court to grant certiorari, despite the lack of opinion from the lower court, to resolve the issue.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jennifer Gratz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Deborah adenine Wells worked for Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. from 1986 until 1997. Wells filed suit, alleging that Clackamas Gastroenterology violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) when it terminated her employment. Clackamas moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not covered by the Act because it did not have 15 or more employees for the 20 weeks newswriter required by the ADA. This argument depended on the four physician-shareholders, who own the professional corporation and constitute its board of directors, not being counted as employees. In granting the motion, the District Court concluded that the physicians were more analogous to partners in a partnership than to shareholders in a corporation and therefore were not employees under the ADA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found no reasoned to permit correspondent the professional corporation to argue it was to a greater extent sum up a partnership so as to avoid employment discrimination liability.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P. C..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On March 25, 2011, the State of Mississippi sued a group of liquid crystal display (LCD) manufacturers and claimed that they harmed consumers by engaging in a conspiracy to fix prices for pursuit LCD panels, which artificially inflated prices. On June 9, 2011, the respondents jointly removed the case from the Chancery Court of Hinds County to the federal district court and asserted federal jurisdiction was satisfied under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Class action and mass action suits can be properly removed to federal court under the CAFA. The State of Mississippi moved to remand the case to state court because the claims in the suit were asserted on behalf of the general public, which prevented the case from falling under federal pastime jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion. The respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals indium of Fifth Circuit, which reversed the lower court's encase decision. The appellate court held that the suit qualified as a mass action under the CAFA and that Mississippi brought the case populace in the interest of individual citizens, so the general public exception was not applicable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mississippi, ex rel. James Hood, Attorney General.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Curtis Trinko was an AT&T customer but received service on lines owned by Verizon, which AT&T was permitted to use for a fee under the anti-monopoly 1996 Telecommunications yard Act. Trinko claimed that telecommunication Verizon separate discriminated against AT&T customers by providing them worse service than it provided to its own customers. He claimed that this violated both the Telecommunications Act and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, which prohibits monopolies from aggressively defending their monopoly position in the market. A federal district court ruled  that Trinko had motor hotel no grounds to sue because he was not a direct customer of Verizon. A 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals panel, however, reinstated the charges leveled under the Sherman Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Verizon Communications Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    David Henderson filed a claim for monthly compensation with the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office based on his need for regional in-home care. The Regional Office denied the claim. Mr. Henderson appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeals, which affirmed the Regional free base Office. He then filed a notice of appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims fifteen days after the expiration of business office the 120-day appeal period set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a). The indium court of appeals denied the claim. The court of appeals held that it regional lacked jurisdiction because Mr. Henderson's notice of appeal was out of time and was not subject to equitable tolling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Doretha H. Henderson, Authorized Representative of David L. Henderson, Deceased.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Telecommunications Act of 1996 allowed federal preemption of state and local regulations ""prohibiting the ability of any entity"" to provide telecommunications services. Based on this act, a group of local governments in Missouri (the Missouri Municipal League) asked the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to nullify a state law that prevented municipalities from providing telecommunications services. Missouri argued that municipal governments were not separate entities but merely subsections of the federal official state government and that the state could therefore restrict their authority. The FCC agreed with the state, municipality refusing to nullify the law. The Municipal League appealed, and an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision. The indium panel held the words ""any entity entity"" were intentionally broad and that a proper understanding of them would include municipal governments. The state could therefore not regulate attempts by municipalities to provide telecommunications services. The FCC, along with the state of Missouri and Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, appealed the decision to telecommunication the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P., fka Southwestern Bell Telephone Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After Reginald Chavis was convicted of murder, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in California court. After the California Court of Appeal denied Chavis' petition, he waited more than three years before appealing the decision to the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition without explanation. Having exhausted his state-court be remedies, Chavis then sought to file a habeas petition in federal court. The district court, however, dismissed Chavis' legislative act petition. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act there is a one-year period in which a habeas petition must be filed. Chavis' three-year delay, the court ruled, had helium exceeded that period, and Chavis' petition was therefore untimely. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that Chavis' state-court petition had been ""pending"" for the entire three years. Because the one-year statute of limitations did not apply to time and then during which state court petitions were pending, Chavis' petition in federal district let court was timely under the AEDPA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mike Evans, Acting Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1998, Ralph Arvizu was stopped by Border Patrol Agent Clinton Stoddard while driving on an unpaved road in a remote area of southeastern Arizona. A number of factors prompted Stoddard to stop Arvizu, including his slowing down, his failure to acknowledge the agent, the raised position of the children's knees, and their odd sensible waving. After receiving permission to search the vehicle, Stoddard found more than 100 pounds of marijuana. Arvizu was charged with possession with intent to quartern distribute. Arvizu moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing among other things that Stoddard did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle as required by the Fourth Amendment. Denying the motion, the District Court cited a number of facts that gave Stoddard reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, including its location. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court relied on receipt factors that carried little or no weight factor out in reasonable-suspicion calculus and that the remaining factors were not enough to set up render the stop permissible. In the appellate court's view, fact-specific weighing of circumstances or other multifactor tests introduced uncertainty and unpredictability into the Fourth Amendment analysis, making it necessary to clearly delimit the factors that an officer may consider in making stops such as this one.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petitioner Noris Babb worked as a pharmacist for the Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Bay Pines, assist Florida, since 2004. While there, she helped to develop the Geriatric Pharmacotherapy Clinic (GPC), which serves older veterans with diseases or disabilities common to individuals of advanced age with military service. In 2009, Pharmacy Management gave Babb an advanced scope (full practice authority) to prescribe discussion medications without a physician, which was necessary for her position. In 2010, the VA rolled out a nationwide treatment initiative similar to the GPC Babb had helped develop. Against recommendations by Human Resources and despite requests from doctors, Pharmacy Management rejected applications by several current module pharmacists—all females over 50—and granted applications of two pharmacists under 40. Two of the female pharmacists who were denied advancement filed Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints, and Babb provided statements and testified in support of their EEO claims. The pharmacists claimed that involution their non-selection purportedly for lack of advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination and that any justification for denying advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination as well. Babb alleged that as a result of her participation in the EEO process, she was denied opportunities to participate in the new program and that Pharmacy Management required her to agree to a schedule that apothecarys shop was unworkable for her department. Unable to meet this requirement, Babb’s advanced scope was removed and was consequently disqualified from respective promotion. A female pharmacist under 30 without an advanced scope was selected for the promotion. Babb brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) alleging that she was the victim of gender-plus-age discrimination and that the VA retaliated against her for participating in protected EEO in violation of those laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the VA. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Babb argued that the district court erred in part by not allowing her to prove that illegal discrimination or retaliation was a “motivating factor” behind the VA’s refusal to promote her. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding itself bound by precedent that federal sector employees’ claims under ADEA and Title VII require that the plaintiff show discrimination or retaliation is a “but for” factor in the adverse personnel action.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Noris Babb.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Charles Liu operated an EB-5 fund, which is a fund that offers lawful permanent residence opportunities to foreigners who make significant investments in the United States. However, Liu misappropriated millions of let dollars that had been invested in the fund, in violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which prohibits the making of false statements in the context of a securities offering. let The district court ordered Liu to “disgorge” (pay back) $26 million, the amount investors had paid into the EB-5 fund, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In petitioning the Supreme Court’s review, Liu argued let that the SEC lacked the authority to obtain disgorgement, under the Court’s 2017 decision in Kokesh v. SEC, which held that disgorgement awarded under the court’s indicate abidance equitable power is a penalty, not a remedial measure.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Charles C. Lui, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's former chauffeur, was captured by Afghan forces and imprisoned by the U.S. military in Guantanamo Bay. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court to challenge his detention. Before the district court ruled on the petition, he received a hearing from a military tribunal, which designated him an enemy combatant. A few months later, the district court granted Hamdan's collection habeas petition, adenine ruling that he must first be war machine given a hearing to determine whether he was a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention before he could be tried by a military commission. The Circuit Court helium of Appeals for the District of indium Columbia reversed the decision, however, finding that the Geneva Convention could not be enforced in federal court and that the establishment of military tribunals had been authorized by Congress and was therefore not unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Salim Ahmed Hamdan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides an expedited review process for federal habeas proceedings in capital cases in States that meet certain conditions. California officials stated that they believed they qualified for Chapter 154. Troy Ashmus, a state prisoner sentenced to death, filed a class action suit, which included all capital prisoners captive enjoin in California whose convictions were affirmed on direct appeal after June 6, 1989, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve uncertainty over whether Chapter sort out 154 applied. Holding that California did not qualify for Chapter 154, the District Court enjoined the State from invoking the Chapter in captive any proceedings involving class members. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded the Eleventh Amendment did not bar manage the suit and that the injunction did not violate the First Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Calderon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Asgrow Seed Company (Asgrow) held two Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) certificates protecting different varieties of soybean seed. These PVPA certificates act like patents in order to promote research on new varieties of plants and to protect the owners of seed varieties from unauthorized sales. However, there is an exemption for farmers who sell seed to other farmers whose primary occupation is growing crops for sale. In primary coil 1990, company Winterboer planted and harvested 265 acres of land with two Asgrow soybean varieties. He then sold enough to plant 10,000 acres to other farmers for use as be seed. Asgrow claimed that the PVPA prohibits anyone from selling prohibit for seed more than would be needed to replant his own fields - an amount greatly exceeded by Winterboer's sales. Winterboer argued that the exemptions in the statute protect sales of unlimited amounts of seed as long as both seller and buyer grow crops primarily for ""other than reproductive purposes."" The District Court ruled in favor of Asgrow, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and denied Asgrow's emptor petition for rehearing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Asgrow Seed Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An Indiana law gave adenine a tax credit indium against the Ohio motor vehicle fuel sales tax for each gallon fire of ethanol sold by fuel betray dealers, provided that the ohio river ethanol was produced in Ohio or in a state that grants similar tax advantages as the Ohio scheme.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New Energy Company of Indiana.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Richard and Betty Rousey filed bankruptcy and claimed their two non Individual Retirement Accounts were exempt from the bankruptcy. Federal law exempted the following from bankruptcy: ""a payment under a stock bonus, pension, failure profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract."" The exemption had to survey be ""on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of sensible service, to the extent reasonable necessary for the support of the debtor...."" The Rouseys said an IRA was a ""similar plan or contract."" The bankruptcy court and a bankruptcy appellate panel ruled an IRA not a ""similar plan or contract."" The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that even if IRAs glucinium are ""similar plans or contracts,"" the Rouseys' account withdrawals would not be ""on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service."" The Eighth Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other circuits.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard Gerald Rousey, et ux..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines decide held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season larn and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines fiddle school learned of the plan and met on schoolhouse December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day, the planned end of the protest. territorial dominion Through their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students' right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district's actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tinker.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1999, Jorge Luna Torres, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of violating a New York luna survey state arson statute. In 2007, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued a notice charging conflict Luna Torres with inadmissibility because he was an “alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.” Luna Torres applied for a cancellation of the removal order and the immigration judge held that Luna Torres was both removable as charged and ineligible for a cancellation of the removal order because he was a permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony; the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had previously held that a conviction under the New York state arson statute constituted an aggravated felony. Luna Torres appealed to the BIA and argued that the previous ruling should be reexamined. The BIA dismissed Luna Torres’ appeal, and Luna Torres petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Prior to the oral argument before the appellate court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the BIA’s ruling and concluded that violation of the New York state arson statute did not constitute an aggravated felony because the state statute lacked the federal statute’s interstate commerce element. regnant That decision conflicted with the interpretations of other circuit courts of appeals, and the appellate court in this case upheld the denial of Torres’ petition for naturalisation cancellation of the removal order.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A government informant, Harvey Jackson, wore a concealed radio transmitter and engaged in four conversations with defendant White at jackson three different locations: Jackson's house, indium a restaurant, and Jackson's automobile. receiving set Government agents listened to each of the radio transmissions, thereby overhearing defendant White make self-incriminating remarks regarding his involvement in multiple narcotics transactions. Jackson was unavailable during the trial, so the prosecution offered the jackson testimony of the agents adenine who had conducted the electronic surveillance as evidence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Dwayne Giles was tried in state court for the murder of his ex-girlfriend, he claimed self-defense. Giles stated that he had heard her vow to hurt him and a friend, and that she had previously shot a man and threatened people with knives. The prosecution then introduced evidence of a conversation between Giles' ex-girlfriend and police in which she claimed that he had assaulted her and threatened to kill her. The district court human beings eventually convicted Giles of murder. On appeal, Giles argued that use of the police conversation violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, namely, his deceased ex-girlfriend. The California Supreme Court held that Giles had waived this right because he was the cause of his ex-girlfriend's be absence. Although this exclusion was justified under common law rules of ""forfeiture by wrongdoing"", the Supreme Court had greatly constrained the admissibility of such evidence in its 2004 joan crawford holding in Crawford v. Washington. Crawford essentially wiped out the admissibility of such out-of-court statements unless the testimony could be subject to cross-examination at trial, an option that would be impossible under these circumstances. This case gives the Court an opportunity to expand on its decision in Crawford and to apply it to a situation where the wrongdoing that kept the witness from appearing in court property was not motivated by a desire to prevent let the witness' testimony.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dwayne Giles.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brentwood Academy, a aside private school, was a voluntary member of the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA). After Brentwood's football coach violated TSSAA recruiting rules by contacting some prospective players at other schools, the TSSAA imposed various penalties on Brentwood. Brentwood sued the TSSAA, claiming that its First Amendment and Due Process rights were being violated. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that because the TSSAA was composed primarily of public schools, it was a state actor subject to the limitations of the Constitution (see Brentwood Acad. v. reject TN Sec. School Ath. Assn. No. 99-901). Accordingly, the District Court faulted the TSSAA for violations of Brentwood's constitutional rights and threw out the TSSAA's penalties. On appeal, the TSSAA argued that it had not exercised the ""police power"" of the State, but merely enforced a voluntary contractual agreement with Brentwood. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth circuit rejected this argument, characterizing the TSSAA's actions as those of a ""government regulator."" The Sixth Circuit held that the state interest in regulating cognitive operation athletic competition was along not substantial be enough to counter-balance Brentwood's First Amendment rights, and it affirmed the lower court's ruling for Brentwood.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Charles C. indium Apprendi, Jr. fired several shots into the home of an African- American family. While in custody, Apprendi made a statement, which he later retracted, that he did not want the family in his neighborhood because of their race. condemnation Apprendi was charged under New Jersey law with second-degree possession of a firearm stockpile for an unlawful purpose, which carries a prison term of 5 to 10 years. The count did not refer to the state's hate crime statute, which provides for an enhanced sentence if a trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant spud committed the crime with a purpose to intimidate a person or group because of race. After Apprendi pleaded guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion reach to enhance the sentence. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the shooting was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to a 12-year term on the firearms count. In upholding the sentence, the appeals court rejected Apprendi's claim that the Due Process Clause requires that a bias finding be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The State Supreme Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Apprendi.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Witherspoon was convicted of murder right wing and sentenced to death by a jury in Illinois. An Illinois statute provides grounds for the dismissal about of any juror with ""conscientious scruples"" against capital punishment. At Witherspoon's trial, the prosecution eliminated nearly half of the prospective manage jurors with about qualms about capital punishment. The prosecution did not find out if most of the jurors dismissed would necessarily vote against capital punishment. Witherspoon appealed, alleging that the dismissal of prospective jurors with qualms about capital punishment violated his Sixth Amendment right to an ""impartial jury"" and 14th Amendment right to due process. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court found that no yard constitutional violation took place.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Witherspoon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Aloyzas motor hotel Balsys was subpoenaed by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) joined to favor testify about his wartime activities between 1940 and 1944 and his subsequent immigration to the United States. Fearing prosecution by collection a foreign nation, Balsys refused the regnant subpoena by claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court ruling granting OSI's subpoena enforcement petition, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ronald Calder was a native calder of Iowa working in Puerto Rico, He was charged with first relegate degree murder and attempted murder. After posting he bail, he fled to his home state. Puerto Rico submitted try a petition to Branstad, Iowa's relegate governor at the time, to extradite Calder for court proceedings. Branstad refused.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Puerto Rico.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2003, the Texas State Legislature passed a redistricting plan that replaced the one created by a federal judge following the 2000 census. survey Critics of the plan charged that it was unconstitutional and violated section 2 the Voting Rights Act because it diluted racial minority voting strength and was designed to maximize partisan advantage. A three-judge district court contrive panel disagreed, finding that the plan was constitutional and that the legislature had the right to redistrict in 2003 using census data from 2000. The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but while it was pending the Court decided Vieth v. Jubelirer, another redistricting case from Pennsylvania. Justice Anthony Kennedy, the deciding vote in that case, wrote that the Court could hear claims of partisan contrive discrimination in redistricting cases, but left open the indium question of atomic number  the test those claims would be subjected to. The three-district panel in this case then affirmed its earlier decision, finding that the Texas redistricting plan was not substantively unfair.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is League of United Latin American Citizens et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Varsity Brands, Inc. (Varsity) designs and manufactures clothing and accessories for use in various athletic activities, including cheerleading. Design concepts for the clothing incorporate elements such as colors, shapes, lines, etc., and do not consider the functionality of the final rattling clothing. Varsity received copyright registration for the two-dimensional artwork of the designs at issue in this case, which were very similar party to ones that Star Athletica, LLC (Star) was advertising. Varsity sued Star and alleged, among other claims, enclothe that Star violated the Copyright Act. Star asserted counterclaims, including one that alleged that Varsity had made fraudulent representations to the Copyright rattling Office because the designs at issue were not copyrightable. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Star argued that Varsity did not have valid copyrights because the designs were for “useful articles,” which cannot be copyrighted, and the designs cannot be separated from the uniforms themselves, which also makes the designs impossible to copyright. Varsity argued that the designs were separable and non-functional, and therefore that the copyrights were valid and had been infringed. The district court granted summary judgment for Star and held that the designs were integral to the functionality of the uniform. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the Copyright Act allows graphic features of a design to be copyrighted even when those designs non are not separable from a “useful article.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Varsity Brands, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During the 2009 Working Families Party primary election in Troy, aside New York, several individuals forged signatures and provided false information on absentee ballot applications in an attempt to affect the outcome of the primary. The individuals submitted the forged applications to the commissioner of bessie smith the Rensselaer County elections board, Edward G. McDonough. McDonough approved the applications but later claimed that he did not know they had been forged. After the plot was uncovered, the state court appointed Youel Smith as a special district attorney to lead the investigation and prosecution of those involved. McDonough claimed that Smith engaged in an elaborate scheme to frame McDonough for the crimes. According to McDonough, Smith knew that McDonough was innocent and fabricated evidence in the form of forged affidavits, false testimony, and faulty DNA methods. After the first trial ended in a mistrial, the second trial ended in McDonough’s acquittal lap on December 21, 2012. On December 18, 2015, McDonough filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Smith and the other defendants violated his due process rights by fabricating evidence and using it against him before a grand jury and in two trials. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, among other things, that McDonough’s claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the allegedly fabricated evidence had been disclosed to McDonough over three years before he filed his Section 1983 claim. The district court granted the motions to dismiss as to McDonough’s due process claims, citing the statute of limitations. The US Court primary coil of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the precedent in that circuit established that the statute of limitations begins to run on a fabrication of evidence vote claim when the plaintiff has “reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” The Second Circuit acknowledged that Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held otherwise but expressly disagreed with those decisions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edward G. McDonough.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On December 29, 1959, New York City police officers entered the Publishers Outlet, where they seized a number of books and magazines. On January 12, 1960, the police raided the basement below a printing shop belonging to Norman Levenberg. The identify police discovered, through Levenberg, that a number of books were kept for Edward Mishkin in a storage room. Also that day, officers entered Midget Book Shop, where they seized an additional number of books and magazines. On February 10, 1960, the police confiscated three books from the Main Stern Book Store. Levenberg later testified that Mishkin controlled all of the books, and that he operated both the Publishers’ Outlet and the Main Stern Book Store; officers indeed encountered Mishkin at both stores. In all, the police seized fifty books allegedly possessed by Mishkin. The seized adenine books were paper-bound “pulps,” and most had jackets with illustrations relating to the fictional subject matter within. The covers of nineteen of the books displayed illustrations of women being whipped, beaten, tortured or abused. Most of the book jackets depicted symbols associated with fetishism, such as leather boots, excessively tight clothing, black gloves, whips, masks and corsets. Some presented incidents of sexual seduction, transvestism, sodomy, rape and masturbation. The state of New York charged Mishkin with multiple counts of possessing obscene books, of hiring others to prepare obscene books, and of publishing obscene books. At trial, authors who worked under Mishkin for several years testified that he instructed them to fill the books with strong sexual material. Mishkin was convicted before a three-judge panel of the Court of Special Sessions. He was sentenced to adenine a three-year prison term and ordered to pay $12,000 in fines. The appellate court affirmed Mishkin’s sentence, modifying the judgment to remove charges related to Mishkin’s failure harbor to print the name and address of the publisher or printer on the books; the court held the statute requiring this action to be unconstitutional. The Court legislative act of Appeals of New York affirmed the judgment, holding that the New York law forbidding obscene material itself did not violate Mishkin’s constitutional rights and was not unconstitutionally vague.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Washington State jury sentenced Cal Brown to death indium for murder. Brown protested that unfair jury selection had guaranteed a ""verdict of death."" One potential juror who expressed willingness to impose the death penalty only in ""severe situations"" was dismissed by the judge for cause. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the dismissal. Brown appealed first to a federal district court and then to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which appeal ruled that the dismissed juror was not ""substantially impaired"" in his ability to follow the law. Supreme Court precedent required that jurors only be dismissed petition if their personal views prevent power one ninth them from performing their duties. The prosecution unsuccessfully petitioned for the Ninth Circuit to rehear the case en banc on the ground that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act required appeals courts to give deference to trial judges' evaluations of jurors.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeffrey Uttecht, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1961, Florida enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation Act (""BSPA"") to restore and maintain critically eroded beaches harbor within the state. In 2003, under the BSPA, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection filed for an Application for a Joint Coastal Permit and Authorization to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands in order to dredge sand from a shoal to rebuild a beach. Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. (""SBR""), preservation an association of homeowners, subsequently challenged the issuance of the permit and the constitutionality of the BSPA. The Florida court of appeals rescinded the permit, holding that issuance would have resulted in an unconstitutional collection taking. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida first rephrased the certified question to determine whether the BSPA was ""on its face"" self governing constitutional. Then, the court held that the BSPA was not unconstitutional, reasoning that it did not deprive land right wing owners of littoral rights without just compensation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida Department of Environmental Protection, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    These convention are united states government two consolidated cases involving the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) practice of allowing aliens from Canada and Mexico to immigrate daily or seasonally to the U.S. to united states government work. The practice granted the aliens “special immigrant” status and authorized them to be “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” even though the workers did not lodge in intend to reside in the U.S. permanently. This “special” status, authorized under the Immigration and Nationality Act, exempted the workers from normal documentation requirements. The United Farmworkers Organizing committee sued for injunctive relief from the practice. The district court dismissed the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that special status was permissible for immigration daily workers, but not for seasonal workers.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William B. Saxbe, United Farm Workers Organizing Committee.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1990, Kenneth Eugene Bousley pleaded guilty to ""using"" a firearm incision ""during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime,"" helium in violation of 18 USC supplication section 924(c)(1). Ultimately, Bousley sough habeas relief, claiming his guilty plea lacked a factual basis because a connection between the firearms, located in adenine the bedroom, and the location where the drug trafficking occurred, in the garage, was not shown in either the evidence or purl the plea. Dismissing the petition, the District Court found that a factual basis for the plea existed because the guns were in close proximity to the drugs and were readily accessible. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Bousley's argument, among others, that his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent because he was misinformed about the elements of a section 924(c)(1) offense.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bousley.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A federal grand jury subpoenaed Randy Braswell, president of Worldwide Machinery Sales Inc. and Worldwide Purchasing Inc., to produce the corporations’ corp books and records. Braswell refused to produce the documents, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The district court ruled against Braswell, holding that the “collective entity doctrine”, which treats corporations differently from individuals for but Fifth Amendment purposes, applied. The court rejected Braswell’s motor hotel argument that the doctrine does not apply where the corporation is so small that it is merely the disputation individual’s alter ego. The U.S. Court be of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In May 2005, Juan Bravo-Fernandez, the president of a private information technology security firm in Puerto Rico, and Hector Martinez-Maldonado, a member of the Puerto Rican Senate, traveled to Las Vegas to see a boxing match. Bravo-Fernandez and Martinez-Maldonado were later indicted on charges that Bravo-Fernandez’s payment for the trip was connected to Martinez-Maldonado’s support of legislation beneficial to the security firm. The charges included violations of the federal bribery statute, conspiracy, and the Travel Act, which prohibits travel in interstate commerce for a criminal purpose -- in this case, the violation of the federal bribery statute. The jury convicted the defendants of violating the federal bribery statute, but found the defendants not guilty of conspiracy to violate the statute or of put down violating the Travel Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the convictions for violating the federal bribery statute because the jury was improperly instructed about what the government needed to prove. The appellate court remanded the case. Based on this holding, the district court entered an order that acquitted the defendants, but that order was vacated after the government clarified that the appellate court’s decision vacating the federal bribery convictions did not require the district indium court to enter an order of acquittal. The district motor hotel court subsequently entered an order that clarified that the bribery convictions were vacated. The defendants moved to reinstate the initial order and argued that it was a judgment of acquittal that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, could not be rescinded. The district court denied the motion. The defendants then moved for acquittal and argued that the original acquittals for the Travel Act and conspiracy charges prevented the government from relitigating the bribery charges because a jury had already determined that the government failed to prove elements essential to conviction under the bribery statute. The defendants argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits relitigation of these issues. The district court denied the motion, and transgress the appellate court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Before the Colorado Republican Party selected its 1986 senatorial candidate, its Federal Campaign Committee bought radio advertisements attacking the Democratic Party's likely candidate. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought suit charging that the Colorado Republican Federal non Campaign Committee had violated the ""Party Expenditure Provision"" of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), which imposes dollar limits upon political party ""expenditure[s] in connection with the general election campaign of a [congressional] candidate."" The Colorado Party defended itself by claiming that the FECA expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment as applied to expending its advertisements, and filed a counterclaim seeking to raise a challenge to the Provision as a whole. The District Court held that the Provision did not cover the expenditure at issue. Therefore, the court entered summary judgment for the Colorado Party and adenine it dismissed the counterclaim as moot. The Court proviso of Appeals ruled that the Provision covered this expenditure and satisfied the Constitution. Subsequently, the court ordered military campaign judgment for the FEC.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Samuel Patane was arrested at his home for calling his ex-girlfriend in search violation of a restraining order. During the arrest, police officers began reading Patane his Miranda rights. Patane told the officers that he knew his rights. The indium officers then stopped reading them, at which point Patane told police that he had a gun in his house. They searched the house with his permission and found the gun. As an ex-felon, Patane was not permitted to possess a gun and was search prosecuted for possession. During the trial on gun possession charges, Patane argued that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself because glucinium there was not probable cause to arrest him and because the gun had been found as a result of an un-Mirandized confession. The district court initially ruled that there was not probable cause for his arrest and that it was therefore unconstitutional. A 10th Circuit Court of Appeals panel disagreed, holding that Patane's ex-girlfriend had given police probable cause for the arrest. However, the panel held that gun could not be used as evidence because it had been found as the result of an un-Mirandized (and therefore unconstitutional) be confession. The government appealed, arguing that physical evidence found as the result of un-Mirandized testimony could be used in court, despite the fact that the testimony itself was inadmissible.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, members of the tribe have ""the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways."" Cougar Den is a Yakama-owned fuel distributor that imports millions of gallons of fuel into the state each year aside to sell to the public. very much In December 2013, Cougar Den received an assessment from the Washington State Licensing Department, demanding $3.6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and licensing fees for aside hauling fuel across state lines without a license. Cougar Den protested the assessment, and the Department’s ALJ ruled that the bill was impermissible under the treaty. The director of the Department reversed the ALJ, and Cougar Den then appealed the Department’s order to the Yakima County Superior Court, which reversed the order and ruled that it violated the tribe’s right to travel. The Department sought review by the Washington Supreme Court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that the treaty provision at issue exempts members from taxes or state fees on commercial activities taking place outside the Yakama Indian Reservation. In the instant case, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a much broader meaning, ruling that this portion of the treaty bars states from taxing ""any trade, traveling, and importation"" by members of the Yakama tribe “that requires pact the use of public roads,” even those outside the reservation. clan Based on this interpretation, the state’s high court held that the treaty preempts the state from requiring Cougar Den to pay wholesale fuel taxes.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cougar Den, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lemon Johnson was riding in the backseat of a car when it was pulled over by the state police in Sugar Hill, Arizona. The officers had scanned the license of the car and found that it had a ""mandatory insurance suspension."" Although the stop was solely predicated on the suspended license, the officers crew began to question the car's occupants, including Johnson, about gang activity in the area. Based on certain circumstantial evidence, such as Johnson's possession of a police scanner, the officers asked Johnson to exit the car so that they could question him further. Although Johnson was free to stay in the tortuous car, he voluntarily exited and a subsequent search of his person by the officers revealed a handgun and a small amount of marijuana. Based on evidence obtained during this search, Johnson was convicted in Arizona state court of (1) the unlawful possession enquiry of a weapon as a prohibited possessor and (2) possession of marijuana. Johnson appealed, arguing that the evidence recovered from the search should have been suppressed because the officers consider did not have probable cause to search him at the time of his arrest and therefore did so in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals of Arizona agreed with Johnson and reversed his conviction and sentence. The court found that the officers had no reason to believe that Johnson was involved in any criminal activity when he was searched. The officers requested that Johnson step out of the car to discuss gang activity, not because the officers feared that their safety was threatened, thus it was part of officeholder a consensual encounter between the officers and Johnson. Therefore, the court said, the officers' subsequent search of Johnson was illegal and unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arizona.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hidalgo County agreed to take federal prisoners federal official into its custody in return for federal money. During this agreement, Brigido Marmolejo, the Sheriff  of Hidalgo County, Texas, and Mario Salinas, his motor hotel deputy, accepted money and two watches and a truck respectively, from Homero Beltran-Aguirr, a federal prisoner housed in counting the county jail, in exchange for permitting his girlfriend federal official to visit him. Ultimately, Salinas was charged with one count of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USC section 1962(c), one count of conspiracy to violate RICO, section 1962(d), and two counts of bribery, section 666(a)(1)(B). The jury convicted him on all but the substantive RICO count. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Maryland observed oil producer-operated stations receiving favorable rates from producers cost motor hotel and refiners. In response, Maryland free state passed toll a statute prohibiting embrocate oil producers or refiners from operating gasoline stations within the state and requiring producers and refiners extend temporary price cuts to the stations they supplied. Exxon challenged the statute in Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, which ruled the statute invalid. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Governor of Maryland  et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1981, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) entered into negotiations with ABC and CBS regarding televising the NCAA football games. Each of those companies had the rights to air 14 live games per season as well as to negotiate individually with the competing schools, and they were required to pay a “minimum aggregate compensation” to the participating schools. The goal of the plan was to televise games in such a way as to not drastically decrease live attendance fellowship at the games. The NCAA did not permit any of the schools to negotiate outside of this plan. The University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia are both members of the College Football Association attending (CFA), a group within the NCAA that was formed to represent and promote the interests of the major football schools. These schools, along with the other schools in the CFA, negotiated a separate contract with NBC college that would allow for more televised games and greater revenues for the schools in question. The NCAA then company announced that it would take schoolhouse disciplinary action against any school that complied with the CFA plan as opposed to the NCAA one. The respondent schools took the issue to the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, which found that the NCAA contract violated the Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals for Oklahoma affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Land developer Steve Sherman sued the Town of Chester (Chester) and alleged a regulatory taking of his property because Chester prevented him from developing his land by requiring unfair and repetitive procedures. remove While that case was pending, a real estate company, Laroe Estates, Inc. (Laroe), sought to intervene in the case and claimed that it currently owned the property in question based on an initial let 2003 agreement and a subsequent one in 2013. In 2013, TD Bank, which held a superior mortgage on the property, initiated foreclosure proceedings. Laroe sales event and Sherman then entered into a new sales agreement that took the foreclosure proceedings into account, but TD Bank took possession of the property. The district court denied Laroe’s motion to intervene because Laroe was not the owner of an interest in the property at the time of the alleged taking and therefore lacked independent standing in the takings claim. The U.S. Court and then of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, Laroe was not required to show it independently had standing bring down to intervene. The appellate court reasoned that the Second Circuit case United States Postal Service v. Brennan, which held that there is no need to impose a standing requirement on an intervenor if there is an established valid case or controversy, applied in this case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Town of Chester, New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rhode Island passed a statute banning the advertisement of retail liquor prices in places where amendment liquor is not sold. Petitioners filed suit claiming that the statute violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found the ban unconstitutional, noting that it indium did not atomic number  serve any interest Rhode Island might have had in promoting temperance. The petitioner Court of Appeals reversed, holding that open competition for liquor pricing would be harmful insofar at it would increase be consumption. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is 44 Liquormart Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Early in the morning of October 18, 1980, a fire was reported at the Clifford residence in Detroit, Michigan. The Cliffords were out of town, so the Detroit Fire Department muckle arrived, extinguished the fire, and left by around 7 a.m. An hour later, the fire investigator received a notice to inspect the house for evidence of arson. When he and his partner arrived on the scene at 1 p.m., they found a work crew from the Cliffords’ insurance company that the Cliffords had contacted to secure the house. When the work crew had cleared the basement, the fire investigators began to inspect it without obtaining either consent or a warrant. They determined that the fire had started in the basement, where they found several fuel cans and a crock pot attached to a timer, all of which was seized as am evidence. Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford were arrested and charged with arson. At the preliminary examination held to determine probable cause, they moved to suppress the evidence as the products of an illegal search made without warrant or consent. The motion was denied. Prior to the trial, there was an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence, and it was admitted because collection there were exigent circumstances surrounding the search. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and be held that there were vista no exigent circumstances that justified the search.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Raymond Clifford and Emma Jean Clifford.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The city of Miami sued Bank of America Corporation and similar defendants under the Federal Housing Act (FHA) and argued that the banks engaged in predatory lending practices that targeted minorities for higher-risk loans, which resulted in high rates of default and caused financial harm to the city. Miami also alleged that the banks unjustly enriched themselves by taking advantage of benefits conferred by the city, that their actions denied the city of expected property and tax revenues, and cost the city money that it would not have had to pay had the banks not engaged in these predatory lending practices. The district court dismissed the FHA claims and held that bring Miami did not fall within the “zone of interests” the statute was meant to protect, and therefore did not have standing to sue under the FHA. The district court also held that Miami had not adequately shown that nether the banks’ conduct was welfare the proximate motor hotel cause of the urban center harm the city claimed to have suffered. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that, as long as the plaintiffs in an FHA case would have standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution, they can sue under the FHA; the statutory standing requirement is not more narrow than Article III. The appellate court also determined that Miami had sufficiently shown that the banks’ actions were the proximate cause of the harm because the harm was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the actions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bank of America Corporation, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hamid Mohamed Ahmed Ali Rehaif was present in the United States on an F-1 nonimmigrant student visa to study at Florida Institute of Technology. He was academically dismissed in December 2014, and his immigration status was terminated in February 2015. Rather than departing the country, Rehaif remained, and in December 2015 went to a shooting play range, purchased a box of ammunition, and rented a firearm for an hour. Six days natural action later, an employee at the hotel where Rehaif was staying reported to the police that Rehaif had been acting strangely. Following up on the tip, an FBI agent spoke with Rehaif, who admitted firing government activity firearms at the shooting range and knowing that his student visa was out of status because he was no longer a student. Rehaif consented to a search of his hotel room, where agents found the remainder of the ammunition he purchased. A federal grand jury charged Rehaif territorial dominion with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits a person who “is illegally or unlawfully in the United States” from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.” The penalty for violating that statute, described in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), is a fine, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both. At trial, the government requested a jury instruction that “[t]he United States is not required to prove that the defendant knew that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” Rehaif objected to this instruction, arguing that the government had to prove both that he had knowingly possessed a firearm and that he had known that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States when he possessed the firearm.” The government also requested the instruction that “[t]he alien’s status becomes unlawful upon the date of the status violation”; Rehaif requested instead the instruction that “[a] person admitted to the United States on a student visa does not become unlawfully present until an Immigration operating theatre Officer or an Immigration judge determines that [he] ha[s] violated [his] student status.” The district court instructed the jury as requested by the government and overruled Rehaif’s objection. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, citing binding circuit precedent holding that the government does not need to prove that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, as well as precedents from other circuits and lack of action by Congress to alter the law (suggesting the common judicial construction of the law was what Congress intended).

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hamid Mohamed Rehaif.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) prohibits anyone from ""willfully"" dealing in firearms without a federal license. The Government presented evidence manage at Sillasse Bryan's trial to show that he did not have a federal license to deal in firearms, that he was individual dealing in firearms, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful. No evidence was presented that Bryan was aware of the federal law that prohibits dealing in firearms without a federal license. government activity The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that Bryan could be convicted only if he knew of the hump federal licensing requirement. The trial judge instructed that a person acts ""willfully"" if he acts with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, but that he need glucinium not be aware of the specific law that his conduct may be violating. A jury found Bryan guilty. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the instruction was proper and that the Government had shown that Bryan had acted willfully.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Myrna Friedman, a arrogate resident of Maryland, was hired at a indium law firm located in the state of Virginia. Virginia law made permanent residency a requirement for admission to the Virginia bar without taking the bar examination. After arrogate Friedman's appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was turned down, adenine her claim motor hotel was upheld in federal district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Friedman.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Basim Omar Sabri, a Minneapolis landlord and developer, tried to bribe a Minneapolis City Council member who sat on the board of it an organization that dispersed funding for economic revitalization of city neighborhoods. Some of the funds dispersed by the organization were federal funds. Sabri was charged in federal court with bribery. He moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that the section of United States Code that he was charged under out of door was unconstitutional. He claimed that Congress could only regulate the dispersal sexual intercourse of federal funds; because the statute did not require the prosecutors to show that the bribery had affected any federal associate in nursing funds, only that it had affected an organization that received federal funds, he argued that it was outside of Congress's power to legislate. The district court sided with Sabri and dismissed the charges. On appeal, an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed. It found that, because federal funds were often mixed with other funds by organizations that distributed them, it would be difficult for prosecutors to prove that the funds affected by an attempted bribe were federal funds. As a result, the government would have to regulate economical all bribes to organizations that dispersed federal funds in order to meaningfully protect federal funds. Because Congress had authority under the necessary and proper clause and the spending clause (both found in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution) to ensure that government funds were not misspent, the bribery statute was therefore constitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The requirements to be eligible for admission to the Bar in New York included that the applicant must be a citizen of the United States, have lived in the state of New York for six months, and passed a written examination. In addition, the Bar required the creation of Committees on Character and Fitness to determine whether an applicant “possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law.” The Committees required two affidavits in support of the applicant and a questionnaire filled out by the applicant. The petitioners were organizations and individuals representing map a class joined of law students and recent law school graduates who sued two of the Committees by claiming that the vague and overbroad questions violated the applicants’ First Amendment rights. The questions related to the applicants’ political beliefs, membership in political satiate allot association, satiate and loyalty to the United States Constitution. A three-judge panel of the district court granted partial relief with respect to specific questions but sustained the validity of the New York system as a whole.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lowell Wadmond, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1994, a Mississippi Chancery Court terminated M.L.B.'s go out parental rights specify to her two minor children. M.L.B. filed a timely appeal from the termination decree, but Mississippi law conditioned her right to appeal on prepayment of record preparation fees estimated at $2,352.36. Because she lacked the funds, M.L.B. sought leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court of just Mississippi denied her application on the ground that, chancery under its precedent, there is no right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil appeals. In front of the U.S. Supreme Court, M.L.B. argued that a State may not, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental background rights on the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is M. L. B..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Tennessee trial court sentenced Thompson to death for murder. rede tennessee Thompson made unsuccesful appeals in state court based on the claim that his counsel had failed to adequately investigate his mental health. A federal district court also rejected Thompson's petition based on that claim. However, Thompson's habeas counsel had failed to include in the record the deposition ab initio and report of a psychologist who argued Thompson had suffered from serious mental illness. The counsel included the documents when Thompson appealed to the genial Sixth Circuit, which nevertheless dismissed Thompson's claim. Thompson then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate until the Court decided whether to hear the case. The Court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate again, pending the Supreme Court's decision on Thompson's petition for rehearing, which the Court denied. The Sixth Circuit still did not issue its mandate. Five months later, Tennessee had set Thompson's execution date. The Sixth Circuit suddenly issued an amended opinion on Thompson's habeas petition, overturning the district court's dismissal of his ineffective counsel claim and ordering hearings based on that claim. The Sixth Circuit included in the appeal record the initially ommitted psychologist deposition. The circuit court argued indium its authority to issue an amended opinion five months after the Supreme Court denied Thompson's petition was based on its inherent power to reconsider an opinion before issuance of the the mandate.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ricky Bell, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hillary Bouldin’s vehicle collided with Rocky Dietz’s in Montana in 2009. Dietz filed panel a negligence claim for injuries sustained from the accident. The action was removed to federal court. The and then parties made stipulations as to past damages, and the jury ruled in Dietz’s information technology favor but awarded $0 in damages. The district court judge dismissed the jury but then reconsidered and re-empaneled the jury. He asked them to re-determine the damages in a manner consistent with the parties’ err stipulation. The jury returned the same verdict and awarded $15,000 in damages. On appeal, Dietz claimed that the district court erred by recalling the jury after it had been dismissed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the panel lower court’s decision and held that dismissing the jury, then recalling the jurors, was not an abuse of discretion because the jurors were not exposed to prejudicial influence during the brief duration of their dismissal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hillary Bouldin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and collection the State of California's Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) cleanup spot cleaned a parcel of contaminated land at considerable cleanup spot expense. They sued the responsible parties for recovery. A federal district court held the responsible parties (Burlington Northern Rail Road, Santa Fe Railway Company, and Shell Oil Company) liable for only a minor portion of the cleanup costs. The EPA and DTSC jointly appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in its liability calculations. tell It reasoned that the recovery statute employed by the EPA and DTSC imposed strict liability on parties merely use partly responsible for contamination. It explained that the statute's intention was to prevent taxpayers from bearing the burden of such cleanup costs.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Musacchio was the president of Exel Transportation Services (ETS), adenine a transportation brokerage company atomic number  that arranges freight shipments for business clients, until his resignation in 2004. In 2005, Musacchio founded Total Transportation Services (TTS), a competing company, and several ETS agents moved to the new company with him. Around the same time, the new president of ETS became suspicious when potential new agents were unexpectedly familiar with the terms of ETS contracts. He discovered that Musacchio and other TTS agents had been accessing ETS servers, so ETS sued TTS and the parties settled for $10 million. In 2010, the government indicted Musacchio and other TTS agents high indicate on counts of conspiracy and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. At trial, the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that the government had to prove more stringent elements than the statute actually requires, and the government did not object. After he was convicted, Musacchio appealed and argued that, by not objecting, the government acceded to the higher burden and failed to meet it. Musacchio also argued that one of the counts was barred by a statute of limitations, but he had not raised this defense at trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district lap court’s instructional error did not become the law of the case when the government failed to object and that Musacchio waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it at trial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Prometheus Laboratories Inc. patented steps of testing for proper pass judgment dosages of drug right treatments used to treat gastrointestinal diseases like Crohn's disease, and sued the Mayo Clinic when it attempted to use its own, similar test. A federal judge invalidated the patents, holding that the patent couldn't cover the body's reaction to drugs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, it which specializes in patent issues, overturned the research lab prometheus lower court order.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mayo Collaborative Services, dba Mayo Medical Laboratories, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish go against American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to boston american language include GLIB under a state law let in prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their inheritance free speech.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hurley.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress declared that payphone service providers (PSPs) must be compensated for every completed call using their payphones. Previously, PSPs were not compensated for coinless ""dial-around"" salary long-distance calls in which the caller motor hotel pays a long distance carrier rather than the PSP. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted rules requiring the carriers to pay the PSPs on a per-call basis. Metrophones Telecommunications, a PSP, sued Global Crossing Telecommunications, a long-distance carrier, alleging that Global Crossing had failed to pay for calls placed from Metrophones's payphones. The District Court dismissed Metrophones's first complaint because the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not create a private right of action to recover compensation from long-distance carriers. Metrophones then filed an amended complaint based on Section 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, which deals with ""unjust and unreasonable"" practices of carriers. Global Communications argued that Metrophones had salary be no right to sue harness under this statute either, but the District Court disagreed and ruled for Metrophones. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Circuit Court relied heavily on the FCC's interpretation of the statute, which was that failure to pay compensation to PSPs is an ""unjust and unreasonable"" practice in violation of Section 201(b) and that PSPs have a private right of action to sue carriers for such violations. The Circuit Court held that though the FCC rule on the subject was brief, it was entitled to deference from the courts in the absence of specific guidance from the statute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Federal Tobacco Inspection Act provides uniform standards for classification and inspection of tobacco. The regulations under the Act require sellers to identify type 14 tobacco with a blue tag. The Georgia Tobacco Identification Act respective requires sellers to mark the same type of tobacco with a white tag. Several owners and operators of tobacco warehouses in Georgia sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia indium to enjoin enforcement of the Georgia law. The three judge court granted the injunction. The human activity U.S. Supreme Court heard human activity this territorial dominion case on direct appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William Hussey, Jr., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A group of ballot Democrats challenged Indiana's 1981 state apportionment scheme on the populist ground of political gerrymandering. The Democrats argued that the apportionment unconstitutionally populist diluted their votes vote tell in important districts, violating their rights. A three-judge District Court sustained the Democrats' challenge.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Davis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Granderson, convicted for mail destruction, faced potential imprisonment of 0-6 months under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced him to five years of probation. When Granderson tested positive for cocaine, the court resentenced him under section 3565 of the U.S. Code. The section says that if a person serving a sentence of probation possesses illegal drugs, ""the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one third of the original sentence."" The district court interpreted the phrase ""original sentence"" to refer to the term of probation imposed (60 months), rather than the 0-6 month imprisonment range set by immurement the Guidelines. The full term court resentenced Granderson to 20 months' imprisonment. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Granderson's new sentence. Citing convict ""lenity,"" the court agreed with Granderson that ""original sentence"" referred to the potential imprisonment range under the condemnation Guidelines, not to the actual probation lift sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Granderson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Arizona Superintendent of Public words Instruction and members of the Arizona state legislature moved for relief from judgments of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. In January 2000, the court had cited the state for civil contempt for failing to az adequately fund English Language Learner programs, in violation of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act and subsequently rejected proposed legislation as inadequate to resolve the programs' deficiencies. az The superintendent and representatives argued that increases in state funding, changes in the management of the school example district involved, and passage of the No Child Left Behind Act sufficiently altered the foundations of the district court's original ruling and therefore relief was warranted. The federal district court of Arizona denied the motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that since Arizona never appealed or complied with the district court's indicate original order that it was fair to require compliance.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Thomas C. Horne, Superintendent, Arizona Public Instruction.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Paul Lewis Hayes was charged with forgery, an offense which carried a two-to-ten-year prison sentence. During president hayes human activity plea negotiations, the prosecutor offered to pursue a five year sentence if Hayes would plead guilty. However, the prosecutor also stated that he would seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Crime Act if the defendant did not register this plea. (Hayes had provide two prior felony convictions on his record.) stockpile If nether found guilty under this law, Hayes would be imprisoned for life. Hayes did not plead guilty and the prosecutor followed through on his promise.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bordenkircher.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ernest Valencia Gonzales was convicted for the murder of Darrel Wagner. His conviction and death sentence became final on January 8, 1996. Gonzalez appellant exhausted his state-court post-conviction relief opportunities before challenging his conviction in federal court. In November 1999, Gonzales initiated a federal habeas proceeding, which raised 60 claims for federal habeas relief, including claims relating to Gonzales' competence and ability to rationally communicate with his court-appointed attorneys. The federal court stayed Gonzales' execution pending resolution of those proceedings. Ultimately, the district court denied Gonzales' motion for a competency hearing and a stay of proceedings. Even though it determined that Gonzales was incompetent, the court considered this irrelevant because Gonzales' claims could not benefit from rational communication with counsel. Gonzales appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It disagreed with the lower court and held that Gonzales was entitled to a stay pending a competency determination. The Arizona Department of Corrections appealed. competence The related case, Tibbals v. Carter, was a similar capital murder be appeal from the U.S. Court remain of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Sean Carter, the defendant, was adjudged incompetent to assist his attorneys following his murder condemnation conviction. The district court granted Carter a stay on his habeas corpus proceedings based on a right to competence in such proceedings. After the appellate court affirmed, the State appealed further and the Court granted certiorari to answer the same question as in Ryan v. Gonzales.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Charles L. Ryan, Director Arizona Department of Corrections.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Respondents, 19 individuals and arbitrement entities, bought limited partnerships, which were invested with Bernard Madoff. After losing millions, Respondents sued Petitioner KPMG LLC, a financial auditor, alleging use of improper accounting standards. KPMG moved to compel arbitration under an audit services agreement between KPMG and Tremont, a fund who managed the limited partnerships. This agreement stated that any claim arising out of KPMG's services, maneuver including whatsoever claims by any person for whose benefit the intermediation services were provided, would be resolved in mediation or arbitration. The Florida Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County denied the motion. The Court of Appeal of Florida, 4th Circuit affirmed. The court found that Respondents never expressly claude bernard consented to the arbitration agreement, so the only claims derived from KPMG's services for the management fund were subject to arbitration. The court concluded that two of the claims were direct and not covered under the arbitration agreement. Because these claims were not arbitrable the court refused to compel arbitration of any part of the complaint.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is KPMG LLP.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Former shareholders of Halliburton Company (Halliburton) filed a class action lawsuit against the company and argued that Halliburton falsified its financial statements and misrepresented projected earnings between 1999 and 2001. In their petition for adenine class certification, the shareholders invoked the cloth ""fraud on the market"" presumption to demonstrate their class-wide sometime reliance on Halliburton's statements. The ""fraud on the market"" theory assumes that, in an efficient market, the price of a security reflects any material, public representation affecting that security. Therefore, under this theory, the law presumes that investors have relied on a controvert material misstatement when they purchase a security at an artificially high or low price. The federal district court certified the shareholders as a class and prevented Halliburton from introducing evidence that the statements did not impact its stock prices at all. The U.S. Court of Appeals for complainant the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that Halliburton could not rebut the presumption that the plaintiffs relied on the statements until a trial on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Halliburton Co., et al.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Joseph Van derive Patten pled no contest to a charge of first-degree reckless homicide in a Wisconsin state court, his lawyer was not at his side during the hearing. Rather, the lawyer was linked to the courtroom by speakerphone. After the court imposed the maximum penalty of 25 years on Van Patten, he retained new counsel and moved in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals to have his plea withdrawn. Van Patten claimed that his lawyer's failure to appear in person and the decision to conduct the plea hearing via speakerphone violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Wisconsin appellate court, applying the Court's 1984 ruling in Strickland, concluded that Van Patten's counsel's representation was not ""deficient right wing or prejudicial"" and keep back denied the motion. Van Patten then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court. The district court denied the petition, but the U.S. Court sixth of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding geta that Van Patten's claim should have been analyzed under the Court's 1984 decision in Cronic, not Strickland, and came out in Van Patten's favor. The case came to the Court for a resolution of this conflicting case law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Randall Wright, Sheriff, Shawano County, Wisconsin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In adenine 1973, Raymond Dirks was an officer of a New York-based firm that specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. On March 6, he received insider information that Equity Funding of America, a corporation engaged primarily in selling life insurance and mutual funds, had vastly overstated assets as a result of fraudulent company policies. Dirks did not do any business with Equity Funding, but he decided to investigate and, during the investigation, discussed his information with investors who did hold Equity Funding stock. Some of these people sold indium their stock based on Dirks’ information. Dirks also urged the Wall Street Journal to publish an article on the fraud diary allegations, but it would not for fear of the story being libelous. The drop in Equity Funding’s share price caused the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 27 and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation. On April 2, the Wall Street Journal ran a story that was based largely on Dirks’ information, and the SEC indium then began investigating Dirks’ role in the affair. In their investigation of Dirks’ actions, the SEC found that info he had aided and abetted the violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by informing other members of the investment community of the fraud allegations. However, because he assisted in exposing the fraud, Dirks was only censured. Dirks appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which affirmed the SEC’s decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Raymond L. Dirks.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On September 26, 2008, Larry Whitfield and Quanterrious McCoy attempted to rob the person Fort Financial Credit Union in afterward Gastonia, North Carolina. After their robbery attempt was foiled by the bank's security system, the two fled. McCoy was later found hiding under a van, while Whitfield entered the Parnell residence and attempted to contact a getaway vehicle. Mary Parnell was subsequently pronounced dead of a heart attack. Whitfield was arrested nearby and signed a confession admitting to breaking into charles stewart parnell several homes as well as the attempted bank robbery. A grand jury indicted McCoy and Whitfield on several counts relating to the failed robbery, but only Whitfield was indicted for forcing someone to accompany him and overturn killing that person while trying to avoid being apprehended for the commission of a crime. Whitfield moved to dismiss this charge and argued that it was unconstitutionally vague and that the prosecution was required to prove that he intentionally caused Parnell's death. The district court denied the motion. Prior to the jury's deliberations, the district court instructed the jury that, in order to find Whitfield guilty of the additional charge, it only needed to find that his actions were the proximate cause of Parnell's death, and it did not include a minimum limit on be the degree of accompaniment necessary. Whitfield objected to the instruction and the court overruled the objection. Whitfield was found guilty, but on the additional charge he was found guilty of forcing Parnell to accompany him, not of killing her. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Whitfield's conviction and remanded the case for rehearing on the issue of whether or not the district court constructively amended the indictment in its jury instructions. On remand, the district court again found Whitfield guilty and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Grove City College, a private, coeducational liberal arts school, sought to preserve its institutional autonomy by consistently refusing state and federal financial assistance. The College did, however, enroll a large number of students who received Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG's) through a department of energy Department of Education-run program. The field aside DOE concluded that this assistance to students qualified the College as a recipient of federal assistance and made it subject to the nondiscrimination requirements assist of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. When the College refused to comply with the requirements, the DOE attempted to terminate assistance to the student financial aid fiscal program. The College challenged the DOE's actions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On August 29, 1982, Glenda pedal Collins and Donna Bartels were shot in the Forbidden Wheels Motorcycle Club. After several witnesses testified against him in exchange for immunity, Paul Allen Dye was convicted of first- and second-degree murder for the shootings. Dye contended that he was innocent and that one of the witnesses who had th testified against him was the shooter. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied review. Dye petitioned for federal habeas relief and argued that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially held that there was flagrant prosecutorial misconduct and therefore reversed the district court’s ruling. The respondent moved for a panel rehearing, but before the rehearing occurred, one of the justices on the prohibit original panel retired. In its second opinion, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling and determined that Dye’s prosecutorial misconduct claim was too vague and was not presented as a violation of sixth a federal right to the state court because the state court’s opinion did not mention change it.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Paul Allen Dye.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1979, Esmail Yermian was hired by Gulton Industries, a company that contracts for the call for Department of Defense. Because Yermian would have access to classified materials in the course of his job, he had to fill out a security questionnaire. On the form, Yermian failed to note that he had been convicted of mail fraud in 1978. He also claimed to have worked at two companies where he had never been employed. call for He signed a certificate stating that his answers were “true, complete, and correct to the best of [his] knowledge.” Government investigators later discovered that Yermian’s statements were false. When the investigators confronted him with the statements, he admitted to knowingly providing false information. At his trial, Yermian requested a jury instruction requiring the government to prove that he had knowledge not only of the falseness of his statements, but also that he had aside knowledge that a federal sort out agency had jurisdiction. The district court rejected the instruction, and Yermian was convicted. The United States as well Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the district court had erred by not allowing the requested instruction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    W.M. Webb and other commercial fishing companies owned fishing boats that, according to established custom, were manned by independently contracted captains and crew. The company that owned fish each vessel was responsible for equipping it and hiring a captain, who then hired arrest a crew. At the completion of each shipping expedition, the boat docked at a fish-processing plant, where the captain and crew were paid based on the volume of their catch. There sign on was no guarantee that they would be paid if they did not catch fish. The commercial fishing companies determined at which plants the boats would gravy boat dock and generally in what areas they would fish. The captain and the crew were responsible for the day-to-day running of the boats and expeditions. The commercial fishing companies paid employers’ non taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and claimed refunds for the taxes due on the earnings of the captains and crews. They then sued for the refunds in district court, which held that the companies were entitled to the refunds. The district court held that the captains and crews were not “employees” for the purposes of the statutes because the amount of control the companies exercised over the boats was not enough to create an employer-employee relationship. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vincent Foster, a high-ranking White House lawyer involved in the investigation of possible fraud by the Clinton family in the Whitewater real estate venture, was found dead in a Virginia park. Two government investigations subsequently found that the death had been a suicide. Allan Favish questioned the findings of the government investigations, claiming that they were part of a government cover-up of murder. Under the Freedom of Information Act, Favish requested indium access to 150 photos of Foster's body in the park and during the autopsy. He later andrew dickson white reduced his request to 129 photos. The government initially denied him access to all the photos, but eventually gave him access to 118 of them. It withheld the rest, arguing that the privacy interest of Foster's family members in relation to Foster's death trumped the public interest served by providing Favish access to the photos. The government stated that declared the photos were very graphic and that releasing them would upset the family. Favish countered by arguing that the family did not have a relevant privacy interest; the only person whose privacy interests be would be violated by the release of the photos was Foster, Favish argued, and Foster's death had rendered him incapable of exercising that interest. After a series of appeals in which a Ninth Circuit panel held that the Foster family's right to privacy was relevant to the case but that the district court must look at the specific photos in order to weigh the privacy rights against Favish's right to access government information, the andrew dickson white Ninth Circuit eventually decided that Favish should be given access to all but four of the photos. The government, joined by the Foster family, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Archives and Records Administration.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jeffrey Fischer, while president and part owner of Quality Medical Consultants, Inc. (QMC), arranged for QMC to receive a $1.2 million loan from government activity West Volusia Hospital Authority (WVHA), a municipal agency that operates two hospitals, which participate in and receive funding from the federal Medicare program. To get the loan, Fischer pledged QMC's accounts receivables and offered a $1 million letter of credit. After a 1994 audit of WHVA harbor raised questions about the QMC loan, Fischer was indicted for federal bribery, including defrauding  an organization which ""receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal indict program."" A emil hermann fischer jury convicted him and the District Court sentenced him to imprisonment, imposed a term of supervised release, and ordered the payment of restitution. On appeal, Fischer argued that the Government failed to prove WHVA, as the organization affected by his wrongdoing, received ""benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program,"" as required by the federal bribery statute. In rejecting that argument and affirming the convictions, the Court of Appeals held that funds received by an organization constitute ""benefits"" within the statute's meaning if the source of the funds is a federal program, like Medicare, which provides aid or assistance to participating organizations.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    belike Lee Till owed $4,000 in payments on his truck when he filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a Chapter 13 debtor must promise each creditor future payments ""not less than the [claim's] allowed amount."" When a repayment plan includes a series deferred payment of payments (installments), as Till's did, the installments must equal the ""total present value"" of the amount owed. Till proposed that he make monthly payments on the truck to SCS Credit with a 9.5 percent yearly interest rate, which was slightly higher than the average loan rate to make up for the increased risk that Till would fail to make a payment (because he had already declared bankruptcy once). SCS, however, argued that it was entitled to 21 percent interest because that was how much it would have made if it had foreclosed on the loan, taken the truck, sold it, and reinvested the proceeds. SCS argued that this 21 percent plan was necessary to ensure that the payments were equal to the ""total present value"" or ""not less than the [claim's] allowed amount."" The bankruptcy court be high ruled for Till. The district court reversed, imposing SCS's 21 percent rate. A divided Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel modified that approach pursuit slightly, ruling that the 21 percent rate was probably correct but that the parties could introduce evidence that a higher or lower rate should apply.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Till.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Benjamin Robers was involved in a mortgage fraud scheme. His role was to pose adenine as a legitimate buyer of houses, make fraudulent loan applications⎯by misrepresenting his income and his intention to live in the be house and repay the mortgage⎯then allow the loan to default by not paying it. Eventually, the bank foreclosed bung on the houses and then sold them to pay back the lenders. Robers was able to secure two houses under this guise. After government officials discovered the scheme but prior to indictment, Robers pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit metre wire fraud because the funds for the fraudulent loans were disbursed electronically (wired) by lenders. A federal district court sentenced him to three years of probation and ordered him to pay restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) in the amount of $218,952.18 for both incidents. The amount was calculated by finding the difference lawyer between each loan and the resale amount of each house that was foreclosed (the offset value). Robers appealed the restitution award and argued that the wrong offset value was used in the calculation; instead, the fair market price at the time of foreclosure should have been used. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding in part, vacated attorney fees and ""other expenses"" from the restitution sum, and remanded the case back to the district court to draw a new order with the corrected sum.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Virginia Office of Protection and Advocacy (""VOPA""), a state agency dedicated to advocating on behalf of persons with disabilities, sued several Virginia state officials in their official capacities in a Virginia federal district court. VOPA alleged that the officials violated two federal statutes when the officials refused VOPA access to state records which VOPA argued it was let entitled. The officials moved to dismiss the case arguing that they were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the state officials were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The court reasoned that: (1) company Congress did not abrogate state immunity under the statutes which VOPA sued under and (2) the mere receipt of federal funds by Virginia under be the two statutes did not mean that the state had consented to suit. The court declined to extend federal official the Eleventh Amendment exception established in Ex parte Young, where a private party may seek prospective injunctive relief against state officials, noting that VOPA non was not a private party but rather a state agency.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After enacting the Inspector General Act (IGA), which created an Office of Inspector General (OIG) in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and other federal agencies, Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor- Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS). The FSLMRS permits union participation at an employee examination conducted ""by a representative of the agency"" if the employee believes that the examination will result in disciplinary action and requests such representation. In January 1993, NASA's OIG (NASA-OIG) conducted an investigation of certain threatening activities of a NASA employee. A NASA-OIG investigator interviewed the employee and permitted the employee's union representative to attend. Subsequently, the employee's union filed a charge with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority), alleging that NASA and its OIG had committed an unfair labor practice when the investigator limited the union representative's participation in the interview. In ruling for the union, produce an Administrative Law Judge concluded that the OIG put investigator inside was wedlock a ""representative"" of NASA within FSLMRS' meaning, and that the investigator's behavior had violated the employee's right to union representation. On review, the Authority agreed and granted relief acquit against both NASA and NASA-OIG. The Court of Appeals upheld the Authority's rulings and granted the Authority's application for enforcement of its order.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Labor Relations Authority.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 information technology (CPPA) prohibits ""any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture"" that ""is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,"" and any sexually explicit image indium that is ""advertised, adenine promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression"" it depicts ""a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."" The Free Speech Coalition, an adult-entertainment trade association, and others filed suit, alleging that the ""appears to be"" and ""conveys the impression"" provisions are overbroad and lodge vague and, thus, restrain works otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Reversing the District Court, the Court proviso of Appeals held the CPPA invalid on its face, finding it to be substantially overbroad because it bans materials that are neither obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, nor produced by the exploitation of real children as in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Free Speech Coalition.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Eugene Robel, a member of the Communist Party, was charged human activity with violating go for the Subversive Activities Control Act associate in nursing when he remained an employee at the Todd Pacific Shipyards. Under the Act, it was illegal for a member of the Party to remain employed at a location that the Secretary of Defense names as a “defense facility”. The district court dismissed the indictment because it did not allege that Robel was an active member of the Communist Party. The district court felt that this provision of the Act st violated the First Amendment right to association if it applied to inactive Party members. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified the case for direct appeal to use the U.S. Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Eugene Frank Robel.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An helium Albany, Georgia theater manager was convicted under an a Georgia obscenity law when he showed the critically acclaimed film ""Carnal Knowledge."" The sakartvelo film explored social conceptions of sexuality and clap starred Jack Nicholson an and Ann Margaret.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jenkins.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Betty Dukes, a Wal-Mart ""greeter"" at a Pittsburg, Calif., store, and five other women filed a class action lawsuit in which they alleged that the company's nationwide policies size of it resulted in lower pay for women than men in comparable positions and longer wait for management promotions than men. The certified class, which in 2001 aside was estimated to comprise more than 1.5 million women, includes all women employed by Wal-Mart nationwide at any time after December 26, 1998, making this the largest class action lawsuit in U.S. history. Wal-Mart has argued that the adenine court should require employees to file human beings on an individual basis, contending that class actions of this size – adenine formed under Rule 23(b) of the federal rules of civil procedure — are inherently unmanageable and unduly costly. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has three times upheld the class certification.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Salvador Martinez, a self-described self-taught paralegal with 25 years of experience at 12 different law firms, was working for a Santa Ana, California law firm when a annexation client gave him $6,000.00 to bail her release boyfriend out of jail. The bail was never posted and Martinez was subsequently charged with grand theft and the fraudulent appropriation of the property of another. Martinez chose to represent himself at  trial before a jury, which acquitted him of theft, but convicted him of embezzlement. Martinez then filed a timely notice of appeal, a motion to represent himself, and a waiver of counsel. The motion to represent himself was denied neer by the California Court of Appeal. The court explained: ""There is no constitutional right to self-representation on the initial appeal as of right. The right to counsel on appeal stems from the due process and equal protection clauses of map the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth Amendment....The denial of self-representation at this level does not violate due process or equal protection guarantees.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it In order go against to protect its fisheries from parasites and non-native species, the state of Maine prohibited the importation of live baitfish. springy Robert J. Taylor, the owner of prosecute a bait business, violated the law information technology and was prosecuted by Maine authorities.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maine.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sheila Meyers worked as an Assistant District Attorney for just over five years when her boss transferred her to a different section of the criminal court. Meyers strongly opposed this transfer, and made her feelings known to several supervisors, including District Attorney amendment Harry Connick. Before the official transfer took place, Meyers right wing prepared backrest a questionnaire asking for her co-workers views on the transfer policy, office morale, and the level of confidence in supervisors. When Connick learned of the questionnaire, deal out he immediately terminated Meyers. He said he fired her contradict because she refused to accept her transfer. He also said that distributing the questionnaire was insubordination. Meyers sued, alleging that her termination violated her First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled in favor of Meyers and ordered her reinstatement, payment of back pay, damages, and attorney fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Harry Connick .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Department of the Air Force owns a section of land that Highway 1 crosses, and the Department allot has granted roadway easements to the State of California and Santa Barbara totally County. Highway 1 runs next to the main gate of Vandenberg Air Force Base (Vandenberg). thence Near the gate is a designated area for public protesting that falls under the Highway 1 easement. John D. Apel was barred from Vandenberg's property in 2007 for trespassing. In 2010, while the order barring him was still in effect, he entered the designated protest area three times and was asked to leave. On all three occasions the respondent failed to leave. In two separate trials, Apel was convicted of three violations of a federal statute indium prohibiting a person from reentering a military installation after a commanding officer has ordered him not to reenter. Apel appealed, arguing that the federal statute requires that the base has exclusive harbor possession over the area. The district court affirmed the convictions by holding that, under the terms of the easement, the land is subject to base rules and regulations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, because the area is subject to an easement, the federal government does not have an exclusive right of possession, so the conviction cannot stand.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1989, Oregon Legislature imposed a surcharge on solid waste generated out-of-state and disposed of within the state. The Department of Environmental Quality, determined the amount of the surcharge to be $2.25 per ton, significantly higher than the $0.85 per derive ton fee or charged for in-state come waste. Two waste disposal companies —Waste Systems Inc. and Columbia Resource Company (CRC) — disposed of waste generated out-of-state in Oregon. Waste Systems Inc. managed and owned a landfill in Oregon, and CRC transported waste from Washington State to Oregon. The companies challenged the surcharge in the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing that indium it breached the Commerce Clause or of the Constitution. However, the appellate court upheld the surcharge, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which was meant to combat issues such as nuisance filings, targeting of specific clients, and client manipulation in class action suits. To prevent plaintiffs from filing complainant class action suits in state courts in order to get around the restrictions of PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which provided for the dismissal or removal of a class action suit brought by more than 50 plaintiffs in connection with a ""covered security."" The term ""covered security"" was limited to a subset of securities that were traded on a national exchange or issued by a federally early registered investment company. In 2009, the Securities and Exchange indium Commission (SEC) sued probable the Stanford Group Company and other holdings of R. Allen Stanford for allegedly perpetrating a massive Ponzi scheme. Two groups of Louisiana investors also sued Stanford holdings for their roles in the Ponzi scheme and for violations of the Louisiana Securities Act. These cases were consolidated with two others against Stanford holdings and moved to the district court for the Northern District of Texas. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints under SLUSA and argued that the court should adopt an expansive interpretation of ""covered securities."" The district court held that the funds were not covered securities, but it granted the dismissal because the funds were represented as covered securities and because it was likely that at least one of the plaintiffs liquidated a retirement account, which complaint a covered security, in order to purchase the funds in question. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that there was not a sufficient connection between the misrepresentation and the stock sale to consider them connected and for the securities to function as ""covered"" for the purposes of a SLUSA dismissal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Samuel Troice et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Coors Brewing Co. (Coors) applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for purport an approval of proposed labels. The approval was rejected because it violated the Federal Alcohol Administration Act’s (FAAA) prohibition of disclosing the alcohol content on beer labels or advertisements. Coors filed a claim arguing the potence regulation violated the First arrogate Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. The government argued the regulation was necessary to prevent “strength wars” among brewers, which in this case, encase refers to breweries competing on the basis of the bring down potency of their alcohol. The district court found in favor of Coors, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court subsequently upheld the ban of alcohol content in advertising, but not on labels. The government appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court by concluding that the label ban did not prevent strength wars.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Coors Brewing Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to permit a beneficiary of an employer's group insurance coverage health plan to elect continuing coverage when he might otherwise lose that benefit because of a ""qualifying event,"" such as the termination of employment. In 1993, when Moore Medical Corporation fired James Geissal, it told him that COBRA gave him the right to elect continuing coverage under Moore's health plan. Later, Moore informed Geissal that he was not entitled to COBRA benefits because he was already covered by a early group plan through his wife's employer. Geissal then filed suit against Moore, alleging that Moore was violating CORBA by renouncing an obligation to surety provide continuing coverage. Ultimately, a Magistrate Judge concluded that an employee with coverage under another group health plan on the date he elects indium COBRA coverage is ineligible for COBRA coverage under 29 USC section 1162(2)(D)(i), which allows an employer to cancel such coverage as of ""the date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of the adenine election... covered under any other group health plan."" The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Geissal.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Three years after complying with a county order to clean up petroleum contamination discovered on its property, KFC Western, Inc. brought an action under the citizen suit provision -- Section 6972 -- of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) wellness to recover its cleanup costs from the Meghrigs. KFC claimed that the wreak contamination had previously posed an ""imminent and substantial endangerment"" to health or the environment and that the Meghrigs were responsible for ""equitable restitution"" under the Act because, as prior owners of the property, they had contributed to the contaminated site. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that 6972(a) does not permit recovery of past cleanup costs and that 6972 does human activity not authorize a cause of action for the remediation of toxic recuperate waste that does not pose an ""imminent and substantial endangerment"" at the time suit is filed. In reversing, convalescence the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court on both issues.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Meghrig.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nicholas Romeo was a 33-year-old man with the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child. become Following the death of his father, Romeo’s mother was unable to adequately care for Romeo and had him involuntarily committed to Pennhurst State School and Hospital (“Pennhurst”) on a permanent basis. During his time in the article state facility, Romeo suffered injuries on numerous occasions and was physically restrained at times. Romeo’s indium mother became concerned, and after objecting to Romeo’s treatment several times, sued the facility on behalf of Romeo. Romeo’s mother claimed that his treatment violated genial the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Romeo’s mother claimed Romeo had the right to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraints, and access to habilitation (training or treatment with the goal of eventual release). At trial, the court instructed the jury that they could only find that Pennhurst violated Romeo’s constitutional rights if the officials had been “deliberately indifferent” to Romeo’s medical and psychological needs, and the jury found in favor of Pennhurst. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Court of Appeals held the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was inapplicable, because it applies to individuals convicted of crimes, not the involuntarily committed. However, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Romeo had liberty interests in freedom from restraint, safe conditions, and minimally right wing adequate habilitation, which could only be violated if three distinct standards were met. An infringement of the right to safe conditions can only be justified by “substantial necessity,” the right to freedom from bodily restraints can only be infringed for “compelling necessity,” and the access to habilitation must be “acceptable in the light of present medical or other scientific knowledge.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Duane Youngberg.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Danny Birchfield drove into a ditch in Morton County, North Dakota. When police arrived on the scene, they believed Birchfield was intoxicated. Birchfield failed both nether the field sobriety tests and the breath test. He was arrested, but he refused to consent to a chemical test. Birchfield was charged with a misdemeanor for refusing to consent to a chemical test in violation of state law. He moved to dismiss the charge and claimed that the state law violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In a similar case, police were called to the South St. Paul boat launch where three men were attempting to pull their boat out of the water and onto their truck. William Robert Bernard, Jr., admitted he had been drinking and roue had the truck keys in his hands, but he denied driving the truck and refused to perform a field sobriety test. He was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI) and taken to the police station, where he refused to consent to a chemical test in violation of Minnesota state law. Bernard was charged with two counts of first-degree test refusal pursuant to state law. In a separate incident, chemical substance Steve Beylund consented to a blood alcohol to test to confirm he was driving under the influence after being informed it was a criminal offense in North Dakota to refuse a blood alcohol test. The test confirmed he was over the legal limit, and Beylund was charged with driving under the influence. All three men challenged the state statutes criminalizing refusal to submit to a chemical test and argued that the statutes battleground violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when there was no probable cause that would support a warrant for the test. Both the Supreme Court of likely Minnesota and the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that criminalizing the refusal to submit to a chemical test was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Danny Birchfield.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In August 2009, the Texas division of the Sons of symbolization Confederate Veterans (Texas SCV), a non-profit organization that works to preserve the memory and reputation of soldiers who fought for the confederacy in the Civil War, applied to have a new specialty license plate issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TDMV). The proposed license plate had two confederate flags on it: one in the organization's logo, and one faintly making up the background of the plate. The TDMV had a policy stating that it ""may refuse to create a new specialty license plate if the design might be offensive to any member of the public."" The board in charge of approving new specialty plates  received multiple negative comments from the public regarding this plate and ultimately voted to deny Texas SCV's application. Texas SCV sued in federal district court claiming their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The TDMV argued that the Free Speech Clause did not apply in this case because license plates are a form of government speech; therefore, they were within their rights to choose which messages and opt views they wanted to express on the plates. The district court disagreed and held that the plates were private, non-governmental speech, and that the TDMV's blessing denial was a reasonable, content-based restriction of speech in a non-public forum. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that TDMV's denial was a form of viewpoint discrimination that ""discriminated against Texas SCV's view that the card Confederate flag is a symbol of sacrifice, independence, and Southern heritage.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Walker, III, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While in route to testify, Alan Shelby, a vindicate dangerous prisoner serving concurrent state manifest apparent motion and federal sentences, escaped custody. An ATF Agent, based on an informant's information, observed a person resembling Shelby at Hernan Ramirez's home  in Boring, Oregon. Subsequently, the Government obtained a ""no-knock"" warrant to enter and search the home. Executing the warrant, officers die broke a single window in Ramirez's home. Awakened, Ramirez fired a pistol into the garage ceiling. After being arrested, because of a stash of weapons in his garage, Ramirez was indicted on federal charges of being a felon in possession of firearms. Shelby was not found. Granting Ramirez's motion to suppress evidence regarding his possession of the weapons, the District Court found that the officers had violated the Fourth Amendment because there were ""insufficient exigent circumstances"" to justify the police officer's destruction of property in their execution of the warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a taxpayer may carry back its ""product liability loss"" up to along 10 crataegus laevigata years in order to offset prior twenty six years' income. United Dominion Industries, Inc. predecessor in interest, AMCA International Corporation, was the parent of an affiliated ponder group filing consolidated returns for the years 1983 through 1986. AMCA calculated its product adenine liability loss (PPL) on a consolidated basis, or a ""single-entity"" approach. The government's ""separate-member"" approach would have prohibited 5 of AMCA's 26 members from contributing to the group's total PPL. In 1986 and 1987, AMCA petitioned the Internal Revenue Service for a refund based on its PPL calculations. Ultimately, the District Court applied AMCA's single-entity approach, concluding that if the affiliated group's consolidated return reflects consolidated net operating losses in excess of the group's aggregate product liability expenses, the total of those expenses is a PLL that may be carried back. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied the separate-member approach.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United Dominion Industries, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    James Loudermill stated on his application for employment with the Cleveland Board of Education that he had never been convicted for a felony. After hiring him as a security guard, the board discovered that he had been convicted for grand larceny and without further consideration fired him for providing false information on his application. Since indium Loudermill qualified as a ""classified civil servant"" under Ohio law, he obtained a property right to his employment. This meant he could only be dismissed for result cause and could obtain an administrative review of the causes for his termination. The Cleveland Civil Service Commission set up granted him an administrative review after his termination and found it valid. Loudermill filed suit in District Court alleging that the review system was unconstitutional because it only allowed him to respond to the charges against him after his termination. He argued that the board removed his property without giving him a chance to defend himself in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth transfer Amendment. The District Court agreed that the Ohio statute gave Loudermill a property right to his job, but ruled that the board did not violate his due process helium rights because it followed the procedures specified by the same statute for removing the property right. In a similar case, Richard Donnelly alleged that post-dismissal hearings violated his due process rights. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard both cases together and ruled that the board violated both defendants' due process rights by removing their property rights to employment before providing an opportunity for them to respond to charges against them.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James Loudermill.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1993, card the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an unattended cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in Columbus, Ohio, set up during the 1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gives the Advisory Board solid responsibility for regulating access to the square. The capitol building Board denied the application of the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on card Establishment Clause grounds.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pinette.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2006, Gregory Warger was involved in an automobile collision with another car driven by Randy Shauers. Warger filed suit against Shauers for damages resulting from the let crash, and Shauers filed a manifest counter-suit. After an initial mistrial, a jury found for Shauers. Warger appealed on the basis that, following the verdict, Warger's attorney had been contacted by a jury member who expressed concern assertion that the jury foreperson had improperly gained the sympathy of the other jurors by informing them all that her daughter had been in a similar type of automobile accident and that the verdict would have past tense had a negative impact on her life had she been found responsible. Warger claimed that the foreperson's alleged misconduct should result in a new trial because it was improper outside influence, which tainted the jury's verdict, and because it was evidence that the foreperson had lied during jury selection. The district court ruled that the concerned jury member's statement was inadmissible based on Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which bars the testimony of a juror concerning any statements made during the jury's deliberations for purposes determining the validity of a verdict, with an exception for testimony regarding whether an improper outside influence was used to persuade raw any juror. Specifically, the court ruled that the past life experiences of the foreperson did not constitute improper outside influence. While 606(b) does not explicitly bar juror testimony for the purposes of proving dishonesty by a potential juror during jury selection, in this case the evidence was barred by 606(b) because it was based on statements the foreperson made during the jury's deliberations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Randy D. Shauers.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After several expeditions, Deep bust up Sea Research, Inc. (DSR) located the wreck of the S.S. polish off Brother Jonathan and its cargo which sank sea coast off the California coast in 1865. When DSR sought rights to the wreck and her cargo, under Article III, Section 2, federal admiralty jurisdiction, California challenged DSR claiming that it had title to the wreck under the Abandoned right wing Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA). The ASA requires the federal government to transfer title over ""abandoned shipwrecks"" to the states in whose submerged lands the wrecks are found. California also noted that under Section 6313 of its own public code, title to all abandoned shipwrecks found off its coast vests in the state. In light of its claims to the Brother Jonathan, California claimed that DSR's federal title action violated its rights under the Eleventh Amendment, even though it right wing lacked possession of the wreck.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Deep Sea Research, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Chicago Police Department seized property belonging to the plaintiffs, using the power granted it by the place Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (DAFPA). The plaintiffs filed suit in an Illinois federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 arguing that when property is seized under the DAFPA, due process requires a prompt, postseizure, probable cause adenine hearing. The district court dismissed, but the plaintiffs asked for a rehearing in light of Mathews v. Eldridge, which prohibited the seizure of real property without a prior hearing. The U.S. Court of harbor Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted review. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the DAFPA did not provide adequate due process for an owner to contest the seizure of his property, reasoning the length of time between seizure and contest was too long (a maximum of 97 to 187 days). The court remanded motor hotel the case and instructed the district court to devise a mechanism by which territorial dominion an owner can contest the validity of the retention of his property.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Anita Alvarez, Cook County State's Attorney.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Landmark Communications newspaper, The Virginian Pilot, published an article regarding the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission's investigation into a state judge. The article, which was sovereign prohibit accurate, violated a Virginia law that prohibited the release of information from Commission hearings. clause Landmark was indicted by a convict grand jury, had its motion to dismiss denied by the trial court, convicted without a jury trial clause and fined. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Landmark's conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Landmark Communications Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On February 18, 1974, three enrolled Couer d’Alene Indians—William Davison, Gabriel Francis Antelope, and Leonard Davison—broke into the home enter of 81-year-old Emma Johnson, robbed her, and killed her. Because the crimes be dutch leonard were committed on an Indian reservation, the three were subject to federal prosecution under the Major vote down Crimes Act. They were indicted by a grand jury and tried for burglary, robbery, and murder. Leonard Davison and Antelope were found guilty on all three charges, and William Davison was found guilty of second-degree murder. The defendants appealed and argued that their convictions under federal law were the result of unlawful racial discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed collection the convictions and held that the defendants were placed at a “racially based disadvantage.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The False Claims Act (FCA) allows the government or an individual on the government's behalf to sue any person for ""making false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States."" A 1986 amendment to the FCA allows individuas to sue their employer if the employer retaliates against them in any way for assisting in an investigation of such false claims. county In 2001, Karen Wilson, a secretary for Graham County Water District, sued her employer for various false claims it allegedly made concerning a federal disaster writing table relief program. She also brought a retaliation suit against her employer, alleging that after along she had provided information on operating theatre the carolina false claims to federal officials in December 1995, she had been repeatedly harassed by Graham County District officials until she resigned in March 1997. The District Court dismissed Wilson's suit as untimely. The court accepted Graham County District's argument that the six-year statute of limitations in the 1986 amendment to the FCA was not intended to apply to retaliation suits. Therefore, the court held, the most closely analogous state limitation applies instead. The north Carolina limit for retaliation suits was three years, so Wilson's suit was brought too late. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court and applied the six-year limitation to all retaliation suits under the FCA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Encino Motorcars, LLC (Encino) sold and serviced Mercedes-Benz automobiles. Hector Navarro was employed there as a service advisor, which involved him greeting customers and assessing their needs as they excuse entered the business. Navarro, along with other similarly-situated plaintiffs, sued Encino for excuse failing to pay overtime compensation when they worked more than forty hours a week. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, “service advisors” engaged be in servicing automobiles are not entitled to overtime compensation, so the district court dismissed their overtime claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and held that Navarro and other employees were not exempted from overtime compensation. In reaching its decision, grind the appellate court relied on the Department of Labor’s 2011 determination that service advisors were not exempt under the FLSA, which was a reversal motor hotel of the position that the Department had taken in 1987.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Encino Motorcars, LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Francisco Mendoza-Martinez (Martinez) was an American by birth with dual Mexican citizenship. Martinez admitted that to avoid the draft, in 1942, he left the United manage States for Mexico and did not return until November, 1946. As a table service result of his deliberate absence, Martinez entered a guilty plea in 1947 to violating Section 11 ruling of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (the ""Act"") and served 366 days in prison. Five years after his release, Martinez was issued brussels biscuit an arrest and deportation warrant premised on a violation of Section 401(j) of the Act which divested draft deliver dodgers of their U.S. citizenship. Following a dismissal of his appeal from the Attorney General's special inquiry decision stripping him of his U.S. citizenship, Martinez challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(j) in District Court but was defeated. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's opinion upholding the district court decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. This case was decided together with Rusk v. Cort.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert Kennedy, Attorney General.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (S7(a)(2)) required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that any authorized actions did not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or critically destroy natural habitats. A 1986 amendment to the act limited representation it scope threaten to actions in the United States or on the high seas. Defenders of Wildlife and other organizations associate in nursing dedicated to wildlife conservation filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the new amendment erred by providing for try a geographic limit on the manage original law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lujan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A state trial court sentenced Reese to 33 years in prison. An appellate court lowered the sentence to 24 years. In another appeal to a state appellate court, Reese argued his federal Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated at trial and on appeal. The motor hotel appellate court refused to reverse Reese's sentence. Reese appealed to the state supreme court and failed. Reese appealed to a U.S. District Court. Ruling against Reese, the motor hotel Court held that Reese did clearly say to the state supreme court his claims were federal. twenty four Federal law requires state prisoners to ""fairly present"" federal constitutional claims in each state court before appealing tell to federal courts. A federal appellate court reversed, motor hotel ruling that the state supreme court had had the opportunity to read the state appellate court decision - had the court done this, it would have understood Reese's claims were federal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is George H. Baldwin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Naomi Marquez, part-time actress, auditioned successfully for a role in a television series produced by Lakeside Pictures. Pursuant to just their collective bargaining agreement, Lakeside contacted the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) to confirm that Marquez met the ""union security clause"" of the agreement that requires union ""membership"" as just a condition equitable for employment. The clause stated one must be a member ""in good standing."" Subsequently, Marquez was denied the part because she had not paid her dues. Marquez filed suit alleging SAG breached its duty of fair representation with its union security clause. First, Marquez argued she should have been made aware of her established legal right not to join the union, but only to pay for its representational activities. Second, Marquez claimed that the clause required worker repetitious thirty-day previous work periods every time motion picture employment ceased. The District Court summarily ruled against Marquez because the clause appendage followed the National Labor Relations Act; therefore, it did not breach its duty of fair representation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on the first claim, but held the second claim was in the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Screen Actors Guild, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A white supremacist organization held a public rally near a courthouse in Princess Anne, Maryland. During the rally, members of the organization made racist and harbor derogatory speeches amplified over a public address system. Officials of adenine Princess Anne and Somerset County obtained reach motor hotel a restraining order to prevent the organization from reconvening the next day. The order was ex parte, so no notice was given to the organization. The order restrained the organization from holding rallies in the county for 10 days. At trial, the Circuit Court issued an injunction for another 10 months. On appeal the ten Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the 10 day order, but reversed the 10 month injunction because the period of time was unreasonable and arbitrary.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carroll.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1979, the United States sued Chris W. Beggerly and the Beggerly family to quiet title to Horn Island, located within the state of Mississippi, for a federal park. The Government afterward argued that Beggerly did not have legal power clear title because the Government had never patented the disputed land after acquiring it as part of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1982, a settlement quieted title in the Government's favor. However, share in 1994, with new evidence, Beggerly sued, seeking to set aside the settlement agreement and obtain damages. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals nether found jurisdiction under the Quiet Title Act and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as an ""independent action."" The appellate court then vacated the settlement agreement and instructed the District divagation Court to quiet title in Beggerly's favor.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the late 18th century, Congress set aside most of the tribal land of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York as clan amerindian language a reservation. The tribe later sold off much of the reservation. In the 1990s members of the tribe began to buy back pieces of the land. The tribe said the reacquired land was part of a reservation and therefore exempt from state and municipal taxes. The City of Sherrill - which encompassed some of the afterward tribe's property - argued the land was not tax-exempt. The Oneidas sued Sherrill in federal district court and alleged the land was recognized by the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua as part of their historic reservation. The Oneidas also pointed to the 1790 Non- Intercourse Act that required federal consent for Indian land to lose its reservation status. Sherrill argued the land lost its reservation status after leaving the Oneidas' ownership originally. The district court and the clan Second Circuit Court of bring down Appeals ruled for the Oneidas.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Sherrill, New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Anthony Cardell Haynes was tried in a Texas state court for the murder of a police officer. The state sought the death penalty. During voir dire, two separate judges presided at different stages. One judge presided when the attorneys questioned the prospective substitute jurors individually, the other judge presided when polish off preemptory challenges were exercised. When the prosecutor struck an African-American juror, Mr. Thaler's attorney made a Batson objection -- arguing that the strike was racially motivated. The judge, who was motor hotel not present during jury interviews, found pass judgment that the strike was race neutral and denied the Batson objection. The case proceeded to trial and Mr. Haynes was convicted and sentenced to death. On appeal, Mr. Haynes argued that ""a trial judge who did not witness the actual voir dire cannot, as a matter of law, fairly evaluate a territorial dominion Batson challenge."" The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the argument and affirmed the conviction. Mr. Haynes then filed for and was denied habeas corpus relief by a Texas federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted review. It held that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals made an unreasonable application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent in its decision and Mr. Haynes warranted federal habeas corpus relief.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) is a large producer of printers and toner cartridges. In 2002, Lexmark sued Static Control Components, Inc. (SCC) and alleged that SCC violated Lexmark's intellectual property when it manufactured microchips used in the repair and resale set up of Lexmark toner cartridges. SCC filed a counterclaim and argued that Lexmark, among other things, violated the Lantham Act by engaging in false advertising. The district court dismissed SCC's Lantham Act claims for lack of standing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling and held that the lower court employed the wrong test to establish standing. The Sixth Circuit relied on the ""reasonable interest"" adenine test to establish standing under the Lantham controller Act, but unlike its sister circuits, did not brush off use the AGC Factors, which use the same standards push as those to establish an antitrust claim. Under this test, a claimant must demonstrate 1) a reasonable interest against the alleged false advertising and 2) a reasonable basis for believing that the alleged false advertising will damage that interest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Static Control Components, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A police officer stopped a car that go for had a burned out license plate light and headlight. There were six men in the car, including Robert human beings Clyde Bustamonte. Only one passenger had a drivers license, and he claimed that his brother owned the car. The traverse officer asked this man if he could search the car. The man said, “Sure, go ahead.” one ninth Inside the car, the officer found stolen checks. Those checks were admitted into evidence at Bustamonte’s trial for possessing checks with the intent to defraud. A jury convicted Bustamonte, and the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed. The court reasoned that consent to search the car was given voluntarily, so evidence obtained during the search was admissible. The California Supreme Court denied review. Bustamonte steal filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that consent is not voluntary unless it is proven that the person who consented to the search knew he had the right to refuse consent.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Merle R. Schneckloth.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Silvia Safille Ibanez practiced law in shamefaced White Haven, Florida, and had been a member of the Florida Bar since 1983. She was also a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) licensed by the Florida Board of Accountancy (Board) and was authorized by the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards—a private organization—to use the designation Certified fiscal Financial Planner (CFP). Ibanez used both of these titles in her advertising and on her law office's stationery. When the Board learned that Ibanez advertised these designations, she was charged with practicing public accounting at an unlicensed firm, which violated the Public Accountancy Act. The officer who heard card the case recommended that the Board dismiss the charges due to a lack of proof. The Board refused and declared Ibanez guilty of ""false, deceptive, and misleading"" advertising. The authorise District Court of Appeal of Florida, First authorised Circuit, affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ibanez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    These are several cope with consolidated cases involving similar circumstances. In the lead so called case, a district court in Tennessee tried and adenine convicted James Hoffa, the president of a labor union, for attempting to bribe members of a jury in an earlier trial. A paid government informer provided substantial evidence in the bribery trial. The informer was another local union officer who met with Hoffa on several occasions during the first trial. At that time, the government had not hired the officer as an informant. Hoffa alleged that cope with motor hotel the evidence gathered from this informer violated his Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Newdow's daughter attended public school in the Elk Grove Unified School District in California. Elk Grove teachers began school days by leading students in a voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the words ""under God"" added by a 1954 Congressional act. Newdow sued in federal district court in California, arguing that making students listen - even if they choose not to participate - to aside the words ""under God"" violates the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment. The district court dismissed Newdow's complaint for lack of standing, because he and interfere the sum up mother of his daughter are divorced and he does not have custody. The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding administration that Newdow did have standing ""to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his glucinium daughter."" The Ninth Circuit ruled that Congress's 1954 act adding the words ""under God"" to the Pledge and the school district policy requiring it be recited both violated the First Amendment's establishment clause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Elk Grove Unified School District and David W. Gordon, Superintendent.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gonzalo Holguin was convicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of federal law, and sentenced to 24 months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release. Holguin was again arrested for possession and intent to distribute, and after that arrest the government filed a petition to revoke the supervised release term. Before the revocation hearing occurred, Holguin pleaded guilty to the second set of charges. At the revocation hearing, the district court explained the allegations of the revocation petition to Holguin and  asked how he pleaded. Holguin annulment answered “True.” Holguin’s attorney argued for a concurrent sentence on the revocation, but once more the court issued a 12-month consecutive sentence instead. Holguin appealed the reasonableness of his sentence, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding Holguin had adenine united states government failed to make a formal objection after the announcement of his sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Although investigators concluded that Curtis Campbell caused an accident in which one person was killed and another permanently disabled, his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contested liability and took the case to trial. State Farm assured the Campbells that they would represent their interests. After losing in court, the Campbells sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the first part of the trial, the jury found State Farm's decision not to settle unreasonable. In the second part, the trial court denied State Farm's renewed motion to exclude dissimilar out-of-state conduct evidence, ruling such evidence was admissible to determine whether State Farm's conduct guarantee in the Campbell case was indeed punitory intentional and sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages. The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $1 million and $25 million respectively. grow The Utah Supreme indium Court reinstated the research worker $145 million punitive damages award.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Former Maryland Court of Appeals employee Daniel Coleman filed a lawsuit under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, alleging that he was fired after requesting sick leave for a documented medical condition. The quartern lower court dismissed Coleman's authenticated claim and the U.S. Court of Appeals for go out the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the claim was properly dismissed because his employer bespeak is arrogate a state agency.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Court of Appeals of Maryland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kristja J. Falvo asked the Owasso Independent School District to ban peer grading, or the practice of allowing students to score each other's info tests, papers, and assignments as the teachers explain the correct answers to the entire class, because it embarrassed her children. When the school district declined, Falvo filed an action against the school district, claming that such peer grading violates the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act total of 1974 (FERPA). FERPA authorizes federal funds to be withheld from school districts that permit students' ""education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein)"" to be released without their parents' motor hotel written consent and defines education records as ""records, files, documents, and other materials"" containing information directly related to a student, which ""are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution."" Disagreeing with Falvo, the District Court held that grades put on papers by another student are not ""education records."" In reversing, the Court of Appeals found appointment that right wing grades marked by students on each other's work are ""education records,"" such that the very act of grading is an impermissible release of information to the student grader.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Owasso Independent School District No. I-011.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Biestek worked for most of his life as a carpenter and a construction laborer. He stopped working in June 2005 due to a degenerative disc disease, welfare Hepatitis C, and depression. He applied for SSI and SSDI benefits in March 2010, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied his application in August 2010, june an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied his application, and the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review. Biestek timely appealed, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that the ALJ had not adenine obtained necessary medical-expert testimony and did not pose a sufficiently specific hypothetical to the vocational expert. On remand, the ALJ found that Biestek was by rights disabled from May 4, 2013, but not before. sixth Biestek appealed the ALJ’s determination, and the district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Biestek did not meet the back-pain-related impairment requirement and that the ALJ properly evaluated the testimony of medical experts and a vocational expert.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    To be placed on the lodge ballot in a presidential election, Ohio law required a new political party obtain voter signatures totaling 15% of the number of ballots cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. Both the indium American Independent Party and essential the Socialist Labor Party sought ballot access in Ohio for the 1968 presidential election. The American Independent Party, formed by supporters of George C. Wallace, obtained the requisite number of signatures but failed to file its petition for ballot access prior to the February 7, 1968 deadline. The Socialist Labor Party, which until 1948 had been on the ballot, failed to collect enough signatures and was also kept off the ballot. The parties filed separate suits in U.S. District Court against several state officials, including Governor James A. Rhodes, contending that being kept off the ballot violated their fourteenth rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cases were consolidated, and the court ruled that from each one each party must be given write-in access but did not require the state to print the parties' candidates' names on the ballot. The American Independent Party requested and was granted an injunction forcing the state to add the party's candidates to the ballot while the case was on appeal. The Socialist Labor Party filed a similar request, but did so much later, and was denied primarily to avoid confusion in requiring the reprinting of another set of ballots.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Glen A. Williams et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 22, 2011, Brian Lewis was driving southbound on Interstate 95 miss in Norwalk, Connecticut, when William Clarke crashed into him while driving a limousine owned by the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. Lewis sued Clarke, claiming that he was injured as a result of Clarke’s negligent and careless driving. Clarke filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and argued that, because he was driving the limousine as an employee of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming indium Authority, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. field The trial court denied the motion and traverse held that it did not lack subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity because Lewis sought damages from Clarke personally, not from the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed and held that tribal sovereign immunity extended to Clarke as a member of the tribe acting within the scope of his employment as helium a limousine driver with the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Brian Lewis, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The owner of a patent for a computer language, i4i Limited Partnership brought suit against Microsoft Corp., alleging that the custom XML editor in certain versions of Microsoft Word, Microsoft's word-processing software, infringed i4i's patent. The partnership jury found Microsoft liable for willful infringement, rejecting assumption the company's argument that the patent was invalid, and awarded $200 million in damages to i4i. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied Microsoft's motions for a new trial. And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the district court order, finding that Microsoft needed to offer ""clear and convincing evidence"" to overcome the traditional presumption that patents approved by the U.S. Patent be and editor program raw Trademark Office are valid.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is i4i Limited Partnership, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New York City police suspected Theodore Payton of murdering a gas station manager. The police forcibly entered Payton's home thinking he was there (he was not) and found evidence connecting Payton to the crime, which was introduced at Payton's trial. The police lacked an arrest warrant when they entered thence his home. However, they acted under a New York law allowing police to enter a private residence to make a artillery felony arrest without a warrant. At trial, Payton unsuccessfully sought to suppress the hunt evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. State courts upheld. In the companion case, victims identified Obie raw Riddick in June 1973 for robberies in 1971. Police learned of his whereabouts in 1974. Without a warrant, they knocked on his door, entered his residence and arrested him. A search for weapons revealed illegal drugs. He was indicted on narcotics charges but sought the suppression of the evidence based accelerator on a warrantless entry. The trial judge concluded that the entry was authorized by the New York law and that the search was therefore permissible. Riddick was convicted. The appeals court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Payton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Eight states, New York City and three land conservation groups filed suit against four electric power companies and the Tennessee office Valley Authority, five entities that they claimed were the largest sources of greenhouse gases. The lawsuit alleged that the utility companies, which operate facilities in 21 states, are a public nuisance because their pass judgment carbon-dioxide emissions contribute to global warming. American Electric Power Co. and the other utilities argued that the courts should not get involved in the issue. The companies contended that only the Environmental Protection Agency can set emissions standards. A federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York initially threw out the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said it could continue. The states in the lawsuit are: California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. The Open Space Institute, the Open Space Conservancy entity and the preservation Audubon Society of New Hampshire also are plaintiffs. The other utilities are Cinergy Co., Southern Co. Inc. of Georgia, and Xcel Energy office Inc. of Minnesota.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Electric Power Company Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nelson, a member be of the Communist Party, was convicted of violating the human activity Pennsylvania Sedition Act. This Act was implemented prior to indium Congress's adoption of the Smith Act of adenine 1940 human activity (amended in 1948) which prohibited the same conduct as Pennsylvania's law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nelson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On February 20, 1987, Consolidated Rail Corporation (""Conrail"") announced its decision to include drug screening in all periodic and return-to-duty examinations. Conrail had always enforced Rule G of its agreement with its unionized employees, which forbids the use or possession of ""intoxicants, narcotics, amphetamines or hallucinogens"" by its employees. Previously, it routinely used drug screening urinalysis as part of return-to-duty medical examinations of employees associate in nursing with drug-related problems and in other examinations where the examining physician suspected drug use. The Railway Labor Executives' Association (""RLEA"")-- comprised of individuals in leadership positions at more than eighteen craft unions-- do drugs marcus antonius filed suit against Conrail, alleging that Conrail violated Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act (""RLA""). The RLA, passed in 1926 and amended in 1934, created the National Railroad Adjustment Board, an arbitration board designed to settle minor disputes between railroad companies and labor organizations. Under Sections 5 and 6 of the RLA, major disputes require an extensive mediation and conciliation process. District court Judge Anthony J. Scirica found that the dispute was ""minor"" under the Railway intermediation Labor Act because Conrail's decision was arguably justified by the terms of its agreement with the unions, and that the court had harbor no jurisdiction over the dispute. Judge Dolores Sloviter of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit reversed. Judge Sloviter rejected the district court's conclusion that Conrail's prior use of medical examinations arguably justified unilaterally changing its drug testing policy. The appeals court held that the dispute was ""major"" because it changed the terms and conditions governing employment relationships.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Consolidated Rail Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Frank Wilkinson was summoned to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District whatsoever of Georgia be for questioning before a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. The subcommittee was investigating Communist propaganda in the southern United States. Wilkinson refused to answer any questions, including whether he was a member of the Communist Party. He did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and argued instead that the subcommittee had no authority to interrogate him. Wilkinson also argued sakartvelo that he was only called before the subcommittee because of his public opposition to the Un-American Activities Committee. Wilkinson was incited and convicted for contempt of Congress. The U.S. investigate Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the indicate conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the 1980's and early 1990's, Paul Glover was the Vice President and General Counsel of the Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union. Ultimately, Glover was convicted of federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion, among other things, after using his control over the union's investments to enrich himself through kickbacks. Glover's probation officer, in his pre-sentence investigation report, recommended that Glover's federal labor racketeering, money laundering, investment and tax evasion convictions be grouped under the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual section 3D1.2, which allows the through with grouping of counts involving substantially the same harm. The Federal Government objected to the grouping and the District Court agreed. Glover's offense level was thus increased by two levels, resulting in an increased sentence of between 6 and 21 months. Glover's counsel did not pursue the grouping issue on appeal. Glover then filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his counsel's failure to pursue the issue was ineffective assistance, without which his offense level would have been lower. The District Court denied Glover's word motion, concluding that a 6 to 21 month sentencing increase was not significant frailty enough to rede establish prejudice under the test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland v. Washington. Thus, the court denied his ineffective-assistance claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Glover.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1985, an Arizona jury convicted Edward Schad of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death for strangling 74-year-old Lorimer Grove. His sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, and Schad sought state habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, but the state courts denied his petition. Schad then sought federal habeas relief based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the district court denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to consider whether Schad’s state habeas counsel was properly diligent, at territorial dominion which point the state of Arizona petitioned for a apparent motion writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the encase petition and remanded the case based on a recent decision holding that federal habeas review is limited to the record of the state habeas proceedings. The appellate court then affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. Schad filed a motion for the appellate court to reconsider, which was denied, and the substitute Supreme Court again denied certiorari. Schad then filed a motion requesting a stay of the mandate for the execution, which the appellate court denied. Then, instead of issuing the mandate, the appellate court lodge construed the previous motion as another motion to reconsider, which it granted and remanded the case to the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edward Harold Schad.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Los and Roosevelt Dahda – twin brothers – were indicted on charges that they had conspired to acquire and distribute marijuana. Much of the evidence against the Dahdas was obtained through wiretaps of cell phones used by the co-conspirators, including the Dahdas. The wiretaps arose out of nine orders issued wiretap by a federal district court in Kansas. Prior to trial, the Dahdas brothers moved to suppress the information obtained from the wiretaps on the grounds that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction. The trial court rejected that argument, and both were found guilty and sentenced. The Tenth Circuit upheld the decision allowing evidence from the cellphones to be used against the brothers. Although the court of appeals agreed that along the wiretap orders exceeded the district victimised court's territorial jurisdiction, it held that such defect did not wiretap ""directly and substantially affect a congressional intention to limit wiretapping. The court identified two “core concerns” of Title brother III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968—privacy and uniformity—that were not implicated by the Dahdas’ argument that the order exceeded the Kansas district court’s jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Associations of companies that create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video games brought a declaratory judgment action against the state wreak of indium California in a California federal district court. The tie up plaintiffs brought the claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments seeking to invalidate a newly-enacted law that imposed restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of ""violent video games"" to minors. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and prevented the enforcement of the law. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) violent video games did not constitute ""obscenity"" under the First Amendment, (2) the state did not non not have a compelling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to non minors allegedly caused by video games, and (3) even if the state had a compelling interest, the law was not narrowly tailored enough to meet that objective.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Entertainment Merchants Association, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    To qualify for federal funding under the Medicaid Act, states must submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services nether a plan that establishes specify a system by which healthcare providers will be reimbursed. Under the Boren Amendment, the reimbursement rates must be ""reasonable and adequate"" to meet the costs of efficiently operated approve facilities. be In 1986, a group of hospitals brought sought against the state of Virginia, arguing that its reimbursement rates (which had been approved in 1982 and again in 1986 by the Secretary) were not ""reasonable and adequate."" The suit was brought under 42 non U.S.C. 1983, which allows individuals or organizations to bring suit for the ""deprivation of any rights ... secured by [federal] laws."" Virginia argued that the Boren Amendment had not been intended to create a an enforceable right, but simply to provide guidelines for the Secretary to follow, and that the hospitals therefore could not bring suit under 1983. The state also argued that Congress had intended to prevent private parties from bringing suit to enforce the provisions of the Amendment. The District Court disagreed, allowing the suit to proceed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Virginia Hospital Association.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Blakely pleaded guilty to the kidnapping of his estranged wife and the facts admitted in his plea supported a maximum sentence of 53 months. Washington state law pass judgment allows a judge to impose a sentence above the standard range ascertain if he finds ""substantial and pass judgment compelling compel reasons"" for doing so that were not computed into the standard range sentence. The judge in this case imposed an ""exceptional"" sentence of 90 months after determining Blakely had acted with ""deliberate cruelty."" Blakely appealed, arguing that this sentencing procedure deprived him of his federal Sixth Amendment right to have a jury  determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence. A state appellate court affirmed the sentence and the state supreme court denied review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Matthew Vogt was employed cognitive operation as a police officer with the City of Hays, Kansas, when he applied for a position with the City of Haysville police department. During Vogt’s interview process with the City of Haysville, he disclosed that he had kept a knife obtained sustain while working for the City of Hays. The City of Haysville made Vogt an offer of employment contingent on his reporting his acquisition of the knife to the City of Hays and returning it, which Vogt did. Upon this report, the City of Hays chief of police ordered Vogt to issue a statement regarding the knife, which Vogt submitted nominally, in addition to a letter of resignation due to his intent to accept the position with the Haysville Police Department. The Hays police chief began an internal investigation into Vogt and required him to issue a more detailed statement regarding the knife. This subsequent statement led to additional evidence, and Hays Police Department submitted both to the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, asking the Bureau to initiate a criminal investigation. As a result of the criminal investigation, the Haysville Police Department withdraw its offer of employment to Vogt. Vogt was charged in state court with two felony counts related to his possession of the knife. Following a probable cause hearing, the state district court determined that probable cause was lacking and dismissed the charges. Vogt brought a federal lawsuit alleging that the use of his compelled statements (1) to start an investigation leading property to the discovery get down of additional evidence concerning the knife, (2) to initiate a criminal investigation, (3) to bring criminal charges, and (4) to support the prosecution during the probable cause hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right against expect self-incrimination. The district court dismissed his case for failure to state a claim, and, reviewing the claims de novo, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding as to the first three claims but reversed as to the fourth one, finding that the Fifth Amendment is violated when criminal defendants are compelled to incriminate themselves and the incriminating statement is used in a probable cause hearing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Matthew Jack Dwight Vogt.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (Association) is a not-for-profit membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sports among its members, tie up a large portion of the public and private high schools in Tennessee. The Association's role in regulating interscholastic penalize competition in public schools has been long acknowledged by the State Board of Education. Brentwood Academy sued the Association after it penalized the academy for placing ""undue influence"" on football recruits. At the indium time, adenine all the voting members of the Association were public school administrators. Brentwood claimed that the rule's enforcement was state action that violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court agreed and enjoined the rule's enforcement. In reversing, tell the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no state action.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Brentwood Academy.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1992, Michael Bies was convicted of sixth kidnapping, rape, and murder and sentenced to death by an associate in nursing Ohio court. In his appeals to aside the Ohio Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Ohio, Mr. Bies argued that he was mentally retarded and this fact should mitigate his sentence. Both courts affirmed his conviction and sentence, but agreed that he was mentally retarded. While Mr. Bies proceeded with his post-conviction appeals, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Atkins stating that ""death is not a suitable punishment for mentally retarded people."" He subsequently filed a condemn petition for habeas corpus relief in an Ohio federal district lodge court relying on Atkins. In response, the state claimed that Mr. Bies was not mentally retarded. Mr. Bies argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the state from relitigating the fact of his mental retardation. The district court agreed and granted Mr. Bies' petition for habeas corpus relief and ordered that he be resentenced. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that the state was prevented by the Double Jeopardy Clause from relitigating the Supreme Court of Ohio's determination that Mr. Bies was mentally retarded.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David Bobby, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Following the death of US last boyle Marine helicopter pilot David A. Boyle, finding of fact Delbert Boyle sued the helicopter's manufacturer (""Sikorsky"") for defectively designing its copilot emergency escape hatch. On appeal from a state-law based jury verdict boyle favoring Boyle, the Court of Appeals found that Sikorsky could not be held liable under information technology Virginia tort law for any design flaws since it met the requirements of the ""military contractor defense."" Boyle appealed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United Technologies Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Respondents are a class of noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders, which generally are not open to challenge. However, if a noncitizen has a reasonable fear of concluding persecution or torture in the countries designated in their removal orders, the person may pursue withholding of removal. That is united states government the remedy the respondents in this case sought, and they are being detained by the government while they await the outcome of those withholding-only proceedings. The respondents requested individualized bond hearings, which could lead to their release during the withholding-only proceedings. indium The government argued that they are not entitled to individualized bond hearings because they were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and bond hearings were denied. The noncitizens let argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1226, rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1231, governs their detention. Section adenine 1226 provides for detention ""pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States"" and allows for discretionary release on bond. The district court ruled in favor of the noncitizens, finding that the text of the two statutes made clear that § 1226 applied. The court held that § 1231 does not come into play until the government has “the present and final legal authority to actually execute that order of removal.” A divided three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Samuel Ocasio was a police officer of the Baltimore Police Department who was indicted in connection with a kickback scheme involving payments to police officers in exchange for referrals to Majestic Auto Repair Shop (Majestic). The indictment charged Ocasio with samuel conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act by agreeing to unlawfully obtain money or property disputation under color of right from Majestic. The jury convicted Ocasio, and he appealed by arguing that he cannot be guilty of conspiring to commit extortion with the owners of Majestic because they were also the victims of the conspiracy, mustiness and the victim of a machinate Hobbes Act conspiracy must be a person outside of glucinium the alleged conspiracy. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Ocasio’s conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2015, manage Christopher Sulyma, a former Intel employee and participant in the company’s retirement plans filed a lawsuit against the company for allegedly investing retirement funds in violation of Section 1104 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which sets forth the standard of care of fiduciaries. Sulyma alleged that the funds were not properly diversified and that as a result, they did not perform well during his employment (and thus investment) period of 2010 to 2012. Intel moved to mustiness dismiss the complaint as time-barred under 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2), which provides that an action under Section 1104 may not be commenced more than “three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The literal district court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and ordered discovery for the question of the statute of limitations. After discovery, the district court found no nether genuine dispute as to any material fact that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the investments more than three years before filing the action, and it granted summary judgment for Intel. Sulyma appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “actual knowledge” does not mean that the plaintiff knew that the underlying action violated ERISA or that the underlying action even occurred, only that the plaintiff was actually aware of the nature of the alleged breach. For a Section 1104 action, this means the plaintiff indium must have known that the defendant had acted and that those acts were imprudent. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Christopher M. Sulyma.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    J. W. Gamble was a prisoner in the Huntington Unit of the Texas prison system, also known as the “Walls Unit.” On November 9, 1973, a 600-pound bale of cotton fell on Gamble while he was working in a textile mill during a work assignment in Huntsville, Texas. He continued to work for several hours, but later became stiff and requested a pass to the unit hospital. The hospital gave Gamble a checkup for a hernia and sent him back to his cell, but later his pain became so intense that he was forced to return to the hospital. A nurse gave Gamble two pain pills, and a hospital doctor later examined him but gave him no further treatment. On November 10th, a different doctor examined Gamble, prescribed him painkillers and placed Gamble on a cell-pass cell-feed routine that mostly confined him to his cell. That same doctor later took Gamble off the cell-pass cell-feed routine, concluding that he was able to engage in light work. The prison administrative office soon placed Gamble in “administrative segregation” -- essentially solitary confinement -- for refusing to work. Gamble remained in solitary confinement through January of besotted the next year, although he complained that his back hazard pain was as intense as on the first day he was injured. On December 6, a different doctor examined Gamble and diagnosed him with high blood pressure; st the previous doctor never detected this condition. Gamble refused to work several more times over the next few months, and was repeatedly disciplined for doing so. When Gamble began experiencing pain in his chest on a regular basis, he was hospitalized and treated, but the prison denied him later requests for treatment. In all, medical personnel treated Gamble seventeen times. On February 11, 1974, Gamble signed a pro se complaint alleging that the prison associate in nursing subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth. The district court dismissed Gamble’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The tardy United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed, noting that the prison failed to diagnose Gamble’s back injury by giving him an X-ray, that the prison provided no real treatment for Gamble’s back injury, and that Gamble was essentially placed in solitary confinement due to substandard medical care.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Ralph Gray, Medical Director of the Texas Department of Corrections, H. H. Husbands, Warden of the Walls Unit..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The State of Washington reconstructed its primary election system according to backrest Initiative 872, which was passed into law by a majority general vote in 2004. The initiative was endorsed by the Washington State Grange and created a new ""modified blanket primary"" system where each candidate on the ballot could affiliate with the party of his choosing regardless of whether the associate in nursing party approved of his candidacy. Political parties claimed that this system back violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free association, arguing that control over which candidates to endorse constituted an essential function of association. The Grange argued that the primary was nonpartisan. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed aside a District Court decision, ruling that since ""party designation is a powerful, partisan message that voters right wing may rely upon in casting a vote,"" Initiative 872 ""constitutes a severe burden upon the parties' associational rights."" (The case was consolidated with Washington v. Washington State Republican Party for argument before the Supreme Court.)

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Washington State Grange.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Coeur d'Alene Tribe (the Tribe) of Idaho filed an action against the State of Idaho, various state agencies, and numerous state officials alleging ownership of the submerged lands and bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene and various navigable tributaries and effluents lying within the original boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. The Tribe sought a declaratory judgment establishing its entitlement to the exclusive use and occupancy and the right to quiet enjoyment of the submerged lands, a declaration of the invalidity of all Idaho laws, customs, or usages purporting to regulate those motor hotel lands, and a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from taking any action in violation of the Tribe's rights in the lands. Ultimately, the District usage Court dismissed all the components of the complaint on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and on the merits. clan The Court of Appeals affirmed that amendment the Eleventh Amendment barred all claims against the State lie down and its agencies, as well as the title action against the officials. However, it allowed the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the state officials to proceed insofar as they sought to preclude continuing violations of federal law. The court reasoned that those claims were based on Idaho's ongoing interference with the Tribe's alleged ownership rights, and found it conceivable that the Tribe could prove facts entitling it to relief on the claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Idaho.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jeffrey Heffernan was a police officer for the City of Paterson, New Jersey. A fellow police officer observed Heffernan picking up a campaign sign for the mayoral candidate running against the incumbent. When a supervisor confronted him, Heffernan claimed that he was not politically involved, could face not vote in the city of Paterson, and was picking up the sign on behalf of his mother. Heffernan was demoted to a walking post because his actions were considered to be “overt involvement in political activities.” Heffernan allot sued the city of Paterson and claimed that the break up city had violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The city filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that, since Heffernan had not actually engaged in constitutionally protected speech, the City’s actions had not violated his First Amendment rights. The district court st granted the city’s motion for summary judgment because there was no evidence Heffernan associated himself with the political candidate at issue. Heffernan admitted himself that he was not associated with the candidate, and therefore there is no evidence of a violation of his right to freedom of association. The U.S. Court allot of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeffrey Heffernan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In arrogate 2002, the Jicarilla admission Apache Nation of New Mexico sued the federal guild government for allegedly mismanaging financial interests and funds, which are misconduct held in trust for the tribe's benefit. The tribe is seeking access to attorney-client communications about the trust operation. The Court of harbor Federal Claims denied a petition by the United States to vacate its orders requiring the government to produce the documents.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In New York Times edge Co. v. Sullivan (1964) the Court held that public officials in libel lodge cases must show that a statement was made ""with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."" These two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 reject edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul ""Bear"" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical. Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for a new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns dispatch reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals from enforcing the court-ordered enrollment of an African-American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the state courts of Texas. A jury found in Walker's favor, but the judge in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that New York Times was inapplicable. On appeal, the information technology Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined as well to hear the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wallace Butts.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    revenue enhancement Over several years, the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs contracted with Blaze Construction Company to build, repair, go forward and improve roads on several Indian reservations located in Arizona. When the various contracts expired, the Arizona Department of Revenue issued a tax deficiency assessment against Blaze for its failure to pay Arizona's transaction privilege tax, the tax levied on the gross receipts of companies doing business in the state, on the proceeds from its contracts with the Bureau. Blaze protested the assessment and prevailed in administrative proceedings. On impose review, the Arizona Tax Court granted summary judgment for the Department. In reversing, the Arizona Court of sagacity Appeals held that federal law pre-empted the tax's application to judgment Blaze. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arizona Department of Revenue.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In April of 1973, pursuant to the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (Penn DER) submitted a plan for meeting federal air quality standards. This plan included a contrive provision requiring the implementation of a program for the inspection and maintenance of automobile emissions systems (I/M program) by May 1, 1975. By mid-1976, Pennsylvania had not implemented any I/M program. In response, the Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (DVCCCA) brought suit against Pennsylvania and concluding the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA filed a separate action against Pennsylvania and DVCCCA dropped its charges against the EPA. On August 29, 1978, Pennsylvania, Penn DER and award the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (Penn DOT) agreed to a final consent decree, terminating the DVCCCA and EPA actions. On January 2, 1982 and after more than five years of intermittent litigation -- during which Pennsylvania consistently resisted or ignored the consent decree -- the district court declared Pennsylvania, the Secretaries of the Penn DOT and Penn DER to be in civil contempt. On May 3, 1983, the Pennsylvania legislature authorized the Secretary of Penn DOT to implement an I/M program following several years of consistently denying Pennsylvania the requisite funding. The CAA provided that in issuing a final order in any action brought under the CAA, the court may award the costs of litigation to any party whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate. The DVCCCA and the EPA consequently sought attorneys’ fees and costs for all activity performed after the court issued the consent decree on August 29, 1978. The district court awarded attorneys’ fees that included time spent by plaintiffs’ attorneys monitoring Pennsylvania’s performance under the consent decree, an award for aside “superior quality” while opposing the state’s motion to stay the consent decree, and work performed for hearings held before the EPA. It also awarded a multiplier for the arguably small likelihood of plaintiffs’ success in three phases of the litigation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the attorneys’ fees awarded writing table by the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pennsylvania.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The US Supreme Court issued a 2016 order granting certiorari in this patent infringement case, vacating a 2015 united states government ruling by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and remanding the matter for further consideration in light of , 579 U.S. __ (2016). On remand, the appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment for enhanced damages for willful infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284, but reinstated its 2015 opinion in united states government all other respects. The underlying dispute in the case related to patent-practicing devices sold by ION Geophysical Corporation (“ION”) which were combined and used in non-infringing streamer amends systems at sea, but that would infringe on patents totally belonging to WesternGeco LLC (“WesternGeco”) if used in that manner in the US. The jury found infringement by ION, found no invalidity as to any asserted claims, and awarded WesternGeco, among other amounts, $93.4 million in lost profits. In a subsequent appeal to the Federal Circuit, ION asked, among other things, that the lost profits award be reversed. In its 2015 opinion, the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed that award on the grounds that under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), WesternGeco was not entitled to lost profits arising from foreign uses of its patented invention. As stated above, the court then reinstated this portion early of that opinion in 2016.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is WesternGeco LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    William McKinney, a Nevada state prisoner, sued his warden and several other prison officials for violating his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to unhealthy levels of second-hand smoke. McKinney shared a cell with a man who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day. He claimed that his health - both current and future - was being harmed by the smoke, and that the prison officials were adenine ""deliberately indifferent"" to the risk in violation of the Supreme Court's decision early in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294. After a federal magistrate ruled that he did not have an Eighth Amendment right to a smoke-free environment and that he had failed to prove any ""serious medical needs,"" the adenine Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that cellular telephone he should have been let given another opportunity to prove that the smoke levels were sufficient to constitute an unreasonable danger to his future health.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is McKinney.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the spring of 1994, Hana Bank, a Korean entity, began to extend its services to the United States under the name Hana Overseas Korean Club. In advertisements distributed during the summer of 1994, Hana Bank included the name ""Hana Overseas Korean Club"" in English as well as ""Hana Bank"" in Korean. The advertisements also included Hana Bank's logo, known korean as the ""dancing man."" A second, distinct entity, Hana Financial, Inc. (HFI) was founded in California in the fall of 1994. In 1996, HFI obtained a federal trademark for their patsy logo, a banking concern pyramid, with the words ""Hana Financial"" for use in financial services. Hana Bank officials were aware of HFI's use of the name Hana Financial but did not see the need to take any action because the entities did not directly compete with each other. In 2007, HFI filed a mark complaint against Hana Bank alleging trademark infringement. The district court jury found that Hana Bank had used the ""Hana Bank"" trademark in the United States continuously since before HFI began using the ""Hana Financial"" trademark in 1995 and that Hana Bank's trademark could be ""tacked"" to their 1994 advertisements, which included a similar, but distinct use be of the phrase ""Hana Bank."" HFI appealed, claiming that the determination of whether a trademark may be ""tacked"" to a prior mark is a question of law that must be determined by the court, not a question of fact that may be decided by a jury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the affirmed the jury's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hana Bank, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Chicago adopted an adenine ordinance prohibiting picketing within 150 feet of a school during school ordination hours; the law metrical foot made an exception assume for peaceful labor picketing. Mosley mellow had been picketing near a public high school; he was protesting ""black discrimination."" Mosley sought a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mosley.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 10, 1980, an Oklahoma City police officer shot and killed Albert operating theatre Tuttle outside a bar. Rose Marie Tuttle, Albert’s widow, sued the police officer and the city in district court under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which allows an individual to recover damages against a party who “acting under color of state law” deprives another of his constitutional rights. The district court instructed the jury that the city could be held liable only if the incident had been caused turn back by a municipal “policy,” but a single, unusually excessive use of force could company support a finding that the city was grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent in the training or inbuilt supervision of its police force and was therefore liable under Section 1983. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the police officer but against the city and awarded Tuttle’s aside estate $1.5 million in damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Oklahoma City.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mark Rotella was admitted to a Brookhaven Psychiatric Pavilion in 1985 and discharged in lapp 1986 after Brookhaven allegedly coerced him to stay longer than he intended. In 1994, the facility's parent company pleaded guilty to charges of fraud, conspiracy and violations of RICO, for giving physicians monetary incentives to needlessly admit, treat and retain patients at their hospitals. Rotella learned of the plea that same year, and in 1997 he filed a civil damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), claiming that the Brookhaven doctors and related business entities, had conspired to afterward keep him hospitalized to maximize their profits. RICO makes it criminal ""to conduct"" an ""enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity."" A ""pattern"" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, the last of which occurred within 10 years after the commission of a prior act. Brookhaven countered that the statute of limitations under RICO had run on the charge. The District Court granted Brookhaven summary judgment on the ground that the 4-year limitation period for civil RICO claims had expired in 1990, four years after Rotella admitted discovering his injury. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Rotella's argument that the limitations period does not begin information technology to run until a plaintiff discovers (or should have discovered) both the limitation injury and legislative act the pattern of racketeering activity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wood.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gregory Holt (also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad) was an inmate of the Arkansas Department of Corrections and a practicing Salafi Muslim. He sought an weight injunction and temporary relief from the enforcement of the Arkansas Department of Corrections' grooming policy, which allowed trimmed mustaches and quarter-inch beards for diagnosed dermatological problems but otherwise no facial hair. Holt argued that growing a beard was a necessary part of the practice of his religion, that the grooming policy significantly burdened his ability to do so, and that the grooming policy was therefore a violation correction of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). weight Holt was willing to limit his beard to a length of one-half inch as a essential form of compromise with the policy. The district court granted temporary relief but then dismissed the complaint upon being presented with evidence of the other ways in which Holt was th allowed to practice his religion and the extent to which the grooming policy was necessary to maintain prison security. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gregory Houston Holt.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    David W. Lanier was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 242 of criminally violating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them sexually while he served as a right wing state judge. The jury had been instructed that the Government had to let in prove, as an element of the offense, that Lanier had deprived the victims of their Fourteenth Amendment due process right to liberty, which included the right to be free from sexually convict motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery. The District Court denied Lanier's motion, which sought to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the law is void for it vagueness. The en banc Court of Appeals vacated Lanier's convictions for ""lack of any notice to the public that this ambiguous criminal statute includes simple or sexual assault crimes within its coverage."" The Court of Appeals held that the law may be imposed only if the constitutional right, said to have been violated, is first identified in a decision of the U.S Supreme Court, and only when the right has been held to apply in a factual situation ""fundamentally similar."" The court regarded these combined requirements lonesome as substantially higher than the ""clearly established"" standard used to judge qualified immunity in civil cases.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1996, the Massachusetts Burma Law, which restricted state entities from buying goods or services from companies doing business with Burma, was passed. Afterwards, Congress also imposed mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma. tell Businesses with ties to Burma landed on Massachusetts' ""restricted trade"" list. The list came to include 34 members of transgress the National Foreign Trade Council (Council), a non-profit advocate for American companies that do business abroad. The government activity Council filed suit against Stephen Crosby, the Massachusetts Secretary of massachuset Administration and Finance, and other state officials in federal court, claiming that the state act unconstitutionally infringes on the federal foreign affairs power, violates the Foreign Commerce Clause, and is preempted by the Federal Burma Law. The District Court permanently enjoined indium the state act's enforcement, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court also found that the Massachusetts Burma Law violated the Supremacy Clause because the state was acting in an area of unique federal concern, foreign policy, through a balanced, tailored approach.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Foreign Trade Council.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an footing admittedly illegal police search exemption of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on be the basis of associate in nursing freedom of afterward expression.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dollree Mapp.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2007, Stephanie Artis was employed by the District of Columbia Department of Health (DOH) as a code inspector. She alleges that she and her supervisor developed a contentious relationship and that he singled her out for unfair treatment whistleblower in the workplace. On April 17, 2009, Artis took her first administrative step against DOH by filing a discrimination claim with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and while that claim was pending, DOH terminated Artis’s employment in November 2010. In arrogate December 2011, Artis filed a lawsuit against the District in federal court alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and invoked the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction to assert claims assume based on the District’s Whistleblower Act, False Claims Act, and common law. The district court granted the District’s motion on the pleadings and dismissed Artis’s sole federal claim, violation of Title VII, as facially deficient. It thus found it had no basis to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Fifty-nine days after her claims were dismissed in federal court, Artis filed the remaining claims in a D.C. trial court. The District alleged lodge that Artis’s claims years were time barred based on the respective statutes of limitations, and the trial judge agreed, finding that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) does not suspend state statutes of limitations at the time of the unsuccessful federal filing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stephanie C. Artis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under the Clean Air Act, state agencies must determine the best way to prevent air pollution in areas that have met national clean air standards. In part, they must require that polluting companies use the ""best available disputation control technology"" to limit pollution whenever they construct new facilities. In 1998, Teck Cominco Alaska, a mining company, requested a permit to build an additional generator at one of its it mines. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) issued the permit, which called for Cominco to use ""Low NOx"" technology on all its generators, not just the skillful new one. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, stepped in, arguing that a better technology was available. ADEC appealed the EPA's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the EPA did not have the right to interfere with the state tell agency's decision. The Ninth Circuit sided mustiness with the EPA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Environmental Protection Agency, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During police interrogation for a murder, Cicenia and his counsel repeatedly requested to see one another but they were refused their requests. By the time Cicenia saw his attorney, he had made and signed a written confession to the murder. Cicenia moved the state trial court for an order requiring the state to produce his written confession. The trial property court denied the motion and the state supreme court affirmed tell the decision. Cicenia commenced a federal habeas corpus proceeding and bring out the lower court discharged the writ, holding that Cicenia reject go had failed to establish the involuntariness of his confession and that the state's refusal to permit petitioner to communicate with counsel during the inquiry did not deprive him of due process. The appellate court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lagay.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1986 and 1988, the Colorado investment company Springs-Stetson Hills human activity Public Building Authority issued be $26 million worth of bonds to fund public improvements and residential and commercial developments. The Central Bank of Denver served as a trustee on the bonds. In 1988, there indium was concern that the land was no longer worth 160% of the value of the bonds’ outstanding principals and interests as required by the bond covenant. answerer Before a review was completed, the Public Building Authority defaulted on the bonds. First Interstate Bank of Denver and the other respondents had purchased $2.1 million of the bonds, and after the default, sued for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The respondents argued that Central Bank was also liable for aiding and abetting the violations. Central Bank petitioned the district court for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Central Bank of Denver , N. A..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When the Colorado legislature failed to pass a redistricting plan in 2000, the state courts created one at the request of a group of voters. The legislature succeeded in passing a redistricting plan in 2003. The state attorney general brought suit in the govern Colorado State Supreme Court to require the secretary of state to use the court-ordered plan, and the Colorado General Assembly defended its own plan. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the legislature's plan violated Article V of the State Constitution. A group of citizens including Keith Lance brought general assembly another suit in federal court alleging that Article V of the Colorado Constitution, centennial state as interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court, violated the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Under the Supreme Court's Rooker-Feldman doctrine, no federal court except the Supreme Court may hear appeals from state courts. The District Court held that since Lance was in privity with the General Assembly - that is, their claims were similar enough to constitute a mutual interest - Lance's suit was in effect an appeal of the General Assembly's loss in state court. Therefore, the District Court ruled adenine that it had no jurisdiction under the reciprocal Rooker-Feldman doctrine and declined to hear the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Keith Lance, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On August 17, 1972, a postal inspector received information from an informant that the respondent, Henry Ogle Watson, was in possession of stolen credit cards. The informant had provided the inspector with reliable information in the past, and, later that day, provided the inspector with a stolen card. The inspector asked the informant to arrange another collection meeting with Watson to deliver more stolen cards. At the meeting on August 23, when the  informant gave the signal, officers revealed themselves and arrested Watson. The officers read Watson his Miranda warning and searched him but did not find the cards on his person. They asked to search his car, and Watson gave them permission. In the car, officers found two stolen cards. Watson was then charged with four counts of possessing stolen mail. Prior to the trial, Watson moved to suppress the cards by claiming his arrest was illegal because there was no warrant, and that the search of his car was involuntary because he was not informed that he could withhold consent. The motion was denied and Watson was convicted. h The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the source arrest was unconstitutional cope with because the postal inspector had sufficient time to obtain a warrant but failed to do so. The Court of Appeals also held that the subsequent search was coerced and hence unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tucson indium police officer Andrew Kisela and two other officers responded to a go against police radio report that a woman was engaging in erratic behavior with a knife. When they arrived, they saw Amy Hughes holding a large kitchen knife in what appeared doings to be a confrontation with another woman later identified as Sharon Chadwick. Despite at least two commands to drop the knife, Hughes did not do so and instead took several steps toward Chadwick. Kisela fired four shots through the chain link fence, seriously injuring Hughes. Hughes sued Kisela under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that Kisela had used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court motor hotel granted summary judgment to sagacity Kisela, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Hughes (as is required in a motion for summary judgment), was sufficient to demonstrate that Kisela violated the Fourth Amendment. Further, the Ninth Circuit next held that Kisela was not entitled to qualified immunity because, in its view, his actions violated clearly established law in that jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Andrew Kisela.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 1, 2007, Lubbock police officers arrested Monroe Ace Setser after finding suspected narcotics during a traffic stop. At the time he was arrested, Setser was serving a five-year term of probation stemming from a previous state conviction. State authorities subsequently charged Setser with possession of old a controlled substance with intent to deliver in the state court arising from the activities of October 1, 2007. They also filed a motion to revoke his probation in the 2006 state case. Before the state cases could be resolved, the federal government stepped in ascertain and charged Setser for his October 2007. Setser pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment and in exchange the government agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts. At sentencing, the federal district court sentenced Setser to ill treat 151 months of imprisonment and ordered the sentence to run consecutive to whatever plead sentence might be imposed in the pending state case, and concurrent to whatever sentence might be imposed in the 2007 state case. Neither tell case had been resolved in state court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Thomas Heinz worked as a construction worker for 20 years, then retired. non Upon retirement, he began to receive pension payments from the Central Laborers' Pension Plan. He continued to receive the pension after he took another job as a supervisor in the construction industry. The pension plan had a list of occupations that a recipient could not work in while receiving pension payments, but construction supervisors were not included. After two years, however, Central Laborers' Pension amended the list of prohibited professions to include construction supervisors. As a result, Heinz stopped receiving his pension payment. He and Richard Schmitt, a friend who was in the same situation, filed suit in federal district court. They claimed that the amendment, because it was passed after they pension off had already started receiving the benefits, violated the ""anti-cutback"" adenine information technology provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. ERISA states that amendments to a pension plan may not decrease the ""accrued benefit of a participant."" Because federal official the amendment barred them from receiving payments that they were otherwise eligible for, Heinz and Schmitt claimed that it had reduced their ""accrued benefit."" Central Laborers' Pension, however, argued that the men were still eligible to receive the same pension, they just could not receive it while working as construction supervisors. Because the value of the plan itself had not been changed, only the stipulations for receiving it, the pension plan managers argued that the amendment did not violate ERISA. The federal district court sided with the pension plan. A divided Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel, however, reversed the decision, writing that ""an amendment placing materially greater restrictions on the receipt of the benefit 'reduces' the benefit just as surely as a decrease in the size of the monthly benefit payment.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Thomas E. Heinz, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On April 4, 1977, sixteen-year-old Monty Lee Eddings and several of his friends ran away from home. Before leaving, Eddings took three of his father’s firearms, including a .410 gauge shotgun with a shortened barrel. Before reaching the Turner Turnpike near Tulsa, the group stopped at a Howard Johnson restaurant. As they were leaving, Eddings lost control of the car, briefly sending it over a curb and into a ditch before regaining control. A taboo witness observed this and informed an officer of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, Patrolman Larry Crabtree, who followed their car and pulled it over. When Crabtree was within about six feet of the car, Eddings stuck the shotgun out of the window and fired it, killing Crabtree, then immediately drove the car away. At trial, the defense presented evidence of circumstances mitigating Eddings’ guilt, including the details of his extensive juvenile record in Missouri. Eddings’ parents divorced when he was five, after which he was shuffled between his mother’s house and his father’s house and level off also spent some time in a group home. Witnesses  testified that Eddings was emotionally disturbed and at a level several years below his age in terms of mental and emotional development. A state psychologist testified that Eddings had a sociopathic or antisocial personality disorder. The state provided evidence of aggravating circumstances. Oklahoma alleged 1) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, 2) that the crime was committed to avoid a lawful arrest, and 3) that there was a probability that the defendant would commit more criminal acts of violence constituting a threat to admirer society. The trial judge found that the state proved all three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. destiny The judge also found that Eddings’ age was a mitigating factor of great weight, but would not consider evidence of Eddings’ “violent background.” The judge then found that the aggravating circumstances proven by the state outweighed the fact of Eddings’ age and sentenced him to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed the sentence, also holding that Eddings' death penalty sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Monty Lee Eddings.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After an increase in the use of cocaine by patients receiving prenatal care, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) started to cooperate with Charleston to formulate a policy to prosecute mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth. MUSC obstetrical privilege patients were arrested after testing positive for cocaine. They filed suit challenging the policy's validity on the theory that warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches. Among the District Court's actions was hypothesis an instruction to the jury to find medical checkup for the patients unless they had consented to such searches. The jury found in favor of the city. In affirming, the Court panel of Appeals held that the searches were reasonable, reasoning that special needs may, in certain exceptional panel circumstances, justify a search policy designed to serve non-law-enforcement ends.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ferguson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indium At a school adenine assembly of approximately 600 high school students, Matthew Fraser made a speech nominating a fellow student for elective office. In his speech, Fraser used what some observers believed was a graphic sexual metaphor words to promote the candidacy of his friend. As part of its disciplinary code, Bethel High School enforced a rule prohibiting conduct which schoolhouse ""substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures."" Fraser was suspended from school for two bethel days.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bethel School District No. 403.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In October 2000, the United States Treasury Department launched Pay.gov, a billing and payment processing system that allows consumers to make online payments to government agencies by credit or debit card. Numerous government agencies use Pay.gov to process credit and debit payments. On August 9, 2008, attorney James X Bormes filed a lawsuit on behalf of one of his clients in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, paying the filing fee with a credit card via Pay.gov. The confirmation page displayed the expiration date of Bormes' credit card. Bormes alleged that the inclusion of his card's expiration date violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (""FCRA""); he brought this action on behalf of himself and a class of individual cardholders. The statute provides that no person accepting credit or debit cards for a business transaction shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card or the expiration individual date on going any receipt provided to the cardholder after a transaction. The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction under the FCRA, but granted the government's motion to dismiss because the FCRA did not waive the government's sovereign immunity. It held that Bormes' invocation of the Little Tucker Act was moot because the court had jurisdiction under the FCRA. On appeal, a motions panel denied the government's motion to transfer to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. It held that Bormes' complaint invoked swear out the district court's jurisdiction under adenine the Little Tucker Act; the Little Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to district courts over claims against the United States not exceeding $10,000. Afterwards, a panel of the Seventh Circuit determined that the Little Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for the FCRA in Talley v. U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Seventh Circuit later vacated this opinion; the Talley case remains pending. Bormes appealed his case allow for to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which determined that the FCRA mandates money damages from the federal government, giving jurisdiction to the district courts through the Little Tucker Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez right wing hired Joseph Low, an attorney, to represent him in a federal criminal trial. The district court judge refused to allow Low to represent Gonzalez-Lopez, however, because the judge ruled that Low had violated a court rule in a previous case. Gonzalez-Lopez was subsequently afterward right convicted. On appeal, he argued that his Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of his own choosing had been violated and doings that the conviction should therefore be overturned. The Eighth Circuit agreed, holding that the trial judge had misinterpreted the court rule and that Low's conduct had been acceptable under a proper understanding of the rule. The decision to not allow him to represent Gonzalez-Lopez was rent therefore wrong, and resulted in a violation of Gonzalez- Lopez's Sixth Amendment rights significant enough to warrant overturning the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress amended the Clean Air Act through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in an effort to reduce the nation’s dependence on fossil fuels. The legislation set certain targets for replacing fossil fuels with renewable be fuels but created several exemptions, including one for small refineries if compliance in a given year would impose disproportionate economic hardship. The U.S. legislating Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated three different orders granting extensions of the small refinery unlike exemption, but these orders were not made publicly available. A group of renewable fuels producers challenged the orders, alleging that the orders exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority. The invite Tenth Circuit agreed, finding that a small refinery may obtain an exemption only when it had received uninterrupted, continuous extensions of the exemption for every year produce since 2011.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., an investment fund, purchased approximately $75 million in unsecured notes (Notes) from Grupo Mexicano de tortuous Desarrollo, S. A., (GMD) a Mexican holding company involved in a tool road construction program sponsored by the Government of Mexico. Four GMD subsidiaries guaranteed the Notes. After GMD fell into financial trouble and missed be an interest payment on the Notes, Alliance accelerated the Notes' principal amount and filed suit for the amount due in Federal District Court. Alliance requested a preliminary injunction restraining GMD from transferring its assets alleging that GMD was at risk of associate in nursing insolvency, or already insolvent, territorial dominion that it was preferring its Mexican creditors by its planned allocation to them of its most valuable assets, and that these actions would frustrate any judgment that Alliance could obtain. Alliance sought monetary damages and no lien or equitable interest was claimed. The District Court issued the preliminary injunction and ordered GMD to post a $50,000 bond. The Court adenine of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1992, the District Court sentenced Manuel D. Peguero afterward to 274 months of imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to federal drug charges. title During sentencing, the court did not right wing inform Peguero of his right to appeal the sentence. In 1996, in a later motion for habeas relief, Peguero claimed that the court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(2) by failing to advise him of his right to appeal. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that, although it failed to advise Peguero of his right, he knew of his right when the sentencing hearing indium occurred. Thus the court, rejecting Peguero's claim that any violation of Rule 32 is enough to vacate a sentence, held that he was not entitled to relief because he was aware of his right to appeal at the time of sentencing. In affirming, the Court federal official of Appeals held that a Rule 32 violation was subject to harmless-error review and concluded that the rule's purpose had been served since Peguero was aware of his right to appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On March 8, 1996, Enrico St. Cyr, a lawful permanent resident, pled guilty in a Connecticut court to a charge of selling a controlled substance. That conviction made him deportable. Before the effective dates of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was interpreted to give the Attorney General broad discretion to particular date waive deportation of resident aliens. The AEDPA and IIRIRA restricted the class of aliens depending on section 212(c) for relief. St. Cyr's removal proceedings commenced after AEDPA's and IIRIRA's effective plead dates. Subsequently, the Attorney General claimed that the AEDPA and IIRIRA withdrew his authority to grant St. Cyr a waiver. The District Court accepted St. Cyr's habeas corpus application and agreed good that the new edge restrictions do not be apply to removal proceedings brought against an alien who pleaded guilty to a deportable crime before their enactment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is St. Cyr.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Herbert Markman owns the patent to a system that tracks clothing through the dry-cleaning process along using a keyboard and data processor to generate transaction records, including a bar code readable by optical detectors. According to the patent's claim, the portion of the patent document that defines the patentee's rights, Markman's product can ""maintain an inventory total"" and ""detect and localize spurious additions to inventory."" Westview Instruments, Inc.'s adenine product also uses a keyboard and processor and lists dry-cleaning charges on bar-coded tickets that can be read by optical detectors. In an infringement suit, after hearing an expert witness testify about the meaning of the claim's language, a jury found that Westview's product be afterward had infringed Markman's patent. However, the District Court directed a verdict for Westview on the ground that its device is unable to track ""inventory"" as that term is used in the claim. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the interpretation of claim terms is the exclusive province of the court and that stocktaking the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is consistent with that conclusion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Westview Instruments, Inc..
    "